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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt,

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Speaker 2: my name is Nola.

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Speaker 3: They call me Ben.

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Speaker 4: We're joined as always with our super producer Dylan the

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Speaker 4: Tennessee Pal Fagan.

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Speaker 3: Most importantly, you are you. You are here.

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Speaker 4: That makes this the stuff they don't want you to know,

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Speaker 4: coming to you live and direct in digital sometime in

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Speaker 4: November twenty twenty five. We hope, guys. Let's start it

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Speaker 4: this way. Have you ever visited a sketchy website?

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Speaker 5: Ah? Absolutely not, never once, just do for them, Never

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Speaker 5: got a pop up, never got a virus.

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Speaker 2: Interestingly, enough guys, for this week's listener mail. I went

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Speaker 2: to a dot org and it was completely fine. Then

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Speaker 2: I went to a dot com of the same title.

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Speaker 2: If that makes sense, just switch out advance and the

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Speaker 2: dot com one is supposedly the more legit site. But

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Speaker 2: that's the one that I got a little message from

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Speaker 2: my browser. Yeah you sure you want to go here?

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Speaker 3: Pal? Sure about that?

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Speaker 2: Why? I said no, I do not want to go

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Speaker 2: to here.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, advanced go.

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Speaker 4: So this is hilarious to us and hopefully to you

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Speaker 4: as well, fellow conspiracy realist, because there has been a

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Speaker 4: sea change in recent years or in a recent decade,

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Speaker 4: back in the house Yon days of the Internet, before

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Speaker 4: most folks began interacting with the World Wide Web through

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Speaker 4: social media, which is true most people now when they

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Speaker 4: say going online, they mean going to social media. It's

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Speaker 4: also where most folks get their news. Before those before

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Speaker 4: those big dogs took over everything with the dopamine casinos,

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Speaker 4: the average web user found themselves in all sorts of niche,

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Speaker 4: unexpected rabbit holes, worldwide Web, new Frontier, wild West, a

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Speaker 4: vast horizon of all things weird.

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Speaker 5: Geo cities. Man, everyone could have a website.

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Speaker 3: Yeah.

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Speaker 5: I used to go to all these like Smashing Pumpkins

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Speaker 5: fan sites and trade bootleg CDs with people. We'd send

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Speaker 5: each other and stuff in the mail. But you found

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Speaker 5: them on these like very niche websites that would sometimes

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Speaker 5: have comment sections or you know, bbs or whatever. Sure

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Speaker 5: bullet board system. It's fun and everyone wanted to stake acclaim,

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Speaker 5: and soon enough anyone relatively speaking, could build a website.

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Speaker 5: Society was not sure and probably still doesn't know what

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Speaker 5: would happen next. Victories, massive profit, massive losses, unforeseen consequences

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Speaker 5: never Yeah, as we'll witness in tonight's episode, our friends

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Speaker 5: at the shop, the Central Intelligence Agency, they were no different.

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Speaker 5: So let's get into it and see what we're talking about.

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Speaker 5: Here are the facts.

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Speaker 3: I think we need.

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Speaker 4: To start with, not just a general here of the facts,

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Speaker 4: but let's start with three basic facts. They'll really set

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Speaker 4: up tonight's conspiracy.

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Speaker 3: Yeah.

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Speaker 5: I remember when you know, you with along with your

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Speaker 5: Internet service provider account, many of which were local ish

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Speaker 5: at the time, you'd get a domain you could get

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Speaker 5: like a website, you know, on like your whatever. Mine

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Speaker 5: was znet dot com, slash Noel Brown user, a terrible

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Speaker 5: opsect Oh not good, Yeah, for sure. But you'd have

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Speaker 5: to upload everything with like an f to FTP and you'd,

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Speaker 5: you know, he did have to know a little basic HTML.

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Speaker 5: And that's why they all looked like trash because it

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Speaker 5: was somebody that wasn't into coding, just placing that image

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Speaker 5: in the center and then having a background color or

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Speaker 5: maybe a tiled you know, bit map or something like that,

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Speaker 5: and it was a delightful.

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Speaker 2: Time do you remember how big of a deal it

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Speaker 2: was to get a really good url, yes, to buy

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Speaker 2: those domains and go and go daddy, or negotiate with

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Speaker 2: somebody who already owned a band site or something, and

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Speaker 2: you're like, oh, what business.

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Speaker 3: Yeah we.

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Speaker 5: Squatters exactly, Yeah, yeah.

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Speaker 4: Domain spatters would find something like sting dot com and

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Speaker 4: then musicians like Sting would have to pay an egregious

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Speaker 4: amount of money so they could get that digital parking space.

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Speaker 5: Friend of the show Matt Riddle bought uh djcovid nineteen

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Speaker 5: dot com just you know, who knows maybe an artist

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Speaker 5: with use that name.

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Speaker 3: For yeah.

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Speaker 4: In the heyday of the pre bought Internet, please check

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Speaker 4: out our episode on dead internet theory. In the heyday

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Speaker 4: of pre bought Internet bot not b o U g HD,

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Speaker 4: anyone could make a website with a relatively small amount

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Speaker 4: of time, cash, and elbow grease, right, And that's true today.

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Speaker 4: The earlier days of the web were home to millions

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Speaker 4: and millions of pages and sites that were dedicated to

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Speaker 4: diplomatically put bizarrely specific things, niche hobbies that weren't widely

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Speaker 4: represented in other forms of.

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Speaker 2: Media, such as You're the Man now, doc Sure, or.

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Speaker 4: You are Mighty, which I loved, which was a beautiful website,

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Speaker 4: or Rotten dot com remember, sure, sure, I do remember

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Speaker 4: rotten dot com pretty gross. I remember a lot of

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Speaker 4: weird blogs too. And so from these beachheads, right, these

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Speaker 4: initial sites, we see the rise of online communities and commentary.

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Speaker 4: Like you were saying, forums, BBS, bulletin boards for discussion

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Speaker 4: and dissemination. Funny story anecdotal. One of our old d

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Speaker 4: news chums and I spent a long time talking about

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Speaker 4: what he thought was the first online community, and he

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Speaker 4: did a lot of research for this, and he's pretty

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Speaker 4: convinced it was about people who It was for people

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Speaker 4: who fantasized about having anonymous sex with various models of cars,

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Speaker 4: not car models, models of cars.

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Speaker 5: It doesn't get more niche than that.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, So they found a community, they built a church

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Speaker 4: and then so that's our first fact and it is

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Speaker 4: true today. Second then is now world governments work around

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Speaker 4: the clock to leverage any emergent technology. Surveillance was always

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Speaker 4: a huge part of this. Check out our trade Craft episodes.

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Speaker 4: We also have a weird story about Kroger and biometrics

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Speaker 4: on the way. It's spoiler, but the communication was always

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Speaker 4: a huge piece of the puzzle, and surveillance is something

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Speaker 4: I think most of the public understands, but communication effectively

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Speaker 4: is something the public didn't really rock or clock, right,

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Speaker 4: And that's our third point. All intelligence agencies ever hinge

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Speaker 4: on control of communication. They're some of the first gatekeepers

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Speaker 4: up there with religion. Yeah, I walked down the street

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Speaker 4: for it. I'm fine with it.

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Speaker 2: Well, yeah, you know, you're right, You're absolutely right. But

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Speaker 2: also like the security of communication, right, because in the end,

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Speaker 2: communication is key in all things, especially in governments and

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Speaker 2: intelligence agencies. But making sure that nobody else has their

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Speaker 2: eyes or ears on that stuff is paramount.

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Speaker 3: Yeah.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, it is so hypocritical, right, You do want to

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Speaker 4: obse kate a control what other people see, but you

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Speaker 4: want to know all the stuff that they have going on.

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Speaker 4: This is the ancient game, it continued. It's older than empires, right,

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Speaker 4: It's thousands of years old. Things like cryptography and codes,

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Speaker 4: dead drops, double agents, human intelligence or human tales, tai ls,

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Speaker 4: and so for every intelligence agency. As the Internet is

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Speaker 4: being born, birthed, not by what's that guy Gore?

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Speaker 3: Alan, Alan Gore, Alan.

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Speaker 2: Do you think about Cheney? Dick Cheney, rip.

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Speaker 4: Rip as of today is real father's name. Yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 4: please call him Penis. He expired as we're recorded on Tuesday,

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Speaker 4: November fourth, at the age of eighty four.

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Speaker 3: Never made it to the anyway.

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Speaker 4: Look, any time a new technology comes out, and the

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Speaker 4: US was instrumental in the creation of the World Wide Web,

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Speaker 4: all intelligence agencies see a gold rush. The advent of

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Speaker 4: the Internet was a new gold mine, and everybody wanted

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Speaker 4: to stake their claim in this gold brush. We know

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Speaker 4: traditional calm channels already exist. Every competent government's aware of them.

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Speaker 4: So we talked about this in our number Station episodes. Right,

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Speaker 4: even if you can't crack a specific code or root

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Speaker 4: of transmission of information, the leaders of one place like

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Speaker 4: Russia's FSB, they're going to be roughly aware of how

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Speaker 4: their rivals will attempt to obtain control and communicate intelligence.

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Speaker 4: It's very old cat and mouse game, and a lot

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Speaker 4: of people are very good at it.

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Speaker 3: Yeah.

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Speaker 5: Actually, I watched a movie over the weekend. It's a

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Speaker 5: Hong Kong film from the early two thousands that was

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Speaker 5: remade as The Departed, the Sparcesean movie. It's called Infernal Affairs,

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Speaker 5: and I'd never seen it. There's apparently two others that

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Speaker 5: are also great in this trilogy. But there's a whole

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Speaker 5: bit that I don't remember how they did it in

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Speaker 5: the Scorsese version, but where it's like there's a mole

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Speaker 5: on the inside of the bad guys, and then there's

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Speaker 5: a mole from the bad guys on the inside of

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Speaker 5: the good guys, and there's this whole cat and mouse

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Speaker 5: thing where the mole for the bad guys is in

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Speaker 5: on the surveillance of the bad guys, and it is

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Speaker 5: like trying to jam it all up covertly, and they're

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Speaker 5: using switching channels and stuff. I'm sorry it's not directly related,

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Speaker 5: but I just thought it was a really good depiction

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Speaker 5: of exactly the kind of stuff we're talking about here,

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Speaker 5: and how complex it can be. In this whole No

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Speaker 5: Thine Enemy aspect of it.

