WEBVTT - Meta and Apple Hand Over Data to Hackers 0:00:02.600 --> 0:00:05.880 From the heart of where innovation, money and power colli 0:00:06.720 --> 0:00:11.239 in Silicon Vallet and beyond. This is Bloomberg Technology with 0:00:11.320 --> 0:00:27.520 Emily Jay I'm Emily checking San Francisco and this is 0:00:27.520 --> 0:00:30.800 Bloomberg Technology. Coming up in the next hour a Bloomberg scoop. 0:00:30.800 --> 0:00:35.320 Hackers masquerading is law enforcement tricked Apple and Meta into 0:00:35.400 --> 0:00:39.680 handing over customer data. We have all the details. Plus 0:00:39.760 --> 0:00:42.800 Apple is cutting out the middleman, the iPhone maker developing 0:00:42.800 --> 0:00:47.240 its own payment processing technology, building a full in house 0:00:47.240 --> 0:00:50.000 set of financial services offerings on top of its Apple 0:00:50.040 --> 0:00:53.360 credit card and wallet. Bloomberg's Mark German will bring us 0:00:53.400 --> 0:00:58.920 his exclusive story and Tesla's hidden competitive advantage. The electric 0:00:58.960 --> 0:01:01.720 car maker made a secret deal to help dodge the 0:01:01.840 --> 0:01:06.080 nickel crisis. Russia is one of the world's top suppliers. 0:01:06.120 --> 0:01:09.720 Now to that Bloomberg exclusive, Bloomberg learning that Apple and 0:01:09.840 --> 0:01:14.240 Meta provided customer data to presumed law enforcement officials who 0:01:14.240 --> 0:01:18.520 were really hackers in disguise. William Turton, our Bloomberg cubersecurity reporter, 0:01:18.600 --> 0:01:21.160 joins us. Now with that school will how did the 0:01:21.160 --> 0:01:24.560 hackers pull this off? Hey, Emily, thanks for having me. 0:01:24.680 --> 0:01:27.199 So here's what the hackers did. They kind of exploited 0:01:27.280 --> 0:01:29.880 what some might call a loophole in this system. When 0:01:29.959 --> 0:01:33.840 you send a request of a search warrant or subpoena 0:01:34.240 --> 0:01:36.600 to a company for data, that has to be signed 0:01:36.600 --> 0:01:39.280 by a judge. But if you send something called an 0:01:39.319 --> 0:01:42.800 emergency data request, UM that's not something that has to 0:01:42.800 --> 0:01:45.280 be signed by a judge. So what these hackers did 0:01:45.480 --> 0:01:49.160 is they broke into the email boxes of legitimate law 0:01:49.240 --> 0:01:52.920 enforcement agencies and they sent emails posing as a legitimate 0:01:52.960 --> 0:01:57.040 law enforcement officer to these companies with a forged emergency 0:01:57.120 --> 0:02:00.040 data request. And as we're reporting today, the co and 0:02:00.080 --> 0:02:03.760 he's complied with those requests and actually turned over user data. 0:02:04.080 --> 0:02:07.000 But we don't know is just the scale of this problem. 0:02:07.040 --> 0:02:09.639 We've been hearing from sources that you know, it's much 0:02:09.680 --> 0:02:12.720 bigger than these companies um AND has a much bigger scope. 0:02:13.040 --> 0:02:15.560 And that's what we're trying to find out now. So 0:02:15.840 --> 0:02:18.280 is it understandable then that Apple and Meta could have 0:02:18.360 --> 0:02:20.760 fallen for this or is this a major loophole in 0:02:20.800 --> 0:02:26.000 their systems? So, I mean, it cannot be overstated how 0:02:26.200 --> 0:02:30.440 complicated and difficult these process are. The emergency data request. 0:02:30.760 --> 0:02:33.760 Some will say it's a very legitimate form for law 0:02:33.840 --> 0:02:36.799 enforcement to get information in times of crisis, like a 0:02:37.040 --> 0:02:40.239 like a terrorist threat or someone's life is an imminent danger. 0:02:40.600 --> 0:02:43.639 And that's exactly what the hackers do in their Forge request. 0:02:44.360 --> 0:02:46.720 They will say something along the lines of there's a 0:02:46.840 --> 0:02:50.040 terrorist threat, someone's life is in danger, someone's you know, 0:02:50.080 --> 0:02:53.840 at risk of suicide, and you know, companies are expected 0:02:54.000 --> 0:02:57.320 to comply very quickly with these requests. Now, you know, 0:02:57.360 --> 0:03:00.400 I think, as it's becoming clear, companies need to have 0:03:00.520 --> 0:03:03.400 more oversight and more verification that these requests are legitimate 0:03:03.560 --> 0:03:07.160 and are coming from real law enforcement officers. Now, according 0:03:07.200 --> 0:03:11.840 to your reporting, William Discord had a similar issue. Also, 0:03:12.080 --> 0:03:15.040 Snap also got this request, but we don't know yet 0:03:15.160 --> 0:03:18.200 if they provided any of this information to the hackers. 