Speaker 1: Cool Zone Media.
Speaker 2: Hello everyone, and welcome to It can Happen Here. My
Speaker 2: name is Dan al Kurd. I'm a writer, analyst, and
Speaker 2: researcher of Palestinian and Arab politics. I'm an associate professor
Speaker 2: of political science and a senior non resident Fellow at
Speaker 2: the Arab Center Washington. You may have heard me on
Speaker 2: It Could Happen Here before or behind the Bastards. I've
Speaker 2: been following cool Zone media projects for a while. I
Speaker 2: was happy when Robert and Sophie reached out and said, hey,
Speaker 2: come talk to our listeners on a more regular basis.
Speaker 1: Today.
Speaker 2: I want to talk to you about something that doesn't
Speaker 2: get almost any attention in Western media, internal Palestinian politics.
Speaker 2: Something I've argued for a while and continues to be
Speaker 2: the focus of my work is that Pasadian politics are
Speaker 2: important and the Passingian issue is important. I remember once
Speaker 2: being on stage for one of these DC events with
Speaker 2: none other than General Stanley McCrystal, and he turns to
Speaker 2: me and says, essentially, the Palstadian issue is an issue.
Speaker 1: Of the past.
Speaker 2: Other Arabs want to move on, and it took everything
Speaker 2: in me to not respond, what planet are you living on?
Speaker 2: A genocide has been unfolding for the past almost two years,
Speaker 2: and crackdown on pro pastine activists is in the American
Speaker 2: media every other day. Maybe now we recognize that this
Speaker 2: is an important issue to understand, Maybe one can hope,
Speaker 2: But you would not believe how many people in DC,
Speaker 2: in the American government, and by extension, lots of people
Speaker 2: in power, convinced themselves for years that the Pasadian issue
Speaker 2: and internal Pastadian politics were not worth addressing. For today's episode,
Speaker 2: I want to start to tackle a sort of big
Speaker 2: question of what is going on with Pastadian politics, and
Speaker 2: I'll give you the takeaways for this episode right away.
Speaker 2: Number One, the Palestinian people are totally unrepresented by their
Speaker 2: leadership right now. The Pasadian people haven't had a say
Speaker 2: in a very long time, and that's a big problem
Speaker 2: because if we want to resolve any part of this
Speaker 2: conflict sustainably, will need people to go along. And the
Speaker 2: conflict got to where it is now because international actors
Speaker 2: thought that they could ignore the Palestinian people. That's literally
Speaker 2: as simple as it gets. Number Two, no one internationally
Speaker 2: or state side seems to have learned this lesson. In
Speaker 2: the US, we've had bipartisan support for ignoring Palestinians and internationally,
Speaker 2: the response has been Okay, let's go back and try
Speaker 2: to do the same things we've always done, and maybe
Speaker 2: this time it'll work out for us. I'll explain more
Speaker 2: of what I mean as I go along.
Speaker 1: Stay with me.
Speaker 2: Let's start first with the present. What's on everyone's minds
Speaker 2: and screens, The war in Gaza, the genocide that's unfolding there.
Speaker 2: I use that term because it's been credibly identified as
Speaker 2: a genocide by scholars of genocide and holocaust studies such
Speaker 2: as ras Segal, Omer Bartov and Amos Goldberg.
Speaker 1: But I don't really care about this mantics here.
Speaker 2: Even if it was just mass violence and war crimes,
Speaker 2: that's still pretty bad too. But this genocide and this
Speaker 2: war has been relentless for over six hundred days now.
Speaker 2: So what's everyone's endgame here? When this latest iteration of
Speaker 2: violence started under the Biden registration, with Hamas's October seventh
Speaker 2: attack that killed twelve hundred people and took two hundred
Speaker 2: and fifty hostages, the president and his team took every
Speaker 2: step to support Israel in its war. As Krada del Guindhi,
Speaker 2: author and political analysts wrote for Foreign policy last year,
Speaker 2: Biden's embrace of Nittanne, who was rooted in the belief
Speaker 2: that only positive inducements and constant reassurances, both militarily and diplomatically,
Speaker 2: could restrain Israel's actions in Gaza.
