WEBVTT - Omega Advisors Leon Cooperman: Masters in Business (Audio)

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<v Speaker 1>This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholds on Bloomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>This week on the podcast, we have a very special guest.

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<v Speaker 1>And I know you folks are tired of hearing me

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<v Speaker 1>say that, but we do. We have a very special guest,

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<v Speaker 1>Leon Cooperman. He is the founder and chief investment officer

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<v Speaker 1>of Omega Advisors. They are a hedge fund that runs

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<v Speaker 1>about nine point three billion dollars. His track record is

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<v Speaker 1>actually quite fantastic. He's outperformed the S and P five

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<v Speaker 1>hundred on an annualized basis of about four hundred and

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<v Speaker 1>fifty basis points. His tax advantage fund has outperformed the

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<v Speaker 1>Broad Index a thousand basis points. Uh. He is a

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<v Speaker 1>legend on Wall Street. He began his career at Goldman Sachs,

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<v Speaker 1>where he ran eventually ran the research department. I I

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<v Speaker 1>rated just number one. There are a few people who

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<v Speaker 1>are more fascinating and more knowledgeable about what it's like

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<v Speaker 1>to run money, to do research, to execute a portfolio

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<v Speaker 1>then Lee Cooperman. Very accessible, very humble, a tremendous, tremendous

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<v Speaker 1>um philanthropist, has committed to giving away a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>his money. I can't begin to tell you enough of

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<v Speaker 1>of how enjoyable our conversation was and what a pleasure

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<v Speaker 1>it was to sit down with him for for nearly

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<v Speaker 1>two hours. He he was scheduled to leave at one thirty,

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<v Speaker 1>and he waved me off. He just you know, kept

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<v Speaker 1>going and understood that this was really a deep dive

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<v Speaker 1>and didn't want to cut it short because he had

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<v Speaker 1>to be somewhere else. So, with no further ado from me,

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<v Speaker 1>here is my conversation with Leon Cooperman. This is Masters

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<v Speaker 1>in Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio. My very

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<v Speaker 1>special guest today, Lee Cooperman. You may or may not

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<v Speaker 1>have heard of him. Lee was born in the bronx

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<v Speaker 1>of immigrant parents. Your your whole curriculum vitae is gonna

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<v Speaker 1>take me ten minutes to read, so I'm just gonna

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<v Speaker 1>do the short version. Columbia Business School, nineteen sixty nine.

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<v Speaker 1>You've got an m b A straight to Goldman Sachs,

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<v Speaker 1>where you spent twenty two years in the Investment Research department,

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<v Speaker 1>eventually becoming co chairman of the Investment Policy Committee and

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<v Speaker 1>chairman of the Stock Selection Committee. You were voted onto

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<v Speaker 1>Institutional Investors All America Research team for Portfolio Strategy. You

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<v Speaker 1>ranked first in portfolio strategy from nineteen seventy seven to five.

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<v Speaker 1>You eventually set up Goldman Sachs is Asset Management division

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<v Speaker 1>and then leave to launch Omega Advisors, where your flagship

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<v Speaker 1>overseas fund has averaged fourteen point six percent from two

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<v Speaker 1>to and that's about fift better than the benchmark SMP

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<v Speaker 1>five hundred. Lee Cooperman, welcome to Bloomberg NICs to be

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<v Speaker 1>with you. And for those of you folks who may

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<v Speaker 1>not be familiar with either Guldman Sachs or Omega Advisors,

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<v Speaker 1>you're probably listening to the wrong radio station. So let's

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<v Speaker 1>jump right into your a little bit of your background.

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<v Speaker 1>What did you do before you found your way to

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<v Speaker 1>Wall Street. Well, I'm kind of like in a Ratio

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<v Speaker 1>Alger story, and I say this with great humility. I've

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<v Speaker 1>been very lucky in life. Basically, I was born in

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<v Speaker 1>the South Bronx, first generation of my family to get

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<v Speaker 1>a born in America, first generation my family get a

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<v Speaker 1>college degree. I went to public school in the Bronx

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<v Speaker 1>PS seventy five. I went to high school in the

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<v Speaker 1>Bronx and Morris High School. I went to college in

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<v Speaker 1>the Bronx Uh, West Bronx. My both of my grade

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<v Speaker 1>school and my high school was in the East Bronx.

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<v Speaker 1>I went west, follow the device of horst Reeley and

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<v Speaker 1>I went to the West young Man, go West, young Man.

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<v Speaker 1>I went to a Hunter College, part of the City

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<v Speaker 1>University of New York. UM, graduated in nineteen sixty four.

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<v Speaker 1>Went to work for Xerox Corporation up in Rochester. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>let me stop you right there. From Hunter to Xerox.

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<v Speaker 1>What did you do on at Xerox? Well, it was

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<v Speaker 1>very interesting. I don't know how much time we have.

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<v Speaker 1>I tend to be I have all day. You're the

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<v Speaker 1>one with Well, basically, um, it's very interesting. You know.

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<v Speaker 1>Part of my success in life I attribute to luck. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>certain part of education hard work. By the way, that's

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<v Speaker 1>a theme that every person who's done an interview with

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<v Speaker 1>me has more or less said, Well, you know, I

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<v Speaker 1>worked hard, but I also got really lucky. Well, I

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<v Speaker 1>would say that you're not realistic if you don't think

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<v Speaker 1>luck plays a part in the one success. And I

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<v Speaker 1>like to think I'm above all. I'm realistic and self

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<v Speaker 1>effacing and have humility. Uh. But basically it's a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit of a story to get to answer your question

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<v Speaker 1>back in the sixty and still maybe the case of

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<v Speaker 1>day that if you finished your major and minor in

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<v Speaker 1>three years, you could count in your first year of

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<v Speaker 1>dental or medical school towards your fourth year of college

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<v Speaker 1>you get a separate degree. I actually did something similar

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<v Speaker 1>with law school. I applied part of law school towards

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<v Speaker 1>my undergraduate So you know, basically, in the summer of

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<v Speaker 1>nineteen sixty three, I toiled very hard in the University

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<v Speaker 1>of Pennsylvania laboratories. I took a course in physical chemistry

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<v Speaker 1>to finish you off my major. My major was chemistry,

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<v Speaker 1>my mind was math and physics. And I enrolled in

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<v Speaker 1>the University of Pennsylvania Dental School. And after eight days

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<v Speaker 1>I wondered if I was making the right decision. And

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<v Speaker 1>so you know, part of your life, not only his luck,

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<v Speaker 1>is intuition and making the right decision. That that was

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<v Speaker 1>a good instinct. I cannot picture you as all you know,

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<v Speaker 1>instead of my hand in their mouths and I have

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<v Speaker 1>my hand in their pockets, I guess you could say

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<v Speaker 1>that basically I went. It was a very traumatic period

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<v Speaker 1>of my life. I went to the dean of the

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<v Speaker 1>dental school and I said, I would like to return

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<v Speaker 1>to my undergraduate school, finish you off my fourth year,

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<v Speaker 1>unencumbered by any decision, and then in the fullness of time,

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<v Speaker 1>making decision to either return to dental school or whatever.

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<v Speaker 1>And he put me on a real guilt trip, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>in the sense that he said, you deprived the hundred

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<v Speaker 1>first applicant of a dental school education. How can you

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<v Speaker 1>decide after eight days? And so I returned to undergraduate school.

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<v Speaker 1>The only person that really understood the import of my

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<v Speaker 1>decision and difficulty was a dean of Hunter College at

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<v Speaker 1>the time. His name was Glen T. Nigrin. I just

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<v Speaker 1>noticed an obituary of several years ago where he passed away,

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<v Speaker 1>and he said, boy, this must have been a tough decision.

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<v Speaker 1>Of course, you could matriculate back into a Hunter. And

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<v Speaker 1>I went back to Hunter, at which point I had

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<v Speaker 1>all elective is my major minor was completed. So I

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<v Speaker 1>took ten courses in economics, got ten a's, and I

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<v Speaker 1>had the unusual situation of graduating as a major in chemistry,

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<v Speaker 1>monor math and physics, but honors in economics. And I

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<v Speaker 1>was interviewing in the ninth seen hundred and I guess

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<v Speaker 1>sixty three yearly sixty four for a job. Xerox Corporation

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<v Speaker 1>came to the campus and I was lucky enough to

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<v Speaker 1>get an invite back to Rochester to meet with other

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<v Speaker 1>people for a second, you know, interview, and I went

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<v Speaker 1>up getting the best job warfer if anyone that cite

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<v Speaker 1>the university. They offered me, I think was seventy five

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<v Speaker 1>hundred or seven thousand dollars a year, which I accepted,

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<v Speaker 1>and I started working there in August of nineteen four,

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<v Speaker 1>and they really, an effect, did not make a full

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<v Speaker 1>disclosure to me about the job. It's what they didn't

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<v Speaker 1>tell me when I started, when they offered me the job.

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<v Speaker 1>Is a month later they were going to a twenty

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<v Speaker 1>four hour work week, meaning one week I'd have to

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<v Speaker 1>work eight in the morning to four in the afternoon,

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<v Speaker 1>the next week four in the afternoon to midnight, three

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<v Speaker 1>three shifts a day um. And so I was enrolled

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<v Speaker 1>in the University of Rochester Graduate School of Business at night,

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<v Speaker 1>working towards an m b A. But the weeks that

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<v Speaker 1>I was in the four in the afternoon to midnight shift,

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<v Speaker 1>I'd have to find somebody else to shift off with

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<v Speaker 1>work sixteen hours go to school, work sixteen hours, go

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<v Speaker 1>to school. And I had had a lovely life a

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<v Speaker 1>wife at that time, and he was still a lovely wife.

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<v Speaker 1>She's married fifty one years. And she said, look, I'm

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<v Speaker 1>happy to work if you want to go to school

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<v Speaker 1>full time. And I took leave of absence and I

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<v Speaker 1>went to Columbia University Graduate School of Business in New

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<v Speaker 1>York on a trimester basis sixty months, got my m

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<v Speaker 1>b A interviewed, and I was lucky enough to get

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<v Speaker 1>a job off of Goldman Sachs and who entered Wall Street.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh via my MBA from Columbia to Goldman Sax. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>Barry Ritults. You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg

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<v Speaker 1>Radio and my very special guest today, Lee Cooperman. He

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<v Speaker 1>is the founder of Omega Advisors. Prior to that, he

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<v Speaker 1>spent twenty three years in in the investment research department

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<v Speaker 1>at Goldman Sacks. Let's let's talk a little bit about

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<v Speaker 1>um Goldman Sacks. You went right out of Columbia where

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<v Speaker 1>you got your m b A into not the sexier

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<v Speaker 1>investment banking half that I think Goldman at the time

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<v Speaker 1>was better owned for, but into research. What was your

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<v Speaker 1>thought process. What attracted you to that? I basically had

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<v Speaker 1>a strong interest in investing through investment research would be

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<v Speaker 1>a good foundation for pursuing career in investing, and Columbia

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<v Speaker 1>was known as a deep value school. That was the

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<v Speaker 1>training you had. The professor had the greatest influence to

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<v Speaker 1>me was Professor Roger Murray, who was an adjunct professor

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<v Speaker 1>of business at Columbia. His day job was being the

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<v Speaker 1>chief investment officer of College Retirement Equities Fund, and he

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<v Speaker 1>taught at Columbia. He also was an author of one

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<v Speaker 1>of the follow up editions of security analysis, the original

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<v Speaker 1>publication four by Graham and Dodd, and he honed my interest.

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<v Speaker 1>He was a fabulous professor, a real practitioner of his profession,

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<v Speaker 1>and one that was a great inspiration. But you know, um,

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<v Speaker 1>it was a great experience. I never I like. I

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<v Speaker 1>like to say I like the higher PhDs in my business. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>but my PhDs are poor, hungry and driven. Uh. Isn't that?

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<v Speaker 1>Isn't that something that Mario Gabelli used to say all

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<v Speaker 1>the time. He says it all the time. We're great friends.

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<v Speaker 1>You know. One of the great things that came out

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<v Speaker 1>of Columbia Business school, was married when I met, and

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<v Speaker 1>we remained close friends for fifty years. You know, it

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<v Speaker 1>was the Columbia experience that got me the entry card

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<v Speaker 1>into Wall Street. I wouldn't say it's right, but the

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<v Speaker 1>odds or I could not have gotten into Wall Street

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<v Speaker 1>directly from Hunter College into an investment position at Goldman,

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<v Speaker 1>But part of this, like I said earlier, horatial outer story.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, I um, when I went to Columbia Business School,

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<v Speaker 1>I had a six month old child, I had National

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<v Speaker 1>Defense Education Act student loan to repay, had no money

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<v Speaker 1>in the bank, and had to get onto making a living.

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<v Speaker 1>So I got my degree on January thirty one of

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<v Speaker 1>nineteen sixty seven, and the very next day, February one

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<v Speaker 1>to sixty seven, I started my close to year career

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<v Speaker 1>at Goldman Sex. So you were in the research department.

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<v Speaker 1>Let me let me go over some of the stats

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<v Speaker 1>from that, because they're really so impressive. You voted on

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<v Speaker 1>to the All American Research team. You were the number

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<v Speaker 1>one portfolio strategist according to Investor Institutional Investor from nineteen

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<v Speaker 1>seventy seven to ninety five. That that's a heck of

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<v Speaker 1>a good run. And then after all those years in

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<v Speaker 1>the research department you helped build Goman Sacks Asset Manager.

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<v Speaker 1>I actually started it, but i'd say first in the

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<v Speaker 1>research department. Uh, not not being self serving. I had

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<v Speaker 1>two roles, and I started at as an analyst in

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<v Speaker 1>the retail business, and then the mid seventies I became

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<v Speaker 1>co directive Research. In nineteen seventies six, I was named

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<v Speaker 1>partner in charge of Research. I essentially had two roles

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<v Speaker 1>in Goldman Research. One I would call an orchestra leader,

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<v Speaker 1>I ran the research department, and the other, call a solo,

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<v Speaker 1>was to my role as chairman of the Investment Policy Committee,

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<v Speaker 1>helping set investment policy and marketing that investment policy at

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<v Speaker 1>investing clients. And uh, please used to say again, not

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<v Speaker 1>big self serving, because it was a real team effort.

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<v Speaker 1>But when I took over the research department at Goldman,

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<v Speaker 1>we were basically unranked. And when I left, it's a

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<v Speaker 1>polite way to say dead last, No, not that last,

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<v Speaker 1>but we were We were not ranked in the top

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<v Speaker 1>we were not reviewed as a research firm. And when

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<v Speaker 1>I left the research department in nine to start Goldman

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<v Speaker 1>Sacks Asset Management, Goldman Sacks Research was number one institutional

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<v Speaker 1>investor America team number one in Charlie Yellis's Greenwich Research

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<v Speaker 1>survey and number one in financial world, which doesn't exist anymore.

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<v Speaker 1>The first to still exists in terms of measuring people's effecting.

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<v Speaker 1>This now to show you how a little influence I say,

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<v Speaker 1>this is not this is that video They had a

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<v Speaker 1>little influence I had at Goldman and I said this

0:12:42.520 --> 0:12:45.400
<v Speaker 1>had a big smile. I was well regarded. Uh. For

0:12:45.440 --> 0:12:47.600
<v Speaker 1>a decade, I was telling Goldman Sacks, you're making a

0:12:47.640 --> 0:12:51.280
<v Speaker 1>mistake by not being in the asset managing business. I was.

0:12:51.360 --> 0:12:53.880
<v Speaker 1>I was shocked when I was reading your background and

0:12:53.920 --> 0:12:56.960
<v Speaker 1>I'm like, wait, Goldman Sacks didn't have an asset management

0:12:57.000 --> 0:13:01.720
<v Speaker 1>division before. Something it made it's hard to imagine teen

0:13:02.360 --> 0:13:05.760
<v Speaker 1>ninety one. Actually, and for deckcarese telling the firm you're

0:13:05.800 --> 0:13:08.120
<v Speaker 1>making a mistake by not being an asset management and

0:13:08.160 --> 0:13:11.080
<v Speaker 1>for decade they said, Lee, you don't get it that

0:13:11.120 --> 0:13:13.320
<v Speaker 1>we are of the belief that brokers should do brokerage,

0:13:13.360 --> 0:13:15.880
<v Speaker 1>money manage and do money management. Don't compete with your customer,

0:13:16.280 --> 0:13:19.400
<v Speaker 1>Goldman Sachs typical customer at that time was an institutional investor.

0:13:20.160 --> 0:13:22.240
<v Speaker 1>And so I said, well, look look around your Mary

0:13:22.320 --> 0:13:27.640
<v Speaker 1>Lynchest Management, uh CSFPST Management, the Kid I Be Buddies

0:13:27.679 --> 0:13:31.040
<v Speaker 1>division is called Webster att Management. Everybody was getting into

0:13:31.080 --> 0:13:34.400
<v Speaker 1>the business set. One firm who was Goldman's art trading rival,

0:13:34.440 --> 0:13:37.760
<v Speaker 1>that was Solomon Brothers. And then one morning Solomon comes

0:13:37.760 --> 0:13:40.679
<v Speaker 1>out and says, we're pleased to announce that Bob Solomon Jr.

0:13:40.760 --> 0:13:43.240
<v Speaker 1>Will be leaving the research department to start Salmon Brothers

0:13:43.280 --> 0:13:47.160
<v Speaker 1>asset Management. And Bob Rubin and Steve Friedman, who were

0:13:47.200 --> 0:13:48.760
<v Speaker 1>then co heads of the firm, came to me and said,

0:13:48.760 --> 0:13:50.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, we made a mistake. You were right. You

0:13:50.600 --> 0:13:53.400
<v Speaker 1>were right when you leave research and do for us

0:13:53.400 --> 0:13:56.320
<v Speaker 1>to invest in management what you did for us in research.

0:13:56.960 --> 0:13:59.640
<v Speaker 1>And so after about a year or so doing this,

0:13:59.760 --> 0:14:01.600
<v Speaker 1>because aim very clear that you know, I had to

0:14:01.600 --> 0:14:04.880
<v Speaker 1>be on the road constantly to innovate new products to generally,

0:14:04.960 --> 0:14:08.120
<v Speaker 1>you know, capture new assets. And I really wanted to

0:14:08.200 --> 0:14:11.720
<v Speaker 1>visit companies and find outstanding managements make out standing investments.

0:14:12.400 --> 0:14:14.840
<v Speaker 1>And I have great respect for Goldman. I owe a

0:14:14.880 --> 0:14:17.480
<v Speaker 1>lot to my success at Goldmen. I started with nothing.

0:14:17.800 --> 0:14:20.280
<v Speaker 1>I left Goldman very wealthy. Man. I told him I

0:14:20.320 --> 0:14:23.880
<v Speaker 1>really wanted to retire ephemistically, I worked hard and now

0:14:23.880 --> 0:14:25.680
<v Speaker 1>that I worked at Goldman, I worked very hard at Goldman,

0:14:26.040 --> 0:14:28.320
<v Speaker 1>and I wanted to basically start a hedge fund. And

0:14:28.440 --> 0:14:30.720
<v Speaker 1>I believe in no blessed Oblieg and I told him,

0:14:30.760 --> 0:14:33.280
<v Speaker 1>you know, we were still a private partnership UM at

0:14:33.280 --> 0:14:35.480
<v Speaker 1>the time. And uh, I said, you know, if you

0:14:35.520 --> 0:14:38.080
<v Speaker 1>think my having a hedge funds of violation might noncompete,

0:14:38.360 --> 0:14:39.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, I wouldn't do it. And they said, no,

0:14:39.760 --> 0:14:41.600
<v Speaker 1>we we can't possibly say that because you know, we

0:14:41.640 --> 0:14:44.360
<v Speaker 1>don't want to have a hedge fund. And so I

0:14:44.440 --> 0:14:48.000
<v Speaker 1>started Omega, and uh it became something I didn't plan.

0:14:48.120 --> 0:14:51.120
<v Speaker 1>To be honest with you, Uh, this is not a

0:14:51.160 --> 0:14:53.720
<v Speaker 1>TV but I'm I'm you have a big smile on

0:14:53.720 --> 0:14:57.160
<v Speaker 1>your face. But I basically also a larger than average guy.

0:14:57.680 --> 0:15:00.680
<v Speaker 1>And I said, you know, I'm gonna have a small business. Uh,

0:15:00.720 --> 0:15:02.840
<v Speaker 1>and succeed at the only thing that's alluded me all

0:15:02.920 --> 0:15:04.560
<v Speaker 1>my life. Let's get to a normal size is and

0:15:04.640 --> 0:15:06.520
<v Speaker 1>lose some weight. And I have a gym in the

0:15:06.560 --> 0:15:08.600
<v Speaker 1>office and work out and you know, manage a few

0:15:08.640 --> 0:15:12.280
<v Speaker 1>hundred million dollars and down to a normal size. Take

0:15:12.320 --> 0:15:15.080
<v Speaker 1>it easy a way, well, no work, but basically get

0:15:15.120 --> 0:15:17.880
<v Speaker 1>to a normal size, have a more balanced life. And uh,

0:15:18.280 --> 0:15:21.400
<v Speaker 1>what happened is you to my first year, we're up

0:15:21.440 --> 0:15:24.640
<v Speaker 1>about twenty three or twice with the market, and in

0:15:24.800 --> 0:15:26.640
<v Speaker 1>ninety three had about a year I was up like

0:15:26.680 --> 0:15:31.440
<v Speaker 1>sevent because we correctly called a big decline interest rates globally,

0:15:31.920 --> 0:15:34.880
<v Speaker 1>and the firm really starts to grow quite dramatically in size.

0:15:35.440 --> 0:15:37.720
<v Speaker 1>Uh so, Um, we've gone from the start up with

0:15:37.760 --> 0:15:39.840
<v Speaker 1>a few hundred million to nine and a half billion.

0:15:40.280 --> 0:15:43.200
<v Speaker 1>But it's been a great run. And uh, I love

0:15:43.200 --> 0:15:45.520
<v Speaker 1>what I do, and I do a lot of talks

0:15:45.640 --> 0:15:48.960
<v Speaker 1>to meetings with youngsters. They try to give them career guidance.

0:15:49.000 --> 0:15:52.040
<v Speaker 1>I tell him, you know, follow the advice of Henry Ford.

0:15:52.120 --> 0:15:53.840
<v Speaker 1>The best way to make money is not to think

0:15:53.880 --> 0:15:57.160
<v Speaker 1>about making money. Another theme is Warren Buffers is going

0:15:57.200 --> 0:15:59.320
<v Speaker 1>to work with somebody you respected admire, tap dance to

0:15:59.360 --> 0:16:01.560
<v Speaker 1>work and everything will take care of itself. And what

0:16:01.720 --> 0:16:03.440
<v Speaker 1>I say basically is do what you love, love what

0:16:03.520 --> 0:16:04.640
<v Speaker 1>you do. If you do what you love me you

0:16:04.720 --> 0:16:06.720
<v Speaker 1>love what you do. With a little bit of luck,

0:16:06.720 --> 0:16:08.760
<v Speaker 1>you're a bound to be successful. And that's kind of

0:16:08.800 --> 0:16:10.560
<v Speaker 1>where I'm at. I mean, I love what I do.

0:16:10.720 --> 0:16:13.160
<v Speaker 1>I'm Barry rid Hults. You're listening to Masters in Business

0:16:13.160 --> 0:16:16.200
<v Speaker 1>on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest today is Lee Cooperman.

0:16:16.640 --> 0:16:21.360
<v Speaker 1>He is the founder of Omega Advisors and basically spent

0:16:21.440 --> 0:16:23.960
<v Speaker 1>the first twenty five or so years of his career

0:16:24.280 --> 0:16:29.720
<v Speaker 1>at Goldman Sachs as the UH director of the Investment Department,

0:16:29.800 --> 0:16:33.440
<v Speaker 1>and he created and helped build the asset Management Department.