0:03:18.240 --> 0:03:20.400 Are there other companies that could be looped into this? 0:03:21.320 --> 0:03:25.760 That's right, So yesterday Brian Krebs reported that Discord, also, 0:03:26.080 --> 0:03:28.440 you know, was a victim of the same kind of scheme. 0:03:28.880 --> 0:03:32.960 We reported today that Snap received a Forge emergency data request, 0:03:33.040 --> 0:03:35.200 but we do not know whether they actually provided data. 0:03:35.520 --> 0:03:38.800 And yes, I'm hearing from sources that many other companies, 0:03:38.880 --> 0:03:41.840 even beyond tech companies, beyond social media companies, have been 0:03:41.840 --> 0:03:44.680 affected by this Um, if anyone knows more, I you 0:03:44.680 --> 0:03:46.320 should reach out to me because I would love to 0:03:46.320 --> 0:03:49.840 know more. I think this problem extends beyond just the 0:03:49.880 --> 0:03:53.800 two companies that we've reported on today. Alright, bloombergs William 0:03:53.920 --> 0:03:56.640 Turton with that scoop, William, thank you. I want to 0:03:56.640 --> 0:03:59.200 talk more about this now with Wendy Whitmore, senior vice 0:03:59.200 --> 0:04:02.160 president for Unit forty two, the threat intelligence team at 0:04:02.160 --> 0:04:05.400 Palo Alto Networks. Wendy, thank you so much for joining us. 0:04:05.440 --> 0:04:07.680 What do you find most notable about how these accurs 0:04:07.760 --> 0:04:11.160 hackers were able to pull these off with massive companies 0:04:11.200 --> 0:04:17.200 with very established systems. Yeah, Emily, great question. So I 0:04:17.240 --> 0:04:21.120 think the biggest concern here of these attacks is clearly 0:04:21.120 --> 0:04:25.720 how well the attackers understand uh, this potential vulnerability, this 0:04:25.839 --> 0:04:30.520 process of government request to technology companies, social media companies, 0:04:30.560 --> 0:04:34.000 and understand it and are willing to take the risk 0:04:34.120 --> 0:04:39.520 to exploit it. So talk to us about why it's 0:04:39.560 --> 0:04:43.640 so apparently easy to do this. I mean, some of 0:04:43.640 --> 0:04:50.919 the folks behind these attacks we're finding out our teenagers. Yeah. Again, 0:04:50.960 --> 0:04:53.839 great questions. So the interesting thing is it's not easy 0:04:53.880 --> 0:04:57.520 at all. This is relatively complicated. So first I would 0:04:57.520 --> 0:04:59.720 say The easiest part is probably for the attackers to 0:04:59.760 --> 0:05:03.120 get access to the data that they're stealing. Last year alone, 0:05:03.160 --> 0:05:07.960 our team identified over breaches where there was stolen data leaked. 0:05:07.960 --> 0:05:11.000 So what the attackers do is by this information for 0:05:11.160 --> 0:05:15.240 relatively inexpensive prices and then use that to test out 0:05:15.839 --> 0:05:18.560 which kind of credentials they can use to legitimately break 0:05:18.600 --> 0:05:21.600 into organizations, and in this case, they chose those to 0:05:21.640 --> 0:05:25.200 be law enforcement organizations. The complicating part is they have 0:05:25.240 --> 0:05:27.599 to understand that process, and then they have to be 0:05:27.839 --> 0:05:30.279 willing to spend the time that it takes to to 0:05:30.400 --> 0:05:34.400 do the social engineering aspects, understanding specifically who they need 0:05:34.400 --> 0:05:37.320 to contact that these organizations to make these requests, who 0:05:37.400 --> 0:05:41.159 the legitimate law enforcement officers are, and what their processes. 0:05:41.279 --> 0:05:44.760 So this is certainly not an easy task for them 0:05:44.800 --> 0:05:47.880 to orchestrate, clearly being done by people with time on 0:05:47.920 --> 0:05:51.880 their hands. Well to that point, the folks suspected in 0:05:51.880 --> 0:05:55.600 this particular case are minors located in the US and UK. 0:05:56.080 --> 0:05:59.440 I'm reminded of the OPTA hacks that we covered last week, 0:05:59.600 --> 0:06:02.680 where you know, the suspected mastermind is a teenager who 0:06:02.680 --> 0:06:05.120 still lives with his mom in England. What do you 0:06:05.200 --> 0:06:07.840 make of the fact that these are potentially very young 0:06:07.960 --> 0:06:16.160 people behind these very disruptive attacks. It's it's incredibly concerning, right. 