Speaker 1: You might have known boas Weinstein back in the day
Speaker 1: for taking on the JP Morgan London whale, And of
Speaker 1: course he's been known for many many years out of
Speaker 1: the credit world because of course he invests in very
Speaker 1: complicated credit assets. But more recently he's been known as
Speaker 1: an activist investor. You have been most recently after for
Speaker 1: a while targeting a series of clothes down funds, very
Speaker 1: let's say, aggressively going after Black Rock. There have been lawsuits,
Speaker 1: and of course proxy battles. Were actually in the center
Speaker 1: of a proxy battle right now with certain funds actually
Speaker 1: have already been voted on over the last couple of weeks.
Speaker 1: What we don't know and what is a very important thing.
Speaker 1: You've been very vocal on Twitter usually on how these
Speaker 1: battles are going. You've been pretty quiet. How have the
Speaker 1: meetings gone? Have you won anything?
Speaker 2: So it's always nice to aspire to break news.
Speaker 3: On at a conference like this, and it so happens
Speaker 3: that the fund that has gotten the most most of my.
Speaker 2: Attention, which is called big Z.
Speaker 3: BIGZ, just had the voting closed at eleven o'clock. So
Speaker 3: I can say preliminarily I didn't count the votes, but
Speaker 3: they've announced it that actually all the Sauba nominees there
Speaker 3: were seven got more votes than all of the Blackrock nominees,
Speaker 3: and four of our nominees got more than two times
Speaker 3: as many votes as black Rock, so more than two
Speaker 3: to one. And when you win an election by two
Speaker 3: to one, the voters have spoken. You know, we all
Speaker 3: know landslide is like sixty forty fifty eight to forty two.
Speaker 3: If more than two thirds voted one way, you know,
Speaker 3: Blackrock can no longer say and that they purport to
Speaker 3: speak for the shareholder and try to create some divisions.
Speaker 3: The shareholder is spoken, we won, and what we The
Speaker 3: reason that there's been litigation, it's been outward. It's us
Speaker 3: to them is because they have put in place election
Speaker 3: rules that would make Vladimir Putin blush.
Speaker 1: So let's step back, big step back. This is one
Speaker 1: fund you said you will voting for today, but they're
Speaker 1: ten funds. Ultimately, what is it that you want want
Speaker 1: out of this strategy? These are closed in funds, so
Speaker 1: you're locking up or Blackrock has locked up capital for
Speaker 1: a longer period of time forever right in many of
Speaker 1: these funds. So what is it that you're trying to
Speaker 1: accomplish by targeting them. I understand that you target them
Speaker 1: when they're trading below their net asset value. You want
Speaker 1: them to bring investors whole. But what's the endgame here?
Speaker 1: You won at one fund, what else do you want?
Speaker 2: Yeah?
Speaker 3: So ETFs, as we all know, can be sold in
Speaker 3: net acid value, or the market maker can redeem them
Speaker 3: for net asset value, and then the manager Blackrock will
Speaker 3: go instell the assets and give back net asset value.
Speaker 3: Closed in funds, you're trapped. Many of these funds have
Speaker 3: no maturity. They could be around for one hundred years,
Speaker 3: two hundred years, and so there are periods where the
Speaker 3: investors don't want them. And for some reason, there isn't
Speaker 3: a manager more than Blackrock that the investors don't want.
Speaker 3: It's something personal. I'm not looking to not be besties
Speaker 3: with Larry Fink. I'm not looking to be besties with
Speaker 3: Larry Fink.
Speaker 2: You know.
Speaker 3: I basically am just looking to make my investors money.
Speaker 3: And if the discounts are persons, and they're there year
Speaker 3: after year, and you can buy it a literal dollar
Speaker 3: for eighty five cents, you have the power, unlike in
Speaker 3: normal activism, to turn that back into a dollar, because
Speaker 3: if you change the fund structure to being an open
Speaker 3: fund like an ETF or a mutual fund, or the
Speaker 3: manager agrees to buy back shares a net asset value,
Speaker 3: just like Franklin Templeton did this month in three energy funds,
Speaker 3: the investor has a chance to go from eighty five
Speaker 3: to one hundred. And as you all know, that's not
Speaker 3: even just fifteen percent, because it's fifteen over eighty five.
Speaker 2: That's an eighteen percent return.
Speaker 3: Big Z today is at greater than a fifteen percent discount,
Speaker 3: and it's a fund that lit its investors' money on fire.