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Speaker 3: I love it.

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Speaker 4: You're absolutely right, Nol, because it does show us how

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Speaker 4: surreal those kind of things can get. One of the

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Speaker 4: old axioms is when two people in a conversation are lying,

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Speaker 4: and they both know that they're lying, what they're actually

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Speaker 4: saying comes very close to the truth.

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Speaker 5: Right a way, it wouldn't it.

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Speaker 4: Well, it's an old professor Yeah, No, I don't know

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Speaker 4: what that's smart.

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Speaker 2: So we're talking about this cat and mouse game, and

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Speaker 2: you never want the other side to matter who you are,

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Speaker 2: to know what you're saying, Right, That's why encryption is

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Speaker 2: so important. That's why subtlety is so important. I think

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Speaker 2: for this story, the smartest thing that's going to be

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Speaker 2: in the story we're going to talk about is the

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Speaker 2: inherent discretion of the way the websites we're going to

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Speaker 2: be talking about were used. Right, Because ultimately, if you've

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Speaker 2: got let's say, somebody on the inside of a group

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Speaker 2: that's being super secretive and they're working for you, and

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Speaker 2: you're trying to get them to give you information, how

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Speaker 2: do you prevent those other people who are the bad

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Speaker 2: guys from seeing that person like quietly on their phone,

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Speaker 2: like having a little conversation quietly on their phone in

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Speaker 2: the corner, or going off to meet in the darkness

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Speaker 2: at some point at a bench where there's surveillance on

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Speaker 2: that person.

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Speaker 5: Scottsonthing they could do in the course of normal business.

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Speaker 4: Totally fine, Oh okay, innocuous and preferably humanizing.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it's just.

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Speaker 4: A regular buddy boy who likes footstall or star wars.

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Speaker 4: So this cat and mouse game, the thing is a

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Speaker 4: lot of people are very good at it, and the

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Speaker 4: steaks have always been murderously high.

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Speaker 3: So a single misstep in this.

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Speaker 4: Endeavor can result in multiple deaths that can even lead

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Speaker 4: to full out kinetic war. So across the planet, everybody

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Speaker 4: is looking for an edge. The Internet, which offers easy,

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Speaker 4: near instantaneous online communication. It also inherently offers an edge

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Speaker 4: no rational actor can pass up.

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Speaker 5: Yeah, not to mention the needle in the haystack of

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Speaker 5: it all, how fast the Internet, even in its early

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Speaker 5: days was, and how just deep those nerddoms went, and

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Speaker 5: the just absolute vastness of the quantity of websites about

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Speaker 5: the most niche subjects.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, you tell the interrogator. Look, I just like Radiohead,

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Speaker 4: I have opinions. So this led to all sorts of

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Speaker 4: Shenanigan's longtime conspiracy realist. You may recall our earlier episode

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Speaker 4: on something called Lake City Quiet Pills. Do we remember

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Speaker 4: my Tennessee came out a little bit there?

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Speaker 5: Sorry, kay bullets, right, isn't that what the quiet Pills.

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Speaker 2: Were referring to? That's the Quiet Paris.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, So in this episode we explored allegations that a

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Speaker 4: loose group of ex militaries individuals were working as merks

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Speaker 4: mercenaries guns for hire, and they used a series of

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Speaker 4: subreddits as a coded communication platform to coordinate operations on

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Speaker 4: behalf of a mysterious lynchpin figure called Dutch.

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Speaker 2: Remember this one, Yeah, oh yeah, it's kind of like

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Speaker 2: that QAnon guy and the forums or we're gonna talk

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Speaker 2: about listening real too, somebody who infiltrated just a UFO

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Speaker 2: SETI form with information like the way this kind of thing,

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Speaker 2: it's you can't verify it very easily, can you.

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Speaker 4: Well that's part of the art, right, and it's it's

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Speaker 4: still not clear whether the Lake City Quiet Pills allegations

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Speaker 4: are legit or whether it's something like an arg a

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Speaker 4: complicated alternate reality game. But the mechanism holds true because

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Speaker 4: the online world, especially in earlier years, had a lot

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Speaker 4: of Heidi holes, making it, to Knowle's earlier point, easy

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Speaker 4: to communicate ways that can be missed, overlooked, and later

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Speaker 4: if need be erased. Another example, just off the cuff

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Speaker 4: here would be varying communications in YouTube comments before law

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Speaker 4: enforcement and the Spooky Dupes got wise to it. This

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Speaker 4: was a really cheap and really effective way to communicate

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Speaker 4: in pretty much open secrecy. It still occurs, but it's

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Speaker 4: arguably less effective now because everybody, you know, everybody knows

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Speaker 4: how the rabbit gets out of that proverbial hat.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, and don't forget the early days of Google docs,

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Speaker 2: shared Google docs and drives and various things like that.

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Speaker 3: Shout out to petray us, right uh.

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Speaker 4: Oh yeah, yeah, and look, we want to be honest

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Speaker 4: with you folks. Nobody at this point is thrown away.

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Speaker 4: The old analog communication routes. Number stations still operate with

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Speaker 4: one time code, pads, dead drops, proxies. Those all still occur,

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Speaker 4: and they occur because the old stuff is old for

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Speaker 4: a reason. It works, it is hard to crack it.

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Speaker 4: Surreptitious online communication doesn't therefore really erase anything, nor replace it.

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Speaker 4: It's another nifty tool added to your little Batman utility

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Speaker 4: belt to the great game. And it comes with complications

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Speaker 4: because people didn't really know what they were getting into

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Speaker 4: with the Internet, secure communication being one of their chief concerns.

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Speaker 5: Yeah, but this isn't without some you know, caveats and complications.

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Speaker 5: So secure communication with assets placed abroad, it's always been

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Speaker 5: a very very important function of intelligence agencies. So your operative,

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Speaker 5: your informant, your assets is often far far away from

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Speaker 5: where you. The handler are you know, installed, and they're

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Speaker 5: working undercover. They're under just incredible amounts of pressure, the

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Speaker 5: threat of being exposed, the threat of you know, being

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Speaker 5: made or what have you. So, despite all of the

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Speaker 5: different countermeasures that can be taken, was a single misstep,

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Speaker 5: like you were saying Ben earlier, can result in disaster,

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Speaker 5: and by that we mean disaster in terms of intelligence

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Speaker 5: leaked at least of all. And then you've got disaster

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Speaker 5: in terms of the individual being killed.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, but you know, one of the really good

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Speaker 2: things that at least in the story we're talking about today,

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Speaker 2: that the government had going for them is that a

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Speaker 2: lot of people didn't really understand how the internet worked,

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Speaker 2: how HTML functioned, or was really good at it, or

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Speaker 2: there weren't a ton of people that maybe you're attempting

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Speaker 2: to spy on. Let's say that if this this is

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Speaker 2: the CIA we're talking about, a lot of people wouldn't

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Speaker 2: have access and abilities to discover something nefarious happening right

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Speaker 2: at least in the time when we're beginning this program.

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Speaker 4: It would take them a second to learn the ips

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Speaker 4: where sequential this is. That's a bit of foreshadowing. So

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Speaker 4: if we go back, like other folks in the Great Game,

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Speaker 4: the CIA, knowing there were high stakes, they hit upon

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Speaker 4: an objectively brilliant idea.

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Speaker 3: What if they said, we.

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Speaker 4: Create a series of seemingly innocuous websites so that we

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Speaker 4: can talk with our folks abroad. So long as everything

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Speaker 4: works at operative, anywhere in the wide world could be

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Speaker 4: even on a monitor connection and receive coded information, the

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Speaker 4: reply with their own coded responses. At first, blush, this

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Speaker 4: might just look like two fans of football or two

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Speaker 4: fans of Star Wars just chatting about the news. Local

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Speaker 4: authorities wouldn't see anything other than typical fan activity. The

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Speaker 4: CIA did put this into play for years and years,

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Speaker 4: and while it worked, it was absolutely utterly zanzibar, which

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Speaker 4: I have started saying instead of awesome. However, when it

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Speaker 4: didn't work, people.

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Speaker 2: Died, did like dozens of people. A lot of people died, Yeah,

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Speaker 2: for sure.

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Speaker 5: And we're going to get into how all of that

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Speaker 5: played out. After a quick word from our sponsor.

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Speaker 3: Here's where it gets crazy.

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Speaker 4: The CIA did and does engage in tons of covert

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Speaker 4: action and most of it is stuff the public will

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Speaker 4: never learn about because it's a very old rule and

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Speaker 4: it holds today. If the public learns about something someone

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Speaker 4: messed up, that is it gets drilled into it.

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Speaker 3: Langley.

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Speaker 4: Some of these activities did and possibly do still include

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Speaker 4: the creation of misleading websites. Our story starts kind of.

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Speaker 3: I don't know.

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Speaker 4: I feel like the entry point to our story is

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Speaker 4: a security researcher, a white hat guy named cerros Atilly

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Speaker 4: for sure.

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Speaker 5: He originally I was inspired by an article in Reuter's

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Speaker 5: came out in twenty twenty two. It was called America's

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Speaker 5: Throwaway Spies by Joel Schechtmann and Bosar Mayor shar Fedden.

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Speaker 5: I'm hoping I'm doing at least the passable pronunciation of

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Speaker 5: that name. Which discussed the rise in compromised CIA assets

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Speaker 5: and informants in the Cold War with Iran. We mentioned,

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Speaker 5: I think earlier and a little bit again an episode

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Speaker 5: we did in the past on why so many agents

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Speaker 5: and assets are having their cover blown or are being compromised.

