1 00:00:05,040 --> 00:00:08,880 Speaker 1: This is the Bloomberg Surveillance Podcast. I'm Lisa Abram Woyd's 2 00:00:08,880 --> 00:00:11,879 Speaker 1: along with Tom Keane and Jonathan Farrell, join us each 3 00:00:11,920 --> 00:00:15,720 Speaker 1: day for insight from the best in economics, geopolitics, finance 4 00:00:15,760 --> 00:00:19,480 Speaker 1: and investment. Subscribe to Bloomberg Surveillance on demand on Apple, 5 00:00:19,560 --> 00:00:22,759 Speaker 1: Spotify and anywhere you get your podcasts, and always on 6 00:00:22,840 --> 00:00:26,319 Speaker 1: Bloomberg dot Com, the Bloomberg Terminal, and the Bloomberg Business App. 7 00:00:26,400 --> 00:00:28,880 Speaker 1: One thing we do know, yeah, exactly nobody knows. Bill 8 00:00:28,960 --> 00:00:30,880 Speaker 1: Dundley might know it. Johns us Now, the former New 9 00:00:30,920 --> 00:00:34,400 Speaker 1: York Fed President and Bloomberg opinion columnist Bill Let's go there, 10 00:00:34,479 --> 00:00:38,400 Speaker 1: Goldman says, pause, pause, because of stress in the banking system. Bill, 11 00:00:38,440 --> 00:00:41,400 Speaker 1: your best guess right now? What would it be here 12 00:00:41,520 --> 00:00:43,479 Speaker 1: depends on where we are on Wednesday. I think we 13 00:00:43,680 --> 00:00:45,559 Speaker 1: know they're not going to raise fifty we think I 14 00:00:45,560 --> 00:00:47,320 Speaker 1: think we know they're not going to cut rates. The 15 00:00:47,400 --> 00:00:50,640 Speaker 1: real questions zero or twenty five. The case for zero 16 00:00:50,800 --> 00:00:53,680 Speaker 1: is do no harm. We know that banking systems under stress. 17 00:00:54,000 --> 00:00:56,520 Speaker 1: So while you continue to raise rates when the banking 18 00:00:56,520 --> 00:00:59,560 Speaker 1: systems under stress. The case for twenty five basis points 19 00:00:59,600 --> 00:01:01,680 Speaker 1: is to say, look, we still have an inflation problem. 20 00:01:02,200 --> 00:01:04,600 Speaker 1: We can do both. We can use our liquidity facilities 21 00:01:04,600 --> 00:01:06,679 Speaker 1: to show up the confidence in the banking system, and 22 00:01:06,720 --> 00:01:10,480 Speaker 1: we use monetary policy to bring down inflation. You know, 23 00:01:10,520 --> 00:01:12,360 Speaker 1: if I had if I was sitting there, I guess 24 00:01:12,360 --> 00:01:14,720 Speaker 1: I would probably recommend just taking a pause. But you 25 00:01:14,720 --> 00:01:16,559 Speaker 1: have to do it in a way that doesn't alarm people. 26 00:01:17,000 --> 00:01:18,920 Speaker 1: One of the problems of pausing is people are going 27 00:01:18,959 --> 00:01:21,440 Speaker 1: to say, geez, why is the FED pausing? Things must 28 00:01:21,480 --> 00:01:23,600 Speaker 1: be worse in the banking system than we think. I 29 00:01:23,600 --> 00:01:25,679 Speaker 1: think this is a very different situation than the Great 30 00:01:25,760 --> 00:01:28,920 Speaker 1: Financial Crisis in the sense that the banks. This is 31 00:01:29,160 --> 00:01:32,479 Speaker 1: a question of confidence in banks due to uninsured deposits 32 00:01:32,480 --> 00:01:34,800 Speaker 1: and mark to market losses. It's not about the economy 33 00:01:35,160 --> 00:01:40,040 Speaker 1: that's collapsing. In the last recession. During a great financial crisis, 34 00:01:40,040 --> 00:01:43,120 Speaker 1: we were in recession beginning in December two thousand and seven. 35 00:01:43,400 --> 00:01:45,920 Speaker 1: We're not in recession now. The economy is actually doing 36 00:01:45,959 --> 00:01:48,320 Speaker 1: pretty well, and the banks that we're talking about that 37 00:01:48,360 --> 00:01:51,320 Speaker 1: are underspressed in the United States very small share of 38 00:01:51,320 --> 00:01:53,800 Speaker 1: the total banking system. So I think it's important to 39 00:01:53,840 --> 00:01:57,040 Speaker 1: recognize that this isn't the Great Financial Crisis all over again. 40 00:01:57,320 --> 00:02:00,640 Speaker 1: It's a lack of confidence in banks, because especially those 41 00:02:00,680 --> 00:02:04,240 Speaker 1: banks with the high proportion of unsured depositors and marketo 42 00:02:04,320 --> 00:02:08,000 Speaker 1: market losses on their portfolios. All that said, Bill, do 43 00:02:08,040 --> 00:02:11,560 Speaker 1: you still think that this FED should bring a monetary policy, 44 00:02:11,600 --> 00:02:15,000 Speaker 1: should bring their terminal rate to six percent or possibly 45 00:02:15,160 --> 00:02:19,000 Speaker 1: above that based on the inflationary pressures? If there is 46 00:02:19,040 --> 00:02:21,640 Speaker 1: this ongoing tightening that people expect from smaller and mid 47 00:02:21,720 --> 00:02:25,520 Speaker 1: sized banks, that's really the sixty four thousand dollars question. 48 00:02:25,680 --> 00:02:28,240 Speaker 1: How much is this stress that we're seeing today going 49 00:02:28,280 --> 00:02:31,560 Speaker 1: to result in tighter credit conditions. They're going to change 50 00:02:31,600 --> 00:02:35,280 Speaker 1: the trajectory of economic growth. I don't think the problem 51 00:02:35,360 --> 00:02:37,840 Speaker 1: is the credit conditions right now. I think the problem 52 00:02:37,919 --> 00:02:41,120 Speaker 1: is market market losses in the portfolio and unsured deposits. 53 00:02:41,600 --> 00:02:43,960 Speaker 1: It's very different than the Great Financial Crisis, when we 54 00:02:44,000 --> 00:02:46,280 Speaker 1: had this housing boom and bust, and it was the 55 00:02:46,320 --> 00:02:49,080 Speaker 1: bust that really took down fundamental values in the banking 56 00:02:49,120 --> 00:02:54,200 Speaker 1: book and also damage households enormously because households had used 57 00:02:54,240 --> 00:02:57,000 Speaker 1: the rise at home prices to pull money out to 58 00:02:57,040 --> 00:03:00,480 Speaker 1: support their spending. The US economy is fundamental in better 59 00:03:00,480 --> 00:03:03,960 Speaker 1: shape today. Household and business balance sheets are strong, so 60 00:03:04,000 --> 00:03:06,560 Speaker 1: this is I think more about confidence in the banking system. 61 00:03:06,800 --> 00:03:09,120 Speaker 1: One reason why we're having more problems this time though 62 00:03:09,480 --> 00:03:11,360 Speaker 1: last time there were big banks that we're willing to 63 00:03:11,680 --> 00:03:14,720 Speaker 1: ride to the rescue and by the banks that were 64 00:03:14,800 --> 00:03:17,320 Speaker 1: under distressed. They're much less willing to do that this 65 00:03:17,360 --> 00:03:20,040 Speaker 1: time because last time when they did this, they assumed 66 00:03:20,320 --> 00:03:24,200 Speaker 1: a huge legal liabilities that they hadn't anticipated. A second 67 00:03:24,200 --> 00:03:25,880 Speaker 1: reason why big banks don't want to ride to the 68 00:03:25,919 --> 00:03:27,760 Speaker 1: rescue of this time is if I buy a bank 69 00:03:27,800 --> 00:03:30,320 Speaker 1: and get bigger, I could be pushed into a higher 70 00:03:30,919 --> 00:03:33,239 Speaker 1: what's called the Siffy search arge bucket, you know, with 71 00:03:33,360 --> 00:03:36,120 Speaker 1: the higher caper requartment based on my size and complexity, 72 00:03:36,720 --> 00:03:39,840 Speaker 1: which would which would apply to my entire book of business, 73 00:03:39,920 --> 00:03:43,240 Speaker 1: not just the new book part that I just just acquired. 