0:16:33.760 --> 0:16:37.280
<v Speaker 1>Let's talk a little bit about philanthropy. League you Um,

0:16:37.360 --> 0:16:39.640
<v Speaker 1>you said earlier, you're the son of immigrants from the

0:16:39.680 --> 0:16:43.840
<v Speaker 1>South Bronx. Um, did you ever imagine when you were

0:16:43.840 --> 0:16:46.920
<v Speaker 1>going to school and in the Bronx you would grow

0:16:47.000 --> 0:16:52.680
<v Speaker 1>up to become a philanthropist? Never? Never, never, never? What

0:16:52.680 --> 0:16:57.000
<v Speaker 1>what is that like? Coming and from from self described

0:16:57.560 --> 0:17:00.240
<v Speaker 1>very humble roots. There's there's a question. We have a

0:17:00.280 --> 0:17:03.760
<v Speaker 1>mutual friend, Doug Cass and Doug said to ask you

0:17:03.960 --> 0:17:09.800
<v Speaker 1>about the plumbers wrench that you sometimes carry around. Uh.

0:17:09.880 --> 0:17:13.160
<v Speaker 1>Doug's very kind towards me, very complimentary, and I appreciate Doug,

0:17:13.200 --> 0:17:16.600
<v Speaker 1>and Doug's a bright fellow. Look, if you step back

0:17:16.680 --> 0:17:19.040
<v Speaker 1>and think about it, there's only four things you could

0:17:19.040 --> 0:17:23.640
<v Speaker 1>do with money. You could consume it on personal expenditures

0:17:24.200 --> 0:17:26.199
<v Speaker 1>and thankf I've been in a business that generates a

0:17:26.200 --> 0:17:29.000
<v Speaker 1>lot of income, and if you if I don't collect art,

0:17:29.440 --> 0:17:32.119
<v Speaker 1>I can't consume my wealth. And I've never seen the

0:17:32.200 --> 0:17:35.080
<v Speaker 1>value proposition art and I really obviously missed a huge

0:17:35.080 --> 0:17:39.040
<v Speaker 1>opportunity well the past a couple of decades. Yeah, okay,

0:17:39.080 --> 0:17:41.320
<v Speaker 1>but so you could consume your well the second as

0:17:41.359 --> 0:17:44.560
<v Speaker 1>you can give it to your children. Okay, And I'll

0:17:44.600 --> 0:17:46.560
<v Speaker 1>take these one of the time after I mentioned all four.

0:17:46.840 --> 0:17:48.479
<v Speaker 1>The third is you can give it to the government

0:17:48.480 --> 0:17:50.680
<v Speaker 1>the form of taxation, or the fourth as you can

0:17:50.720 --> 0:17:54.800
<v Speaker 1>recycle it back into society. Okay. So on the first one,

0:17:55.520 --> 0:18:00.240
<v Speaker 1>I'm not a consumer. I tend to basically work very hard,

0:18:00.240 --> 0:18:02.800
<v Speaker 1>work very long hours. I have a very purposeful wife,

0:18:03.320 --> 0:18:05.440
<v Speaker 1>married fifty one year. She has been an educator for

0:18:05.480 --> 0:18:08.040
<v Speaker 1>thirty five years, working with learning to say ablell neurologically

0:18:08.040 --> 0:18:11.040
<v Speaker 1>impaired children. And so she's not a consumer because she's

0:18:11.200 --> 0:18:14.600
<v Speaker 1>was working most of her adult life. Um, so I

0:18:14.600 --> 0:18:16.159
<v Speaker 1>can't consume it. You know, you could go out and

0:18:16.160 --> 0:18:18.480
<v Speaker 1>if you if you if you're not collector you don't

0:18:18.520 --> 0:18:21.280
<v Speaker 1>have enough money no matter you know what you make,

0:18:21.359 --> 0:18:23.280
<v Speaker 1>because you could buy a Picasso with the other day

0:18:23.280 --> 0:18:25.960
<v Speaker 1>for a hundred nine million or whatever. So I'm not

0:18:26.080 --> 0:18:28.960
<v Speaker 1>a consumer. Second, I believe in leaving my kids a

0:18:29.080 --> 0:18:30.880
<v Speaker 1>rational or sum of money. Do not want to take

0:18:30.880 --> 0:18:34.320
<v Speaker 1>away from them the incentive to self achieve. Okay. The

0:18:34.440 --> 0:18:36.240
<v Speaker 1>third is who wants to give it the government? If

0:18:36.280 --> 0:18:38.120
<v Speaker 1>you don't have to give it the government. Fourth, I've

0:18:38.119 --> 0:18:40.320
<v Speaker 1>made the determination. My family is going along with the

0:18:40.400 --> 0:18:43.720
<v Speaker 1>determination to take the vest bulk of my money and

0:18:43.760 --> 0:18:47.639
<v Speaker 1>return into society to try and create equal opportunity for

0:18:47.680 --> 0:18:52.200
<v Speaker 1>these splendid youngsters that don't have the opportunities today that

0:18:52.280 --> 0:18:55.080
<v Speaker 1>I enjoyed. You know. So let's let's start with the pledge.

0:18:55.320 --> 0:18:58.320
<v Speaker 1>You had a dinner with um a number of people,

0:18:58.800 --> 0:19:01.360
<v Speaker 1>and you saw in the pledge where you essentially committed

0:19:01.400 --> 0:19:05.080
<v Speaker 1>to giving away the majority. I think that the pledge

0:19:05.080 --> 0:19:06.760
<v Speaker 1>says you're a get away at least half, and I

0:19:06.800 --> 0:19:09.760
<v Speaker 1>intend to give away all my money. Was I given

0:19:09.800 --> 0:19:12.520
<v Speaker 1>my children their inheritance about three or four years ago

0:19:13.160 --> 0:19:16.040
<v Speaker 1>in advance in events. Here's the money. Trying not to

0:19:16.200 --> 0:19:18.880
<v Speaker 1>do it well. I have two kids. One's a fabulous

0:19:18.960 --> 0:19:21.760
<v Speaker 1>money manager. I'm very proud of his accomplishments. Also runs

0:19:22.040 --> 0:19:24.119
<v Speaker 1>run a hedge fund, and he's very very smart. And

0:19:24.119 --> 0:19:25.919
<v Speaker 1>then I have another son who was equally smart up

0:19:25.920 --> 0:19:27.760
<v Speaker 1>in a different field. He has a PhD degree and

0:19:27.880 --> 0:19:33.320
<v Speaker 1>environmental scientist work for conservation to national on environmental issues. Uh.

0:19:33.359 --> 0:19:37.440
<v Speaker 1>And so I gave them their inheritance and what's left over. Basically,

0:19:37.440 --> 0:19:39.920
<v Speaker 1>my game plan is to give away half during my

0:19:40.000 --> 0:19:42.560
<v Speaker 1>lifetime to organizations that have made a difference to my

0:19:42.680 --> 0:19:45.480
<v Speaker 1>family in our lifetime, and the other half on to

0:19:45.520 --> 0:19:48.840
<v Speaker 1>give to a foundation where my children, grandchildren, daughter in

0:19:48.920 --> 0:19:51.920
<v Speaker 1>laws could periodically get together and give away the money

0:19:51.960 --> 0:19:55.600
<v Speaker 1>to worthy organization. So let's talk about some of the organizations. Well,

0:19:55.640 --> 0:19:57.679
<v Speaker 1>let me first, you know say this that you know

0:19:57.840 --> 0:20:00.639
<v Speaker 1>the I said this to warm buffet. If you're speaking

0:20:00.680 --> 0:20:03.560
<v Speaker 1>to people of great wealth, asking for half is not

0:20:03.680 --> 0:20:08.360
<v Speaker 1>asking for enough. But nor is that request original hundred

0:20:08.440 --> 0:20:11.760
<v Speaker 1>Andrew Carnegie said, he who dies rich dies disgraced. In

0:20:11.920 --> 0:20:14.359
<v Speaker 1>ninety Winston Churchill said you make a living by what

0:20:14.400 --> 0:20:16.040
<v Speaker 1>you get, you make a life by what you give.

0:20:16.440 --> 0:20:19.320
<v Speaker 1>In sixty one, when President Kennedy was inaugurated, he said,

0:20:19.520 --> 0:20:21.880
<v Speaker 1>if I we call it, Craig, that's not what your

0:20:21.880 --> 0:20:23.240
<v Speaker 1>country can do for you. Ask what you can do

0:20:23.280 --> 0:20:27.080
<v Speaker 1>for your country or something alone and then I told Warren,

0:20:27.119 --> 0:20:29.040
<v Speaker 1>I said, I'm Jewish, and he said that Thomas your

0:20:29.080 --> 0:20:32.720
<v Speaker 1>measurement not by what he has, but what he gives. So, um,

0:20:32.760 --> 0:20:37.159
<v Speaker 1>you know, I buy into the idea of philanthropic activity.

0:20:37.680 --> 0:20:39.800
<v Speaker 1>And you know, the large bulk of my giving thus

0:20:39.800 --> 0:20:42.640
<v Speaker 1>far has been to organizations that have made a difference

0:20:42.680 --> 0:20:46.000
<v Speaker 1>to me in my lifetime. So you know, a Hunter College.

0:20:46.440 --> 0:20:48.760
<v Speaker 1>I got a first class education from the University of

0:20:48.800 --> 0:20:51.639
<v Speaker 1>New York for twenty four dollars a semester. I know,

0:20:51.800 --> 0:20:53.679
<v Speaker 1>did I get a first class education? But I got

0:20:53.720 --> 0:20:57.120
<v Speaker 1>a terrific wife. So we've given them a very large

0:20:57.119 --> 0:21:00.480
<v Speaker 1>amount of money, both for a scholarship and uh and

0:21:00.520 --> 0:21:02.640
<v Speaker 1>financial aid for when I went to school. I mentioned

0:21:02.640 --> 0:21:04.960
<v Speaker 1>twenty four hour semester. I think the kids today like

0:21:04.960 --> 0:21:08.080
<v Speaker 1>six thousand dollars semester. That's cheap compared to the private school.

0:21:08.240 --> 0:21:10.800
<v Speaker 1>It is, but these kids have trouble coming up with

0:21:10.840 --> 0:21:13.680
<v Speaker 1>that kind of money. So providing financial aid to help

0:21:13.720 --> 0:21:17.440
<v Speaker 1>giving them equal opportunity. Then, um, I have a deader

0:21:17.440 --> 0:21:20.679
<v Speaker 1>gratitude to Columbia of opening the door to my career

0:21:20.680 --> 0:21:22.640
<v Speaker 1>in Wall Street. And I've given them a doubt a chair.

0:21:22.720 --> 0:21:26.159
<v Speaker 1>You've set up some scholarships and you've given some unconstricted

0:21:26.680 --> 0:21:28.720
<v Speaker 1>funds to them as well. Yeah, yeah, well there's a

0:21:28.800 --> 0:21:31.520
<v Speaker 1>large number. I'm embarrassed to mention in numbers. And I'm

0:21:31.560 --> 0:21:33.520
<v Speaker 1>not the most generous guy you're gonna meet. I've done

0:21:33.520 --> 0:21:36.200
<v Speaker 1>what I felt I want to do, so I think

0:21:36.200 --> 0:21:38.360
<v Speaker 1>our industry is popularly with a lot of very generous

0:21:38.359 --> 0:21:41.679
<v Speaker 1>people that have have a good soul and want to

0:21:41.760 --> 0:21:46.240
<v Speaker 1>give back to society. Then third, I was a trustee

0:21:46.240 --> 0:21:48.560
<v Speaker 1>for many years of St. Bonabus Medical Center, where the

0:21:48.600 --> 0:21:51.680
<v Speaker 1>largest hospitals and stay in New Jersey, and they were

0:21:51.920 --> 0:21:54.399
<v Speaker 1>endowed a new wing that's on the construction right as

0:21:54.440 --> 0:21:57.520
<v Speaker 1>we speak. I'm Barry ri Heults. You're listening to Masters

0:21:57.560 --> 0:22:00.240
<v Speaker 1>in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest to day

0:22:00.440 --> 0:22:03.800
<v Speaker 1>is Lee Cooperman of Goldman Sachs and now he runs

0:22:03.840 --> 0:22:06.640
<v Speaker 1>the hedge fund Omega Advisors, and I want to talk

0:22:06.680 --> 0:22:11.000
<v Speaker 1>a little bit Lee about value investing, because really you're

0:22:11.080 --> 0:22:14.399
<v Speaker 1>one of the great value investors. Your your track record

0:22:14.840 --> 0:22:20.359
<v Speaker 1>has been outstanding. You've outperformed the market by almost fifty percent.

0:22:20.600 --> 0:22:24.359
<v Speaker 1>Your your long term track record is fourteen percent and

0:22:24.480 --> 0:22:28.399
<v Speaker 1>change per annum, significantly better than than the benchmark at

0:22:28.440 --> 0:22:31.800
<v Speaker 1>least that's the most recent data. I saw about four

0:22:31.880 --> 0:22:34.440
<v Speaker 1>and fifty basis points neative wolf fees and nexus to

0:22:34.480 --> 0:22:37.240
<v Speaker 1>the SMP, which is fine. We don't want a leverage portfolio,

0:22:37.359 --> 0:22:42.040
<v Speaker 1>so for non leverage, non leverage, that's fantastic. Your percent

0:22:42.600 --> 0:22:45.760
<v Speaker 1>always room for improvement. But we're OK. So so let

0:22:45.760 --> 0:22:47.960
<v Speaker 1>me throw one of my favorite quotes of yours at

0:22:48.000 --> 0:22:51.640
<v Speaker 1>you and get some comments you. You have been known

0:22:51.680 --> 0:22:55.960
<v Speaker 1>to say your favorite question is what is ridiculously priced? Now?

0:22:56.560 --> 0:22:59.080
<v Speaker 1>So is it fair to say that you're not a

0:22:59.119 --> 0:23:03.400
<v Speaker 1>believer that markets are perfectly efficient? H? Yeah, I would

0:23:03.440 --> 0:23:07.480
<v Speaker 1>say that. I don't think Warren Buffett got going from

0:23:07.600 --> 0:23:11.840
<v Speaker 1>flipping newspapers to orre seventy five billion dollars if the

0:23:11.880 --> 0:23:15.600
<v Speaker 1>market was totally efficient. Whether it's Mary Gabilly, whether it

0:23:15.640 --> 0:23:20.640
<v Speaker 1>stand Drucomo, or there's Lee Cooperman. I think that everyone

0:23:20.720 --> 0:23:23.200
<v Speaker 1>seems to think that it's hard to beat the SMP. Well,

0:23:23.640 --> 0:23:26.600
<v Speaker 1>if it's so easy to underperform, the ability must exist

0:23:26.640 --> 0:23:28.919
<v Speaker 1>to outperform, And I think there's enough people that have

0:23:28.960 --> 0:23:33.000
<v Speaker 1>outperformed over number years to suggest that with patients and

0:23:33.119 --> 0:23:36.040
<v Speaker 1>some brains and a little bit of luck, that you

0:23:36.080 --> 0:23:39.800
<v Speaker 1>can outperform. So I'm committed to that proposition. I try

0:23:39.800 --> 0:23:42.760
<v Speaker 1>to make money for my investors a number of ways,

0:23:42.800 --> 0:23:44.920
<v Speaker 1>but number one, I do spend a lot of time

0:23:44.960 --> 0:23:48.200
<v Speaker 1>on the macro picture, you know, as the stock market overvalued,

0:23:48.320 --> 0:23:49.800
<v Speaker 1>is it under valued? Is it going up? Is it

0:23:49.840 --> 0:23:52.639
<v Speaker 1>going down? Because at the end of the day, stocks

0:23:52.640 --> 0:23:55.040
<v Speaker 1>are high risk financial assets to turn bonds and casual

0:23:55.080 --> 0:23:58.240
<v Speaker 1>low rist financial assets. And if it's an environment that's

0:23:58.320 --> 0:24:01.399
<v Speaker 1>negative for stocks, I want to be exposed. On the

0:24:01.480 --> 0:24:03.520
<v Speaker 1>other hand, of his environment part of the stocks positive

0:24:03.560 --> 0:24:05.639
<v Speaker 1>the stocks, I want to be heavily exposed. So let

0:24:05.640 --> 0:24:09.160
<v Speaker 1>me ask you right now, what is ridiculously priced today.

0:24:09.640 --> 0:24:11.920
<v Speaker 1>I think the only place that there's a bubble, in

0:24:12.040 --> 0:24:15.040
<v Speaker 1>my opinion is fixed income. I think in any kind

0:24:15.080 --> 0:24:18.320
<v Speaker 1>of longer term context, the Fed funds rate doesn't belong

0:24:18.320 --> 0:24:22.119
<v Speaker 1>at zero and higher. Yeah, I would say so. I

0:24:22.119 --> 0:24:27.159
<v Speaker 1>mean I think that uh, if interest rates deserve to

0:24:27.240 --> 0:24:30.000
<v Speaker 1>belong where they are, the stock market is not going

0:24:30.040 --> 0:24:33.720
<v Speaker 1>to go up because over time, whatever the market is,

0:24:33.720 --> 0:24:36.080
<v Speaker 1>whether the United States, whether it's Europe, whether it's Japan,

0:24:36.200 --> 0:24:39.680
<v Speaker 1>whether it's uh China, that you would think that the

0:24:39.880 --> 0:24:42.439
<v Speaker 1>long term return in the stock market would be a

0:24:42.520 --> 0:24:45.919
<v Speaker 1>function of the growth of the economy, the rate of

0:24:46.000 --> 0:24:49.320
<v Speaker 1>change in corporate profits, the consumer price index, and what

0:24:49.440 --> 0:24:51.800
<v Speaker 1>you can earn in alternative instruments, whether it be bonds

0:24:51.880 --> 0:24:53.520
<v Speaker 1>or cash. So if you take a look at the

0:24:53.560 --> 0:24:57.880
<v Speaker 1>United States and take thirteen and fourteen, take those three

0:24:57.960 --> 0:25:01.240
<v Speaker 1>years and average them, the ray of growth and ECONI

0:25:01.280 --> 0:25:04.200
<v Speaker 1>has been about two point three percent per annum, so

0:25:04.240 --> 0:25:07.040
<v Speaker 1>we're way lower on rates. Well, well, let me go through.

0:25:07.080 --> 0:25:09.640
<v Speaker 1>So two point three was the real GDP growth. Profits

0:25:09.680 --> 0:25:12.600
<v Speaker 1>rose a little over six percent, the freight of inflation

0:25:12.680 --> 0:25:15.600
<v Speaker 1>was about one eight percent. If you were conservative and

0:25:15.600 --> 0:25:18.520
<v Speaker 1>sat on cash, earned zero for the three years, and

0:25:18.600 --> 0:25:21.240
<v Speaker 1>the tenure government to current coupon was about two point

0:25:21.240 --> 0:25:25.280
<v Speaker 1>to two point three. Notwithstanding those very modest numbers, the

0:25:25.320 --> 0:25:28.240
<v Speaker 1>stock market returned over per annum for each of the

0:25:28.280 --> 0:25:31.960
<v Speaker 1>three years thirteen and fourteen. I think that game is over.

0:25:32.119 --> 0:25:34.280
<v Speaker 1>I think that the markets caught up. The markets about

0:25:34.320 --> 0:25:37.040
<v Speaker 1>sixty and a half seventeen times earnings. I think very

0:25:37.040 --> 0:25:40.320
<v Speaker 1>fully valued any kind of historical context. Uh, some would

0:25:40.400 --> 0:25:43.240
<v Speaker 1>argue is maybe modestly overvalued rowth of the history, but

0:25:43.280 --> 0:25:46.160
<v Speaker 1>if you look at fixed income, it's very overvalued. Roads

0:25:46.240 --> 0:25:48.080
<v Speaker 1>the history. I always tell people. I don't want to

0:25:48.119 --> 0:25:51.400
<v Speaker 1>sound like a statistician, but from nineteen hundred and sixty

0:25:51.440 --> 0:25:54.800
<v Speaker 1>to the present, the multiple in the SMP five average

0:25:54.800 --> 0:25:57.840
<v Speaker 1>to touch under fifteen when the rate of inflation range

0:25:57.880 --> 0:25:59.919
<v Speaker 1>between one and three percent where it is now, the

0:26:00.040 --> 0:26:03.480
<v Speaker 1>multiple was about sixteen point seven sixteen point eight where

0:26:03.480 --> 0:26:05.560
<v Speaker 1>we are right now. We are now. However, that same

0:26:05.880 --> 0:26:09.280
<v Speaker 1>fifty idea period when the multiple the market was fifteen,

0:26:09.560 --> 0:26:12.560
<v Speaker 1>the tenure US government average six point six seven currently

0:26:12.560 --> 0:26:14.440
<v Speaker 1>two point three, so you're a better third of the

0:26:14.480 --> 0:26:17.560
<v Speaker 1>long term average, and T bills average a touch under

0:26:17.600 --> 0:26:21.439
<v Speaker 1>five currently zero. Okay, so relative to fixed income, the

0:26:21.480 --> 0:26:24.160
<v Speaker 1>market is very attractively priced. I think the only place

0:26:24.240 --> 0:26:28.160
<v Speaker 1>I see a bubble is because of the extraordinarily accommodative

0:26:28.200 --> 0:26:31.520
<v Speaker 1>monetary policies globally that interest rates are well below where

0:26:31.520 --> 0:26:33.640
<v Speaker 1>you ought to be. And if interest rates belong where

0:26:33.640 --> 0:26:35.720
<v Speaker 1>they are, that means growth in the economy, growth and

0:26:35.760 --> 0:26:38.680
<v Speaker 1>profits are not what people expecting. So it's one of

0:26:38.720 --> 0:26:43.200
<v Speaker 1>the other. Either we're in a very overextended bond market

0:26:43.359 --> 0:26:48.040
<v Speaker 1>rally and and rates have to go higher, or stocks

0:26:48.040 --> 0:26:50.199
<v Speaker 1>are very pricy. It's one or the other, and it

0:26:50.280 --> 0:26:54.520
<v Speaker 1>sounds like you're betting that stocks are reasonably priced relative

0:26:54.560 --> 0:26:57.600
<v Speaker 1>to all these other metrics versus bonds. I think the

0:26:57.680 --> 0:27:01.320
<v Speaker 1>stock market already allows for some rise in rates, and

0:27:01.400 --> 0:27:03.360
<v Speaker 1>I think the issue for the stock market deal with

0:27:04.040 --> 0:27:07.120
<v Speaker 1>is a slope of the rise. I mean, I'm somewhat quizzical.

0:27:07.119 --> 0:27:08.719
<v Speaker 1>A matter of fact, I just saw Gary Cohen as

0:27:08.720 --> 0:27:11.080
<v Speaker 1>a very bright man in a comment that the market

0:27:11.080 --> 0:27:14.240
<v Speaker 1>is not prepared for a FED rate rise, and I

0:27:14.240 --> 0:27:17.080
<v Speaker 1>don't get it. I honestly don't get it. Everybody's talking

0:27:17.080 --> 0:27:20.040
<v Speaker 1>about it almost every day, okay, And I'll give you

0:27:20.040 --> 0:27:23.720
<v Speaker 1>the statistics. There's been eight rate cycles since the mid fifties,

0:27:24.080 --> 0:27:27.000
<v Speaker 1>and on average from the first FED rate hike to

0:27:27.080 --> 0:27:30.520
<v Speaker 1>the market peak was thirty months. It took thirty months

0:27:30.640 --> 0:27:32.720
<v Speaker 1>on average the market the peak after the first FED

0:27:32.800 --> 0:27:35.159
<v Speaker 1>rate hike, and the hour of the shortest period of

0:27:35.160 --> 0:27:38.240
<v Speaker 1>time was ten months. And those rate rises, those eight

0:27:38.280 --> 0:27:41.880
<v Speaker 1>periods in the mid fifties did not start from zero, okay.