0:06:16.400 --> 0:06:19.640 We typically would see this level of attack orchestrated by 0:06:19.640 --> 0:06:23.200 an organization who's got clear objectives and clear financial backing. 0:06:23.480 --> 0:06:27.400 So the point is these UH, the organization related to 0:06:27.400 --> 0:06:31.400 these attacks certainly has overlapped with lapses and the activities 0:06:31.440 --> 0:06:34.080 we've seen last week. One of the things that they're 0:06:34.080 --> 0:06:37.760 doing incredibly effectively, and we see this in ransomware investigations 0:06:37.800 --> 0:06:41.719 as well, is they use time demands as a way 0:06:41.760 --> 0:06:44.719 to force an organization to make a quick decision. We 0:06:44.760 --> 0:06:47.560 see that with these ransomware attacks when there's extortion involved, 0:06:47.600 --> 0:06:50.560 and we're seeing this work very well with these emergency 0:06:50.640 --> 0:06:57.440 data requests. Now six hundred thousand open jobs in cybersecurity, 0:06:57.440 --> 0:07:00.640 that's what Bloomberg is reporting today that there are six 0:07:00.760 --> 0:07:04.520 hundred thousand jobs UH in the cyber threat landscape that 0:07:04.600 --> 0:07:07.400 are unfilled. Is that part of the reason we may 0:07:07.440 --> 0:07:14.200 be seeing an uptick in hacks. Well, I think you're 0:07:14.200 --> 0:07:17.120 seeing that. So there's no greater example of that today 0:07:17.120 --> 0:07:19.480 and the challenges that we as an industry face than 0:07:19.560 --> 0:07:22.720 as it relates to Russian Ukraine. Right, the US government 0:07:22.720 --> 0:07:26.840 has come out and provided a tremendous amount of recommendations 0:07:26.840 --> 0:07:29.280 and actions to be taken, but the reality is it's 0:07:29.360 --> 0:07:32.400 challenging for organizations across the world to implement all of 0:07:32.440 --> 0:07:35.240 them in a timely manner. Uh, it's much cheaper for 0:07:35.280 --> 0:07:37.920 the attackers to conduct these attacks, and it's much more 0:07:38.000 --> 0:07:42.360 costly and time and resource intensive for organizations to defend 0:07:42.400 --> 0:07:46.080 against them today. So yes, absolutely that's a concern. Now 0:07:46.080 --> 0:07:48.840 we're understanding that the information that was shared with these 0:07:48.880 --> 0:07:54.000 hackers includes addresses, phone numbers, I P addresses. How damaging 0:07:54.120 --> 0:07:56.760 could the release of this information be? How could the 0:07:56.800 --> 0:08:02.920 hackers use it? Well, I think that there's some concern 0:08:03.080 --> 0:08:07.800 in terms of people being cyberstocked, being at that translated 0:08:08.080 --> 0:08:11.640 to physical attacks. Right, So when you look at these 0:08:12.520 --> 0:08:15.280 the people that are behind this oftentimes so they're selling 0:08:15.280 --> 0:08:18.560 this information for really inexpensive amount, right, the equivalent of 0:08:18.600 --> 0:08:21.840 about one fifty U S dollars, So that can be 0:08:21.920 --> 0:08:24.160 used in a wide variety of ways. We want to 0:08:24.160 --> 0:08:27.720 make sure that people are protected and uh, you know 0:08:28.120 --> 0:08:30.840 that this data doesn't then translate to those type of 0:08:30.960 --> 0:08:33.680 tax So certainly law enforcement is going to be working 0:08:33.840 --> 0:08:37.920 very closely with these organizations who have released the data 0:08:38.000 --> 0:08:41.200 to make sure that they can protect people. What do 0:08:41.240 --> 0:08:43.280 you see as the learnings and takeaways here? I mean, 0:08:43.360 --> 0:08:45.200 is this a new tactic that we're going to see 0:08:45.240 --> 0:08:50.840 more cyber criminals start exploiting. Yeah, I think it's it's 0:08:50.840 --> 0:08:54.320 become pretty widespread. Right, So these lapses group attacks over 0:08:54.360 --> 0:08:57.079 the past week saw that you know which you mentioned 0:08:57.120 --> 0:09:01.160 right to Octa to Microsoft um. The level of sophistication 0:09:01.320 --> 0:09:03.920 was largely in the social engineering, so the human to 0:09:04.080 --> 0:09:08.080 human aspects as well as the persistence of their ability 0:09:08.120 --> 0:09:11.040 to figure out once they got inside an organization how 0:09:11.080 --> 0:09:13.320 they could actually get to the data that they needed. 