1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,840 --> 00:00:09,119 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,240 --> 00:00:12,160 Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,280 --> 00:00:13,920 Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio. 5 00:00:24,200 --> 00:00:26,600 Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt, 6 00:00:26,720 --> 00:00:27,440 Speaker 2: my name is Noah. 7 00:00:27,640 --> 00:00:28,680 Speaker 3: They called me Ben. 8 00:00:28,720 --> 00:00:31,600 Speaker 4: We're joined as always with our super producer Alexis code 9 00:00:31,640 --> 00:00:35,400 Speaker 4: named Doc Holliday Jackson. Most importantly, you are you. You 10 00:00:35,560 --> 00:00:38,840 Speaker 4: are here that makes this the stuff they don't want 11 00:00:38,880 --> 00:00:41,800 Speaker 4: you to know. It is time for our weekly listener 12 00:00:41,840 --> 00:00:44,440 Speaker 4: mail program, where we get to hear from the best 13 00:00:44,479 --> 00:00:47,400 Speaker 4: part of the show, you and your fellow conspiracy realist. 14 00:00:47,800 --> 00:00:51,480 Speaker 4: We are going to We're gonna hear from our friend 15 00:00:51,520 --> 00:00:55,040 Speaker 4: Big Shucks, who appears to have accepted the nickname that 16 00:00:55,440 --> 00:00:58,120 Speaker 4: we pitched. We're going to get an update on some 17 00:00:58,280 --> 00:01:01,560 Speaker 4: very strange culty news. But before we do any of that, 18 00:01:01,880 --> 00:01:04,600 Speaker 4: we got a cavalcade of voicemails, right because there are 19 00:01:04,640 --> 00:01:07,119 Speaker 4: some interesting tips that came our way. 20 00:01:07,400 --> 00:01:10,360 Speaker 2: We've been getting so many incredible messages thanks to everybody 21 00:01:10,400 --> 00:01:14,160 Speaker 2: who's been calling in. Let's jump to a message from Sydney, 22 00:01:14,440 --> 00:01:18,240 Speaker 2: who has an interesting idea about a weeding technique I'd 23 00:01:18,280 --> 00:01:18,840 Speaker 2: never heard of. 24 00:01:19,840 --> 00:01:22,440 Speaker 5: Hey, it's been a long time. This is Sydney. I 25 00:01:22,560 --> 00:01:26,240 Speaker 5: just listened to your episode about the Mexican cartel. I 26 00:01:26,240 --> 00:01:28,399 Speaker 5: think it was a strange news. You know, guys were 27 00:01:28,400 --> 00:01:32,880 Speaker 5: talking about roundup, and I mean, I live in Iowa, 28 00:01:32,959 --> 00:01:35,520 Speaker 5: so round up is literally everywhere around a pretty corn. 29 00:01:35,560 --> 00:01:37,759 Speaker 5: We talk about it all the time. So many people 30 00:01:37,760 --> 00:01:40,559 Speaker 5: defend it. My dad even defends it, and I'm like, Dad, 31 00:01:40,600 --> 00:01:43,399 Speaker 5: I really don't want you to do you cancer and die. Anyways, 32 00:01:43,680 --> 00:01:46,399 Speaker 5: you were talking about having to pull your weed's hand 33 00:01:46,400 --> 00:01:50,800 Speaker 5: by hand. If you mix up Don Dishop in some water, 34 00:01:51,360 --> 00:01:55,360 Speaker 5: it can also kill weeds in your garden or in 35 00:01:55,400 --> 00:01:58,000 Speaker 5: your flowerbed. So that's a I guess. I don't know 36 00:01:58,040 --> 00:01:59,960 Speaker 5: if Don Dishov is txting. I don't think it is, 37 00:02:00,080 --> 00:02:04,320 Speaker 5: but that is a different it's an alternative for you. 38 00:02:04,600 --> 00:02:06,640 Speaker 5: So yeah, there you go. Love you guys. 39 00:02:06,880 --> 00:02:11,799 Speaker 2: Wow, Oh thanks so much. Sidney googling Don dish Soap 40 00:02:11,919 --> 00:02:15,880 Speaker 2: tucks yes, Exac well, and and you says a weed killer, right, 41 00:02:16,200 --> 00:02:18,200 Speaker 2: I've never heard of that. My gosh. If I can 42 00:02:18,280 --> 00:02:21,120 Speaker 2: go buy one thing at Don dish Soap, a bucket 43 00:02:21,440 --> 00:02:24,880 Speaker 2: and a means of spraying, then I'm into it, and 44 00:02:24,919 --> 00:02:26,680 Speaker 2: I will do that rather than spray and all the 45 00:02:26,760 --> 00:02:30,360 Speaker 2: chemicals they end up buying to get rid of these weeds. 46 00:02:30,400 --> 00:02:33,880 Speaker 2: Super cool. I had never heard of that before. You 47 00:02:33,880 --> 00:02:37,639 Speaker 2: may have mentioned Sidney say like hey again, like very 48 00:02:37,680 --> 00:02:40,640 Speaker 2: much high again. Sidney has called in to us before. 49 00:02:40,840 --> 00:02:44,000 Speaker 2: She told us a story about losing I believe it 50 00:02:44,040 --> 00:02:47,520 Speaker 2: was her purse or her handbag on a form of 51 00:02:47,680 --> 00:02:50,800 Speaker 2: mass transit, and just that what that entailed and what 52 00:02:50,800 --> 00:02:53,880 Speaker 2: that was like. And we talked to her before about that. 53 00:02:54,320 --> 00:02:57,360 Speaker 2: This concept of living in Iowa, which Sidney describes as 54 00:02:57,520 --> 00:03:00,720 Speaker 2: the cancer capital of the world. And again she's at 55 00:03:01,320 --> 00:03:04,160 Speaker 2: attributing that and a lot of other people attribute that 56 00:03:04,280 --> 00:03:07,560 Speaker 2: to the large use of herbicides and pesticides that just 57 00:03:08,320 --> 00:03:11,200 Speaker 2: hang out on the lands all throughout the farmland out 58 00:03:11,200 --> 00:03:15,079 Speaker 2: there in Iowa. That freaked me out just thinking about that, 59 00:03:15,600 --> 00:03:18,920 Speaker 2: living in that environment and then finding an alternative like 60 00:03:18,960 --> 00:03:21,919 Speaker 2: this that appears to be non toxic, at least to 61 00:03:22,160 --> 00:03:23,360 Speaker 2: everything I've seen on it. 62 00:03:23,960 --> 00:03:26,240 Speaker 6: I did result of said Google was yes, done so 63 00:03:26,400 --> 00:03:30,080 Speaker 6: does contain toxic ingredients oh something to the effect of 64 00:03:30,120 --> 00:03:34,160 Speaker 6: a condition called acute aquatic toxicity. It does appear though 65 00:03:34,200 --> 00:03:37,320 Speaker 6: that's certainly of a lesser order than roundup. 66 00:03:37,760 --> 00:03:40,720 Speaker 2: So sheeez. Well, I mean it is allegedly killing plants, 67 00:03:40,760 --> 00:03:44,200 Speaker 2: so that's probably not good or great. My big question 68 00:03:44,360 --> 00:03:47,120 Speaker 2: was will it also kill your grass? And Sydney's response 69 00:03:47,240 --> 00:03:49,200 Speaker 2: was a was, well, grass grows back. I'm not worried 70 00:03:49,240 --> 00:03:51,440 Speaker 2: about that, So there you go. 71 00:03:52,000 --> 00:03:53,760 Speaker 3: Maybe no use it on your vegetable garden. 72 00:03:53,960 --> 00:03:55,800 Speaker 2: There you go, good call. 73 00:03:55,960 --> 00:03:56,280 Speaker 3: All right. 74 00:03:56,720 --> 00:03:59,760 Speaker 2: Next, we've got a message from trash Panda with an 75 00:03:59,760 --> 00:04:02,680 Speaker 2: intro take on those loyalty programs. 76 00:04:02,920 --> 00:04:07,880 Speaker 7: All right, here we go, Hello STDWYTK crew. In some circles, 77 00:04:07,920 --> 00:04:11,280 Speaker 7: I'm known as trash Panda. Recently, on an episode, you 78 00:04:11,320 --> 00:04:14,120 Speaker 7: guys talked about grocery stores and meeting phone numbers in 79 00:04:14,200 --> 00:04:16,920 Speaker 7: order to access deals. If you don't want to give 80 00:04:16,960 --> 00:04:19,719 Speaker 7: your own phone number, I suggest you think about Jenny. 81 00:04:20,880 --> 00:04:24,239 Speaker 7: I have used eight six, seven, five three oh nine 82 00:04:24,480 --> 00:04:27,680 Speaker 7: at multiple different grocery stores over the years, and there 83 00:04:27,760 --> 00:04:31,919 Speaker 7: is always an account, doesn't matter the area code. My 84 00:04:32,080 --> 00:04:35,440 Speaker 7: local Ralphs, which I believe is Krager's on the East Coast, 85 00:04:35,520 --> 00:04:39,080 Speaker 7: is actually transitioning to an app, so this trick does 86 00:04:39,200 --> 00:04:41,960 Speaker 7: have a shelf life. Thank you for all the content, 87 00:04:42,120 --> 00:04:44,839 Speaker 7: and y'all totally have my permission to use my voice 88 00:04:44,880 --> 00:04:49,080 Speaker 7: and message if you see fit. Thanks a bunch, bye. 89 00:04:48,920 --> 00:04:50,880 Speaker 4: Take you. Trash Panda all. 90 00:04:50,839 --> 00:04:53,880 Speaker 3: Right, Kroger and Ralphs are the same thing. 