74 00:03:43,520 --> 00:03:46,320 Speaker 1: So you don't have the you know, people that come 75 00:03:46,360 --> 00:03:49,200 Speaker 1: in to buy the banks are under stressed like you 76 00:03:49,240 --> 00:03:51,480 Speaker 1: did last time. Given that you don't see this as 77 00:03:51,480 --> 00:03:53,360 Speaker 1: a two thousand and eight reducts, maybe you don't get 78 00:03:53,640 --> 00:03:56,560 Speaker 1: the White Knights coming in to bail out these banks 79 00:03:56,560 --> 00:04:00,160 Speaker 1: with an equi acquisition, as you point out. But other 80 00:04:00,200 --> 00:04:02,040 Speaker 1: people are writing in demand saying you live under a 81 00:04:02,120 --> 00:04:04,600 Speaker 1: rock of bearishness, and you don't understand the momentum that 82 00:04:04,600 --> 00:04:06,920 Speaker 1: you're seeing throughout the world and throughout a lot of 83 00:04:06,960 --> 00:04:09,800 Speaker 1: communities in the United States. Given that there is this 84 00:04:09,880 --> 00:04:12,840 Speaker 1: sort of momentum, do you think that it's folly for 85 00:04:12,880 --> 00:04:15,720 Speaker 1: people to be pricing in significant rate cuts, more than 86 00:04:15,760 --> 00:04:19,000 Speaker 1: one hundred basis points of rate cuts from now until 87 00:04:19,040 --> 00:04:20,880 Speaker 1: the end of next year or until the end of 88 00:04:20,960 --> 00:04:24,160 Speaker 1: January next year. I should say, yeah, that seems very 89 00:04:24,160 --> 00:04:25,880 Speaker 1: premature to me. I mean that means that the FED 90 00:04:26,040 --> 00:04:30,240 Speaker 1: is basically sail in terms of providing a credible liquirity backstop. 91 00:04:30,279 --> 00:04:32,359 Speaker 1: And I think the FED can succeed in providing a 92 00:04:32,400 --> 00:04:35,000 Speaker 1: credible lilquarery backside. In fact, the stuff they've already taken it, 93 00:04:35,120 --> 00:04:37,440 Speaker 1: I think go a long way towards that. I think 94 00:04:37,680 --> 00:04:39,600 Speaker 1: the FED if I were sitting at the federes or 95 00:04:39,720 --> 00:04:41,880 Speaker 1: right now, I'd be asking myself the question, how can 96 00:04:41,920 --> 00:04:45,240 Speaker 1: I do more on the liquidity front so I can 97 00:04:45,279 --> 00:04:49,239 Speaker 1: free up more flexibility on the montery policy side, because 98 00:04:49,240 --> 00:04:51,760 Speaker 1: if we can restore confidence in the banking system, then 99 00:04:51,800 --> 00:04:55,160 Speaker 1: the FAT can use montery policy to bring down inflation. 100 00:04:56,200 --> 00:04:58,160 Speaker 1: Do you live under a rock of parishness. Is that 101 00:04:58,200 --> 00:05:01,600 Speaker 1: what someone sets you? People we have any more? They 102 00:05:01,600 --> 00:05:04,120 Speaker 1: say other things like you're a pessimistic, horrible human who 103 00:05:04,160 --> 00:05:06,200 Speaker 1: doesn't ever think positive things. But I do. It's just 104 00:05:06,200 --> 00:05:08,560 Speaker 1: that I worry a lot of people, you know. They 105 00:05:09,440 --> 00:05:11,840 Speaker 1: it's love you. Well, that's sweet, but it's okay. I 106 00:05:12,160 --> 00:05:14,760 Speaker 1: can deal with it because I'm prepared, because I'm duly perished. 107 00:05:14,800 --> 00:05:17,359 Speaker 1: But I'm not. It's just realistic. It's trying to understand 108 00:05:17,440 --> 00:05:20,640 Speaker 1: the unknown looking around. Thank you, But a couple more 109 00:05:20,680 --> 00:05:23,000 Speaker 1: questions if I can. I got this one over the 110 00:05:23,000 --> 00:05:26,600 Speaker 1: Bloomberg moment ago and someone watching wants to know whether 111 00:05:26,640 --> 00:05:28,760 Speaker 1: you think the gap between FED funds and bank deposit 112 00:05:28,920 --> 00:05:31,720 Speaker 1: rates Matt to hair, has that contributed to the problem. 113 00:05:33,320 --> 00:05:35,560 Speaker 1: I think banks have been slow to raise their deposit 114 00:05:35,680 --> 00:05:38,200 Speaker 1: rates because they've been a wash with deposits. I mean, 115 00:05:38,240 --> 00:05:41,200 Speaker 1: what happened when the FED was doing quantitative easing was 116 00:05:41,200 --> 00:05:44,000 Speaker 1: a buying securities and US and that cash from those 117 00:05:44,040 --> 00:05:47,279 Speaker 1: securities purchases was actually flowing into the banking system. So 118 00:05:47,360 --> 00:05:50,040 Speaker 1: banks have actually been pretty slow to raise their deposit rates. 119 00:05:50,320 --> 00:05:51,840 Speaker 1: You know, when people look at the mark and mark 120 00:05:51,920 --> 00:05:54,600 Speaker 1: delosses on their securities portfoil on their loan book. That 121 00:05:54,839 --> 00:05:56,480 Speaker 1: is to be all set by the fact that banks 122 00:05:56,480 --> 00:06:00,280 Speaker 1: are actually doing quite well in terms of the deposit base. 123 00:06:00,600 --> 00:06:03,400 Speaker 1: The value of a retail bank network today, a branch 124 00:06:03,440 --> 00:06:05,600 Speaker 1: network today is much greater than it was when interest 125 00:06:05,680 --> 00:06:07,599 Speaker 1: rates were at zero. So when you're looking at the 126 00:06:07,600 --> 00:06:10,120 Speaker 1: banking you know, as a liability mix, you also have 127 00:06:10,120 --> 00:06:12,480 Speaker 1: to count the value of those deposits, which is rarely 128 00:06:12,640 --> 00:06:15,480 Speaker 1: really quite so high right now. For most banks, net 129 00:06:15,480 --> 00:06:19,359 Speaker 1: interest margins have actually been expanding. Silicon Valley Bank was 130 00:06:19,400 --> 00:06:22,440 Speaker 1: a very important exception. But I just want to weigh 131 00:06:22,440 --> 00:06:24,080 Speaker 1: in as well on the balance sheet. I'd love your 132 00:06:24,080 --> 00:06:26,800 Speaker 1: thoughts on that. As we know there's been a rush 133 00:06:26,800 --> 00:06:29,400 Speaker 1: to use the discount window. The new facility that was 134 00:06:29,440 --> 00:06:32,520 Speaker 1: opened by the Federal Reserve just last weekend will encourage 135 00:06:32,520 --> 00:06:35,279 Speaker 1: perhaps more or the same. Can you tell me whether 136 00:06:35,839 --> 00:06:38,560 Speaker 1: just because the balance sheet is expanded again, whether that 137 00:06:38,600 --> 00:06:40,360 Speaker 1: means it's the end of QT. How do you think 138 00:06:40,400 --> 00:06:45,039 Speaker 1: about these things? I think this is about exceptional liquidity, 139 00:06:45,120 --> 00:06:48,080 Speaker 1: lender of last resort provision to support the banking system. 140 00:06:48,279 --> 00:06:51,920 Speaker 1: I think quantitative tightening, the runoff of the Treasury portfolio 141 00:06:52,080 --> 00:06:54,839 Speaker 1: and the agency mortgage bank Security PORTFOILO is going to 142 00:06:54,880 --> 00:06:59,400 Speaker 1: continue unabated. I see these tools is very separate and different. 