0:09:13.679 --> 0:09:16.880 And so what the good news on that is that 0:09:16.880 --> 0:09:20.400 that largely relates to defense and depth strategies and best 0:09:20.440 --> 0:09:24.240 practices that we recommend the organizations. It doesn't often mean 0:09:24.320 --> 0:09:27.440 you have to buy millions of dollars of new technology, right. 0:09:27.480 --> 0:09:29.240 It means we have to get back to the basics 0:09:29.480 --> 0:09:31.559 and we have to make sure that, for example, for 0:09:31.920 --> 0:09:36.920 help desk, that we are not asking identity verification questions 0:09:37.000 --> 0:09:40.079 of our employees. That's information that could be easily found 0:09:40.120 --> 0:09:42.800 on the internet. So we've got to continually focus on 0:09:42.840 --> 0:09:46.360 security awareness trainings for organizations and make sure that they're 0:09:46.360 --> 0:09:51.080 well implemented. As the war on Ukraine shows no signs 0:09:51.120 --> 0:09:56.160 of d escalation, but Ukrainian forces and the West have 0:09:56.280 --> 0:09:59.440 really put a lot of pressure on Russian forces. Do 0:09:59.559 --> 0:10:03.400 you see Russia resorting to more cyber attacks and getting 0:10:03.400 --> 0:10:07.080 more aggressive in the cyber landscape? Since we haven't quite 0:10:07.120 --> 0:10:10.560 seen as potentially devastating attacks from the Russian side, is 0:10:10.559 --> 0:10:16.000 some more expecting yet, I think it's a likely scenario. 0:10:16.559 --> 0:10:18.680 One thing we know for certain is that the Russians 0:10:18.679 --> 0:10:22.000 have been incredibly formidable capability when it comes to cyber 0:10:22.040 --> 0:10:25.360 attacks and cyber warfare. So we are encouraging all of 0:10:25.400 --> 0:10:28.440 our clients as well as non clients to be prepared 0:10:29.040 --> 0:10:32.680 to make sure that they've got a documented incident response 0:10:32.760 --> 0:10:36.400 plans in place, that they understand what rules and responsibilities 0:10:36.440 --> 0:10:40.720 their employees have across the board, so that if these 0:10:40.840 --> 0:10:44.240 attacks do occur, that we've got a well orchestrated response 0:10:44.280 --> 0:10:46.960 plan and we can contain contain that the damage as 0:10:47.000 --> 0:10:50.800 quickly as possible. All Right, Wendy went more power outs 0:10:50.800 --> 0:10:54.319 on networks. Always appreciate your insight on these incidents. Thank 0:10:54.360 --> 0:10:57.439 you so much Wendy for joining us coming up. Russia 0:10:57.520 --> 0:11:00.480 is one of the world's largest suppliers of nickel. It 0:11:00.559 --> 0:11:04.400 is a key component in batteries for electric cars. How 0:11:04.520 --> 0:11:09.360 Tesla struck a secret deal to keep supplies coming. This 0:11:09.520 --> 0:11:26.240 is Bloomberg. This back market has been up and down, 0:11:26.320 --> 0:11:29.080 catching the attention of the SEC, which just announced a 0:11:29.120 --> 0:11:32.080 plan for new disclosure requirements. One company that just went 0:11:32.080 --> 0:11:36.040 public this week vs. Back is Storry, the broadband provider 0:11:36.160 --> 0:11:39.680 listed on the New York Stock Exchange just yesterday. The transaction, 0:11:39.880 --> 0:11:43.800 implying at one point seven six billion dollar value, were 0:11:43.840 --> 0:11:47.160 joined out by check Kenogs Starry CEO and co founder 0:11:47.240 --> 0:11:49.080 chet How'd you pull this off in the middle of 0:11:49.080 --> 0:11:51.960 all this market volatility and a war that's casting a 0:11:52.120 --> 0:11:56.480 great deal of uncertainty over the road ahead. Yeah. Well, 0:11:56.679 --> 0:11:59.360 I think probably two or three factors that contributed to it. 0:11:59.480 --> 0:12:03.960 Number one, a very supportive investor base, which I think 0:12:04.080 --> 0:12:07.800 is critical in this market and climate obviously, uh And 0:12:08.000 --> 0:12:10.040 and I think the basic for that support, or the 0:12:10.040 --> 0:12:12.959 basis for the support, including the new investors that came in, 0:12:13.360 --> 0:12:16.079 is really the company's performance. You know, Unlike a lot 0:12:16.120 --> 0:12:18.600 of sort of concept companies