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Speaker 5: This figures into that the report leveraged research from Citizen

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Speaker 5: Labs specifically named nine web sites of interest. These were

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Speaker 5: online portals that would act as secret communication points for

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Speaker 5: the Capital A Agency. Additionally, it's cited some claims that

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Speaker 5: at least eight hundred and eighty five websites similar in

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Speaker 5: nature could potentially have been part of that network, though

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Speaker 5: those were not discussed in specific detail.

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Speaker 2: Are we what is our time frame here with cold

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Speaker 2: war with Iran? Because I don't think we're talking about

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Speaker 2: all the way back to nineteen forty seven and like

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Speaker 2: actual Cold war like.

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Speaker 5: So it's more broad use of cold war maybe.

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Speaker 2: So this is like post nine to eleven probably, or

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Speaker 2: like just pre nine to eleven up into the early

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Speaker 2: establishment of the Internet and all that stuff.

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Speaker 4: Slightly pre nine to eleven, largely post nine to eleven,

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Speaker 4: definitely post the Iranian Revolution, and definitely post the forties.

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Speaker 2: Okay, Iranian Revolution seventies? Is that right?

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Speaker 3: Yeah? I don't remember, that's correct, nineteen seventy nine.

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Speaker 2: Okay, Okay, so got you. But I just want to

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Speaker 2: make sure I understand what time frame we're talking about here.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, that's a good question, because this is a bit

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Speaker 4: of an editorial choice on our behalf to characterize current

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Speaker 4: US Iranian relationship as a cold war hurts very much

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Speaker 4: the same future historians will agree with us.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I think we're right. I just I'm just not

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Speaker 2: sure about like when we would say it started. I

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Speaker 2: guess if that.

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Speaker 4: Ah, yes, yeah, I would say, hmm right, yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 4: I think it's uh, it's Oorwellian. They've always been beefed

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Speaker 4: up for that resource extraction and that regional control. And

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Speaker 4: do check out, by the way, fellow conspiracy realists, do

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Speaker 4: check out a map of US bases that surround the

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Speaker 4: nation of Iran on your seat and ask yourself how

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Speaker 4: you would feel if Iran had that many bases around

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Speaker 4: the contiguous US. Oh my gosh, the wind is high

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Speaker 4: on this soapbox. Guys, let me get a few steps down.

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Speaker 2: But it makes total sense, right, you're not speaking out

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Speaker 2: of turn, Ben, I would say, And I don't think

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Speaker 2: it's a soapbox. I think you're just pointing out the

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Speaker 2: actual real things.

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Speaker 5: It's a step stool.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, but you know I'm cheap and I already had

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Speaker 4: this box full of soaps. Now I got a box

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Speaker 4: that I walk on.

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Speaker 3: Hell.

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Speaker 4: Okay, So, starting from these nine websites and all that

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Speaker 4: you mentioned, Reuter's journalists identified our buddy zero Sentilly and

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Speaker 4: his team. They started digging, and they found what they

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Speaker 4: saw to be irrefutable evidence of what they could identify

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Speaker 4: as several hundred other websites united by what they call

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Speaker 4: a common fingerprint, making them part of the same network.

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Speaker 4: And if you go to Zero's own research on his

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Speaker 4: blog Big Book or Big Open Book, you will see

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Speaker 4: how they start to build a persona marketing we'll call it,

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Speaker 4: or a profile of these sites. It's twenty twenty five,

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Speaker 4: fast forward, real quick sentill he goes public with his discovery,

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Speaker 4: and one of the things that really grabbed the attention

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Speaker 4: of other journalists. And as we'll see, he he's building

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Speaker 4: on the shoulders of giants here and he's going to

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Speaker 4: be the first to say it. He reports a website

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Speaker 4: called star warsweb dot net, which I think we visited

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Speaker 4: in the wayback machine.

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Speaker 2: This first of all, sounds legit, sure.

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Speaker 4: Right, because it doesn't have a dash in the address.

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Speaker 4: Usually when there's a dash in the address, it makes

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Speaker 4: you wonder what happened. So this looked like a definite

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Speaker 4: fan website for the Star Wars fiction empire, but it

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Speaker 4: looked to be not the best. This was not a

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Speaker 4: ferrari of Star Wars fandom. It was much more like

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Speaker 4: a geo metro or the GeoCities of Star Wars fandom.

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Speaker 2: It looked like somebody with a lot of passion for

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Speaker 2: Star Wars and maybe just not a lot of time

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Speaker 2: to shoop up the website or not allow to know how.

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Speaker 2: But it's looked like so those were a dime a dozen?

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Speaker 2: Is the point? Right?

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Speaker 3: The point?

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Speaker 2: Somebody loved Star Wars.

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Speaker 4: If we go to Rich Stanton reporting over a PC Gamer,

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Speaker 4: we see a great explanation of this quote. So we're

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Speaker 4: going to the website to paint the scene here. Dylan,

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Speaker 4: you're an excited kid. Your nineties hackered them well, this

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Speaker 4: early two thousands and you say, oh, what am I

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Speaker 4: looking at?

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Speaker 3: Quote?

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Speaker 4: There's a kid with a lightsaber at the top of

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Speaker 4: the page. The tagline Beyond the Unknown, as well as

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Speaker 4: may the Force Be with You links to other Star

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Speaker 4: Wars resources and quote. For some reason, Master Yoda is

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Speaker 4: recommending Star Wars Battlefront two, Star Wars The Force Unleashed

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Speaker 4: two legos, Star Wars two, and Star Wars The Clone

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Speaker 4: Wars colon Republic heroes. I'm not gonna do the voice

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Speaker 4: like these games, you will, says the text alongside.

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Speaker 2: Wait isn't Star Wars Clone Wars episode two.

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Speaker 5: So there's a cartoon like CGI. It's like a series

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Speaker 5: that's very popular.

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Speaker 3: Spin offs of spinoffs.

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Speaker 2: I'm just pointing these are all the second of all

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Speaker 2: of these guys. Is there a pattern or something we

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Speaker 2: need to know here about you?

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Speaker 4: Yeah, it's the opposite of clean design. In fact, it's

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Speaker 4: it's messy enough that if you were a civilian Star

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Speaker 4: Wars fan just on the wide Internet, you might take

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00:26:28,440 --> 00:26:32,160
Speaker 4: one look at this one. They might click away, go

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Speaker 4: back to Yahoo or whatever, and then go try to

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Speaker 4: find a better site that is by design. That's what

439
00:26:38,800 --> 00:26:42,120
Speaker 4: the CIA wanted. They wanted the they wanted the actual

440
00:26:42,200 --> 00:26:43,760
Speaker 4: Star Wars fans to go.

441
00:26:44,440 --> 00:26:46,520
Speaker 3: I don't know, this might have a virus on it.

442
00:26:46,760 --> 00:26:50,840
Speaker 5: Yeah, at the very least, just mediocre, you know, like

443
00:26:50,880 --> 00:26:53,639
Speaker 5: there are just much better resources than these. And what

444
00:26:53,680 --> 00:26:55,800
Speaker 5: I was saying earlier too, is back in these days,

445
00:26:56,000 --> 00:26:59,800
Speaker 5: I mean I made a half asked website that probably

446
00:26:59,880 --> 00:27:02,679
Speaker 5: was just dead floating around on the Internet without me

447
00:27:02,800 --> 00:27:05,160
Speaker 5: thinking about it for years. I mean, there's a there's

448
00:27:05,200 --> 00:27:07,479
Speaker 5: so many of those, and if you make one that

449
00:27:07,520 --> 00:27:10,199
Speaker 5: looks like that hasn't been updated in a while, it

450
00:27:10,280 --> 00:27:13,119
Speaker 5: feels stale, people aren't gonna actually spend any time on it.

451
00:27:13,160 --> 00:27:16,520
Speaker 5: You've got this like incredible subterfuge kind of hidden in

452
00:27:16,560 --> 00:27:17,080
Speaker 5: plain sight.

453
00:27:17,720 --> 00:27:19,200
Speaker 3: Mm hmmm, yeah.

454
00:27:19,320 --> 00:27:22,159
Speaker 4: I mean that's the question, right, Why the needle in

455
00:27:22,200 --> 00:27:27,040
Speaker 4: a haystack conundrum? Why build a purposefully not great website,

456
00:27:27,440 --> 00:27:31,639
Speaker 4: especially for a fandom that is so widespread that it

457
00:27:31,840 --> 00:27:36,399
Speaker 4: already has thousands of other similar, yet better sites and

458
00:27:36,440 --> 00:27:40,199
Speaker 4: resources online. That is because, as Zero suntil he found

459
00:27:40,520 --> 00:27:45,920
Speaker 4: this was one of hundreds of websites created directly by

460
00:27:46,119 --> 00:27:50,760
Speaker 4: our friends at the CIA from at least twenty ten,

461
00:27:50,960 --> 00:27:56,560
Speaker 4: properly earlier as a secret communication network for CIA assets abroad.

462
00:27:56,960 --> 00:28:00,760
Speaker 4: And some of these assets and operators were in openly

463
00:28:00,880 --> 00:28:06,239
Speaker 4: hostile countries, right, they might be specifically monitored informants with

464
00:28:06,359 --> 00:28:12,280
Speaker 4: expertise on nuclear proliferation or movement of armament and research.

465
00:28:12,640 --> 00:28:15,840
Speaker 4: And even if they're being monitored by you know, a

466
00:28:15,840 --> 00:28:21,359
Speaker 4: little an SA intern analogue like our buddy Steve. Steve

467
00:28:21,440 --> 00:28:25,480
Speaker 4: would look at these guys internet activity and say, man,

468
00:28:26,840 --> 00:28:28,560
Speaker 4: he's super into Star Wars.

469
00:28:29,359 --> 00:28:36,119
Speaker 3: Or football or both or both. He's super into Starball, Starbull,

470
00:28:36,960 --> 00:28:38,120
Speaker 3: the first Quidditch.