91 00:04:54,200 --> 00:04:56,720 Speaker 4: Kroger is in the midst of a huge I know, 92 00:04:56,920 --> 00:04:58,320 Speaker 4: globd overlord move. 93 00:04:58,560 --> 00:05:00,400 Speaker 6: This sounds to me like the way they call Carl's 94 00:05:00,520 --> 00:05:03,600 Speaker 6: Junior Harty's in our neck of the woods, and that 95 00:05:03,720 --> 00:05:07,800 Speaker 6: at Carls Junior you know in the West. 96 00:05:07,800 --> 00:05:08,440 Speaker 3: Have to google that. 97 00:05:08,480 --> 00:05:11,120 Speaker 2: I think it's Chris Kroger and Albertson's are the It's 98 00:05:11,160 --> 00:05:12,520 Speaker 2: the big thing going on right now. 99 00:05:12,800 --> 00:05:15,640 Speaker 4: Yeah, for now, and then we'll see what happens next year, 100 00:05:15,839 --> 00:05:18,000 Speaker 4: next quarter. But yeah, I just want to take a 101 00:05:18,080 --> 00:05:21,599 Speaker 4: second and trash Panda. First off, I want to say 102 00:05:21,640 --> 00:05:24,000 Speaker 4: thank you so much for your awesome name. And I 103 00:05:24,000 --> 00:05:26,560 Speaker 4: think we may have corresponded in the past, but this 104 00:05:26,720 --> 00:05:30,839 Speaker 4: is a brilliant idea. I am all about discordiism and 105 00:05:31,720 --> 00:05:33,920 Speaker 4: light fun anarchy. So let's wreck the. 106 00:05:33,880 --> 00:05:37,520 Speaker 2: System anarchy in the USA. Another great song. So this 107 00:05:37,560 --> 00:05:39,479 Speaker 2: one guy's got stuck in my head ever since we 108 00:05:39,640 --> 00:05:43,080 Speaker 2: got this message. That old Oh what's the name of 109 00:05:43,120 --> 00:05:46,400 Speaker 2: that group? Is two Tone Tommy two Tone No what's 110 00:05:46,440 --> 00:05:49,200 Speaker 2: the what's the band that did eight six seven, five 111 00:05:49,240 --> 00:05:49,800 Speaker 2: three oh nine? 112 00:05:50,400 --> 00:05:52,159 Speaker 8: Got it? Got it? 113 00:05:52,279 --> 00:05:53,839 Speaker 3: I got your number on the wall? 114 00:05:53,920 --> 00:05:56,000 Speaker 2: Okay, you're right. Yeah, well I never knew the name 115 00:05:56,080 --> 00:05:58,720 Speaker 2: in my head. I talked to trash Bandit for a 116 00:05:58,760 --> 00:06:02,240 Speaker 2: little bit. She said she heard a rumor that that 117 00:06:02,600 --> 00:06:05,360 Speaker 2: was actually a number that was on a bathroom wall 118 00:06:05,880 --> 00:06:07,840 Speaker 2: that one of the bandmates saw. Noel, I just want 119 00:06:07,839 --> 00:06:10,039 Speaker 2: to see if you had any music trivia with it. 120 00:06:10,279 --> 00:06:12,200 Speaker 6: Well, I know that it's such a it's such an 121 00:06:12,200 --> 00:06:15,520 Speaker 6: earworm that I don't think the number exits like they 122 00:06:15,640 --> 00:06:18,400 Speaker 6: purposefully don't allow people to have that number because it 123 00:06:18,400 --> 00:06:20,720 Speaker 6: would get called you know, yea nauseam. 124 00:06:20,839 --> 00:06:23,760 Speaker 4: I can confirm that at least the way I have 125 00:06:24,279 --> 00:06:25,760 Speaker 4: this is just me. But the way I had heard 126 00:06:25,800 --> 00:06:28,720 Speaker 4: this rumor it did seem to have a lot of validity. 127 00:06:28,760 --> 00:06:31,640 Speaker 4: I think there's an interview with its oh nice members 128 00:06:31,680 --> 00:06:32,119 Speaker 4: of the band. 129 00:06:33,000 --> 00:06:36,120 Speaker 2: But again, that's just that's awesome. According to trash BANDA, 130 00:06:36,320 --> 00:06:39,240 Speaker 2: that phone number was disconnected no matter who had it 131 00:06:39,360 --> 00:06:41,320 Speaker 2: or when after that song came out and was such 132 00:06:41,360 --> 00:06:43,839 Speaker 2: a hit any phone, you just can't have that phone 133 00:06:43,920 --> 00:06:47,000 Speaker 2: number anymore. But I guess with this system I. 134 00:06:47,000 --> 00:06:47,680 Speaker 3: Don't call you. 135 00:06:47,720 --> 00:06:51,080 Speaker 6: They don't cross reference your phone number to give you 136 00:06:51,120 --> 00:06:52,160 Speaker 6: a Kroger account. 137 00:06:52,440 --> 00:06:56,000 Speaker 2: No, not usually unless again, unless it starts moving towards 138 00:06:56,080 --> 00:06:58,520 Speaker 2: the app thing. That's right, like we're talking about here, 139 00:06:58,560 --> 00:07:01,840 Speaker 2: where then you you might have two factor authentication At 140 00:07:01,839 --> 00:07:05,120 Speaker 2: some point or whatever. It seems like it will go 141 00:07:05,200 --> 00:07:07,679 Speaker 2: out the window. But for now, this is a little 142 00:07:07,720 --> 00:07:09,400 Speaker 2: hack that we can all use. 143 00:07:10,000 --> 00:07:13,440 Speaker 6: And y'all, Ralphs is in the Kroger family of stores. 144 00:07:14,000 --> 00:07:16,320 Speaker 6: It's like, you know, they you got to have brand 145 00:07:16,360 --> 00:07:20,520 Speaker 6: recognition regionally, and for us, I guess it's Kroger on 146 00:07:20,560 --> 00:07:21,760 Speaker 6: the West Coast, it's Ralphs. 147 00:07:22,560 --> 00:07:24,440 Speaker 3: It's in the Big Lebowski for crying out loud. 148 00:07:24,920 --> 00:07:28,160 Speaker 2: And the last message we've got for today comes from 149 00:07:28,480 --> 00:07:31,360 Speaker 2: a Frame and this message has to do with our 150 00:07:31,520 --> 00:07:35,560 Speaker 2: episode of Strange News. We're talking about cartels and moving 151 00:07:36,280 --> 00:07:39,280 Speaker 2: high caliber weapons pretty much military weapons. 152 00:07:39,640 --> 00:07:41,560 Speaker 8: Hey guys, it's say you frame again, and I want 153 00:07:41,600 --> 00:07:43,160 Speaker 8: a way to day to call you. And I didn't 154 00:07:43,200 --> 00:07:46,640 Speaker 8: really want to email this. Uh, but when you're talking 155 00:07:46,680 --> 00:07:52,440 Speaker 8: about how the cartels and have access to military grade 156 00:07:52,560 --> 00:07:57,760 Speaker 8: weaponry and are actively and it's being actively brought into 157 00:07:57,840 --> 00:08:01,200 Speaker 8: Mexico and increasing violence they in leading to a lot 158 00:08:01,240 --> 00:08:04,880 Speaker 8: of the fear mongeringe happening here around illegal immigration and drugs. 159 00:08:05,400 --> 00:08:10,360 Speaker 8: That is not new. I don't do hard drugs anymore. 160 00:08:10,720 --> 00:08:13,080 Speaker 8: I just smoke my weeds. Sometimes I'll take some mushrooms. 161 00:08:13,120 --> 00:08:17,040 Speaker 8: I don't do anything else. I only really drink occasionally, 162 00:08:17,040 --> 00:08:18,760 Speaker 8: and I just like beer, you know, or like a 163 00:08:18,840 --> 00:08:23,320 Speaker 8: nice cocktail. I don't really like going too hard. I'm 164 00:08:23,320 --> 00:08:25,160 Speaker 8: too old for that. But when I was in high 165 00:08:25,200 --> 00:08:29,920 Speaker 8: school in twenty twelve and thirteen, I can tell you 166 00:08:30,000 --> 00:08:32,199 Speaker 8: that it was easier for me to get a hand 167 00:08:32,200 --> 00:08:35,080 Speaker 8: grenade in a Mac eleven than it was for me 168 00:08:35,120 --> 00:08:38,480 Speaker 8: to get alcohol because I had access to cocaine. And 169 00:08:38,520 --> 00:08:41,400 Speaker 8: when you have access to cocaine, you do and always 170 00:08:41,440 --> 00:08:45,400 Speaker 8: have had access to everything. So everybody you know who 171 00:08:45,480 --> 00:08:49,360 Speaker 8: does coke, if they played it cool enough and ask 172 00:08:49,480 --> 00:08:52,680 Speaker 8: the right questions, they could get a hand grenade, They 173 00:08:52,760 --> 00:08:53,640 Speaker 8: could get an RPG. 174 00:08:54,640 --> 00:08:56,720 Speaker 9: Maybe their dealer doesn't want them to know the full 175 00:08:56,760 --> 00:08:59,960 Speaker 9: extent of who they know because they don't necessarily trust them. 176 00:09:00,160 --> 00:09:03,400 Speaker 9: But if you have access to hard drugs like cocaine 177 00:09:03,400 --> 00:09:05,200 Speaker 9: and ecstasy, you have access to. 178 00:09:05,320 --> 00:09:10,000 Speaker 8: Any and everything, from guns to people. The black market 179 00:09:10,200 --> 00:09:15,040 Speaker 8: is just there and it's not. There's really very little 180 00:09:15,040 --> 00:09:19,400 Speaker 8: separation in those organizations in between selling one product and another. 181 00:09:19,880 --> 00:09:23,160 Speaker 8: And Operation Past and Furious. You guys certainly know about that. 182 00:09:23,160 --> 00:09:25,880 Speaker 8: That was name dropped by my homeboy who had those 183 00:09:25,880 --> 00:09:27,920 Speaker 8: hand grenades. He was like, you ever heard of Operation 184 00:09:28,000 --> 00:09:30,280 Speaker 8: Past and Furious? And I was like, yeah, isn't that 185 00:09:30,360 --> 00:09:32,679 Speaker 8: that thing people are mad at Obama about because they 186 00:09:32,800 --> 00:09:35,959 Speaker 8: like gave guns to cartels to see where they smuggled 187 00:09:36,000 --> 00:09:37,720 Speaker 8: them to see if they could catch them later. And 188 00:09:37,760 --> 00:09:40,760 Speaker 8: he's like, yeah, once he hang in it, and that's 189 00:09:40,760 --> 00:09:42,960 Speaker 8: how it all started. So it was just it was 190 00:09:43,080 --> 00:09:49,480 Speaker 8: very las fair, very casual, just normal to him. It 191 00:09:49,559 --> 00:09:52,560 Speaker 8: wasn't new, it wasn't a conspiracy, It wasn't mind blowing. 192 00:09:52,600 --> 00:09:56,199 Speaker 8: He just had access to things from the militaria that 193 00:09:56,240 --> 00:09:58,320 Speaker 8: they were bringing over the border so it would be 194 00:09:58,320 --> 00:10:01,000 Speaker 8: smuggled and they could track it and try to figure 195 00:10:01,000 --> 00:10:04,520 Speaker 8: out where the smuggling roots were. That's it. They've been 196 00:10:04,559 --> 00:10:06,840 Speaker 8: doing it since like the eighties. Obama just got in 197 00:10:06,840 --> 00:10:10,160 Speaker 8: trouble for it because he got in trouble for the 198 00:10:10,240 --> 00:10:13,080 Speaker 8: things that but he didn't start it. It's been going 199 00:10:13,120 --> 00:10:15,199 Speaker 8: for a long time. It's gonna go for a while. 200 00:10:15,679 --> 00:10:19,600 Speaker 8: That's my personal experience with it makes me very uncomfortable 201 00:10:19,640 --> 00:10:21,439 Speaker 8: to think about in the past how easy it was 202 00:10:21,480 --> 00:10:23,520 Speaker 8: for me to get that stuff. Have a good day. 203 00:10:23,520 --> 00:10:27,240 Speaker 3: Gud Wow, never thought of that perspective. That's very interesting. 