in the stack land if 0:12:18.600 --> 0:12:21.520 you will, we um. You know, we're a real company 0:12:21.679 --> 0:12:26.280 growing very rapidly, real revenues, real customers, very lower customer based, 0:12:26.320 --> 0:12:30.480 massive tam um uh and and it real bottoms up 0:12:30.520 --> 0:12:33.440 analysis in terms of what the company is going to 0:12:33.480 --> 0:12:36.320 be doing. So so I think the deal basically got 0:12:36.320 --> 0:12:39.720 done because of those parameters. So talk to us about 0:12:39.760 --> 0:12:42.719 the ambition here. You know, you have for many, many 0:12:42.800 --> 0:12:47.880 years wanted to close the digital divide and democratize access. 0:12:47.880 --> 0:12:51.720 What's the goal with Starry? What unmet needs do you 0:12:51.760 --> 0:12:55.040 feel like you're filling? So, you know, it really depends 0:12:55.040 --> 0:12:59.080 on geography. But in certain areas, in urban areas in particular, 0:12:59.120 --> 0:13:01.080 obviously in the rule is the government's had a lot 0:13:01.120 --> 0:13:03.720 of subsidy programs that provide connectivity because I think that's 0:13:03.760 --> 0:13:07.319 an important component for economic growth and economic engine and 0:13:07.800 --> 0:13:11.200 healthcare education is you know, the pandemic taught us. But 0:13:11.280 --> 0:13:16.240 there's an affordability problem in urban areas uh and UH. 0:13:16.360 --> 0:13:20.400 Affordability ranges from people that you know, are looking for 0:13:20.440 --> 0:13:23.800 a better product that without the television bundle, which is 0:13:23.920 --> 0:13:27.600 typically how the cable companies sell it. For affordability for 0:13:27.679 --> 0:13:31.040 folks that can certainly. Uh, you know, euilize the technology 0:13:31.040 --> 0:13:34.800 and connectivity, but you are you know, can't pay. But 0:13:34.840 --> 0:13:37.880 the government is helping with that with subsidizing with the 0:13:37.920 --> 0:13:42.240 program called a c P or Affordable Connectivity Plan. So 0:13:42.679 --> 0:13:44.760 endgame for us is really you know, core belief for 0:13:44.800 --> 0:13:47.480 the company is that what we're doing is a great 0:13:47.559 --> 0:13:50.680 work in terms of providing you know, real use case, 0:13:50.800 --> 0:13:55.840 real resource to consumers, taking care of them, elevating the experience. 0:13:56.080 --> 0:13:59.040 Uh and hopefully you know, by doing all of these things, 0:13:59.040 --> 0:14:01.920 we're moving um society forward in terms of at least 0:14:01.960 --> 0:14:05.959 economic opportunity and availability of resources to to folks that 0:14:06.160 --> 0:14:09.640 would otherwise either be paying over too much or they 0:14:09.679 --> 0:14:12.520 would be paying or not getting the product at all 0:14:12.559 --> 0:14:14.440 because you know, they happen to be in a difficult 0:14:14.440 --> 0:14:16.920 time in their lives. How is what you're offering, this 0:14:17.000 --> 0:14:22.040 personalized network service different from what traditional legacy broadband providers 0:14:22.120 --> 0:14:25.520 offer aside from price, and is this something that customers 0:14:25.520 --> 0:14:29.480 really want? So yes, there are different cohorts of customers 0:14:29.520 --> 0:14:31.840 that really look for different things. So I'll give you 0:14:31.880 --> 0:14:34.480 an example. You know, if you're a gamer, for example, 0:14:34.520 --> 0:14:37.040 you may be interested in different kinds of latency statistics. 0:14:37.120 --> 0:14:40.120 You work from home potentially, and you know, cable broadband 0:14:40.160 --> 0:14:42.600 network will give you, you know, a very marginal up link, 0:14:42.680 --> 0:14:45.400 and we can offer you several hundred megabits up link 0:14:45.520 --> 0:14:47.960 up to gig a bit up link. Uh. So all 0:14:48.000 --> 0:14:51.400 of these things, you know, our bet is ultimately technology. 0:14:51.440 --> 0:14:54.880 We lead towards personalization and what people are willing to 0:14:54.920 --> 0:14:58.520 pay and what they want. Uh. And that's uh, that's 0:14:58.520 --> 0:15:00.280 the purpose and then that's how we are check with. 0:15:00.360 --> 0:15:04.040 The network is in a highly personalizable way, which is 0:15:04.120 --> 0:15:07.120 very different than your traditional broadband network that tends to 0:15:07.120 --> 0:15:09.960 be one size fits all. You know, teaser rates that 0:15:10.040 --> 0:15:13.920 started whatever number and then go up the year after. 