471
00:28:38,360 --> 00:28:41,880
Speaker 4: So it's weird because a lot of the sites that

472
00:28:41,960 --> 00:28:45,720
Speaker 4: he identified, Like we said in that original Reuter's report,

473
00:28:46,040 --> 00:28:49,800
Speaker 4: which is oft quoted, they only specify nine sites, but

474
00:28:49,920 --> 00:28:54,640
Speaker 4: they talk about eight hundred and eighty five overall from

475
00:28:54,640 --> 00:28:59,440
Speaker 4: independent researchers, and so until he is arguably doing a

476
00:28:59,600 --> 00:29:03,320
Speaker 4: bit of double work. But he wants to personally personally

477
00:29:03,400 --> 00:29:07,040
Speaker 4: verify this stuff. Very Reagan trust, but verify. And he

478
00:29:07,160 --> 00:29:10,920
Speaker 4: sees a lot of the websites that he feels share

479
00:29:10,960 --> 00:29:15,120
Speaker 4: this common fingerprint. They appear to be news sites, right,

480
00:29:15,240 --> 00:29:19,800
Speaker 4: and their copy pasta approach is to take stuff from

481
00:29:19,840 --> 00:29:22,840
Speaker 4: AP or Reuters or what have you, and then just

482
00:29:22,920 --> 00:29:26,000
Speaker 4: slap slap it on their site, right and slap their

483
00:29:26,080 --> 00:29:30,719
Speaker 4: name on it. But then there's a little bit of sports, music,

484
00:29:30,800 --> 00:29:36,880
Speaker 4: gaming centric websites. He names things like Haven of Gamers

485
00:29:36,920 --> 00:29:40,720
Speaker 4: with a Z dot com, Hitpoint Gaming dot com, Active

486
00:29:40,760 --> 00:29:44,880
Speaker 4: Gaming Info dot com, My Online Gamesource dot com, and

487
00:29:45,080 --> 00:29:49,040
Speaker 4: kings You like this, Matt dash Game dot Net.

488
00:29:49,520 --> 00:29:51,640
Speaker 2: That's the one that's the main one.

489
00:29:51,840 --> 00:29:55,520
Speaker 4: Is this taught to you by kings dot Kingslash game

490
00:29:55,640 --> 00:30:01,600
Speaker 4: dot net. This will yes, this now goes to King's Game,

491
00:30:01,720 --> 00:30:04,240
Speaker 4: The Ultimate Men's Self Improvement Guide.

492
00:30:05,200 --> 00:30:06,360
Speaker 3: It is problematic.

493
00:30:07,200 --> 00:30:09,920
Speaker 2: Uh yeah, how to doom yourself to a life with

494
00:30:10,040 --> 00:30:12,840
Speaker 2: no girlfriend, says kingsdash game dot net.

495
00:30:14,080 --> 00:30:17,320
Speaker 5: Is this like some pre proto in cell type culture here,

496
00:30:17,360 --> 00:30:20,440
Speaker 5: she's a girl who looks at you, like, what do

497
00:30:20,800 --> 00:30:21,480
Speaker 5: recent post?

498
00:30:22,000 --> 00:30:22,080
Speaker 1: Ye?

499
00:30:22,800 --> 00:30:27,000
Speaker 4: From most recent posts? These are not timestamped posts, by

500
00:30:27,000 --> 00:30:27,320
Speaker 4: the way.

501
00:30:27,720 --> 00:30:31,520
Speaker 2: No, let's talk about music. How to get laid like

502
00:30:31,560 --> 00:30:32,360
Speaker 2: a rock star?

503
00:30:34,920 --> 00:30:41,280
Speaker 4: Yeah, yep, waiting for her message how to overcome invisibility,

504
00:30:41,320 --> 00:30:44,000
Speaker 4: which I think speaks to Nold's question about proto in

505
00:30:44,120 --> 00:30:44,760
Speaker 4: cell stuff.

506
00:30:45,040 --> 00:30:49,240
Speaker 2: Wait a hold on, they've got an uncategorized category. Should

507
00:30:49,240 --> 00:30:51,520
Speaker 2: we still dig in this website because it's only got

508
00:30:51,520 --> 00:30:53,240
Speaker 2: posts from twenty twenty four?

509
00:30:54,080 --> 00:30:58,200
Speaker 4: Right, because it got taken over? Ah, got sold? Yeah,

510
00:30:58,240 --> 00:31:02,240
Speaker 4: so it's it's no. Look, we'll give you a spoiler

511
00:31:02,680 --> 00:31:05,960
Speaker 4: later with some Star Wars stuff, just to show you,

512
00:31:06,240 --> 00:31:09,880
Speaker 4: just to prove the conspiracy we're positing here. Per our

513
00:31:09,920 --> 00:31:14,640
Speaker 4: buddy Ciro Scentilly, there are a lot of juicy forensics.

514
00:31:14,720 --> 00:31:17,200
Speaker 4: There are a lot of tea leaves to read the

515
00:31:17,360 --> 00:31:21,280
Speaker 4: languages he found across these sites that were united by

516
00:31:21,320 --> 00:31:26,760
Speaker 4: a common fingerprint. They first appeared to be targeting users

517
00:31:26,800 --> 00:31:31,200
Speaker 4: in Germany, France, Spain and Brazil, and he says he

518
00:31:31,320 --> 00:31:37,400
Speaker 4: went on a breadcrumb mission, and his argument was pretty

519
00:31:37,720 --> 00:31:42,640
Speaker 4: interesting because he's saying that the further you dig into

520
00:31:42,720 --> 00:31:46,880
Speaker 4: these rabbit holes, the more you can learn about the

521
00:31:47,000 --> 00:31:49,360
Speaker 4: CIA at the time. As a matter of fact, we

522
00:31:49,400 --> 00:31:52,800
Speaker 4: have a direct quote from him on his own website.

523
00:31:52,920 --> 00:31:55,920
Speaker 5: He said, a broader understanding of the CIA's interest at

524
00:31:55,960 --> 00:31:58,280
Speaker 5: the time. He's talking about what they were able to

525
00:31:58,320 --> 00:32:02,280
Speaker 5: gain from this research, incleading more specific democracies which may

526
00:32:02,280 --> 00:32:05,200
Speaker 5: have been targeted which were not previously mentioned, and also

527
00:32:05,240 --> 00:32:08,560
Speaker 5: a statistical understanding of how much importance they were giving

528
00:32:08,880 --> 00:32:12,120
Speaker 5: to different zones at the time. Yeah, so how they

529
00:32:12,120 --> 00:32:16,080
Speaker 5: were like waiting their targets in terms of like hierarchically

530
00:32:16,120 --> 00:32:19,560
Speaker 5: and unsurprisingly in that hierarchy, the Middle East came out

531
00:32:19,560 --> 00:32:20,160
Speaker 5: on top.

532
00:32:21,400 --> 00:32:25,680
Speaker 4: As ever, he yeah, the Middle East, Latin America, Taiwan,

533
00:32:25,960 --> 00:32:28,800
Speaker 4: And we'll keep this stuff about the African sphere or

534
00:32:28,960 --> 00:32:34,080
Speaker 4: theater out of out of the scope of this episode.

535
00:32:34,320 --> 00:32:38,440
Speaker 4: I don't know what are our initial reactions.

536
00:32:38,760 --> 00:32:41,959
Speaker 2: Well, it's weird stuff. I just want to reframe us

537
00:32:41,960 --> 00:32:47,640
Speaker 2: with timing again. Now we're specifically talking about mid aughts,

538
00:32:47,680 --> 00:32:52,160
Speaker 2: So like I would say two thousand fourish on to

539
00:32:52,680 --> 00:32:58,840
Speaker 2: about twenty what twenty thirteen, maybe twenty twelve, something like that.

540
00:32:58,880 --> 00:33:00,800
Speaker 2: I think I think twenty ten twenty eleven is like

541
00:33:00,840 --> 00:33:03,160
Speaker 2: our primary date, so it's only like five years that

542
00:33:03,160 --> 00:33:05,920
Speaker 2: these were probably super hot in usage.

543
00:33:06,320 --> 00:33:10,479
Speaker 4: Right, Yeah, I'd agree with that. I conservatively put it

544
00:33:10,480 --> 00:33:12,240
Speaker 4: at twenty eleven to twenty twelve.

545
00:33:12,360 --> 00:33:14,120
Speaker 3: And the thing is so sentil.

546
00:33:14,160 --> 00:33:16,560
Speaker 4: He is picking up the bread crumbs long after the

547
00:33:16,600 --> 00:33:20,160
Speaker 4: game has begun, and he is not the only person

548
00:33:20,280 --> 00:33:23,360
Speaker 4: trying to figure this out. We must reiterate he is

549
00:33:23,400 --> 00:33:26,880
Speaker 4: what we would call a white hat security analyst.

550
00:33:26,960 --> 00:33:28,160
Speaker 3: He's one of the good guys.

551
00:33:28,920 --> 00:33:33,960
Speaker 4: He is a very clever investigator out there searching stuff

552
00:33:34,160 --> 00:33:38,720
Speaker 4: for the public interest, for government accountability, and for his

553
00:33:38,880 --> 00:33:43,920
Speaker 4: own curiosity, for his own sniffles and giggles, as we

554
00:33:43,920 --> 00:33:46,840
Speaker 4: would say on a PG thirteen show. While he went

555
00:33:46,880 --> 00:33:49,040
Speaker 4: to public with this info, he was far from the

556
00:33:49,080 --> 00:33:54,400
Speaker 4: first to uncover this conspiracy actual, as we'll see, Iran

557
00:33:54,840 --> 00:33:59,680
Speaker 4: beat him to the punch and again people died. We're

558
00:33:59,720 --> 00:34:02,000
Speaker 4: going to take a pause for a word from our sponsor,

559
00:34:07,120 --> 00:34:10,440
Speaker 4: and we've returned. Maybe we talked about the first reveal

560
00:34:10,680 --> 00:34:13,879
Speaker 4: because Matta and Noel I love that we're walking through

561
00:34:13,920 --> 00:34:20,080
Speaker 4: the timeline here. The first compromise goes public, gets publicly

562
00:34:20,120 --> 00:34:23,200
Speaker 4: announced by Yahoo News.

