WEBVTT - Surveying the AI Threat Landscape

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<v Speaker 1>This is Bloomberg Business Week with Carol Messer and Tim

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<v Speaker 1>Stenebeck on Bloomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 2>Jennifer, I don't know if you saw this making the

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<v Speaker 2>rounds on Twitter last week, but this video went viral.

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<v Speaker 1>It racked up more than a million views.

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<v Speaker 2>It purports to be from a company that calls itself

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<v Speaker 2>quote the world's first AI powered news network. Now, I

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<v Speaker 2>wasn't able to independently confirm that this video is indeed

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<v Speaker 2>all AI, but it's still worth taking a listen to

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<v Speaker 2>kind of see where we are in this day and age.

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<v Speaker 1>Check this out.

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<v Speaker 3>Hello, and welcome to Channel one, a new way of consuming, reporting,

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<v Speaker 3>and thinking about the news powered by artificial intelligence, all

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<v Speaker 3>presented by our team of AI generated reporters.

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<v Speaker 4>Will show you how AI powers and empowers our newsroom

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<v Speaker 4>to deliver journalism that's fast, trustworthy, and accurate. Let's start

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<v Speaker 4>with our reporters. You can hear us and see our

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<v Speaker 4>lips moving, but no one was recorded saying what we're

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<v Speaker 4>all saying, powered by sophisticated systems behind the scenes.

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<v Speaker 2>Okay, so again, I was not able to independently confirm

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<v Speaker 2>that this is indeed all AI, because if you were

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<v Speaker 2>watching that it looks like actual people, but there are

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<v Speaker 2>some clips of people of the actual anchors, like very

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<v Speaker 2>quickly speaking different languages.

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<v Speaker 1>It's all pretty wild.

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<v Speaker 2>So depending on your view, it could either be really

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<v Speaker 2>exciting or if you react like me and then everybody

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<v Speaker 2>I showed this video too in the newsroom, it's pretty

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<v Speaker 2>scary stuff. Let's see what our next guest has to

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<v Speaker 2>say about all this, because he's got more than twenty

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<v Speaker 2>five years of experience on the front lines when it

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<v Speaker 2>comes to cybersecurity, which in this day and age increasingly

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<v Speaker 2>looks at threats posed by so called deep fakes, AI

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<v Speaker 2>and misinformation. We've got Chester Wiznski, Global Field CTO at Sophos.

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<v Speaker 2>He joins us on Zoom from Vancouver.

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<v Speaker 1>Chester. Good to have you with us this afternoon. How

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<v Speaker 1>are you. I'm well, good to be here.

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<v Speaker 5>It's getting close to the holiday times, so it's kind

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<v Speaker 5>of an exciting time to get a chance to have

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<v Speaker 5>a chat about all the things we're going to be

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<v Speaker 5>seeing in our social media feeds the next few weeks.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>The reason I brought that up is because this is

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<v Speaker 2>something that I signed my social media feed over the

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<v Speaker 2>last couple of weeks, and again I reached out to

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<v Speaker 2>this company, and I wasn't able to confirm whether or

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<v Speaker 2>not it was all AI, but you got to see

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<v Speaker 2>some of it, You got to listen to some of it.

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<v Speaker 2>Is that the type of deep fake that we're seeing

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<v Speaker 2>these days, Well.

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<v Speaker 5>I think that's on the sophisticated end of the spectrum.

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<v Speaker 5>And it's important to remember that wasn't probably created in

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<v Speaker 5>real time. You know, it wasn't something that they could

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<v Speaker 5>just whip up in thirty seconds, right, I mean there was.

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<v Speaker 1>Clearly some effort very high that. Yeah. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 5>But I mean, on the other hand, like this is

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<v Speaker 5>how far this has come, right, if you have the

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<v Speaker 5>resources to want to create a realistic audio and video,

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<v Speaker 5>and certainly, as we've all seen with chat GPT in

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<v Speaker 5>the last year text, if you've got the resources, it

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<v Speaker 5>is getting really close to the point where it's indiscernible

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<v Speaker 5>from real content. I suspect that that entire video is

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<v Speaker 5>all done an AI. While you were playing the role

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<v Speaker 5>in there, I was hearing some telltale things in the

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<v Speaker 5>audio that my ear kind of knows to listen for.

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<v Speaker 5>But it's pretty convincing, isn't it.

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<v Speaker 6>What were some of the telltale things to listen for

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<v Speaker 6>because I must confess they passed me by completely.