204 00:10:27,520 --> 00:10:29,880 Speaker 4: A frame always comes in with the best stuff, man. 205 00:10:29,800 --> 00:10:32,560 Speaker 2: Dude, A frame you guys, if you're listening out there, 206 00:10:32,600 --> 00:10:34,360 Speaker 2: you have no idea how often a frame calls in 207 00:10:34,400 --> 00:10:37,640 Speaker 2: with stover just like, oh, well, that's amazing, but this 208 00:10:37,679 --> 00:10:40,000 Speaker 2: isn't the A frame show a frame. You can't have 209 00:10:40,040 --> 00:10:44,720 Speaker 2: amazing things every time, but you do every time. We 210 00:10:44,800 --> 00:10:47,240 Speaker 2: have several several of you out there do that where 211 00:10:47,320 --> 00:10:51,160 Speaker 2: it's just bangers every time. I don't have any personal 212 00:10:51,200 --> 00:10:54,199 Speaker 2: experience with this stuff, guys, but I you know, hearing 213 00:10:54,280 --> 00:10:59,240 Speaker 2: that from somebody who has had experience, who's gone through it, 214 00:10:59,320 --> 00:11:02,560 Speaker 2: who just this concept of if you have access to 215 00:11:02,679 --> 00:11:06,360 Speaker 2: that specific drug I guess cocaine as a dealer, I 216 00:11:06,400 --> 00:11:09,480 Speaker 2: guess then potentially you have access to other things. I 217 00:11:09,800 --> 00:11:13,160 Speaker 2: don't know. That to me feels like an exaggeration, but 218 00:11:13,679 --> 00:11:15,720 Speaker 2: maybe it's not. I don't know. 219 00:11:15,960 --> 00:11:19,400 Speaker 6: Depends on what level of the supply chain you're at. Yeah, 220 00:11:19,559 --> 00:11:23,440 Speaker 6: if you're like a lower level dealer. You know, the 221 00:11:23,520 --> 00:11:26,240 Speaker 6: person above you is dealing with the big shots or 222 00:11:26,280 --> 00:11:28,679 Speaker 6: the top dogs or whatever, you know, who deal with 223 00:11:28,679 --> 00:11:33,120 Speaker 6: the manufacturers and or importers. Perhaps I would think they 224 00:11:33,200 --> 00:11:35,640 Speaker 6: would at that level have that kind of access, but 225 00:11:36,040 --> 00:11:38,559 Speaker 6: I don't know that it would necessarily trickle down all 226 00:11:38,559 --> 00:11:38,920 Speaker 6: the way. 227 00:11:39,760 --> 00:11:44,280 Speaker 4: Crime is like any other business enterprise, right, Ultimately, for longevity, 228 00:11:44,280 --> 00:11:47,960 Speaker 4: one must diversify. You know, it's quite I think it's 229 00:11:48,120 --> 00:11:52,640 Speaker 4: quite rare for the typical to Nole's point, the typical 230 00:11:53,760 --> 00:11:58,080 Speaker 4: what they would call street level drug dealer to say, sorry, 231 00:11:58,520 --> 00:12:03,120 Speaker 4: I only sell okay, I would make money off of you, 232 00:12:03,480 --> 00:12:06,920 Speaker 4: but you're looking for the wrong thing. Because way back 233 00:12:06,960 --> 00:12:12,319 Speaker 4: when when my ancestors started, you know, snowblow and suns, 234 00:12:12,880 --> 00:12:15,840 Speaker 4: we decided we would only sell one thing. The finest 235 00:12:15,920 --> 00:12:19,360 Speaker 4: artists in cocaine. Now they're gonna sell you weed. They're 236 00:12:19,360 --> 00:12:22,200 Speaker 4: going to sell you whatever can be sold. And then, 237 00:12:22,640 --> 00:12:26,840 Speaker 4: just like hotels diversify the avocados, then they are going 238 00:12:26,920 --> 00:12:30,280 Speaker 4: to diversify into other means of income. And there is 239 00:12:30,320 --> 00:12:34,120 Speaker 4: a very strong argument that criminalizing this stuff the way 240 00:12:34,160 --> 00:12:39,040 Speaker 4: the US does further empowers those criminal endeavors. But you know, 241 00:12:39,640 --> 00:12:41,199 Speaker 4: Congress isn't asking us about it. 242 00:12:41,280 --> 00:12:44,280 Speaker 2: Do you think there will be like, I don't what 243 00:12:44,480 --> 00:12:52,120 Speaker 2: bespoke cocaine brands in years. Oh that's so crazy. Yeah, 244 00:12:52,200 --> 00:12:55,040 Speaker 2: I can already imagine the Apple like stores that will 245 00:12:55,080 --> 00:12:56,800 Speaker 2: pop up across the world. 246 00:12:57,040 --> 00:12:58,959 Speaker 4: The further up the hierarchy you go, right, the more 247 00:12:59,040 --> 00:13:02,800 Speaker 4: interesting these criminal products can get. I mean, shout out 248 00:13:02,800 --> 00:13:07,760 Speaker 4: to Pablo Escobar for introducing the hippopotamus to his part 249 00:13:07,840 --> 00:13:10,720 Speaker 4: of the Americans where they're still around. I mean, he 250 00:13:10,880 --> 00:13:13,320 Speaker 4: was at the top. I don't to be clear, I 251 00:13:13,320 --> 00:13:16,400 Speaker 4: don't think if we went to our average street level 252 00:13:16,440 --> 00:13:21,239 Speaker 4: dealer and said, like, hey, great work on the cocaine. 253 00:13:21,840 --> 00:13:24,640 Speaker 4: What are your prices on hippos? Do you have price 254 00:13:24,720 --> 00:13:26,920 Speaker 4: breaks if we get like one apiece? 255 00:13:28,160 --> 00:13:30,960 Speaker 2: You know, well, I guess if you are talking about Okay, 256 00:13:31,160 --> 00:13:35,240 Speaker 2: let's just say it's the probability of someone answering yes 257 00:13:35,559 --> 00:13:38,760 Speaker 2: to the question, Oh, hello, sir or madam, do you 258 00:13:38,880 --> 00:13:42,800 Speaker 2: know where I might acquire a military armament Corporation Model ten, 259 00:13:43,000 --> 00:13:45,720 Speaker 2: which is just the MAC ten. If someone could answer 260 00:13:45,800 --> 00:13:48,959 Speaker 2: yes to that, you can, I guess in this case, 261 00:13:49,520 --> 00:13:52,840 Speaker 2: someone who's in the dealings that are described there by 262 00:13:52,880 --> 00:13:56,360 Speaker 2: a frame, it would probably be a higher probability. I 263 00:13:56,360 --> 00:13:57,280 Speaker 2: don't know what I'm saying. 264 00:13:57,480 --> 00:14:00,280 Speaker 4: No, you got to think about prohibition as well. Right, 265 00:14:00,320 --> 00:14:03,280 Speaker 4: that's a great comparison. So in the days of alcohol 266 00:14:03,320 --> 00:14:08,760 Speaker 4: prohibition in the United States, organized crime was also making 267 00:14:08,800 --> 00:14:15,240 Speaker 4: money running guns. It's just another income stream and typically 268 00:14:15,360 --> 00:14:17,840 Speaker 4: as a rule, organized crime is not going to be 269 00:14:17,880 --> 00:14:22,160 Speaker 4: too discriminating against it, like we romanticize the mob where 270 00:14:22,160 --> 00:14:24,280 Speaker 4: they say, oh, we're not doing drugs, we just do 271 00:14:24,360 --> 00:14:27,800 Speaker 4: gambling and racketeering or whatever. But more and more often 272 00:14:28,560 --> 00:14:30,960 Speaker 4: they diversify, so it makes sense that you would be 273 00:14:31,000 --> 00:14:34,080 Speaker 4: able to connect the drugs and the. 274 00:14:34,040 --> 00:14:41,400 Speaker 2: Firearms, devisify, diversify your vice. Well, thank you to everybody 275 00:14:41,400 --> 00:14:44,240 Speaker 2: who again called in and everybody we just listened to. 276 00:14:44,320 --> 00:14:47,080 Speaker 2: There we'll be right back with more messages from you. 277 00:14:53,720 --> 00:14:56,920 Speaker 6: And we have returned with another piece of listener maw 278 00:14:57,560 --> 00:14:59,160 Speaker 6: amissive from you. 279 00:14:59,480 --> 00:15:00,000 Speaker 3: Yes, you. 280 00:15:00,520 --> 00:15:03,920 Speaker 6: In this case, we have a message, as Ben pointed 281 00:15:03,960 --> 00:15:06,120 Speaker 6: out at the top of the show, from Big Shucks. 282 00:15:07,000 --> 00:15:11,720 Speaker 6: Really appreciate you adopting the nickname. I'm just gonna jump 283 00:15:11,760 --> 00:15:14,880 Speaker 6: right into it. This is about being robbed in a 284 00:15:15,000 --> 00:15:18,440 Speaker 6: more tech ye kind of way. Let's jump right in. Hello, 285 00:15:18,720 --> 00:15:22,000 Speaker 6: my fellow handsome travelers. That is very kind. In the 286 00:15:22,040 --> 00:15:24,680 Speaker 6: most recent podcast episode, I heard you may be doing 287 00:15:24,720 --> 00:15:27,080 Speaker 6: an episode related to credit cards, so I would like 288 00:15:27,120 --> 00:15:29,560 Speaker 6: to share some interesting info about them, if you haven't 289 00:15:29,640 --> 00:15:32,240 Speaker 6: already heard. I was at a bar when I first 290 00:15:32,240 --> 00:15:35,920 Speaker 6: heard about these long range skimmers. I started chatting with 291 00:15:35,960 --> 00:15:37,320 Speaker 6: the guy next to me, and he told me a 292 00:15:37,320 --> 00:15:39,720 Speaker 6: story about how his company credit card had been skimmed, 293 00:15:39,920 --> 00:15:42,480 Speaker 6: but not the normal way. He hadn't even used his 294 00:15:42,520 --> 00:15:45,120 Speaker 6: card on any device in the taxi, he used an 295 00:15:45,160 --> 00:15:47,200 Speaker 6: app to pay for the ride. The only way they 296 00:15:47,240 --> 00:15:50,120 Speaker 6: found the guy is because his company called him about 297 00:15:50,120 --> 00:15:52,960 Speaker 6: twenty to thirty minutes after the taxi ride to downtown 298 00:15:53,000 --> 00:15:55,160 Speaker 6: Seattle and they asked him about a purchase of very 299 00:15:55,200 --> 00:15:56,280 Speaker 6: expensive jewelry. 