Speaker 3: Now I say that it sounds dramatic. The last three
Speaker 3: years we've been in more or lessible market, not for everything,
Speaker 3: but Big Z has lost more than fifty percent of
Speaker 3: its capital from the stock prices going down and from
Speaker 3: the discounts going up, and so it's lost billions of dollars.
Speaker 3: And here we have investors resoundingly saying we want change
Speaker 3: at the board level. But the part that many of
Speaker 3: you would be shocked to hear. Why I mentioned that
Speaker 3: quip about Putin is that they've decided to set election
Speaker 3: rules such that in order to replace their board, you
Speaker 3: have to actually get fifty percent of all the shares
Speaker 3: now in big z preliminarily they got about fifty one
Speaker 3: to vote, so we would have needed fifty out of
Speaker 3: fifty one. Okay, winning thirty five to fifteen wasn't good enough,
Speaker 3: and so that kind of math makes it literally impossible.
Speaker 3: But ironically it makes it impossible for them to put
Speaker 3: anyone else on the board because they would have to
Speaker 3: go through their own arcane rules. And so as a
Speaker 3: result to the black Rock nominees each sit on approximately
Speaker 3: seventy boards, seventy different boards. How can they do their
Speaker 3: job at seventy boards At JP Morgan, each nominee sits
Speaker 3: on one board. It's horrific governance from a firm that's
Speaker 3: an incredible firm that actually prides itself in raising money
Speaker 3: to invest in good governance.
Speaker 1: Now, I think importantly, as we've mentioned, this is one
Speaker 1: fund that you know the outcome far. Yes, it's a
Speaker 1: big fund for you to be investing in a large discount,
Speaker 1: But what about the rest of them? If you were
Speaker 1: to be on course to lose, how would you react? Right?
Speaker 1: Know anything about those votes?
Speaker 2: Right?
Speaker 3: So I can't announce what's going to happen for the
Speaker 3: other big funds. Big Z is something like a billion seven.
Speaker 3: It's really large, and that's also why this has captivated
Speaker 3: the media's attention and also individual investors. There's a lot
Speaker 3: of money at stake. Going to NAV just a few
Speaker 3: weeks ago was worth one point four billion dollars to
Speaker 3: mostly mom and pop investors and to our investors who.
Speaker 2: Include mom and pop.
Speaker 3: We manage money in these very strategies for three different
Speaker 3: state pensions millions of pensioneers. So the results are in
Speaker 3: limbo even if we win, because it depends what the
Speaker 3: judge says. We've taken them to court this year for
Speaker 3: this election, this election scheme, and last year we did
Speaker 3: it for a different election scheme, and we won in
Speaker 3: summary judgment against Blackrock against Neuveen, and I have a
Speaker 3: lot of respect for our former our panelist from the
Speaker 3: last session from New Veene, but it's Blackrock, to be fair,
Speaker 3: is not the only one, but they are by far
Speaker 3: the worst. And it's those legal victories that have helped
Speaker 3: us in order to get good results with other managers
Speaker 3: who don't want to be on the wrong side of
Speaker 3: the law.
Speaker 2: And so that's why this year.
Speaker 3: I was very proud that we won Institutional Investor Activist
Speaker 3: of the Year back to back years and no closed
Speaker 3: in fund activist has ever won it before, and we
Speaker 3: were voted the best activists according to Institutional You're.
Speaker 1: No longer just a closed end fund activist. You're also
Speaker 1: a close and fund manager, given that you've taken over
Speaker 1: some funds and those funds are actually not trading at
Speaker 1: asset value. So how then do you turn around and
Speaker 1: attack black Rock when your own funds are trading at
Speaker 1: a discount.
Speaker 3: So firstly, there's two measures. Let's say there's how they performed.
Speaker 3: How much money did investors make or lose? In not
Speaker 3: you mentioned there's a lot of Blackrock funds where we
Speaker 3: went after There are ten, nine of them the last
Speaker 3: three years have lost investors money. Nine out of ten.