0:15:14.320 --> 0:15:16.640 You know all what I will say, you know, hundred 0:15:16.720 --> 0:15:19.600 year old business practices that really don't belong in a 0:15:19.880 --> 0:15:25.560 modern ecosystem. Alright, check Canoga Starry CEO and co founder. 0:15:25.600 --> 0:15:29.320 We'll keep watching as you continue trading. Thank you so 0:15:29.400 --> 0:15:40.640 much for joining us. The war in Ukraine is raising 0:15:40.680 --> 0:15:44.080 anxiety across the electric car industry, Russia being one of 0:15:44.080 --> 0:15:48.040 the world's biggest producers of nickel, a critical component in 0:15:48.120 --> 0:15:51.400 a VY batteries. Sources tell Bloomberg that Tesla, however, has 0:15:51.400 --> 0:15:55.080 been signing deals to circumvent any supply disruptions. I want 0:15:55.080 --> 0:15:58.160 to bring in analysts as she Satilla, who leads our 0:15:58.320 --> 0:16:01.880 Commodities and energy research at Bloomberg do Energy Finances. She's 0:16:01.880 --> 0:16:04.200 thank you so much for joining us. So, according to 0:16:04.200 --> 0:16:07.640 our reporting, Tesla has been scouring the globe since last 0:16:07.720 --> 0:16:11.200 year for deals on nickel. In particular, has struck a 0:16:11.280 --> 0:16:15.160 deal with Veil, a multi year supply deal that involves 0:16:15.240 --> 0:16:17.880 nickel coming from Canada. What is it you think that 0:16:18.000 --> 0:16:24.000 made this deal possible? Good evening emplace. So essentially, nickel 0:16:24.080 --> 0:16:28.400 prices are already rising slowly and steadily before the Russian 0:16:28.440 --> 0:16:32.040 invasion of Ukraine, and part of the reason for that 0:16:32.200 --> 0:16:34.520 was a tight market for class one nickel, which is 0:16:34.560 --> 0:16:38.440 predominantly used in manufacturing batteries which went to electric beakers. 0:16:39.200 --> 0:16:44.840 Now Russia was supplying almost scent of this class one nickel, 0:16:45.320 --> 0:16:49.640 so a potential disruption. They're definitely cost an impact on 0:16:49.680 --> 0:16:55.400 the market. Tesla strategy, although has been quite straightforward for 0:16:55.480 --> 0:16:57.760 the last year and a half or so. They've been scouring, 0:16:57.760 --> 0:17:00.720 as you rightly said, for nickel around the world. Deals 0:17:00.760 --> 0:17:04.200 with pH D last year and another deal with teln 0:17:04.280 --> 0:17:07.240 Metals and Riot into earlier this year, so they're trying 0:17:07.320 --> 0:17:09.920 to kind of secure their place in the supply chain 0:17:09.960 --> 0:17:14.720 and interrate verticularly as much as possible. In reality, it's 0:17:14.840 --> 0:17:18.640 the battery metal supply chain in general that is under pressure. 0:17:18.800 --> 0:17:23.520 How concerned should governments be and companies beyond the electric 0:17:23.560 --> 0:17:28.159 car market b so absolutely rightingly that there's a lot 0:17:28.200 --> 0:17:31.639 of pressure in the supply chain around the world. Um Interestingly, 0:17:31.640 --> 0:17:33.960 even in the absence of any long term net zero 0:17:34.040 --> 0:17:38.440 carbon emission policies, we expect demand for lethuman batteries to 0:17:38.600 --> 0:17:43.320 rise almost nine times between now and in particularly driven 0:17:43.359 --> 0:17:48.960 by electric vehicles. So commodities like lithium, cobalt, nickel magnees 0:17:49.520 --> 0:17:53.479 will be required in large quantities, and actually the supply 0:17:53.600 --> 0:17:56.480 of these are in particular parts of the world which 0:17:56.520 --> 0:18:00.879 are sometimes not that robust in terms of government structures 0:18:01.000 --> 0:18:04.480 or supply chain enhanced Governments and companies around the world 0:18:04.480 --> 0:18:06.840 are trying to take matters in their own own hands 0:18:06.880 --> 0:18:11.840 to develop the supply chain, either domestically or essentially create 0:18:11.880 --> 0:18:15.960 these partnerships around the world. Now, obviously these companies can 0:18:16.040 --> 0:18:19.640 work to secure extra supplies of nickel or cobalt or 0:18:19.800 --> 0:18:24.680 lithium what else can they do beyond that? UM, so 0:18:24.720 --> 0:18:27.119 I think two or three other interesting things they can do. 0:18:27.200 --> 0:18:30.120 The first one is UM they can use different battery 0:18:30.200 --> 0:18:34.359 chemistryes to reduce dependence on one specific material or metal. 