143 00:06:59,600 --> 00:07:02,520 Speaker 1: So I expect that the quantity of plating will conto you, 144 00:07:03,000 --> 00:07:05,080 Speaker 1: but one for to get your thoughts, as always, both 145 00:07:05,120 --> 00:07:07,039 Speaker 1: down to there A former New York Fed president and 146 00:07:07,120 --> 00:07:14,320 Speaker 1: Bloomberg opinion columnist John Gasnais Max can the chief multi 147 00:07:14,360 --> 00:07:17,520 Speaker 1: assets strategist over at HSBC. Max have asked this question 148 00:07:17,520 --> 00:07:19,200 Speaker 1: a few times in the last twenty four hours. It's 149 00:07:19,200 --> 00:07:21,840 Speaker 1: your turn. You're feeling more or less confident after that 150 00:07:21,920 --> 00:07:25,360 Speaker 1: tie up yesterday? I feel probably more confident. I feel 151 00:07:25,400 --> 00:07:29,440 Speaker 1: also more confident after what's happened last week. I would 152 00:07:29,520 --> 00:07:33,400 Speaker 1: feel much much more concerned if, indeed, when if we 153 00:07:33,480 --> 00:07:37,640 Speaker 1: had perhaps sentiment and positioning much much less really down beat. 154 00:07:37,800 --> 00:07:40,120 Speaker 1: Now you know we've been I've been listening to your 155 00:07:40,160 --> 00:07:42,880 Speaker 1: show for the last eight eight minutes and there's not 156 00:07:42,960 --> 00:07:44,840 Speaker 1: been a lot of positives yet, right, And I think 157 00:07:44,880 --> 00:07:47,400 Speaker 1: that's a fair under statement if I say that, And 158 00:07:47,480 --> 00:07:49,080 Speaker 1: that's the good thing. The good thing is when we 159 00:07:49,080 --> 00:07:52,320 Speaker 1: look at sovey based sentiment, that's pretty depressed already. If 160 00:07:52,320 --> 00:07:55,280 Speaker 1: we look at technicals, right, so like relative strength across 161 00:07:55,400 --> 00:07:58,960 Speaker 1: risk assets already very depressed big term structure sort of 162 00:07:59,000 --> 00:08:02,080 Speaker 1: down to load the ten percentel already, right when we 163 00:08:02,080 --> 00:08:04,600 Speaker 1: look at equity beaters of multi asset funds down right, 164 00:08:04,600 --> 00:08:06,960 Speaker 1: when we look at pot care rats not only in 165 00:08:07,000 --> 00:08:11,200 Speaker 1: equities but across the asset classes, spending clear clear bearish 166 00:08:11,400 --> 00:08:14,080 Speaker 1: risk sentiment signals. So the good thing is right with 167 00:08:14,200 --> 00:08:16,560 Speaker 1: all what's been happening, not only in the last twenty 168 00:08:16,560 --> 00:08:18,880 Speaker 1: four hours but really over the last last week, is 169 00:08:19,120 --> 00:08:22,440 Speaker 1: that sentiment has gone and it's de rated sufficiently really 170 00:08:22,440 --> 00:08:25,320 Speaker 1: to bearish levels that I'd be very very careful to 171 00:08:25,440 --> 00:08:28,120 Speaker 1: throw in the towel on constructive views now, right, So 172 00:08:28,120 --> 00:08:29,960 Speaker 1: we've just put out an one and said, look, we're 173 00:08:30,080 --> 00:08:34,679 Speaker 1: still holding onto that constructive view because in deeper sentiment 174 00:08:34,760 --> 00:08:38,319 Speaker 1: positioning really across the board looks much much more negative now, 175 00:08:38,960 --> 00:08:42,800 Speaker 1: which is a contrarian positive signal. Max. Let's put a 176 00:08:42,800 --> 00:08:45,760 Speaker 1: bit more specifics around this. Are you saying right now 177 00:08:45,960 --> 00:08:48,800 Speaker 1: you're going out there and buying European banks to move 178 00:08:48,880 --> 00:08:51,880 Speaker 1: counter to the zeit guys that we see out there, Yeah, 179 00:08:52,000 --> 00:08:53,800 Speaker 1: I think so. I think banks are more and more 180 00:08:53,840 --> 00:08:56,720 Speaker 1: looking actually attractive if we look at you know, if 181 00:08:56,720 --> 00:08:59,640 Speaker 1: we look at the rilative performance perhaps of banks over 182 00:08:59,840 --> 00:09:03,080 Speaker 1: the broader market. Look at the performance of banks over 183 00:09:03,200 --> 00:09:07,360 Speaker 1: tech for example, that is back to the COVID highest, right, 184 00:09:07,360 --> 00:09:09,160 Speaker 1: that's back to where we were at sort of the 185 00:09:09,240 --> 00:09:12,520 Speaker 1: dizzy heights in twenty twenty, when you know, real rates 186 00:09:12,520 --> 00:09:17,640 Speaker 1: went down to almost record record negative levels. Where we 187 00:09:17,640 --> 00:09:20,160 Speaker 1: look at the broader banks performance not only in Europe 188 00:09:20,200 --> 00:09:22,400 Speaker 1: but also in the US, when we look at that 189 00:09:22,960 --> 00:09:25,240 Speaker 1: against you know, US treasure yields, if we look at 190 00:09:25,280 --> 00:09:29,079 Speaker 1: that against financial conditions, and particularly it's priced right now 191 00:09:29,400 --> 00:09:35,400 Speaker 1: for the second biggest, second sharpest deterioration in financial conditions already, right, 192 00:09:35,400 --> 00:09:38,640 Speaker 1: So there is an awful lot in the price, particularly 193 00:09:38,640 --> 00:09:41,280 Speaker 1: from a from a relative perspective already. Right, So I 194 00:09:41,320 --> 00:09:44,280 Speaker 1: wouldn't say, oh, nothing's happened yet, and you know there's 195 00:09:44,360 --> 00:09:47,360 Speaker 1: much much more deeper pain to come. We're getting pretty 196 00:09:47,440 --> 00:09:50,880 Speaker 1: close to pretty attractive entry levels. I think let's talk 197 00:09:50,920 --> 00:09:54,160 Speaker 1: monastry policy. But Michael sat in that chair yesterday evening 198 00:09:54,480 --> 00:09:57,920 Speaker 1: from JP Morgan. He said, first comes in September. Andrew 199 00:09:57,920 --> 00:10:00,280 Speaker 1: Holland host a city published this morning. He said, you 200 00:10:00,360 --> 00:10:02,480 Speaker 1: get a hike at that meeting. In a couple of days, 201 00:10:02,480 --> 00:10:05,520 Speaker 1: he said, in the SCP the projections they offer for 202 00:10:05,559 --> 00:10:08,040 Speaker 1: the dot plot the medium dot for twenty three He 203 00:10:08,120 --> 00:10:10,360 Speaker 1: thinks five twenty five to five fifty max. What are 204 00:10:10,360 --> 00:10:13,600 Speaker 1: you looking for this Wednesday? I think you know what, John. 205 00:10:13,720 --> 00:10:17,679 Speaker 1: I think there's one rule right now. Don't overdo things right, 206 00:10:17,760 --> 00:10:20,240 Speaker 1: don't talk too much, don't change too much. What you'd 207 00:10:20,280 --> 00:10:24,199 Speaker 1: read now right now, particularly from policymakers, it's steady hand, 208 00:10:24,440 --> 00:10:27,520 Speaker 1: steady ship. Right, what you really want is basically at 209 00:10:27,559 --> 00:10:29,880 Speaker 1: twenty five basis point hike. I agree with what Lisa 210 00:10:29,960 --> 00:10:33,080 Speaker 1: said before. Has anyone really looked at the projections from 211 00:10:33,080 --> 00:10:36,040 Speaker 1: the ECB last week? Not really right, because they've been 212 00:10:36,120 --> 00:10:39,000 Speaker 1: only marginally changed. Really, that's what you need from the 213 00:10:39,000 --> 00:10:41,560 Speaker 1: FED as well. Right, you don't need overaction, right, you 214 00:10:41,600 --> 00:10:43,520 Speaker 1: don't need too much. What I would do is what 215 00:10:43,559 --> 00:10:46,720 Speaker 1: I'm really waiting for, is at twenty five basis point hike. 216 00:10:47,200 --> 00:10:50,320 Speaker 1: Not too much change, not too much flip flopping around 217 00:10:50,360 --> 00:10:54,720 Speaker 1: in projections or opinions, or hiking or lowering the dots, 218 00:10:54,760 --> 00:10:58,440 Speaker 1: but really steady hands, steady ships saying, look, we've managed 219 00:10:58,440 --> 00:11:00,640 Speaker 1: to contain it so far. We can press ahead with 220 00:11:00,679 --> 00:11:03,199 