Speaker 3: Think about the market we're in, where the SMP is,
Speaker 3: even where the Russell is. Nine out of ten are
Speaker 3: in the red our fund that we've been managing for
Speaker 3: two and a half years. That fund has actually made
Speaker 3: quite a bit of money, and in twenty twenty two,
Speaker 3: the first year we managed it, it was ranked number
Speaker 3: one out of two hundred and fifty seven funds. Who's
Speaker 3: in where the motive was income income based funds, and
Speaker 3: we were We came in first. So Blackrock can say, well,
Speaker 3: their fund trades at a discount too. But what they
Speaker 3: leave aside, this is the rub sonali, is that we
Speaker 3: when we took it over, said to the investors, if
Speaker 3: you want to get out at any V or close
Speaker 3: to any V, we will let you. We conducted a
Speaker 3: tender and then there was there were more people that
Speaker 3: wanted to get out, kind of like you know, looking
Speaker 3: at it from capturing that discount, and we did a
Speaker 3: second tender, so we let investors out of forty five percent.
Speaker 3: Forty five percent of the capital exited and we let
Speaker 3: them out of anyv Blackrock is not willing to do
Speaker 3: anything like that.
Speaker 1: One critique I've heard you make is the idea of
Speaker 1: lowering fees here to attract more investment. But for these funds,
Speaker 1: they tend to run at higher fees in the ETF structure.
Speaker 1: Would you consider lowering fees for your own funds?
Speaker 2: Right?
Speaker 3: So, our fund that we took over in January, the
Speaker 3: tickers SABA, is one of the lowest fee funds in
Speaker 3: the marketplace. It only charges seventy five basis points. The
Speaker 3: other funds is more normal. It charges around right around
Speaker 3: one percent, but it's also you get what you pay for,
Speaker 3: you know. I think most investors appreciate that if the
Speaker 3: fund is going to do interesting things. You mentioned Preditor
Speaker 3: of Wizardry or whatever you said in the beginning, and
Speaker 3: we are doing really neat things in those funds. We're
Speaker 3: not just putting together a long portfolio and letting it sit.
Speaker 3: And so I think our fees are actually very modest.
Speaker 3: It's not for me to say, it's for the investors
Speaker 3: to say, when you look at.
Speaker 1: What you're getting now, I want to read you Blackrock statement,
Speaker 1: because of course they have fought back. They have not
Speaker 1: let you jes attize their funds. They said that Blackrock
Speaker 1: and the funds boards remained focused on delivering value for
Speaker 1: all shareholders through concrete actions such as increased distributions and
Speaker 1: discount management programs. SABA is an activist hedge fund looking
Speaker 1: to arbitrage funds to capture quick profits. This attack is
Speaker 1: not about government's performance or discounts. It is about executing
Speaker 1: saba's well known playbook buying can, rolling positions, and forcing
Speaker 1: short term changes that harm retail investors to benefit SABA
Speaker 1: and at touch fund investors. What is your response to
Speaker 1: that and what what do you do after these campaigns?
Speaker 3: Yeah, you know, when I sit here and think, throw
Speaker 3: your best at me, Shali, Like they send you a question,
Speaker 3: just please, like give me your toughest question. There's no,
Speaker 3: there's no, we're not We're not. I'm not here to
Speaker 3: be to be, we don't have some friendly arrangement. Ask
Speaker 3: me anything you want. I fear none of their questions
Speaker 3: because they're so absurd. Okay, when they say that we're
Speaker 3: using some purported playbook to help investors in the short term,
Speaker 3: where is the long term pain of making investors money?
Speaker 3: Usually when you say you have a short term motive,
Speaker 3: there's a long term consequence having the funds, have investors
Speaker 3: have a chance to get out.
Speaker 2: At full value. Where is where is the negative in that?
Speaker 3: And I'm not going to use my words, Okay, I
Speaker 3: assess which is independent?
Speaker 2: Okay?
Speaker 3: Which stands to tell the small investor how they should
Speaker 3: view this kind of rough contest that you know that
Speaker 3: that we're having. Here's what ISS said about this year. Okay,
Speaker 3: the board is deeply entrenched. A direct intervention remains necessary.
Speaker 3: It is rare to witness a board so brazenly flout
Speaker 3: the most basic of shareholder rights in furtherance of their
Speaker 3: own enrichment.
Speaker 2: I'll read one more.