563
00:34:23,800 --> 00:34:27,680
Speaker 5: Yeah, that's true, that's period accurate. I mean they sound

564
00:34:27,760 --> 00:34:29,000
Speaker 5: like the old Internet of it all.

565
00:34:28,920 --> 00:34:33,680
Speaker 2: You Zach Dorfman and Jenna MacLaughlin back in twenty eighteen.

566
00:34:35,640 --> 00:34:38,360
Speaker 2: Let's read the title of it here. The CIA's communications

567
00:34:38,360 --> 00:34:41,960
Speaker 2: suffered a catastrophic compromise. It started in.

568
00:34:41,880 --> 00:34:47,520
Speaker 4: Iran right per these journalists reporting the troubles date back

569
00:34:47,560 --> 00:34:52,239
Speaker 4: to twenty thirteen. This network was partially exposed, and the

570
00:34:52,360 --> 00:34:57,160
Speaker 4: CIA scrambled jumping out their keysters to hide their tracks

571
00:34:57,440 --> 00:35:01,920
Speaker 4: while also at the same time hoping to xfiltrate compromised

572
00:35:02,040 --> 00:35:03,160
Speaker 4: assets abroad.

573
00:35:03,680 --> 00:35:04,920
Speaker 3: This is terrible.

574
00:35:05,480 --> 00:35:10,840
Speaker 4: This is the opposite of ideal. I am scrambling not

575
00:35:11,000 --> 00:35:16,799
Speaker 4: to use English curse words, because now imagine you have

576
00:35:17,520 --> 00:35:21,960
Speaker 4: essentially now you have to deploy ratlines, right like post

577
00:35:21,960 --> 00:35:24,880
Speaker 4: World War two. You have to figure out how to

578
00:35:24,920 --> 00:35:33,560
Speaker 4: get very deeply embedded people a provable, believable reason to

579
00:35:33,800 --> 00:35:37,239
Speaker 4: leave the country safely. And I think that can be

580
00:35:37,280 --> 00:35:42,879
Speaker 4: a very difficult proposition, especially if we're talking about nuclear proliferation,

581
00:35:43,560 --> 00:35:48,839
Speaker 4: sensitive stealth technology, cryptography, stuff like that. Those nerds are

582
00:35:48,920 --> 00:35:52,120
Speaker 4: very closely monitored and it goes back to you. I

583
00:35:52,120 --> 00:35:54,800
Speaker 4: love the reference you made earlier in noll our episode

584
00:35:54,920 --> 00:35:57,799
Speaker 4: why are so many spies getting busted? In that we

585
00:35:57,960 --> 00:36:03,319
Speaker 4: noted a severe, un precedented uptick in exposure and compromise,

586
00:36:03,560 --> 00:36:09,200
Speaker 4: as well as disappearance of dozens of sources, particularly in

587
00:36:09,400 --> 00:36:14,440
Speaker 4: Iran and China. So according to what we know, reported

588
00:36:14,640 --> 00:36:17,680
Speaker 4: again by our friends at Yahoo News, how did their

589
00:36:17,760 --> 00:36:18,400
Speaker 4: tagline go?

590
00:36:18,680 --> 00:36:22,279
Speaker 3: Remember back in the days of the internet. Yeahoo, there

591
00:36:22,360 --> 00:36:22,840
Speaker 3: it is.

592
00:36:23,320 --> 00:36:26,839
Speaker 4: I love it when you guys sing was it? Yeah?

593
00:36:26,960 --> 00:36:29,879
Speaker 4: I think you got it. You definitely read my mind

594
00:36:29,920 --> 00:36:30,239
Speaker 4: on it.

595
00:36:30,280 --> 00:36:33,640
Speaker 2: So how stuff works?

596
00:36:34,640 --> 00:36:36,360
Speaker 3: That was us from earlier.

597
00:36:36,680 --> 00:36:44,759
Speaker 4: So, according to former intelligence officials who were speaking unonomously,

598
00:36:45,080 --> 00:36:48,719
Speaker 4: there was an Erodian double agent who got caught out.

599
00:36:49,560 --> 00:36:53,240
Speaker 4: They rolled the dice incorrectly or fortune did not favor them.

600
00:36:53,600 --> 00:36:58,520
Speaker 4: So they showed Erodian Intelligence this website and they said, Hey,

601
00:36:58,680 --> 00:37:02,480
Speaker 4: this is the website I use to communicate with my

602
00:37:02,680 --> 00:37:06,440
Speaker 4: CIA handlers. I know it looks like a soccer website,

603
00:37:06,719 --> 00:37:10,080
Speaker 4: but please stop pulling my toenails out and I'll show

604
00:37:10,120 --> 00:37:13,279
Speaker 4: you how we talk to each other. And once they

605
00:37:13,320 --> 00:37:18,840
Speaker 4: gave up all that information, which did happen the boffins

606
00:37:18,840 --> 00:37:22,840
Speaker 4: in Ronnie and Intelligence started to look around the rest

607
00:37:22,920 --> 00:37:30,560
Speaker 4: of the world Wide Web for websites with similar hominalities, signifiers, components,

608
00:37:30,840 --> 00:37:35,120
Speaker 4: and they hit on the right string of search terms.

609
00:37:35,600 --> 00:37:38,399
Speaker 4: You know, searching is like casting a spell, right, It's

610
00:37:38,440 --> 00:37:41,920
Speaker 4: an incantation online. So if you know how to phrase

611
00:37:42,000 --> 00:37:46,040
Speaker 4: what you are searching for, you can invoke or summon

612
00:37:46,080 --> 00:37:46,439
Speaker 4: a thing.

613
00:37:46,960 --> 00:37:48,920
Speaker 5: Can I just say really quickly that that proto in

614
00:37:48,960 --> 00:37:51,239
Speaker 5: cell website we were talking about earlier, Dylan posted an

615
00:37:51,239 --> 00:37:56,200
Speaker 5: incredible link in the chat to a Salon article featuring

616
00:37:56,239 --> 00:37:59,000
Speaker 5: a pickup artist by the name of Eric von Markovic,

617
00:37:59,600 --> 00:38:03,640
Speaker 5: where he chats about the Venusian arts, sexual psychology and

618
00:38:03,680 --> 00:38:06,480
Speaker 5: why he can help forty year old virgins everywhere get laid.

619
00:38:07,120 --> 00:38:10,800
Speaker 5: And Dylan said the website was giving this dude vibes

620
00:38:10,920 --> 00:38:13,600
Speaker 5: the artful seducer. Sorry, I had to give props to

621
00:38:13,719 --> 00:38:17,280
Speaker 5: this link, also making jump stare warning because the dude's

622
00:38:17,280 --> 00:38:19,800
Speaker 5: face is huge on the on the article and he's

623
00:38:20,760 --> 00:38:21,720
Speaker 5: got a bit of a vibe.

624
00:38:21,880 --> 00:38:23,440
Speaker 3: He's peacocking. Well, thank you there.

625
00:38:23,440 --> 00:38:27,399
Speaker 4: At Tennessee, we know that Iran was able to play

626
00:38:27,440 --> 00:38:33,839
Speaker 4: the breadcrumb game because they use these search terms. Again,

627
00:38:33,920 --> 00:38:38,360
Speaker 4: these incanggations, right, these series of words and codes to

628
00:38:38,400 --> 00:38:43,640
Speaker 4: figure out not only other secret CIA comm sites in

629
00:38:43,680 --> 00:38:47,040
Speaker 4: this network, but also to track who was visiting these

630
00:38:47,080 --> 00:38:51,600
Speaker 4: sites and where they were visiting them from. And they

631
00:38:51,680 --> 00:38:55,120
Speaker 4: started to unravel the larger spider web.

632
00:38:55,680 --> 00:38:59,719
Speaker 2: Yeah, this is serious. So it goes all the way

633
00:38:59,760 --> 00:39:03,280
Speaker 2: back two thousand and nine. That's when Hezbola originally began

634
00:39:03,400 --> 00:39:07,000
Speaker 2: to unravel this stuff, and it was reported in twenty

635
00:39:07,000 --> 00:39:12,279
Speaker 2: eleven by Reuters, but nobody knew how it was happening. Right,

636
00:39:12,520 --> 00:39:15,440
Speaker 2: what is it? We always say them, it's the ways

637
00:39:15,480 --> 00:39:17,920
Speaker 2: and means or the things that are protected, the method

638
00:39:18,120 --> 00:39:23,160
Speaker 2: The methods are super protected. So but back in twenty eleven,

639
00:39:23,200 --> 00:39:28,440
Speaker 2: November twenty first, twenty eleven, Reuters put out Hesbela, Iran

640
00:39:28,480 --> 00:39:32,080
Speaker 2: and cover CIA informants and they were talking about specifically

641
00:39:32,120 --> 00:39:35,640
Speaker 2: this stuff without naming any websites or anything, because Hezbola

642
00:39:35,680 --> 00:39:38,399
Speaker 2: was keeping that close to their chest. That that's how

643
00:39:38,440 --> 00:39:41,800
Speaker 2: they uncovered these spies, and they were sharing that information

644
00:39:41,880 --> 00:39:45,760
Speaker 2: directly with China, and only a couple of years later,

645
00:39:46,400 --> 00:39:48,279
Speaker 2: or like a year and a half later, is when

646
00:39:48,320 --> 00:39:52,480
Speaker 2: you find out that China rolled up several dozen spies

647
00:39:52,640 --> 00:39:55,719
Speaker 2: working in their ranks where many of them, not all

648
00:39:55,719 --> 00:39:57,839
Speaker 2: of them were CIA or they were like people who

649
00:39:57,840 --> 00:40:01,520
Speaker 2: were working in either Iran or or China, who are

650
00:40:01,680 --> 00:40:04,360
Speaker 2: you know, brought in by the CIA. But it is

651
00:40:04,440 --> 00:40:07,680
Speaker 2: really scary to think about what was happening because in

652
00:40:07,719 --> 00:40:11,640
Speaker 2: this time we were trying not to put this lightly

653
00:40:11,680 --> 00:40:14,960
Speaker 2: but also not make it so gruesome as Ben was,

654
00:40:15,200 --> 00:40:17,239
Speaker 2: you know, kind of alluding to the torture that was

655
00:40:17,280 --> 00:40:21,879
Speaker 2: happening there. These folks once they get uncovered or at least

656
00:40:21,880 --> 00:40:25,719
Speaker 2: one person is suspected, Right, we're talking actual torture, and

657
00:40:25,760 --> 00:40:27,840
Speaker 2: then we're talking about other people who are going to

658
00:40:27,920 --> 00:40:32,200
Speaker 2: be subjected to that and or imprisoned and or just executed,

659
00:40:32,400 --> 00:40:34,160
Speaker 2: which is exactly what happened.