0:27:41.960 --> 0:27:45.159
<v Speaker 1>And on average, from the first FED rate hike to

0:27:45.760 --> 0:27:47.919
<v Speaker 1>a year after the first FED rate hike, the market

0:27:47.920 --> 0:27:50.520
<v Speaker 1>was hired by almost ten percent. And so you know,

0:27:51.040 --> 0:27:56.679
<v Speaker 1>rising interest rates are indicative of improving economy, and so

0:27:56.800 --> 0:27:58.320
<v Speaker 1>I think it's only when the rates get to a

0:27:58.400 --> 0:28:00.760
<v Speaker 1>level that's competitive with returns and docks and the stock

0:28:00.800 --> 0:28:02.919
<v Speaker 1>market start to decline. But you know, we have a

0:28:02.960 --> 0:28:06.119
<v Speaker 1>central bank that's cheering on for more growth, more inflation,

0:28:06.680 --> 0:28:09.520
<v Speaker 1>and they're gonna be as a comminative as they can be,

0:28:09.640 --> 0:28:12.800
<v Speaker 1>and I think it's gonna be it's gonna require inflation

0:28:12.880 --> 0:28:15.639
<v Speaker 1>over two percent for the FED to become more restrictive,

0:28:16.080 --> 0:28:19.280
<v Speaker 1>and that would probably require wage growth of about three

0:28:19.320 --> 0:28:21.720
<v Speaker 1>and a a half percent, which probably won't happen until probably

0:28:21.800 --> 0:28:26.760
<v Speaker 1>late maybe. You know, we ran similar numbers that you

0:28:26.880 --> 0:28:29.679
<v Speaker 1>just described in terms of how the market performs in

0:28:29.680 --> 0:28:32.480
<v Speaker 1>a rising rate environment, and the one thing that was

0:28:32.600 --> 0:28:36.800
<v Speaker 1>really clear was when you start from relatively high interest

0:28:36.880 --> 0:28:41.120
<v Speaker 1>rates in a period of high inflation, that's the sort

0:28:41.160 --> 0:28:44.000
<v Speaker 1>of rate rise that's not great for equities. But when

0:28:44.040 --> 0:28:46.440
<v Speaker 1>you're starting from a very low level and what's lower

0:28:46.440 --> 0:28:50.200
<v Speaker 1>than zero and inflation is modest, you tend to see

0:28:50.200 --> 0:28:53.600
<v Speaker 1>smart stocks rise even as rates go higher. That would

0:28:53.600 --> 0:28:57.080
<v Speaker 1>be my view. It's only you know, it's it's it's

0:28:57.120 --> 0:28:59.960
<v Speaker 1>not a complex concept, but it's very very important point

0:29:00.280 --> 0:29:04.320
<v Speaker 1>gonna make, and that is, over time, the only way

0:29:04.440 --> 0:29:07.760
<v Speaker 1>bonds are just to higher interest rates and the decline

0:29:07.760 --> 0:29:11.440
<v Speaker 1>in price to keep the coupon current. The way stocks

0:29:11.440 --> 0:29:13.640
<v Speaker 1>and company to adjust to higher inflation is they take

0:29:13.680 --> 0:29:17.680
<v Speaker 1>the inflation in their costs, incorporating their selling prices, so

0:29:17.880 --> 0:29:21.360
<v Speaker 1>higher inflation lifts the nominal level of revenues and earnings.

0:29:21.960 --> 0:29:25.520
<v Speaker 1>Is only when the FED or central bank is fighting

0:29:25.680 --> 0:29:29.880
<v Speaker 1>to curb inflation that the market starts to decline because

0:29:29.920 --> 0:29:33.560
<v Speaker 1>curbing inflation is tanamount to curbing growth, and investors pay

0:29:33.560 --> 0:29:36.680
<v Speaker 1>a low multiple anticipation slow in growth. But we have

0:29:36.720 --> 0:29:39.840
<v Speaker 1>a FED that's very concerned about you know, income disparity,

0:29:40.000 --> 0:29:44.000
<v Speaker 1>social inequality, and wants to get more economic growth. And

0:29:44.040 --> 0:29:45.840
<v Speaker 1>so I think it's would be quite some time before

0:29:45.840 --> 0:29:48.520
<v Speaker 1>the FED takes the punch away from the punch bowl.

0:29:48.880 --> 0:29:50.720
<v Speaker 1>Uh you know, I mean it wasn't original. I think

0:29:50.720 --> 0:29:53.680
<v Speaker 1>it was George Schaeffer, some technician, uh fifty years ago

0:29:54.120 --> 0:29:57.240
<v Speaker 1>coined the phrase three steps and stumble. It took three

0:29:57.280 --> 0:29:59.360
<v Speaker 1>tightens by the FED for the market that to have

0:29:59.440 --> 0:30:01.960
<v Speaker 1>a stumble, and we haven't had the first tightening yet.

0:30:02.360 --> 0:30:06.040
<v Speaker 1>And it's fairly safe to say that we're not looking

0:30:06.080 --> 0:30:09.880
<v Speaker 1>at any sort of real inflation and wage growth, even

0:30:09.880 --> 0:30:13.280
<v Speaker 1>the most recent data, which has been improving, still fairly

0:30:13.320 --> 0:30:16.800
<v Speaker 1>tapped in terms of wage improvement. I would say that

0:30:16.880 --> 0:30:20.280
<v Speaker 1>the rate of inflation is stath of two percent, and uh,

0:30:20.320 --> 0:30:21.840
<v Speaker 1>it will be a while before we get above that.

0:30:22.400 --> 0:30:24.760
<v Speaker 1>So so let's talk about some of your favorite metrics.

0:30:24.800 --> 0:30:28.120
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned where the pe ratio is. Tell us about

0:30:28.160 --> 0:30:31.760
<v Speaker 1>other ways that you look to measure equities, whether it's

0:30:31.800 --> 0:30:36.120
<v Speaker 1>dividend yield or I'm very eclectic, you know. As I

0:30:36.160 --> 0:30:38.720
<v Speaker 1>said before, we've start out first trying to develop a

0:30:38.800 --> 0:30:43.200
<v Speaker 1>view of the market. Once we done macro view, and

0:30:43.240 --> 0:30:46.920
<v Speaker 1>then on the bottom up we try we understand the

0:30:47.000 --> 0:30:49.640
<v Speaker 1>value proposition at the SMP five hundred, which is the

0:30:49.720 --> 0:30:53.480
<v Speaker 1>broadest based, the most accepted index offers. So if you

0:30:53.560 --> 0:30:55.800
<v Speaker 1>look at the SMP five hundreds and index of five

0:30:56.040 --> 0:30:58.920
<v Speaker 1>companies growing on average five maybe six percent per adam

0:30:59.680 --> 0:31:02.560
<v Speaker 1>that basically has a dividend yield of about two percent,

0:31:03.080 --> 0:31:05.040
<v Speaker 1>that has a debt to capital ratio for around thirty

0:31:05.080 --> 0:31:07.800
<v Speaker 1>five or thirty six percent, sells a little under three

0:31:07.840 --> 0:31:12.360
<v Speaker 1>times this nominal book value. And four that statistics, you're

0:31:12.360 --> 0:31:15.560
<v Speaker 1>paying about sixteen a half seventeen times earnings. So our

0:31:15.600 --> 0:31:18.120
<v Speaker 1>game is very simple. We try to find more growth

0:31:18.200 --> 0:31:22.160
<v Speaker 1>at a lower multiple, more underlying asset value than the

0:31:22.200 --> 0:31:26.000
<v Speaker 1>market has at a lower evaluation, more income than the

0:31:26.040 --> 0:31:29.600
<v Speaker 1>market offers that a more attractive valuation. And you know,

0:31:30.120 --> 0:31:32.520
<v Speaker 1>the bond market is very homogeneous. You know, if you're

0:31:32.560 --> 0:31:35.200
<v Speaker 1>talking looking at triple A bonds, double A bond, single

0:31:35.200 --> 0:31:38.320
<v Speaker 1>A bonds, bonds of a similar quality moved with an

0:31:38.320 --> 0:31:40.440
<v Speaker 1>eighth of a point of each other, it's very homogeneous.

0:31:40.560 --> 0:31:43.960
<v Speaker 1>The stock market is heterogeneous. The SMP might be twenty

0:31:44.000 --> 0:31:46.320
<v Speaker 1>one as we speak, but there are some stocks that

0:31:46.400 --> 0:31:49.560
<v Speaker 1>might be already and some stocks that are seventeen hundred

0:31:49.560 --> 0:31:51.520
<v Speaker 1>on the index, and we're trying to be long the

0:31:51.640 --> 0:31:55.520
<v Speaker 1>seventeen hundred index type equivalence and be short of out.

0:31:56.400 --> 0:31:58.640
<v Speaker 1>So when you say some stocks are two hundred, you

0:31:58.640 --> 0:32:02.160
<v Speaker 1>mean they're very pricey, and the stocks are sere are

0:32:02.200 --> 0:32:05.760
<v Speaker 1>trading at a discount relative to what we perceived to

0:32:05.760 --> 0:32:08.640
<v Speaker 1>be the underlying asset value of the business. We've been

0:32:08.640 --> 0:32:12.600
<v Speaker 1>speaking with Leon Cooperman, founder of Omega Advisers. If you

0:32:12.720 --> 0:32:15.520
<v Speaker 1>enjoy this conversation, be sure and check out the rest

0:32:15.560 --> 0:32:18.520
<v Speaker 1>of our discussion. You could see that on Apple, iTunes,

0:32:18.920 --> 0:32:22.400
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg dot com, and SoundCloud. Be sure and check out

0:32:22.440 --> 0:32:26.000
<v Speaker 1>my daily column on Bloomberg View dot com or uh

0:32:26.040 --> 0:32:29.200
<v Speaker 1>follow me on Twitter at Rid Halts. I'm Barry Ridhults.

0:32:29.240 --> 0:32:32.200
<v Speaker 1>You've been listening to Masters in Business. I'm Bloomberg Radio.

0:32:32.760 --> 0:32:35.440
<v Speaker 1>Welcome to the podcast portion of our show. I know

0:32:35.560 --> 0:32:37.480
<v Speaker 1>I say this every week and you guys will make

0:32:37.480 --> 0:32:40.240
<v Speaker 1>fun of me, but really I have a very special

0:32:40.320 --> 0:32:44.080
<v Speaker 1>guest this week, someone who I've been actually chasing for

0:32:44.480 --> 0:32:48.280
<v Speaker 1>quite a while. Lee Cooperman, a legend on Wall Street,

0:32:49.160 --> 0:32:54.520
<v Speaker 1>ran Goldman Sachs Research department for twenty plus years practically,

0:32:54.560 --> 0:32:58.040
<v Speaker 1>and then set up Goman Sacks Asset Management Division UM

0:32:58.120 --> 0:33:01.520
<v Speaker 1>his hedge funds Omega Partner now manages about ten billion

0:33:01.560 --> 0:33:04.560
<v Speaker 1>dollars just under Is that about right? Nine three nine

0:33:04.600 --> 0:33:10.040
<v Speaker 1>point three long term returns in excess of about four

0:33:10.440 --> 0:33:14.080
<v Speaker 1>fifty basis points over the SMP five over a long

0:33:14.080 --> 0:33:18.320
<v Speaker 1>period of time. I really have so many questions for you.

0:33:18.840 --> 0:33:21.880
<v Speaker 1>Let me start with some stuff that I we skipped

0:33:21.880 --> 0:33:25.640
<v Speaker 1>through on the radio portion. So I get the sense

0:33:25.680 --> 0:33:30.640
<v Speaker 1>from you that Colombia extremely formative to you as an investor.

0:33:31.680 --> 0:33:36.040
<v Speaker 1>Columbia Business School, Yeah, Well, as I mentioned, I studied

0:33:36.120 --> 0:33:40.200
<v Speaker 1>under Dr Roger Murray, who was a real practitioner of Mega.

0:33:40.560 --> 0:33:44.240
<v Speaker 1>If you're familiar with the Tech Security Analysis by Graham

0:33:44.240 --> 0:33:46.520
<v Speaker 1>and Dodd, which is the kind of bible in the classic,

0:33:47.320 --> 0:33:49.600
<v Speaker 1>and there is a section there where there's like a

0:33:49.720 --> 0:33:52.720
<v Speaker 1>ratio and now analysis where they had about the twenty

0:33:52.720 --> 0:33:56.080
<v Speaker 1>different ratios over ten years to study a company's financial progress.

0:33:56.600 --> 0:34:00.160
<v Speaker 1>I remember from my paper for Security Analysis as I

0:34:00.200 --> 0:34:04.000
<v Speaker 1>did a study contrasting JP Stevens with Burlington Industries, and

0:34:04.040 --> 0:34:07.480
<v Speaker 1>I had this ten year ratio history, twenty different ratios,

0:34:08.080 --> 0:34:10.920
<v Speaker 1>and I had a transposition and one of maybe two

0:34:11.360 --> 0:34:14.880
<v Speaker 1>statistics in the exhibit, and Dr Murray caught it and

0:34:14.960 --> 0:34:17.160
<v Speaker 1>circled it and read, this is the kind of guy

0:34:17.160 --> 0:34:22.439
<v Speaker 1>who was sharp understood the business. And you know his

0:34:22.440 --> 0:34:29.919
<v Speaker 1>his love of his of his uh vocation rubbed off

0:34:29.960 --> 0:34:32.760
<v Speaker 1>on me and you know it was a great business.

0:34:32.760 --> 0:34:35.920
<v Speaker 1>You know where else I'm getting paid for enjoying what

0:34:36.040 --> 0:34:38.920
<v Speaker 1>I do. I mean, it's my vocation, is my advocation,

0:34:39.360 --> 0:34:41.960
<v Speaker 1>and historically it's been a means of supplementing my income

0:34:42.160 --> 0:34:44.720
<v Speaker 1>because if you invest intelligently you could do very well.

0:34:45.080 --> 0:34:49.080
<v Speaker 1>So I kind of I love the game. Um, I

0:34:49.120 --> 0:34:52.440
<v Speaker 1>get an earlier, stay late, uh your your work ethic.

0:34:52.880 --> 0:34:56.160
<v Speaker 1>Doug Casts we just got stuck. Earlier, Doug called you

0:34:56.239 --> 0:34:59.560
<v Speaker 1>the James Brown of the investing business, the hardest working

0:34:59.600 --> 0:35:02.000
<v Speaker 1>man in the industry. Maybe it's because I have an

0:35:02.000 --> 0:35:03.400
<v Speaker 1>average right que, so I got to work card that

0:35:03.480 --> 0:35:06.759
<v Speaker 1>somebody else is smart. That's nothing, you know. I get

0:35:06.800 --> 0:35:09.200
<v Speaker 1>in around six thirty sixty five in the morning, and

0:35:09.239 --> 0:35:11.279
<v Speaker 1>I tend to be an information hog. So I go

0:35:11.320 --> 0:35:13.279
<v Speaker 1>out pretty much every night of the week with other

0:35:13.320 --> 0:35:17.840
<v Speaker 1>money managers or companies to try and basically develop insights

0:35:17.880 --> 0:35:20.600
<v Speaker 1>into my investments. Uh. And I always trying to learn

0:35:20.680 --> 0:35:23.720
<v Speaker 1>from people that are probably smarter than me or equally

0:35:23.760 --> 0:35:26.799
<v Speaker 1>adept at what they do, and we exchange ideas. But

0:35:27.080 --> 0:35:29.760
<v Speaker 1>I'm totally committed. I believe in the concept of total commitment.

0:35:30.239 --> 0:35:34.080
<v Speaker 1>I believe my investors are owed my total commitment and fidelity.

0:35:34.160 --> 0:35:38.319
<v Speaker 1>And uh, I'm never striving to be number one, but

0:35:38.400 --> 0:35:41.320
<v Speaker 1>I want to deliver a competitive return to my investors.

0:35:41.360 --> 0:35:44.560
<v Speaker 1>I do not want to get rich under performing. So

0:35:44.600 --> 0:35:47.759
<v Speaker 1>when I started my business, UH twenty four years ago,

0:35:47.920 --> 0:35:50.280
<v Speaker 1>I had an exhibit which is still my exhibit today

0:35:50.280 --> 0:35:53.480
<v Speaker 1>in my pitch book, and it says I tell people

0:35:53.560 --> 0:35:55.840
<v Speaker 1>when when I meet in a perspective investor, they say, well,

0:35:55.840 --> 0:35:57.480
<v Speaker 1>if I invest with you, what am I gonna earn?

0:35:57.840 --> 0:35:59.400
<v Speaker 1>I would always say the same thing. I don't know

0:35:59.440 --> 0:36:01.560
<v Speaker 1>what you're gonna earn, but let me tell you what

0:36:01.680 --> 0:36:04.760
<v Speaker 1>will make me happy. Because what makes me happy doesn't

0:36:04.800 --> 0:36:07.520
<v Speaker 1>make you happy. I'd rather not invest with me because

0:36:07.520 --> 0:36:10.560
<v Speaker 1>that's the basis of a flawed relationship. So my objectives

0:36:10.560 --> 0:36:12.680
<v Speaker 1>are Number one, no down years, and I've had four

0:36:12.719 --> 0:36:15.680
<v Speaker 1>down years in twenty four. Always came roaring back. But

0:36:15.719 --> 0:36:18.200
<v Speaker 1>I've had down years. Uh, that doesn't mean you change

0:36:18.200 --> 0:36:20.200
<v Speaker 1>your objectives. That's still my objective, not to have a

0:36:20.239 --> 0:36:22.600
<v Speaker 1>down year. Number two, I want to beat the SMP

0:36:22.719 --> 0:36:25.239
<v Speaker 1>five net of my fees. I don't want to make

0:36:25.280 --> 0:36:28.320
<v Speaker 1>a lot of money under performing some mindless ben benchmark.

0:36:28.800 --> 0:36:31.520
<v Speaker 1>Number Three, I don't run a leverage portfolio, so I'd say,

0:36:31.800 --> 0:36:34.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, ten to twelve percent net returned to the

0:36:34.040 --> 0:36:37.279
<v Speaker 1>investor would make me happy. We've done fourteen percent net,

0:36:37.360 --> 0:36:39.880
<v Speaker 1>so I'm fine there. And fourth, I like to have

0:36:39.960 --> 0:36:42.680
<v Speaker 1>less volatility than the market. So I like to app

0:36:42.680 --> 0:36:45.080
<v Speaker 1>perform the market while being less voltile of the market.

0:36:45.440 --> 0:36:48.080
<v Speaker 1>And if you buy into that value proposition, come invest

0:36:48.120 --> 0:36:49.960
<v Speaker 1>with me, and I can assure you that we have

0:36:50.000 --> 0:36:53.160
<v Speaker 1>a total alignment of interest. So you know, we met

0:36:53.239 --> 0:36:56.640
<v Speaker 1>nine point three billion of that is general partner capital,

0:36:57.239 --> 0:36:59.640
<v Speaker 1>So you know we So you're a big investor in

0:36:59.640 --> 0:37:02.440
<v Speaker 1>your own my firm. You you you eat your own cooking,

0:37:02.719 --> 0:37:05.320
<v Speaker 1>eat my own cooking, and the team meets their own cooking.

0:37:05.360 --> 0:37:07.239
<v Speaker 1>We have a forty nine of us in the firm,

0:37:07.360 --> 0:37:10.600
<v Speaker 1>twenty five general partners. They all have money in the

0:37:10.680 --> 0:37:14.440
<v Speaker 1>farm UH as investors. And what I'd like to say

0:37:14.560 --> 0:37:17.160
<v Speaker 1>is we prosper the most when we get it right,

0:37:17.239 --> 0:37:19.000
<v Speaker 1>and we get hurt the most when we get it wrong.

0:37:19.400 --> 0:37:21.360
<v Speaker 1>And we're not in an asset capturing mission. We're in

0:37:21.400 --> 0:37:23.600
<v Speaker 1>a mission of trying to generate capital games and have

0:37:23.640 --> 0:37:27.240
<v Speaker 1>a total alignment of interest. You mentioned your down years,

0:37:27.320 --> 0:37:30.960
<v Speaker 1>and you mentioned something and when I was so, we

0:37:31.040 --> 0:37:32.800
<v Speaker 1>do a lot of research before I sit down with

0:37:33.360 --> 0:37:36.319
<v Speaker 1>a Lee Cooperman and and one of the things I

0:37:36.360 --> 0:37:40.600
<v Speaker 1>read was really quite astonishing. So one of your down

0:37:40.680 --> 0:37:43.239
<v Speaker 1>years was oh eight, you were still less volatile than

0:37:43.280 --> 0:37:47.120
<v Speaker 1>the market the SMP. The SMP was down thirty eight percent.

0:37:47.200 --> 0:37:49.560
<v Speaker 1>You have down thirty But what I wanted to ask

0:37:49.600 --> 0:37:52.920
<v Speaker 1>you about in oh eight and o nine, every hedge

0:37:52.920 --> 0:37:57.279
<v Speaker 1>fund I read about was gating their funds meeting. They

0:37:57.360 --> 0:38:02.799
<v Speaker 1>have an an option to not let their investors withdraw money,

0:38:02.880 --> 0:38:06.360
<v Speaker 1>and you refuse to do that. You said, we're on gated.

0:38:06.400 --> 0:38:08.240
<v Speaker 1>If you're not happy and you want to take your money,

0:38:08.520 --> 0:38:10.960
<v Speaker 1>it's your money. Take it. Yeah, I have Uh. I

0:38:11.000 --> 0:38:12.680
<v Speaker 1>think it was in New York Times and a little

0:38:12.680 --> 0:38:14.960
<v Speaker 1>story about that time. That's where I found that that

0:38:15.040 --> 0:38:16.760
<v Speaker 1>they had a picture of me and under the pictures

0:38:16.760 --> 0:38:18.680
<v Speaker 1>said they'd have to load me into my grave before

0:38:18.680 --> 0:38:20.560
<v Speaker 1>I get a capital who did not honor a high

0:38:20.600 --> 0:38:23.520
<v Speaker 1>water market. There were two aspects of oh eight, I'm

0:38:23.640 --> 0:38:27.000
<v Speaker 1>sure your your listeners understand. But one of the negatives

0:38:27.040 --> 0:38:29.040
<v Speaker 1>of the hedge fund, and it's fair by the way, uh,

0:38:29.560 --> 0:38:32.560
<v Speaker 1>compensation schemes is a so called high water mark, you know,

0:38:32.560 --> 0:38:35.640
<v Speaker 1>where you get paid for appreciation and lose money. You've

0:38:35.600 --> 0:38:37.640
<v Speaker 1>got to make back the lossit before you get paid again.

0:38:37.880 --> 0:38:40.400
<v Speaker 1>Another word, just started a hundred bucks and you're getting

0:38:40.400 --> 0:38:44.239
<v Speaker 1>two and twenty, it drops down to eighty. The performance

0:38:44.280 --> 0:38:47.280
<v Speaker 1>feed doesn't show up again until you're over that hundred

0:38:47.280 --> 0:38:50.200
<v Speaker 1>again exactly, and a lot of money. Match is elected

0:38:50.239 --> 0:38:52.279
<v Speaker 1>to close up and oh wait, because they got way

0:38:52.320 --> 0:38:54.360
<v Speaker 1>below their high water and they could not make an

0:38:54.400 --> 0:38:57.640
<v Speaker 1>incentive fee, and I kind of feel that's morally wrong

0:38:57.800 --> 0:39:00.839
<v Speaker 1>because it's one thing if it investors. Look, I'm scared

0:39:00.840 --> 0:39:03.160
<v Speaker 1>about the environment, and I want my where where I

0:39:03.160 --> 0:39:04.960
<v Speaker 1>I'm scared about you the money matag, I want my

0:39:05.000 --> 0:39:07.080
<v Speaker 1>money back there. To stay of money, they should get

0:39:07.120 --> 0:39:11.600
<v Speaker 1>it back, okay, But to voluntarily give somebody back the money.

0:39:11.640 --> 0:39:14.400
<v Speaker 1>And so I'm closing up and retiring because i can't

0:39:14.440 --> 0:39:17.759
<v Speaker 1>make money is wrong because the high watermark is an

0:39:17.760 --> 0:39:20.400
<v Speaker 1>asset of the investor, and you should not deprive that

0:39:20.480 --> 0:39:22.520
<v Speaker 1>investor of the asset as long as he or she

0:39:22.640 --> 0:39:25.799
<v Speaker 1>is willing to continue to take the risk. And so, uh,

0:39:26.160 --> 0:39:28.120
<v Speaker 1>closing up and giving back money I think was wrong.