300 00:15:56,520 --> 00:15:56,960 Speaker 3: Yikes. 301 00:15:57,400 --> 00:16:01,040 Speaker 6: Police were able to get there pretty quick and found 302 00:16:01,080 --> 00:16:04,119 Speaker 6: the guy still in the store and arrested him. Apparently, 303 00:16:04,160 --> 00:16:07,480 Speaker 6: there is a group within the SEATTLEPD that specifically deals 304 00:16:07,520 --> 00:16:09,680 Speaker 6: with these kinds of issues. What you might think of 305 00:16:09,720 --> 00:16:11,480 Speaker 6: as a card scammer is a bit different from what 306 00:16:11,560 --> 00:16:14,120 Speaker 6: happened in the above story. While normal card skimming is 307 00:16:14,120 --> 00:16:16,280 Speaker 6: a big problem, there are other devices that can be 308 00:16:16,360 --> 00:16:19,400 Speaker 6: quite a good distance away from your card. If your 309 00:16:19,440 --> 00:16:23,640 Speaker 6: card has RFID capabilities, it can be copied either with 310 00:16:23,680 --> 00:16:27,640 Speaker 6: smaller devices similar to the Flipper zero, or by big 311 00:16:27,680 --> 00:16:30,720 Speaker 6: devices placed in the trunks of taxis. Now, I'm not 312 00:16:30,800 --> 00:16:33,080 Speaker 6: trying to harp on taxi drivers here. These devices can 313 00:16:33,120 --> 00:16:36,160 Speaker 6: steal credit card info while just walking around an area 314 00:16:36,240 --> 00:16:37,520 Speaker 6: with the scammer placed. 315 00:16:37,200 --> 00:16:40,240 Speaker 3: In a backpack. And yeah, links to a video showing 316 00:16:40,600 --> 00:16:40,840 Speaker 3: just that. 317 00:16:41,360 --> 00:16:45,000 Speaker 6: Here's a quote from a blog entry on butterflymx dot com. 318 00:16:45,520 --> 00:16:49,160 Speaker 6: Long range RFID skimmers don't need to be directly next 319 00:16:49,200 --> 00:16:52,080 Speaker 6: to an RFID credential to read its information. Instead, most 320 00:16:52,120 --> 00:16:54,920 Speaker 6: skimmers can read from a distance of up to nineteen 321 00:16:54,960 --> 00:16:59,080 Speaker 6: inches or fifty centimeters. Here's a kicker, However, users can 322 00:16:59,160 --> 00:17:02,040 Speaker 6: boost the power of an RFID S camera with antennas 323 00:17:02,360 --> 00:17:06,120 Speaker 6: or other long range transmission technologies to try to collect 324 00:17:06,200 --> 00:17:09,679 Speaker 6: data from further away. Then he linked to an article 325 00:17:09,720 --> 00:17:14,720 Speaker 6: from hackaday dot com RFID readers snoops cards from three 326 00:17:14,800 --> 00:17:15,520 Speaker 6: feet away. 327 00:17:15,800 --> 00:17:18,680 Speaker 3: And here's the thing as well. You can legally buy 328 00:17:18,800 --> 00:17:21,639 Speaker 3: these devices online. Just a quick Google search and you 329 00:17:21,680 --> 00:17:22,480 Speaker 3: will find them. 330 00:17:22,840 --> 00:17:26,760 Speaker 6: And then linked to literally a place on online where 331 00:17:26,760 --> 00:17:32,639 Speaker 6: you can buy something called a UHF RFID small integrated reader. 332 00:17:33,359 --> 00:17:36,520 Speaker 6: So I guess it exists under the auspices of kind 333 00:17:36,520 --> 00:17:42,000 Speaker 6: of being a card reader, perhaps for mobile use. Yeah, 334 00:17:42,040 --> 00:17:45,120 Speaker 6: it's it's it's not that in case, it could be, 335 00:17:45,200 --> 00:17:48,600 Speaker 6: but and it's only three thirty four eighty with fifty 336 00:17:48,640 --> 00:17:51,800 Speaker 6: seven ninety nine in shipping, so not cheap. 337 00:17:51,920 --> 00:17:54,520 Speaker 3: But hey, I mean, think of think of all the 338 00:17:54,560 --> 00:17:57,399 Speaker 3: card numbers you could steal. No, don't, don't do that. 339 00:17:57,400 --> 00:17:58,040 Speaker 3: That's gross. 340 00:17:58,760 --> 00:18:02,359 Speaker 6: MythBusters and Act was forced by the big credit card 341 00:18:02,440 --> 00:18:06,200 Speaker 6: legal teams to not air an episode re guarding RFIDs 342 00:18:06,320 --> 00:18:09,040 Speaker 6: in credit cards, and then linked to an article in 343 00:18:09,240 --> 00:18:12,640 Speaker 6: the Register myth Busters Our Idea episode acts after pressure 344 00:18:12,840 --> 00:18:14,960 Speaker 6: from credit card firms. I don't know if you guys 345 00:18:15,000 --> 00:18:18,840 Speaker 6: have heard about this. I certainly had not. It seems 346 00:18:18,920 --> 00:18:23,480 Speaker 6: as though a request for interview with the Texas Instruments 347 00:18:23,840 --> 00:18:28,480 Speaker 6: Company is what led to this this episode being shut down. 348 00:18:29,720 --> 00:18:31,200 Speaker 2: Yeah, I remember hearing about this one. 349 00:18:31,240 --> 00:18:33,640 Speaker 4: Do you remember this, yes, quite vividly. 350 00:18:34,000 --> 00:18:37,639 Speaker 2: It was a big deal because it was one of, 351 00:18:37,960 --> 00:18:41,720 Speaker 2: if not the only, episode that they got shut down about. 352 00:18:42,000 --> 00:18:46,440 Speaker 4: Right, because the issue is, first off, it's terrible pr 353 00:18:46,920 --> 00:18:51,280 Speaker 4: for credit card companies and for the consumer finance industry 354 00:18:51,320 --> 00:18:54,919 Speaker 4: in general. As as you know, Big Chucks, and also 355 00:18:55,880 --> 00:19:01,920 Speaker 4: it shows people how on out non cure our stuff is. 356 00:19:02,160 --> 00:19:04,320 Speaker 4: You know, just like just like think about when you're 357 00:19:04,400 --> 00:19:07,359 Speaker 4: driving on the road and the only thing stopping people 358 00:19:07,400 --> 00:19:10,399 Speaker 4: from careening into you is an agreed upon system of 359 00:19:10,480 --> 00:19:15,080 Speaker 4: pretending painted lines are barriers. It's a social contract. There 360 00:19:15,160 --> 00:19:18,760 Speaker 4: is a social contract that says your credit card accounts 361 00:19:19,040 --> 00:19:21,560 Speaker 4: and your tap to pays and your pins are safe. 362 00:19:22,080 --> 00:19:25,800 Speaker 4: I got to tell you, Noel and fellow conspiracy realist 363 00:19:25,840 --> 00:19:29,879 Speaker 4: Big Shucks, especially tuning in Big Shocks, already knows about this. 364 00:19:30,000 --> 00:19:32,960 Speaker 4: But one thing that is very handy for these is 365 00:19:33,600 --> 00:19:36,639 Speaker 4: RFID blocking, you know wallet. 366 00:19:37,840 --> 00:19:40,960 Speaker 6: That's what I got to Yeah, and actually that Butterfly 367 00:19:41,160 --> 00:19:45,600 Speaker 6: MX kind of Techi blog entry that they linked to 368 00:19:46,520 --> 00:19:49,760 Speaker 6: has all kinds of details on how to protect yourself 369 00:19:49,960 --> 00:19:53,359 Speaker 6: against this technology, which has existed longer than we might think. 370 00:19:53,680 --> 00:19:59,560 Speaker 6: This stuff can be amplified to pick up these these numbers, 371 00:19:59,560 --> 00:20:02,080 Speaker 6: this data and store it in the form of a 372 00:20:02,119 --> 00:20:04,639 Speaker 6: text document or a text entry. There's a whole system 373 00:20:04,680 --> 00:20:07,040 Speaker 6: that can be put together. Like again, you don't buy 374 00:20:07,040 --> 00:20:09,040 Speaker 6: the thing and it does the whole job for you. You 375 00:20:08,920 --> 00:20:10,639 Speaker 6: got to have a little bit of know how like 376 00:20:10,680 --> 00:20:13,399 Speaker 6: there was one description of one that involved using an 377 00:20:13,520 --> 00:20:16,959 Speaker 6: r duino kind of little microcomputer thing. So it's like, 378 00:20:17,000 --> 00:20:19,320 Speaker 6: you know, you can get away with doing this stuff 379 00:20:19,359 --> 00:20:22,959 Speaker 6: and having those uhf RFID small integrated reader because it 380 00:20:23,080 --> 00:20:26,000 Speaker 6: does technically have a legitimate. 381 00:20:25,880 --> 00:20:27,760 Speaker 4: Use sure like pin testing. 382 00:20:27,960 --> 00:20:30,040 Speaker 6: Right when you pair it with other stuff, it can 383 00:20:30,080 --> 00:20:33,480 Speaker 6: be bad news. But again, the amplification part of it too, 384 00:20:33,560 --> 00:20:36,399 Speaker 6: that's requires a little bit of know how you know, 385 00:20:36,520 --> 00:20:38,919 Speaker 6: to get that kind of like repeater or whatever to 386 00:20:38,960 --> 00:20:41,439 Speaker 6: make it like I read. I did read though that 387 00:20:41,800 --> 00:20:44,480 Speaker 6: while this stuff is scary and it can be you know, 388 00:20:44,640 --> 00:20:48,320 Speaker 6: amplified it, when you amplify it like that, it's not 389 00:20:48,560 --> 00:20:51,040 Speaker 6: as precise. It's sort of just like casting a real 390 00:20:51,080 --> 00:20:54,360 Speaker 6: wide net, and it can be interfered with by regular 391 00:20:54,440 --> 00:20:59,040 Speaker 6: old electromagnetic interference and radio signals and all kinds of stuff. 392 00:20:59,080 --> 00:21:02,320 Speaker 6: So chances are are this isn't how you're gonna get calm. 393 00:21:02,560 --> 00:21:03,760 Speaker 3: How you're gonna get ripped off. 394 00:21:03,840 --> 00:21:05,639 Speaker 6: It's going to be by one of those more traditional 395 00:21:05,640 --> 00:21:09,240 Speaker 6: skimmers or some phishing kind of exercise you know that's 396 00:21:09,280 --> 00:21:13,920 Speaker 6: trying to steal your digital currency, or again, yeah. 397 00:21:13,800 --> 00:21:16,000 Speaker 2: Just one of the hacks that's already happened. 