Speaker 1: End quote, the.
Speaker 2: Israelis were pretty vocal and clear about what they thought
Speaker 2: they needed to do in Gaza. Their goals were to
Speaker 2: eliminate Hamas as a political actor entirely, and some vocal
Speaker 2: members of the Cabinet, such as Nance Minister Bisilosmotrich, as
Speaker 2: well as members of the Kanesset Israeli Parliament like nissiin Vaturi,
Speaker 2: the deputy Kanesset speaker, were talking straight up about annihilation
Speaker 2: and population transfer settlement in Gaza. Perhaps we all remember
Speaker 2: what happened here, but even as time went on, none
Speaker 2: of this was enough for the Biden administration to change
Speaker 2: course on the type of support it was extending for
Speaker 2: this war. But let's also remember that the Biden administration
Speaker 2: had little interest in the Israeli Palestinian conflict before the
Speaker 2: October seventh attack, or indeed any interest in the Middle East.
Speaker 2: The State Department under Biden had wound down its Middle
Speaker 2: East engagement. They didn't undo any of Trump's major policy
Speaker 2: changes visavi the Middle East during his first administration. In fact,
Speaker 2: they doubled down they agreed. For example, Trump during his
Speaker 2: first term officially recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital, even though
Speaker 2: this is contested and you and Resolution one four seven
Speaker 2: says it should be an international city, internationally administered so
Speaker 2: that studients could also have access and claim to it,
Speaker 2: but Trump says the US doesn't care accepts Israel's sovereignty
Speaker 2: over Jerusalem. Trump also during his first term tried to
Speaker 2: sideline the issue of Palistine entirely by engineering these quote
Speaker 2: unquote peace deals between AIRB governments and Israel. Now, most
Speaker 2: Arab governments have had the position since the Arab Peace
Speaker 2: Initiative of two thousand and two that they would not
Speaker 2: have diplomatic relations with Israel and not recognize it officially
Speaker 2: until the implementation of a two state solution, that palsienens
Speaker 2: would need to get some sort of state and only
Speaker 2: then would AIRB governments normalize relations with Israel. For a
Speaker 2: variety of reasons I can't get into here during this episode,
Speaker 2: but might be good to touch on in the future.
Speaker 2: Some of these Arab governments and the Trump administration decide
Speaker 2: to undo that precedent, sign these agreements with Israel, and
Speaker 2: basically make the claim that the Pasienen issue.
Speaker 1: Doesn't need to be solved. We can all move on.
Speaker 2: When the Biden administration comes in, they support this line
Speaker 2: of policy too. They seem to agree that the world
Speaker 2: can move on while the Palestinians experience worse and worse
Speaker 2: violence and have zero freedom of movement, and are born
Speaker 2: and die without any sort of political rights or autonomy.
Speaker 2: They thought that that status quo looked pretty sustainable. Two
Speaker 2: years into the Biden administration, my colleagues at the Arab
Speaker 2: Center wrote a report titled the Biden Administration and the
Speaker 2: Middle East in twenty twenty three, where they try to
Speaker 2: trace any shifts in his foreign policy towards the Middle East.
Speaker 1: There are six different analysts.
Speaker 2: They basically agree across a variety of issue areas, including Palestine,
Speaker 2: that the Biden administration is pursuing business as usual. Of course,
Speaker 2: we know now that this comes to an abrupt end
Speaker 2: with the October seventh attacks and the subsequent war and genocide.
Speaker 1: Then Trump wins in twenty twenty four. He's back and
Speaker 1: Trump and his.