0:39:28.480 --> 0:39:30.160
<v Speaker 1>And the other thing that and then, by the way,

0:39:30.200 --> 0:39:33.640
<v Speaker 1>relaunching under a different name, there's some huge some of

0:39:33.640 --> 0:39:35.879
<v Speaker 1>that happened. When you started. There were you know, I'm

0:39:35.880 --> 0:39:39.040
<v Speaker 1>gonna quote Jim Channos back when you know, we look

0:39:39.080 --> 0:39:41.920
<v Speaker 1>at how many hedge funds are not generating alpha, and

0:39:42.080 --> 0:39:44.400
<v Speaker 1>Jim Chanos said said, well, when he launched, there were

0:39:44.400 --> 0:39:46.560
<v Speaker 1>a hundred or so hedge funds and they were all

0:39:46.600 --> 0:39:49.520
<v Speaker 1>really profitable. Now there's ten thousand hedge funds and it's

0:39:49.560 --> 0:39:52.520
<v Speaker 1>the same hundred that are generating most of the YA.

0:39:53.280 --> 0:39:56.759
<v Speaker 1>I can't generalize, UH, but you know, I've used this

0:39:56.760 --> 0:39:59.960
<v Speaker 1>as a hand out. I think a very very distinct

0:40:00.040 --> 0:40:03.680
<v Speaker 1>whish the person for for good reason. Carol Loomis, who

0:40:03.760 --> 0:40:06.360
<v Speaker 1>has been advising Warren Buffett on the writing of his

0:40:06.400 --> 0:40:10.680
<v Speaker 1>annuary portfet know fifty years I think nineteen seventy one,

0:40:11.280 --> 0:40:15.200
<v Speaker 1>wrote a very negative article about hedge funds UH, focusing

0:40:15.280 --> 0:40:18.960
<v Speaker 1>on the performance from nineteen sixty eight to nineteen seventy

0:40:19.000 --> 0:40:21.480
<v Speaker 1>where all the hedge funds got murdered, with the exception

0:40:21.520 --> 0:40:23.359
<v Speaker 1>of Stein, Hunt, find and Burke, which which was up

0:40:23.400 --> 0:40:26.359
<v Speaker 1>five percent in that period. And she kind of rang

0:40:26.440 --> 0:40:29.200
<v Speaker 1>the death knell for hedge funds. UH. And if you

0:40:29.280 --> 0:40:31.759
<v Speaker 1>go back and look as as distinguished and smart as

0:40:31.800 --> 0:40:34.440
<v Speaker 1>she is, and she is distinguished, you're smart. Couldn't been

0:40:34.440 --> 0:40:37.200
<v Speaker 1>more wrong. The largest hedge funds in nineteen sixty eight

0:40:37.320 --> 0:40:41.120
<v Speaker 1>was a W. Jones at two hundred million, okay, And

0:40:41.160 --> 0:40:43.759
<v Speaker 1>the whole industry might have been a billion dollars if

0:40:43.760 --> 0:40:45.799
<v Speaker 1>you're lucky. And today I don't know, the hedges over

0:40:45.920 --> 0:40:49.200
<v Speaker 1>three trillions, three trillion dollars. And you said ten thou

0:40:49.400 --> 0:40:53.400
<v Speaker 1>hedge funds. Bridgewater has a hundred almost a hundred fifty

0:40:53.480 --> 0:40:56.560
<v Speaker 1>billion a q u R as a hundred plus. It's

0:40:56.600 --> 0:40:59.719
<v Speaker 1>all about performance. If you could deliver the performance, you'll

0:40:59.760 --> 0:41:02.440
<v Speaker 1>have a business. And so what happened in two thousand

0:41:02.560 --> 0:41:08.680
<v Speaker 1>and eight is uh, the stabilitating year of the five

0:41:08.800 --> 0:41:11.520
<v Speaker 1>years before two thousand eight, Let's say two thousand and

0:41:11.520 --> 0:41:14.279
<v Speaker 1>two to two thousand and seven, hedge funds were out

0:41:14.280 --> 0:41:19.560
<v Speaker 1>performing conventional money managers, and they attracted a lot of money, okay,

0:41:19.719 --> 0:41:22.240
<v Speaker 1>And what happened two thousand eight is people got scared.

0:41:22.600 --> 0:41:24.400
<v Speaker 1>I didn't realize you could lose money by being in

0:41:24.440 --> 0:41:26.120
<v Speaker 1>a hedge fund. The fact that the average hedge fund

0:41:26.200 --> 0:41:29.239
<v Speaker 1>was only down six less than half d SMP didn't

0:41:29.239 --> 0:41:31.560
<v Speaker 1>impress People say, I didn't realize you could lose money,

0:41:31.800 --> 0:41:34.120
<v Speaker 1>so they asked for their money back, and the hedge

0:41:34.120 --> 0:41:36.920
<v Speaker 1>fund industry shot themselves in the foot by gating capital.

0:41:37.280 --> 0:41:39.719
<v Speaker 1>There's nothing no better way to get money from an

0:41:39.719 --> 0:41:42.839
<v Speaker 1>individual by telling me you closed, you know, like made

0:41:42.880 --> 0:41:47.240
<v Speaker 1>off with time. People we want that which we can't have, Okay,

0:41:47.239 --> 0:41:51.040
<v Speaker 1>exactly that well phrased, and uh, there's no better way

0:41:51.040 --> 0:41:53.239
<v Speaker 1>of scaring people than telling you can't have your money back.

0:41:53.600 --> 0:41:56.239
<v Speaker 1>So even though the hedgefund industry performed their role by

0:41:56.280 --> 0:41:59.480
<v Speaker 1>being down less than half of the industry by gating capital.

0:41:59.520 --> 0:42:02.239
<v Speaker 1>They're scared everybody, But we didn't get We had about

0:42:02.280 --> 0:42:05.239
<v Speaker 1>six seven million dollars of redemptions. Every dollar was met

0:42:05.280 --> 0:42:08.680
<v Speaker 1>for cash, no gating, no in kind, and life went

0:42:08.719 --> 0:42:10.879
<v Speaker 1>on and we worked very hard to recover our high

0:42:10.920 --> 0:42:15.399
<v Speaker 1>water mark, which we did. You know, two thousand nine,

0:42:15.400 --> 0:42:20.319
<v Speaker 1>you were up about doubled the market performance. So well,

0:42:20.360 --> 0:42:23.160
<v Speaker 1>that's been a tendency where we underperformed. The history has

0:42:23.200 --> 0:42:28.040
<v Speaker 1>been that we generally significantly outperform coming out uh we uh,

0:42:28.080 --> 0:42:30.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, we were up a week before Lehman Brothers

0:42:30.320 --> 0:42:31.600
<v Speaker 1>hit in two thousand and eight. We were up on

0:42:31.640 --> 0:42:34.319
<v Speaker 1>the ear We totally really because the market was down

0:42:34.400 --> 0:42:37.759
<v Speaker 1>about I want to say about twenty something. I think

0:42:37.880 --> 0:42:42.319
<v Speaker 1>was less than that before Lehman hit before made less

0:42:42.320 --> 0:42:44.920
<v Speaker 1>than that. But but I recall that point in two

0:42:45.000 --> 0:42:47.000
<v Speaker 1>thousand and eight was a negative year off to look

0:42:47.080 --> 0:42:49.160
<v Speaker 1>up to very I think much more modestly. I'd helped

0:42:49.200 --> 0:42:54.320
<v Speaker 1>take it up modestly, and we totally misgauged the effect

0:42:54.400 --> 0:42:57.040
<v Speaker 1>of Lehman's and ovously in the market, and the fact

0:42:57.080 --> 0:42:58.719
<v Speaker 1>that there were a lot of people along with us,

0:42:58.760 --> 0:43:01.840
<v Speaker 1>including the government, is irrelevant. My investors looked to me

0:43:01.920 --> 0:43:05.760
<v Speaker 1>to protect their capital and with my responsibility is my era. Okay,

0:43:05.840 --> 0:43:08.120
<v Speaker 1>The only good thing I can say is we stuck

0:43:08.200 --> 0:43:11.440
<v Speaker 1>with the guns. We came back fifty and oh nine

0:43:14.280 --> 0:43:18.640
<v Speaker 1>flat and eleven thirty four in twelve and thirty eight

0:43:18.640 --> 0:43:22.040
<v Speaker 1>and thirteen and this year. Uh. Last year we had

0:43:22.040 --> 0:43:24.040
<v Speaker 1>a bad year, my worst year relative to the market.

0:43:24.040 --> 0:43:26.000
<v Speaker 1>We were flatish and the Y S and P was up.

0:43:26.160 --> 0:43:28.000
<v Speaker 1>But this year we're about two and a half times. Yes,

0:43:28.040 --> 0:43:31.319
<v Speaker 1>and people have about seven eight percent. But it's tough.

0:43:31.360 --> 0:43:33.719
<v Speaker 1>Game has gotten tougher and a lot of competition, a

0:43:33.800 --> 0:43:38.000
<v Speaker 1>lot of competition. But you're you even still with this competition,

0:43:38.080 --> 0:43:41.120
<v Speaker 1>you've managed to put up some those are all star numbers.

0:43:41.120 --> 0:43:44.319
<v Speaker 1>Even with a flat year or or an underperforming year.

0:43:44.680 --> 0:43:46.759
<v Speaker 1>That that's a heck of a run. That's seven year.

0:43:47.719 --> 0:43:50.239
<v Speaker 1>Well said enough. You know, we've been blessed by a

0:43:50.280 --> 0:43:53.040
<v Speaker 1>trended bull market. Now of course the UH and on

0:43:53.080 --> 0:43:55.400
<v Speaker 1>the right side of it, yeah, we we've had a

0:43:55.440 --> 0:43:58.920
<v Speaker 1>positive view. We try to add value to portfolios in

0:43:59.000 --> 0:44:01.279
<v Speaker 1>five ways, and the first as I mentioned before is

0:44:01.680 --> 0:44:04.120
<v Speaker 1>stocks are high risk financial assets. Short term bonds and

0:44:04.160 --> 0:44:06.839
<v Speaker 1>cash lowrist financial assets. And we spent a great deal

0:44:06.840 --> 0:44:09.960
<v Speaker 1>of time trying to study the market. I have a

0:44:10.080 --> 0:44:14.880
<v Speaker 1>terrific partner, vice chairman, Steve en Horne. He worked I

0:44:15.160 --> 0:44:17.480
<v Speaker 1>actually one of my better heart my best hire in

0:44:17.560 --> 0:44:19.719
<v Speaker 1>my career. I hired him at a podential insurance. He

0:44:19.760 --> 0:44:22.600
<v Speaker 1>worked directly under me for twelve years a goldman. I

0:44:22.640 --> 0:44:26.640
<v Speaker 1>retired from Goldley. He retired from Goldley in ninety eight,

0:44:26.719 --> 0:44:29.000
<v Speaker 1>not with the intent of joining me. He wasn't sure

0:44:29.040 --> 0:44:31.360
<v Speaker 1>what he was gonna do. And I read about his retirement.

0:44:31.400 --> 0:44:33.759
<v Speaker 1>I called him up and we had dinner, and I

0:44:33.800 --> 0:44:36.120
<v Speaker 1>got him to rejoin me as vice chairman. And he

0:44:36.200 --> 0:44:39.000
<v Speaker 1>spends the bulk of his time on the macro big picture.

0:44:39.000 --> 0:44:41.160
<v Speaker 1>Does a wonderful job for the firm. And we have

0:44:41.200 --> 0:44:43.880
<v Speaker 1>a whole policy group that meets every Monday to discuss

0:44:44.000 --> 0:44:47.839
<v Speaker 1>the global economy and FED and so let's talk about that,

0:44:47.920 --> 0:44:52.200
<v Speaker 1>because I'm fascinated by your process. What are those Monday

0:44:52.239 --> 0:44:55.239
<v Speaker 1>morning meetings like, well, you know, we get we get

0:44:55.280 --> 0:44:58.680
<v Speaker 1>together at eight fifteen the morning. Our head of macro

0:44:58.800 --> 0:45:01.120
<v Speaker 1>trading is on the many. Actually we have two people

0:45:01.160 --> 0:45:04.880
<v Speaker 1>in macro trading on the committee and they're studying China, Japan,

0:45:05.120 --> 0:45:09.839
<v Speaker 1>currency fixed income. We have a consulting economists that participates

0:45:09.840 --> 0:45:12.600
<v Speaker 1>in the meeting, Steve and I and our two co

0:45:12.760 --> 0:45:16.440
<v Speaker 1>directors of research and we we we it's like kind

0:45:16.440 --> 0:45:20.040
<v Speaker 1>of putting together a heuristic model about the world. You

0:45:20.080 --> 0:45:24.200
<v Speaker 1>know what looks miss priced, you know what looks overvalued?

0:45:25.360 --> 0:45:27.040
<v Speaker 1>When is the FED gonna move? What is the FED

0:45:27.120 --> 0:45:29.640
<v Speaker 1>move gonna be? Uh? What is it gonna what's the

0:45:29.680 --> 0:45:32.520
<v Speaker 1>impact on the market. You would you rather be in, uh,

0:45:32.680 --> 0:45:36.480
<v Speaker 1>Japan or Europe or United States? What's the return profile

0:45:36.520 --> 0:45:39.040
<v Speaker 1>on each of these markets? Where do you see FED

0:45:39.080 --> 0:45:41.960
<v Speaker 1>funds at the end of t s And we're trying

0:45:42.000 --> 0:45:43.920
<v Speaker 1>to find, you know, where the intelligent bed is. So

0:45:43.960 --> 0:45:45.640
<v Speaker 1>we're doing well this year in part because we have

0:45:45.640 --> 0:45:48.040
<v Speaker 1>money in Japan, we have money in Europe. Were short

0:45:48.080 --> 0:45:50.520
<v Speaker 1>to short endo the yell curve UH, and we've been

0:45:50.560 --> 0:45:53.800
<v Speaker 1>short UH the yen and been short the euro. Was

0:45:54.320 --> 0:45:56.960
<v Speaker 1>about to ask you are you long Japan shortly end

0:45:57.040 --> 0:46:00.040
<v Speaker 1>and and how do you affect that trade? Well? In

0:46:00.280 --> 0:46:03.799
<v Speaker 1>the in the cash market, we don't need to borrow money.

0:46:03.880 --> 0:46:07.200
<v Speaker 1>We have plenty of UH. You know capital and we

0:46:07.400 --> 0:46:10.720
<v Speaker 1>basically are we don't do a lot of individual stocks

0:46:10.719 --> 0:46:13.640
<v Speaker 1>in Japan, so they're not to my liking in all

0:46:13.680 --> 0:46:17.800
<v Speaker 1>honesty with long the topics and Nikki as opposed individual

0:46:17.800 --> 0:46:20.040
<v Speaker 1>stocks because we don't have a lot of stock expertise,

0:46:20.080 --> 0:46:23.560
<v Speaker 1>but we've had a strong macro view Japan. Don't have

0:46:23.600 --> 0:46:26.400
<v Speaker 1>a lot of Japanese stock expertise, no, but we have

0:46:26.480 --> 0:46:29.440
<v Speaker 1>a view of the Japanese market, so we've may expressed

0:46:29.440 --> 0:46:33.200
<v Speaker 1>that bet through the indices um and we kind of

0:46:33.280 --> 0:46:37.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, you have qui infinity. There many globally competitive

0:46:37.000 --> 0:46:40.520
<v Speaker 1>companies sellaying a very reasonable valuations with the multiples in

0:46:40.560 --> 0:46:43.360
<v Speaker 1>Japan are quite low relative to their intrat strate structure.

0:46:43.880 --> 0:46:46.200
<v Speaker 1>And we believe Europe is several years behind the United

0:46:46.239 --> 0:46:49.040
<v Speaker 1>States in terms of the economic recovery right now. Has

0:46:49.040 --> 0:46:52.480
<v Speaker 1>been buffeted by what's going on in Greece, but general

0:46:52.520 --> 0:46:55.279
<v Speaker 1>belief is there will be an agreement with Grease and

0:46:55.400 --> 0:46:58.359
<v Speaker 1>not gonna exit, and if they did exit, other than

0:46:58.360 --> 0:47:00.799
<v Speaker 1>a short term adjustment. The reality is Greece is two

0:47:00.800 --> 0:47:04.360
<v Speaker 1>tents of one percent of global gdp UM and it

0:47:04.400 --> 0:47:07.719
<v Speaker 1>would not be as significant as the market seems to

0:47:07.760 --> 0:47:09.600
<v Speaker 1>make it make it out, and I think that they'll

0:47:09.600 --> 0:47:15.200
<v Speaker 1>stay in the because Germany will basically compromise. You mentioned

0:47:15.440 --> 0:47:20.000
<v Speaker 1>Steinhardt earlier, Um, I believe his farm. He's an adviser

0:47:20.040 --> 0:47:22.560
<v Speaker 1>to wisdom Tree. Is that right? Yeah, that's a personal

0:47:22.560 --> 0:47:24.560
<v Speaker 1>investment he made. I don't know that much about it,

0:47:24.640 --> 0:47:27.960
<v Speaker 1>but they're big product over the past few years has

0:47:28.040 --> 0:47:33.279
<v Speaker 1>been there hedged Yen Long Japan product which has just

0:47:33.560 --> 0:47:36.320
<v Speaker 1>blown up. It's become a huge made a great investment

0:47:36.360 --> 0:47:39.640
<v Speaker 1>Wisdom Tree. Jonathan Steinberg has done a great job. I

0:47:39.680 --> 0:47:41.719
<v Speaker 1>didn't have the pleasure of knowing him. I knew his dad,

0:47:42.040 --> 0:47:44.719
<v Speaker 1>but basically Michael had the opportunity to back him, and

0:47:44.760 --> 0:47:47.080
<v Speaker 1>Michael made a great investment decision. I think Michael has

0:47:47.080 --> 0:47:50.239
<v Speaker 1>done extremely well in that investment. I don't know, I

0:47:50.280 --> 0:47:51.640
<v Speaker 1>don't know the details, but I think he's made a

0:47:51.640 --> 0:47:54.239
<v Speaker 1>lot of money. So let's keep working our way through

0:47:54.280 --> 0:47:57.920
<v Speaker 1>some of the questions. Uh I missed you mentioned Mario

0:47:58.040 --> 0:48:02.360
<v Speaker 1>Gibelli was with you at Columbia. Who else was in

0:48:02.400 --> 0:48:05.440
<v Speaker 1>your class of Columbia? Two guys that made remain clost

0:48:05.480 --> 0:48:08.759
<v Speaker 1>most closely in touch with were classmates. Is Art Sandberg

0:48:09.719 --> 0:48:12.240
<v Speaker 1>and what's he doing? That is he's doing a venture

0:48:12.239 --> 0:48:14.840
<v Speaker 1>capital in a major way. And he's pleased to report

0:48:14.880 --> 0:48:19.680
<v Speaker 1>he's extremely happy, doing very well, very successful financially, very scable,

0:48:20.080 --> 0:48:23.080
<v Speaker 1>just a very high quality human being. UH. And then

0:48:23.120 --> 0:48:26.279
<v Speaker 1>Mario and I have made remained closely in touch for

0:48:26.440 --> 0:48:31.560
<v Speaker 1>fifty years. UH. I have great admiration for Mario. I

0:48:31.600 --> 0:48:35.600
<v Speaker 1>like people that deal well with this success, that remember

0:48:35.640 --> 0:48:38.439
<v Speaker 1>where they came from, UH, and are prepared to give

0:48:38.480 --> 0:48:41.880
<v Speaker 1>back the society and the nice thing I like to say,

0:48:41.920 --> 0:48:44.399
<v Speaker 1>and I've said this so often about Mario. The only

0:48:44.440 --> 0:48:46.799
<v Speaker 1>thing that's changed with Mario, other than a lot of

0:48:46.880 --> 0:48:50.279
<v Speaker 1>digits after his net worth, is the color of his hair.

0:48:50.320 --> 0:48:52.120
<v Speaker 1>When I knew Marrio, he was a redhead. Now he's

0:48:52.160 --> 0:48:55.120
<v Speaker 1>got a full head of gray hair. He weighs less,

0:48:55.120 --> 0:48:56.600
<v Speaker 1>I think today than he weighed when he went to

0:48:56.600 --> 0:48:59.400
<v Speaker 1>Columbia business schools, which I would say I'd love to

0:48:59.400 --> 0:49:02.480
<v Speaker 1>be able to say. I can't say. I'm a bit heavier.

0:49:02.880 --> 0:49:05.600
<v Speaker 1>But he's a He's a great person, great human being,

0:49:05.640 --> 0:49:08.600
<v Speaker 1>and a terrific investor and has built a fabulous business.

0:49:08.600 --> 0:49:11.200
<v Speaker 1>I think they manage it with fifty billion dollars, a

0:49:11.280 --> 0:49:15.120
<v Speaker 1>very successful public company and very generous and UH. He

0:49:15.200 --> 0:49:18.399
<v Speaker 1>and I get together. I say at least a half

0:49:18.440 --> 0:49:21.279
<v Speaker 1>a dozen times a year. In fact, I invited him.

0:49:21.280 --> 0:49:23.359
<v Speaker 1>He's not Jewish, as you can hell from the name

0:49:23.880 --> 0:49:25.680
<v Speaker 1>I took. I took him on a u j A

0:49:25.760 --> 0:49:28.520
<v Speaker 1>mission to Cuba at eighteen months ago with his lovely wife,

0:49:28.520 --> 0:49:32.239
<v Speaker 1>Regina uh And then he and I and wives went

0:49:32.320 --> 0:49:35.839
<v Speaker 1>on about ten day around the world trip. On one

0:49:35.840 --> 0:49:39.360
<v Speaker 1>of these was sponsored by Columbia where they tartted a

0:49:39.440 --> 0:49:41.440
<v Speaker 1>plane for seven year eighty people and they have a

0:49:41.480 --> 0:49:44.440
<v Speaker 1>few lecturers and a doctor that goes along with you

0:49:44.520 --> 0:49:47.200
<v Speaker 1>and plane lands. The next thing you see, your luggage

0:49:47.239 --> 0:49:49.520
<v Speaker 1>is in your hotel room, and you put your luggage

0:49:49.520 --> 0:49:52.360
<v Speaker 1>at your your hotel room door and it's gone and

0:49:52.400 --> 0:49:56.839
<v Speaker 1>so very nice too. We went to Turkey, Egypt, uh Ti,

0:49:56.920 --> 0:49:59.400
<v Speaker 1>porn Agria, India, the Los city of Petro, and Jordan's

0:50:00.040 --> 0:50:04.040
<v Speaker 1>and uh Monica, Morocco, and it was very interesting and

0:50:04.080 --> 0:50:06.920
<v Speaker 1>we spent that time together. Now he's a global investor.

0:50:07.040 --> 0:50:09.880
<v Speaker 1>He's all over the world on a fairly regular basis.

0:50:09.840 --> 0:50:11.880
<v Speaker 1>Big transformation for him because he used to say it

0:50:11.920 --> 0:50:14.520
<v Speaker 1>was strictly United States only, but now he's a big

0:50:14.560 --> 0:50:18.399
<v Speaker 1>emerging market. Guys, but you were are famous for not

0:50:18.480 --> 0:50:22.640
<v Speaker 1>really liking to take a vacation. Well, uh, let me

0:50:22.760 --> 0:50:25.400
<v Speaker 1>say this that you said, or let me we phrase

0:50:25.480 --> 0:50:28.120
<v Speaker 1>that the best part about going on vacation is coming home.

0:50:28.440 --> 0:50:32.239
<v Speaker 1>That I would absolutely acknowledge. And the vacation I just

0:50:32.360 --> 0:50:35.719
<v Speaker 1>referenced with Mario. The best part of vacation was as follows.