Speaker 1: the inflation fide. We don't need to be as aggressive 221 00:11:03,240 --> 00:11:06,000 Speaker 1: anymore as we've been a couple of months ago. Let's 222 00:11:06,040 --> 00:11:08,840 Speaker 1: see this through. I think that is if we think 223 00:11:08,880 --> 00:11:12,280 Speaker 1: about it and we talk about restoring confidence. The number 224 00:11:12,400 --> 00:11:16,520 Speaker 1: one rule in restoring confidence is steady hand, steady ship, 225 00:11:16,840 --> 00:11:19,000 Speaker 1: don't overdo it. And Max Wader for to get your 226 00:11:19,040 --> 00:11:20,880 Speaker 1: thoughts as always to kick off the week, Max certain 227 00:11:21,000 --> 00:11:33,920 Speaker 1: there of HSBC joining us now, I'm please to say 228 00:11:34,000 --> 00:11:38,920 Speaker 1: Mara Rodriguez Valadaris, managing principal at MRV Associates, Mara, thank 229 00:11:38,920 --> 00:11:41,200 Speaker 1: you for being on the program with us. Last weekend 230 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:44,560 Speaker 1: it was Signature, it was SVB. This weekend it was 231 00:11:44,600 --> 00:11:49,600 Speaker 1: Credit Suis. What are you expecting next weekend? Right, that's 232 00:11:49,640 --> 00:11:52,120 Speaker 1: really the question. I'm afraid that the regional banks in 233 00:11:52,160 --> 00:11:55,240 Speaker 1: the US, of course, are still very very sensitive to 234 00:11:55,480 --> 00:12:01,240 Speaker 1: this crisis and confidence frankly, but the eyes of DUIs 235 00:12:01,559 --> 00:12:05,360 Speaker 1: is very very different. And unfortunately I heard some Swiss 236 00:12:05,360 --> 00:12:10,800 Speaker 1: regulators and government officials blaming the US banking chaos for 237 00:12:11,040 --> 00:12:15,960 Speaker 1: the demise, and this one cannot be pinned on the 238 00:12:16,000 --> 00:12:21,120 Speaker 1: American banking sector. Unfortunately, klepto, cracks and crooks have long 239 00:12:21,320 --> 00:12:27,840 Speaker 1: been banking, as it has decades long unfortunately history of 240 00:12:27,960 --> 00:12:30,320 Speaker 1: many many scandals, So if anything, I would really be 241 00:12:30,400 --> 00:12:34,160 Speaker 1: worried about those really big banks that have weak operational risk. 242 00:12:34,240 --> 00:12:36,000 Speaker 1: That's what we really need to be looking at. We 243 00:12:36,120 --> 00:12:38,600 Speaker 1: just had Bill Dudley, the former president of the New 244 00:12:38,679 --> 00:12:41,640 Speaker 1: York Federal Reserve, and he was talking about how the 245 00:12:41,800 --> 00:12:44,439 Speaker 1: one difference now or one of the main differences now 246 00:12:44,920 --> 00:12:48,040 Speaker 1: from twenty years ago, is that big banks don't want 247 00:12:48,040 --> 00:12:51,360 Speaker 1: to acquire other banks so quickly, the litigation risks, the 248 00:12:51,600 --> 00:12:56,240 Speaker 1: regulatory risks that a company that are significant and opaque. 249 00:12:56,480 --> 00:12:59,080 Speaker 1: What do you make of that in terms of how 250 00:12:59,120 --> 00:13:01,880 Speaker 1: many provisions to be put around the UBS acquisition of 251 00:13:02,160 --> 00:13:04,920 Speaker 1: Credit Suis and what that means for distress that we're 252 00:13:04,920 --> 00:13:08,480 Speaker 1: seeing in certain pockets of the US. He's actually right, 253 00:13:08,640 --> 00:13:12,680 Speaker 1: because the big banks have a lot of interconnections. There's 254 00:13:12,679 --> 00:13:15,600 Speaker 1: just a tremendous amount of opacity that investors don't know. 255 00:13:15,720 --> 00:13:18,520 Speaker 1: And I think that that's what we really should be 256 00:13:18,600 --> 00:13:22,120 Speaker 1: focusing in the coming days because right now everybody's trying 257 00:13:22,200 --> 00:13:25,520 Speaker 1: to go through all the fine print of the memorandum 258 00:13:25,559 --> 00:13:28,920 Speaker 1: of the UBS memorandum of the takeover Credit Suis, But 259 00:13:29,080 --> 00:13:34,320 Speaker 1: imagine all the opaqueness in the banks, especially in Credit 260 00:13:34,320 --> 00:13:37,160 Speaker 1: Suis there's a lot of duplication. There's going to be 261 00:13:37,240 --> 00:13:41,160 Speaker 1: unfortunately thousands of people who will be fired all over 262 00:13:41,200 --> 00:13:44,680 Speaker 1: the globe because of course UBS will get a says 263 00:13:44,720 --> 00:13:49,120 Speaker 1: to who gets to say you have shared facilities in 264 00:13:49,200 --> 00:13:52,120 Speaker 1: terms of liquidity. You also have a lot of systems 265 00:13:52,160 --> 00:13:55,480 Speaker 1: at both banks, many which are legacy systems, and so 266 00:13:55,679 --> 00:13:57,840 Speaker 1: UBS is going to have to be combing through this 267 00:13:58,000 --> 00:14:02,960 Speaker 1: all very very carefully. Are there hidden liabilities at Credit 268 00:14:03,040 --> 00:14:06,480 Speaker 1: Suite that UBS hasn't had a chance to find out? 269 00:14:06,520 --> 00:14:08,600 Speaker 1: There is no way that they were able to do 270 00:14:08,679 --> 00:14:12,400 Speaker 1: all this level of in depth due diligence to be 271 00:14:12,480 --> 00:14:16,040 Speaker 1: able to do this deal. And so that's really what UBS, 272 00:14:16,120 --> 00:14:18,520 Speaker 1: in any big bank would be worried about in terms 273 00:14:18,559 --> 00:14:20,480 Speaker 1: of trying to buy out another one. There are two 274 00:14:20,520 --> 00:14:22,120 Speaker 1: issues here, or there are a lot of issues here. 275 00:14:22,160 --> 00:14:24,640 Speaker 1: But there's what's going on with Credit Suites and UBS, 276 00:14:24,680 --> 00:14:26,880 Speaker 1: and there's what's going on over in the US and 277 00:14:27,000 --> 00:14:29,840 Speaker 1: some of the regional banks. The interlinkage perhaps is a 278 00:14:29,840 --> 00:14:33,760 Speaker 1: confidence story, but the stories are separate in what is 279 00:14:33,800 --> 00:14:36,600 Speaker 1: going on and why? And I want to just go 280 00:14:36,680 --> 00:14:38,920 Speaker 1: to the US story for a second. Myra and this 281 00:14:39,000 --> 00:14:41,920 Speaker 1: question of supervision of the federal reserve and the role 282 00:14:42,000 --> 00:14:45,680 Speaker 1: of people to identify problems and adequately prevent against them 283 00:14:45,680 --> 00:14:49,120 Speaker 1: spiraling out of control. What is your concern level in 284 00:14:49,200 --> 00:14:51,440 Speaker 1: the inability to do that with Silicon Valley Bank and 285 00:14:51,480 --> 00:14:54,880 Speaker 1: some of the others that have drawn scrutiny recently. Yes, 286 00:14:54,960 --> 00:14:57,920 Speaker 1: I'm glad you said the words supervision, because that's really 287 00:14:57,960 --> 00:15:03,240 Speaker 1: we need more supervision, not necessarily regulation. However, having said that, 288 00:15:03,960 --> 00:15:08,080 Speaker 1: if big banks were required to be called systemically important, 289 00:15:08,080 --> 00:15:13,560 Speaker 1: which is exactly what the Trump law deregulated, then those 290 00:15:13,760 --> 00:15:17,200 Speaker 1: banks the size of Silicon Valley would actually be disclosing 291 00:15:17,280 --> 00:15:21,720 Speaker 1: more about their liquidity, the composition of their deposits. And 292 00:15:21,880 --> 00:15:24,920 Speaker 1: in the US we have a very complex regulatory and 293 00:15:25,000 --> 00:15:29,320 Speaker 1: supervisory framework. You have the state regulator. So state regulators 294 00:15:29,440 --> 00:15:33,000 Speaker 1: often do not have the money, they don't have the resources, 295 00:15:33,000 --> 00:15:35,360 Speaker 1: and they're the ones that are right there on the ground. 