Speaker 2: Team while they largely see the Middle East as a
Speaker 2: business opportunity. Like everything, It's a place for money making
Speaker 2: and grift. It's where katark can give the president a
Speaker 2: Boeing seven four to seven, and where the president's companies
Speaker 2: can build hotels. The uncertainty around war spilling over from Gaza,
Speaker 2: it's putting a damper on all of that. The Trump
Speaker 2: team has people on it like Mike Kuckabee, who doesn't
Speaker 2: even believe Palestinians exists as a people. He has repeatedly
Speaker 2: said that the occupied territories are not occupied, often uses
Speaker 2: their biblical names. Judan Samaria when he was one of
Speaker 2: the candidates running for president in two thousand and eight,
Speaker 2: he said that the Palestenian identity was quote a political
Speaker 2: tool to try and force land away from.
Speaker 1: Israel end quote. This is an argument on.
Speaker 2: The far right and some liberals too, who think that
Speaker 2: the Palsainian identity is not a national identity, but it's
Speaker 2: some sort of anti Semitic ideology. He has also since
Speaker 2: as the ambassador to Israel, currently talked about establishing a
Speaker 2: Palestinian state in another Muslim country. Despite these types of people,
Speaker 2: the Trump administration is weirdly more willing to take steps
Speaker 2: without Israel's approval to try and get a ceasefire in
Speaker 2: Gaza and resolve the war that's cramping everyone's hopes and
Speaker 2: dreams for a Gaza Rivera maybe complete with bearded belly dancers.
Speaker 2: And if you don't know what I'm talking about, I
Speaker 2: really envy you. So Trump's team, Steve Witkoff, US Special
Speaker 2: Envoy to the Middle East and Adam Bohler, US Hostage Envoy,
Speaker 2: actually have direct talks with Hamas the Trump team is
Speaker 2: talking deals with Saudi Arabia without trying to pressure them
Speaker 2: to make a deal with Israel anymore. Bohler says, the
Speaker 2: US isn't an agent of Israel. It has to have
Speaker 2: its own policy. Honestly, the Biden administration could never not.
Speaker 2: To be clear, the Trump administration is still talking about
Speaker 2: population transfer. They don't care about stopping Israel's worst excesses
Speaker 2: like targeting schools and aid organizations. They in fact go
Speaker 2: along with this idea of creating eight distribution points under
Speaker 2: an new organization they called the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which
Speaker 2: all the other aid groups are screaming warnings about. The
Speaker 2: United Nations Relief and Works Agency ONNERWA. Their Commissioner, General
Speaker 2: Felipe Lazzarini has described the distribution sites as quote a
Speaker 2: death trap with quote scores of injured and killed amongst
Speaker 2: starving civilians. Doctors Without Borders as an organization put out
Speaker 2: a statement affirming that this proposed AID organization is quote
Speaker 2: conditional en forced displacement and vetting of the population. So
Speaker 2: this humanitarian foundation is really just a way to politicize AID,
Speaker 2: and indeed the Israelis promptly use them to make arrests
Speaker 2: at AID sites and use them to sequester Palestinians into
Speaker 2: smaller katayd areas. You'd think in the Gaza strip that
Speaker 2: wouldn't even be possible, but they are finding a way.
Speaker 2: The first executive director of this foundation, Jake Woods, literally
Speaker 2: resigns in a matter of weeks because he can't do
Speaker 2: his work while respecting humanitarian lis. He said specifically, it
Speaker 2: was quote not possible to implement a new Israeli back
Speaker 2: to aid system in the enclave while remaining neutral and independent.
Speaker 2: So we're talking that bad. What's the endgame here for
Speaker 2: the Israelis? Like I said, it's been pretty clear they
Speaker 2: want population transfer for the US. We shall see to
Speaker 2: what extent the Trump administration will go along with that.
Speaker 2: For Arab leaders, for international powers outside the US, they're
Speaker 2: all scrambling to go back to a two state solution framework.