Speaker 3: The board actions are so grave that they would warrant
Speaker 3: adverse vote for incumbents in an uncontested election. What Isss
Speaker 3: said is that even if we didn't run against Blackrock,
Speaker 3: they would have recommended against their nominees. That is literally
Speaker 3: how bad it is. And I want to just say,
Speaker 3: BlackRock's an amazing firm. They managed ten and a half
Speaker 3: trillion dollars by last account. This might be big to us,
Speaker 3: This might be very big to our investors. This is tiny,
Speaker 3: small potatoes, and it will someday be a case study
Speaker 3: at HBS of a strategy failure that for five billion
Speaker 3: dollars of action of buying back funds at a discount,
Speaker 3: including their own employees who would get to make that money,
Speaker 3: including their shareholders, that they would say, look, we actually
Speaker 3: care about you. We're going to treat you the way
Speaker 3: other managers are treating their shareholders.
Speaker 2: They wouldn't have this problem on their hands.
Speaker 3: They have amazing but for closed end funds, they basically
Speaker 3: have taken the position no one is going to tell
Speaker 3: us what to do, and we're willing to do whatever
Speaker 3: it takes to squash share the rights of the shareholder,
Speaker 3: which is enshrined in the forty Act. The forty Act
Speaker 3: is there, the nineteen forty Act, the Investment Company Act
Speaker 3: is there to protect small investors. They don't need the
Speaker 3: same protections in ETFs because you can vote with your feet,
Speaker 3: you can redeem a mutual fund, you can sell an
Speaker 3: ETF at a ne EV. But they are violating the
Speaker 3: Investment Company Act. Don't trust my words. A judge said
Speaker 3: it last year and we won our case.
Speaker 1: What is your endgame here, because in addition to yes,
Speaker 1: they did support you on the director push, but they
Speaker 1: did not support you iss that is to terminate black
Speaker 1: Rock as the investment advisor. Is your ultimate end game
Speaker 1: to take over these funds.
Speaker 3: So we've been in this is not my first rodeo.
Speaker 3: We've been in about I don't know eighty campaigns, and
Speaker 3: across eighty campaigns, only two times did the end result
Speaker 3: come that we took it over. In the first case,
Speaker 3: actually the manager resigned. They said we'll stay on as
Speaker 3: manager until you can find a new manager. So we
Speaker 3: don't come into it with that goal. We come into
Speaker 3: it with the goal of making our investors' money, and
Speaker 3: it turns out all shareholders get to make the same
Speaker 3: amount of money. They don't have to pay the legal
Speaker 3: fees that we're paying. And by the way, Blackrock has
Speaker 3: sent tons of mailers. You saw the chiron and you
Speaker 3: saw the graphic SABA is trying to destroy your fund.
Speaker 3: That mailer went out four or five times. Robo calls
Speaker 3: on and on. I actually receive them because I'm a
Speaker 3: personal shareholder. I receive these these robo calls and these mailers.
Speaker 3: And what's amazing in the case of Big Z is
Speaker 3: the only one I can talk about. They only got
Speaker 3: one out of seven shareholders to.
Speaker 2: Vote for them.
Speaker 3: I mean, it's just it's just incredible. That's despite the
Speaker 3: So what is my end goal? My end goal is
Speaker 3: to turn these funds back to an ev and make
Speaker 3: everyone a billion three not because I'm some sort of
Speaker 3: management McKinsey wizard, because NAV is a billion three away.
Speaker 1: Has this gotten personal?
Speaker 3: I mean I definitely, you know, I definitely a feeling
Speaker 3: it on the stage right, But no, it's really you
Speaker 3: know what it is. I have a pet, my pet, Peeve,
Speaker 3: is this is going to sound a little corny. Is injustice? Okay,
Speaker 3: it's everyone has their own. It's it's abusive. And and
Speaker 3: so I just, having been doing this, having been in
Speaker 3: eighty campaigns before, I just haven't seen it. We actually
Speaker 3: decided this past year and year two of this craziness
Speaker 3: to launch a fund dedicated to the closed in funds
Speaker 3: of a single manager. Okay, we didn't say we're going
Speaker 3: to pick black Rock. We looked at the attributes. What
Speaker 3: are the funds that are at the biggest discounts, What
Speaker 3: are the funds that have the worst governance? I should
Speaker 3: say those two funds you mentioned that we run, we
Speaker 3: put in place the best governance.
Speaker 2: ISS agrees.
Speaker 3: We put in place governance where you count the number
Speaker 3: of votes, not the number of whatever that you know.
Speaker 3: I don't even know how to describe the You know
Speaker 3: that you need half of all the shares to be
Speaker 3: voted in your favor, even if half don't even show up.
Speaker 3: So all of those things annual elections instead of staggered elections.