398 00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:18,600 Speaker 6: There is your data being leaked by the company that's 399 00:21:18,600 --> 00:21:21,320 Speaker 6: purported to have you know, been a good steward of it. 400 00:21:21,720 --> 00:21:24,440 Speaker 4: Also there you know, the main skeleton key in these 401 00:21:24,480 --> 00:21:28,160 Speaker 4: sorts of shenanigans is always going to be social engineering, right, 402 00:21:28,280 --> 00:21:33,080 Speaker 4: leveraging that expectation of safety and privacy, So be careful 403 00:21:33,080 --> 00:21:35,359 Speaker 4: with that, you know, there are other things got to 404 00:21:35,440 --> 00:21:39,040 Speaker 4: say it, h This is always endlessly fascinating to a 405 00:21:39,040 --> 00:21:42,160 Speaker 4: lot of us listening this evening. Yes, you can teach 406 00:21:42,200 --> 00:21:45,399 Speaker 4: yourself to do this online, but that I'm sure this 407 00:21:45,520 --> 00:21:48,960 Speaker 4: does not apply to any of our fellow listeners. Do 408 00:21:49,200 --> 00:21:53,240 Speaker 4: be aware that if you are researching this stuff online 409 00:21:53,600 --> 00:21:57,640 Speaker 4: and you somehow get involved with shenanigans, the authorities are 410 00:21:57,680 --> 00:22:00,480 Speaker 4: going to pull your search history and they will know. 411 00:22:02,320 --> 00:22:03,760 Speaker 3: Well, you know, it's interesting too. 412 00:22:03,800 --> 00:22:05,520 Speaker 6: I mentioned this is this idea of like, you know, 413 00:22:05,560 --> 00:22:07,800 Speaker 6: requiring some technical know how to kind of jury rig 414 00:22:07,920 --> 00:22:09,960 Speaker 6: some of the stuff together. But now that I'm looking 415 00:22:09,960 --> 00:22:13,440 Speaker 6: a little deeper into this product that's available on Ali Express, 416 00:22:13,680 --> 00:22:17,200 Speaker 6: it already has the antenna. It looks like a router basically, 417 00:22:17,400 --> 00:22:20,720 Speaker 6: So again, maybe there's a legitimate use for this, but 418 00:22:21,600 --> 00:22:23,560 Speaker 6: I don't know, is an Ali Express kind of like 419 00:22:24,080 --> 00:22:27,000 Speaker 6: ull notorious for being sort of a hub forgetting stuff 420 00:22:27,040 --> 00:22:28,119 Speaker 6: you're maybe not supposed to have. 421 00:22:28,400 --> 00:22:32,080 Speaker 4: Well, it's all the intention in the application of the technology. 422 00:22:32,200 --> 00:22:35,119 Speaker 4: Like again to the point I'm making here, like you 423 00:22:35,160 --> 00:22:37,879 Speaker 4: can teach yourself to do this stuff in an afternoon. 424 00:22:38,040 --> 00:22:41,359 Speaker 4: Legitimate testing For anybody who's wondering what pen testing is. 425 00:22:41,680 --> 00:22:45,639 Speaker 4: Pen testing is a portmanteau for penetration testing. So you 426 00:22:45,760 --> 00:22:50,080 Speaker 4: can help a company or a client evaluate how secure 427 00:22:50,119 --> 00:22:51,600 Speaker 4: their electronic systems are. 428 00:22:51,640 --> 00:22:53,879 Speaker 6: Or your own network, you know, I mean if you 429 00:22:53,920 --> 00:22:56,000 Speaker 6: want it to right, if you've got some people have 430 00:22:56,200 --> 00:23:01,040 Speaker 6: RFID fobs that gain you act says, to your home, 431 00:23:01,359 --> 00:23:05,520 Speaker 6: to your property, to private areas, you know, perhaps safes, 432 00:23:06,000 --> 00:23:08,560 Speaker 6: so maybe you would be doing this to pintest your 433 00:23:08,600 --> 00:23:10,080 Speaker 6: own facilities. 434 00:23:10,280 --> 00:23:11,919 Speaker 4: Yeah, yep, completely valid. 435 00:23:12,040 --> 00:23:14,560 Speaker 2: And buddy of mine is he has been for a 436 00:23:14,560 --> 00:23:18,240 Speaker 2: long time in security, like network security for large enterprise companies, 437 00:23:18,320 --> 00:23:21,119 Speaker 2: and he does that with his home system. He routinely 438 00:23:21,200 --> 00:23:24,520 Speaker 2: tries to figure out if I wanted to, how could 439 00:23:24,600 --> 00:23:28,560 Speaker 2: I get in, And then he's he's constantly plugging holes 440 00:23:29,040 --> 00:23:31,760 Speaker 2: and and he knows what he's doing. So it's like 441 00:23:32,119 --> 00:23:35,520 Speaker 2: it's it's basically there's there's a never ending series of 442 00:23:35,680 --> 00:23:39,280 Speaker 2: issues that come up when when hardware meets software right, 443 00:23:39,800 --> 00:23:42,720 Speaker 2: and I think this is going to be a just 444 00:23:42,760 --> 00:23:44,960 Speaker 2: an exciting, little ongoing battle that we're going to be 445 00:23:45,240 --> 00:23:47,480 Speaker 2: having for the rest of our human lives. 446 00:23:48,119 --> 00:23:50,800 Speaker 6: One of the recommendations too, on the Butterflymax article, this 447 00:23:50,840 --> 00:23:53,520 Speaker 6: seemed to be sort of geared towards like rental property 448 00:23:53,520 --> 00:23:56,720 Speaker 6: owners or maybe even landlords of like apartment complexes or 449 00:23:56,840 --> 00:24:00,560 Speaker 6: you know, maybe developers. Was as kind of like sort 450 00:24:00,560 --> 00:24:03,359 Speaker 6: of like is this better or worse? Moving more towards 451 00:24:03,400 --> 00:24:06,960 Speaker 6: smartphone based access, like we have to our office. There's 452 00:24:06,960 --> 00:24:10,239 Speaker 6: an app, but it does require two factor authentication and 453 00:24:10,280 --> 00:24:13,000 Speaker 6: you do have to get this key provided to you 454 00:24:13,400 --> 00:24:17,359 Speaker 6: that will expire, and it isn't I guess it is 455 00:24:17,359 --> 00:24:21,720 Speaker 6: our FID triggered. But there are layers that even give 456 00:24:21,800 --> 00:24:25,000 Speaker 6: you access and it requires you know, password at tree, 457 00:24:25,080 --> 00:24:27,600 Speaker 6: using like single signing kind of stuff for your whole company. 458 00:24:28,440 --> 00:24:31,480 Speaker 3: So again, surely there's a way to backdoor that as well. 459 00:24:31,520 --> 00:24:34,680 Speaker 3: But interesting stuff. It's also what I didn't realize and 460 00:24:34,840 --> 00:24:35,720 Speaker 3: looking into this, is that this. 461 00:24:35,640 --> 00:24:37,520 Speaker 6: Stuff has been around a lot longer than one might think, 462 00:24:37,680 --> 00:24:40,639 Speaker 6: especially for being something that maybe some of us hadn't 463 00:24:40,680 --> 00:24:41,800 Speaker 6: been hipped to yet. 464 00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:44,639 Speaker 4: It's an old war again yet. I'll tell you one 465 00:24:44,720 --> 00:24:49,560 Speaker 4: of my favorite the Guiver just for funzies project, there 466 00:24:49,680 --> 00:24:53,960 Speaker 4: is one way to absolutely prevent skimming at a at 467 00:24:53,960 --> 00:24:56,720 Speaker 4: a long range or from several feet away, and it's 468 00:24:56,920 --> 00:25:01,280 Speaker 4: it's like a nuclear option. Just you could just build 469 00:25:01,400 --> 00:25:08,040 Speaker 4: an EMP like a one use electromatic electromagnetic pulse device 470 00:25:08,320 --> 00:25:10,400 Speaker 4: and you can fit these inside of an altoy ten. 471 00:25:10,920 --> 00:25:14,200 Speaker 4: Like you can build these. They're going to completely screw 472 00:25:14,280 --> 00:25:18,000 Speaker 4: up everything else as well, so you know you're not 473 00:25:18,080 --> 00:25:20,280 Speaker 4: gonna have your phone's not gonna work either. 474 00:25:20,240 --> 00:25:24,159 Speaker 6: Like when mc guiver hacked that like traffic light box 475 00:25:24,440 --> 00:25:27,000 Speaker 6: to create a diversion and causes like a multi car 476 00:25:27,160 --> 00:25:27,600 Speaker 6: pile up. 477 00:25:27,920 --> 00:25:31,000 Speaker 3: I always wanted to be a little bit chaotic, you know, 478 00:25:31,880 --> 00:25:32,439 Speaker 3: not evil. 479 00:25:32,520 --> 00:25:36,160 Speaker 6: I don't know, I forget the archetypes, but to your point, 480 00:25:36,160 --> 00:25:38,560 Speaker 6: been there in terms of other maybe hacky type ways. 481 00:25:38,880 --> 00:25:40,760 Speaker 6: If you don't want to get one of those walls, 482 00:25:40,800 --> 00:25:44,040 Speaker 6: you can just wrap your cards in tinfoil, which goes 483 00:25:44,080 --> 00:25:46,640 Speaker 6: back to the whole tinfoil hat thing about guarding your 484 00:25:46,640 --> 00:25:51,240 Speaker 6: brain against penetration from whatever, you know, infiltration by aliens 485 00:25:51,320 --> 00:25:52,919 Speaker 6: or whatever it might be. But apparently you know, it 486 00:25:52,960 --> 00:25:55,800 Speaker 6: is a pretty decent shield, but not very convenient and 487 00:25:55,840 --> 00:25:56,600 Speaker 6: maybe a little. 488 00:25:56,359 --> 00:25:58,440 Speaker 3: Embarrassing you ripping your card out of the store. 