296 00:15:35,760 --> 00:15:38,200 Speaker 1: So the state regulators are the ones that have to 297 00:15:38,200 --> 00:15:41,560 Speaker 1: be empowered, and the banks should be required to disclose 298 00:15:41,760 --> 00:15:46,840 Speaker 1: more about their liquidity, their capital. There other kinds of risks, 299 00:15:46,920 --> 00:15:51,800 Speaker 1: such as leverage, the concentration. If investors had that information 300 00:15:51,960 --> 00:15:55,320 Speaker 1: more often than just once a quarter, they would be 301 00:15:55,360 --> 00:15:59,360 Speaker 1: able to discipline the banks. You cannot count on regulators 302 00:15:59,440 --> 00:16:03,280 Speaker 1: or rating agencies to discipline the banks. But the banks 303 00:16:03,400 --> 00:16:06,200 Speaker 1: are opaque, and they should really be disclosing a lot 304 00:16:06,240 --> 00:16:10,200 Speaker 1: more about their concentration and liquidity risks. Mara. Bank failures, 305 00:16:10,200 --> 00:16:13,840 Speaker 1: as you know, go back centuries, and I wonder if 306 00:16:13,840 --> 00:16:16,520 Speaker 1: our biggest problem right now is the fact that banks fail, 307 00:16:17,120 --> 00:16:20,800 Speaker 1: or the fact that seemingly we can't tolerate failure anymore. 308 00:16:21,960 --> 00:16:25,680 Speaker 1: That's exactly it. You have to let banks fail. The problem, 309 00:16:25,760 --> 00:16:28,040 Speaker 1: of course, is that the people who are going to 310 00:16:28,200 --> 00:16:31,800 Speaker 1: get hurt are the junior level employees, the ones that 311 00:16:31,840 --> 00:16:35,360 Speaker 1: aren't getting the big bonuses. All the restaurants and hotels 312 00:16:35,440 --> 00:16:39,440 Speaker 1: anywhere that had any business with those banks are the 313 00:16:39,440 --> 00:16:42,400 Speaker 1: ones that get hurt. And we're no longer really a 314 00:16:42,480 --> 00:16:48,120 Speaker 1: capitalist society. We are constantly letting these bank executives socialize 315 00:16:48,160 --> 00:16:50,600 Speaker 1: the losses, and that's the problem. They should be allowed 316 00:16:50,600 --> 00:16:54,000 Speaker 1: to fail. There should be clawbacks for bonuses, and you 317 00:16:54,160 --> 00:16:58,880 Speaker 1: have to discipline rogue professionals at these banks. Otherwise we're 318 00:16:58,920 --> 00:17:03,480 Speaker 1: constantly doing this and it's always the taxpayers that are 319 00:17:03,480 --> 00:17:06,040 Speaker 1: bailing people out, bailing out the banks, I should say. 320 00:17:06,840 --> 00:17:09,679 Speaker 1: And it's a problem for all the different kinds of 321 00:17:09,720 --> 00:17:12,840 Speaker 1: central banks. The Fed now is probably not going to 322 00:17:12,880 --> 00:17:15,280 Speaker 1: be able to raise rates, but it's not just because 323 00:17:15,280 --> 00:17:16,800 Speaker 1: of what's going on in the US. I mean, do 324 00:17:16,840 --> 00:17:19,520 Speaker 1: you think that Switzerland right now is good raise rates 325 00:17:19,640 --> 00:17:23,199 Speaker 1: or the European Central Bank? We have global inflation, but 326 00:17:23,640 --> 00:17:26,560 Speaker 1: now come all of these problem banks, and so it 327 00:17:26,680 --> 00:17:28,639 Speaker 1: is really going to be quite a channenge for all 328 00:17:28,680 --> 00:17:31,320 Speaker 1: of these different central banks as well, of course, as 329 00:17:31,359 --> 00:17:34,840 Speaker 1: the bank regulators globally. Does this not just an American problem? 330 00:17:35,119 --> 00:17:37,840 Speaker 1: Let's kinshap soon. I appreciate your time this morning. Thank you. 331 00:17:37,960 --> 00:17:46,879 Speaker 1: Mario Rodriguez Volataris of m Anti Associates Beyond Cooperman chairman 332 00:17:46,920 --> 00:17:51,040 Speaker 1: and CEO of Omega Family Office joining us now and Leona, 333 00:17:51,240 --> 00:17:53,760 Speaker 1: I just want to first start with what's your impression 334 00:17:54,040 --> 00:17:56,200 Speaker 1: of everything that we've seen over the past I would 335 00:17:56,200 --> 00:17:59,720 Speaker 1: say week last weekend with what happened with Silicon Valley 336 00:17:59,720 --> 00:18:02,640 Speaker 1: Bank and just now with UBS taking over Credit Suet. 337 00:18:03,280 --> 00:18:06,320 Speaker 1: We are being overly simplistic to me, It's kind of 338 00:18:06,359 --> 00:18:10,199 Speaker 1: like textbook. We've degenerated into a system of leadership at 339 00:18:10,200 --> 00:18:14,280 Speaker 1: a crisis. We have a self induced crisis by irresponsible 340 00:18:14,280 --> 00:18:19,720 Speaker 1: fiscal monetary policy. The last decade. I did not forecast 341 00:18:19,760 --> 00:18:23,280 Speaker 1: a silicon bank issue, but I didn't have a view 342 00:18:23,400 --> 00:18:25,359 Speaker 1: that we were heading to a crisis of some kind. 343 00:18:25,920 --> 00:18:29,600 Speaker 1: And we're seeing it and we're getting a predictable response 344 00:18:29,640 --> 00:18:35,520 Speaker 1: by government, and so I think it's sad, you know, 345 00:18:35,520 --> 00:18:38,440 Speaker 1: what's going on in the country, But what they're doing 346 00:18:38,520 --> 00:18:41,320 Speaker 1: is what is necessary to be done. I have to 347 00:18:41,320 --> 00:18:44,400 Speaker 1: preserve the system. So I'm assuming that the Fed goes 348 00:18:44,440 --> 00:18:47,800 Speaker 1: twenty five BIPs on Wednesday. They're twenty five and done. 349 00:18:48,359 --> 00:18:52,840 Speaker 1: They can accept a higher level of inflation and that 350 00:18:52,920 --> 00:18:55,720 Speaker 1: they would like to accept because of the stress and 351 00:18:55,720 --> 00:18:58,679 Speaker 1: the financial system. They have to stabilize the treasury market. 352 00:18:58,680 --> 00:19:02,800 Speaker 1: The volatility of bond is so great that that's destabilizing 353 00:19:02,840 --> 00:19:05,480 Speaker 1: the equities. Well, I want to Leon, I want to 354 00:19:05,480 --> 00:19:07,600 Speaker 1: pick up on that, because we've been talking about that. 355 00:19:07,640 --> 00:19:12,560 Speaker 1: We've seen unbelievable fluctuations in the basic most liquid instruments 356 00:19:12,560 --> 00:19:15,440 Speaker 1: in the world, right treasuries. What's the read through a 357 00:19:15,600 --> 00:19:19,200 Speaker 1: fact of just even that volatility on other risk assets 358 00:19:19,359 --> 00:19:21,199 Speaker 1: and how much further does it have to take that 359 00:19:21,240 --> 00:19:25,560 Speaker 1: out in terms of volatility pressuring equity valuations. That's not 360 00:19:25,680 --> 00:19:29,040 Speaker 1: my area of expertise, but I would say that this 361 00:19:29,240 --> 00:19:31,480 Speaker 1: is a response to the debt build up in the country. 362 00:19:31,800 --> 00:19:35,800 Speaker 1: You know, in twenty seventeen we had twenty trillion dollars 363 00:19:35,880 --> 00:19:39,280 Speaker 1: of national debt, and today we're not going to do 364 00:19:39,359 --> 00:19:42,560 Speaker 1: a thirty two trillion five years later, five or six 365 00:19:42,640 --> 00:19:44,880 Speaker 1: years later because a growth rate in debt for an 366 00:19:44,920 --> 00:19:47,720 Speaker 1: excess to the growth rate of the economy, which is 367 00:19:47,760 --> 00:19:50,080 Speaker 1: going to create issues. You know, who is the buyer 368 00:19:50,520 --> 00:19:52,720 Speaker 1: buy The banks are not the buyer of bonds anymore. 