Speaker 3: It is it is only personal in the sense that
Speaker 3: it is it to me violates. We're so lucky in
Speaker 3: this business. The amount of money that managers management firms
Speaker 3: make they have ten and a half trillion dollars to
Speaker 3: do this because they want.
Speaker 2: To trap capital.
Speaker 3: They're basically blinded by this being long term capital that
Speaker 3: cannot be redeemed and they want to hold on to it.
Speaker 3: And so it to me, it's it's like a very
Speaker 3: noble fight. And we've received you can just look on Twitter,
Speaker 3: hundreds and hundreds of positive comments and basically not one
Speaker 3: negative comment. So I do enjoy the retail coming along
Speaker 3: for the ride.
Speaker 2: Yes, in that sense, it's personal.
Speaker 1: So also to be clear, this is an investment strategy.
Speaker 1: This is a strategy that is meant to return money
Speaker 1: to shareholders. It's not just on concept. How profitable is
Speaker 1: it and how big of a strategy has it become.
Speaker 1: Has SABA really pivoted from becoming a tail fund to
Speaker 1: an activist fund?
Speaker 3: Well, give me a tail event and I'll be I'll
Speaker 3: be a tail fund manager again. But we've had what
Speaker 3: have we had like forty straight days of the S
Speaker 3: and P not going down even three quarters of a percent?
Speaker 3: I am it is a It is a big business
Speaker 3: for us. We own six billion of closed end funds,
Speaker 3: a full third of them or just this single manager
Speaker 3: black Rock and and many of them we think have
Speaker 3: good governance, they just are at discounts. We don't have
Speaker 3: a governance issue. So it's it's it is quite a
Speaker 3: big business for us, and I can't really on this
Speaker 3: stage speak to the returns. But we have an ETF,
Speaker 3: for example, the ticker is CEFS. It's been around for
Speaker 3: more than seven years, and people can plug in how
Speaker 3: that did versus the three other ETFs that own closed
Speaker 3: in funds. It's done, It's done very well.
Speaker 1: How well?
Speaker 2: All right?
Speaker 3: Well, if someone were to plug it into Bloomberg and
Speaker 3: they put CFS and then they put the invesco version
Speaker 3: or the first trust version, I think for the last
Speaker 3: three years, and it's held a lot of it, it's
Speaker 3: been in fixed income, which is you know, had a
Speaker 3: tough time. Those other funds have made between zero and
Speaker 3: two percent and we've made ten percent.
Speaker 1: So let's broaden out here again, because you know, people
Speaker 1: have looked at you for credit markets for a long time.
Speaker 1: When we talk about the closed un funds strategy, there's
Speaker 1: a deeper question. It's not really just about closed on funds.
Speaker 1: There's a whole push by the private acset industry to
Speaker 1: push into retail, to push into interval funds to find
Speaker 1: new strategies to bring money in. Are all of those
Speaker 1: funds vulnerable to activists?
Speaker 3: So by the laws of depending on the structure, some are,
Speaker 3: some are not. You know, in the interval fund you
Speaker 3: generally you only have the right to redeem five percent,
Speaker 3: so you're getting five percent back per quarter, but you can't.
Speaker 3: They also invest generally in deeply liquid assets, so you
Speaker 3: couldn't just sell Microsoft or IBM and raise the cash.
Speaker 3: So it is interesting for me as having been in
Speaker 3: credit at the forefront of all the innovation that came
Speaker 3: after nineteen ninety eight, with with credit derivatives and synthetic
Speaker 3: securitization and all of this sort of stuff. And back
Speaker 3: then retail investors were redeemed.
Speaker 2: Unsuitable to own these things.
Speaker 3: You couldn't own high yields really if you were not
Speaker 3: a qualified investor. And now whether it's Colo tranches, you know,
Speaker 3: alphabet soup, and so this has been an amazing boom
Speaker 3: for the largest asset managers, the amazing managers like in
Speaker 3: Aries or Apollo that can bring these products their reputations
Speaker 3: and good governance, I should say, because we also see
Speaker 3: a lot of good governance JP Morgan has great governance
Speaker 3: on their closed in funds.
Speaker 2: And we see that. You know, there is huge investor demand.
Speaker 3: The private credit space was a cottage industry a decade
Speaker 3: ago at less than a quarter trillion dollars. Now it's
Speaker 3: one and a half trillion, and it's growing like gangbusters.