489 00:25:58,720 --> 00:26:01,240 Speaker 6: Not nearly as esthetic as that cool wality you guys 490 00:26:01,240 --> 00:26:01,760 Speaker 6: pulled out. 491 00:26:01,920 --> 00:26:05,400 Speaker 4: Oh man, I don't know, Like, here's the thing too. 492 00:26:06,000 --> 00:26:08,520 Speaker 4: And this is why I'm so glad you're bringing this up. 493 00:26:08,560 --> 00:26:14,639 Speaker 4: Big shucks. In coming years, not having security literacy is 494 00:26:14,680 --> 00:26:19,080 Speaker 4: going to be like being a literate is today, right, 495 00:26:19,480 --> 00:26:22,560 Speaker 4: if you have any younglings, if you have any kids 496 00:26:22,560 --> 00:26:26,400 Speaker 4: you're raising. It's especially in a time where the erosion 497 00:26:26,440 --> 00:26:29,840 Speaker 4: of privacy is being so aggressively normalized by the powers 498 00:26:29,880 --> 00:26:32,560 Speaker 4: that be, it's important to know that you have to 499 00:26:32,560 --> 00:26:34,919 Speaker 4: be the author of your own privacy, right. You have 500 00:26:34,960 --> 00:26:37,240 Speaker 4: to be the author of your own security to an 501 00:26:37,240 --> 00:26:42,840 Speaker 4: astonishing degree, especially in this look. It just it sounds 502 00:26:42,880 --> 00:26:46,160 Speaker 4: weird because for people who are not like Matt's friend, 503 00:26:46,160 --> 00:26:49,120 Speaker 4: a security expert, you don't really think of a lot 504 00:26:49,160 --> 00:26:52,159 Speaker 4: of this stuff because it's invisible until you see it 505 00:26:52,200 --> 00:26:54,560 Speaker 4: through a ux on a screen, you know what I mean, 506 00:26:54,960 --> 00:27:00,720 Speaker 4: And that that assumption is easily easily leverage. This is 507 00:27:00,840 --> 00:27:03,800 Speaker 4: making me even more paranoid. Maybe it's because the coffee's 508 00:27:03,880 --> 00:27:07,000 Speaker 4: kicking into but no, what advice would you give to 509 00:27:07,080 --> 00:27:10,080 Speaker 4: people who are hearing about this for maybe the first 510 00:27:10,119 --> 00:27:12,840 Speaker 4: time and thinking, crap, what do I do? Should they 511 00:27:12,880 --> 00:27:15,320 Speaker 4: go get a wallet? Should they get the tinfoil's get 512 00:27:15,320 --> 00:27:16,080 Speaker 4: the sick wallet? 513 00:27:16,160 --> 00:27:18,160 Speaker 6: Those things look bad ass. I want to get one 514 00:27:18,200 --> 00:27:20,520 Speaker 6: now too, And they really are kind of becoming the norm. 515 00:27:20,600 --> 00:27:23,520 Speaker 6: They are these kind of stretchy sort of cardholder things 516 00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:26,320 Speaker 6: where it's got lots of cool you know, little pockets 517 00:27:26,320 --> 00:27:29,520 Speaker 6: and niches. But this technology is built in. Yours is 518 00:27:29,560 --> 00:27:31,520 Speaker 6: a little different, Matt, Matt, it looks more like a 519 00:27:31,600 --> 00:27:34,920 Speaker 6: regular wallet. Well, yours isn't as cool looking as Ben's. 520 00:27:34,920 --> 00:27:36,320 Speaker 6: I'm sorry, Matt, I'm sorry. 521 00:27:36,760 --> 00:27:38,520 Speaker 2: I'm just saying, if you want to go onto the radar, 522 00:27:38,640 --> 00:27:40,680 Speaker 2: you just get one of niche should go. 523 00:27:40,920 --> 00:27:43,560 Speaker 4: Yeah, you don't want you don't want one that looks cool. 524 00:27:43,680 --> 00:27:46,359 Speaker 4: The reason this one is the way it is is 525 00:27:46,400 --> 00:27:47,879 Speaker 4: because very few people see it. 526 00:27:48,080 --> 00:27:50,840 Speaker 6: Oh, fair enough, I'm just saying I have seen those 527 00:27:50,880 --> 00:27:53,439 Speaker 6: types before, Ben, I have toyed with getting one, and 528 00:27:53,440 --> 00:27:55,840 Speaker 6: I just didn't pull the trigger. But now, after hearing this, 529 00:27:55,920 --> 00:27:58,960 Speaker 6: because again I knew about skimmers. I knew about a 530 00:27:58,960 --> 00:28:01,399 Speaker 6: lot of this stuff. I know about the long range stuff. 531 00:28:01,400 --> 00:28:05,280 Speaker 6: But again, not to give you a sense of false complacency. 532 00:28:05,480 --> 00:28:08,159 Speaker 6: There is a whole section on this article and a 533 00:28:08,160 --> 00:28:11,200 Speaker 6: couple that I've seen where it's not an exact science. 534 00:28:11,520 --> 00:28:14,200 Speaker 6: They can't target you and shoot a laser at you. 535 00:28:14,280 --> 00:28:17,800 Speaker 6: It's sort of casting a wide net, and chances are 536 00:28:17,840 --> 00:28:19,959 Speaker 6: if you're outside and you're walking around and someone's not 537 00:28:19,960 --> 00:28:22,440 Speaker 6: coming right up on you and you know, bumping into you, 538 00:28:22,640 --> 00:28:24,280 Speaker 6: it's gonna be a little bit hard for them to 539 00:28:24,320 --> 00:28:25,800 Speaker 6: do it, even with those repeaters. 540 00:28:26,280 --> 00:28:31,119 Speaker 4: If someone is executing something above a certain level of 541 00:28:31,200 --> 00:28:35,320 Speaker 4: precision like that means they have thought about this, or 542 00:28:35,359 --> 00:28:38,760 Speaker 4: they're aiming for you specifically, then you have other problems. 543 00:28:39,040 --> 00:28:41,600 Speaker 6: That's for damn sure, you got a stalker on your hands. 544 00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:43,440 Speaker 6: They're gonna take you for all your worth. 545 00:28:43,680 --> 00:28:44,720 Speaker 2: Well, that sounds exciting. 546 00:28:44,800 --> 00:28:49,400 Speaker 3: Be anonymous, Oh Matt, you's SICKO. No, man, it's true. 547 00:28:49,480 --> 00:28:51,520 Speaker 6: I mean, you know a lot of people say, oh, 548 00:28:51,680 --> 00:28:55,200 Speaker 6: be careful an ex country, you're gonna get robbed or 549 00:28:55,200 --> 00:28:57,760 Speaker 6: you're likely to get mugged. I have found that the 550 00:28:57,800 --> 00:29:01,720 Speaker 6: best solution to that is just to blend in. Don't 551 00:29:01,720 --> 00:29:04,000 Speaker 6: make a scene, don't make a big show of yourself, 552 00:29:04,040 --> 00:29:07,080 Speaker 6: look like you belong there. Maybe that's easier said than done, 553 00:29:07,080 --> 00:29:09,640 Speaker 6: but I think all three of us, when traveling roughly 554 00:29:09,760 --> 00:29:12,120 Speaker 6: know how to do that. And knock on wood, I've 555 00:29:12,160 --> 00:29:14,240 Speaker 6: never been victimized in this way, and I hope never 556 00:29:14,280 --> 00:29:18,040 Speaker 6: to be. But just don't don't make yourself a target, 557 00:29:18,520 --> 00:29:21,200 Speaker 6: that's all. It's not to say like they were asking 558 00:29:21,240 --> 00:29:24,280 Speaker 6: for it, nothing like that. Just you know, it's smart 559 00:29:24,400 --> 00:29:25,840 Speaker 6: to be able to kind of blend in. 560 00:29:26,400 --> 00:29:28,240 Speaker 3: That's all. Thank you, big shucks. 561 00:29:29,240 --> 00:29:31,120 Speaker 6: Let's take a quick break here worth more sponsor, and 562 00:29:31,120 --> 00:29:32,640 Speaker 6: then come back with one more message from you. 563 00:29:39,440 --> 00:29:43,560 Speaker 4: And we have returned with an update for something that 564 00:29:43,640 --> 00:29:47,120 Speaker 4: I can't believe we missed earlier. So we'll give you 565 00:29:47,160 --> 00:29:50,080 Speaker 4: the part from twenty twenty three, and then we'll follow up. 566 00:29:50,200 --> 00:29:54,840 Speaker 4: So a fellow conspiracy realist going by the moniker hey 567 00:29:55,120 --> 00:29:59,440 Speaker 4: Lee h e y l Ee writes to us in 568 00:29:59,560 --> 00:30:02,880 Speaker 4: October and says the following, thanks for the many laughs 569 00:30:02,920 --> 00:30:04,920 Speaker 4: I've had so far. As a new listener, I began 570 00:30:05,040 --> 00:30:07,360 Speaker 4: listening to stuff they don't want you to know earlier 571 00:30:07,400 --> 00:30:10,760 Speaker 4: this year. I just began listening to companies started by cults. 572 00:30:10,880 --> 00:30:13,920 Speaker 4: Two this evening while doing the worst job in the world, 573 00:30:14,160 --> 00:30:18,200 Speaker 4: washing dishes, and before long I was laughing again. And 574 00:30:18,320 --> 00:30:21,000 Speaker 4: Haley wants us to put in a trigger warning here 575 00:30:21,160 --> 00:30:27,440 Speaker 4: for CSA and essay and creepy cult content. So pause 576 00:30:27,480 --> 00:30:31,200 Speaker 4: for a second for anybody who has listeners tonight, who this, 577 00:30:31,360 --> 00:30:36,360 Speaker 4: who might find this content objectionable. All right, here we go, 578 00:30:36,760 --> 00:30:38,959 Speaker 4: So Hailey says, I was born and raised in a 579 00:30:39,000 --> 00:30:43,280 Speaker 4: religious cult usually referred to by researchers and other outsiders 580 00:30:43,320 --> 00:30:46,760 Speaker 4: as the two by twos. Some of us who escaped 581 00:30:46,840 --> 00:30:51,920 Speaker 4: call them bunheads, laugh or cry. Others call them the Friends, 582 00:30:52,000 --> 00:30:54,680 Speaker 4: the Way, the Truth, the Gospel, and so forth. In 583 00:30:54,720 --> 00:30:57,400 Speaker 4: spite of their best efforts, they did not succeed in 584 00:30:57,480 --> 00:31:00,600 Speaker 4: my indoctrination. I got out at age fifteen, and I 585 00:31:00,640 --> 00:31:03,920 Speaker 4: am still an atheist. I was abused in nearly all 586 00:31:03,960 --> 00:31:07,880 Speaker 4: the ways by parents and their version of the clergy. Recently, 587 00:31:07,960 --> 00:31:11,600 Speaker 4: there has finally been some exposure in more mainstream press 588 00:31:11,960 --> 00:31:16,000 Speaker 4: of the CSA and essay so rampant for such a 589 00:31:16,080 --> 00:31:21,120 Speaker 4: small population round or less than seventy five thousand worldwide. 