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<v Speaker 5>Yeah, well, it's getting better all the time, certainly when

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<v Speaker 5>we're looking at AI generated photos and even video. Sometimes

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<v Speaker 5>AI historically has had a pretty bad approach to creating

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<v Speaker 5>straight lines. You'd think straight lines are the simplest thing

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<v Speaker 5>for a computer to draw, ever, but the way AI

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<v Speaker 5>is trained, it's actually really hard to teach it to

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<v Speaker 5>make straight lines. And with human faces, it often makes

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<v Speaker 5>mistakes like one ear lobe being attached and the other

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<v Speaker 5>one being detached, or too many teeth in the mouth,

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<v Speaker 5>or you know, there's some telltale things that frequently messes

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<v Speaker 5>up too many fingers on a hand, for example. But

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<v Speaker 5>these are all getting better all the time. And in

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<v Speaker 5>the audio the things I was listening for, there was

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<v Speaker 5>there was there's a crispness to each word in the

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<v Speaker 5>way that they're separated, and it almost had a bit

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<v Speaker 5>of a slightly robotic tone when it's trying to inflect emotion.

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<v Speaker 5>That is just feels a little bit off.

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<v Speaker 1>When I'm listening to it. Right when I heard the.

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<v Speaker 5>Anchor saying regular words, it sounded pretty plausible. But then

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<v Speaker 5>if I listened really carefully when she was trying to

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<v Speaker 5>inflect some emotion. It had a bit of a robotic

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<v Speaker 5>on natural feel to.

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<v Speaker 1>It, still so ched.

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<v Speaker 2>It all raises the question how this stuff can be

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<v Speaker 2>used for malicious purposes moving forward. I mean my first

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<v Speaker 2>thought is misinformation and disinformation, the idea that videos can

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<v Speaker 2>be created that you can just not trust, whether that's

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<v Speaker 2>of a world leader saying something or doing something, or

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<v Speaker 2>of a celebrity saying something that just isn't real.

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<v Speaker 5>Yeah, And I think that's really the real problem here

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<v Speaker 5>is this allows this content to be created at a

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<v Speaker 5>scale that it hasn't been able to be done before. Right,

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<v Speaker 5>if you and I have been speaking last year at Christmas,

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<v Speaker 5>or even the year before at Christmas, it would have

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<v Speaker 5>been pretty unlikely that a commercial company would have been

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<v Speaker 5>able to produce that video that you played a little

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<v Speaker 5>clip of. And it's accelerating so fast now and it's

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<v Speaker 5>getting so hard to tell the good from the bad.

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<v Speaker 5>It also means it can be done at a volume

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<v Speaker 5>that humans would be unable of creating. Right When we

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<v Speaker 5>think about a video like that, that's something that now

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<v Speaker 5>can be done in hours and with's a modest amount

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<v Speaker 5>of money, whereas before, you know, it would have required

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<v Speaker 5>a ridiculous amount of resources to even attempt to generate

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<v Speaker 5>something that believable. So while it's not something you and

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<v Speaker 5>I are going to be able to create that newsroom

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<v Speaker 5>clip tomorrow, maybe if we talk again a year from now,

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<v Speaker 5>we might be able.

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<v Speaker 1>To even be able to do that as individuals.

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<v Speaker 5>So this is going to be very challenging moving forward

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<v Speaker 5>because it's not something that's easily to disprove. So I

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<v Speaker 5>think we need to be working with our media sources

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<v Speaker 5>toward making sure the real content can be proven to

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<v Speaker 5>be real as a way of, you know, allowing us

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<v Speaker 5>to more easily discern what's real what isn't you know what?

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<v Speaker 6>This is actually leading up to my next question because,

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<v Speaker 6>as you say, a year from now, who knows what

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<v Speaker 6>the capabilities are going to be, but from what you're saying,

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<v Speaker 6>they're going to be much better. And then if we're

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<v Speaker 6>looking at next Christmas when we have this conversation, the

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<v Speaker 6>thing that will have just happened before next Christmas is

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<v Speaker 6>the US election, and it's already very contentious, and we've

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<v Speaker 6>got to ask what can the average voter, you know,

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<v Speaker 6>US journalist, you know, policymakers, how are we supposed to

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<v Speaker 6>be able to tell what's real and what's fake as

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<v Speaker 6>the election approaches, and what are the risks to a

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<v Speaker 6>free and fair election if we're not able to really

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<v Speaker 6>get on top of this problem straight away.