Speaker 2: They want a press reset on this war. Go back
Speaker 2: thirty years to nineteen ninety three when Israel in the
Speaker 2: past time the Liberation Organization signed the Hostile Peace Accords,
Speaker 2: and they want to restart these promised negotiations. The Saudi
Speaker 2: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Vesan Binfarhan bin Abdullah, has
Speaker 2: repeat heatedly emphasized the Saudi Kingdom's commitment to the two
Speaker 2: state solution, both at the Arab and Islamic Summit last
Speaker 2: year and in internal ministerial meetings. French President Emmanuel Macron
Speaker 2: and Saudi Crown Prince Hammad bin Seman even recently co
Speaker 2: chaired what they called quote a high level international Conference
Speaker 2: for the Peaceful Settlement of the Palestinian Question and the
Speaker 2: implementation of the two State Solution.
Speaker 1: Quite a mouthful.
Speaker 2: This meeting is held at the UN, and Katari Prime
Speaker 2: Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Schehmhammad bin Androhman Arthani
Speaker 2: also expressed.
Speaker 1: Support for the conference and its mission.
Speaker 2: A lot of regional actors would love to put an
Speaker 2: end to all the war that's destabilizing Palestine, the region,
Speaker 2: and the domestic politics in many countries. And that would
Speaker 2: sound like a good idea if we didn't know how
Speaker 2: the first attempt at the two state solution ended up.
Speaker 1: Let's break this down more.
Speaker 2: What is the Tuesday solution that they are desperately trying
Speaker 2: to go back to, and what were the also Peace
Speaker 2: of Courts Piece Accords was a framework agreed upon by
Speaker 2: the Palestine Liberation Organization and the State of Israel to
Speaker 2: start the discussion about a two state solution. As part
Speaker 2: of that, it established the creation of a Palstinian Authority,
Speaker 2: a government that was supposed to start building up the
Speaker 2: parts of an eventual Palestinian state and occupied territories, Now
Speaker 2: where those lines eventually would be, what the word state
Speaker 2: actually meant for Palestinians, who would get to have sovereignty
Speaker 2: in Jerusalem, What would happen to refugees. All of this
Speaker 2: was put on the table for continued negotiations. But the
Speaker 2: ASCO Accords were significant and have shaped the modern Israeli
Speaker 2: Palestinian conflict because not only was it the first time
Speaker 2: Israelis and Palestinians were directly negotiating with American oversight and control,
Speaker 2: of course, but also because it creates this Palestinian authority apparatus.
Speaker 2: The biggest problem is the Ascil piece of coords didn't work.
Speaker 2: We don't have a Palestenian state today. Palstenians, in fact
Speaker 2: have become more repressed, more restricted in their political rights
Speaker 2: and freedom of movement, augmented physically and politically. After the
Speaker 2: ASCO courts, the ALSCOLL courts create a system of separating
Speaker 2: different parts of the occupied territories into Area A, B
Speaker 2: and C. Eventually, Gaza and the West Bank are no
Speaker 2: longer governed together and Palestinians in the occupied territories no
Speaker 2: longer can access Jerusalem or inside the Green Line in Israel.
Speaker 2: And all of these changes happen because of the Oslo Accords,
Speaker 2: not to mention, of course, the fact that the Palestinians
Speaker 2: continue to deal with the repression of the occupation as
Speaker 2: well as the Palestinian authority. The Prime Minister of Israel
Speaker 2: who signed the ASCO Accords, Yitzak Robin, literally said in
Speaker 2: his last speech to Israeli parliament, quote, we will give
Speaker 2: them something less than a state, and then after he's
Speaker 2: assassinated by a right wing Israeli we get successive Israeli
Speaker 2: governments that don't care about these negotiations at all, that
Speaker 2: continue to take more and more land in the occupied territories,
Speaker 2: build new Israeli settlements, and restrict Palestinian life. The Palestinian
Speaker 2: people have not had a real say in any of this,
Speaker 2: and the ASCOL Accords fundamentally shifted internal Palestinian politics in
Speaker 2: such a way that disempowered the Palestinian people even more.