590 00:31:21,480 --> 00:31:24,920 Speaker 4: There have been many excellent articles, books, and websites at 591 00:31:24,960 --> 00:31:29,360 Speaker 4: all for at least thirty years, produced mostly by former members. However, 592 00:31:29,400 --> 00:31:35,000 Speaker 4: the cult still maintained invisibility to the general public overall. 593 00:31:35,320 --> 00:31:38,880 Speaker 4: And I want to pause here because check me on this, guys, 594 00:31:38,960 --> 00:31:41,360 Speaker 4: keep me honest. I don't think we've talked about the 595 00:31:41,400 --> 00:31:43,040 Speaker 4: two by twos yet it. 596 00:31:42,960 --> 00:31:43,960 Speaker 3: Does not ring a bellt to me. 597 00:31:44,080 --> 00:31:46,040 Speaker 6: I am looking at this Vice article that you linked 598 00:31:46,040 --> 00:31:50,920 Speaker 6: out to Ben, and this is some shadowy, creepy stuff 599 00:31:51,000 --> 00:31:52,200 Speaker 6: that is unfamiliar to me. 600 00:31:52,760 --> 00:31:53,000 Speaker 7: Yeah. 601 00:31:53,120 --> 00:31:56,960 Speaker 4: The Vice article comes to us courtesy of Haylee by 602 00:31:57,080 --> 00:32:01,600 Speaker 4: Ada Merlin. A nameless until their religious sect is being 603 00:32:01,680 --> 00:32:06,480 Speaker 4: rocked by a massive sexual abuse scandal. SA stands for 604 00:32:06,640 --> 00:32:13,040 Speaker 4: sexual abuse, CSA stands for child sexual abuse. Hailey goes on, 605 00:32:13,360 --> 00:32:15,719 Speaker 4: before we get too much into this cult, which I 606 00:32:15,720 --> 00:32:19,000 Speaker 4: think will be an episode in the future. Haley goes 607 00:32:19,040 --> 00:32:21,200 Speaker 4: on and says, I've noticed you all are very gracious 608 00:32:21,280 --> 00:32:23,200 Speaker 4: when talking about cults and religion. 609 00:32:23,800 --> 00:32:24,200 Speaker 3: Just heard. 610 00:32:24,400 --> 00:32:27,400 Speaker 4: I am not implying Christianity as a cult per se 611 00:32:27,600 --> 00:32:30,240 Speaker 4: in this episode I'm listening to right now, for example, 612 00:32:30,600 --> 00:32:33,560 Speaker 4: And no one would ever say that Christianity or Catholicism 613 00:32:33,720 --> 00:32:37,280 Speaker 4: or a cult. But I assure you, gentlemen, there are 614 00:32:37,360 --> 00:32:40,480 Speaker 4: a lot of us who do consider them cults, regardless 615 00:32:40,520 --> 00:32:44,400 Speaker 4: of their size or how long they've succeeded in normalizing 616 00:32:44,440 --> 00:32:49,200 Speaker 4: their unprovable fantasies. Is a strong language with their cannibalistic 617 00:32:49,360 --> 00:32:54,040 Speaker 4: vampire mimicking all the silly hats and sashes and dresses, 618 00:32:54,200 --> 00:32:56,560 Speaker 4: and we say that out loud to anyone who can hear. 619 00:32:57,240 --> 00:33:00,400 Speaker 4: A quick, legitimate way to assess whether or not a 620 00:33:00,480 --> 00:33:04,240 Speaker 4: cult is a cult is to apply doctor Stephen Hassan's 621 00:33:04,720 --> 00:33:08,880 Speaker 4: bite model. And this is just to catch people up. 622 00:33:08,920 --> 00:33:12,360 Speaker 4: The byte model is something we talked about a little 623 00:33:12,400 --> 00:33:12,880 Speaker 4: bit earlier, but. 624 00:33:12,840 --> 00:33:13,480 Speaker 3: It's a mnemonic. 625 00:33:13,920 --> 00:33:17,360 Speaker 4: It stands for behavior, information, thought, and emotion and how 626 00:33:17,400 --> 00:33:20,360 Speaker 4: those things are controlled. And I think we're familiar with this, 627 00:33:20,520 --> 00:33:22,160 Speaker 4: not just in stuff they want you to know, but 628 00:33:22,200 --> 00:33:24,080 Speaker 4: in some of our other endeavors. 629 00:33:24,120 --> 00:33:24,479 Speaker 3: Correct. 630 00:33:24,880 --> 00:33:30,520 Speaker 2: Yeah, and especially some of the serial killer things, the 631 00:33:30,560 --> 00:33:32,800 Speaker 2: at least that I've looked at in the past. These 632 00:33:32,880 --> 00:33:36,880 Speaker 2: killers have often attempted to control those very things over 633 00:33:36,920 --> 00:33:40,200 Speaker 2: their victims, like when they've got them captive prior to 634 00:33:40,320 --> 00:33:42,000 Speaker 2: killing them. 635 00:33:42,080 --> 00:33:45,120 Speaker 4: Yeah, and check out our video on how to start 636 00:33:45,120 --> 00:33:48,040 Speaker 4: a cult. So it's pretty old now, but it's still 637 00:33:48,160 --> 00:33:52,480 Speaker 4: unfortunately holds up because the rules for these things don't 638 00:33:52,520 --> 00:33:57,320 Speaker 4: really change. Unfortunately. You can find more about the byte model, 639 00:33:57,560 --> 00:34:00,400 Speaker 4: which is quite a quite a good room brick to 640 00:34:00,440 --> 00:34:03,720 Speaker 4: look at over on Freedom of Mind dot com and 641 00:34:03,720 --> 00:34:07,240 Speaker 4: thank you again to Haley for the link. Haley also 642 00:34:07,400 --> 00:34:11,320 Speaker 4: has some other links that they've sent to us Daily 643 00:34:11,400 --> 00:34:15,640 Speaker 4: dot dot com, Daily dot dot com Advocates for the 644 00:34:15,840 --> 00:34:19,719 Speaker 4: Truth dot com. These are both great resources if you 645 00:34:20,000 --> 00:34:24,600 Speaker 4: or a loved one have been have found yourself involved 646 00:34:24,640 --> 00:34:27,720 Speaker 4: with something like the two by twos, or indeed any 647 00:34:28,160 --> 00:34:34,040 Speaker 4: organization with cltic leanings. Here's the thing. We received a 648 00:34:34,280 --> 00:34:38,680 Speaker 4: follow up correspondence from you, Hailey, and you added the following. 649 00:34:38,800 --> 00:34:43,399 Speaker 4: Quite recently, the FBI has begun investigating and recently sent 650 00:34:43,440 --> 00:34:47,560 Speaker 4: out a news alert on two x two specifically asking 651 00:34:47,600 --> 00:34:51,920 Speaker 4: for victims and witnesses to report what they know. So 652 00:34:51,960 --> 00:34:55,160 Speaker 4: Haley has asked us on behalf of all the victims 653 00:34:55,200 --> 00:34:59,440 Speaker 4: of this organization to spread the word. FBI dot gov 654 00:34:59,600 --> 00:35:03,680 Speaker 4: has the word out. You can read more as Hayley says, 655 00:35:03,719 --> 00:35:07,920 Speaker 4: on the BBC and the CBC, which you know we're 656 00:35:08,000 --> 00:35:12,200 Speaker 4: big fans of the CBC. Obviously, I would recommend reading 657 00:35:12,440 --> 00:35:16,040 Speaker 4: a piece by George Wright over on BBC, the FBI 658 00:35:16,200 --> 00:35:20,160 Speaker 4: launches probe into a church and then reading on CBC 659 00:35:20,640 --> 00:35:25,800 Speaker 4: historical sexual abuse charges filed against BC minister British Columbia 660 00:35:25,840 --> 00:35:30,360 Speaker 4: minister belonging to a church with no name by Karen Larsen. 661 00:35:30,920 --> 00:35:33,880 Speaker 2: So these's a really interesting organization. 662 00:35:34,200 --> 00:35:36,640 Speaker 4: Yeah, dates back to the eighteen hundreds. 663 00:35:37,200 --> 00:35:41,760 Speaker 2: Yeah, and just the idea that there's no churches really 664 00:35:42,640 --> 00:35:48,160 Speaker 2: and there's no written doctrine, right, so when someone goes 665 00:35:48,239 --> 00:35:52,399 Speaker 2: up and preaches, it's just word of it's oral preaching. Right. 666 00:35:52,440 --> 00:35:54,759 Speaker 4: It's also incredibly malleable as a. 667 00:35:54,719 --> 00:35:57,879 Speaker 2: Result, exactly, oh man, in the schism. I'm just looking 668 00:35:57,920 --> 00:36:00,160 Speaker 2: at here at some of the schisms over time. This 669 00:36:00,239 --> 00:36:01,400 Speaker 2: is a deep dive for sure. 670 00:36:01,719 --> 00:36:01,919 Speaker 3: Yeah. 671 00:36:01,960 --> 00:36:04,680 Speaker 4: I think this is an episode because Haley, as you said, 672 00:36:04,920 --> 00:36:08,040 Speaker 4: we do need to spread the word about these kinds 673 00:36:08,040 --> 00:36:14,560 Speaker 4: of organizations, because organizations that thrive in the shadows or 674 00:36:15,320 --> 00:36:20,160 Speaker 4: work best without transparency or public knowledge, they lose power 675 00:36:20,520 --> 00:36:24,320 Speaker 4: when there is transparency, They lose power when there is accountability. 676 00:36:24,680 --> 00:36:24,839 Speaker 3: Right. 677 00:36:25,880 --> 00:36:29,880 Speaker 4: This story is as you said, Matt, it's just absolutely wild. 678 00:36:29,960 --> 00:36:32,880 Speaker 4: It reminds me a little bit of the finders or 679 00:36:32,920 --> 00:36:37,680 Speaker 4: the garbage eaters, remember those, right, And they kind of 680 00:36:37,719 --> 00:36:41,920 Speaker 4: had that same amorphous quality they describe themselves as just 681 00:36:42,000 --> 00:36:46,919 Speaker 4: maybe like the movement or the Brethren, things like that. 682 00:36:48,600 --> 00:36:53,920 Speaker 4: It's strange, though, how large these things can grow without 683 00:36:54,080 --> 00:36:57,040 Speaker 4: much public knowledge about it, Like how do you think 684 00:36:57,080 --> 00:37:01,480 Speaker 4: people find out about these things? Is it just you know, 685 00:37:01,560 --> 00:37:03,759 Speaker 4: do they target people who are at a low point 686 00:37:03,800 --> 00:37:07,160 Speaker 4: in their life? Do they just encourage the current members 687 00:37:07,200 --> 00:37:10,760 Speaker 4: to reproduce? That sounds like what happened to you, Haley, 688 00:37:10,880 --> 00:37:14,120 Speaker 4: because you say half my kid or western North Carolina 689 00:37:14,160 --> 00:37:18,200 Speaker 4: Blue Ridge Mountain folks and born and raised in this cult. 690 00:37:18,800 --> 00:37:21,360 Speaker 4: So maybe maybe that's part of it. Like how do 691 00:37:21,400 --> 00:37:23,600 Speaker 4: you indoctrinate you know, outsiders? 