369 00:19:53,240 --> 00:19:57,480 Speaker 1: So you're relying upon the kindness of strangers and they're 370 00:19:57,520 --> 00:20:01,400 Speaker 1: probably not imbued with their financial policy when they look 371 00:20:01,400 --> 00:20:04,160 Speaker 1: at the politics of the country. It's also very depressing. 372 00:20:04,760 --> 00:20:06,639 Speaker 1: You know, we have a country that I think is 373 00:20:06,720 --> 00:20:09,880 Speaker 1: largely centrist to nature. It's been taken over by two 374 00:20:09,920 --> 00:20:14,840 Speaker 1: political parties, with the radicals radical right radical left ruling 375 00:20:14,840 --> 00:20:17,920 Speaker 1: the day. We don't need this, well, Leon, Leon. We're 376 00:20:17,920 --> 00:20:20,640 Speaker 1: dealing with a situation where the political overlay is raising 377 00:20:20,720 --> 00:20:22,840 Speaker 1: questions about the debt ceiling debate, and we can get 378 00:20:22,840 --> 00:20:25,080 Speaker 1: into that and people are trying to figure out what 379 00:20:25,160 --> 00:20:29,879 Speaker 1: that means economically and for the market. Your expertise is 380 00:20:29,960 --> 00:20:33,119 Speaker 1: in the SMP in the market and market calls and 381 00:20:33,160 --> 00:20:35,919 Speaker 1: you've been warning about a recession for a long time. 382 00:20:36,080 --> 00:20:39,320 Speaker 1: You've been saying that this is a self induced error 383 00:20:39,400 --> 00:20:43,600 Speaker 1: of monetary policy and woes. And I'm curious, first of all, 384 00:20:43,800 --> 00:20:47,040 Speaker 1: whether you're getting more optimistic about returns because of the 385 00:20:47,040 --> 00:20:50,000 Speaker 1: declines that we're seeing and because of perhaps people waking 386 00:20:50,080 --> 00:20:52,320 Speaker 1: up to the reality of the potential for recession as 387 00:20:52,359 --> 00:20:58,440 Speaker 1: you've been saying it. Well, my view has been as follows. 388 00:20:58,800 --> 00:21:01,560 Speaker 1: I tell the story about at the Faraoh. I told 389 00:21:01,600 --> 00:21:05,159 Speaker 1: us almost a year ago on TV The Farrell excuse me, 390 00:21:05,200 --> 00:21:08,359 Speaker 1: had a dream. The dream was interpreted by Joseph. It 391 00:21:08,480 --> 00:21:11,160 Speaker 1: was in the Bible. His dreams were heading for seven 392 00:21:11,240 --> 00:21:15,000 Speaker 1: lean years after seven fat years. And that is my view. 393 00:21:15,160 --> 00:21:18,080 Speaker 1: I think the forty eight hundred SMP will be high, 394 00:21:18,080 --> 00:21:20,399 Speaker 1: that will stand for quite some time. And then I 395 00:21:20,600 --> 00:21:23,359 Speaker 1: kind of analogized that to my own career. I got 396 00:21:23,359 --> 00:21:26,040 Speaker 1: my MBA from Columbia Business School on January thirty first 397 00:21:26,040 --> 00:21:29,240 Speaker 1: of nineteen sixty seven at a six month old trial 398 00:21:29,280 --> 00:21:31,640 Speaker 1: at the time. Now he's a healthy fifty six year old. 399 00:21:32,520 --> 00:21:34,879 Speaker 1: I had no money in the bank at a student 400 00:21:34,920 --> 00:21:37,200 Speaker 1: loan to repay. They were not for giving student loans, 401 00:21:37,680 --> 00:21:40,000 Speaker 1: and I couldn't a fortification. I went to work the 402 00:21:40,080 --> 00:21:42,560 Speaker 1: very next day. I joined Gome and Sacks. To my 403 00:21:42,640 --> 00:21:45,680 Speaker 1: twenty five year career, from February first to sixty seven, 404 00:21:45,960 --> 00:21:47,960 Speaker 1: that was a thousand and nineteen eighty two was one 405 00:21:48,000 --> 00:21:52,919 Speaker 1: thousand and So I made my money picking stocks. You know, 406 00:21:52,960 --> 00:21:55,480 Speaker 1: I'm not selling eightying anybody because I'm a retired money 407 00:21:55,480 --> 00:21:57,760 Speaker 1: manager and I'm turning eighty years old in a few weeks. 408 00:21:58,240 --> 00:22:01,399 Speaker 1: But I would say that I think we're in a 409 00:22:01,480 --> 00:22:04,400 Speaker 1: stock pickers environment. I expect the returns to the SMP 410 00:22:04,520 --> 00:22:06,639 Speaker 1: to be very pedestrian. I think what's going on in 411 00:22:06,680 --> 00:22:09,240 Speaker 1: the world is negative a price ratios. And I want 412 00:22:09,240 --> 00:22:11,760 Speaker 1: to make this point. If the government is looked upon 413 00:22:12,000 --> 00:22:15,440 Speaker 1: to monerate the downside risk, the government has every right 414 00:22:15,520 --> 00:22:19,600 Speaker 1: to monerate the upside return. Okay, we this Chips Act. 415 00:22:19,920 --> 00:22:21,800 Speaker 1: You know, I think Intel, since it a balanced you 416 00:22:21,840 --> 00:22:24,399 Speaker 1: to fifty billion dollars, they don't need the government to 417 00:22:24,440 --> 00:22:27,800 Speaker 1: build plans for them. They could do it themselves. I'm 418 00:22:27,840 --> 00:22:31,639 Speaker 1: in favor of private sector solutions, and the extent that 419 00:22:31,720 --> 00:22:37,520 Speaker 1: the political system is getting corrupted, that's negative for capitalism 420 00:22:37,560 --> 00:22:40,720 Speaker 1: long term. So Leon, from your perspective, you have major 421 00:22:40,760 --> 00:22:43,960 Speaker 1: career in picking single stocks. Where are you putting your 422 00:22:43,960 --> 00:22:47,400 Speaker 1: money now? Given that you still are investing, if perhaps 423 00:22:47,680 --> 00:22:52,760 Speaker 1: for yourself and for others, where do you go? I'm 424 00:22:52,800 --> 00:22:54,639 Speaker 1: like a one off kind of guy. I'm looking at 425 00:22:54,560 --> 00:22:58,680 Speaker 1: a couple of these mortgage routes that are yielding fourteen 426 00:22:58,720 --> 00:23:02,840 Speaker 1: to sixteen percent discount to book value, where they're buying back, 427 00:23:02,880 --> 00:23:06,280 Speaker 1: they're on stock whenever it's they have you achieved? But 428 00:23:06,359 --> 00:23:09,280 Speaker 1: you know those are one off. My biggest exposure has 429 00:23:09,320 --> 00:23:11,600 Speaker 1: been energy, and that's cost me some money this year. 430 00:23:12,040 --> 00:23:17,720 Speaker 1: I'm generally of the view that world travel will come back, 431 00:23:18,240 --> 00:23:21,359 Speaker 1: which will be a plus for energy demand. China coming 432 00:23:21,800 --> 00:23:23,959 Speaker 1: out of lockdown will be a plus for energy demand. 