Speaker 2: Keep this in mind, it's a very important point. Before
Speaker 2: the Also Accords, Palestinian politics was defined by the PLO,
Speaker 2: the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO is an umbrella organization
Speaker 2: with a number of political factions.
Speaker 1: It includes the diaspora.
Speaker 2: And includes Palstenians or refugee camps Pastinians as a people
Speaker 2: basically wherever they are.
Speaker 1: Of course, the Palestinians are killed.
Speaker 2: Wherever they are, of course, within the West Bank and
Speaker 2: the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem, and within the Pastinian communities
Speaker 2: in Israel, they're repressed in a variety of ways. So
Speaker 2: just to be clear that it wasn't great before the
Speaker 2: Also Accords by any means, and there are divisions within
Speaker 2: the PLO between the different factions. There are also divisions
Speaker 2: between those within the occupied territories and those in the
Speaker 2: PLO outside occupied territories. And then during the First Palestinian
Speaker 2: Uprising in the nineteen eighties, we also have the emergence
Speaker 2: of militant Islamus groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who
Speaker 2: are not part of the PLO and represent a sort
Speaker 2: of opposition to them. But the PLO is the internationally
Speaker 2: recognized representative of the Palestinian people. It's a national liberation
Speaker 2: movement by its own definition. It's not a state and
Speaker 2: it's not a government. The Palestinian Authority, a governing body,
Speaker 2: is supposed to be subordinate to the PLO. In actuality,
Speaker 2: it really became the key player, and the PLO becomes
Speaker 2: a zombie organization. Some parts of the PLO haven't seen
Speaker 2: meetings since the nineteen nineties. The PLO today is not representative,
Speaker 2: it's not very active. The PLO National Council, the main
Speaker 2: legislative body, is supposed to meet every year, that has
Speaker 2: only met twice in the past three decades. And then
Speaker 2: certain bodies within the PLO, like the Executive Committee or
Speaker 2: the Central Council really only meets to rubber stamp the
Speaker 2: Palestinian Authority leader's decisions. Why is this relevant, Well, it
Speaker 2: means the issue of Palestine became the issue of negotiating
Speaker 2: over what this quote less than a state governing body
Speaker 2: called the Palestinian Authority gets to do in the bits
Speaker 2: of the occupied territories where it's allowed to operate. This
Speaker 2: framework doesn't include Palestinians outside those bits of the occupied territories,
Speaker 2: and the issue of Palestine is no longer about the
Speaker 2: right of refugees to return, for Palestinians to have actual sovereignty,
Speaker 2: to have a say in their own future. The PA
Speaker 2: doesn't defend the Palestinians it's supposedly governing. In fact, it
Speaker 2: coordinates with Israel to maintain Israeli security, and there's no
Speaker 2: institutional way for Palestinians to impact their political leadership that
Speaker 2: might actually negotiate away their rights. Because the p LOO
Speaker 2: is no longer functioning and the PA itself is undemocratic,
Speaker 2: the US and its allies consistently make sure it stays
Speaker 2: that way. They elevate the current leader, Mahamad Abbas and
Speaker 2: back is essentially uncontested election in two thousand and four
Speaker 2: to the presidency, they push our best to hold parliamentary
Speaker 2: elections in two thousand and six, and then when Hamas
Speaker 2: wins a plurality, help him overturn those elections. Within the
Speaker 2: political party that Abbas is also a leader of Fate,