Speaker 3: So this kind of liquid credit investing that you're referring
Speaker 3: to allows the manager to lock up for many years.
Speaker 3: It's great for their stock price, it may be great
Speaker 3: for their investors, but you know, we are in a
Speaker 3: little bit of a zero sum world. Like if making
Speaker 3: loans that are secured that are safe, that of you know,
Speaker 3: a lot of acid coverage at twelve percent or thirteen
Speaker 3: percent is great for areas, it probably ain't great for
Speaker 3: the for the borrower, especially in this higher for longer world.
Speaker 3: So just to close on that, just to say, I
Speaker 3: think people just even three months ago, we're really expecting
Speaker 3: rates to come down and that thirteen to go to
Speaker 3: twelve eleven ten and really alleviate that pressure. But I
Speaker 3: think higher for longer we're headed for some sort of
Speaker 3: collision course between If we have that in conjunction with
Speaker 3: an economic slowdown, we are going.
Speaker 2: To have a default cycle.
Speaker 3: We are going to see which firms were good at
Speaker 3: private credit and which we're not, because private credit has
Speaker 3: been touted as this like amazing thing, almost like NFTs
Speaker 3: or you know, chatch ept. I mean, what is private credit?
Speaker 3: You're you're making loans to smaller companies. I mean, how
Speaker 3: is that sexy? No, you know so, but it's very
Speaker 3: sexy for Aris and Apollo and and I look at
Speaker 3: it like this amazing force that will have hiccups in
Speaker 3: the years to come.
Speaker 1: Now, one more question before you before I let you go,
Speaker 1: is you know we have a major catalyst around the corner,
Speaker 1: that is the US presidential election. As a massive investor
Speaker 1: in credit and also as somebody who looks at volatility
Speaker 1: very closely, what are you thinking about headed into that
Speaker 1: election cycle and what comes out of it? How to position?
Speaker 3: Yeah, so you know, it's it's coming closer every day,
Speaker 3: and it warn't our attention. And we'll also if there
Speaker 3: is a change in the presidency, you'll have a president
Speaker 3: that people consider as someone that will be less will
Speaker 3: be more unfettered, let's say, and maybe have scores to
Speaker 3: settle and have views about how to undo things. And
Speaker 3: so change generally means volatility. So it's really reflexive to think, Okay,
Speaker 3: if Trump is elected, there'll be a lot of volatility. Now,
Speaker 3: he also is very interested in the stock market going up,
Speaker 3: which you know usually think about in conjunction with lower volatility.
Speaker 3: So you know, so, but might might the ways he
Speaker 3: does that, whether it's a new Fed governor cause.
Speaker 2: Some short term short term gain for actual long term pain.
Speaker 3: Where interest rates and the front end come down but
Speaker 3: in the back end go up, and and you know
Speaker 3: certain firms are affected that way. As when I think
Speaker 3: through that Trump means volatility. I also the other side
Speaker 3: of me thinks back to twenty seventeen. We had Trump
Speaker 3: and we had Kim jongun and he was calling him
Speaker 3: rocket Man. He was kind of taunting him, and I
Speaker 3: remember during Rocketman, it wasn't an Elton John reference. Right
Speaker 3: at that moment, the Vics hit single digits. The VIX
Speaker 3: was the all time, it was at nine. I like,
Speaker 3: I was crying because I'm a long volatility matter. During
Speaker 3: the VICK is literally at nine, and so you know,
Speaker 3: the Trump presidency is, if it happens, is going to
Speaker 3: be in many ways unpredictable, So you think they'll be
Speaker 3: volatility but let's also remember there was also a lot
Speaker 3: of economic stability. Though maybe because we're in a zero
Speaker 3: percent interest rate world and now having seen the excess
Speaker 3: of that and the inflation, maybe we're not going to
Speaker 3: go back to that world, and they'll be volatility whether
Speaker 3: Trump is elected or Biden is reelected.
Speaker 1: Who's better for the bond market?
Speaker 2: Biden?
Speaker 3: Why he's well, because I think he's less motivated by
Speaker 3: the stock market and more motivated by what's good for America.
Speaker 3: On the subject of bonds, I'm not getting that political.
Speaker 2: Just bonds.
Speaker 1: We will leave it there, Boaz, thank you so much
Speaker 1: for taking all our questions. That as BoA's mind set
Speaker 1: of SABA Capital