0:18:34.840 --> 0:18:38.440 For example, Tesla has been using more of lithium and 0:18:38.680 --> 0:18:43.080 fosters batteries which require less nickel, although they have lower 0:18:43.160 --> 0:18:46.560 range and lower performance. UM. There is a move towards 0:18:46.640 --> 0:18:51.360 using batteries which have hired magnees content and less nickel content. UM. 0:18:51.440 --> 0:18:53.679 The second thing that would be done is building more 0:18:53.760 --> 0:18:56.920 charging infrastructure. If you build more charging infrastructure, you need 0:18:57.520 --> 0:19:00.879 batteries that slightly lower range as well. Perhaps. And the 0:19:00.960 --> 0:19:04.240 third thing that could be done is recycling. So UM 0:19:04.240 --> 0:19:07.800 from twenty onwards you will have a lot of batteries UM, 0:19:08.080 --> 0:19:10.879 large volume of batteries that would be available for recycling, 0:19:10.920 --> 0:19:14.360 and we probably need to make yourse oft time. All right, 0:19:14.960 --> 0:19:18.480 she Saiitia, thank you for that context. They're head of 0:19:18.520 --> 0:19:30.960 Commodities and Energy Research at Bloomberg and welcome back to 0:19:30.960 --> 0:19:33.840 Bloomberg Technology, Emily Jack in San Francisco. This week, I 0:19:33.880 --> 0:19:37.760 spoke exclusively with Uber CEO Dark Causa Shocking about the 0:19:37.760 --> 0:19:41.359 company's plan to quote out Amazon, Amazon, take a listen. 0:19:43.760 --> 0:19:47.239 I think that Amazon has is an incredible company and 0:19:47.280 --> 0:19:50.040 no one is ever going to replace Amazon. But we 0:19:50.080 --> 0:19:56.000 can essentially use our technology local logistics capabilities to power 0:19:56.760 --> 0:20:01.240 the local merchant or restaurant to deliver anything within an hour, 0:20:01.720 --> 0:20:07.360 which we think is a delightful experience causa. He says, 0:20:07.400 --> 0:20:10.800 Uber's delivery business could eventually grow to be bigger than rides, 0:20:10.840 --> 0:20:13.119 the idea being that it doesn't deliver just food, but 0:20:13.200 --> 0:20:16.200 potentially anything. This coming at a time though, when other 0:20:16.240 --> 0:20:20.280 delivery services are cutting back, instat Carts slashing its valuation 0:20:21.400 --> 0:20:25.280 and the information reporting go Puff plans to cut hundreds 0:20:25.320 --> 0:20:28.760 of employees. Here to discuss. Andrea Walney, general partner at 0:20:28.800 --> 0:20:32.480 Manhattan Venture Partners. And Andrea, you're an investor in instat 0:20:32.520 --> 0:20:35.960 cart What do you make of of instat carts move here? 0:20:35.960 --> 0:20:40.439 Should we be worried about its business? Thanks so much, Emily, 0:20:40.520 --> 0:20:45.000 So overall, we're really not worried. I think generally this 0:20:45.400 --> 0:20:48.639 act of actually reducing the valuation is very much so 0:20:48.760 --> 0:20:51.720 based on the value of the stock options that the 0:20:51.760 --> 0:20:56.000 company is issuing to their employees today and any incoming employees. 0:20:56.400 --> 0:20:59.639 We think this move is really smart for the hiring 0:20:59.680 --> 0:21:03.520 and recruitment of new employees, because generally what employees want 0:21:03.560 --> 0:21:06.199 to see is the upside upside in their stock right. 0:21:06.240 --> 0:21:08.800 They want to see that there's going to be value 0:21:08.920 --> 0:21:12.280 accruel once they joined the company. So overall, we think 0:21:12.280 --> 0:21:14.560 that this is a move that made headlines because they 0:21:14.560 --> 0:21:17.120 were one of the first companies to do it, amiss 0:21:17.200 --> 0:21:20.520 all the volatility in the market, and we just assume 0:21:20.600 --> 0:21:23.000 that many and many other companies are going to join 0:21:23.080 --> 0:21:25.920 suit in this. But doesn't it mean that anyone who 0:21:25.960 --> 0:21:29.399 exercise their shares that the original valuation thirty nine billion 0:21:29.400 --> 0:21:33.440 dollars would be underwater now? Well, the folks that did 0:21:33.520 --> 0:21:36.600 exercise their stock options are probably there to hold on 