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<v Speaker 5>Well, I think we just need to get in a

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<v Speaker 5>better habit of going to trusted, verifiable sources, whether that

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<v Speaker 5>if it's about a candidate or an election campaign, then

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<v Speaker 5>making sure that we're getting the information from the campaign itself,

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<v Speaker 5>so that we know it's real from that candidate. And

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<v Speaker 5>you know, we've been seeing on television ads for years

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<v Speaker 5>that this ad was approved by whoever the candidate is, right,

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<v Speaker 5>there is an official channel for receiving that information so

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<v Speaker 5>that we can verify that it's definitely from a campaign

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<v Speaker 5>or a party or that kind of thing. And of

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<v Speaker 5>course our new sources, I mean Bloomberg is a great

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<v Speaker 5>example of that. But I mean, no matter what your

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<v Speaker 5>politics are, that there's a lot of trusted journalism out there,

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<v Speaker 5>and going to those sources to verify a story before

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<v Speaker 5>we repost things on social media I think is going

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<v Speaker 5>to be a really important step because trusting random accounts

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<v Speaker 5>on x and Meta and TikTok is probably going to

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<v Speaker 5>lead us in a dangerous direction.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that is certainly true, and I'm not optimistic about

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<v Speaker 2>the way that these platforms have allowed misinformation to flourish.

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<v Speaker 2>Hey chat, I promised i'd ask you, as somebody who's

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<v Speaker 2>been on the front lines of cybersecurity for twenty five years,

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<v Speaker 2>what worries you, what keeps you up at night?

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<v Speaker 5>Well, the quality of this stuff and the quantity of

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<v Speaker 5>that can be created is going to really blur the

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<v Speaker 5>lines for a lot of people between you know, the

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<v Speaker 5>reality and this misinformation, and a lot of us have

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<v Speaker 5>gotten too comfortable. You know, we don't specifically study people

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<v Speaker 5>trying to manipulate elections. We're worried about people being manipulated

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<v Speaker 5>into scams, getting you know, their money stolen from them,

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<v Speaker 5>getting their computers infected with viruses, that kind of thing.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, And when we.

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<v Speaker 5>Look at the things that people used to pay attention to,

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<v Speaker 5>you know, they read their email and they look for

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<v Speaker 5>the spelling mistakes. So this email doesn't really look like

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<v Speaker 5>it's from Bank of America. All those tell tale signs

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<v Speaker 5>are out the window now, right, There's really no discernible

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<v Speaker 5>difference between computer generated content that a criminal can make

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<v Speaker 5>tens of thousands of inn minutes and the real thing

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<v Speaker 5>that you're really getting from your financial institution or anybody

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<v Speaker 5>else that you do commerce with. So I think us

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<v Speaker 5>educating society on to be more suspicious and to double

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<v Speaker 5>check things before they believe them is going to be

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<v Speaker 5>important part of it. And more than that, I think

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<v Speaker 5>a lot of it comes back on the industry itself,

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<v Speaker 5>on the AI industry, and on us people in security

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<v Speaker 5>to build better tools to sort through this stuff so

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<v Speaker 5>that the majority of what ends up in your inbox

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<v Speaker 5>is signal, not.

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<v Speaker 6>Noise, just real quick thirty seconds. What do you think

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<v Speaker 6>regulators and social media companies should be doing about this?

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that's challenging.

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<v Speaker 5>I mean, the Biden White House has published in an

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<v Speaker 5>executive order at the end of October that covers a

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<v Speaker 5>lot of AI usage and is moving toward marking AI

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<v Speaker 5>generated content with a watermark. Certainly when it's produced by

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<v Speaker 5>the federal government. That's encouraging. But of course, what I'm

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<v Speaker 5>really worried about is people who aren't going.

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<v Speaker 4>To follow the law.

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<v Speaker 5>Right if we're worried about Russians and influencing our next election,

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<v Speaker 5>they're not going to abide by an executive order from

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<v Speaker 5>the White House to be good boys and good girls.

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<v Speaker 5>That's just not going to fly right. We have to

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<v Speaker 5>be able to, I think, invest our effort in proving

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<v Speaker 5>authenticity rather than trying to prove an inauthentic content.

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<v Speaker 2>Chester really appreciate you taking the time. That's Chet Wiznsky,

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<v Speaker 2>Global Field CTO at Sophos joining us from Vancouver.