660
00:40:34,320 --> 00:40:34,799
Speaker 3: All right.

661
00:40:35,040 --> 00:40:37,360
Speaker 4: Yeah, And to give a little bit of context for

662
00:40:37,400 --> 00:40:42,840
Speaker 4: anybody unfamiliar, Hezbela is multiple things. It is a legitimate

663
00:40:42,920 --> 00:40:47,600
Speaker 4: political party in Lebanon. However, it is also a proxy

664
00:40:47,680 --> 00:40:53,320
Speaker 4: military arm of the Iradian government. So in these sorts

665
00:40:53,360 --> 00:40:58,560
Speaker 4: of functions, in intelligence functions, his Blah is Iran, There's

666
00:40:58,800 --> 00:41:02,640
Speaker 4: no way around it. Like the Wagner group is Russia,

667
00:41:03,000 --> 00:41:05,760
Speaker 4: you know what I mean? And beat me or Dylan

668
00:41:06,200 --> 00:41:10,000
Speaker 4: the whatever legalistic shit they're going to say at the

669
00:41:10,000 --> 00:41:15,240
Speaker 4: Hague that is just true. That's how legalism goes, and

670
00:41:15,680 --> 00:41:22,920
Speaker 4: Matt's absolutely correct. Ron YESLBLA did share this information, this

671
00:41:23,120 --> 00:41:29,560
Speaker 4: uncovering of the network with colleagues abroad, particularly China. This

672
00:41:29,719 --> 00:41:34,000
Speaker 4: led to the deaths of people in China or in

673
00:41:34,080 --> 00:41:39,360
Speaker 4: Chinese controlled vassal states, especially through the bloody year of

674
00:41:39,400 --> 00:41:44,160
Speaker 4: twenty eleven and twenty twelve. Also on a human note,

675
00:41:44,160 --> 00:41:47,320
Speaker 4: it is important to emphasize that some of the people

676
00:41:47,560 --> 00:41:52,239
Speaker 4: killed here were not aware that they were working for

677
00:41:52,280 --> 00:41:57,080
Speaker 4: the CIA. That is another part of the hidden hands. Yeah,

678
00:41:57,280 --> 00:42:00,520
Speaker 4: talk about subcontractors, right, sub sub subcontract.

679
00:42:00,000 --> 00:42:02,560
Speaker 2: Oh yes, just get some info and that put it

680
00:42:02,600 --> 00:42:06,800
Speaker 2: into this website. Don't ask any questions. It is crazy

681
00:42:06,800 --> 00:42:09,440
Speaker 2: to think that it was so in two thousand and

682
00:42:09,520 --> 00:42:13,560
Speaker 2: nine is when people started figuring it out, and as

683
00:42:13,600 --> 00:42:17,279
Speaker 2: we look at some of the later reporting, one of

684
00:42:17,320 --> 00:42:23,399
Speaker 2: the things you'll read is that this specific technique of tradecraft,

685
00:42:23,560 --> 00:42:28,480
Speaker 2: using a website for these surreptitious communications was meant to

686
00:42:28,560 --> 00:42:33,319
Speaker 2: go against lower level actors, not state actors, who are

687
00:42:33,400 --> 00:42:36,200
Speaker 2: going to have a lot more money and manpower and

688
00:42:36,320 --> 00:42:40,600
Speaker 2: expertise to throw at things like trying to figure out

689
00:42:40,600 --> 00:42:44,799
Speaker 2: the methods and means of communication. Right, So when using

690
00:42:44,880 --> 00:42:49,440
Speaker 2: these websites in this somewhat simplistic manner of secret communication

691
00:42:49,800 --> 00:42:53,120
Speaker 2: went up against Hesbola and then went up against China

692
00:42:53,360 --> 00:42:57,120
Speaker 2: and their state forces, it was just it was inevitable

693
00:42:57,480 --> 00:42:59,879
Speaker 2: that everybody was going to get caught up in this.

694
00:43:00,560 --> 00:43:03,680
Speaker 2: And there's a sentiment that maybe from the top down

695
00:43:03,760 --> 00:43:07,000
Speaker 2: within the CIA, it was kind of said, hey, this

696
00:43:07,120 --> 00:43:09,680
Speaker 2: is working for us. Let it's not broken yet, so

697
00:43:09,800 --> 00:43:12,840
Speaker 2: let's not fix it for at least a good year there,

698
00:43:13,400 --> 00:43:16,160
Speaker 2: until there was a realization, oh, we're actually losing assets,

699
00:43:16,160 --> 00:43:17,160
Speaker 2: we're losing sources.

700
00:43:18,000 --> 00:43:21,200
Speaker 4: They were asleep at the switch, Matt. The one of

701
00:43:21,239 --> 00:43:26,000
Speaker 4: the biggest screw ups here was that these dummy websites,

702
00:43:26,640 --> 00:43:31,080
Speaker 4: many of them in the network, had sequential IP addresses,

703
00:43:31,520 --> 00:43:36,680
Speaker 4: which is such an elementary day one thing to not

704
00:43:37,000 --> 00:43:37,560
Speaker 4: mess up.

705
00:43:37,840 --> 00:43:40,000
Speaker 5: Yeah, that reminds you of like whenever you have like

706
00:43:40,000 --> 00:43:42,160
Speaker 5: like a ransom or something, is that we needed in

707
00:43:42,280 --> 00:43:46,320
Speaker 5: non sequential bills, right, because having the sequential bills shows

708
00:43:46,360 --> 00:43:48,480
Speaker 5: that they're like it's a tell, right that they're like

709
00:43:48,719 --> 00:43:50,160
Speaker 5: being tracked or that they're.

710
00:43:50,000 --> 00:43:51,759
Speaker 2: Part of the same thing one hundred part.

711
00:43:52,080 --> 00:43:56,920
Speaker 4: Yeah, it shows an association. You want things disassociated. If

712
00:43:56,960 --> 00:44:00,279
Speaker 4: you see a sequential IP address, you just have to

713
00:44:00,320 --> 00:44:05,800
Speaker 4: know MySpace level HTML to start to start tracing those.

714
00:44:06,080 --> 00:44:09,319
Speaker 4: And that means that once you find one site, you

715
00:44:09,400 --> 00:44:13,760
Speaker 4: can easily target the next. So things were super bad.

716
00:44:14,600 --> 00:44:18,640
Speaker 4: The agency worked around the clock to mitigate this disaster

717
00:44:18,920 --> 00:44:22,560
Speaker 4: after they figured out this ship had sank. Initially, the

718
00:44:22,680 --> 00:44:27,160
Speaker 4: idea at Langley was well, part of it is compromised, right,

719
00:44:27,560 --> 00:44:30,319
Speaker 4: you lose one limb. That doesn't mean you need to

720
00:44:30,360 --> 00:44:35,360
Speaker 4: sacrifice the body entire. But as we see, when a

721
00:44:35,400 --> 00:44:38,520
Speaker 4: ship starts sinking, it sinks quickly. This might seem like

722
00:44:38,560 --> 00:44:40,920
Speaker 4: old beans, right, because we're more than a decade and

723
00:44:40,920 --> 00:44:44,640
Speaker 4: a half past the time these particular sites were actively used.

724
00:44:45,239 --> 00:44:48,920
Speaker 4: These particular sites, it's.

725
00:44:48,800 --> 00:44:51,240
Speaker 2: Very true, guys. I'm just seeing in this twenty eleven

726
00:44:51,480 --> 00:44:55,000
Speaker 2: Reuter's article. I'm going to read this from the article,

727
00:44:55,719 --> 00:44:58,520
Speaker 2: it says in May. I guess that's talking about twenty

728
00:44:58,520 --> 00:45:02,160
Speaker 2: eleven yere In may. Ron's intelligence minister said that more

729
00:45:02,200 --> 00:45:04,960
Speaker 2: than two dozen spies for the US and Israel had

730
00:45:04,960 --> 00:45:09,959
Speaker 2: been uncovered. ABC News reported that Iranian TV had broadcast

731
00:45:10,080 --> 00:45:14,360
Speaker 2: what the US network described as quote accurate video of

732
00:45:14,440 --> 00:45:19,560
Speaker 2: websites used by the CIA, which means they did distribute

733
00:45:19,600 --> 00:45:23,440
Speaker 2: that information internally, at least once it was known that

734
00:45:23,480 --> 00:45:29,880
Speaker 2: those websites were being used, the Iranian TV broadcasted to everybody.

735
00:45:29,960 --> 00:45:33,759
Speaker 2: So then everybody operating knew and had that information. And

736
00:45:34,360 --> 00:45:37,200
Speaker 2: I wonder if possibly that's why it was so disastrous.

737
00:45:38,080 --> 00:45:44,000
Speaker 4: M Yeah, and before our friends in Tehran put that

738
00:45:44,080 --> 00:45:47,960
Speaker 4: out on state sponsored television, they did contact Russia and

739
00:45:48,080 --> 00:45:55,280
Speaker 4: China unasprovable. Interesting, it's it's what a rational actor would.