0:50:36.480 --> 0:50:39.040
<v Speaker 1>I'm standing in the value of the kings and lux

0:50:39.080 --> 0:50:42.320
<v Speaker 1>for Egypt looking at that many many, many, many thousand

0:50:42.360 --> 0:50:45.680
<v Speaker 1>year olds fink statue. My cell phone goes off at

0:50:45.680 --> 0:50:48.120
<v Speaker 1>one o'clock in the afternoon and it's seven am New

0:50:48.200 --> 0:50:50.960
<v Speaker 1>York time. It's my trained desk calling to tell me

0:50:51.000 --> 0:50:54.560
<v Speaker 1>that largest position Atlas Energy just agreed to be taken

0:50:54.600 --> 0:50:58.800
<v Speaker 1>over above the last sales by a chevron. And I

0:50:58.840 --> 0:51:00.360
<v Speaker 1>would say that was the highlight of the trip, not

0:51:00.400 --> 0:51:04.200
<v Speaker 1>take anything along. So it wasn't the sphinx. It was

0:51:04.280 --> 0:51:09.160
<v Speaker 1>a takeover, and the takeover happened to be a largest position.

0:51:09.520 --> 0:51:13.400
<v Speaker 1>Um so uh yeah, I'm I kind of in touch

0:51:13.440 --> 0:51:16.400
<v Speaker 1>with the office all the time. And uh but you know,

0:51:16.600 --> 0:51:18.160
<v Speaker 1>let me say this, and I give my wife a

0:51:18.200 --> 0:51:21.319
<v Speaker 1>great credit. I have two wonderful kids, have three great grandchildren,

0:51:21.400 --> 0:51:25.200
<v Speaker 1>I have a terrific marriage, and I don't think I

0:51:25.239 --> 0:51:28.160
<v Speaker 1>would be successful if I didn't have a successful marriage,

0:51:28.160 --> 0:51:30.480
<v Speaker 1>if I didn't have terrific kids. And I've had a

0:51:30.560 --> 0:51:33.840
<v Speaker 1>very balanced life, and I've always had that wisdom to

0:51:33.960 --> 0:51:37.240
<v Speaker 1>know when they go home and cut short that business

0:51:37.239 --> 0:51:41.440
<v Speaker 1>trip or not go away to balance. And yes, there

0:51:41.480 --> 0:51:43.400
<v Speaker 1>was a perfect example. I was supposed to go to

0:51:43.440 --> 0:51:44.960
<v Speaker 1>a business dinner and I sent, you know, for the

0:51:45.000 --> 0:51:46.520
<v Speaker 1>last two weeks, I've been that every night other week

0:51:46.800 --> 0:51:48.640
<v Speaker 1>at the time to co up to missus and say,

0:51:48.680 --> 0:51:51.920
<v Speaker 1>I'll meet you at Touro's for a pizza for dinner

0:51:51.920 --> 0:51:53.920
<v Speaker 1>if you're free. And that was the right thing to

0:51:53.960 --> 0:51:57.160
<v Speaker 1>do down near Canal Street. You know. That was Toros

0:51:57.200 --> 0:52:00.279
<v Speaker 1>in the Maplewood, New Jersey. Okay, so you're just a

0:52:00.360 --> 0:52:05.879
<v Speaker 1>regular pizza I am. I am. I'm a regular guy.

0:52:05.920 --> 0:52:09.640
<v Speaker 1>I have not learned how to live rich. So let's

0:52:09.680 --> 0:52:12.840
<v Speaker 1>let's go back to that the plumbers wrenches. That is

0:52:12.840 --> 0:52:15.400
<v Speaker 1>that a myth? Or is that true? No? Well, I

0:52:15.400 --> 0:52:19.040
<v Speaker 1>guess an analogy. I would say that when I started Omega,

0:52:21.200 --> 0:52:24.920
<v Speaker 1>I hung personally every picture in our office. And I

0:52:24.960 --> 0:52:27.359
<v Speaker 1>don't ask anybody do anything that I'm not pre paid

0:52:27.360 --> 0:52:30.360
<v Speaker 1>to do myself. I take great pride of ownership. I

0:52:30.480 --> 0:52:33.239
<v Speaker 1>like to make sure the office looks proper. And you know,

0:52:33.320 --> 0:52:37.279
<v Speaker 1>I just ask people to basically be committed to the

0:52:37.280 --> 0:52:42.040
<v Speaker 1>client's interests uh and basically know what you're doing and

0:52:42.600 --> 0:52:46.520
<v Speaker 1>work hard and be knowledgeable. And I tried to set

0:52:46.560 --> 0:52:49.000
<v Speaker 1>an example, like I said a moment ago, I don't

0:52:49.040 --> 0:52:50.520
<v Speaker 1>ask people to do what I'm not pre paid to

0:52:50.520 --> 0:52:54.959
<v Speaker 1>do myself. So so, and this goes back to Doug said,

0:52:55.800 --> 0:52:58.720
<v Speaker 1>so he shared some insights with me about you, because

0:52:59.200 --> 0:53:01.759
<v Speaker 1>so for those people don't know, Doug cast runs Sea

0:53:01.800 --> 0:53:05.120
<v Speaker 1>Breeze Partners and and his very articulate and writes a

0:53:05.120 --> 0:53:08.680
<v Speaker 1>lot and and Doug said, Lee never wanted to forget

0:53:08.680 --> 0:53:12.160
<v Speaker 1>his roots that he comes from. Um a dad who's

0:53:12.160 --> 0:53:14.160
<v Speaker 1>a plumber. And he used to walking around in his

0:53:14.200 --> 0:53:18.560
<v Speaker 1>briefcase with this heavy giant plumbers wrench. And I didn't

0:53:18.560 --> 0:53:20.640
<v Speaker 1>know if he was pulling my leg. I think he was.

0:53:20.680 --> 0:53:22.799
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I don't recall mean I car enough waight

0:53:22.880 --> 0:53:26.960
<v Speaker 1>around as it is principally saying he's right, But I

0:53:27.120 --> 0:53:28.880
<v Speaker 1>never carried around the plumbers ranch. And I've used the

0:53:28.880 --> 0:53:31.920
<v Speaker 1>plumbers wrench. I've cleaned that, I've cleaned out stoppages and

0:53:32.040 --> 0:53:35.280
<v Speaker 1>used a wire. Wait, so you're cleaning toilets and omega,

0:53:35.320 --> 0:53:37.759
<v Speaker 1>is that what you're telling me? No? But now what

0:53:37.800 --> 0:53:39.120
<v Speaker 1>I do is I put a sign on the wall,

0:53:39.160 --> 0:53:40.960
<v Speaker 1>please shut the light off when you finished. You know,

0:53:42.080 --> 0:53:44.920
<v Speaker 1>you would rather give them money away than just waste

0:53:44.920 --> 0:53:49.640
<v Speaker 1>it frivolously. Yeah, that's the motivation behind this. I think

0:53:49.680 --> 0:53:53.799
<v Speaker 1>there was something I made note of. Um and uh,

0:53:54.520 --> 0:53:59.239
<v Speaker 1>go ahead, correctly. And I really don't associate this with

0:53:59.320 --> 0:54:02.120
<v Speaker 1>the person who said it, Okay, but it is the

0:54:02.160 --> 0:54:05.760
<v Speaker 1>meaning of life is to find your gift. The purpose

0:54:05.800 --> 0:54:08.200
<v Speaker 1>of life is to give it away. That's that's an

0:54:08.239 --> 0:54:11.719
<v Speaker 1>interesting I'm saying that. Pablo Picasso. Actually it was a

0:54:11.760 --> 0:54:16.080
<v Speaker 1>bit of a womanizer. But basically, uh, you know, I

0:54:16.239 --> 0:54:18.799
<v Speaker 1>having taken the giving pledge and having taken care of

0:54:18.840 --> 0:54:21.920
<v Speaker 1>my kids and all. And I'm not complaining, not bragging,

0:54:21.960 --> 0:54:26.000
<v Speaker 1>because the people I know have a similar oriolation. But

0:54:26.160 --> 0:54:30.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, I'm working for charity. Okay, so you look

0:54:30.120 --> 0:54:32.000
<v Speaker 1>at all the money you raise at this point is

0:54:32.040 --> 0:54:34.640
<v Speaker 1>going to go to a higher purpose. That's the fact

0:54:34.680 --> 0:54:36.239
<v Speaker 1>that like, and I would just like to make sure

0:54:36.280 --> 0:54:41.520
<v Speaker 1>it's properly utilized. You know, I've worked too hard for

0:54:41.520 --> 0:54:43.680
<v Speaker 1>this money. I want to make sure that it accomplishes

0:54:43.719 --> 0:54:45.719
<v Speaker 1>some end to it. So so let's talk about that

0:54:45.760 --> 0:54:48.279
<v Speaker 1>a little bit, because that's a question that I see

0:54:48.280 --> 0:54:51.759
<v Speaker 1>all the time. How can one make sure that the

0:54:51.800 --> 0:54:57.640
<v Speaker 1>philanthropical gifts that are made are actually you're lying up

0:54:57.640 --> 0:55:00.319
<v Speaker 1>on other people? Look, there's no greater example that and

0:55:00.480 --> 0:55:05.239
<v Speaker 1>the Warren Buffett, very very very complex individual, and he

0:55:05.360 --> 0:55:09.239
<v Speaker 1>basically says that I am the warm buffet investing. I'm

0:55:09.239 --> 0:55:11.840
<v Speaker 1>not the warm buffet of charitable giving. And when the

0:55:11.880 --> 0:55:13.439
<v Speaker 1>time comes to get away my money and I will

0:55:13.440 --> 0:55:15.520
<v Speaker 1>give it away. I want the warm buffet of childboll

0:55:15.560 --> 0:55:17.479
<v Speaker 1>giving giving it away. I think he went to Billy

0:55:17.480 --> 0:55:19.640
<v Speaker 1>Wollnda Gates. He said, look, you're a lot younger than me.

0:55:20.239 --> 0:55:23.600
<v Speaker 1>I trust you. I really get my jollies by making it.

0:55:23.719 --> 0:55:26.640
<v Speaker 1>Not because I'm greedy, because I like to make investment decisions.

0:55:27.120 --> 0:55:31.360
<v Speaker 1>I don't much care about charitable activities. So if you

0:55:31.520 --> 0:55:34.359
<v Speaker 1>leave Microsoft and spend full time on chardable giving, I'll

0:55:34.400 --> 0:55:36.920
<v Speaker 1>take my sixties seventy billion dollars and put into the

0:55:36.920 --> 0:55:39.600
<v Speaker 1>Bill of Milinda Gates Foundation. I mean what you and

0:55:39.680 --> 0:55:42.360
<v Speaker 1>Bean does that? You know that was an amazing gift,

0:55:42.480 --> 0:55:44.879
<v Speaker 1>he says, I trust Bill millind the gates and that's

0:55:44.920 --> 0:55:48.120
<v Speaker 1>not my forte. My forte is investing, not charitable giving.

0:55:48.840 --> 0:55:51.839
<v Speaker 1>And so, in a sense to answer your question, I

0:55:51.880 --> 0:55:53.960
<v Speaker 1>tried to make a judgment, just like I try to

0:55:54.000 --> 0:55:56.279
<v Speaker 1>make a judgment to invest in the right company with

0:55:56.360 --> 0:55:58.799
<v Speaker 1>the right management, that they have the right motivations and

0:55:58.800 --> 0:56:01.080
<v Speaker 1>they have the smarts and the skill set in the

0:56:01.120 --> 0:56:03.600
<v Speaker 1>common sense to do a good job. I'm trying to

0:56:03.640 --> 0:56:06.920
<v Speaker 1>support those organizations that I think have a common interest

0:56:06.960 --> 0:56:11.120
<v Speaker 1>of common gold with a person I'm investing that responsibility

0:56:11.120 --> 0:56:14.080
<v Speaker 1>and has the same passion about it then in their

0:56:14.200 --> 0:56:17.359
<v Speaker 1>organization and I have in my business. So Jennifer Rabb,

0:56:18.000 --> 0:56:21.120
<v Speaker 1>president of Hunter College, worked me out with pretty good

0:56:21.280 --> 0:56:23.399
<v Speaker 1>and then went up giving twenty five million dollars to Hunter.

0:56:24.040 --> 0:56:29.080
<v Speaker 1>Uh My mom went the Glenn uh Hubbard of Columbia

0:56:29.120 --> 0:56:31.399
<v Speaker 1>Business School has worked me over nicely, and I've given

0:56:31.480 --> 0:56:34.399
<v Speaker 1>him thirty three million dollars. And you've also, in doubt,

0:56:34.480 --> 0:56:37.040
<v Speaker 1>you've done more than just that. You've in doubt chairs

0:56:37.080 --> 0:56:40.240
<v Speaker 1>you've given scholarships to them. You have a very extensive

0:56:40.239 --> 0:56:43.799
<v Speaker 1>relations Clumbia. They're not shy and asking. I told cool

0:56:43.880 --> 0:56:47.000
<v Speaker 1>that I totally administration of Columbia that they order to

0:56:47.000 --> 0:56:48.960
<v Speaker 1>basically give a few leaps out of their book to

0:56:49.120 --> 0:56:52.839
<v Speaker 1>the u J. A u J is notorious, Columbia is

0:56:53.200 --> 0:56:57.040
<v Speaker 1>maybe even better. Really that that's fascinating to hear. So,

0:56:57.040 --> 0:56:59.920
<v Speaker 1>so you mentioned a little bit about you invest in

0:57:00.000 --> 0:57:03.520
<v Speaker 1>gate philanthropy, the way you investigate stocks. Let's talk about

0:57:03.560 --> 0:57:06.520
<v Speaker 1>that a bit. What what is your process? How do

0:57:06.560 --> 0:57:11.000
<v Speaker 1>you identify and evaluate a given stock prior to making

0:57:11.560 --> 0:57:14.160
<v Speaker 1>We have a team, you know, and I am just

0:57:14.320 --> 0:57:17.640
<v Speaker 1>one member of the team, but I generally would say

0:57:17.680 --> 0:57:23.120
<v Speaker 1>that we have seventeen analysts. It's their job to mind

0:57:23.200 --> 0:57:27.280
<v Speaker 1>the areas of expertise that they focus on and to

0:57:27.920 --> 0:57:30.360
<v Speaker 1>capture profits out of the market. So the analyst job

0:57:30.400 --> 0:57:33.200
<v Speaker 1>is to propose. And we have a stock selection committe

0:57:33.200 --> 0:57:37.760
<v Speaker 1>OMEGA that disposes, propose and disposed so the analysts, so

0:57:37.800 --> 0:57:40.840
<v Speaker 1>that bubbles up and then this committee and his report

0:57:40.920 --> 0:57:43.760
<v Speaker 1>proposes the idea of the stock selection committee which consists

0:57:43.800 --> 0:57:46.560
<v Speaker 1>of co directors of research Steve Ienho and Vice Himan

0:57:46.600 --> 0:57:49.400
<v Speaker 1>the firm, myself and a couple of the senior macro people,

0:57:49.760 --> 0:57:53.720
<v Speaker 1>and we vet the idea and every report is required

0:57:53.800 --> 0:57:57.919
<v Speaker 1>to have price objective in the recommendation of downside risk

0:57:58.560 --> 0:58:02.040
<v Speaker 1>um and if we buy the stock, it's simplicitly we've

0:58:02.080 --> 0:58:07.720
<v Speaker 1>accepted the return and risk profile. After stock declines to

0:58:08.120 --> 0:58:11.680
<v Speaker 1>the risk point or below, the analyst becomes a secondary

0:58:11.720 --> 0:58:15.000
<v Speaker 1>input into the decision making going forward, and it's taken

0:58:15.000 --> 0:58:17.320
<v Speaker 1>over by what we call the cesspool committee, you know,

0:58:17.360 --> 0:58:20.320
<v Speaker 1>with a cesspool where that's all the junkos and so

0:58:20.800 --> 0:58:23.640
<v Speaker 1>I chair the sesspool committee, and we'll bring in people

0:58:23.640 --> 0:58:26.880
<v Speaker 1>from the outside to help us vet the idea. UH,

0:58:26.920 --> 0:58:30.520
<v Speaker 1>and we can decide either to double down meeting average

0:58:30.560 --> 0:58:32.640
<v Speaker 1>down in the position. Do you do that? Often? Does

0:58:32.680 --> 0:58:34.880
<v Speaker 1>that happen for it? It varies. At times we sell,

0:58:34.880 --> 0:58:37.800
<v Speaker 1>at times we just sit patent. At times we basically

0:58:37.840 --> 0:58:41.000
<v Speaker 1>double down. And it really depends upon the characteristic of

0:58:41.040 --> 0:58:43.280
<v Speaker 1>the company, the diving in the yield, the asset value

0:58:43.280 --> 0:58:46.720
<v Speaker 1>of the multiple, what the overall market is doing. You know,

0:58:46.880 --> 0:58:48.760
<v Speaker 1>a rising tide, lifts of ships that we've seen tide

0:58:48.800 --> 0:58:51.200
<v Speaker 1>loads of ships, as I said before, And sometimes stock

0:58:51.280 --> 0:58:52.720
<v Speaker 1>is down because of the market and you want to

0:58:52.720 --> 0:58:56.960
<v Speaker 1>separate out the noise and um. So we we have,

0:58:57.080 --> 0:58:59.600
<v Speaker 1>like I said, invest in policy committee that sets policy

0:58:59.640 --> 0:59:02.400
<v Speaker 1>for the farm. We have a stock selection committee, that

0:59:02.560 --> 0:59:04.960
<v Speaker 1>responds to the analysts. And then, of course a certain

0:59:05.000 --> 0:59:08.880
<v Speaker 1>amount of the activity is top down, where I would

0:59:09.440 --> 0:59:11.880
<v Speaker 1>or Steve iron Horn or other people on the policy

0:59:11.920 --> 0:59:14.000
<v Speaker 1>coming would have an idea about a sector and we

0:59:14.000 --> 0:59:15.600
<v Speaker 1>would go to the analysts and asked them to look

0:59:15.640 --> 0:59:17.840
<v Speaker 1>at a particular area. So now let's talk about a

0:59:17.840 --> 0:59:21.400
<v Speaker 1>stock that's working out. It's it's one decision when you're

0:59:21.400 --> 0:59:24.120
<v Speaker 1>buying something at X, and now it's down ten or

0:59:24.880 --> 0:59:28.520
<v Speaker 1>and very different. It's very difficult if you're a value investor.

0:59:28.560 --> 0:59:30.800
<v Speaker 1>If you like something at ten, you should like it

0:59:30.920 --> 0:59:33.360
<v Speaker 1>more to nine or eight. But there are those times

0:59:33.400 --> 0:59:37.400
<v Speaker 1>where something is tangibly changed and the circumstances have changed,

0:59:37.440 --> 0:59:39.600
<v Speaker 1>and you've got to make a different decision. So the

0:59:39.600 --> 0:59:42.200
<v Speaker 1>way I'd like to answer the question is we sell.

0:59:42.320 --> 0:59:44.480
<v Speaker 1>You know, a typical question from a consultant that comes

0:59:44.480 --> 0:59:48.000
<v Speaker 1>in your shop, what is your cell discipline? Okay? And

0:59:48.080 --> 0:59:50.920
<v Speaker 1>I say we sell the stock for one or four reasons.

0:59:51.560 --> 0:59:54.600
<v Speaker 1>The first and the highest quality reason is we board

0:59:54.600 --> 0:59:56.920
<v Speaker 1>a stock at X. We thought it was worth X

0:59:56.920 --> 0:59:59.480
<v Speaker 1>plus thirty or forty, it goes up thirty percent, nothing

0:59:59.520 --> 1:00:03.680
<v Speaker 1>has changed, we sell, So even even once it hits

1:00:03.680 --> 1:00:07.760
<v Speaker 1>your price, objective even if there's no change in circumstances.

1:00:07.840 --> 1:00:10.160
<v Speaker 1>If there is no change of circumstances. So give you

1:00:10.160 --> 1:00:12.760
<v Speaker 1>a perfect example. I bought twenty five million shares of

1:00:12.840 --> 1:00:15.919
<v Speaker 1>Bosting Scientific in between five and six dollars a share.

1:00:16.200 --> 1:00:19.040
<v Speaker 1>We thought it was worth twelve or thirteen. It got there.

1:00:19.160 --> 1:00:22.400
<v Speaker 1>We didn't see circumstances that change. We saw unfortunates a mistake.

1:00:22.400 --> 1:00:24.800
<v Speaker 1>But I think it's about eighteen and nineteen now, okay.

1:00:24.800 --> 1:00:27.160
<v Speaker 1>But so the first reason, just generically is it is

1:00:27.200 --> 1:00:29.800
<v Speaker 1>always a full sale or is it ever well, let's

1:00:29.800 --> 1:00:33.320
<v Speaker 1>sell half of varias. It very again depending on the company,

1:00:33.320 --> 1:00:35.720
<v Speaker 1>depending upon the characteristics. And look, I believe in looking

1:00:35.720 --> 1:00:39.400
<v Speaker 1>at charts. You know you do, Bob, absolutely is what

1:00:39.440 --> 1:00:41.160
<v Speaker 1>are the ingredients? Because I think the stock markets are

1:00:41.240 --> 1:00:44.920
<v Speaker 1>highly quality leading indicator. And you know, often times when

1:00:44.960 --> 1:00:46.240
<v Speaker 1>it comes in kind of that with bed earnings of

1:00:46.280 --> 1:00:48.720
<v Speaker 1>stock was down we before the earnings, and they come

1:00:48.760 --> 1:00:50.480
<v Speaker 1>away with blow where your earnings of stock is up

1:00:50.480 --> 1:00:52.160
<v Speaker 1>before that, and the market has a way of knowing

1:00:52.200 --> 1:00:55.120
<v Speaker 1>there's some secretary typing of breast release for some CEO

1:00:55.560 --> 1:00:57.680
<v Speaker 1>who's got a cousin or got a wife, who's got

1:00:57.680 --> 1:01:01.960
<v Speaker 1>a relative or whatever. So there's a discounting mechanisms out. Yeah, exactly.

1:01:02.240 --> 1:01:05.120
<v Speaker 1>So you're not we would never consider you a techno

1:01:05.200 --> 1:01:08.560
<v Speaker 1>analyst or chartist. You're not making buying cell decisions based

1:01:08.600 --> 1:01:12.160
<v Speaker 1>on because Doug said. Doug cass said, asked Lee if

1:01:12.200 --> 1:01:16.400
<v Speaker 1>he's believes in voodoo. No, we are deep dive fundamental investors.

1:01:16.400 --> 1:01:19.240
<v Speaker 1>We work hard to developer information. But I'll look at

1:01:19.240 --> 1:01:22.200
<v Speaker 1>a chart because the confirmation of what you think and

1:01:22.360 --> 1:01:24.680
<v Speaker 1>raised the question when the truck's going the wrong way?

1:01:25.040 --> 1:01:28.320
<v Speaker 1>You know, because again, the stock market is a leading indicator,

1:01:28.800 --> 1:01:31.680
<v Speaker 1>and so stocks tend to give you some indication of

1:01:31.720 --> 1:01:34.440
<v Speaker 1>what's going on. So the first reason we sell the stock,

1:01:34.560 --> 1:01:36.960
<v Speaker 1>which the highest quality. Reason we bought something that X,

1:01:37.040 --> 1:01:38.800
<v Speaker 1>we thought it was worth something more than X. It it

1:01:38.680 --> 1:01:42.040
<v Speaker 1>it appreciates nothing has changed. We sell. Second reason we

1:01:42.080 --> 1:01:44.760
<v Speaker 1>sell something is I tell my guys, stay in gals,

1:01:44.800 --> 1:01:48.560
<v Speaker 1>stay on top of your companies. Not everything unfolds the

1:01:48.600 --> 1:01:52.360
<v Speaker 1>way you anticipated. So talk to suppliers, talk to competitors,

1:01:52.360 --> 1:01:56.160
<v Speaker 1>talk to companies. You know, foul what's going on the economy,

1:01:56.400 --> 1:01:58.760
<v Speaker 1>and if you get to sense things are unfolding differently

1:01:58.760 --> 1:02:01.520
<v Speaker 1>than you anticipated. Let's out before we get murdered. This

1:02:01.560 --> 1:02:05.200
<v Speaker 1>it's hard to make up two kind of environment. The

1:02:05.240 --> 1:02:07.560
<v Speaker 1>third reason we sell as we are not the Federal

1:02:07.560 --> 1:02:11.200
<v Speaker 1>Reserve Board. We cannot print money. So sometimes you develop

1:02:11.240 --> 1:02:14.040
<v Speaker 1>a new idea that has a much better ratio of

1:02:14.080 --> 1:02:17.080
<v Speaker 1>reward to risk than something you currently own. So we'll

1:02:17.160 --> 1:02:20.240
<v Speaker 1>rotate out of something that has got more modest attraction

1:02:20.480 --> 1:02:23.080
<v Speaker 1>to something that we think has greater attraction. And the

1:02:23.120 --> 1:02:26.080
<v Speaker 1>fourth reason we sell is we change our view of

1:02:26.080 --> 1:02:29.000
<v Speaker 1>the market. Okay, and you know you could deal with

1:02:29.080 --> 1:02:31.440
<v Speaker 1>futures or options for a while. But the end of

1:02:31.440 --> 1:02:34.000
<v Speaker 1>the day, if you go off bullish to bearish and

1:02:34.040 --> 1:02:35.880
<v Speaker 1>you want to take your exposure from ninety your arm

1:02:35.920 --> 1:02:38.920
<v Speaker 1>present down a fifty or sixty percent, you gotta sell inventory.