Speaker 2: the emergence of new leaders is often blocked, sometimes by
Speaker 2: Israel simply not allowing party members to travel at attend
Speaker 2: the conferences. Palestinian scholar thought It Dana has some really
Speaker 2: interesting research on that front. If people are interested in
Speaker 2: a chapter titled Lost in Transition the Palestinian National Movement
Speaker 2: after Oslo, suffice to say, everyone ignores demands by Palestinians
Speaker 2: in the occupied territories to have new leadership or to
Speaker 2: hold elections, and the Palestinian people's regular everyday life is
Speaker 2: such that they face more restrictions, more violence, more of
Speaker 2: an inability to live. When Hamas takes control in Gaza,
Speaker 2: Palestinians and Gaza all time so have to face a
Speaker 2: brutal blockade. Everyone in Palestine faces layers of authoritarian control,
Speaker 2: not just the occupation but the Palsidian authority itself, and
Speaker 2: everyone with power around the world basically expects them to
Speaker 2: just accept this reality. Well, they won't, not because they're crazy,
Speaker 2: but because this is existential. There are more uprisings, some
Speaker 2: very violent. The second Palestinian uprising that starts in two
Speaker 2: thousand is more fragmented and much more violent than the first,
Speaker 2: based on both death toll and tactics. Wendy Prohman's book
Speaker 2: Violence Nonviolence in the Palestinian National Movement has an excellent
Speaker 2: analysis of how and why this happened. There are also
Speaker 2: nonviolent campaigns. There is the call by Palestinian Civil Society
Speaker 2: in two thousand and five to boycott, divest from, and
Speaker 2: sanctioned Israel, the BDS movement. There are non violent protest campaigns,
Speaker 2: especially in village areas where the new segregation wall is
Speaker 2: going up. People really lean on getting the attention of
Speaker 2: the international community and pursuing non violent tactics as a
Speaker 2: form of legitimacy. There are village campaigns in places like
Speaker 2: Bilayin and Layin and Budrus, lots of books, documentaries and
Speaker 2: press coverage.
Speaker 1: They get attention, but they don't stop the occupation.
Speaker 2: Thanks for Pastenians keep getting worse with no political options,
Speaker 2: the appeal of violent tactics goes up with increased threats
Speaker 2: and attacks by Israeli settlers alongside occupation forces, the appeal
Speaker 2: of violent tactics goes up. The Pastadian Center for Policy
Speaker 2: and Survey Research in a poll from September two on
Speaker 2: twenty three across occupied territories, so this is right before
Speaker 2: the last war, found support for armed struggle is much
Speaker 2: higher than support for negotiations as the most effective means
Speaker 2: of ending the Israeli occupation. Fifty three percent of respondents
Speaker 2: support armed struggle and twenty percent support negotiations. I remember
Speaker 2: being interviewed by the Ukrainian Outlet Commons, and I'm not
Speaker 2: the first to say this, nor was I the last,
Speaker 2: but I remember talking to them in August twenty twenty
Speaker 2: three and saying, it really seems like mass violence is
Speaker 2: coming because all of this isn't sustainable. On the Israeli side,
Speaker 2: with every election, their government was becoming more extreme, more
Speaker 2: vocal about population transfer.
Speaker 1: And ethnic cleansing.
Speaker 2: So now that you know the backstory, it puts a
Speaker 2: new light on the discussion of a two state framework today.
Speaker 2: Even if that two state framework remained feasible, and that's
Speaker 2: a big if, how do international actors imagine this is
Speaker 2: going to work out.
Speaker 1: If Palestinians still.