740
00:45:55,080 --> 00:45:59,920
Speaker 2: Do, and theoretically there that's to warn allies first, let

741
00:46:00,160 --> 00:46:02,799
Speaker 2: them take whatever action they need to take, and then

742
00:46:04,200 --> 00:46:05,800
Speaker 2: let the information out publicly.

743
00:46:07,760 --> 00:46:07,960
Speaker 3: Right.

744
00:46:08,200 --> 00:46:12,040
Speaker 4: Yeah, we'll talk about this maybe in a listener mail

745
00:46:12,120 --> 00:46:16,600
Speaker 4: conversation later on the idea of the Overton window, right,

746
00:46:16,719 --> 00:46:21,839
Speaker 4: controlling what is considered plausible conversation. Look, even though this

747
00:46:21,960 --> 00:46:24,960
Speaker 4: is a real conspiracy, it's a real screw up. It's

748
00:46:25,000 --> 00:46:27,960
Speaker 4: actually competing conspiracies and they are all proven.

749
00:46:28,000 --> 00:46:30,360
Speaker 3: They are not theories. Even though this is.

750
00:46:30,360 --> 00:46:34,680
Speaker 4: All true, it is valid to ask, well, guys, is

751
00:46:34,719 --> 00:46:39,080
Speaker 4: twenty twenty five, right, Ben, Matt, No, tennessee, why are

752
00:46:39,080 --> 00:46:40,279
Speaker 4: we still talking about this?

753
00:46:40,480 --> 00:46:41,480
Speaker 3: Here's what you need to know.

754
00:46:42,000 --> 00:46:46,160
Speaker 4: This is a parable that will be taught in Langley

755
00:46:46,440 --> 00:46:51,960
Speaker 4: for generations to come. Experts like cybersecurity researcher Zach Edwards

756
00:46:52,520 --> 00:46:56,080
Speaker 4: note new information is still dripping out year after year,

757
00:46:56,440 --> 00:46:59,319
Speaker 4: and he said the whole episode is a reminder that

758
00:46:59,480 --> 00:47:03,680
Speaker 4: developers make mistakes, no kidding, man, no better in the

759
00:47:03,680 --> 00:47:07,520
Speaker 4: bag there, and sometimes it takes years for someone else

760
00:47:07,600 --> 00:47:10,760
Speaker 4: to find those mistakes. But this is not your average

761
00:47:10,800 --> 00:47:15,080
Speaker 4: developer mistake type of scenario. And I'd love for us

762
00:47:15,160 --> 00:47:20,160
Speaker 4: to play a little game online right now, folks, if

763
00:47:20,200 --> 00:47:23,719
Speaker 4: you can, if you're not driving, if you're in a

764
00:47:23,760 --> 00:47:28,120
Speaker 4: place where you can just click over to a different

765
00:47:28,160 --> 00:47:30,880
Speaker 4: tab or a different thing on your phone, go to

766
00:47:31,520 --> 00:47:39,040
Speaker 4: Star warsweb dot net right now. The link will redirect you.

767
00:47:40,200 --> 00:47:42,440
Speaker 4: Do we want to say where the link redirects you.

768
00:47:43,719 --> 00:47:46,360
Speaker 2: Let's see, I'm on an about page here. It says

769
00:47:46,400 --> 00:47:49,480
Speaker 2: we are the nation's first line of defense. We accomplish

770
00:47:49,520 --> 00:47:53,080
Speaker 2: what others cannot accomplish, and go where others cannot go.

771
00:47:53,680 --> 00:47:59,760
Speaker 4: Davidbusters dot com also known as ww dot CIA dot gov.

772
00:48:01,200 --> 00:48:04,480
Speaker 4: They just cauterized the wound on that one. The jig,

773
00:48:04,680 --> 00:48:08,080
Speaker 4: at least this version is of it is up now.

774
00:48:08,120 --> 00:48:11,200
Speaker 4: If you go through the wayback machine and you look

775
00:48:11,239 --> 00:48:15,160
Speaker 4: at earlier shots of Star Wars web dot net. You

776
00:48:15,280 --> 00:48:20,080
Speaker 4: will see the intentionally not great website we talked about

777
00:48:20,120 --> 00:48:23,680
Speaker 4: at the top of the show. But now, as with

778
00:48:23,800 --> 00:48:26,479
Speaker 4: several of those other gaming websites, if you click through

779
00:48:26,520 --> 00:48:29,960
Speaker 4: on them, since it's public knowledge, it takes you to

780
00:48:30,000 --> 00:48:38,840
Speaker 4: the about page of the CIA. Oh wow, look at that.

781
00:48:38,800 --> 00:48:41,800
Speaker 2: That makes you feel. If this makes you feel a

782
00:48:41,840 --> 00:48:43,960
Speaker 2: certain type of way, we found another website for you.

783
00:48:44,520 --> 00:48:47,799
Speaker 2: The title is Scream into the Void dot com.

784
00:48:48,200 --> 00:48:52,000
Speaker 3: Yeah, and we do on daily. You can also write

785
00:48:52,000 --> 00:48:52,319
Speaker 3: to us.

786
00:48:52,440 --> 00:48:54,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, well yeah, you can write to the Void. So

787
00:48:54,520 --> 00:48:57,760
Speaker 2: you just type, you literally type your feelings into the void.

788
00:48:58,000 --> 00:48:58,399
Speaker 1: Just ti.

789
00:49:00,040 --> 00:49:03,600
Speaker 2: A and then click scream.

790
00:49:03,760 --> 00:49:08,160
Speaker 4: There's no denying that all intelligence agencies worth their spook

791
00:49:08,200 --> 00:49:11,200
Speaker 4: and salt are going to do stuff like this and

792
00:49:11,280 --> 00:49:16,280
Speaker 4: still deploy assets and conduct operations abroad. Shout out to Venezuela.

793
00:49:16,400 --> 00:49:20,440
Speaker 4: If anything, we could argue. The discovery of this conspiracy

794
00:49:20,560 --> 00:49:24,439
Speaker 4: just raises more questions. One of the big ones that

795
00:49:24,640 --> 00:49:28,360
Speaker 4: the mainstream is not really talking about is this was

796
00:49:28,400 --> 00:49:33,680
Speaker 4: the CIA recklessly endangering its own assets, its own people,

797
00:49:33,840 --> 00:49:36,960
Speaker 4: even the folks who didn't maybe know they were working

798
00:49:37,239 --> 00:49:39,000
Speaker 4: with the agency or with the shop.

799
00:49:39,160 --> 00:49:41,960
Speaker 5: I mean just because of the sloppy you know, the

800
00:49:41,960 --> 00:49:44,040
Speaker 5: stuff with the IP and just then in fact, they

801
00:49:44,040 --> 00:49:46,680
Speaker 5: didn't do a particularly good job disguising.

802
00:49:47,040 --> 00:49:49,680
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly that Nolan Lake Matt was saying

803
00:49:49,680 --> 00:49:53,160
Speaker 4: the fact that when they realized the compromise had occurred,

804
00:49:53,200 --> 00:49:58,759
Speaker 4: they still didn't they didn't immediately acfiltrate everybody associated. They

805
00:49:58,800 --> 00:50:00,480
Speaker 4: wanted to keep playing the game.

806
00:50:00,440 --> 00:50:00,960
Speaker 3: Just somebody.

807
00:50:02,719 --> 00:50:07,200
Speaker 4: Yeah, mistakes were made. Another thing, right that we say.

808
00:50:07,760 --> 00:50:13,200
Speaker 2: There's a twenty seventeen BBC article that is referencing a

809
00:50:13,200 --> 00:50:16,160
Speaker 2: New York Times article. So you go down the rabbit

810
00:50:16,160 --> 00:50:17,600
Speaker 2: hole there so you can gain access to the New

811
00:50:17,680 --> 00:50:20,239
Speaker 2: York Times article. That's probably best, But otherwise you can

812
00:50:20,280 --> 00:50:23,120
Speaker 2: go to BBC and look up China crippled CIA by

813
00:50:23,200 --> 00:50:26,640
Speaker 2: killing US sources, says New York Times. And this goes

814
00:50:26,719 --> 00:50:29,399
Speaker 2: back to that exact time you were mentioning Ben, that

815
00:50:29,840 --> 00:50:34,200
Speaker 2: twenty ten to twenty twelve timeframe where dozens of assets

816
00:50:34,239 --> 00:50:38,160
Speaker 2: of some form or another, right, we were caught. And

817
00:50:38,719 --> 00:50:41,800
Speaker 2: it's that time when I guess Iran made those phone

818
00:50:41,840 --> 00:50:45,040
Speaker 2: calls or those communications you were mentioning and just let

819
00:50:45,120 --> 00:50:48,200
Speaker 2: China know what was going on? And then China it

820
00:50:48,280 --> 00:50:51,160
Speaker 2: says in twenty eleven informants began to just disappear.

821
00:50:51,800 --> 00:50:57,040
Speaker 4: Yep, and we don't. The public does not have an

822
00:50:57,040 --> 00:51:02,799
Speaker 4: official count. The issue here is another question, right, how

823
00:51:02,840 --> 00:51:07,120
Speaker 4: has the agency recovered from this fiasco which occurred in

824
00:51:07,200 --> 00:51:11,040
Speaker 4: step with other intelligence failures And we'll say it here

825
00:51:11,080 --> 00:51:14,440
Speaker 4: at the end, so we could avoid the emails failures

826
00:51:14,520 --> 00:51:20,000
Speaker 4: like high level US politicians allegedly disclosing classified intel to

827
00:51:20,200 --> 00:51:23,400
Speaker 4: foreign powers that they're buddy buddy with for some reason.

828
00:51:23,719 --> 00:51:27,080
Speaker 4: Side note for the record, not that we are experts,

829
00:51:27,360 --> 00:51:31,240
Speaker 4: You are not supposed to leave classified top secret docs

830
00:51:31,280 --> 00:51:34,680
Speaker 4: in your home bathroom. Just leave like a reader's digest,

831
00:51:35,080 --> 00:51:38,360
Speaker 4: or leave like a fun poop reed like depraved and

832
00:51:38,400 --> 00:51:39,960
Speaker 4: insulting English.