1:02:39.400 --> 1:02:40.800
<v Speaker 1>And so you sell a stock because you want to

1:02:40.800 --> 1:02:42.720
<v Speaker 1>get out of harm's way. And we did a poor

1:02:42.800 --> 1:02:44.480
<v Speaker 1>job in two thousand and eight because we missed a

1:02:44.480 --> 1:02:46.960
<v Speaker 1>significance of Lehman. But by a law, those are the

1:02:46.960 --> 1:02:50.520
<v Speaker 1>four reasons we sell. Price appreciation hit our target, we

1:02:50.560 --> 1:02:52.800
<v Speaker 1>get out. The second is things are not unfolding. Is

1:02:52.840 --> 1:02:55.080
<v Speaker 1>we anticipated it out before you get murdered. The third

1:02:55.120 --> 1:02:57.160
<v Speaker 1>reason we sell as we found a new idea better

1:02:57.200 --> 1:03:00.120
<v Speaker 1>than the one that we have in the fourth reasons

1:03:00.120 --> 1:03:01.520
<v Speaker 1>we've changed our view with the market. We want to

1:03:01.560 --> 1:03:06.240
<v Speaker 1>reduce exposure. That's quite fascinating. Do you generally you mentioned

1:03:06.560 --> 1:03:08.720
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of hedging. Do you generally hedge? Because

1:03:08.720 --> 1:03:11.720
<v Speaker 1>from what I've been looking at, you're pretty much. I

1:03:11.760 --> 1:03:15.280
<v Speaker 1>would say we tend to be long oriented, more long

1:03:15.360 --> 1:03:17.200
<v Speaker 1>and the typical hedge fund, which has served as well

1:03:17.240 --> 1:03:20.520
<v Speaker 1>the last five or six years. UM. I would say

1:03:20.600 --> 1:03:24.120
<v Speaker 1>that our short positions range from five to fiftent to

1:03:24.160 --> 1:03:27.720
<v Speaker 1>the fund. We do not run a big gross book

1:03:27.760 --> 1:03:31.280
<v Speaker 1>and a small netbook. I found it very difficult because

1:03:31.840 --> 1:03:34.280
<v Speaker 1>we tend to want to know our companies, so we

1:03:34.400 --> 1:03:36.880
<v Speaker 1>have about ninety positions at any point in time. We

1:03:37.000 --> 1:03:40.720
<v Speaker 1>have seventeen analysts that divide seventeen. I'm asking my colleagues

1:03:40.760 --> 1:03:42.959
<v Speaker 1>and the five or six companies better than somebody else,

1:03:43.720 --> 1:03:46.480
<v Speaker 1>which means we had that luxury of knowing our companies

1:03:46.480 --> 1:03:50.520
<v Speaker 1>really well, which I want you know. Uh. Wall Street

1:03:50.560 --> 1:03:53.000
<v Speaker 1>has changed from the time I was on Wall Street today.

1:03:53.360 --> 1:03:57.400
<v Speaker 1>Wall Street has become a distribution business. Okay, sure they

1:03:57.400 --> 1:03:59.840
<v Speaker 1>would like you as their client to make money, but

1:04:00.040 --> 1:04:04.200
<v Speaker 1>their primary objective is distributing securities and also the regulatory

1:04:04.240 --> 1:04:07.800
<v Speaker 1>environment appropriately has created a level of playing field, and

1:04:08.080 --> 1:04:09.960
<v Speaker 1>they'll give you the information when they give it to

1:04:10.000 --> 1:04:12.880
<v Speaker 1>everybody else at the same time. So we really want

1:04:12.880 --> 1:04:15.520
<v Speaker 1>to do our own research. And Wall Streets large become

1:04:15.560 --> 1:04:19.680
<v Speaker 1>an access and underwriting business. They'll have conferences and seminars

1:04:19.720 --> 1:04:22.960
<v Speaker 1>and managing meetings and they'll provide access. Luckily, we're large

1:04:23.000 --> 1:04:24.560
<v Speaker 1>enough to get access in our own but we do

1:04:24.640 --> 1:04:27.080
<v Speaker 1>go to all these conferences and that's what wall Ster

1:04:27.240 --> 1:04:29.480
<v Speaker 1>is helpful. And then they underwrite securities and if there's

1:04:29.480 --> 1:04:31.880
<v Speaker 1>something we're interested in, we would hope to get a

1:04:31.880 --> 1:04:35.160
<v Speaker 1>good allocation. We tend not to be flippers. We tend

1:04:35.160 --> 1:04:39.000
<v Speaker 1>to be investors, uh, and so by having a good

1:04:39.000 --> 1:04:41.280
<v Speaker 1>relationship with Wall Street, we tend to get good allocations

1:04:41.440 --> 1:04:44.280
<v Speaker 1>where we're interested. We don't to slip deals for sake

1:04:44.280 --> 1:04:47.920
<v Speaker 1>of flipping deals. So you mentioned your investors not flippers. Typically,

1:04:47.920 --> 1:04:50.800
<v Speaker 1>how long do you not not even syndicate or I

1:04:50.840 --> 1:04:53.200
<v Speaker 1>p o s? But something that your team finds that

1:04:53.520 --> 1:04:56.080
<v Speaker 1>you're enthusiastic about, how long do you have not an

1:04:56.120 --> 1:04:58.440
<v Speaker 1>asset base is taxable, so you know, we try to

1:04:58.480 --> 1:05:00.360
<v Speaker 1>go a long term and we actually have a tax

1:05:01.320 --> 1:05:04.120
<v Speaker 1>advantage fund where we represent we go a long term.

1:05:04.840 --> 1:05:08.640
<v Speaker 1>But I would say seventy inventory is made for investment

1:05:08.760 --> 1:05:11.800
<v Speaker 1>with the horizons of over a year, not quite the

1:05:11.800 --> 1:05:15.200
<v Speaker 1>Warm Buffet horizon, which almost as permanent. But I respect

1:05:15.240 --> 1:05:17.320
<v Speaker 1>and admire that. You know, most people who miss really

1:05:17.320 --> 1:05:20.840
<v Speaker 1>Buffett's record and they criticize the under before this year

1:05:20.960 --> 1:05:24.720
<v Speaker 1>or he's in line with you. Remember, all I heard

1:05:24.840 --> 1:05:28.000
<v Speaker 1>was this Warren Buffett guy. He's done his best years

1:05:28.000 --> 1:05:31.080
<v Speaker 1>of behind and this guy's a different You know, Warren

1:05:31.080 --> 1:05:36.480
<v Speaker 1>Buffett's record is great pretax. It's better than great aff

1:05:36.480 --> 1:05:39.920
<v Speaker 1>attacks because m yeah, you know, he's not looking to

1:05:40.000 --> 1:05:42.640
<v Speaker 1>buy this year's hot stock, flip it out and by

1:05:42.680 --> 1:05:45.600
<v Speaker 1>next year's hot stock. He's looking for after tax returns.

1:05:45.600 --> 1:05:48.680
<v Speaker 1>And I forget the annual meeting, the annual report year

1:05:49.000 --> 1:05:52.880
<v Speaker 1>maybe twenty five years ago, maybe even thirty. He showed

1:05:52.920 --> 1:05:56.120
<v Speaker 1>an example if you had a great money manager that

1:05:56.720 --> 1:06:00.640
<v Speaker 1>but this year's hot stock made fift and sold it,

1:06:00.880 --> 1:06:03.520
<v Speaker 1>and what yester next year's hot stock made fifty and

1:06:03.640 --> 1:06:05.960
<v Speaker 1>sold it. Where you found a great company that was

1:06:05.960 --> 1:06:08.080
<v Speaker 1>a great investment, held it for twenty or thirty years

1:06:08.120 --> 1:06:10.360
<v Speaker 1>and made fifteen percent a year, what did you have

1:06:10.520 --> 1:06:13.560
<v Speaker 1>as attacks at the end of thirty years was thousands

1:06:13.600 --> 1:06:16.200
<v Speaker 1>of times different. The flippers giving up a third of

1:06:16.240 --> 1:06:18.880
<v Speaker 1>thet of his prophecy, which I could be a discipline

1:06:18.920 --> 1:06:21.840
<v Speaker 1>and him. Unfortunately the business and client a man don't

1:06:21.840 --> 1:06:24.680
<v Speaker 1>allow completely for that. But we're sympathetic to that. You know,

1:06:24.760 --> 1:06:27.520
<v Speaker 1>we've seen the holding period shrink and shrink and shrink,

1:06:27.600 --> 1:06:30.800
<v Speaker 1>but it sounds like you're still longer than many. I

1:06:30.840 --> 1:06:36.080
<v Speaker 1>would say. You know, in two thousands, I remember my investors,

1:06:36.160 --> 1:06:37.800
<v Speaker 1>many of my investors coming to me and said, Lee,

1:06:38.120 --> 1:06:40.200
<v Speaker 1>you're doing very well. We're making a lot of money,

1:06:40.240 --> 1:06:43.160
<v Speaker 1>but we really don't want to pay the taxes. Do

1:06:43.160 --> 1:06:46.640
<v Speaker 1>you have anything tax advantaged? I said, Jesus, that's music

1:06:46.680 --> 1:06:50.000
<v Speaker 1>to my years in the largest investment Omega. I'll tell

1:06:50.000 --> 1:06:51.920
<v Speaker 1>you what you know. And I'm not just not a commercial.

1:06:51.960 --> 1:06:55.080
<v Speaker 1>I'm not looking to investors. I said, if you give

1:06:55.120 --> 1:06:58.800
<v Speaker 1>me a three year commitment period, Okay, we have three

1:06:58.840 --> 1:07:03.320
<v Speaker 1>year commitment period, I'll give via one in fifteen conversation

1:07:03.360 --> 1:07:08.360
<v Speaker 1>scheme and five percent hurdle rate. And uh, if something

1:07:08.400 --> 1:07:10.840
<v Speaker 1>happens to you the investor in that three period, you're

1:07:10.840 --> 1:07:13.360
<v Speaker 1>stay can get out immediately. If something happens to me,

1:07:13.400 --> 1:07:14.920
<v Speaker 1>the money manage and you want to get out, you

1:07:14.920 --> 1:07:18.680
<v Speaker 1>can get out immediately and represent for that package seventy

1:07:18.720 --> 1:07:20.840
<v Speaker 1>five percent more of the games will be long term

1:07:20.840 --> 1:07:24.040
<v Speaker 1>capital gains. I believe in memory and I think it's

1:07:24.040 --> 1:07:26.280
<v Speaker 1>pretty accurate. We've beat in the SMP by thousand basis

1:07:26.360 --> 1:07:28.440
<v Speaker 1>points and a hundred percent of the games a long

1:07:28.560 --> 1:07:31.320
<v Speaker 1>term capital gains. And that's for people that are tax

1:07:31.360 --> 1:07:34.160
<v Speaker 1>sens So let's go over that one in fifteen versus

1:07:35.440 --> 1:07:37.400
<v Speaker 1>because we had allowed to be we raised it maybe

1:07:37.440 --> 1:07:39.320
<v Speaker 1>five years later to one and half in twenty. Still

1:07:39.320 --> 1:07:42.280
<v Speaker 1>have a five percent hurdle rate meaning what meaning the

1:07:42.320 --> 1:07:44.440
<v Speaker 1>first five percent we don't get compensated on in terms

1:07:44.480 --> 1:07:49.760
<v Speaker 1>of incentive. There's no doesn't count. Yeah, it's twenty above

1:07:49.840 --> 1:07:52.560
<v Speaker 1>the five and I think we beat the SMP by

1:07:52.560 --> 1:07:54.760
<v Speaker 1>a moment with a thousand basis points in that period

1:07:55.520 --> 1:07:59.760
<v Speaker 1>well spent over a hundred percent of games with long

1:07:59.880 --> 1:08:02.440
<v Speaker 1>term capital gains. The best way to understand the product

1:08:02.600 --> 1:08:06.439
<v Speaker 1>is we buy a stock. Okay, we intend to hold

1:08:06.480 --> 1:08:08.680
<v Speaker 1>it for a year. Sometimes you get a gain much

1:08:08.760 --> 1:08:12.440
<v Speaker 1>more quickly. They appreciate to a sell point more quickly

1:08:12.520 --> 1:08:16.160
<v Speaker 1>from regular fund. We don't represent tax efficiency will sell

1:08:16.200 --> 1:08:18.959
<v Speaker 1>it for this fund. We we'll do is use options

1:08:19.320 --> 1:08:21.519
<v Speaker 1>to age the position to go long term, so you

1:08:21.600 --> 1:08:23.280
<v Speaker 1>put a collar on it, or you just marry it

1:08:23.320 --> 1:08:26.599
<v Speaker 1>put to it, or well will put some basically increasing

1:08:26.640 --> 1:08:30.000
<v Speaker 1>the long position, will sell calls against the position until

1:08:30.080 --> 1:08:32.360
<v Speaker 1>we go long term, and you have to sell calls

1:08:32.400 --> 1:08:35.560
<v Speaker 1>that are slightly out of money to avoid stopping the

1:08:35.640 --> 1:08:39.000
<v Speaker 1>holding period. There's certain I risks require to make twelve

1:08:39.080 --> 1:08:42.120
<v Speaker 1>full months. That's fascinating and that sounds like that's done

1:08:42.240 --> 1:08:45.960
<v Speaker 1>really really well. It has is what percentage of your

1:08:46.000 --> 1:08:49.879
<v Speaker 1>assets are are in the tax advantage? That one product

1:08:50.120 --> 1:08:54.479
<v Speaker 1>is probably about eleven percent of our assets alright, and

1:08:54.880 --> 1:08:57.519
<v Speaker 1>spargaining in the Western world away. It sounds like it's

1:08:57.680 --> 1:09:01.960
<v Speaker 1>based on the performance plus the the admendation fee, that

1:09:02.080 --> 1:09:05.680
<v Speaker 1>that hurdle is something that that's not very typical in

1:09:05.680 --> 1:09:09.960
<v Speaker 1>a low return world. It's uh, it's a significant benefit

1:09:10.040 --> 1:09:13.840
<v Speaker 1>to the investor. There was I think probably the markets

1:09:14.040 --> 1:09:17.439
<v Speaker 1>adequately priced to day that I would be had. I

1:09:17.439 --> 1:09:19.320
<v Speaker 1>would think the market if it gave you six to

1:09:19.400 --> 1:09:23.560
<v Speaker 1>eight percent including dividends over the next five years, that

1:09:23.600 --> 1:09:25.920
<v Speaker 1>would be a good return. And so the idea of

1:09:26.000 --> 1:09:28.000
<v Speaker 1>not getting compensated for the first five percent is a

1:09:28.080 --> 1:09:30.720
<v Speaker 1>pretty significant benefits sure to say. To say, at least

1:09:30.920 --> 1:09:34.320
<v Speaker 1>you mentioned um Warren Buffett not too long ago you

1:09:34.400 --> 1:09:38.080
<v Speaker 1>took a trip to their annual meeting. Yeah, I did,

1:09:38.360 --> 1:09:41.320
<v Speaker 1>uh tell us about that. Well, I look, the guy is,

1:09:41.640 --> 1:09:44.960
<v Speaker 1>he's the man, right, he's the guru. I didn't learn

1:09:45.240 --> 1:09:48.120
<v Speaker 1>very much because if you study Buffet, you know one

1:09:48.120 --> 1:09:49.439
<v Speaker 1>are the things I did this and that. We're going

1:09:49.479 --> 1:09:53.200
<v Speaker 1>back thirty five years ago. I was the guy at

1:09:53.240 --> 1:09:56.200
<v Speaker 1>Goldman Sachs that used to send them around Warren Buffet's

1:09:56.640 --> 1:09:59.960
<v Speaker 1>annual Report to all my partners at Goldman Sacks and keep.

1:10:00.040 --> 1:10:02.000
<v Speaker 1>But I and this guy, he's gonna be famous one day,

1:10:02.200 --> 1:10:04.760
<v Speaker 1>good good call. This was well before Goldman had that

1:10:04.840 --> 1:10:08.920
<v Speaker 1>special relationship where this is way before two thousand and

1:10:08.960 --> 1:10:11.760
<v Speaker 1>eight where warn't invested directly in the firm. So I've

1:10:11.760 --> 1:10:13.559
<v Speaker 1>always had a very high regard from my read as

1:10:13.560 --> 1:10:15.439
<v Speaker 1>annual report cover to covered. If you read as annual

1:10:15.439 --> 1:10:16.600
<v Speaker 1>report cover to cup, you don't have to go the

1:10:16.640 --> 1:10:19.639
<v Speaker 1>annual meeting. But I went to the annual meeting because

1:10:19.760 --> 1:10:22.040
<v Speaker 1>in part Columbia asked me to speak at a dinner

1:10:22.160 --> 1:10:25.360
<v Speaker 1>the Friday night before the annual meeting at dinner. But

1:10:25.479 --> 1:10:27.760
<v Speaker 1>you know the managed to be admired. There's no person

1:10:27.880 --> 1:10:30.160
<v Speaker 1>alive and the invest in business has more quotable lines

1:10:30.200 --> 1:10:34.479
<v Speaker 1>than Warren and his record is unbelievable and you have

1:10:34.560 --> 1:10:38.840
<v Speaker 1>to admire respect the guy. Um, So you flew to

1:10:39.000 --> 1:10:44.160
<v Speaker 1>a recent meeting with a rock star collection of people, Um,

1:10:44.760 --> 1:10:49.599
<v Speaker 1>Doug Cast, Marty Cohen, Steve Roth, Harvey Eisen, Miles NDL.

1:10:50.120 --> 1:10:52.680
<v Speaker 1>What was that was? Was that a recent trip or

1:10:53.280 --> 1:10:56.160
<v Speaker 1>that was a connection with the annual report, the annual meeting?

1:10:56.800 --> 1:10:59.439
<v Speaker 1>And what was that crew like to to go to

1:10:59.520 --> 1:11:05.360
<v Speaker 1>bar show? Look Dougs catalytic, bright, thoughtful guy, Harvey Eisen, Uh,

1:11:06.240 --> 1:11:10.040
<v Speaker 1>different character but also thoughtful. Steve Roth is a major

1:11:10.080 --> 1:11:16.080
<v Speaker 1>accomplished guy. Rety that's a monster company each success. Uh.

1:11:16.240 --> 1:11:19.519
<v Speaker 1>And these are all in you know, interesting individuals. Miles

1:11:19.520 --> 1:11:23.120
<v Speaker 1>and del also is a self made guy h MC

1:11:23.920 --> 1:11:28.360
<v Speaker 1>NBC partners and I've done extremely well over the years, um.

1:11:28.720 --> 1:11:31.600
<v Speaker 1>And you know, each individual has their own strengths and weaknesses.

1:11:31.720 --> 1:11:34.559
<v Speaker 1>And Uh, I like learning from people, listening to people

1:11:34.800 --> 1:11:38.200
<v Speaker 1>and seeing how they respond to my questions and that

1:11:38.560 --> 1:11:42.320
<v Speaker 1>makes life interesting to say the least. Um, So let

1:11:42.360 --> 1:11:44.760
<v Speaker 1>me let me shift gears a little bit on you. Um,

1:11:45.280 --> 1:11:46.960
<v Speaker 1>let's talk a little bit about books. One of the

1:11:47.040 --> 1:11:51.639
<v Speaker 1>things Buffett and short conversation, because you're all you're reading

1:11:51.760 --> 1:11:54.200
<v Speaker 1>so many a book every day, but reading a book

1:11:54.240 --> 1:11:58.600
<v Speaker 1>of reports from my seventeen analysts. Um, you know, I

1:11:58.720 --> 1:12:01.919
<v Speaker 1>wish I read more. I'm very proud of my oldest granddaughter.

1:12:02.040 --> 1:12:05.840
<v Speaker 1>My god, she reads all the time. Fabulous writer. But

1:12:07.560 --> 1:12:11.800
<v Speaker 1>book reading is not my major suit. You're drilling down

1:12:11.840 --> 1:12:15.080
<v Speaker 1>into company reports and researching for Financial Times, the Wall

1:12:15.160 --> 1:12:18.680
<v Speaker 1>Street Journal, in New York Times, research reports. You know

1:12:20.000 --> 1:12:24.840
<v Speaker 1>right now, I'm reading books about prosecutorial abuse, and you know,

1:12:24.960 --> 1:12:26.880
<v Speaker 1>having received the subpedia that I got to deal with

1:12:27.160 --> 1:12:30.240
<v Speaker 1>and be mystified by what the government is thinking about.

1:12:30.760 --> 1:12:32.720
<v Speaker 1>So do you talk about it? I was gonna say, well,

1:12:32.800 --> 1:12:34.679
<v Speaker 1>I don't think we really can discuss that. I don't

1:12:34.680 --> 1:12:36.720
<v Speaker 1>think your lawyers would be happy. Well, we told that

1:12:36.800 --> 1:12:39.360
<v Speaker 1>investors is that there's nothing wrong. We've been done. We've

1:12:39.400 --> 1:12:41.880
<v Speaker 1>responded to the subpoena and the government, and the government

1:12:41.920 --> 1:12:44.200
<v Speaker 1>is analyzing the response and we're quite comfortable. When the

1:12:44.200 --> 1:12:46.760
<v Speaker 1>analyze the response they'll see that nothing wrong was done.

1:12:47.080 --> 1:12:48.840
<v Speaker 1>We do our homework. We worked very hard. We do

1:12:48.920 --> 1:12:52.400
<v Speaker 1>fundamental research and that and that is that. So we'll

1:12:52.439 --> 1:12:56.799
<v Speaker 1>leave that, uh, that that question alone. Um, you mentioned

1:12:56.880 --> 1:12:59.800
<v Speaker 1>one of the professors at Columbia as a mentor. Who

1:13:00.040 --> 1:13:02.240
<v Speaker 1>who else we were some of your early mentors. You know,

1:13:02.320 --> 1:13:04.040
<v Speaker 1>you're you're learning a lot of different things with a

1:13:04.080 --> 1:13:07.439
<v Speaker 1>lot of different people. On the trading side, the guy

1:13:07.560 --> 1:13:10.519
<v Speaker 1>that was a major name and institution in his own right,

1:13:10.560 --> 1:13:15.320
<v Speaker 1>Bob Manusian, was in charge of trading, uh Goldman Sachs.

1:13:15.439 --> 1:13:19.080
<v Speaker 1>Unusual at that time. A Yale graduate ran trading at

1:13:19.080 --> 1:13:22.400
<v Speaker 1>Goldman Sachs. L J. Tannembaun who was deceased. The Bob

1:13:22.479 --> 1:13:25.120
<v Speaker 1>is still very much alivee thankfully, a great guy. L J.

1:13:25.200 --> 1:13:29.479
<v Speaker 1>Tanneman ran arbitrage. Gust of Levy. You saw him in action.

1:13:29.520 --> 1:13:31.840
<v Speaker 1>I worked directly with him on a number of assignments.