433 00:23:24,680 --> 00:23:27,760 Speaker 1: We're getting no longer complete the strategic Petoleum reserve. We 434 00:23:27,880 --> 00:23:32,600 Speaker 1: have to rebuild it, and we're not replacing reserves the 435 00:23:32,680 --> 00:23:36,480 Speaker 1: extent that we are we should be in terms of 436 00:23:36,520 --> 00:23:39,400 Speaker 1: where we're producing. Yeah, I have a bunch of oil 437 00:23:39,440 --> 00:23:42,359 Speaker 1: stocks my portfolio that have current yields of five or 438 00:23:42,359 --> 00:23:48,080 Speaker 1: ten percent, production costs well below current prices. They're largely 439 00:23:48,160 --> 00:23:51,200 Speaker 1: debt free in their position to buy back on the 440 00:23:51,280 --> 00:23:55,879 Speaker 1: bad stock. My favorite is Paramount Resource Stup in Canada, 441 00:23:55,920 --> 00:23:59,200 Speaker 1: pou You know, they produce well for thirty one dollars 442 00:23:59,200 --> 00:24:03,080 Speaker 1: a barrel. They're growing production at fifteen percent. The stock 443 00:24:03,160 --> 00:24:07,639 Speaker 1: yields over five percent. Yeah, Leon, bobbing up against the 444 00:24:07,640 --> 00:24:11,320 Speaker 1: clock thirty seconds. Do you agree with Elizabeth Warren that 445 00:24:11,600 --> 00:24:14,000 Speaker 1: there should be insurance for deposits it's more than two 446 00:24:14,080 --> 00:24:16,200 Speaker 1: hundred and fifty thousand dollars and that banks should have 447 00:24:16,240 --> 00:24:20,639 Speaker 1: to pay for that. There's very little that Lizard Warren 448 00:24:20,680 --> 00:24:26,199 Speaker 1: says that I agree with. But uh, you know, I 449 00:24:26,280 --> 00:24:27,919 Speaker 1: think we have to do whatever we have to do 450 00:24:27,960 --> 00:24:30,560 Speaker 1: to stabilize the system, and we will do it. But 451 00:24:30,720 --> 00:24:34,239 Speaker 1: I think I'm focusing a long term implications of what 452 00:24:34,280 --> 00:24:38,639 Speaker 1: they're doing, So I think that yes, they should do 453 00:24:38,680 --> 00:24:40,720 Speaker 1: whatever they got to do to stabilize the system. It's 454 00:24:40,720 --> 00:24:42,880 Speaker 1: a damn shame that we have to do what we're doing, 455 00:24:43,240 --> 00:24:45,600 Speaker 1: that we none it should have been this problem, you know, 456 00:24:46,840 --> 00:24:52,000 Speaker 1: mister Powell. You know the Fed head said that the 457 00:24:52,040 --> 00:24:54,840 Speaker 1: stock market wasn't overvalued. This is a few years ago. 458 00:24:55,320 --> 00:24:57,280 Speaker 1: Because if we're interest race were it never by the 459 00:24:57,280 --> 00:24:59,880 Speaker 1: time people interest race didn't belong where they were, Leon, 460 00:25:00,119 --> 00:25:01,480 Speaker 1: remember're gonna have to leave it there. Thank you so 461 00:25:01,600 --> 00:25:04,880 Speaker 1: much for joining us Leon Cooperman of Omega Family Office. 462 00:25:04,920 --> 00:25:18,600 Speaker 1: We really appreciate your time. Michael Arrakeetzi joins US now 463 00:25:18,640 --> 00:25:22,640 Speaker 1: co founder and CEO Heiress Management. Michael, wonderful to catch 464 00:25:22,720 --> 00:25:24,120 Speaker 1: up with you, sir. I think we need to talk 465 00:25:24,160 --> 00:25:27,879 Speaker 1: about speed, just how quickly this is moving. What do 466 00:25:27,880 --> 00:25:30,520 Speaker 1: you make of it all? I think you hit on 467 00:25:30,560 --> 00:25:35,360 Speaker 1: a big challenge in today's mark environment relative to past cycles. 468 00:25:35,400 --> 00:25:38,280 Speaker 1: I think with the speed with which money can move 469 00:25:38,320 --> 00:25:41,640 Speaker 1: through the system, the speed with which information is coming 470 00:25:41,680 --> 00:25:44,960 Speaker 1: at us, it's getting harder and harder to distill the 471 00:25:45,080 --> 00:25:49,960 Speaker 1: signal through the noise. So we're talking with you, Michael 472 00:25:50,160 --> 00:25:52,600 Speaker 1: at a time when people are wondering who will take 473 00:25:52,640 --> 00:25:55,360 Speaker 1: over some of the institutions that are seeing some distress, 474 00:25:55,560 --> 00:25:57,400 Speaker 1: who will come to the rescue. And we were talking 475 00:25:57,400 --> 00:25:59,840 Speaker 1: with Bill Dudley about how big banks learn their lessons 476 00:26:00,119 --> 00:26:03,520 Speaker 1: the financial crisis and are concerned about litigation risks. From 477 00:26:03,520 --> 00:26:06,639 Speaker 1: your vantage point, given the arias overseas three hundred and 478 00:26:06,680 --> 00:26:09,040 Speaker 1: fifty two billion dollars of assets, including more than two 479 00:26:09,080 --> 00:26:11,840 Speaker 1: hundred billion dollars of credit, what's your view on that? 480 00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:16,200 Speaker 1: Where is your role? It's interesting? I think the private 481 00:26:16,359 --> 00:26:18,600 Speaker 1: credit markets have been playing a little bit of a 482 00:26:18,720 --> 00:26:22,600 Speaker 1: stabilizing role here over the last couple of weeks and months, 483 00:26:23,160 --> 00:26:26,040 Speaker 1: as liquidity in the traded markets is not what it 484 00:26:26,119 --> 00:26:29,600 Speaker 1: used to be. I think folks like Arias are coming 485 00:26:29,640 --> 00:26:33,360 Speaker 1: in and really providing liquidity in certain markets where liquidity 486 00:26:33,400 --> 00:26:36,560 Speaker 1: has gotten been. One thing I think about now is 487 00:26:36,600 --> 00:26:39,800 Speaker 1: one of the larger private credit managers is We don't 488 00:26:39,800 --> 00:26:41,840 Speaker 1: know exactly how this all will unfold, but I can 489 00:26:41,880 --> 00:26:45,040 Speaker 1: tell you one thing. We will see more regulation of banks, 490 00:26:45,119 --> 00:26:48,679 Speaker 1: both mid sized and large. We will likely see a 491 00:26:48,800 --> 00:26:51,840 Speaker 1: change to bank capp or regulatory framework here in the 492 00:26:51,960 --> 00:26:56,239 Speaker 1: US and abroad, and that capital contraction will make it 493 00:26:56,240 --> 00:26:58,639 Speaker 1: ever more important than private credit plays a role in 494 00:26:58,760 --> 00:27:01,440 Speaker 1: funding real economy. So at what point and I want 495 00:27:01,440 --> 00:27:03,280 Speaker 1: to go to the funding the real economy in a second, 496 00:27:03,359 --> 00:27:06,119 Speaker 1: But just in terms of the here and now, is 497 00:27:06,200 --> 00:27:09,080 Speaker 1: aries going in and picking up bank bonds. Is aries 498 00:27:09,160 --> 00:27:13,040 Speaker 1: coming in and discussing how to finance banks that perhaps 499 00:27:13,119 --> 00:27:18,879 Speaker 1: are threatened with deposit outflows. I remind you, Lisa, we 500 00:27:19,280 --> 00:27:22,239 Speaker 1: play strictly in the private market, so we do have 501 00:27:22,280 --> 00:27:26,240 Speaker 1: certain pockets of capital within our opportunistic credit and distress 502 00:27:26,240 --> 00:27:30,040 Speaker 1: businesses that will dabble in the public market. Opportunity gets 503 00:27:30,040 --> 00:27:33,240 Speaker 1: created here, but the opportunity is set for aries and 504 00:27:33,320 --> 00:27:35,240 Speaker 1: those that look like us really is to come in 505 00:27:35,320 --> 00:27:38,520 Speaker 1: and be a liquidity provider to the small companies that 506 00:27:38,640 --> 00:27:41,040 Speaker 1: may be challenged to get liquidity from mid size and 507 00:27:41,080 --> 00:27:43,960 Speaker 1: regional banks. And it could be as a real good 508 00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:47,120 Speaker 1: counterparty to the bank on right PAP grades that they 509 00:27:47,160 --> 00:27:50,120 Speaker 1: try to revisit the liquidity are on their own Balanteam. 