0:21:36.680 --> 0:21:39.840 and see where the company goes as per their I 0:21:39.960 --> 0:21:42.840 p O and the plans there. So overall, with the 0:21:42.920 --> 0:21:46.000 lack of liquidity now leading up to the I p O, yes, 0:21:46.080 --> 0:21:49.040 those employees just have to bear with us and hold on. 0:21:49.359 --> 0:21:53.159 But generally the tax treatment between the four owner and 0:21:53.200 --> 0:21:56.840 A which is the valuation, right, that's the addit valuation 0:21:56.880 --> 0:21:59.600 that every company who is private has to do once 0:21:59.640 --> 0:22:03.240 a year at least between that spread of the foreigner 0:22:03.240 --> 0:22:06.159 and A and where they actually sell the stock is 0:22:06.200 --> 0:22:10.280 what's really meaningful. So if we reduce that valuation price, 0:22:10.560 --> 0:22:13.199 it means that they can have more upside leading up 0:22:13.200 --> 0:22:16.320 to what they ultimately sell the stock. At meantime, we 0:22:16.359 --> 0:22:19.440 just saw go Puff planning to cut hundreds of employees 0:22:19.440 --> 0:22:22.480 according to a report from The Information cutting forty million 0:22:22.520 --> 0:22:27.040 dollars in cost three of their global workforce. Do you 0:22:27.040 --> 0:22:30.840 think we're going to see more companies slashing their valuations 0:22:31.000 --> 0:22:37.080 like Insta cart and potentially going through these mass layoffs. Yeah, Emily, so, 0:22:37.200 --> 0:22:39.920 I truly think that we're about to see a one 0:22:40.000 --> 0:22:43.680 eighty reverse of the Great Resignation. I think many companies 0:22:43.720 --> 0:22:47.040 are using this opportunity of the volatility in the market 0:22:47.119 --> 0:22:52.440 to reduce spend, reduce opex, increase their margins, get to profitability, 0:22:52.480 --> 0:22:56.440 and show both investors private and public that they can 0:22:56.480 --> 0:22:59.560 succeed as they grow, right, And so we do think 0:22:59.560 --> 0:23:02.200 that we're going to see a lot of companies. You know, further, 0:23:02.480 --> 0:23:06.240 even though we are expecting the opposite of the Great Resignation, 0:23:06.720 --> 0:23:10.080 we expect the talent pool and the recruitment landscape to 0:23:10.119 --> 0:23:13.080 be just as competitive as it ever was. And so 0:23:13.119 --> 0:23:16.160 with that being said, companies need to find really compelling 0:23:16.160 --> 0:23:19.800 ways to recruit and retain, and so with that, they 0:23:19.880 --> 0:23:22.880 are going to be looking for ways to show the 0:23:22.960 --> 0:23:25.600 talent pool that's out there that they can have an 0:23:25.640 --> 0:23:28.320 increase in the value of the stock they're getting issued. 0:23:28.440 --> 0:23:31.280 So we think there's gonna be a lot more of 0:23:31.359 --> 0:23:34.000 the layoff and news coming out. We expect a lot 0:23:34.040 --> 0:23:37.159 of companies are having conversations with the board of directors 0:23:37.200 --> 0:23:40.320 to say, what should we do around our valuation, should 0:23:40.320 --> 0:23:42.800 we bring it back down to real levels, and then 0:23:42.840 --> 0:23:45.640 how should we plan ahead for our hiring plans going 0:23:45.640 --> 0:23:48.600 into the rest of the year. Generally, companies like insta Car. 0:23:49.080 --> 0:23:54.040 Last year we're really really focused on profitability and broke 0:23:54.119 --> 0:23:57.040 even because of that, and now companies like insta Car 0:23:57.119 --> 0:24:00.720 are focusing on top line continuous sing the focus on growth, 0:24:01.080 --> 0:24:05.520 and then furthermore really just focusing on that reduction of 0:24:06.119 --> 0:24:10.320 um spend across the board. So profitability is key, margins 0:24:10.359 --> 0:24:13.879 are key, and retaining talent from the executive level on 0:24:14.000 --> 0:24:18.879 down is also incredibly important. Now public companies in this 0:24:19.000 --> 0:24:22.879 space also seeing their stocks slide. Uber and door Dash, 0:24:22.960 --> 0:24:25.679 for example, down here today, and I'm curious what you 0:24:25.720 --> 0:24:29.040 think of Uber's vision here to be the future of 0:24:29.440 --> 0:24:32.680 driving retail. That you know, the idea that they could 0:24:32.720 --> 0:24:38.840 deliver something faster, for example, than Amazon. And if you 0:24:38.880 --> 0:24:43.840