Speaker 2: Don't get a say in their own leadership, how are
Speaker 2: you going to get Palestinians to go along with the
Speaker 2: peace process they had no hand in shaping. And Palestinians
Speaker 2: are critical of their entire political establishment, both the PA
Speaker 2: and HAMAS in Gaza. People were protesting HAMAS before the
Speaker 2: October seventh detexts, that were protests in July twenty twenty
Speaker 2: three against governance and living conditions, and there were protests
Speaker 2: after the October seventh attack in March of this year,
Speaker 2: also critical of HAMAS and its conduct. In May twenty
Speaker 2: twenty five, that same center, the Palestinian Center for Policy
Speaker 2: and Survey Research, had a poll which showed that only
Speaker 2: fifteen percent of respondents from across the occupied territories thought
Speaker 2: that the Palsaenian authority's conduct had been satisfactory. Forty two
Speaker 2: percent support its dissolution. So, given that this is how
Speaker 2: the public views thinks, plans for Gaza that rely on
Speaker 2: the return of a previous status quo, something like HAMAS
Speaker 2: in Gaza or the PA in the West Bank, or
Speaker 2: returning PA controlled to Gaza altogether, will not be popular
Speaker 2: in any shape or form, and yet there haven't been
Speaker 2: any clear proposals for anything but such a scenario. In fact,
Speaker 2: it seems Israel is banking on the idea of sequestering
Speaker 2: Palestinians into smaller camps. The US doesn't seem to have
Speaker 2: a problem with that. The Arabs and EU actors are
Speaker 2: still talking about supporting the Palstinian Authority. Foreign Minister of
Speaker 2: Sad Arabia and December twenty twenty four put out a
Speaker 2: statement affirming that quote the Kingdom and Arab and Islamic
Speaker 2: countries will continue to support the Palestinian Authority, noting its
Speaker 2: capacity despite all challenges to manage the situation in the
Speaker 2: West Bank and Gaza end quote and because they're worried
Speaker 2: about where the PA will go from here. Given how
Speaker 2: old the Palestinian president what Abbass is, He's eighty nine.
Speaker 2: Arab governments have also pressured him to figure out a
Speaker 2: succession plan. A few weeks ago May twenty twenty five,
Speaker 2: he did indeed convene the PLOW Central Council, despite objections
Speaker 2: and despite the fact that most factions within the PLO
Speaker 2: boycotted the proceedings. Those president changed the bylaws to make
Speaker 2: a new vice president position understood to be Abbess's successor.
Speaker 2: Abbess then appoints a man named Seenan Chez, a businessman,
Speaker 2: a security coordination guy who pulls at two percent. I mean,
Speaker 2: this just won't be acceptable to the Palestinian public, but
Speaker 2: this is their best plan. Because of these shenetigans, there
Speaker 2: are Palestinian initiatives with political leaders and civil society actors
Speaker 2: calling to revitalize the PLO to make it more representative.
Speaker 2: For example, there is the Palestinian National Conference initiative, which
Speaker 2: has been pretty consistently attacked by the PA. This National
Speaker 2: Conference attempts to involve a wider diaspora and include input
Speaker 2: from all the political factions, and it's called on PA
Speaker 2: leaders to revive the PLO meaningfully and allow for more input.
Speaker 2: There are also initiatives such as Land for All, which
Speaker 2: includes Israelis and Palestinians that talk about a new type
Speaker 2: of two state solution and they want to move beyond
Speaker 2: the current kind of political impacts on both sides. But
Speaker 2: no one is really paying attention to these calls from
Speaker 2: outside initiatives or from civil society, so as of now,
Speaker 2: the only plan being taken seriously is the Israeli US
Speaker 2: plan of repressing Gaza into oblivion. There's even reporting by
Speaker 2: how much haw that at Zeteo that the Israeli forces
Speaker 2: have activated and supported gangs in Gaza, some of them
Speaker 2: with affiliations to Isis, to advance their political aims. What's
Speaker 2: clear is that we do need to go back to
Speaker 2: the drawing board, and we need to understand that unless
Speaker 2: Palestinians have a say in their internal politics, no solutions
Speaker 2: will be meaningful. But I don't see any indication that
Speaker 2: anyone with any power talking about solutions for Gaza and
Speaker 2: the war has absorbed this fact.
Speaker 1: That's all I have for you today.
Speaker 2: I'll be back to talk more about developments in Palestinian politics,
Speaker 2: as well as deep dives on topics like Arab Israeli negotiations,
Speaker 2: protest movements and more.
Speaker 1: Thanks for listening.
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