833
00:51:39,800 --> 00:51:44,920
Speaker 3: And don't have to leave the names of CIA in assets.

834
00:51:45,040 --> 00:51:46,959
Speaker 2: Yeah. Well, and if you are going to have those

835
00:51:46,960 --> 00:51:49,120
Speaker 2: things in a bathroom, at least do it in a

836
00:51:49,160 --> 00:51:54,400
Speaker 2: tasteful marble covered floor to ceiling, golden enshrined toilet.

837
00:51:54,520 --> 00:51:56,879
Speaker 5: Just had some golden accents goods.

838
00:51:56,960 --> 00:52:00,640
Speaker 2: Yeah, just real classic, something Lincoln would really really appreciate.

839
00:52:00,800 --> 00:52:02,680
Speaker 2: You know, I loved it.

840
00:52:02,960 --> 00:52:08,120
Speaker 4: Famous amateur wrestler and fan of Wall the Wall. Marble

841
00:52:08,280 --> 00:52:11,080
Speaker 4: also did a couple of other good things, famously at

842
00:52:11,080 --> 00:52:13,480
Speaker 4: a Bad Night at the Theater Abraham Lincoln.

843
00:52:13,520 --> 00:52:13,919
Speaker 3: It's true.

844
00:52:14,239 --> 00:52:17,080
Speaker 5: So before you come at us about you know, subtweeting,

845
00:52:17,640 --> 00:52:20,960
Speaker 5: we're just we are fond of architecture and we just

846
00:52:20,960 --> 00:52:23,440
Speaker 5: don't like tasting additions.

847
00:52:23,520 --> 00:52:26,800
Speaker 3: So we're coming from on this issue. Y'alli.

848
00:52:26,960 --> 00:52:30,239
Speaker 4: I find metal necessary. I'm on record, it bothers me

849
00:52:30,360 --> 00:52:30,840
Speaker 4: to touch it.

850
00:52:31,000 --> 00:52:32,839
Speaker 2: I'm just a fan of Michael Ja and I really

851
00:52:32,920 --> 00:52:35,800
Speaker 2: enjoyed a recent episode of SNL.

852
00:52:36,239 --> 00:52:38,840
Speaker 4: Did you hear the Apparently word on the street is

853
00:52:38,880 --> 00:52:42,239
Speaker 4: folks are telling me after he does weekend Update, he

854
00:52:42,280 --> 00:52:42,839
Speaker 4: goes home.

855
00:52:43,840 --> 00:52:44,759
Speaker 2: No, he can't do that.

856
00:52:44,760 --> 00:52:47,040
Speaker 3: That's why he's not in the big Goodbye seed.

857
00:52:47,760 --> 00:52:50,120
Speaker 2: There's an after party and an after after party. I

858
00:52:50,480 --> 00:52:52,120
Speaker 2: know this. Are you required to go.

859
00:52:52,080 --> 00:52:56,120
Speaker 4: To the Age of the Blues over so it's way less,

860
00:52:56,640 --> 00:52:59,880
Speaker 4: way less cocaine, way fewer kailud mandatory party.

861
00:53:00,480 --> 00:53:03,319
Speaker 2: You know. My guy dis Newts is in there all right.

862
00:53:04,520 --> 00:53:07,400
Speaker 4: He's in there telling people they should drink pedialyte in

863
00:53:07,440 --> 00:53:12,279
Speaker 4: the morning and to go home and also congrats on

864
00:53:12,360 --> 00:53:13,200
Speaker 4: your recent marriage.

865
00:53:13,239 --> 00:53:13,560
Speaker 3: People.

866
00:53:13,800 --> 00:53:17,960
Speaker 4: So as global tensions rise in theaters the world round.

867
00:53:18,160 --> 00:53:22,520
Speaker 4: All these questions we posed are increasingly important their mission.

868
00:53:22,520 --> 00:53:26,560
Speaker 4: Critical trust in the United States, domestically abroad said an

869
00:53:26,560 --> 00:53:30,480
Speaker 4: all time low, which means whatever happens next might well

870
00:53:30,520 --> 00:53:34,840
Speaker 4: get hairy. And the weirdest thing is the game itself

871
00:53:34,920 --> 00:53:38,120
Speaker 4: is not over, because the best, most addictive part of

872
00:53:38,239 --> 00:53:41,360
Speaker 4: what we call the great game is that it never ends.

873
00:53:41,600 --> 00:53:44,880
Speaker 4: If anything, this is a teachable moment. If you really

874
00:53:45,080 --> 00:53:50,160
Speaker 4: do jokes aside, Internet jokes aside, if you really are

875
00:53:50,400 --> 00:53:53,479
Speaker 4: dealing with stuff they don't want you to know, then

876
00:53:53,600 --> 00:53:58,880
Speaker 4: take care to make sure enemies and not actually know

877
00:53:59,040 --> 00:54:01,720
Speaker 4: it lives all are on the line.

878
00:54:01,880 --> 00:54:04,560
Speaker 5: Do a better job the CIA. Come on, you have

879
00:54:04,640 --> 00:54:05,080
Speaker 5: one job.

880
00:54:05,480 --> 00:54:07,040
Speaker 3: Let's all do a better job.

881
00:54:08,560 --> 00:54:12,759
Speaker 4: We are also going to do a continuing job, hopefully

882
00:54:13,000 --> 00:54:15,759
Speaker 4: a good job. Responding to you. We want to hear

883
00:54:16,040 --> 00:54:19,120
Speaker 4: your thoughts, folks, whether or not you are in a circus,

884
00:54:19,440 --> 00:54:24,640
Speaker 4: a shop, a vacation abroad, whether this is news to you,

885
00:54:24,800 --> 00:54:29,400
Speaker 4: whether you are a white hat or black hat cyber punk,

886
00:54:30,360 --> 00:54:32,920
Speaker 4: we want your thoughts. You're the best part of the show.

887
00:54:33,360 --> 00:54:36,600
Speaker 4: We can't wait to hear what is on your mind.

888
00:54:36,719 --> 00:54:41,000
Speaker 4: After learning about this confluence very real conspiracies, you can

889
00:54:41,480 --> 00:54:44,920
Speaker 4: always write to the void. You can always call us

890
00:54:44,960 --> 00:54:47,560
Speaker 4: on the phone. You can always find us on ye

891
00:54:47,640 --> 00:54:48,719
Speaker 4: old internets.

892
00:54:49,880 --> 00:54:51,560
Speaker 3: Speaking of dealer's choice.

893
00:54:51,600 --> 00:54:52,920
Speaker 5: If you want to find us on the Internet, you

894
00:54:52,960 --> 00:54:56,640
Speaker 5: can do so by searching down the handle conspiracy Stuff

895
00:54:56,680 --> 00:54:58,879
Speaker 5: where we exist on Facebook with our Facebook group Here's

896
00:54:58,880 --> 00:55:01,200
Speaker 5: where it gets crazy, on x FKA, Twitter.

897
00:55:00,920 --> 00:55:01,839
Speaker 3: And on YouTube.

898
00:55:02,000 --> 00:55:04,520
Speaker 5: You can also find its Conspiracy Stuff show on Instagram

899
00:55:04,560 --> 00:55:05,640
Speaker 5: and TikTok in it.

900
00:55:05,760 --> 00:55:06,560
Speaker 3: I think there's more.

901
00:55:08,239 --> 00:55:10,480
Speaker 2: Yes, we have a phone number. It is one eight

902
00:55:10,680 --> 00:55:15,120
Speaker 2: three three st d w y t K. When you

903
00:55:15,160 --> 00:55:17,160
Speaker 2: call in, give yourself a cool nickname and let us

904
00:55:17,160 --> 00:55:18,759
Speaker 2: know if we can use your name and message on

905
00:55:18,880 --> 00:55:22,640
Speaker 2: the air. What's your favorite weird website and what are

906
00:55:22,719 --> 00:55:26,319
Speaker 2: what's the probability that it's currently being used by the

907
00:55:26,360 --> 00:55:28,520
Speaker 2: CIA or Massade or some other.

908
00:55:28,600 --> 00:55:31,400
Speaker 3: That my questions. That's the best question.

909
00:55:31,640 --> 00:55:34,400
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, is it the is it Christmas website?

910
00:55:35,040 --> 00:55:35,400
Speaker 3: Uh?

911
00:55:35,600 --> 00:55:38,160
Speaker 2: Three hundred and sixty four days out of the year.

912
00:55:38,920 --> 00:55:41,560
Speaker 5: The answer is the one you're always talking about.

913
00:55:41,640 --> 00:55:43,080
Speaker 2: That's a fun one. That's a great one.

914
00:55:43,120 --> 00:55:43,319
Speaker 3: One.

915
00:55:43,880 --> 00:55:46,000
Speaker 2: That's a great one. Is it zombo dot com? What

916
00:55:46,160 --> 00:55:48,400
Speaker 2: is it? Just send it to us let us know

917
00:55:48,560 --> 00:55:50,360
Speaker 2: If you don't want to send us a voicemail. We

918
00:55:50,400 --> 00:55:53,960
Speaker 2: have an amazing email system only monitored by us.

919
00:55:54,880 --> 00:55:57,319
Speaker 3: We are the entities the bed.

920
00:55:57,360 --> 00:56:00,880
Speaker 4: Each piece of correspondence we receive be well aware, yet unafraid.

921
00:56:01,000 --> 00:56:05,880
Speaker 4: Sometimes the void writes back zero one, Bravo, Delta Potatoes

922
00:56:06,200 --> 00:56:10,359
Speaker 4: conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com. This is conspiracy, actual.

923
00:56:29,160 --> 00:56:31,240
Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know. Is a production

924
00:56:31,320 --> 00:56:35,839
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

925
00:56:35,960 --> 00:56:39,280
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.