692 00:37:23,880 --> 00:37:25,600 Speaker 2: I don't know. I mean it sounds like it's a 693 00:37:25,680 --> 00:37:29,160 Speaker 2: roving thing to where you would just go house to 694 00:37:29,239 --> 00:37:32,400 Speaker 2: house and have a conversation the way some other religious 695 00:37:32,400 --> 00:37:34,640 Speaker 2: movements do. A group of them showed up in my 696 00:37:34,680 --> 00:37:38,920 Speaker 2: house earlier today. Actually not this group, but a different. 697 00:37:40,080 --> 00:37:45,200 Speaker 6: Christ of Latter day Saints or different several there's several 698 00:37:45,360 --> 00:37:45,680 Speaker 6: there are. 699 00:37:45,719 --> 00:37:46,840 Speaker 3: You're right, now, you're right. 700 00:37:47,680 --> 00:37:50,120 Speaker 4: But you know, shout out to the musical, the Book 701 00:37:50,160 --> 00:37:50,600 Speaker 4: of Mormon. 702 00:37:51,120 --> 00:37:55,400 Speaker 3: That was all part of their you know, initiation. I 703 00:37:55,440 --> 00:37:57,879 Speaker 3: guess more or less is going door to door like that. Yeah, 704 00:37:58,040 --> 00:37:58,799 Speaker 3: I do want to give. 705 00:37:59,239 --> 00:38:03,359 Speaker 4: Like we talked about the Church of LDS in past 706 00:38:03,400 --> 00:38:06,799 Speaker 4: Strange News listener mail or episodes, but to be very clear, 707 00:38:06,920 --> 00:38:09,640 Speaker 4: they are different from the two by twos very much. 708 00:38:09,719 --> 00:38:12,040 Speaker 4: So I'm bringing up the Book of Mormon because the 709 00:38:12,120 --> 00:38:15,120 Speaker 4: most amazing thing to me about that was when I 710 00:38:15,239 --> 00:38:19,360 Speaker 4: saw it in the playbill. The actual Church of Jesus 711 00:38:19,480 --> 00:38:22,640 Speaker 4: Christ of Latter day Saints had advertisements in here. They 712 00:38:22,719 --> 00:38:25,439 Speaker 4: helped fund the play, and they've got this beautiful ad 713 00:38:25,560 --> 00:38:28,279 Speaker 4: where they say you've seen the play, now read the book. 714 00:38:28,600 --> 00:38:31,719 Speaker 3: And I was like, oh, that's funny, well done. That's 715 00:38:31,760 --> 00:38:32,759 Speaker 3: good marketing, man. 716 00:38:33,320 --> 00:38:39,399 Speaker 4: That's good marketing. But hopefully raising awareness of the two 717 00:38:39,480 --> 00:38:44,120 Speaker 4: by twos in the future will help bring some bring 718 00:38:44,239 --> 00:38:47,040 Speaker 4: some much needed justice, bring some closure to these folks. 719 00:38:47,080 --> 00:38:49,400 Speaker 4: And again, you know, like you can tell folks, we 720 00:38:49,600 --> 00:38:52,920 Speaker 4: have a lot of research to do to dive into 721 00:38:53,800 --> 00:38:57,919 Speaker 4: this one. And with that in mind, I suggest maybe 722 00:38:58,000 --> 00:39:01,320 Speaker 4: we we end with one brief letter from Home and 723 00:39:01,440 --> 00:39:03,799 Speaker 4: then we get back on the case. 724 00:39:03,880 --> 00:39:06,320 Speaker 3: What do you guys think it? Okay? 725 00:39:07,680 --> 00:39:11,680 Speaker 4: With that vote of confidence, here is one letter from Home, 726 00:39:11,840 --> 00:39:15,759 Speaker 4: courtesy of Carrie Letters from Home it's just similar to 727 00:39:15,840 --> 00:39:18,520 Speaker 4: some of the voicemails we get. It's just quick tips 728 00:39:18,719 --> 00:39:21,320 Speaker 4: or nice things. How you doing, how you folks, that 729 00:39:21,440 --> 00:39:24,440 Speaker 4: kind of stuff. So Carrie says, Hya and I lived 730 00:39:24,480 --> 00:39:27,600 Speaker 4: in Vietnam a number of years ago and Nesley was everywhere. 731 00:39:27,840 --> 00:39:31,440 Speaker 4: Their campaign was to convince new mums not to breastfeed, 732 00:39:31,520 --> 00:39:34,360 Speaker 4: but to buy their formula, which was available in small 733 00:39:34,400 --> 00:39:38,759 Speaker 4: shops owned by poor locals locked up in captains with 734 00:39:38,920 --> 00:39:42,920 Speaker 4: the promise of money. It was absolutely disgraceful. Keep focusing 735 00:39:43,000 --> 00:39:46,160 Speaker 4: on these stories, it matters. And I think that's because 736 00:39:46,320 --> 00:39:50,480 Speaker 4: we recently had a classic episode about Nessley published. 737 00:39:50,360 --> 00:39:51,160 Speaker 3: And I remember that. 738 00:39:51,719 --> 00:39:54,960 Speaker 4: Thank you, Carrie, Thank you to everybody for tuning in. 739 00:39:55,120 --> 00:39:58,160 Speaker 4: Thank you to Sydney trash pandat a frame, thank you 740 00:39:58,280 --> 00:40:01,640 Speaker 4: to Big Chucks. Makes my day that we were able 741 00:40:01,719 --> 00:40:04,640 Speaker 4: to give someone a nickname, you know, pretty sweet. Yeah, 742 00:40:04,800 --> 00:40:08,560 Speaker 4: and thank you of course to Hayley. We are on 743 00:40:08,760 --> 00:40:12,160 Speaker 4: the case. We will be returning very soon with more 744 00:40:12,239 --> 00:40:15,959 Speaker 4: strange news, more messages from you, more stuff they don't 745 00:40:16,040 --> 00:40:19,200 Speaker 4: want you to know. Most importantly, before we go, folks, 746 00:40:19,520 --> 00:40:22,120 Speaker 4: big favor, do you want to join up with us? 747 00:40:22,680 --> 00:40:24,600 Speaker 4: Do you want to share some stories or some leads 748 00:40:24,680 --> 00:40:26,880 Speaker 4: with your fellow listeners. We'd love to have you, and 749 00:40:26,960 --> 00:40:29,480 Speaker 4: we try to be easy to find online. That's right, 750 00:40:29,520 --> 00:40:31,080 Speaker 4: You don't have to wait till we come and knock 751 00:40:31,160 --> 00:40:33,560 Speaker 4: in on your physical door. You can reach out to 752 00:40:33,680 --> 00:40:36,759 Speaker 4: us via the social media platform of your choice. We 753 00:40:36,960 --> 00:40:41,280 Speaker 4: are Conspiracy Stuff on YouTube, where we have video content 754 00:40:41,400 --> 00:40:42,920 Speaker 4: rolling out every single week. 755 00:40:43,520 --> 00:40:46,160 Speaker 3: On xfkaa Twitter, and also on Facebook. We have our 756 00:40:46,160 --> 00:40:47,399 Speaker 3: Facebook group He's where It's Crazy. 757 00:40:47,600 --> 00:40:49,320 Speaker 6: You can also find us at the handle Conspiracy Stuff 758 00:40:49,320 --> 00:40:50,640 Speaker 6: Show on Instagram and TikTok. 759 00:40:50,840 --> 00:40:51,000 Speaker 4: Hey. 760 00:40:51,160 --> 00:40:54,960 Speaker 2: We've noticed a couple of really nice reviews on Apple 761 00:40:55,040 --> 00:40:58,920 Speaker 2: Podcasts and Spotify and other places. If you have an 762 00:40:58,960 --> 00:41:02,120 Speaker 2: inkling of want wanting to review the show, we would 763 00:41:02,200 --> 00:41:05,279 Speaker 2: just recommend it. We would say thank you so much 764 00:41:05,400 --> 00:41:07,479 Speaker 2: for doing so. It means a lot and it helps 765 00:41:07,560 --> 00:41:10,200 Speaker 2: the show. So if you got some time, please do that. 766 00:41:10,680 --> 00:41:12,440 Speaker 2: If you don't want to do that, why not call us. 767 00:41:12,760 --> 00:41:16,920 Speaker 2: Our number is one eight three three STDWYTK. It's a 768 00:41:17,000 --> 00:41:19,520 Speaker 2: voicemail system. You've got three minutes. Give yourself a cool 769 00:41:19,600 --> 00:41:21,120 Speaker 2: nickname and let us know if we can use that 770 00:41:21,320 --> 00:41:23,960 Speaker 2: name and your voice on the air. If you've got 771 00:41:24,080 --> 00:41:26,960 Speaker 2: more to say than three minutes worth. If you've got links, 772 00:41:27,000 --> 00:41:29,800 Speaker 2: if you've got attachments, why not instead send us a 773 00:41:29,840 --> 00:41:31,120 Speaker 2: good old fashioned email in. 774 00:41:31,200 --> 00:41:33,480 Speaker 4: The spirit of reviews. Thank you for bringing that up, Matt. 775 00:41:33,520 --> 00:41:36,080 Speaker 4: Before we get to the email, we'd like to thank Ian. 776 00:41:36,440 --> 00:41:41,200 Speaker 4: The Phoenician in particular wrote a wrote a very kind 777 00:41:41,280 --> 00:41:44,360 Speaker 4: review called Lighthouse in the Store. I don't want to 778 00:41:44,360 --> 00:41:46,840 Speaker 4: spoil it for you, but go check that out. And 779 00:41:47,080 --> 00:41:50,400 Speaker 4: while you are on the tubes and the cables of 780 00:41:50,440 --> 00:41:53,520 Speaker 4: the internets, yes, do send us an email. Twenty four 781 00:41:53,600 --> 00:41:56,880 Speaker 4: hours a day, seven days a week. Be careful, sometimes 782 00:41:56,960 --> 00:41:59,080 Speaker 4: the void writes back. All you have to do is 783 00:41:59,120 --> 00:42:02,640 Speaker 4: drop us a line. We are conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com. 784 00:42:21,280 --> 00:42:23,320 Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production 785 00:42:23,440 --> 00:42:27,919 Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, 786 00:42:28,040 --> 00:42:30,920 Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.