1:13:32.520 --> 1:13:36.080
<v Speaker 1>He passed away in nineteen seventy six. A real dynamo

1:13:36.520 --> 1:13:38.400
<v Speaker 1>man got into seven o'clock in the morning, kept two

1:13:38.439 --> 1:13:41.160
<v Speaker 1>secretaries busy. There wasn't a charity in New York that

1:13:41.240 --> 1:13:43.560
<v Speaker 1>he did not work with in support and help. And

1:13:43.920 --> 1:13:46.400
<v Speaker 1>so you learned about chadbl instincts giving back from people

1:13:46.479 --> 1:13:51.560
<v Speaker 1>like us Levy. John Whitehead was deceased John Weinberg a Screenberg.

1:13:52.160 --> 1:13:54.960
<v Speaker 1>You know you just watched people in action and uh,

1:13:55.800 --> 1:14:00.360
<v Speaker 1>you know, um, you learn and you and your mature yourself.

1:14:01.080 --> 1:14:03.240
<v Speaker 1>I have a family foundation I set up I think

1:14:03.360 --> 1:14:07.800
<v Speaker 1>in the and that long ago. Yeah, well when when

1:14:07.840 --> 1:14:11.000
<v Speaker 1>when when my income started to exceed my course of

1:14:11.080 --> 1:14:13.479
<v Speaker 1>living and I started to build up savings, I was

1:14:13.560 --> 1:14:17.040
<v Speaker 1>really committed to give back. Um. And again, as I

1:14:17.080 --> 1:14:19.439
<v Speaker 1>said before, I don't want to picture myself as being

1:14:20.040 --> 1:14:22.240
<v Speaker 1>different than anyone else. The guys that are in my

1:14:22.439 --> 1:14:26.280
<v Speaker 1>category all have a similar view, you know. Uh. I

1:14:26.360 --> 1:14:29.519
<v Speaker 1>have a great admiration for Canlan gown Stand, Drucca Miller,

1:14:29.600 --> 1:14:36.479
<v Speaker 1>Michael Steinhardt, Um, Bill Ackman, John Paulson, uh and Dan Loeby.

1:14:36.479 --> 1:14:38.640
<v Speaker 1>I apologize with peopleho name I left up? Is there

1:14:38.760 --> 1:14:41.559
<v Speaker 1>so many of them that are giving back, that work

1:14:41.680 --> 1:14:44.720
<v Speaker 1>hard because they have a professional instinct and take the

1:14:44.840 --> 1:14:48.280
<v Speaker 1>financial success and share what others less fortunate. So I

1:14:48.280 --> 1:14:50.840
<v Speaker 1>shouldn't mention I'll open up a Pandora's box. But I

1:14:50.960 --> 1:14:55.240
<v Speaker 1>got quoted recently negatively towards Hillary Clinton. And it wasn't

1:14:55.280 --> 1:14:58.640
<v Speaker 1>negative about her necessarily as a person, but you know,

1:14:59.040 --> 1:15:02.080
<v Speaker 1>comes out of the box and uh kind of criticize

1:15:02.120 --> 1:15:05.519
<v Speaker 1>and craps all over hedge funds. I don't see this,

1:15:06.000 --> 1:15:09.519
<v Speaker 1>you know, pitting against the one percent, I don't see it.

1:15:09.920 --> 1:15:13.040
<v Speaker 1>You know, the nine to one percent are not victimizing.

1:15:14.800 --> 1:15:16.479
<v Speaker 1>Most of the one percent that I know are giving

1:15:16.560 --> 1:15:20.200
<v Speaker 1>back and trying to create a better life than um.

1:15:20.520 --> 1:15:24.240
<v Speaker 1>And so why why criticized hedge funds when, particularly in

1:15:24.280 --> 1:15:25.840
<v Speaker 1>our case, she hangs out with them, which is goes

1:15:25.880 --> 1:15:28.080
<v Speaker 1>to Montha's vineon in the hand, not afraid to ask

1:15:28.160 --> 1:15:32.040
<v Speaker 1>for donations from from Wall Street. That's been her to

1:15:32.200 --> 1:15:36.920
<v Speaker 1>the Clintons. Certainly they want to advocate the higher taxation

1:15:37.160 --> 1:15:40.320
<v Speaker 1>and things like that. That's fine, that that's a different

1:15:40.439 --> 1:15:43.240
<v Speaker 1>that's a policy issue. And I was I've been quoted

1:15:43.280 --> 1:15:46.840
<v Speaker 1>now for seven years. I've said that the idea of

1:15:47.080 --> 1:15:52.880
<v Speaker 1>the income being carried taxes carried interest is wrong. My

1:15:53.000 --> 1:15:55.679
<v Speaker 1>income is a special exemption that if you are running

1:15:55.720 --> 1:15:58.800
<v Speaker 1>a private partnership like a private equity or hedge fund,

1:15:59.280 --> 1:16:02.640
<v Speaker 1>you're paying a lower tax rate. Now, they should not

1:16:02.800 --> 1:16:07.200
<v Speaker 1>pertain to my income in managing the business. It should

1:16:07.280 --> 1:16:11.000
<v Speaker 1>pertain to my income as an investor investing alongside of

1:16:11.040 --> 1:16:13.840
<v Speaker 1>my other investors. And for some reason the government has

1:16:14.320 --> 1:16:17.200
<v Speaker 1>not been focused on that, just like I think that

1:16:17.280 --> 1:16:19.320
<v Speaker 1>there's a lot of efficiency to be gained that we

1:16:19.400 --> 1:16:23.559
<v Speaker 1>have a Department of Education at the federal level, cabinet level,

1:16:23.600 --> 1:16:26.559
<v Speaker 1>that's over a hundred billion dollar department. I don't think

1:16:26.640 --> 1:16:28.760
<v Speaker 1>we have to spend a hundred billion dollars for the

1:16:28.840 --> 1:16:31.760
<v Speaker 1>federal government to tell the state and local governments how

1:16:31.760 --> 1:16:34.200
<v Speaker 1>to educate their children. That might have been the case

1:16:34.479 --> 1:16:37.360
<v Speaker 1>fifty years ago, and segregation things like that, but I

1:16:37.439 --> 1:16:39.920
<v Speaker 1>don't think it's today. How much of that budget is

1:16:40.000 --> 1:16:43.000
<v Speaker 1>just them dolling out money to different states, I honestly

1:16:43.000 --> 1:16:44.439
<v Speaker 1>don't know the number. I don't want to be like

1:16:44.920 --> 1:16:48.400
<v Speaker 1>the fello from Texas, Uh say the four things MoMA

1:16:49.320 --> 1:16:53.519
<v Speaker 1>oops oops, Yeah, but the four reasons we sell a stock?

1:16:53.560 --> 1:16:56.400
<v Speaker 1>I remember the four reasons. Well, that that's the area

1:16:56.439 --> 1:16:58.719
<v Speaker 1>you focus on, So that would that would certainly make sense.

1:16:59.160 --> 1:17:04.440
<v Speaker 1>So when we look at issues in society of income inequality,

1:17:05.479 --> 1:17:10.519
<v Speaker 1>your perspective is the wealthier doing at least amongst Wall Street,

1:17:11.000 --> 1:17:15.080
<v Speaker 1>the people you know are contributing a lot to charity.

1:17:15.200 --> 1:17:22.000
<v Speaker 1>It's very complex. You know, the President understandably would like

1:17:22.320 --> 1:17:25.360
<v Speaker 1>to narrow this income disparity. I would like in narrow

1:17:25.400 --> 1:17:28.720
<v Speaker 1>the income to how do we do that? Well, I'm

1:17:28.760 --> 1:17:31.960
<v Speaker 1>an economist, you know, but I think you have to

1:17:32.080 --> 1:17:36.759
<v Speaker 1>do through education, by improving the skill set of these youngsters,

1:17:36.920 --> 1:17:40.920
<v Speaker 1>by giving them a exposure to improving themselves. I look

1:17:40.960 --> 1:17:44.479
<v Speaker 1>at my own situation, you know, it's my college education,

1:17:45.240 --> 1:17:48.960
<v Speaker 1>it's my NBA Columbia that literally changed my life, changed

1:17:49.000 --> 1:17:52.280
<v Speaker 1>my whole income prospect. I mean, I left Xerox making

1:17:52.360 --> 1:17:55.000
<v Speaker 1>seven thousand dollars a year. I go back to business

1:17:55.040 --> 1:17:56.800
<v Speaker 1>school getting the m b A. And I hired into

1:17:56.840 --> 1:18:01.360
<v Speaker 1>Goldman at five hundred, which is a substantial was doubled

1:18:01.439 --> 1:18:04.720
<v Speaker 1>my income by going to business school for thirteen months.

1:18:04.760 --> 1:18:06.400
<v Speaker 1>There was a tri messed deals. I went right through

1:18:06.439 --> 1:18:08.559
<v Speaker 1>the summer because I couldn't afford to take time off

1:18:09.200 --> 1:18:10.479
<v Speaker 1>six months old kids and I had to make a

1:18:10.560 --> 1:18:15.040
<v Speaker 1>living um. And so it's education. It's getting into the

1:18:15.160 --> 1:18:18.120
<v Speaker 1>home to educate the parents, to motivate them. I mean

1:18:18.920 --> 1:18:22.160
<v Speaker 1>the Jews of a hundred years ago today or the

1:18:23.000 --> 1:18:27.599
<v Speaker 1>Asians who who really pushed education. Each wave of immigrant

1:18:27.680 --> 1:18:31.280
<v Speaker 1>has their own focus on education. Test and I think

1:18:31.320 --> 1:18:33.559
<v Speaker 1>the wonderful thing in this program the Kopman College scholes,

1:18:33.560 --> 1:18:35.680
<v Speaker 1>when the kids showed up with their parents. You know,

1:18:35.800 --> 1:18:37.760
<v Speaker 1>it was wonderful to see, you know. I give money

1:18:37.800 --> 1:18:40.400
<v Speaker 1>to a South Bronze educational program called the South Bronze

1:18:40.479 --> 1:18:43.400
<v Speaker 1>Educational Foundation. And I think seven year, eighty percent of

1:18:43.439 --> 1:18:45.800
<v Speaker 1>the kids have never met their father. Really, and I

1:18:45.840 --> 1:18:48.479
<v Speaker 1>look at the and I appreciate the significance of my

1:18:48.600 --> 1:18:51.160
<v Speaker 1>father in my growing up. That these kids have a

1:18:51.280 --> 1:18:57.360
<v Speaker 1>terrific disadvantage. And so I'm trying to create equal opportunity

1:18:57.840 --> 1:19:02.000
<v Speaker 1>through my charitable efforts, uh by giving them a platform

1:19:02.080 --> 1:19:05.640
<v Speaker 1>to achieve an education where they have the aptitude and

1:19:05.680 --> 1:19:09.200
<v Speaker 1>the willingness and the desire. So so you're willing you

1:19:09.320 --> 1:19:13.519
<v Speaker 1>support getting rid of that carried interest for the income side,

1:19:13.600 --> 1:19:17.040
<v Speaker 1>not the investment side. What other policy changes do you

1:19:17.120 --> 1:19:21.200
<v Speaker 1>think should we look? I was beginning to develop a thought.

1:19:21.280 --> 1:19:23.560
<v Speaker 1>The irony of the whole thing the last five or

1:19:23.600 --> 1:19:30.200
<v Speaker 1>six years is uh Bernankee wanted to create economic growth

1:19:30.240 --> 1:19:33.200
<v Speaker 1>and employment, and he figured out the best way to

1:19:33.280 --> 1:19:36.960
<v Speaker 1>do that is to create wealth, because wealth creates consumption

1:19:37.160 --> 1:19:40.599
<v Speaker 1>and consumption creates jobs. So he said, the way I'm

1:19:40.600 --> 1:19:42.400
<v Speaker 1>gonna do is to get the stock market up to

1:19:42.479 --> 1:19:45.559
<v Speaker 1>create wealth, to create consumption, to create jobs. The trouble

1:19:45.680 --> 1:19:47.719
<v Speaker 1>is is a mald distribution of the ownership of stock.

1:19:47.760 --> 1:19:51.240
<v Speaker 1>So guys like me have benefited mightily. And because we've

1:19:51.280 --> 1:19:55.400
<v Speaker 1>had this gridlock and government where the Republican the Democrats

1:19:55.479 --> 1:19:58.200
<v Speaker 1>don't seem to get along and the President can't seem

1:19:58.240 --> 1:20:02.599
<v Speaker 1>to unite them, we've not had phisical policy initiatives designed

1:20:02.640 --> 1:20:05.320
<v Speaker 1>to go along with the monetary initiatives. So the entire

1:20:05.400 --> 1:20:07.960
<v Speaker 1>burden to deal with the recessions for in monetary policy.

1:20:08.960 --> 1:20:13.080
<v Speaker 1>Maybe we should have a jobs program, maybe, Uh, infrastructure

1:20:13.240 --> 1:20:16.720
<v Speaker 1>that normal posting back all this retained earnings that sit

1:20:16.800 --> 1:20:20.680
<v Speaker 1>offshore and bank accounts doing nothing productively bring it back

1:20:20.760 --> 1:20:25.320
<v Speaker 1>and attacks howiday tie to hiring and infrastructure development to

1:20:25.400 --> 1:20:28.400
<v Speaker 1>take this big collapse in the price of energy. Uh,

1:20:28.600 --> 1:20:31.840
<v Speaker 1>put an energy tax on design to infrastructure building. We

1:20:31.960 --> 1:20:34.600
<v Speaker 1>don't seem to have the fiscal initiatives. And I'm not

1:20:34.720 --> 1:20:38.400
<v Speaker 1>blaming the president. Okay, I blamed the President for some

1:20:38.479 --> 1:20:42.360
<v Speaker 1>of his dialogue on you know, class warfare and stuff

1:20:42.400 --> 1:20:44.640
<v Speaker 1>like that, but that was an old story. And I

1:20:44.720 --> 1:20:50.400
<v Speaker 1>got ordered by virus by president basically just a Coincidencely,

1:20:50.560 --> 1:20:52.479
<v Speaker 1>I hope, so that's nothing let's over to do. But

1:20:53.040 --> 1:20:55.960
<v Speaker 1>I think we need a better coordination of fiscal monetary policies,

1:20:55.960 --> 1:20:57.800
<v Speaker 1>and hopefully in time we'll get it. But we don't,

1:20:57.800 --> 1:20:59.880
<v Speaker 1>we'll get head it to a disasters. We really haven't

1:21:00.040 --> 1:21:03.599
<v Speaker 1>seen the normal fiscal stimulus that you get following forget

1:21:04.479 --> 1:21:08.519
<v Speaker 1>an economic crisis following a normal deep recession, when it's

1:21:08.600 --> 1:21:12.320
<v Speaker 1>just hasn't been following on the heels of monetary policy exclusively.

1:21:12.600 --> 1:21:14.720
<v Speaker 1>So it's all it's all that, all right, So let's

1:21:14.800 --> 1:21:16.880
<v Speaker 1>keep let's go through. I only have you for a

1:21:16.960 --> 1:21:19.800
<v Speaker 1>few more minutes, so let me ask you some of

1:21:20.080 --> 1:21:24.280
<v Speaker 1>um the standard questions I ask everybody, and they're they're

1:21:24.320 --> 1:21:29.759
<v Speaker 1>always always generates some interesting response. Um. So you mentioned

1:21:29.800 --> 1:21:32.360
<v Speaker 1>you start really early. To take us quickly through a

1:21:32.479 --> 1:21:34.920
<v Speaker 1>day in the life of Lee Cooperman, You're you're up

1:21:34.960 --> 1:21:39.200
<v Speaker 1>at five in the morning, at the five ten. I

1:21:39.400 --> 1:21:44.400
<v Speaker 1>leave my house at a proixing five, depending upon traffic,

1:21:44.439 --> 1:21:49.479
<v Speaker 1>I come in from suburbs against the officer si. Um

1:21:50.840 --> 1:21:54.640
<v Speaker 1>and uh, you're there for twelve hours until six o

1:21:55.040 --> 1:21:57.439
<v Speaker 1>lea about you know, depending upon the time of my dinner.

1:21:58.040 --> 1:22:00.599
<v Speaker 1>I leave the office between five. I have to leave

1:22:00.640 --> 1:22:03.000
<v Speaker 1>tonight at five. Story have dinner with a client at

1:22:03.080 --> 1:22:05.960
<v Speaker 1>six o'clock. Meeted a restaurant last night, had dinner with

1:22:06.000 --> 1:22:08.400
<v Speaker 1>the company. I met the company at six. I got

1:22:08.439 --> 1:22:11.960
<v Speaker 1>finished with dinner at eight and went home. Um, and

1:22:12.040 --> 1:22:14.679
<v Speaker 1>I get home, I take a shower, and I logged

1:22:14.720 --> 1:22:16.920
<v Speaker 1>into a Bloomberg not paid commercial. I love into my

1:22:16.920 --> 1:22:20.160
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg terminal. He's the most powerful terminal out there. But

1:22:20.280 --> 1:22:22.960
<v Speaker 1>by the way, during this entire interview, and I'm not exaggerating,

1:22:23.280 --> 1:22:26.920
<v Speaker 1>you've been checking stock prices. People don't realize you're multitasking

1:22:27.360 --> 1:22:30.360
<v Speaker 1>this whole conversation. Yeah, well, I'm not making investment decisions.

1:22:30.760 --> 1:22:32.400
<v Speaker 1>Of course, I'm trying to see what But you have

1:22:32.439 --> 1:22:34.960
<v Speaker 1>an eye on what's going on. Even throughout this conversation.

1:22:35.200 --> 1:22:42.160
<v Speaker 1>I would say, I'm pretty plugged, pretty obsessive, excessive, obsessive, compulsive. Um,

1:22:43.360 --> 1:22:46.000
<v Speaker 1>So you go to dinner and then go home, my shower,

1:22:46.160 --> 1:22:48.960
<v Speaker 1>and I logged into Bloomberg terminal and see what's going

1:22:49.000 --> 1:22:51.479
<v Speaker 1>on in China, what's going on Japan, what's going on

1:22:51.600 --> 1:22:54.559
<v Speaker 1>the euro dollar, what's going on in the dollar yen?

1:22:55.320 --> 1:22:58.600
<v Speaker 1>And see what the headlines are, And uh, this is

1:22:58.680 --> 1:23:02.439
<v Speaker 1>my life. You know, it's it's you know I said

1:23:02.520 --> 1:23:04.120
<v Speaker 1>earlier on but you know, do what you love, what

1:23:04.240 --> 1:23:06.439
<v Speaker 1>love what you do. You can't possibly work at this

1:23:06.560 --> 1:23:08.920
<v Speaker 1>pace and this engagement if you didn't like what you did.

1:23:09.280 --> 1:23:13.080
<v Speaker 1>My wife tells people that I'm gainfully unemployed. I get

1:23:13.080 --> 1:23:15.200
<v Speaker 1>paid for doing what I would be doing for free anyway.

1:23:16.000 --> 1:23:19.520
<v Speaker 1>And you know that that's difference with me. And retirement

1:23:19.800 --> 1:23:22.719
<v Speaker 1>would be one word, and that one where would be investors.

1:23:23.520 --> 1:23:25.519
<v Speaker 1>If I did not have investors, I would be doing

1:23:25.560 --> 1:23:29.719
<v Speaker 1>exactly what I'm doing now. But I probably couldn't afford.

1:23:29.840 --> 1:23:33.400
<v Speaker 1>Not probably I couldn't affords. I'm too cheap, basically afforced. No,

1:23:33.520 --> 1:23:35.880
<v Speaker 1>I say it seriously. You know, I joke with people.

1:23:36.360 --> 1:23:38.800
<v Speaker 1>You know I have a home in Florida. I spent

1:23:38.840 --> 1:23:41.439
<v Speaker 1>a lot of time in Florida working, and I have

1:23:41.560 --> 1:23:43.680
<v Speaker 1>two cars in Florida. I just put my second car

1:23:43.760 --> 1:23:45.640
<v Speaker 1>and floor. I have two cars in New Jersey. My

1:23:45.760 --> 1:23:49.160
<v Speaker 1>first three cars with two thousand twos, two thousand and

1:23:49.280 --> 1:23:52.599
<v Speaker 1>two Lexus convertible with two thousand two Alexus Sedan, two

1:23:52.640 --> 1:23:56.000
<v Speaker 1>thousand eight Lexus oh wheel drive sedan, and I just

1:23:56.160 --> 1:23:59.720
<v Speaker 1>bought a used Volkswagen facade. But I feel like a

1:23:59.800 --> 1:24:03.440
<v Speaker 1>rich man. Why it's the first three cars preceded Bluetooth.

1:24:03.920 --> 1:24:07.200
<v Speaker 1>My new car used with thirteen miles wokes Away inside

1:24:07.240 --> 1:24:09.000
<v Speaker 1>his bluetooth. So I get into the car and I

1:24:09.080 --> 1:24:12.120
<v Speaker 1>feel like a rich man. I say, call Billy Gordiano

1:24:12.360 --> 1:24:15.400
<v Speaker 1>at work and it does, and it does. My other

1:24:15.479 --> 1:24:17.000
<v Speaker 1>three cars I can't do that, So I feel like

1:24:17.040 --> 1:24:19.120
<v Speaker 1>a rich man. You know you can. You can replace

1:24:19.280 --> 1:24:22.559
<v Speaker 1>those old cars. And by the way, the newer cars,

1:24:22.720 --> 1:24:27.400
<v Speaker 1>the safety technology, the lane you know, they stop automatically.

1:24:27.640 --> 1:24:31.960
<v Speaker 1>I don't drive a lot, uh. And I'm told in

1:24:32.080 --> 1:24:35.880
<v Speaker 1>a two thousand and two Lexus LS four thirty, with

1:24:36.000 --> 1:24:39.120
<v Speaker 1>the best Lexus they made, I got eighty thousand miles

1:24:39.240 --> 1:24:43.120
<v Speaker 1>on it like a new car. It drives like a

1:24:43.200 --> 1:24:45.960
<v Speaker 1>new car, and I'd rather give the money to charity.

1:24:46.080 --> 1:24:48.799
<v Speaker 1>So that's what I was about to say, is you know, people,

1:24:48.840 --> 1:24:52.479
<v Speaker 1>you describe yourself as cheap. But again going back to

1:24:52.640 --> 1:24:55.160
<v Speaker 1>and say cheap, I respect money. I'm not going to

1:24:55.240 --> 1:24:56.960
<v Speaker 1>tell you how much I give away every year to charity,

1:24:56.960 --> 1:24:59.560
<v Speaker 1>but its millions of dollars and I don't spend that

1:24:59.600 --> 1:25:01.599
<v Speaker 1>kind of mone in my cell boast. You know you'd

1:25:01.680 --> 1:25:03.960
<v Speaker 1>rather give it away than buy a Nu mercedy because

1:25:04.439 --> 1:25:05.840
<v Speaker 1>you know it's the end of the day. I don't

1:25:05.840 --> 1:25:07.880
<v Speaker 1>play so much value in that. I don't. I don't

1:25:07.880 --> 1:25:09.759
<v Speaker 1>want to give anything. I don't deprive myself of anything.

1:25:09.800 --> 1:25:12.120
<v Speaker 1>If I want something, I buy it because I could

1:25:12.160 --> 1:25:14.600
<v Speaker 1>afford it. But there's nothing that I really want I

1:25:14.680 --> 1:25:17.320
<v Speaker 1>don't have. You're not, you said earlier, and you're not.

1:25:17.720 --> 1:25:21.640
<v Speaker 1>I'm not. I'm not a clothes horse obvious reasons. I'm

1:25:21.760 --> 1:25:26.920
<v Speaker 1>overweight and you know, uh so I have the clothes

1:25:27.000 --> 1:25:29.599
<v Speaker 1>I need. You're in a suit and tie, dressed nicely.

1:25:29.680 --> 1:25:34.599
<v Speaker 1>I dressed properly. I dress adequately. Though a guy I laughed,

1:25:34.960 --> 1:25:40.200
<v Speaker 1>I got you know, it's a funny story. Yeah, um,

1:25:41.320 --> 1:25:45.160
<v Speaker 1>Anthony Scaramucci. Sure. He said publicly somewhere that I was

1:25:45.200 --> 1:25:48.320
<v Speaker 1>the worst dress billionaire he hasn't met, And I said

1:25:48.360 --> 1:25:51.880
<v Speaker 1>to him multi he jokes about that all the time.