510 00:27:50,280 --> 00:27:53,640 Speaker 1: You talked about the broader capital sphere that we're watching 511 00:27:53,680 --> 00:27:57,320 Speaker 1: and this concern about whether commercial real estate operators as 512 00:27:57,359 --> 00:28:00,000 Speaker 1: well as individuals and small businesses can get the loans 513 00:28:00,080 --> 00:28:02,840 Speaker 1: that regional banks used to provide to them. Michael, private 514 00:28:03,000 --> 00:28:05,720 Speaker 1: credit might step in, but how much more expensive will 515 00:28:05,720 --> 00:28:08,080 Speaker 1: it be to get it from a private equity company 516 00:28:08,200 --> 00:28:12,560 Speaker 1: or a private debt firm than from a regional bank. Look, 517 00:28:12,600 --> 00:28:15,919 Speaker 1: I think historically the private credit markets have been more expensive. 518 00:28:16,480 --> 00:28:20,080 Speaker 1: That's largely because they tend to provide a level of 519 00:28:20,240 --> 00:28:25,440 Speaker 1: creativity or innovation, or frankly, more leverage or structural flexibility 520 00:28:25,480 --> 00:28:28,480 Speaker 1: than a bank solution could. So I think the market 521 00:28:28,560 --> 00:28:31,120 Speaker 1: is pretty well attuned to a higher cost of capital. 522 00:28:31,600 --> 00:28:34,119 Speaker 1: I think you raise an important point though here is 523 00:28:34,200 --> 00:28:38,160 Speaker 1: what we're dealing with now is liquidity and duration, not credit. 524 00:28:38,280 --> 00:28:41,880 Speaker 1: We're already seeing the impact that cost of capital is 525 00:28:41,920 --> 00:28:45,160 Speaker 1: having as rates from moving up so quickly. I think 526 00:28:45,160 --> 00:28:46,920 Speaker 1: we first need to get to a point where the 527 00:28:47,040 --> 00:28:52,240 Speaker 1: equity valuation environment adjusts in the new realities that people 528 00:28:52,280 --> 00:28:55,800 Speaker 1: can actually afford a higher cost of capital. If that's 529 00:28:55,800 --> 00:28:58,200 Speaker 1: where this takes the Michael. One issue that's come up 530 00:28:58,240 --> 00:29:01,560 Speaker 1: repeatedly over the last week, it's this idea that ultimately 531 00:29:01,600 --> 00:29:03,880 Speaker 1: now will end up we're tighter lending standards, tight to 532 00:29:03,960 --> 00:29:06,760 Speaker 1: financial conditions. Think a lot of people are lining up 533 00:29:06,800 --> 00:29:08,960 Speaker 1: to give us the stats about how dependent certain parts 534 00:29:08,960 --> 00:29:11,440 Speaker 1: of this economy are on the financing from small and 535 00:29:11,520 --> 00:29:14,840 Speaker 1: medium sized banks. We're thinking about real estate a whole 536 00:29:14,840 --> 00:29:17,520 Speaker 1: lot more. Michael, how are you thinking about the ripples 537 00:29:17,560 --> 00:29:19,479 Speaker 1: from what's developed in the last couple of weeks from 538 00:29:19,520 --> 00:29:21,760 Speaker 1: these banks and what regionals are going through, and what 539 00:29:21,800 --> 00:29:23,840 Speaker 1: it means for an asset class that I imagine you're 540 00:29:23,840 --> 00:29:28,560 Speaker 1: exposed to look. I think it could be very challenging. 541 00:29:28,640 --> 00:29:31,440 Speaker 1: I think that the FED is doing everything it's supposed 542 00:29:31,480 --> 00:29:34,520 Speaker 1: to do to step in and provide confidence. I was 543 00:29:34,640 --> 00:29:38,080 Speaker 1: pleased to see the larger banks in the market step 544 00:29:38,160 --> 00:29:41,719 Speaker 1: in to provide support to First Republic. I think at 545 00:29:41,720 --> 00:29:44,160 Speaker 1: the end of the day, again, this is duration lookquid 546 00:29:44,200 --> 00:29:47,480 Speaker 1: to be and confidence not credit. So I would hope 547 00:29:47,480 --> 00:29:51,120 Speaker 1: that folks calm down again to see the signal through 548 00:29:51,160 --> 00:29:54,520 Speaker 1: the noise and get back to lending. But it is 549 00:29:54,560 --> 00:29:57,760 Speaker 1: a real risk obviously, the extent that people continue to 550 00:29:57,800 --> 00:30:01,600 Speaker 1: lose confidence have it leaves that part of the banking 551 00:30:01,640 --> 00:30:03,600 Speaker 1: sector and it is going to make it harder for 552 00:30:03,680 --> 00:30:06,160 Speaker 1: people to act as capital. For sure, it feels like 553 00:30:06,200 --> 00:30:08,440 Speaker 1: a year ago. But last week Larry Fink of Blackrock 554 00:30:08,680 --> 00:30:10,080 Speaker 1: said that there are a number of shoes that are 555 00:30:10,080 --> 00:30:12,240 Speaker 1: going to drop. First it was Silicon Valley Bank, then 556 00:30:12,240 --> 00:30:14,960 Speaker 1: it was other smaller and red medium sized banks, and 557 00:30:15,040 --> 00:30:17,320 Speaker 1: next it would be the private credit and private equity 558 00:30:17,360 --> 00:30:20,880 Speaker 1: and venture capital markets that wouldn't get that credit. Do 559 00:30:20,920 --> 00:30:24,800 Speaker 1: you agree with that. I think one thing that is 560 00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:27,720 Speaker 1: probably most missed understood about the private markets, which is 561 00:30:27,760 --> 00:30:29,560 Speaker 1: why you know, it's always been this view that the 562 00:30:30,240 --> 00:30:32,480 Speaker 1: canary in the coal mine, and yet every time we 563 00:30:32,560 --> 00:30:36,800 Speaker 1: have a crisis or a mini crisis, private markets tend 564 00:30:36,880 --> 00:30:41,280 Speaker 1: to emerge fairly unscathed. And I think the big difference 565 00:30:41,320 --> 00:30:44,240 Speaker 1: that folks don't really appreciate is one. Most private credit 566 00:30:44,400 --> 00:30:48,240 Speaker 1: assets are held unlevered to the extent their lever they're 567 00:30:48,240 --> 00:30:53,040 Speaker 1: modesty leverage with matt duration and match funding. Duxtapose that 568 00:30:53,120 --> 00:30:55,880 Speaker 1: with a bank that is ten to fifteen times lever 569 00:30:56,000 --> 00:30:59,240 Speaker 1: and you get obviously a much different outcome. And markets 570 00:30:59,280 --> 00:31:03,280 Speaker 1: like this. Similarly, on the equity side, they are operating 571 00:31:03,280 --> 00:31:08,280 Speaker 1: out of funds with end to twelve year life cycles, 572 00:31:08,280 --> 00:31:12,080 Speaker 1: and so most private owners of assets that are institutionally 573 00:31:12,120 --> 00:31:16,440 Speaker 1: backed are neither force sellers or forced buyers in any market, 574 00:31:16,440 --> 00:31:18,880 Speaker 1: and that provides a level of stability that I think 575 00:31:18,920 --> 00:31:21,360 Speaker 1: people may underappreciate when we go through markets like when 576 00:31:21,400 --> 00:31:23,800 Speaker 1: we're in right now. That's a constructive point. Michael, gotta 577 00:31:23,880 --> 00:31:25,720 Speaker 1: leave it there. It's wonderful to hear your thoughts. Thank you, 578 00:31:26,040 --> 00:31:29,880 Speaker 1: Michael Arrogetti, the of Ari's management. Subscribe to the Bloomberg 579 00:31:29,920 --> 00:31:33,120 Speaker 1: Surveillance podcast on Apple, Spotify and anywhere else you get 580 00:31:33,160 --> 00:31:37,040 Speaker 1: your podcasts. Listen live every weekday starting at seven am Eastern, 581 00:31:37,120 --> 00:31:40,280 Speaker 1: on Bloomberg dot Com, the iHeartRadio app tune In, and 582 00:31:40,520 --> 00:31:43,280 Speaker 1: the Bloomberg Business app. You can watch us live on 583 00:31:43,360 --> 00:31:47,520 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Television and always on the Bloomberg terminal. Thanks for listening. 584 00:31:47,560 --> 00:31:49,880 Speaker 1: I'm Lisa Abramowitz, and this is Bloomberg