1:25:52.320 --> 1:25:55.200
<v Speaker 1>I actually think I'm pretty well addressed. You're well put together.

1:25:55.760 --> 1:25:58.120
<v Speaker 1>Your wife picked out the tie. Though I know my wife.

1:25:58.680 --> 1:26:01.560
<v Speaker 1>He leaves me alone. I'm I Actually I'm building a

1:26:01.600 --> 1:26:04.960
<v Speaker 1>new house now Florida, and my wife sees everything to me. Really,

1:26:05.400 --> 1:26:09.640
<v Speaker 1>my uh my wife basically knows what she's interested in,

1:26:09.880 --> 1:26:13.040
<v Speaker 1>and she pursues what she's interested in. And uh, very

1:26:13.080 --> 1:26:16.880
<v Speaker 1>purposeful purpose and very very smart lady, terrific wife. That

1:26:17.080 --> 1:26:22.679
<v Speaker 1>that sounds fantastic. So um, we mentioned your your mentors,

1:26:22.760 --> 1:26:25.760
<v Speaker 1>We mentioned some of the investors. Actually we didn't get

1:26:25.760 --> 1:26:29.320
<v Speaker 1>any other than Buffett. What other investors have influenced your

1:26:29.400 --> 1:26:33.800
<v Speaker 1>approach to invest Roger Murray, Warren Buffett. I mentioned Bob

1:26:33.840 --> 1:26:38.240
<v Speaker 1>Minutia and Geodd Whitehead. I mean all in different ways.

1:26:38.600 --> 1:26:44.280
<v Speaker 1>You know, Bear Sterns was notoriously positive firm and with

1:26:44.439 --> 1:26:48.360
<v Speaker 1>charitable instincts, and so you pick up different things, and

1:26:48.479 --> 1:26:50.880
<v Speaker 1>then you watch different investors, and I'd say it's the

1:26:51.120 --> 1:26:53.679
<v Speaker 1>process of learning. I can't I can't point to anyone

1:26:53.800 --> 1:26:56.960
<v Speaker 1>individual that's changed my life on the industrial side. The

1:26:57.040 --> 1:26:59.479
<v Speaker 1>guy that I had the greatest admiration for where I

1:26:59.520 --> 1:27:02.200
<v Speaker 1>spent really first twenty five years of my life studying,

1:27:02.280 --> 1:27:05.240
<v Speaker 1>was Dr Henry Singleton, was a founder of tel Dine

1:27:05.320 --> 1:27:09.800
<v Speaker 1>and arguably the smartest guy I ever met. Really absolutely

1:27:10.080 --> 1:27:15.519
<v Speaker 1>and uh, basically uh. I have no greater authority to

1:27:15.680 --> 1:27:19.360
<v Speaker 1>that view than Warren Buffett. In two thousand and seven,

1:27:20.040 --> 1:27:22.600
<v Speaker 1>he gave a speech at the Value Investing Conference on

1:27:22.680 --> 1:27:25.800
<v Speaker 1>two subjects. One was I was highly critical of stock

1:27:25.920 --> 1:27:29.920
<v Speaker 1>repurchased the way it was being um um, you know,

1:27:30.080 --> 1:27:32.679
<v Speaker 1>practice of time. And then I went through a case

1:27:32.720 --> 1:27:35.599
<v Speaker 1>study that used at Harvard UH and it was untiled.

1:27:35.680 --> 1:27:39.120
<v Speaker 1>The financial brilliance of Dr Henry Singleton of tele Dine.

1:27:39.680 --> 1:27:42.960
<v Speaker 1>Warren Buffett got ahold of those two presentations. Not by accident.

1:27:43.000 --> 1:27:46.000
<v Speaker 1>I sent to him, having great respect for Warren's And

1:27:46.160 --> 1:27:47.920
<v Speaker 1>there's a letter he sent me. I hope he doesn't

1:27:47.960 --> 1:27:50.920
<v Speaker 1>mind them reading it publicly November twenty thousand and seven,

1:27:51.520 --> 1:27:53.240
<v Speaker 1>and he said, dearly, I don't think you could have

1:27:53.280 --> 1:27:56.160
<v Speaker 1>picked two better subjects, Henry. That's Henry Singleton has a

1:27:56.200 --> 1:27:58.840
<v Speaker 1>manage that all investors CEO would be CEO s and

1:27:59.000 --> 1:28:01.160
<v Speaker 1>NBA students should stud In the end, it was one

1:28:01.840 --> 1:28:04.000
<v Speaker 1>rational and there are very few CEOs about whom I

1:28:04.000 --> 1:28:08.000
<v Speaker 1>could make that statement. Paragraph the stock repurchase situation is

1:28:08.040 --> 1:28:10.559
<v Speaker 1>fascinating to be that's because the answer is so simple.

1:28:10.640 --> 1:28:12.479
<v Speaker 1>You do it when you are buying dollar bills and

1:28:12.560 --> 1:28:16.800
<v Speaker 1>click cutting significant discount, and only then underline only paragraph

1:28:17.160 --> 1:28:19.599
<v Speaker 1>and the general observation. I would say that most companies

1:28:19.640 --> 1:28:21.640
<v Speaker 1>that repurchase shares thirty years ago, we're doing for the

1:28:21.760 --> 1:28:24.400
<v Speaker 1>right reasons, and most companies doing it now are wrong.

1:28:24.479 --> 1:28:27.240
<v Speaker 1>When doing so time of the time, I see managers

1:28:27.240 --> 1:28:30.920
<v Speaker 1>who are attempting to be fashionable or subconsciously hoping to

1:28:31.000 --> 1:28:34.439
<v Speaker 1>support their stock. Lows is a great example. I use

1:28:34.479 --> 1:28:36.559
<v Speaker 1>Low as an example of a good buy back program.

1:28:36.920 --> 1:28:39.240
<v Speaker 1>Lows is a great example of the company's always repurchase

1:28:39.240 --> 1:28:42.080
<v Speaker 1>shares the right reason. I could give examples the reverse.

1:28:42.200 --> 1:28:44.879
<v Speaker 1>I love this following statement, but I follow the dictum

1:28:45.200 --> 1:28:48.920
<v Speaker 1>praise by name, criticized by category, best regarded warrant. I

1:28:49.040 --> 1:28:52.439
<v Speaker 1>showed that letter to my two older my two sons,

1:28:52.880 --> 1:28:54.960
<v Speaker 1>and it's a great philosophy of life. You never see

1:28:55.000 --> 1:28:58.840
<v Speaker 1>warrant criticizing any one individual in public. We might criticize

1:28:58.880 --> 1:29:01.920
<v Speaker 1>invest in bankers and criticized hedge funds, but it doesn't

1:29:01.920 --> 1:29:03.880
<v Speaker 1>go after anyone. That's a good philosophy of life. In

1:29:03.960 --> 1:29:07.479
<v Speaker 1>my opinion, that's a fascinating What's the date on that letter?

1:29:07.720 --> 1:29:12.759
<v Speaker 1>That data on that letter was November two thousand and seven,

1:29:13.080 --> 1:29:16.160
<v Speaker 1>So here it is eight years later. We see a

1:29:16.400 --> 1:29:20.040
<v Speaker 1>massive run of buy backs the past few years. What

1:29:20.160 --> 1:29:22.960
<v Speaker 1>are your thoughts on these are are buy backs? Are

1:29:23.000 --> 1:29:26.000
<v Speaker 1>they buying dollar bills at a substantial discount, or they

1:29:26.120 --> 1:29:29.439
<v Speaker 1>being fashionable? There are four kind of buy backs that

1:29:30.040 --> 1:29:32.519
<v Speaker 1>that's a theme four of everything. It sounds like, well

1:29:33.120 --> 1:29:37.120
<v Speaker 1>quinciense bibe back type one has nothing, and I'll give

1:29:37.160 --> 1:29:41.280
<v Speaker 1>examples nothing to do with fundamental value. Remember in D

1:29:41.400 --> 1:29:43.720
<v Speaker 1>and ninety four, being on the chowel line at the

1:29:43.800 --> 1:29:47.240
<v Speaker 1>Allen and Company media conference, standing behind Andy Grove, and

1:29:47.320 --> 1:29:50.200
<v Speaker 1>I said to Andy, what statement is Intel making my

1:29:50.320 --> 1:29:53.080
<v Speaker 1>buying back stock at fifty times earnings? He says, We're

1:29:53.120 --> 1:29:56.599
<v Speaker 1>not looking to make any statement. Basically, Uh, we don't

1:29:56.640 --> 1:29:59.600
<v Speaker 1>want the flak from the shoreholders over option creep. So

1:29:59.720 --> 1:30:01.920
<v Speaker 1>with I'm back enough shares to keep the up the

1:30:02.160 --> 1:30:05.440
<v Speaker 1>share count flat. Second kind of buy back very nefarious.

1:30:05.760 --> 1:30:08.720
<v Speaker 1>The one that warrant to sends the reference. That's managements

1:30:08.760 --> 1:30:11.120
<v Speaker 1>that are looking to either support their stock or create

1:30:11.200 --> 1:30:15.760
<v Speaker 1>this impression that's undervalued or married maybe even creating a

1:30:15.840 --> 1:30:19.040
<v Speaker 1>conditioned market where they're buying backstock for the company their

1:30:19.040 --> 1:30:21.600
<v Speaker 1>selling stock themselves. I'm not going computing them, but you know,

1:30:21.720 --> 1:30:24.840
<v Speaker 1>Andrew Mazzolo has spent so several hundred million dollars worth

1:30:24.840 --> 1:30:27.360
<v Speaker 1>of stock at forty while country Wide Credit was buying

1:30:27.400 --> 1:30:30.400
<v Speaker 1>backstock at forty two billion dollars worth, only to sell

1:30:30.439 --> 1:30:32.479
<v Speaker 1>the company to Bank of America at four, and I'm

1:30:32.479 --> 1:30:34.320
<v Speaker 1>telling you back in America is very sorry they bought

1:30:34.360 --> 1:30:37.200
<v Speaker 1>it it for. Okay. The third kind of buy back,

1:30:37.360 --> 1:30:39.759
<v Speaker 1>which is the typical buyback now, is companies that blessed

1:30:39.760 --> 1:30:42.360
<v Speaker 1>with excess cash flow. They've kind of convinced themselves that

1:30:42.439 --> 1:30:44.960
<v Speaker 1>dividends forever. We don't want to be embarrassed by having

1:30:44.960 --> 1:30:46.960
<v Speaker 1>the kind of dividend we could always turn off a

1:30:47.000 --> 1:30:49.320
<v Speaker 1>buyback program. So we're gonna take excess case flowing buy

1:30:49.360 --> 1:30:52.320
<v Speaker 1>back stock. And I would you rather see those folks

1:30:52.360 --> 1:30:57.000
<v Speaker 1>doing a higher dividend than many cases in many cases, okay.

1:30:57.120 --> 1:30:59.160
<v Speaker 1>And the fallacy of that is that the average Carmon

1:30:59.200 --> 1:31:02.400
<v Speaker 1>stock is yielding, uh, you know, two percent for every

1:31:02.439 --> 1:31:04.679
<v Speaker 1>shore you buy back, your buying back fifty years of dividends.

1:31:04.840 --> 1:31:07.120
<v Speaker 1>And it turns out that a dividend policy was the

1:31:07.120 --> 1:31:09.280
<v Speaker 1>wrong policy and cut the dividend, your stock doesn't get

1:31:09.320 --> 1:31:12.400
<v Speaker 1>cremated anyway. So look, look, I mean, I have enormous

1:31:12.439 --> 1:31:14.680
<v Speaker 1>respect for Goldman Sacks. Goldman Sack sports stock back for

1:31:14.680 --> 1:31:17.040
<v Speaker 1>the Treasury over two hundred and two thousand and seven

1:31:17.120 --> 1:31:19.400
<v Speaker 1>only sell stock to warm buffet and under eighty if

1:31:19.479 --> 1:31:22.080
<v Speaker 1>you propably account for the warrants, and all the banks

1:31:22.120 --> 1:31:24.320
<v Speaker 1>and financial institutions and some of the old companies with

1:31:24.400 --> 1:31:27.200
<v Speaker 1>buying back stock are totally inappropriate prices. And the fourth

1:31:27.280 --> 1:31:29.040
<v Speaker 1>kind of buy back the one I love, the one

1:31:29.080 --> 1:31:31.439
<v Speaker 1>that Henry singled him did the eight self tender offers

1:31:31.479 --> 1:31:34.439
<v Speaker 1>made retire nine of the company stock and there was

1:31:34.479 --> 1:31:38.200
<v Speaker 1>a billiont executed. Program is they understand the value proposition

1:31:38.240 --> 1:31:40.720
<v Speaker 1>of their company. They can correctly determine their stock is

1:31:40.800 --> 1:31:43.519
<v Speaker 1>under valued and buy back under badge stock. They leverage

1:31:43.560 --> 1:31:46.040
<v Speaker 1>the return to those investors that aren't selling. If what

1:31:46.240 --> 1:31:49.840
<v Speaker 1>companies have to you know, understand is when you buy

1:31:49.960 --> 1:31:53.240
<v Speaker 1>back stock, you're lodging the ownership of those who are

1:31:53.280 --> 1:31:57.439
<v Speaker 1>not selling. If you're lodging the ownership but those not

1:31:57.600 --> 1:32:02.679
<v Speaker 1>selling your disservice. You're investor by buying backstock and inappropriate prices,

1:32:03.080 --> 1:32:05.200
<v Speaker 1>so at the right price at the right place. I

1:32:05.280 --> 1:32:08.080
<v Speaker 1>love it. You know, it's funny you mentioned the goldman

1:32:08.400 --> 1:32:12.760
<v Speaker 1>Um situation. Uh Dell recently went private, and before they

1:32:12.800 --> 1:32:14.639
<v Speaker 1>went private, we were looking at some of the numbers.

1:32:15.000 --> 1:32:17.799
<v Speaker 1>It turned out, over the course of their entire history,

1:32:18.280 --> 1:32:21.160
<v Speaker 1>they spent more on buy backs than they actually earned

1:32:21.200 --> 1:32:23.160
<v Speaker 1>in profit. I have I don't want to get into

1:32:23.200 --> 1:32:25.000
<v Speaker 1>a debate with Michael Dell, but I have a very

1:32:25.080 --> 1:32:27.439
<v Speaker 1>negative view of what they did. That carl I com

1:32:27.600 --> 1:32:30.559
<v Speaker 1>was on the right track in a sense. Going private

1:32:31.200 --> 1:32:33.559
<v Speaker 1>is a giant case of instruy trading by managing against

1:32:33.600 --> 1:32:37.720
<v Speaker 1>their shaholders. Okay, uh. I would have thought it would

1:32:37.720 --> 1:32:40.800
<v Speaker 1>be more appropriate for Dell to recapitalize the company, making

1:32:40.800 --> 1:32:43.400
<v Speaker 1>an offer to shareholders, take out those showers they want

1:32:43.439 --> 1:32:45.720
<v Speaker 1>to go out and those shareholders that wanted to take

1:32:45.760 --> 1:32:48.240
<v Speaker 1>the risk of a more leverage enterprise, and bet on

1:32:48.360 --> 1:32:51.200
<v Speaker 1>Michael Dell's management team and his own talent to improve

1:32:51.280 --> 1:32:53.360
<v Speaker 1>the situation. That would a fair a way to go.

1:32:53.960 --> 1:32:56.040
<v Speaker 1>So three years from now when he fixes it up

1:32:56.080 --> 1:32:58.479
<v Speaker 1>and creates a normal capital game for him in silver

1:32:58.640 --> 1:33:02.280
<v Speaker 1>Lake and tried to bring it, Yeah, that was gains

1:33:02.400 --> 1:33:04.479
<v Speaker 1>that were really belonging in the pocket of the investor.

1:33:04.600 --> 1:33:06.479
<v Speaker 1>The investor. So you mentioned carl I Con. What do

1:33:06.600 --> 1:33:10.920
<v Speaker 1>you think of activist investor. I would say I'm balanced positive,

1:33:11.000 --> 1:33:12.920
<v Speaker 1>you know, I think there's some negative aspects to it.

1:33:13.320 --> 1:33:15.880
<v Speaker 1>I think this formula go out and borrow a lot

1:33:15.920 --> 1:33:17.760
<v Speaker 1>of money, leverage up a couple of turns of debt,

1:33:18.120 --> 1:33:20.600
<v Speaker 1>capital and buy back a lot of stock is not

1:33:20.760 --> 1:33:23.680
<v Speaker 1>suitable for every company, but buying Lodge, I would say

1:33:24.240 --> 1:33:26.960
<v Speaker 1>activism has to be viewed in a constructive light. And

1:33:27.040 --> 1:33:32.200
<v Speaker 1>he's been totally brilliant the Netflix trade also, and the

1:33:32.280 --> 1:33:34.280
<v Speaker 1>guy has got a phenomenal record. He's only to be

1:33:34.320 --> 1:33:38.400
<v Speaker 1>admired and respected. And um, what sort of advice would

1:33:38.439 --> 1:33:41.320
<v Speaker 1>you give to millennials or someone just starting out their

1:33:41.360 --> 1:33:44.559
<v Speaker 1>career today? I think we covered some of it. I mean, uh,

1:33:45.120 --> 1:33:48.639
<v Speaker 1>I look at my situation. Uh coming fore I came.

1:33:48.800 --> 1:33:52.160
<v Speaker 1>I think education, it's important if you're interested in the

1:33:52.280 --> 1:33:56.040
<v Speaker 1>business world. I think, uh, get a good business education.

1:33:56.280 --> 1:33:58.720
<v Speaker 1>You know, accounting is the language of business. So my

1:33:58.920 --> 1:34:01.599
<v Speaker 1>NBA made a all the difference to me in terms

1:34:01.640 --> 1:34:03.479
<v Speaker 1>of not only could open up doors, it gave me

1:34:03.560 --> 1:34:05.679
<v Speaker 1>technical skills. They didn't have a major in the chemistry,

1:34:05.720 --> 1:34:08.479
<v Speaker 1>mind and meth and physics. Uh. And don't go into

1:34:08.520 --> 1:34:10.280
<v Speaker 1>a field just for money. You know, all these kids

1:34:10.320 --> 1:34:14.479
<v Speaker 1>interviewing they could join hedge funds. Everything is cyclical. Figure

1:34:14.520 --> 1:34:17.160
<v Speaker 1>out what your aptitude and your interests are and pursue

1:34:17.240 --> 1:34:20.280
<v Speaker 1>that career and go to work for somebody respect and admire.

1:34:20.760 --> 1:34:23.480
<v Speaker 1>You know, it's very important and you get a good foundation.

1:34:24.240 --> 1:34:26.920
<v Speaker 1>And then our final question, and I asked this of

1:34:27.000 --> 1:34:30.920
<v Speaker 1>all my guests, what do you know today about investing

1:34:31.000 --> 1:34:34.360
<v Speaker 1>and asset management that you wish you knew forty years

1:34:34.400 --> 1:34:40.639
<v Speaker 1>ago when you started. I loved my career at Goldman Sachs.

1:34:41.600 --> 1:34:44.439
<v Speaker 1>I owe a great gratitude to Goldman Sachs. I think

1:34:44.479 --> 1:34:46.720
<v Speaker 1>Goldman Sacks owes me. But I performed very strongly as

1:34:46.720 --> 1:34:49.200
<v Speaker 1>a professional. But I probably would have gone into this

1:34:49.280 --> 1:34:51.640
<v Speaker 1>business earlier. What I did you wish you would have

1:34:51.680 --> 1:34:53.920
<v Speaker 1>started earlier? Now it's a chicken and egg. You know.

1:34:54.040 --> 1:34:58.920
<v Speaker 1>I developed my reputation at Goldman, but this is a

1:34:59.280 --> 1:35:01.479
<v Speaker 1>much more p off of the hedge fund business. You

1:35:01.640 --> 1:35:03.640
<v Speaker 1>had fun business, but you know, and you have a

1:35:03.720 --> 1:35:06.280
<v Speaker 1>lot more control when it's essentially you at the top

1:35:06.360 --> 1:35:10.400
<v Speaker 1>of the part. Your hoppers are higher down as are lower.

1:35:10.640 --> 1:35:12.720
<v Speaker 1>You know, you're out there alone. And I do have

1:35:12.760 --> 1:35:14.439
<v Speaker 1>a team that I have a very competent team, But

1:35:14.560 --> 1:35:16.720
<v Speaker 1>the truth is I didn't have the same infrastructure I

1:35:16.720 --> 1:35:19.439
<v Speaker 1>had a Goldman SAX. You know, I was the number

1:35:19.479 --> 1:35:23.960
<v Speaker 1>fifty partner made was fifty partners in total, five hundre employees,

1:35:23.960 --> 1:35:25.960
<v Speaker 1>and today is thirty eight thousand people, I think in

1:35:26.040 --> 1:35:28.640
<v Speaker 1>four hundred, that's an amazing that's an amazing set of

1:35:28.760 --> 1:35:32.040
<v Speaker 1>numbers from five. So now when you're a partner and

1:35:32.120 --> 1:35:36.080
<v Speaker 1>you leave that partnership and have to digress briefly because

1:35:36.120 --> 1:35:38.760
<v Speaker 1>you brought this up, are they buying you out of

1:35:38.880 --> 1:35:41.200
<v Speaker 1>the partnership? How does that a capital We were a

1:35:41.240 --> 1:35:43.840
<v Speaker 1>private partnership. You have a capital account. The firm had

1:35:43.840 --> 1:35:46.960
<v Speaker 1>a very strong capital retention rules. When you retire, they

1:35:47.000 --> 1:35:49.720
<v Speaker 1>gave you half of your capital back. The other half

1:35:49.760 --> 1:35:52.080
<v Speaker 1>you got back after five years. So I took the

1:35:52.120 --> 1:35:53.680
<v Speaker 1>amount of cap I can get a go home in,

1:35:53.720 --> 1:35:55.719
<v Speaker 1>plus whatever else I had, and I put into Omega

1:35:56.200 --> 1:36:01.880
<v Speaker 1>and I started Omegan and that number has grown, uh

1:36:04.400 --> 1:36:07.280
<v Speaker 1>something like that, not too chevy, and uh, that's because

1:36:07.280 --> 1:36:09.280
<v Speaker 1>I believed in myself and I left my money in

1:36:09.560 --> 1:36:11.719
<v Speaker 1>and I want to be a co investor with my investors.

1:36:12.320 --> 1:36:14.720
<v Speaker 1>I want to eat my own cooking, and so I

1:36:15.040 --> 1:36:17.960
<v Speaker 1>believe in that very strongly. And so I lost more

1:36:18.000 --> 1:36:19.920
<v Speaker 1>money than anyone lost in two thousand and eight, and

1:36:20.000 --> 1:36:22.599
<v Speaker 1>I've done extremely well subsequent to that. And I think

1:36:22.640 --> 1:36:26.639
<v Speaker 1>that's the that's the alignment of interest that should exist. Lee.

1:36:26.720 --> 1:36:29.200
<v Speaker 1>I can't thank you so much for how generous you've

1:36:29.240 --> 1:36:33.840
<v Speaker 1>been with your time. Um, this just has been tremendous. Uh.

1:36:34.240 --> 1:36:37.840
<v Speaker 1>You've been listening to my conversation with Leon Cooperman of

1:36:38.120 --> 1:36:41.479
<v Speaker 1>Omega Advisors. If you enjoy this conversation, be sure and

1:36:41.600 --> 1:36:44.360
<v Speaker 1>check out an Inch above or an Inch Below on

1:36:44.479 --> 1:36:48.240
<v Speaker 1>Apple iTunes to see all the rest of our various shows.

1:36:48.720 --> 1:36:52.080
<v Speaker 1>Check out my daily column on Bloomberg View dot com.

1:36:52.280 --> 1:36:55.920
<v Speaker 1>Follow me on Twitter at Ridholtz. You've been listening to

1:36:56.080 --> 1:36:58.559
<v Speaker 1>Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio