WEBVTT - Interview With Robert Johnson: Masters in Business (Audio)

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<v Speaker 1>This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholds on Bloomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>This week on Masters in Business, I have a special guest.

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<v Speaker 1>His name is Dr Robert Johnson. He is currently the

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<v Speaker 1>President of the American College of Finance. In his previous job,

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<v Speaker 1>he was a senior person at the cf A Institute,

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<v Speaker 1>where he pretty much was in charge of the Chartered

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<v Speaker 1>Financial Analyst Test. You can only take one part per year,

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<v Speaker 1>pass part one, and you have to wait a year

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<v Speaker 1>to pass part two, and then ultimately take the third

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<v Speaker 1>part in the third year. It has about a fifty

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<v Speaker 1>fail rate and a lot of people look at it

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<v Speaker 1>as a um really a most challenging exam they'll ever

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<v Speaker 1>encounter in their career in finance. We discuss all sorts

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<v Speaker 1>of things, everything from the value of value investing to

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<v Speaker 1>the impact of the FED on the investment process. UH,

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<v Speaker 1>if you are at all interested in how people become

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<v Speaker 1>certified to actually be c f A s and what

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<v Speaker 1>the value of those those letters are to either a

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<v Speaker 1>company or an investment bank or or an analyst, I

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<v Speaker 1>think you'll find this conversation quite interesting. Bob is really

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<v Speaker 1>an interesting guy to talk to. He's very knowledgeable about

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of areas tells some great stories about Warren Buffett.

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<v Speaker 1>One of the books he wrote, which is called Strategic

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<v Speaker 1>Value Investing, is on Buffets reading list. Every year at

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<v Speaker 1>Berkshire Hathaway's annual fest they have a list of suggested books.

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<v Speaker 1>His book has been on that list for quite some time. Anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>I found him to be just a genuine, fascinating, interesting guy,

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<v Speaker 1>and I think you'll enjoy the conversation. So, with no

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<v Speaker 1>further ado, my conversation with Dr Robert Johnson. This is

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<v Speaker 1>Masters in Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio. My

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<v Speaker 1>special guest this week is Dr Robert Johnson. Let me

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<v Speaker 1>just give you the short version of his curriculum VITA.

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<v Speaker 1>He is currently President and CEO at the American College

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<v Speaker 1>of Financial Services UH. He has been the recipient of

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<v Speaker 1>the Alfred C. Morley Distinguished Service Award when he was

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<v Speaker 1>one of the senior folks at the c f A Institute.

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<v Speaker 1>He has won the RFK Memorial Student Award for teaching achievement.

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<v Speaker 1>Serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Portfolio Management.

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<v Speaker 1>He really helped to develop and refine the Chartered Financial

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<v Speaker 1>Analyst test. Will get to that later. Today. He is

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<v Speaker 1>the author of numerous books, including Invest with the FED,

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<v Speaker 1>Strategic Value Investing, and Tools and Techniques of Investment Planning.

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<v Speaker 1>Dr Robert Johnson, Welcome to Bloomberg. Thank you very It's

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<v Speaker 1>terrific to be here. I'm thrilled to have you. We

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<v Speaker 1>met previously on Tom Keene Show, and I found it fascinating.

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<v Speaker 1>What are unique niche in the world of finance that

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<v Speaker 1>you occupy sort of one foot in the world of

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<v Speaker 1>academia and one foot in the world of actually helping

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<v Speaker 1>um people become chartered financial analysts. So so let's talk

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<v Speaker 1>a little bit about your background. When people when you

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<v Speaker 1>first meet people and they say, hey, Bob, what do

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<v Speaker 1>you do for a living? How do you answer that question, Barry,

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<v Speaker 1>I tell him I'm a pracademic. A pracademic, and that's

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<v Speaker 1>the word that I hope sometime comes into lexicon, the

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<v Speaker 1>popular lexicon. I hope it's in Wikipedia someday, maybe even

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<v Speaker 1>in Websters. But basically, a procademic is somebody who operates

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<v Speaker 1>both in the world of the practitioner and in the

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<v Speaker 1>world of academia. And unfortunately, I don't think that those

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<v Speaker 1>circles if you look at it in a Van Diagram

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<v Speaker 1>sense intersect very often, and I think that if we

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<v Speaker 1>had more of that, I think both worlds would benefit.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's that's fascinating. One of the questions I wanted

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<v Speaker 1>to ask you was you've sort of gone back and

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<v Speaker 1>forth between being a practitioner and being an academic. How

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<v Speaker 1>does one make that transition in either direction? How do

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<v Speaker 1>you go from a practitioner to an academic and vice versa. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I think if you stay close to the edge of

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<v Speaker 1>each that it isn't much of a transition. When I

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<v Speaker 1>was a finance professor at Creighton University, I also ran

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<v Speaker 1>a money management firm. I had about fifty million dollars

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<v Speaker 1>under management of private wealth, and I was a much

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<v Speaker 1>better teacher because I was actually managing money. And I

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<v Speaker 1>think the same is true in reverse. I think that

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<v Speaker 1>folks who practice, if they look at the best in academia,

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<v Speaker 1>can benefit greatly. So I I really don't think it's

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<v Speaker 1>a tough transition if you if you kind of stay

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<v Speaker 1>close to the edge. Fortunately, I think people want to

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<v Speaker 1>operate in the center of those circles instead of where

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<v Speaker 1>they overlap. You know, we use so much academic research

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<v Speaker 1>in our regular practice. Whether it's the behavioral side as

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<v Speaker 1>to how people misbehave, or just classic UM portfolio management theory.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a lot of things to be learned from people

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<v Speaker 1>who are spending lots of time just doing deep thought.

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<v Speaker 1>You mentioned you were running a relatively small asset management business,

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<v Speaker 1>but you've also been an outside director on some fairly

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<v Speaker 1>substantial UM multibillion dollar management firms. What does the academic

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<v Speaker 1>bring to a twenty plus billion dollar funds and how

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<v Speaker 1>does that help you? How does being on a huge

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<v Speaker 1>twenty billion dollar funds board help you as an educator? Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I think it's discipline and rigor that that the academic

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<v Speaker 1>can bring to the to the asset manager, and I

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<v Speaker 1>think it's the best of academic research. Or instance, one

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<v Speaker 1>of the things we looked at when I was was

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<v Speaker 1>on the funds board that I was on was executive compensation. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I happen to have done my dissertation and executive compensation,

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<v Speaker 1>and basically what my research showed was that incentive stock

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<v Speaker 1>options change the way people worked. So I think when

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<v Speaker 1>you bring some empirical evidence to the table that it

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<v Speaker 1>no longer is just anecdotal that I think it really

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<v Speaker 1>brings it to light and people can see that their

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<v Speaker 1>substantive research behind a lot of the findings, So not

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<v Speaker 1>just a story, but actual data that that underlines it. Look,

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<v Speaker 1>as long as you brought it up, let's talk a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit about executive compensation. My concern about stock options

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<v Speaker 1>are that you're paying people for based how well the

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<v Speaker 1>stock market does, as opposed to how much they've improved

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<v Speaker 1>the underlying company. True of false, true the delta. What

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<v Speaker 1>what you really would like to measure is the delta

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<v Speaker 1>how much how how much that particular executive change the

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<v Speaker 1>way that company operated, And too often they're just paid

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<v Speaker 1>for a tailwind. The market goes up, the sector goes up,

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<v Speaker 1>and your company within that sector is going to participate

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<v Speaker 1>in both of those, whether you're great or terrible, there's

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<v Speaker 1>going to be some overlap there exactly, and there's no

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<v Speaker 1>pure element. It's it's it's so difficult to disentangle the effects.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's talk about another rising tide. And in the

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<v Speaker 1>last minute and a half we have in the segment

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<v Speaker 1>you wrote the role of monetary policy and investment management.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh said differently, I was always taught don't fight the Fed.

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<v Speaker 1>What is the proper role of monetary policy? In investment management.

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<v Speaker 1>The curious thing is that when you say don't fight

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<v Speaker 1>the FED. Um. When I started that line of research,

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<v Speaker 1>I was an asset manager and I noticed and this

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<v Speaker 1>is in the late eighties. So remember in the late eighties,

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<v Speaker 1>the people in the industry didn't know who the chairman

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<v Speaker 1>of the FED to reserve it was. People didn't know

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<v Speaker 1>people didn't know what the FED was. Now it's front

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<v Speaker 1>page news. So if you put yourself back in there,

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<v Speaker 1>I noticed that when the FED changed policy, it influenced

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<v Speaker 1>asset prices, and so I wanted to rigorously study that

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<v Speaker 1>and empirically study that lo and behold. I started these

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<v Speaker 1>studies in the early nineties, and the culmination actually was

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<v Speaker 1>the book invest with the FED that was recently just

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<v Speaker 1>published by McGraw hill. We're gonna get to that in

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<v Speaker 1>a little while. That's on my list of things to

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<v Speaker 1>chat about. I'm Barry rid Helts. You're listening to Masters

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<v Speaker 1>in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest this week

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<v Speaker 1>is Dr Robert Johnson. He is the president of the

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<v Speaker 1>American College of Financial Services. Before that, he was a

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<v Speaker 1>very senior person at the CIFA Institute, where he had

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<v Speaker 1>a lot to do with the Chartered Financial Analyst Test

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<v Speaker 1>the CIFA exam Levels one, two, and three as it's

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<v Speaker 1>known and hated. Let's talk a little bit about the

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<v Speaker 1>institute first. What exactly is the c f A Institute

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<v Speaker 1>c fan Stude is basically two things. The cf an

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<v Speaker 1>Stude is the organization that rights and administers the c

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<v Speaker 1>f A exams, and cfn Stute is also a membership organization.

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<v Speaker 1>To maintain the c f A charter, one needs to

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<v Speaker 1>be a member of cf A Institute, so it's a

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<v Speaker 1>membership organization. I believe the numbers now are probably about

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<v Speaker 1>a hundred fifty thousand people, So there's a hundred fifty

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<v Speaker 1>thousand cf A s out there in the world. You

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<v Speaker 1>can be a member of cf A Institute without being

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<v Speaker 1>a c f A. Very few are the lion share

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<v Speaker 1>of people are c f A charter holders, are cf

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<v Speaker 1>A candidates, some cf A candidates members safe to say

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<v Speaker 1>a hundred thousand people have gone through all three exams,

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<v Speaker 1>past all three exams, well, I think I think it's

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<v Speaker 1>probably more than that because the exam started in sixty three,

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<v Speaker 1>so some of those folks have died, so I think

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<v Speaker 1>that you've probably got over somewhere between a hundred and

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<v Speaker 1>probably i'd a quarter and UM, what were your what

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<v Speaker 1>was your role at the cf A Institute. You've had

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<v Speaker 1>a number of positions within the institute. It's funny, Barry,

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<v Speaker 1>I Uh, I'm laughing because I was at Creighton University.

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<v Speaker 1>I was a tenured full professor of finance, last of

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<v Speaker 1>the landed gentry in America, and c f A Institute

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<v Speaker 1>came calling and said that they would like me to

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<v Speaker 1>come and work on the curriculum. So I took a

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<v Speaker 1>two year leave of absence in n and I was

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<v Speaker 1>hired to UH to run the curriculum development process UM too.

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<v Speaker 1>About almost two years into the process, I was promoted

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<v Speaker 1>to being head of the c f A program, the

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<v Speaker 1>whole thing, the curriculum, exams, administering the exams, standard setting

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<v Speaker 1>the exams, the whole thing. So I resigned tenure at

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<v Speaker 1>cf at Creighton University and stayed on at cf A Institute.

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<v Speaker 1>A few years later UM, I would promoted to being

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<v Speaker 1>in charge of all educational products they do. Cf A

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<v Speaker 1>does some other educational They have the Certificate Investment Performance

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<v Speaker 1>Measurement UM. They run the Financial Analyst Journal UM. A

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<v Speaker 1>lot of professional publications, conferences and so forth. So I

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<v Speaker 1>was in charge of all of those UM. Later on

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<v Speaker 1>I was promoted to being Deputy CEO UM basically second

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<v Speaker 1>in command at CFA Institute and manage the lions share

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<v Speaker 1>of the organization reported up through to me at that time.

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<v Speaker 1>So uh and I ended up leaving in two thousand eleven.

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<v Speaker 1>So I was there fifteen years. Your your bio says

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<v Speaker 1>that you have quote extensive experience with the credentialing programs UNE.

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<v Speaker 1>Now in English, what exactly does that mean. Well, there's

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<v Speaker 1>a profession that's known as psychometrics, and these are people

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<v Speaker 1>who have PhDs in measurement and testing. This is the

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<v Speaker 1>science of test ng and the science of determining who

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<v Speaker 1>has indeed passed an examination. So what I did when

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<v Speaker 1>I was at cf Institute was I knew we were

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<v Speaker 1>good at finance, and we were good at investments, but

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<v Speaker 1>I was convinced we really weren't very good at developing

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<v Speaker 1>curriculum that was great for the distance learner. And I

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<v Speaker 1>certainly didn't think we knew how to write exam questions

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<v Speaker 1>like someone who studied that for a living did. So

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<v Speaker 1>I brought psychometricians into the process and Basically what I

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<v Speaker 1>what I believe happened is we professionalize the process of

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<v Speaker 1>writing the exams, developing the curriculum and so forth. I

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<v Speaker 1>love that expression, the distance learner, the person who's not

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<v Speaker 1>just memorizing something temporarily but learning it for the long haul. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>and the other thing Barry with the c f A

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<v Speaker 1>program was the lion's share of the candidates now or

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<v Speaker 1>from outside of North America, many for many of whom

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<v Speaker 1>English is a second language. So you have to take

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<v Speaker 1>that into account when fighting the curricular materials and writing

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<v Speaker 1>the exams. And that's a big factor. Now, um, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>just interest, just nomenclature and and just common terminology, no shorthand,

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<v Speaker 1>no colloquialisms. It has to be the queen's tongue so

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<v Speaker 1>to speak right. You have to think about the person

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<v Speaker 1>in in Thailand or in Cambodia or in uh in

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<v Speaker 1>Kenya who's studying this, who it isn't familiar with colloquial English. Huh,

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<v Speaker 1>that's that's really never thought about that before. That's quite interesting.

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<v Speaker 1>So the cf A exam has a reputation for being

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<v Speaker 1>a killer, especially um. Two of the levels are known

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<v Speaker 1>as being notoriously hard. The fail rate is fairly high.

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<v Speaker 1>What what is the fail rate on the each cf

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<v Speaker 1>A level? Gosh? Now, I believe the fail rate on

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<v Speaker 1>level one is about six the fail rate more than half? Right,

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<v Speaker 1>The fail rate on level two is I believe it

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<v Speaker 1>more than half, but still more than half. Failure rate

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<v Speaker 1>on level three is less than just you know, you

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<v Speaker 1>don't even have to study now the entrance walk right

0:14:06.880 --> 0:14:09.360
<v Speaker 1>through that. It's only like a forty eight percent fail rate?

0:14:09.800 --> 0:14:12.880
<v Speaker 1>Are you could cram in like an hour? Barry every year.

0:14:13.040 --> 0:14:15.200
<v Speaker 1>I used to get letters and phone calls when I

0:14:15.240 --> 0:14:18.560
<v Speaker 1>was in charge of the CFA program and people said, well,

0:14:18.640 --> 0:14:20.920
<v Speaker 1>you must have some mistake. I got a letter that

0:14:21.000 --> 0:14:24.400
<v Speaker 1>said I failed the exam. There must be some mistake there.

0:14:24.520 --> 0:14:28.480
<v Speaker 1>I have a degree from fill in your blank, Ivy

0:14:28.520 --> 0:14:31.640
<v Speaker 1>League University. I've never failed any exam in my life.

0:14:32.720 --> 0:14:35.840
<v Speaker 1>And something is wrong with you folks. Doesn't the Sea

0:14:36.080 --> 0:14:40.200
<v Speaker 1>Institute know about the gentleman cy? And the interesting thing

0:14:40.240 --> 0:14:43.640
<v Speaker 1>there is that my response and I didn't respond in

0:14:43.680 --> 0:14:46.440
<v Speaker 1>these terms, but um I I did a much nicer

0:14:46.480 --> 0:14:49.120
<v Speaker 1>way than this. But I used to say, you know,

0:14:49.560 --> 0:14:52.400
<v Speaker 1>this is a meritocracy. We don't know who you are.

0:14:52.520 --> 0:14:55.760
<v Speaker 1>We don't know your lineage. It's how you do on

0:14:55.800 --> 0:15:00.200
<v Speaker 1>that exam, and it means at eight percent of the

0:15:00.240 --> 0:15:02.920
<v Speaker 1>candidates did better than you. And and you know, we

0:15:02.960 --> 0:15:05.720
<v Speaker 1>had people from community colleges that were passing the exam

0:15:05.760 --> 0:15:07.680
<v Speaker 1>and I used to say, you know, I think you

0:15:07.760 --> 0:15:09.840
<v Speaker 1>might want to write your letter to your alma mater

0:15:09.960 --> 0:15:12.960
<v Speaker 1>instead of us. They're the ones that failed you. So

0:15:13.040 --> 0:15:15.840
<v Speaker 1>in the last minute or so, we have left. What

0:15:15.920 --> 0:15:19.560
<v Speaker 1>does this credential NG do for investors? What does it

0:15:19.600 --> 0:15:21.480
<v Speaker 1>do for corporate clients, and what does it do for

0:15:21.520 --> 0:15:25.640
<v Speaker 1>investment banks? I think it really ups people's game. And

0:15:25.680 --> 0:15:28.640
<v Speaker 1>when somebody is hiring a c FA charter holder around

0:15:28.720 --> 0:15:32.280
<v Speaker 1>the world, and this is the same whether you're in Um,

0:15:32.320 --> 0:15:37.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, Lagos, Nigeria, or Miami, Florida, you've gone through

0:15:37.480 --> 0:15:39.160
<v Speaker 1>the same exam. If you have the letter c f

0:15:39.280 --> 0:15:41.480
<v Speaker 1>A behind your name, it means the same thing. And

0:15:41.520 --> 0:15:44.800
<v Speaker 1>you've attained that that that that level. And I think

0:15:44.800 --> 0:15:48.680
<v Speaker 1>that employers know that you're really getting someone who not

0:15:48.840 --> 0:15:51.800
<v Speaker 1>only has mastered a body and knowledge, but really had

0:15:51.800 --> 0:15:55.800
<v Speaker 1>the discipline to go through it. Because it's an arduous process.

0:15:55.880 --> 0:15:59.320
<v Speaker 1>As you said, in fact Um, most of the successful

0:15:59.360 --> 0:16:02.760
<v Speaker 1>people failed at least one of those exams, and it's

0:16:02.800 --> 0:16:05.320
<v Speaker 1>tough when those exams are only given with level two

0:16:05.320 --> 0:16:07.280
<v Speaker 1>and three are only given once a year. So you

0:16:07.360 --> 0:16:10.080
<v Speaker 1>really gotta buckled down and say, now I got to

0:16:10.120 --> 0:16:13.400
<v Speaker 1>redo this all over and do even more work than

0:16:13.440 --> 0:16:15.480
<v Speaker 1>I did last time. And I think it's a signal

0:16:15.560 --> 0:16:20.320
<v Speaker 1>to UH two investors, to clients that these are these

0:16:20.320 --> 0:16:23.160
<v Speaker 1>folks are bit really best to breed. I'm Barry Ridholtz.

0:16:23.200 --> 0:16:26.280
<v Speaker 1>You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My

0:16:26.360 --> 0:16:29.680
<v Speaker 1>special guest today is Dr Robert Johnson. He is the

0:16:29.680 --> 0:16:33.720
<v Speaker 1>head of the American College of Financial Services. He used

0:16:33.760 --> 0:16:38.240
<v Speaker 1>to run the entire cf A Institute Chartered Financial Analyst

0:16:38.360 --> 0:16:43.200
<v Speaker 1>Testing program and the curriculum program, and is extremely knowledgeable

0:16:43.240 --> 0:16:47.360
<v Speaker 1>about all things cf A related. Let's talk about a

0:16:47.400 --> 0:16:50.800
<v Speaker 1>book you wrote way back when, called The Tools and

0:16:50.920 --> 0:16:55.240
<v Speaker 1>Techniques of Investment Planning. What what motivated you do to

0:16:55.520 --> 0:16:58.760
<v Speaker 1>pen a book of such a title. To be perfectly

0:16:58.800 --> 0:17:01.200
<v Speaker 1>honest with you, I want to do I have had

0:17:01.240 --> 0:17:04.399
<v Speaker 1>a relationship of professional relationship with the individual that I

0:17:04.440 --> 0:17:07.400
<v Speaker 1>wrote it with, and it was an excuse for us

0:17:07.440 --> 0:17:10.520
<v Speaker 1>to uh stay together. He worked with me at c

0:17:10.680 --> 0:17:14.320
<v Speaker 1>FA Institute and it was an opportunity to continue working

0:17:14.320 --> 0:17:17.280
<v Speaker 1>with him. His name is Tom Robinson. Tom is now

0:17:17.320 --> 0:17:20.960
<v Speaker 1>the president and CEO of Double A CSB International, the

0:17:21.359 --> 0:17:25.159
<v Speaker 1>accredited the Double A c s B, the accrediting agency

0:17:25.280 --> 0:17:29.680
<v Speaker 1>that does uh collegiate schools of business. Oh, really, collegiate

0:17:29.840 --> 0:17:32.360
<v Speaker 1>schools of business. So anybody who wants to my alamont

0:17:32.440 --> 0:17:35.360
<v Speaker 1>is Stonybrook. They added a school of business recently. They

0:17:35.400 --> 0:17:37.120
<v Speaker 1>had to jump through his hoops. They have to jump

0:17:37.160 --> 0:17:41.280
<v Speaker 1>through those hoops recently, years ago, recently. Um, that's interesting.

0:17:41.280 --> 0:17:43.920
<v Speaker 1>I don't even know such a thing. I assumed it existed.

0:17:44.000 --> 0:17:47.720
<v Speaker 1>I never knew what the acronym it was. So let's

0:17:47.720 --> 0:17:50.879
<v Speaker 1>talk a little bit about the details of that. What

0:17:51.080 --> 0:17:55.400
<v Speaker 1>should clients expect from their relationship with their financial advisor.

0:17:56.080 --> 0:17:59.639
<v Speaker 1>They should expect that that financial advisor is acting in

0:17:59.640 --> 0:18:04.119
<v Speaker 1>their interest. And unfortunately, what we have now is that

0:18:04.160 --> 0:18:08.000
<v Speaker 1>the landscape, I believe, is that we have what you

0:18:08.000 --> 0:18:12.399
<v Speaker 1>would refer to Barry as a financial services industry and

0:18:12.520 --> 0:18:16.520
<v Speaker 1>not a financial services profession. And I think you're a

0:18:16.600 --> 0:18:20.879
<v Speaker 1>profession if you have three qualities, and those three qualities

0:18:20.960 --> 0:18:25.760
<v Speaker 1>or knowledge that the second is that you have some experience,

0:18:26.480 --> 0:18:28.879
<v Speaker 1>and the third thing that makes you a professional is

0:18:28.920 --> 0:18:32.000
<v Speaker 1>that you aspire to a code of ethics. And whether

0:18:32.040 --> 0:18:34.760
<v Speaker 1>you're a doctor, whether you're a lawyer or an architect,

0:18:35.200 --> 0:18:39.720
<v Speaker 1>whatever your profession, a profession has to have those three elements.

0:18:39.960 --> 0:18:45.120
<v Speaker 1>And I think that's why, unfortunately the financial services financial

0:18:45.160 --> 0:18:48.160
<v Speaker 1>services is referred to as an industry instead of a profession.

0:18:48.240 --> 0:18:49.600
<v Speaker 1>And one of the things we want to do with

0:18:49.680 --> 0:18:52.560
<v Speaker 1>the American College that C. F. Anstude is doing in

0:18:52.600 --> 0:18:56.520
<v Speaker 1>the investment management realm, in financial planning is we want

0:18:56.520 --> 0:19:00.399
<v Speaker 1>to make financial services a profession. That's what we buyer

0:19:00.440 --> 0:19:03.520
<v Speaker 1>to do. So I'm on the same side of the

0:19:03.560 --> 0:19:06.400
<v Speaker 1>boat as you. I think we should have a fiduciary standard.

0:19:06.440 --> 0:19:09.640
<v Speaker 1>I think the best interests of the client should be paramount.

0:19:10.080 --> 0:19:12.960
<v Speaker 1>But let me, however, briefly take the other side of

0:19:13.000 --> 0:19:16.520
<v Speaker 1>the argument. This is what in the we just finished

0:19:16.520 --> 0:19:22.040
<v Speaker 1>a fairly robust debate about the fiduciary standard on retirement accounts.

0:19:23.119 --> 0:19:27.400
<v Speaker 1>I argued against people who said we shouldn't do that.

0:19:28.400 --> 0:19:31.000
<v Speaker 1>I said, there's no reason we shouldn't. But let me

0:19:31.080 --> 0:19:35.040
<v Speaker 1>push back, and and here's the argument that they said, Well,

0:19:35.080 --> 0:19:39.000
<v Speaker 1>if we're on the brokerag side, we have our own

0:19:39.040 --> 0:19:42.840
<v Speaker 1>ethical code that we're obligated to be maintain a certain

0:19:42.920 --> 0:19:46.959
<v Speaker 1>level of ethical standard. We may not have a fiduciary obligation,

0:19:47.040 --> 0:19:49.639
<v Speaker 1>but we certainly have to know our clients and have

0:19:50.119 --> 0:19:54.080
<v Speaker 1>only offer them suitable investments. And if we engage in

0:19:54.119 --> 0:19:58.760
<v Speaker 1>any behavior that transgresses from that, we could be penalized

0:19:59.280 --> 0:20:02.439
<v Speaker 1>or or I heard from the industry, what's what's wrong

0:20:02.520 --> 0:20:05.920
<v Speaker 1>from with that argument? I think suitability burries a pretty

0:20:05.920 --> 0:20:09.800
<v Speaker 1>low hurdle, to say the least. But I'm trying really

0:20:09.840 --> 0:20:12.760
<v Speaker 1>hard to take that side of the case. It's not easy.

0:20:12.960 --> 0:20:15.600
<v Speaker 1>I don't think I really don't think there's a lot

0:20:15.640 --> 0:20:22.119
<v Speaker 1>of people that oppose the statement that that people in

0:20:22.119 --> 0:20:26.680
<v Speaker 1>the financial services and i'll say profession here should act

0:20:26.720 --> 0:20:28.600
<v Speaker 1>as a fiduciary. I don't think there are many people

0:20:28.600 --> 0:20:31.560
<v Speaker 1>would argue with that. Where people are arguing is this

0:20:31.640 --> 0:20:37.160
<v Speaker 1>fiduciary standard, and that that it is fairly nebulous. For instance,

0:20:37.240 --> 0:20:42.160
<v Speaker 1>reasonable fees. We'll define what reasonable fees are, define how

0:20:42.280 --> 0:20:46.840
<v Speaker 1>much somebody needs to know in terms of fulfilling that

0:20:46.920 --> 0:20:51.440
<v Speaker 1>fiduciary standards. So let's separate that fact that we all

0:20:51.480 --> 0:20:54.800
<v Speaker 1>agree that people should be a fiduciary with the fact

0:20:54.840 --> 0:20:57.520
<v Speaker 1>that of course, the devil's in the details. Well, there

0:20:57.560 --> 0:21:01.280
<v Speaker 1>are such things as best practices. You can could average costs,

0:21:01.320 --> 0:21:04.680
<v Speaker 1>and there's always a gray line. Well, if the averages,

0:21:04.720 --> 0:21:06.320
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to use a fat round number. If the

0:21:06.320 --> 0:21:09.359
<v Speaker 1>average is one percent, and you think you're doing something

0:21:09.480 --> 0:21:11.920
<v Speaker 1>special and you're charging one in a quarter and one

0:21:11.960 --> 0:21:15.320
<v Speaker 1>and a half percent, I don't think anyone's gonna argue

0:21:15.320 --> 0:21:18.359
<v Speaker 1>that that is uxurious. On the other hands, when we

0:21:18.400 --> 0:21:24.280
<v Speaker 1>see nine percent and really multiples of an average one percent,

0:21:24.800 --> 0:21:28.439
<v Speaker 1>that that's a pretty bright line variation. So where it

0:21:28.480 --> 0:21:32.800
<v Speaker 1>gets a little challenging is okay, one percent is is standard.

0:21:33.200 --> 0:21:34.920
<v Speaker 1>One in a quarter is a little high, but it's

0:21:34.920 --> 0:21:38.520
<v Speaker 1>not ridiculous one and a half, especially for smaller accounts.

0:21:39.840 --> 0:21:44.280
<v Speaker 1>The question becomes, shouldn't it simply be what's in the

0:21:44.359 --> 0:21:47.680
<v Speaker 1>best interest of the client? Hey, here's our fee structure.

0:21:47.720 --> 0:21:50.960
<v Speaker 1>Were transparent, We're gonna disclose our fees. It's all out

0:21:50.960 --> 0:21:53.440
<v Speaker 1>in the open. There's no conflicts. Nobody else is paying

0:21:53.520 --> 0:21:56.760
<v Speaker 1>us uh under the table, it's all here in front

0:21:56.760 --> 0:22:00.359
<v Speaker 1>of you. It should be fairly easy to make the

0:22:00.480 --> 0:22:04.720
<v Speaker 1>interest of the clients that that shouldn't be a challenging standard.

0:22:04.760 --> 0:22:09.240
<v Speaker 1>Best interest or fiduciary should it? I think the worry is,

0:22:09.280 --> 0:22:11.720
<v Speaker 1>after the fact, how are you going to judge best interest?

0:22:11.760 --> 0:22:14.399
<v Speaker 1>And let me give you just uh an idea of

0:22:14.440 --> 0:22:17.679
<v Speaker 1>what I mean. Most of the studies out there, and

0:22:17.720 --> 0:22:19.840
<v Speaker 1>you know this, most of the studies out there show

0:22:19.920 --> 0:22:26.640
<v Speaker 1>that active managers underperform the indexes over the long haul. Right,

0:22:27.680 --> 0:22:29.800
<v Speaker 1>So if you take the fiduciary standard, and I know

0:22:29.880 --> 0:22:31.760
<v Speaker 1>that it's not going to be taken to the limit,

0:22:31.800 --> 0:22:35.679
<v Speaker 1>but if you take the fiduciary standard to the limit, gosh,

0:22:35.760 --> 0:22:38.720
<v Speaker 1>isn't the best interest to put people in index funds

0:22:38.840 --> 0:22:42.399
<v Speaker 1>that are virtually no cost? Now because index funds the

0:22:42.440 --> 0:22:44.439
<v Speaker 1>cost has gone to zero, and the wealth of the

0:22:44.480 --> 0:22:48.520
<v Speaker 1>evidence shows that at most active managers failed to beat

0:22:49.359 --> 0:22:51.840
<v Speaker 1>I think, listen, that's how I manage money. But that's

0:22:51.880 --> 0:22:55.560
<v Speaker 1>not what necessarily what everybody wants. Some people. If someone

0:22:55.640 --> 0:22:58.480
<v Speaker 1>says to me, look, I would be bored with that

0:22:58.600 --> 0:23:00.359
<v Speaker 1>and I wouldn't be able to stay with So I

0:23:00.400 --> 0:23:04.960
<v Speaker 1>need something just to keep me interested. You could talk

0:23:05.000 --> 0:23:06.760
<v Speaker 1>till you're blue in the face to that person. I

0:23:06.760 --> 0:23:11.440
<v Speaker 1>could say, look, all the academic data says overwhelmingly your

0:23:11.480 --> 0:23:16.320
<v Speaker 1>best bet is low cost. Broadly diversified global indices, you

0:23:16.440 --> 0:23:20.480
<v Speaker 1>rebalance it regularly, see you next year. Investing should be boring.

0:23:21.000 --> 0:23:24.320
<v Speaker 1>If a person says to me, I can't do that,

0:23:24.320 --> 0:23:25.840
<v Speaker 1>that would board me out of my mind. Then I

0:23:25.880 --> 0:23:28.359
<v Speaker 1>know in six months i'd be on too. The next advisor.

0:23:28.800 --> 0:23:30.880
<v Speaker 1>Well me personally, I would say, well, let me save

0:23:30.880 --> 0:23:33.040
<v Speaker 1>you the six months and go find another advisor now,

0:23:33.080 --> 0:23:36.080
<v Speaker 1>and we'll we'll just say, hey, this isn't a great fit.

0:23:36.480 --> 0:23:39.520
<v Speaker 1>But what about the advisor who understands that this guy

0:23:40.040 --> 0:23:43.439
<v Speaker 1>needs a little excitement in his life and and Sunday

0:23:43.520 --> 0:23:46.879
<v Speaker 1>night football doesn't get it done for him, and understands

0:23:46.960 --> 0:23:49.760
<v Speaker 1>the risk he's taking. It's weird for me to make

0:23:49.800 --> 0:23:51.520
<v Speaker 1>this argument because I don't believe any of it. But

0:23:51.760 --> 0:23:54.360
<v Speaker 1>he understands the risk he's taking in order to try

0:23:54.400 --> 0:23:59.320
<v Speaker 1>and capture alpha, that he might actually forego beta. But

0:23:59.440 --> 0:24:02.399
<v Speaker 1>he needs some of his portfolite. Here. We'll take ten percent.

0:24:02.680 --> 0:24:05.600
<v Speaker 1>We'll put you in this high octane slug and maybe

0:24:05.640 --> 0:24:09.040
<v Speaker 1>that will keep you focused on this so we could

0:24:09.080 --> 0:24:11.600
<v Speaker 1>let the bulk of your portfolio do what it's supposed

0:24:11.600 --> 0:24:15.399
<v Speaker 1>to do. If a client understands and wants that, is

0:24:15.400 --> 0:24:18.200
<v Speaker 1>it in his best interest to give him the medicine

0:24:18.240 --> 0:24:20.520
<v Speaker 1>that he doesn't want, isn't going to take and is

0:24:20.560 --> 0:24:22.520
<v Speaker 1>going to move on at a certain point, doesn't the

0:24:22.560 --> 0:24:26.040
<v Speaker 1>behavior of the investor become a question. Oh, I wouldn't

0:24:26.040 --> 0:24:28.520
<v Speaker 1>force it on anybody. But what I'm saying is the

0:24:28.640 --> 0:24:32.919
<v Speaker 1>lay investor that comes to the advisor, I mean, the

0:24:32.960 --> 0:24:37.240
<v Speaker 1>default to me would be indexing given the evidence under

0:24:37.240 --> 0:24:40.840
<v Speaker 1>the fiduciary standard. So I just think that the devil's

0:24:40.880 --> 0:24:44.240
<v Speaker 1>in the details. And and after the fact, if somebody

0:24:44.280 --> 0:24:49.280
<v Speaker 1>put an investor in active funds that underperformed, is that

0:24:49.440 --> 0:24:51.800
<v Speaker 1>active manager going to be is that is that person

0:24:51.840 --> 0:24:53.919
<v Speaker 1>going to be liable? And I don't know that we

0:24:54.000 --> 0:24:57.359
<v Speaker 1>know that yet. I don't think we could say after

0:24:57.400 --> 0:25:00.440
<v Speaker 1>the fact that if you went active because a client

0:25:00.520 --> 0:25:05.439
<v Speaker 1>requested it, and we know of active managers don't hit

0:25:05.480 --> 0:25:08.080
<v Speaker 1>their benchmark, Look, we can look at it over a decade.

0:25:08.240 --> 0:25:13.359
<v Speaker 1>Once you're taking cost fees, taxes. Almost nobody outperforms the

0:25:13.359 --> 0:25:15.840
<v Speaker 1>indexes over a deck, you know. But I'm even saying

0:25:15.920 --> 0:25:18.760
<v Speaker 1>the investor that comes, the lay investor that comes and

0:25:18.800 --> 0:25:22.280
<v Speaker 1>doesn't have a predisposition toward active or passive, and the

0:25:22.280 --> 0:25:26.320
<v Speaker 1>the advisor puts them in active, why did this advisor.

0:25:26.560 --> 0:25:29.720
<v Speaker 1>Investor go to this advisor. There are a lot of questions,

0:25:30.040 --> 0:25:34.520
<v Speaker 1>look the way, so let me I try not to

0:25:34.560 --> 0:25:36.640
<v Speaker 1>talk about my practice on the air because it's too

0:25:36.640 --> 0:25:40.040
<v Speaker 1>easy to just digress. But we set stuff up so

0:25:40.080 --> 0:25:43.160
<v Speaker 1>that there's a three step process, and step one is, hey,

0:25:43.160 --> 0:25:44.679
<v Speaker 1>are we a good fit for you? When we have

0:25:44.720 --> 0:25:48.040
<v Speaker 1>a client, content or prospective client contact us, and the

0:25:48.080 --> 0:25:50.840
<v Speaker 1>first thing he's doing is what's your sharp ratio? How

0:25:50.920 --> 0:25:52.919
<v Speaker 1>much draw down can I expect? How much should I

0:25:52.920 --> 0:25:56.679
<v Speaker 1>expect to outperform the market? You know that those are

0:25:56.720 --> 0:26:00.000
<v Speaker 1>red flags that let us force us to say, listen,

0:26:00.280 --> 0:26:03.400
<v Speaker 1>let we appreciate your interest, let us explain what we do.

0:26:04.359 --> 0:26:06.680
<v Speaker 1>And based on what you're describing, we're not sure you're

0:26:06.680 --> 0:26:09.240
<v Speaker 1>a good fit. But here's what we do, Global low

0:26:09.280 --> 0:26:12.399
<v Speaker 1>cost index blah blah blah. But you were looking for

0:26:12.440 --> 0:26:14.840
<v Speaker 1>a little more juice. Now let's figure out what you

0:26:14.880 --> 0:26:17.240
<v Speaker 1>really want need when you canna retire, when you gonna

0:26:17.280 --> 0:26:20.680
<v Speaker 1>draw down kids in college blah blah blah. And when

0:26:20.720 --> 0:26:23.960
<v Speaker 1>we get to how the money is deployed. If you

0:26:24.040 --> 0:26:25.879
<v Speaker 1>want to have a slug, if you want to have

0:26:25.880 --> 0:26:30.480
<v Speaker 1>a sleeve of your money in a really sexy high octane,

0:26:30.960 --> 0:26:33.280
<v Speaker 1>shoot the lights out when the times are good, but

0:26:34.000 --> 0:26:37.240
<v Speaker 1>get she lacked when the times are bad. Sort of sleeve.

0:26:37.920 --> 0:26:41.520
<v Speaker 1>We work with other third party managers. Just somebody who

0:26:41.560 --> 0:26:43.800
<v Speaker 1>I know offers that there's a handful of people who

0:26:43.840 --> 0:26:46.600
<v Speaker 1>were great at it, but we don't think that's the

0:26:46.640 --> 0:26:48.920
<v Speaker 1>best thing for you over the long haul. We think

0:26:48.920 --> 0:26:51.320
<v Speaker 1>over the long haul, hey, the market's going to give

0:26:51.320 --> 0:26:54.160
<v Speaker 1>you a certain amount with the lowest cost, the lowest

0:26:54.200 --> 0:26:56.359
<v Speaker 1>amount of risk, the lowest turn over, the lowest taxes,

0:26:56.359 --> 0:26:59.600
<v Speaker 1>blah blah blah blah blah. So sometimes you have to

0:26:59.760 --> 0:27:04.080
<v Speaker 1>look at a client who I swear this is true.

0:27:04.119 --> 0:27:06.280
<v Speaker 1>I tell this to people, and nobody believes me. I

0:27:06.320 --> 0:27:09.920
<v Speaker 1>got an email about five years ago from somebody who

0:27:10.000 --> 0:27:14.560
<v Speaker 1>who send says to me, um, I just inherited a

0:27:14.600 --> 0:27:16.360
<v Speaker 1>big slug of money, and I want to give half

0:27:16.359 --> 0:27:20.520
<v Speaker 1>a million dollars to five advisors, and whoever does the best,

0:27:20.800 --> 0:27:23.200
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to give ten million to. That's the money

0:27:23.200 --> 0:27:25.399
<v Speaker 1>behind it, and what was the best over what time period?

0:27:25.680 --> 0:27:28.199
<v Speaker 1>Over a year? So so I wrote him back and

0:27:28.240 --> 0:27:32.520
<v Speaker 1>said thank you, but no thanks. But before you dismiss

0:27:32.560 --> 0:27:35.879
<v Speaker 1>my dismissing of your offer, let me explain to you

0:27:35.920 --> 0:27:39.720
<v Speaker 1>what you just did. You just created created um a

0:27:39.840 --> 0:27:45.040
<v Speaker 1>game theory agency issue where you've incentivized five managers. They

0:27:45.080 --> 0:27:47.440
<v Speaker 1>know the odds are only one in five that you're

0:27:47.440 --> 0:27:50.879
<v Speaker 1>gonna they're gonna win, So you've incented them to swing

0:27:51.000 --> 0:27:53.760
<v Speaker 1>for the fences. And if they lose, well, I got

0:27:53.840 --> 0:27:57.080
<v Speaker 1>a year fees out of this guy, and if they win,

0:27:57.520 --> 0:28:01.119
<v Speaker 1>you can't tell the difference between lat repeatable process. So

0:28:01.760 --> 0:28:06.320
<v Speaker 1>no matter what, you just wasted a quarter two million dollars,

0:28:06.359 --> 0:28:09.000
<v Speaker 1>and heaven forbid, you give money to the guy who

0:28:09.040 --> 0:28:11.520
<v Speaker 1>did the best, and it has nothing to do with

0:28:11.560 --> 0:28:14.560
<v Speaker 1>how he should manage your ten million dollars. The question

0:28:14.680 --> 0:28:17.680
<v Speaker 1>you should be asking is what do I want to

0:28:17.760 --> 0:28:20.480
<v Speaker 1>use this money for money as a tool? How best

0:28:20.560 --> 0:28:22.960
<v Speaker 1>can I do that with the least amount of risk

0:28:23.040 --> 0:28:25.760
<v Speaker 1>to myself and my family? And where what is this

0:28:25.800 --> 0:28:28.760
<v Speaker 1>going to do for me over the next sixty years

0:28:28.760 --> 0:28:31.480
<v Speaker 1>and beyond not who's going to shoot the lights out?

0:28:31.520 --> 0:28:34.600
<v Speaker 1>So I have bragging rights at a cocktail party, but

0:28:34.960 --> 0:28:37.440
<v Speaker 1>nobody you know? So I never heard from that guy again.

0:28:37.480 --> 0:28:39.840
<v Speaker 1>And I swear that was the email. I remember it

0:28:40.000 --> 0:28:42.520
<v Speaker 1>was a million of person or a half of whatever

0:28:42.520 --> 0:28:47.480
<v Speaker 1>it was. It was some idiotic thing. When we look

0:28:47.600 --> 0:28:50.440
<v Speaker 1>at the right way to manage money for clients, is

0:28:50.520 --> 0:28:54.600
<v Speaker 1>that really that person, what that person wants or what

0:28:54.760 --> 0:28:58.880
<v Speaker 1>that person needs is should be paramounts. So so that's

0:28:58.880 --> 0:29:01.480
<v Speaker 1>the question. UM. I don't mean to go on a

0:29:01.520 --> 0:29:04.920
<v Speaker 1>massive digression in the last minute we have in this section.

0:29:05.320 --> 0:29:09.240
<v Speaker 1>Let me ask one short question. What is it that

0:29:09.360 --> 0:29:12.400
<v Speaker 1>the industry is doing right and and what's its biggest flaw.

0:29:15.280 --> 0:29:18.719
<v Speaker 1>I think that the biggest flaw is that the industry

0:29:19.120 --> 0:29:23.680
<v Speaker 1>doesn't encourage enough people to invest enough. And I don't

0:29:23.680 --> 0:29:27.000
<v Speaker 1>mean invest a large amount of money. I mean invest

0:29:27.200 --> 0:29:30.760
<v Speaker 1>people want to speculate. You talked about that. We're in

0:29:30.840 --> 0:29:35.920
<v Speaker 1>an era of four seven. People can check their account balances.

0:29:36.680 --> 0:29:40.600
<v Speaker 1>We have people that are constantly moderate monitoring what they're doing,

0:29:41.600 --> 0:29:45.640
<v Speaker 1>and people want this action. You know, it used to

0:29:45.680 --> 0:29:48.160
<v Speaker 1>be bury when I was back when I was teaching

0:29:48.160 --> 0:29:50.960
<v Speaker 1>at Creighton. I used to record on VHS tape. So

0:29:51.000 --> 0:29:53.440
<v Speaker 1>that's how long ago it was Wall Street Week with

0:29:53.600 --> 0:29:58.440
<v Speaker 1>Chris Verkeiser. We've gone from Wall Street Week now to

0:29:58.880 --> 0:30:02.680
<v Speaker 1>Jim Kramer scream mad Money. I heard something the other

0:30:02.760 --> 0:30:06.880
<v Speaker 1>day on one of the twenty four seven UM business

0:30:06.880 --> 0:30:10.479
<v Speaker 1>business networks that was really interesting. There was a debate

0:30:11.320 --> 0:30:14.760
<v Speaker 1>between two folks on a particular stock and they said, well,

0:30:14.840 --> 0:30:18.200
<v Speaker 1>let's let's figure out over the long term. We'll come

0:30:18.200 --> 0:30:20.640
<v Speaker 1>back over the long term and figure out who's right.

0:30:21.160 --> 0:30:23.280
<v Speaker 1>And they said, yeah, we'll come back in six months.

0:30:24.120 --> 0:30:27.760
<v Speaker 1>So six months has become the long term. I think

0:30:27.800 --> 0:30:32.880
<v Speaker 1>that that is the industry I believe is not doing

0:30:33.040 --> 0:30:37.160
<v Speaker 1>enough to promote investing and is you know, looking at

0:30:37.480 --> 0:30:40.680
<v Speaker 1>a speculating It's funny because over the course of my career,

0:30:41.320 --> 0:30:45.440
<v Speaker 1>my holding periods have gone from minutes, two months, two years,

0:30:45.480 --> 0:30:47.680
<v Speaker 1>to deck. I started out as a trader and if

0:30:47.720 --> 0:30:49.360
<v Speaker 1>you had to hold something for twenty minutes, it was

0:30:49.400 --> 0:30:53.760
<v Speaker 1>a long time, and then it slowly moved to long

0:30:53.800 --> 0:30:56.160
<v Speaker 1>long term being defined as six months to a year,

0:30:56.160 --> 0:30:58.920
<v Speaker 1>and now long term is decades. So I kind of

0:30:59.680 --> 0:31:03.680
<v Speaker 1>did full one eighty from my early days. But I

0:31:03.720 --> 0:31:06.800
<v Speaker 1>see everybody else go in the opposite direction, the holding

0:31:06.800 --> 0:31:09.840
<v Speaker 1>periods of getting shorter. Not talking about h f T

0:31:10.000 --> 0:31:12.600
<v Speaker 1>s with the guys who are holding things for a nanosecond,

0:31:12.640 --> 0:31:16.240
<v Speaker 1>I mean actual investors and traders. Is that your perception

0:31:16.280 --> 0:31:18.800
<v Speaker 1>of this as well? It is um, you know. I

0:31:18.840 --> 0:31:20.720
<v Speaker 1>think the other thing that I think the industry is

0:31:20.760 --> 0:31:23.880
<v Speaker 1>doing wrong is that they tend to take something that's

0:31:23.880 --> 0:31:28.760
<v Speaker 1>pretty inherently simple. Investing is really inherently simple and making

0:31:28.880 --> 0:31:32.719
<v Speaker 1>it very complex. I think investment bankers are wonderful for that.

0:31:32.760 --> 0:31:35.240
<v Speaker 1>They always kind of stay one step ahead of folks

0:31:35.320 --> 0:31:39.640
<v Speaker 1>in terms of making something incredibly complex that's pretty simple.

0:31:39.680 --> 0:31:42.720
<v Speaker 1>Think about what happened in the mortgage crisis. So there's

0:31:43.000 --> 0:31:45.320
<v Speaker 1>there's a lot of money in complexity. There is money

0:31:45.320 --> 0:31:47.280
<v Speaker 1>in complexity, and I think one of the things the

0:31:47.360 --> 0:31:51.600
<v Speaker 1>financial advisors should do for folks is that trusted advisors

0:31:51.640 --> 0:31:54.760
<v Speaker 1>should be able to cut through the complexity and go

0:31:54.880 --> 0:31:58.160
<v Speaker 1>the other way. Take something that's complex and make it simple.

0:31:58.720 --> 0:32:00.880
<v Speaker 1>Makes a whole lot of sense. When high was managing money,

0:32:00.920 --> 0:32:04.600
<v Speaker 1>That's what I said of what I did was counseling,

0:32:06.080 --> 0:32:10.200
<v Speaker 1>counseling and teaching. That's very very sounds very familiar. I'm

0:32:10.240 --> 0:32:12.960
<v Speaker 1>Barry rid Hults. You're listening to Masters in Business on

0:32:13.000 --> 0:32:16.600
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Radio. My special guest today is Dr Robert Johnson.

0:32:17.120 --> 0:32:21.840
<v Speaker 1>He is the president of the American College of Financial Services.

0:32:21.880 --> 0:32:25.280
<v Speaker 1>He's a former head of the Curriculum and Testing at

0:32:25.320 --> 0:32:29.080
<v Speaker 1>the c f A institute, author of a number of books.

0:32:29.200 --> 0:32:32.720
<v Speaker 1>Let's talk about um a couple of books you wrote

0:32:32.760 --> 0:32:36.520
<v Speaker 1>that I think are really interesting. What is it that

0:32:36.640 --> 0:32:40.280
<v Speaker 1>strategic value investing is and how does that differ from

0:32:40.320 --> 0:32:42.880
<v Speaker 1>just good old value investment. Well, first thing I have

0:32:42.960 --> 0:32:44.719
<v Speaker 1>to do is put a plug in for the book,

0:32:45.280 --> 0:32:48.360
<v Speaker 1>and I put this whole segment. Last week I found

0:32:48.360 --> 0:32:54.640
<v Speaker 1>out that my idol in the business, Mr Buffett, growing

0:32:54.760 --> 0:32:57.000
<v Speaker 1>up in almahaa Braska. How can you not look sure,

0:32:57.200 --> 0:33:01.320
<v Speaker 1>look up to Warren Buffett. Mr Buffett has put strategic

0:33:01.400 --> 0:33:05.160
<v Speaker 1>value investing on his annual reading list for the Berkshire

0:33:05.200 --> 0:33:08.120
<v Speaker 1>hand Hathaway Annual meeting. Oh my goodness, that's fantastic. There's

0:33:08.120 --> 0:33:10.800
<v Speaker 1>a very excited There are about three dozen books. I

0:33:10.880 --> 0:33:14.720
<v Speaker 1>will be in Omaha signing books along at the Berkshire

0:33:14.760 --> 0:33:19.280
<v Speaker 1>Hathaway meeting. And again, for somebody who grew up in Omaha, Nebraska,

0:33:19.520 --> 0:33:23.640
<v Speaker 1>that is about the pinnacle of a career in investments.

0:33:23.680 --> 0:33:26.240
<v Speaker 1>So someone from Berkshire reached out to you and said,

0:33:26.240 --> 0:33:28.800
<v Speaker 1>we want you at the annual meeting and come signed

0:33:28.800 --> 0:33:31.880
<v Speaker 1>books and will you get a chance that there's He

0:33:32.000 --> 0:33:35.720
<v Speaker 1>works with a bookstore in Omaha, and the bookstore puts

0:33:35.720 --> 0:33:38.800
<v Speaker 1>a list out of books that they believe should be

0:33:38.880 --> 0:33:43.280
<v Speaker 1>on the list. And how my book showed up on there,

0:33:43.320 --> 0:33:46.840
<v Speaker 1>I didn't know. But one of our PR people called

0:33:47.080 --> 0:33:50.040
<v Speaker 1>the Omaha bookstore that does this. The Bookworm is a

0:33:50.160 --> 0:33:52.600
<v Speaker 1>name of the book, and they said that an email

0:33:52.680 --> 0:33:55.240
<v Speaker 1>came from Mr Buffett personally to say, I want to

0:33:55.280 --> 0:33:58.960
<v Speaker 1>put this book on the list. So you know, I've

0:34:00.080 --> 0:34:04.480
<v Speaker 1>been on cloud nine since. But strategic, yeah, strategic value

0:34:04.480 --> 0:34:09.239
<v Speaker 1>investing is simply there are various schools of thought and

0:34:09.320 --> 0:34:12.719
<v Speaker 1>value investing. It started with Ben Graham, of course, uh

0:34:12.760 --> 0:34:16.240
<v Speaker 1>the father of value investing. But strate in strategic value investing,

0:34:16.280 --> 0:34:20.359
<v Speaker 1>we look at several definitions of value investing, whether that

0:34:20.400 --> 0:34:24.040
<v Speaker 1>be the traditional Graham and Dodd. We look at residual income,

0:34:24.160 --> 0:34:27.040
<v Speaker 1>we look at asset based approaches. We look at a

0:34:27.080 --> 0:34:31.239
<v Speaker 1>lot of different approaches to value investing. And what we

0:34:31.360 --> 0:34:34.480
<v Speaker 1>believe is that gives the reader the opportunity to kind

0:34:34.480 --> 0:34:38.160
<v Speaker 1>of figure out where their proclivity is, what kind of

0:34:38.239 --> 0:34:42.120
<v Speaker 1>style they may want to develop, because you know, value

0:34:42.160 --> 0:34:48.880
<v Speaker 1>investing is a discipline. UM name your value investor, Wally White's,

0:34:49.280 --> 0:34:52.520
<v Speaker 1>Warren Buffett, John Neff, they all have a little bit

0:34:52.560 --> 0:34:55.960
<v Speaker 1>of a different variations on a theme. So I think

0:34:56.000 --> 0:35:00.239
<v Speaker 1>that a book that describes all those different variations and

0:35:00.320 --> 0:35:03.279
<v Speaker 1>shows them to people and kind of cuts through a

0:35:03.320 --> 0:35:06.280
<v Speaker 1>lot of what they do, I think helps people develop

0:35:06.360 --> 0:35:11.239
<v Speaker 1>their own style. Huh, that's quite interesting, So let's keep

0:35:11.280 --> 0:35:15.319
<v Speaker 1>let's keep plowing away through. So you're saying that your

0:35:15.440 --> 0:35:20.480
<v Speaker 1>version of strategic value investing, it's based on traditional value investing.

0:35:20.520 --> 0:35:23.880
<v Speaker 1>You're just looking at certain variations on that theme, the

0:35:23.960 --> 0:35:26.879
<v Speaker 1>different variations on the theme. So let's talk about another

0:35:26.920 --> 0:35:29.560
<v Speaker 1>book of yours invest with the FED that came out

0:35:29.800 --> 0:35:34.120
<v Speaker 1>fairly recently. Um, what does that mean? And this goes

0:35:34.160 --> 0:35:38.759
<v Speaker 1>back to the old Marty's Wide comment don't fight the Fed. Yeah.

0:35:38.800 --> 0:35:40.759
<v Speaker 1>The other Marty's Wide quote that I love is he

0:35:40.800 --> 0:35:43.640
<v Speaker 1>said money makes the mare go if you look at

0:35:43.640 --> 0:35:47.319
<v Speaker 1>it as in terms of horse racing. Basically, what we

0:35:47.440 --> 0:35:50.200
<v Speaker 1>show in the book, and my co authors are Jerry

0:35:50.280 --> 0:35:53.800
<v Speaker 1>Jensen of Greaton University and Luis Garcia Fijo of Florida

0:35:53.840 --> 0:35:57.120
<v Speaker 1>Atlantic University. And once again this was an excuse to

0:35:57.200 --> 0:36:01.080
<v Speaker 1>keep working with former colleagues. Both of those individuals worked

0:36:01.080 --> 0:36:04.759
<v Speaker 1>with me on the c f A program. But basically

0:36:04.760 --> 0:36:08.440
<v Speaker 1>what we did was we in a very rigorous empirical

0:36:08.560 --> 0:36:16.439
<v Speaker 1>sense looked at FED policy and how different capital markets perform, stocks, bonds, commodities,

0:36:16.520 --> 0:36:18.560
<v Speaker 1>real estate, and so forth. And just to give you

0:36:18.600 --> 0:36:22.680
<v Speaker 1>a little flavor, when the FED was being expansive with

0:36:22.800 --> 0:36:27.200
<v Speaker 1>monetary policy, the SMP on average returned fifteen point two percent.

0:36:27.880 --> 0:36:31.640
<v Speaker 1>When the FED was being restrictive, the market returned the

0:36:31.760 --> 0:36:35.000
<v Speaker 1>SMP returned about five point nine percent. And this was

0:36:35.080 --> 0:36:39.440
<v Speaker 1>over a long time period of that's a giant, giant

0:36:39.719 --> 0:36:42.040
<v Speaker 1>and it's even and that was over a time period

0:36:42.080 --> 0:36:45.239
<v Speaker 1>from sixty six through two thousand thirteen. But it's even

0:36:45.239 --> 0:36:48.200
<v Speaker 1>bigger than that, Barry, because if you factor in inflation,

0:36:48.480 --> 0:36:52.400
<v Speaker 1>and inflation is higher in a restrictive environment than in

0:36:52.440 --> 0:36:56.840
<v Speaker 1>an expansive environment, real returns were about twelve percent different.

0:36:57.480 --> 0:37:00.200
<v Speaker 1>So there's something going on there. It's something that that

0:37:00.280 --> 0:37:03.920
<v Speaker 1>you can't ignore. Now, is that correlation relative to the

0:37:03.920 --> 0:37:07.080
<v Speaker 1>fact that when the FED is cutting it usually means

0:37:07.160 --> 0:37:11.359
<v Speaker 1>that you've just had a huge revaluation in markets and

0:37:11.400 --> 0:37:14.000
<v Speaker 1>you're you're getting to buy when things are fairly cheap,

0:37:14.840 --> 0:37:17.319
<v Speaker 1>or does it mean something else? Well, what I think

0:37:17.360 --> 0:37:22.120
<v Speaker 1>it means is that the FED both reacts to and

0:37:22.280 --> 0:37:27.040
<v Speaker 1>leads markets. Um, we're not saying that one causes the other.

0:37:27.280 --> 0:37:30.880
<v Speaker 1>We're not saying that the FED policy causes these returns.

0:37:31.360 --> 0:37:34.879
<v Speaker 1>We're simply saying that there's this correlation and that it's

0:37:34.920 --> 0:37:38.360
<v Speaker 1>something that's so dominant that you can't ignore it. And

0:37:38.400 --> 0:37:42.480
<v Speaker 1>here's the other interesting thing we found. We found that commodities,

0:37:43.400 --> 0:37:48.040
<v Speaker 1>the Golden Sacks Commodity Index, actually had a negative return

0:37:48.239 --> 0:37:53.400
<v Speaker 1>during expansive time periods and a very high return during

0:37:53.440 --> 0:37:57.799
<v Speaker 1>restrictive time periods. So you're not a big fan of commodities,

0:37:57.840 --> 0:38:00.319
<v Speaker 1>I take it then. I'm not a big fan of commas,

0:38:00.360 --> 0:38:03.840
<v Speaker 1>but they are a great diversifier during restrictive time periods.

0:38:03.920 --> 0:38:06.759
<v Speaker 1>And if you believe that we're moving into a restrictive

0:38:06.800 --> 0:38:10.839
<v Speaker 1>time period, which I believe we are, UM, I think

0:38:10.840 --> 0:38:14.040
<v Speaker 1>that you may see UH commodities performed pretty well in

0:38:14.600 --> 0:38:17.040
<v Speaker 1>the near term. But by the way, I've pulled up

0:38:17.160 --> 0:38:21.640
<v Speaker 1>your book on Amazon and looking at UH some of

0:38:21.640 --> 0:38:25.080
<v Speaker 1>the interesting comments here on invest with the FED five

0:38:25.120 --> 0:38:29.640
<v Speaker 1>stars on Amazon, forty plus reviews. That's actually really really interesting.

0:38:30.040 --> 0:38:33.880
<v Speaker 1>So it's not that the FED is what's driving the

0:38:33.920 --> 0:38:37.240
<v Speaker 1>markets necessarily. It's when the FED is doing their cycle,

0:38:37.280 --> 0:38:40.480
<v Speaker 1>when their expansionary something else is going on. When they're

0:38:40.920 --> 0:38:44.960
<v Speaker 1>less expansionary, different things going on, and you could parallel

0:38:45.120 --> 0:38:49.799
<v Speaker 1>their behavior in order to most advantageously position your portfolio.

0:38:50.000 --> 0:38:51.960
<v Speaker 1>And what we look at two is and I always

0:38:51.960 --> 0:38:55.120
<v Speaker 1>say the following, are you a golfer berry, I am not. Well,

0:38:55.160 --> 0:38:59.759
<v Speaker 1>there's a famous golf pro Harvey Peanick was Ben Cranshaw's

0:38:59.760 --> 0:39:03.279
<v Speaker 1>golf coach, and Harvey Peanuck had this saying that when

0:39:03.320 --> 0:39:05.680
<v Speaker 1>you get a golf lesson and you get a tip,

0:39:06.760 --> 0:39:09.399
<v Speaker 1>take an asper and don't take the whole bottle. And

0:39:09.440 --> 0:39:12.320
<v Speaker 1>what that means is that you don't over exaggerate something.

0:39:12.920 --> 0:39:15.960
<v Speaker 1>So with invest with the FED, what we suggest is

0:39:16.000 --> 0:39:18.960
<v Speaker 1>that you may want to tilt your asset allocations a

0:39:19.040 --> 0:39:22.479
<v Speaker 1>little bit with regard to FED policy. That doesn't mean

0:39:22.520 --> 0:39:25.640
<v Speaker 1>you sell out of equities completely and go to commodities

0:39:25.640 --> 0:39:28.800
<v Speaker 1>when the FED becomes restrictive. But for instance, we find

0:39:28.840 --> 0:39:35.200
<v Speaker 1>when the FED is restrictive that necessity goods perform pretty well,

0:39:35.800 --> 0:39:42.239
<v Speaker 1>and disc and UH and nondescrit and discretionary industries don't

0:39:42.280 --> 0:39:46.319
<v Speaker 1>perform very well. For instance, don't perform very well when

0:39:46.320 --> 0:39:50.200
<v Speaker 1>the FED is in a restrictive mode, but auto parts

0:39:50.520 --> 0:39:55.279
<v Speaker 1>perform pretty well. Healthcare, food, basic medicines, hospitals that that's

0:39:55.280 --> 0:39:57.319
<v Speaker 1>going to do well. People have to buy food and

0:39:57.320 --> 0:39:59.640
<v Speaker 1>brush their teeth no matter what. If you break your leg,

0:39:59.640 --> 0:40:01.840
<v Speaker 1>you're going the hospital. It doesn't matter what what's going

0:40:01.880 --> 0:40:03.600
<v Speaker 1>to happen. But you can delay that purchase of a

0:40:03.640 --> 0:40:05.759
<v Speaker 1>new car, you can delay that purchase of a new

0:40:05.800 --> 0:40:12.239
<v Speaker 1>suit UM during UM restrictive time periods. That that makes

0:40:12.280 --> 0:40:14.840
<v Speaker 1>perfect sense. What else do we know about not fighting

0:40:14.880 --> 0:40:17.160
<v Speaker 1>the FED and investing with them? What else would you

0:40:17.760 --> 0:40:20.680
<v Speaker 1>add to that conversation that you know, I don't want

0:40:20.680 --> 0:40:22.320
<v Speaker 1>to go chapter by chapter with the book, but I

0:40:22.360 --> 0:40:24.640
<v Speaker 1>thought there were some interesting things in there. Yeah. One

0:40:24.680 --> 0:40:28.720
<v Speaker 1>of the interesting things I think is that real estate, Uh,

0:40:28.880 --> 0:40:31.520
<v Speaker 1>real estate performs pretty well when the FED is in

0:40:31.520 --> 0:40:34.080
<v Speaker 1>a restrictive period. You know, many people would think real

0:40:34.200 --> 0:40:37.360
<v Speaker 1>estate doesn't perform, wouldn't perform because you're raising rates and

0:40:37.400 --> 0:40:41.880
<v Speaker 1>making mortgages more expensive. Usually when the FED is tightening,

0:40:41.920 --> 0:40:44.080
<v Speaker 1>it means that you later in the cycle and the

0:40:44.080 --> 0:40:48.480
<v Speaker 1>economy is already heated up. One would imagine that in

0:40:48.880 --> 0:40:52.279
<v Speaker 1>yours to the benefit of certainly residential real estate and

0:40:52.320 --> 0:40:55.359
<v Speaker 1>perhaps commercial resident real estate as well. And of course

0:40:55.400 --> 0:40:58.160
<v Speaker 1>we're looking at real estate investment trust data because you

0:40:58.200 --> 0:41:02.759
<v Speaker 1>can't get date on individual residences. You can't well, what

0:41:02.840 --> 0:41:05.040
<v Speaker 1>you can get is just so regional. You can't ruin

0:41:05.080 --> 0:41:09.920
<v Speaker 1>any specific questions. So so let's um, let's switch gears.

0:41:09.960 --> 0:41:12.920
<v Speaker 1>I know you left uh the c FA Institute in

0:41:12.960 --> 0:41:16.839
<v Speaker 1>two thousand and eleven. About that time, that's when the

0:41:17.080 --> 0:41:21.520
<v Speaker 1>SEC published a study that was mandated by Dodd Frank

0:41:22.320 --> 0:41:27.319
<v Speaker 1>that that specifically recommended that advisors, whether you're working on

0:41:27.400 --> 0:41:31.719
<v Speaker 1>retirement accounts or or discretionary investments, whether you're at a

0:41:31.719 --> 0:41:37.520
<v Speaker 1>broker dealer or at a registered investment advisory, all financial

0:41:37.560 --> 0:41:41.840
<v Speaker 1>advice providers should be put under the fiduciary standard. But

0:41:41.960 --> 0:41:44.440
<v Speaker 1>that ended up not happening. The SEC was deadlocked and

0:41:44.480 --> 0:41:47.040
<v Speaker 1>couldn't agree with that. What are your thoughts on on

0:41:47.080 --> 0:41:51.160
<v Speaker 1>that fiduciary standard for everybody? Yeah? Is it? Is it realistic?

0:41:51.200 --> 0:41:53.440
<v Speaker 1>Are you gonna be have people that are going to

0:41:53.480 --> 0:41:57.360
<v Speaker 1>be able to qualify professionally to do that? That would

0:41:57.360 --> 0:42:00.839
<v Speaker 1>be my response to that is, for instance, we can

0:42:01.080 --> 0:42:03.160
<v Speaker 1>we can set a very high bar that people have

0:42:03.239 --> 0:42:05.480
<v Speaker 1>to get over, but are enough people going to be

0:42:05.480 --> 0:42:07.440
<v Speaker 1>able to get over that bar to serve the public.

0:42:08.239 --> 0:42:10.520
<v Speaker 1>One of the things that I have concern about with

0:42:10.640 --> 0:42:14.520
<v Speaker 1>the current fiduciary standard is is is it going to

0:42:14.680 --> 0:42:19.239
<v Speaker 1>leave a middle market that desperately needs financial advice? Is

0:42:19.239 --> 0:42:21.440
<v Speaker 1>it going to leave it under certain We've been speaking

0:42:21.480 --> 0:42:25.480
<v Speaker 1>with Dr Robert Johnson, President and CEO at the American

0:42:25.600 --> 0:42:29.000
<v Speaker 1>College of Financial Services. Dr Johnson, if people want to

0:42:29.000 --> 0:42:31.560
<v Speaker 1>find your writings and your work, your your books are

0:42:31.560 --> 0:42:35.359
<v Speaker 1>obviously online. Where else can they read anything you've written, Well,

0:42:35.400 --> 0:42:39.600
<v Speaker 1>you can go to www dot the American College dot

0:42:39.600 --> 0:42:42.920
<v Speaker 1>e DU and see my profile in a link to

0:42:43.040 --> 0:42:47.280
<v Speaker 1>some of the writings that I've done. Well, define define

0:42:47.360 --> 0:42:52.120
<v Speaker 1>middle market, mom and pop and uh so with a

0:42:52.120 --> 0:42:54.560
<v Speaker 1>few thousand dollars to put in in uh in a

0:42:54.680 --> 0:42:57.000
<v Speaker 1>mutual fund every once in a while. So if you

0:42:57.120 --> 0:42:59.919
<v Speaker 1>go back and look at what took place post cry

0:43:00.120 --> 0:43:04.399
<v Speaker 1>is this we saw? We saw Merrill Lynch Tell Brokers. Hey,

0:43:04.480 --> 0:43:07.920
<v Speaker 1>if you're gonna have accounts under two D, that's up

0:43:07.960 --> 0:43:09.960
<v Speaker 1>to you, but we're not paying any commission on it.

0:43:10.400 --> 0:43:13.600
<v Speaker 1>Ubs Morgan Stanley, a number of other firms have similar

0:43:14.200 --> 0:43:17.920
<v Speaker 1>but if not but not identical restrictions. But there's really

0:43:17.960 --> 0:43:22.080
<v Speaker 1>a discouraging of taking small accounts from the big firms

0:43:22.120 --> 0:43:25.000
<v Speaker 1>because it's a huge volume and there's no money in it,

0:43:25.440 --> 0:43:28.480
<v Speaker 1>so and that's without the fiduciary standard. You have the

0:43:28.480 --> 0:43:31.319
<v Speaker 1>fiduciary standard, is there really much of a change if

0:43:31.360 --> 0:43:34.399
<v Speaker 1>those clients aren't being served today anyway? Seem I think

0:43:34.480 --> 0:43:36.680
<v Speaker 1>we need to find a way to serve that market

0:43:36.880 --> 0:43:39.960
<v Speaker 1>and and that comes I believe that that comes very

0:43:40.040 --> 0:43:44.040
<v Speaker 1>through education. You know, the Obama administration has made this

0:43:44.080 --> 0:43:46.879
<v Speaker 1>fiduciary standard a big part of what they want their

0:43:46.960 --> 0:43:51.160
<v Speaker 1>legacy to be well, and I don't think that the

0:43:51.239 --> 0:43:54.040
<v Speaker 1>intent is wrong, and I think the intent is is

0:43:55.080 --> 0:43:58.239
<v Speaker 1>it's it's very pure. But what I think is that

0:43:58.280 --> 0:44:01.319
<v Speaker 1>the realization is is that you're going to have this

0:44:01.360 --> 0:44:04.600
<v Speaker 1>middle market that isn't going to be attractive, that isn't

0:44:04.640 --> 0:44:07.480
<v Speaker 1>going to be profitably, be less served. And if you

0:44:07.640 --> 0:44:11.200
<v Speaker 1>really want to make inroads into the retirement income crisis,

0:44:11.320 --> 0:44:15.200
<v Speaker 1>which is arguably the biggest crisis in the country now

0:44:15.400 --> 0:44:17.600
<v Speaker 1>Charlie Ellis has been banging the drum on this for

0:44:17.960 --> 0:44:22.560
<v Speaker 1>years now, then somehow we have to encourage that market

0:44:22.680 --> 0:44:25.799
<v Speaker 1>segment to be served and not discourage it. And I

0:44:25.840 --> 0:44:29.360
<v Speaker 1>know that's not the intent of the fiduciary standard, but

0:44:29.400 --> 0:44:31.560
<v Speaker 1>I think that's actually going to be the realization of

0:44:31.600 --> 0:44:35.879
<v Speaker 1>the fiduciary standard. So the UK said, we don't care.

0:44:35.920 --> 0:44:38.600
<v Speaker 1>What's then do you have if you're managing retirement accounts

0:44:38.600 --> 0:44:41.480
<v Speaker 1>your fees a cap at fifty basis points? Is that

0:44:41.560 --> 0:44:46.879
<v Speaker 1>a solution? I it's a possible solution. But I I

0:44:46.920 --> 0:44:50.080
<v Speaker 1>think that what you are going to see, hopefully, is

0:44:50.120 --> 0:44:52.080
<v Speaker 1>that ten years down the road, we're going to have

0:44:52.160 --> 0:44:55.360
<v Speaker 1>seen some really creative and some really innovative people in

0:44:55.360 --> 0:44:58.759
<v Speaker 1>the financial services industry come up with a solution on

0:44:58.800 --> 0:45:02.160
<v Speaker 1>how to serve that market. But one of the things

0:45:02.160 --> 0:45:05.840
<v Speaker 1>that we kept hearing in this fiduciary standard debates was

0:45:05.920 --> 0:45:08.759
<v Speaker 1>the figure seventeen billion dollars. I'm sure you know that

0:45:08.760 --> 0:45:13.920
<v Speaker 1>that was what bad financial advice was costing Americans. Okay,

0:45:13.960 --> 0:45:18.239
<v Speaker 1>how much was good financial advice making Americans? Well, we

0:45:18.280 --> 0:45:21.200
<v Speaker 1>don't have to worry about good financial advice. It's doing good.

0:45:21.239 --> 0:45:23.919
<v Speaker 1>We have to worry about bad financial advice. By the way,

0:45:23.960 --> 0:45:27.799
<v Speaker 1>someone challenged me on that seventeen billion number. They said,

0:45:27.840 --> 0:45:29.880
<v Speaker 1>how how on earth did you come up with seventeen

0:45:30.480 --> 0:45:33.520
<v Speaker 1>And the answer was, well, if you look in in

0:45:33.640 --> 0:45:36.279
<v Speaker 1>four oh one k fourth not four o three, be

0:45:36.480 --> 0:45:39.600
<v Speaker 1>just four oh one k. And IRA's they were. I

0:45:39.640 --> 0:45:42.760
<v Speaker 1>want to say it was somewhere between fifteen and twenty trillion,

0:45:43.040 --> 0:45:48.320
<v Speaker 1>some like huge, huge number. Assume that bad financial advice

0:45:48.920 --> 0:45:51.480
<v Speaker 1>cost one percent of that, and let's assume that bad

0:45:51.520 --> 0:45:55.920
<v Speaker 1>financial advice is only ten percent, right, So the seventeen

0:45:55.960 --> 0:45:59.160
<v Speaker 1>trillion becomes a hundred and seventy billion, and then we're

0:45:59.160 --> 0:46:02.400
<v Speaker 1>gonna take a one percent drag on returns. That's how

0:46:02.440 --> 0:46:05.200
<v Speaker 1>they got to the seventeen billion. Now, I will tell

0:46:05.239 --> 0:46:08.520
<v Speaker 1>you that bad financial advice is out to more than

0:46:09.800 --> 0:46:13.200
<v Speaker 1>of clients out there in the world, and even worse,

0:46:13.360 --> 0:46:16.279
<v Speaker 1>it costs a whole lot more than one. I think

0:46:16.320 --> 0:46:18.239
<v Speaker 1>they were being really kind. I think the number is

0:46:18.280 --> 0:46:20.840
<v Speaker 1>close to the fifty billion dollars, but that's just my

0:46:20.960 --> 0:46:24.520
<v Speaker 1>back of the envelope calculation. The interesting thing too, though,

0:46:24.520 --> 0:46:27.400
<v Speaker 1>to me, Barry, is that if you really want to

0:46:27.400 --> 0:46:29.960
<v Speaker 1>solve the retirement income crisis, one of the one of

0:46:30.000 --> 0:46:34.040
<v Speaker 1>the solutions that the Obama administration came up with it

0:46:34.120 --> 0:46:36.920
<v Speaker 1>was this my r A accounts. Yeah, and that kind

0:46:36.920 --> 0:46:38.840
<v Speaker 1>of went nowhere. I was really surprised. I thought it

0:46:38.840 --> 0:46:41.200
<v Speaker 1>was an interesting idea, but the only thing you could

0:46:41.239 --> 0:46:44.840
<v Speaker 1>invest in was savings bonds. Makes that makes no sense.

0:46:44.920 --> 0:46:47.279
<v Speaker 1>We'll see. That's my point is that we want to

0:46:47.360 --> 0:46:50.160
<v Speaker 1>encourage people to save, and we want to we we

0:46:50.280 --> 0:46:54.400
<v Speaker 1>create this vehicle that's sanctioned by the government. Well it

0:46:54.480 --> 0:46:56.560
<v Speaker 1>must be a good thing. Well, you know as well

0:46:56.600 --> 0:46:58.120
<v Speaker 1>as I do. If you have a thirty year time

0:46:58.120 --> 0:47:00.680
<v Speaker 1>arising and you're investing in savings bond, you're giving money

0:47:00.680 --> 0:47:04.000
<v Speaker 1>a one giving a lot of money away. It's this

0:47:04.040 --> 0:47:12.200
<v Speaker 1>goes back to a lack of appropriate understanding of Congress's

0:47:12.280 --> 0:47:16.240
<v Speaker 1>own role. Look, there's no people are willing to lend

0:47:16.360 --> 0:47:20.640
<v Speaker 1>Uncle Sam money at absurdly low rates. Take advantage of that.

0:47:20.760 --> 0:47:24.319
<v Speaker 1>Take all of this debt, which is financed with all

0:47:24.360 --> 0:47:27.200
<v Speaker 1>the short term paper seventeen trillion or now it's almost

0:47:27.280 --> 0:47:30.719
<v Speaker 1>up to nineteen trillion. Take that debt rolling into a

0:47:30.800 --> 0:47:34.200
<v Speaker 1>fifty year bond. There's people are dying for yield, dying

0:47:34.239 --> 0:47:37.759
<v Speaker 1>for good paper. Rolling into a fifty year bond. Refinance

0:47:37.800 --> 0:47:40.800
<v Speaker 1>America's debt, get it as low as possible, do another,

0:47:40.920 --> 0:47:44.719
<v Speaker 1>build set of build America bonds and repave, rehearden the

0:47:44.719 --> 0:47:48.400
<v Speaker 1>airports and ports, redo the electrical grid. There's so much

0:47:48.440 --> 0:47:50.759
<v Speaker 1>stuff we could do if we weren't stuck in a

0:47:51.080 --> 0:47:56.560
<v Speaker 1>universe of partisan gridlock and just you know, the inability

0:47:56.600 --> 0:47:59.879
<v Speaker 1>to imagine what made America great in the old day

0:48:00.360 --> 0:48:04.640
<v Speaker 1>seems to have everybody confounded. It's not let's make America great,

0:48:04.719 --> 0:48:06.959
<v Speaker 1>it's what we have to do to just go back

0:48:06.960 --> 0:48:11.680
<v Speaker 1>to normal government functions instead of paralysis. And it was interesting.

0:48:11.719 --> 0:48:14.600
<v Speaker 1>I was asked one time what should we do um

0:48:15.000 --> 0:48:18.200
<v Speaker 1>on financial literacy in this country? And I said, well,

0:48:18.239 --> 0:48:21.680
<v Speaker 1>you should start with Congress. How about this, Why don't

0:48:21.680 --> 0:48:24.680
<v Speaker 1>we make them they have their own healthcare plan, they

0:48:24.680 --> 0:48:28.080
<v Speaker 1>have their own retirement plan, they have their own automatic

0:48:28.160 --> 0:48:31.239
<v Speaker 1>salary increases. Why don't we take all that away and

0:48:31.239 --> 0:48:35.319
<v Speaker 1>make Congress have social Security, Have Congress have Obamacare, and

0:48:35.400 --> 0:48:38.759
<v Speaker 1>have Congress uh get paid the federal minimum wage. We'll

0:48:38.800 --> 0:48:42.120
<v Speaker 1>see how fast things improve across all of those. If

0:48:42.120 --> 0:48:45.000
<v Speaker 1>you don't like Obamacare, then fix it. You have your

0:48:45.000 --> 0:48:49.120
<v Speaker 1>own Cadillac gold plated healthcare plan and your own gold

0:48:49.160 --> 0:48:52.719
<v Speaker 1>plated retirement plan. No wonder, Social Security is a mess,

0:48:52.719 --> 0:48:55.359
<v Speaker 1>and no wonder Medicaid is a mess. But that's me

0:48:55.400 --> 0:48:57.759
<v Speaker 1>getting on my soapbox in the last minute or so

0:48:57.880 --> 0:49:01.560
<v Speaker 1>that we have what should the average investor know about

0:49:01.600 --> 0:49:05.799
<v Speaker 1>the Federal Reserve and how it impacts their portfolio. That

0:49:06.120 --> 0:49:09.400
<v Speaker 1>if the FED is expansive in monetary policy, and the

0:49:09.760 --> 0:49:11.920
<v Speaker 1>real simple way to look at that as if interest

0:49:12.000 --> 0:49:16.200
<v Speaker 1>rates are falling, the stock market tends to do very well.

0:49:16.880 --> 0:49:20.120
<v Speaker 1>If interest rates are rising, the stock market tends to

0:49:20.200 --> 0:49:23.600
<v Speaker 1>do less well. And it's very consistent over time. So

0:49:23.680 --> 0:49:28.360
<v Speaker 1>my point is not that investors necessarily need to sell

0:49:28.440 --> 0:49:32.480
<v Speaker 1>out or need to make any make any transactions based

0:49:32.520 --> 0:49:35.680
<v Speaker 1>on FED policy, but that you need to, in in

0:49:35.800 --> 0:49:39.719
<v Speaker 1>Larry David's terms, you need to curb your enthusiasm when

0:49:39.760 --> 0:49:42.080
<v Speaker 1>the when the when the FED is raising rates, that

0:49:42.239 --> 0:49:45.839
<v Speaker 1>typically that isn't a very good market environment. Bob, thank

0:49:45.880 --> 0:49:48.239
<v Speaker 1>you so much for doing this. I appreciate um all

0:49:48.239 --> 0:49:51.719
<v Speaker 1>the time. This is really, uh an interesting conversation. It's

0:49:51.719 --> 0:49:54.200
<v Speaker 1>great to be here. Thank you. It's a little wonky,

0:49:54.280 --> 0:49:56.000
<v Speaker 1>it's a little in the weeds. I know there is

0:49:56.040 --> 0:49:58.040
<v Speaker 1>an audience that's going to eat this up and a

0:49:58.040 --> 0:50:01.640
<v Speaker 1>lot of people are going to go dr American College

0:50:01.680 --> 0:50:06.280
<v Speaker 1>of What how well known is the American College of Finance?

0:50:06.640 --> 0:50:10.120
<v Speaker 1>Not well enough? Not well enough known, berry um one

0:50:10.160 --> 0:50:12.880
<v Speaker 1>of the things that were very well known in the

0:50:12.920 --> 0:50:16.080
<v Speaker 1>domestic life insurance industry. In fact, that's the roots of

0:50:16.080 --> 0:50:20.000
<v Speaker 1>the college. The college was founded in nine We are

0:50:20.040 --> 0:50:24.359
<v Speaker 1>a nonprofit, accredited degree granting institution. We have the same

0:50:24.480 --> 0:50:30.080
<v Speaker 1>level of accreditation as a Yale, as a Columbia. It's

0:50:30.280 --> 0:50:34.480
<v Speaker 1>UH and UM. But we largely have been known in

0:50:34.520 --> 0:50:37.080
<v Speaker 1>the in the domestic life insurance industry. So do you

0:50:37.120 --> 0:50:39.400
<v Speaker 1>have a program where you train people to take whatever

0:50:39.440 --> 0:50:43.440
<v Speaker 1>the life insurance test is to become We administer the

0:50:43.480 --> 0:50:47.640
<v Speaker 1>CLU program, the Chartered Life Underwriter program. We also administer

0:50:47.760 --> 0:50:51.680
<v Speaker 1>the c HFC program, that Chartered Financial Consultant program, which

0:50:51.719 --> 0:50:54.600
<v Speaker 1>is very similar to the CFP. In fact, there's a

0:50:54.640 --> 0:50:58.719
<v Speaker 1>lot of overlap between the CFP. We also do CFP education.

0:50:58.760 --> 0:51:00.840
<v Speaker 1>By the way, we're one of the biggest providers of

0:51:00.880 --> 0:51:05.200
<v Speaker 1>CFP education. We're fan, big fans of the CFP program,

0:51:05.200 --> 0:51:09.880
<v Speaker 1>But our biggest program now is the Retirement Income Certified

0:51:09.920 --> 0:51:14.719
<v Speaker 1>Professional Program r I c P. And what it is, Barry,

0:51:14.800 --> 0:51:19.120
<v Speaker 1>is it's not the accumulation stage of retirement program. It's

0:51:19.160 --> 0:51:22.520
<v Speaker 1>the draw down. It's when do you take Social Security?

0:51:22.560 --> 0:51:25.799
<v Speaker 1>It's longevity annuities, It's what can your spend down be,

0:51:25.960 --> 0:51:29.600
<v Speaker 1>It's how is life insurance, long term care insurance, It's

0:51:29.640 --> 0:51:35.040
<v Speaker 1>all of that and that is obviously becoming increasingly important

0:51:35.640 --> 0:51:41.320
<v Speaker 1>because there's this uh you know, um um, basically perfect storm.

0:51:41.480 --> 0:51:46.600
<v Speaker 1>People are living longer, people are have under saved, and

0:51:46.640 --> 0:51:51.239
<v Speaker 1>we have extremely low fixed income interest rates in the environment.

0:51:51.280 --> 0:51:54.440
<v Speaker 1>Now it's a perfect storm for retirement income planning and

0:51:54.680 --> 0:51:58.400
<v Speaker 1>in a giant baby boom demographic as the pig is

0:51:58.440 --> 0:52:02.640
<v Speaker 1>almost through the python. And at the same those three

0:52:02.680 --> 0:52:07.560
<v Speaker 1>things plus what is it, sixty people a day of retirement.

0:52:07.800 --> 0:52:11.200
<v Speaker 1>It's ten thousand a day that retires some crazy number.

0:52:11.239 --> 0:52:13.440
<v Speaker 1>It's a huge, huge, And here's the other thing that

0:52:13.560 --> 0:52:15.480
<v Speaker 1>used to work. It used to work in our favor

0:52:15.560 --> 0:52:18.640
<v Speaker 1>when we had pension plans. You didn't have to plan

0:52:18.920 --> 0:52:21.680
<v Speaker 1>for that extreme event that you would live to be

0:52:21.719 --> 0:52:24.719
<v Speaker 1>a hundred years old. You only get one draw the

0:52:24.800 --> 0:52:29.279
<v Speaker 1>distribution and a defined defined contribution plan. Right, you have

0:52:29.440 --> 0:52:33.680
<v Speaker 1>to plan for that worst case slash best case scenario

0:52:33.800 --> 0:52:36.279
<v Speaker 1>that is that you live to be a hundred You

0:52:36.320 --> 0:52:40.719
<v Speaker 1>have to plan for that. In the pension world, there

0:52:40.800 --> 0:52:45.640
<v Speaker 1>was averaging, so that it's an inefficient way to do things.

0:52:45.719 --> 0:52:49.600
<v Speaker 1>Defined contribution plans are much more inefficient than defined benefits

0:52:49.600 --> 0:52:53.080
<v Speaker 1>are plans are societally, But of course, since we moved

0:52:53.120 --> 0:52:56.360
<v Speaker 1>into this defined contribution world. We have to plan for

0:52:56.400 --> 0:52:59.319
<v Speaker 1>those extreme events, and it's pretty clear most people are

0:52:59.360 --> 0:53:02.520
<v Speaker 1>not either adequately planning or if they're planning, they're not

0:53:02.560 --> 0:53:06.160
<v Speaker 1>adequately funding uh their retirement plans. The other thing that

0:53:06.200 --> 0:53:09.240
<v Speaker 1>I'm really excited about College with respect to retirement income

0:53:09.280 --> 0:53:12.879
<v Speaker 1>planning is we actually have our first cohort of PhD

0:53:12.960 --> 0:53:17.960
<v Speaker 1>students that have entered their dissertation stage on retirement income planning.

0:53:18.080 --> 0:53:21.960
<v Speaker 1>We're going to actually be minting PhDs in retirement income planning,

0:53:22.440 --> 0:53:27.200
<v Speaker 1>so that we hope that that helps inform the industry,

0:53:27.280 --> 0:53:32.200
<v Speaker 1>the profession to become better at at at retirement income planning.

0:53:32.320 --> 0:53:35.239
<v Speaker 1>That is truly fascinating. So that that leads me to

0:53:35.280 --> 0:53:37.759
<v Speaker 1>one of the questions we didn't get to before on

0:53:37.840 --> 0:53:42.319
<v Speaker 1>the financial planning segment, what sort of changes do you

0:53:42.360 --> 0:53:45.480
<v Speaker 1>see taking place for the financial planning industry over the

0:53:45.520 --> 0:53:48.400
<v Speaker 1>next decade or so. I think that there are real

0:53:48.800 --> 0:53:53.640
<v Speaker 1>um there's real pressure on costs, a lot more compliance costs,

0:53:54.480 --> 0:53:57.759
<v Speaker 1>and I think that you're seeing that fees are going

0:53:57.800 --> 0:54:00.920
<v Speaker 1>to be going down dramatically. So I think that the

0:54:01.200 --> 0:54:03.080
<v Speaker 1>financial planning industry is going to have to be a

0:54:03.120 --> 0:54:06.080
<v Speaker 1>whole lot more efficient and I also think they're gonna

0:54:06.200 --> 0:54:10.040
<v Speaker 1>have to really raise their game with the fiduciary standard,

0:54:10.160 --> 0:54:14.680
<v Speaker 1>really become better informed, really have a mastery over a

0:54:14.760 --> 0:54:18.920
<v Speaker 1>wider variety of products. You know, in the current advisory world,

0:54:19.640 --> 0:54:21.960
<v Speaker 1>you have some what I would call one trick ponies,

0:54:22.440 --> 0:54:25.080
<v Speaker 1>somebody that has a very deep knowledge about a very

0:54:25.120 --> 0:54:29.120
<v Speaker 1>small sleeve of of products. And I think what you're

0:54:29.160 --> 0:54:31.000
<v Speaker 1>going to see in the future as you're going to

0:54:31.040 --> 0:54:35.320
<v Speaker 1>see people that have to have a much broader um

0:54:35.360 --> 0:54:40.560
<v Speaker 1>expertise across a much broader array of products. Again my

0:54:40.680 --> 0:54:44.440
<v Speaker 1>own practice, we we've discovered that when you're doing corporate

0:54:44.480 --> 0:54:48.160
<v Speaker 1>retirement planning, the skill set, the things you need to

0:54:48.239 --> 0:54:51.960
<v Speaker 1>know about everything associated with four oh one K plan sponsors,

0:54:52.040 --> 0:54:57.360
<v Speaker 1>third party administrators, custodians. We hired a full time person

0:54:57.440 --> 0:55:01.480
<v Speaker 1>to just do that because it's not the sort of

0:55:01.520 --> 0:55:03.839
<v Speaker 1>thing that you could kind of do well. The bulk

0:55:03.880 --> 0:55:06.880
<v Speaker 1>of my practices this, but I dabble in you can't.

0:55:06.880 --> 0:55:09.000
<v Speaker 1>You have to have a person who is the expert

0:55:09.000 --> 0:55:11.600
<v Speaker 1>in that, who can answer any questions, who is doing

0:55:11.600 --> 0:55:14.520
<v Speaker 1>it for a while. And and if you look at

0:55:14.600 --> 0:55:19.040
<v Speaker 1>the nonprofit version, we work with some foundations and some charities,

0:55:19.360 --> 0:55:23.200
<v Speaker 1>so things have come up on the nonprofit side. The

0:55:23.239 --> 0:55:25.200
<v Speaker 1>nonprofit equivalent of the four oh one K is the

0:55:25.239 --> 0:55:28.080
<v Speaker 1>four oh three B. You would think it's the same rules,

0:55:28.120 --> 0:55:33.520
<v Speaker 1>but it's totally different rules and again same situation. If

0:55:33.520 --> 0:55:34.960
<v Speaker 1>you want to work in that space, you need a

0:55:34.960 --> 0:55:38.799
<v Speaker 1>person who's dedicated to that. Uh. We we ended up

0:55:38.800 --> 0:55:41.560
<v Speaker 1>bringing in a team that only works with teachers and

0:55:41.719 --> 0:55:47.080
<v Speaker 1>educators and other nonprofits because you can't you can't do

0:55:47.160 --> 0:55:49.719
<v Speaker 1>it on the side. You can't dabble, you can't be well.

0:55:49.760 --> 0:55:51.439
<v Speaker 1>The bulk of my clients are this, and I'm gonna

0:55:51.480 --> 0:55:54.680
<v Speaker 1>work with a handful of teachers to understand all the

0:55:54.719 --> 0:55:59.160
<v Speaker 1>permutations and wrinkles. It becomes a full time thing. And

0:55:59.239 --> 0:56:02.880
<v Speaker 1>so we're seeing more and more specialization. I wonder if

0:56:02.880 --> 0:56:06.640
<v Speaker 1>you're seeing that at all. Absolutely, And you said the

0:56:06.719 --> 0:56:10.520
<v Speaker 1>key word, there's teams. You're seeing advisory teams where people

0:56:10.600 --> 0:56:12.799
<v Speaker 1>work in teams and they have they each have their

0:56:12.840 --> 0:56:16.000
<v Speaker 1>own expertise, and you're gonna see much more of that

0:56:16.040 --> 0:56:20.040
<v Speaker 1>in the future, I believe. So there are all these

0:56:20.080 --> 0:56:24.080
<v Speaker 1>resources you can get from different firms. Were essentially a

0:56:24.200 --> 0:56:28.360
<v Speaker 1>vanguard dimensional fun. We work with other other asset managers,

0:56:28.360 --> 0:56:30.840
<v Speaker 1>but the bulk of our holdings are Vanguard and Dimensional

0:56:30.880 --> 0:56:36.920
<v Speaker 1>and Dimensional. D f A very intelligently recognized that they

0:56:36.920 --> 0:56:40.640
<v Speaker 1>were sitting at this fantastic nexus where all this information

0:56:40.719 --> 0:56:46.279
<v Speaker 1>was passing, and they signed up a person who only

0:56:46.320 --> 0:56:50.560
<v Speaker 1>looks at firm analytics to try and figure out, what

0:56:50.719 --> 0:56:52.839
<v Speaker 1>can we figure out from all the data we see

0:56:52.840 --> 0:56:55.160
<v Speaker 1>from firms? What are what are small firms and big

0:56:55.200 --> 0:56:57.640
<v Speaker 1>firms doing right? What are they doing wrong? What are

0:56:57.640 --> 0:57:01.719
<v Speaker 1>best practices? It's really fast anything that an asset manager

0:57:02.520 --> 0:57:07.160
<v Speaker 1>developed that sort of practice. And we see similar stuff

0:57:07.160 --> 0:57:10.359
<v Speaker 1>from Vanguard and similar stuff from from other shops. But

0:57:11.120 --> 0:57:13.720
<v Speaker 1>I find that fascinating that a person who you wouldn't

0:57:13.760 --> 0:57:17.240
<v Speaker 1>imagine would have a focus on that, just because of

0:57:17.240 --> 0:57:21.000
<v Speaker 1>where they sit, are capable of of gleaning great insights.

0:57:21.080 --> 0:57:22.760
<v Speaker 1>And you know the history of d f A. They

0:57:22.800 --> 0:57:27.000
<v Speaker 1>are academics. Well you have Eugene Farma and French. And

0:57:27.520 --> 0:57:30.040
<v Speaker 1>by the way, the Booth School in Chicago is named

0:57:30.080 --> 0:57:34.000
<v Speaker 1>after David Booth, the founder and CEO of Dimensional Funds.

0:57:34.320 --> 0:57:39.560
<v Speaker 1>They're a fascinating shop. They're essentially a hybrid. You know,

0:57:39.680 --> 0:57:42.080
<v Speaker 1>when I try and describe, well, I thought you guys

0:57:42.120 --> 0:57:45.520
<v Speaker 1>do indexing, Well, this is indexing, but it's indexing based

0:57:45.560 --> 0:57:48.920
<v Speaker 1>on this dimension. They were really I hate to use

0:57:48.920 --> 0:57:52.080
<v Speaker 1>the phrase smart beta, but they were really a factor

0:57:52.240 --> 0:57:56.120
<v Speaker 1>shop before that became the the hip phrase of the day.

0:57:56.400 --> 0:57:58.160
<v Speaker 1>And see to me, they would be the ultimate and

0:57:58.160 --> 0:58:02.720
<v Speaker 1>pracademics procademics. So you're taking that. I hate that word,

0:58:02.760 --> 0:58:09.320
<v Speaker 1>but I love the concept. Keep pracademics. I actually, uh

0:58:08.840 --> 0:58:13.560
<v Speaker 1>I I prefer academics. What would you call the other way?

0:58:13.600 --> 0:58:21.120
<v Speaker 1>If you want the other way but academs? That doesn't work.

0:58:21.400 --> 0:58:23.680
<v Speaker 1>It's um But the idea of saying, hey, here's what

0:58:23.720 --> 0:58:27.440
<v Speaker 1>the academic data shows, it's overwhelming. It's clear. Listen, the

0:58:27.480 --> 0:58:29.920
<v Speaker 1>market may not be perfectly efficient, but the odds are

0:58:29.960 --> 0:58:31.880
<v Speaker 1>that you're not going to beat the market on any

0:58:31.960 --> 0:58:35.240
<v Speaker 1>consistent basis over any length of time. What what is

0:58:35.240 --> 0:58:38.120
<v Speaker 1>it that we know? Well, we know quality beats junk

0:58:38.320 --> 0:58:42.440
<v Speaker 1>over long periods of time. Unleveraged companies are going to

0:58:42.560 --> 0:58:46.760
<v Speaker 1>do better than highly debt and inconsistent, and we know

0:58:46.840 --> 0:58:49.480
<v Speaker 1>that there's a small cap premium, and we know that

0:58:49.600 --> 0:58:53.760
<v Speaker 1>over long periods of time. Um, sometimes the US does

0:58:53.800 --> 0:58:56.960
<v Speaker 1>better than overseas. Sometimes overseas, there are all these things

0:58:57.000 --> 0:59:00.480
<v Speaker 1>that are out there that you cannot argue and don't

0:59:00.520 --> 0:59:06.040
<v Speaker 1>forget reversion of the main yesterday's winners or tomorrow's losers.

0:59:06.160 --> 0:59:09.560
<v Speaker 1>Losers are tomorrow's winners. Uh. One of my colleagues likes

0:59:09.600 --> 0:59:13.160
<v Speaker 1>to say, Hey, if something in your portfolio isn't doing poorly,

0:59:13.240 --> 0:59:16.160
<v Speaker 1>you're you're doing it wrong. You should always be If

0:59:16.200 --> 0:59:18.480
<v Speaker 1>you're diversified, you're gonna be sitting with something that's a

0:59:18.560 --> 0:59:22.120
<v Speaker 1>dog for now and eventually, uh it will it will

0:59:22.160 --> 0:59:25.240
<v Speaker 1>go from go to hero while one of your heroes

0:59:25.240 --> 0:59:28.840
<v Speaker 1>will eventually go the other way. Um. How would you

0:59:28.920 --> 0:59:33.200
<v Speaker 1>define the proper responsibilities and roles of the financial advisor.

0:59:33.920 --> 0:59:38.400
<v Speaker 1>I think the financial advisor is a trusted advisor who

0:59:38.480 --> 0:59:43.360
<v Speaker 1>has who is an educator. At least that's what I

0:59:43.360 --> 0:59:46.400
<v Speaker 1>feel a really good financial advisor is is I want

0:59:46.440 --> 0:59:49.120
<v Speaker 1>to educate. If I'm a financial advisor, I want to

0:59:49.280 --> 0:59:51.919
<v Speaker 1>educate my clients. I want my clients to feel good

0:59:51.960 --> 0:59:55.640
<v Speaker 1>about what they're doing, not simply because I say so,

0:59:56.280 --> 0:59:59.160
<v Speaker 1>but because I have been able to communicate with them.

0:59:59.440 --> 1:00:02.600
<v Speaker 1>Why the half I am taking is a good path? Man,

1:00:02.640 --> 1:00:05.680
<v Speaker 1>you are preaching to the choir here. Let me before

1:00:05.720 --> 1:00:08.280
<v Speaker 1>we get into our favorite questions in in the last

1:00:08.360 --> 1:00:11.360
<v Speaker 1>twenty minutes or so we have. Let me ask one

1:00:11.400 --> 1:00:16.280
<v Speaker 1>more question. We briefly talked about the suitability standard and FINRA.

1:00:17.040 --> 1:00:19.520
<v Speaker 1>Uh So, FINRA is the s R O is a

1:00:19.520 --> 1:00:24.120
<v Speaker 1>self regulating organization that covers the brokerage firms, all of

1:00:24.160 --> 1:00:27.400
<v Speaker 1>the broker dealers that aren't our I A s that

1:00:27.480 --> 1:00:32.360
<v Speaker 1>aren't covered by the SEC. They're kind of an unusual organization.

1:00:32.440 --> 1:00:35.160
<v Speaker 1>What what are your thoughts on on FINRA. Is FINRA

1:00:35.320 --> 1:00:39.720
<v Speaker 1>really an s R oh, because isn't a self regulatory organization?

1:00:39.840 --> 1:00:42.959
<v Speaker 1>Aren't It isn't the definition of that that you're from

1:00:43.000 --> 1:00:47.880
<v Speaker 1>that industry. Yes, the lions share of the board at

1:00:47.920 --> 1:00:51.760
<v Speaker 1>FINRA is from outside of the industry, so it really

1:00:51.840 --> 1:00:55.440
<v Speaker 1>isn't accountable to the government. It really isn't accountable to

1:00:55.480 --> 1:00:57.720
<v Speaker 1>the industry, and it really isn't accountable to the public.

1:00:57.800 --> 1:01:02.280
<v Speaker 1>It's really an odd situation. I would think that FINNER

1:01:02.480 --> 1:01:05.720
<v Speaker 1>would work better if it operated as a true s R. So,

1:01:05.760 --> 1:01:09.720
<v Speaker 1>in other words, make the board all people. If you're

1:01:09.720 --> 1:01:12.720
<v Speaker 1>going to be a self regulatory industry, the self part

1:01:13.160 --> 1:01:15.920
<v Speaker 1>part self evident, I would think, right, So, the the

1:01:16.040 --> 1:01:19.160
<v Speaker 1>people who are from outside the financial services sector who

1:01:19.200 --> 1:01:24.240
<v Speaker 1>are on the board, why, why and what is the

1:01:24.320 --> 1:01:26.600
<v Speaker 1>downside other than they don't really know the industry. Well,

1:01:26.640 --> 1:01:28.440
<v Speaker 1>that's the point. I think that's the bad that's the

1:01:28.440 --> 1:01:30.840
<v Speaker 1>bad one. If you're going to be a self regulatory industry,

1:01:30.880 --> 1:01:33.160
<v Speaker 1>I think you really need to know the industry. Now,

1:01:33.200 --> 1:01:36.640
<v Speaker 1>I'm the last person, literally the last person who would

1:01:36.640 --> 1:01:40.360
<v Speaker 1>ever defend FINRA. I have my longstanding views on them.

1:01:40.680 --> 1:01:42.440
<v Speaker 1>I've never had an issue with them, I've never been

1:01:42.480 --> 1:01:45.640
<v Speaker 1>in trouble with them. But I'm not a fan. Ah.

1:01:46.560 --> 1:01:49.840
<v Speaker 1>But to take the other side, they would say, well,

1:01:49.960 --> 1:01:52.040
<v Speaker 1>we want to bring diversity of thought, we want to

1:01:52.080 --> 1:01:54.840
<v Speaker 1>avoid group think. We don't want to be insular. We

1:01:54.920 --> 1:01:58.200
<v Speaker 1>want to bring people who are gonna bring an outside perspective.

1:01:58.240 --> 1:02:01.880
<v Speaker 1>And perhaps if we make it only industry people, we're

1:02:01.920 --> 1:02:04.920
<v Speaker 1>gonna miss some important things. What is it that we

1:02:04.960 --> 1:02:06.920
<v Speaker 1>need to see or do or what have you. But

1:02:06.960 --> 1:02:10.160
<v Speaker 1>I think it's industry people. I think to to regulate

1:02:10.200 --> 1:02:11.960
<v Speaker 1>the industry, you have to know the industry. I mean,

1:02:12.160 --> 1:02:13.920
<v Speaker 1>it sounds like a crazy thing to say, but I

1:02:14.000 --> 1:02:16.320
<v Speaker 1>really think that's the important aspect of this, and I

1:02:17.160 --> 1:02:21.160
<v Speaker 1>believe that that that finner the sec There's a couple

1:02:21.400 --> 1:02:23.840
<v Speaker 1>a couple of things here. There's the ability to regulate,

1:02:23.880 --> 1:02:26.720
<v Speaker 1>and there's the will to regulate. And I don't think

1:02:27.200 --> 1:02:31.200
<v Speaker 1>that between the SEC and finer that the the our

1:02:31.280 --> 1:02:34.640
<v Speaker 1>our legislators have given them either the ability or the

1:02:34.680 --> 1:02:37.040
<v Speaker 1>will to regulate. And I think that's one of the

1:02:37.080 --> 1:02:40.840
<v Speaker 1>reasons that really contributed to financial crisis. They don't have

1:02:40.920 --> 1:02:43.800
<v Speaker 1>the ability to regulate nor the will to regulate. And

1:02:44.040 --> 1:02:47.000
<v Speaker 1>by ability and will, I define as do you have

1:02:47.040 --> 1:02:50.000
<v Speaker 1>the laws on the books and you fund the organizations

1:02:50.040 --> 1:02:54.320
<v Speaker 1>to be able to UH to to UH enact those laws,

1:02:54.320 --> 1:02:58.480
<v Speaker 1>to carry out those laws. And I just if you

1:02:58.480 --> 1:03:02.040
<v Speaker 1>look at, for instance, the SEC budget, it is a tiny,

1:03:02.160 --> 1:03:04.959
<v Speaker 1>tiny fraction of really what it should and it keeps

1:03:05.000 --> 1:03:07.480
<v Speaker 1>getting sliced, or at least it had been until the

1:03:07.520 --> 1:03:12.200
<v Speaker 1>financial crisis. It's even after the crisis. Though even after

1:03:12.240 --> 1:03:15.320
<v Speaker 1>the crisis it was don't they capture some of the

1:03:15.360 --> 1:03:20.240
<v Speaker 1>fines the issue which creates this idiotic conflict where you're

1:03:20.280 --> 1:03:24.440
<v Speaker 1>incentivizing industry the regulator to find industry in order to

1:03:24.480 --> 1:03:26.080
<v Speaker 1>have a but then you have but you have then

1:03:26.120 --> 1:03:28.560
<v Speaker 1>you have regulatory capture where you have people that are

1:03:28.600 --> 1:03:31.120
<v Speaker 1>immediately going from the SEC to work in the industry

1:03:31.120 --> 1:03:34.040
<v Speaker 1>and so forth. And there's a I just I I

1:03:34.080 --> 1:03:36.960
<v Speaker 1>think that if you really want to make a robust regulator,

1:03:36.960 --> 1:03:38.480
<v Speaker 1>you've got to fund it. You've got to give them

1:03:38.480 --> 1:03:40.880
<v Speaker 1>both the ability and the will. All right, So let's

1:03:40.920 --> 1:03:44.840
<v Speaker 1>put aside all these in the in the weeds, uh stuff,

1:03:44.880 --> 1:03:48.080
<v Speaker 1>which I think is really quite fascinating. Let's jump to

1:03:48.200 --> 1:03:52.200
<v Speaker 1>some of my favorite questions. UM, So I didn't ask

1:03:52.200 --> 1:03:55.400
<v Speaker 1>you your background. What did you do before you got

1:03:55.400 --> 1:03:59.440
<v Speaker 1>involved with the financial services industry? Was this right out

1:03:59.440 --> 1:04:01.880
<v Speaker 1>of college? Out out of college Berry, I graduated in

1:04:02.000 --> 1:04:04.960
<v Speaker 1>nineteen eighty, and go back and look at a yield

1:04:05.080 --> 1:04:09.760
<v Speaker 1>curve in nineteen eight, Um, I wanted to find a

1:04:09.880 --> 1:04:13.720
<v Speaker 1>job in the investment management business. Good luck in nineteen eight,

1:04:14.400 --> 1:04:19.360
<v Speaker 1>twelve and a half, it was. It was a crazy time.

1:04:19.560 --> 1:04:24.080
<v Speaker 1>So um I went on and got a master's degree.

1:04:24.080 --> 1:04:27.520
<v Speaker 1>I was basically delaying, and I found a really interesting

1:04:27.600 --> 1:04:30.760
<v Speaker 1>when I was When I was pursuing my master's degree,

1:04:30.800 --> 1:04:32.880
<v Speaker 1>I got an assistant ship and I thought, you know,

1:04:32.960 --> 1:04:36.080
<v Speaker 1>this academic lifestyle is a pretty good lifestyle if you

1:04:36.160 --> 1:04:38.480
<v Speaker 1>get offered a ten year like I said, the last

1:04:38.520 --> 1:04:41.640
<v Speaker 1>of the So I decided to make that a career

1:04:42.120 --> 1:04:46.040
<v Speaker 1>and I but but while I was getting my PhD,

1:04:46.080 --> 1:04:49.400
<v Speaker 1>I started a money management company and on the side,

1:04:49.480 --> 1:04:55.320
<v Speaker 1>on the side, and that was night six, so right

1:04:55.320 --> 1:04:57.960
<v Speaker 1>before the crash of eighty seven, and I cut my

1:04:58.000 --> 1:04:59.880
<v Speaker 1>teeth on the crash of eighty seven. And one of

1:04:59.880 --> 1:05:03.200
<v Speaker 1>the things that I learned was that it's much easier

1:05:03.720 --> 1:05:05.600
<v Speaker 1>to lose your own money than it is to lose

1:05:05.600 --> 1:05:08.520
<v Speaker 1>other people's money. Did I take Oh yeah, No, when

1:05:08.520 --> 1:05:11.000
<v Speaker 1>you when you're six, you stop at least if you

1:05:11.120 --> 1:05:14.360
<v Speaker 1>have a well developed sense of ethics. When do you

1:05:14.560 --> 1:05:16.680
<v Speaker 1>make an investment, it goes down. You're not happy when

1:05:16.680 --> 1:05:20.240
<v Speaker 1>it's other people's money. You're like I've heard I've seen

1:05:20.280 --> 1:05:23.760
<v Speaker 1>people throw up in waste paper baskets. I remember earlier

1:05:23.800 --> 1:05:25.880
<v Speaker 1>in my career waking up and just being sick to

1:05:26.000 --> 1:05:28.800
<v Speaker 1>my stomach over I can't believe I have clients in

1:05:28.840 --> 1:05:31.800
<v Speaker 1>this and it's a disaster. Or I can't believe this

1:05:31.800 --> 1:05:34.800
<v Speaker 1>group of brokers has has clients in this and it's

1:05:35.280 --> 1:05:39.200
<v Speaker 1>a nightmare. Even if it's temporary, it's a horrific, horrific

1:05:39.200 --> 1:05:40.880
<v Speaker 1>If you want to you want to just wretch your

1:05:40.920 --> 1:05:44.640
<v Speaker 1>guts up. A friend of mine, Rob Frame, talks about

1:05:44.720 --> 1:05:47.040
<v Speaker 1>his vomit indicator. He knows it's time to buy when

1:05:47.040 --> 1:05:50.120
<v Speaker 1>he's getting ready to puke, when he feels that coming up.

1:05:50.680 --> 1:05:54.080
<v Speaker 1>It's in very and he's tracted over decades, and he says,

1:05:54.120 --> 1:05:56.560
<v Speaker 1>when I feel like throwing up because of how sick

1:05:56.640 --> 1:05:59.800
<v Speaker 1>I am as to what either I or the market

1:05:59.800 --> 1:06:02.440
<v Speaker 1>have onto clients, usually it's a good time to go

1:06:02.600 --> 1:06:06.240
<v Speaker 1>the other way. And I remember distinctly going in that

1:06:06.400 --> 1:06:08.480
<v Speaker 1>Tuesday morning. I had a lot of cash to operate.

1:06:08.520 --> 1:06:10.800
<v Speaker 1>I called all my clients on Monday night, you're talking

1:06:10.800 --> 1:06:17.200
<v Speaker 1>the day after Black Friday, Monday, and I went and bought.

1:06:17.200 --> 1:06:18.920
<v Speaker 1>It opened and I don't know if you remember, but

1:06:18.960 --> 1:06:21.800
<v Speaker 1>it opened, so went the market went down at all, Yeah, no,

1:06:22.040 --> 1:06:25.640
<v Speaker 1>until they unplugged. Tim Metz wrote a great book called

1:06:25.680 --> 1:06:28.640
<v Speaker 1>Black Monday, and if you read the story, I'm drawing

1:06:28.680 --> 1:06:31.000
<v Speaker 1>a blank on his name. Who used to be the

1:06:31.040 --> 1:06:33.720
<v Speaker 1>head of the New York Fed. This was early in

1:06:33.760 --> 1:06:37.040
<v Speaker 1>the days of the Chicago futures feeds. And he went

1:06:37.040 --> 1:06:39.000
<v Speaker 1>and he went into the NYC and he saw the

1:06:39.040 --> 1:06:42.320
<v Speaker 1>futures feed. That's what was driving that's at least the

1:06:42.400 --> 1:06:46.600
<v Speaker 1>argent story that you saw what the futures were. He

1:06:46.680 --> 1:06:51.720
<v Speaker 1>had that unplugged, and the big banks decided to re

1:06:51.920 --> 1:06:54.480
<v Speaker 1>establish credit with the specialists because they had caught him

1:06:54.520 --> 1:06:57.040
<v Speaker 1>off for we're about to and he said, so you

1:06:57.280 --> 1:06:58.960
<v Speaker 1>don't want to ever do business with the New York

1:06:59.000 --> 1:07:01.960
<v Speaker 1>Stock Exchange. Was if you got off credit today, you're done.

1:07:02.400 --> 1:07:05.160
<v Speaker 1>Off the record, he says it to them. And if

1:07:05.320 --> 1:07:09.160
<v Speaker 1>if you're interested in the academic history of that, read

1:07:09.240 --> 1:07:12.960
<v Speaker 1>Tim Mats's Black Monday. It's a wonderful, wonderful book. So

1:07:13.080 --> 1:07:15.760
<v Speaker 1>you were there on Tuesday and I went in and

1:07:15.760 --> 1:07:19.680
<v Speaker 1>and I remember Tuesday morning was when I felt the worst.

1:07:20.000 --> 1:07:21.680
<v Speaker 1>And how does the afternoon I felt a lot better.

1:07:21.720 --> 1:07:24.160
<v Speaker 1>How long did it take before you got your confirms

1:07:24.200 --> 1:07:26.760
<v Speaker 1>when you bought on Tuesday morning? Well, I when I

1:07:26.800 --> 1:07:30.960
<v Speaker 1>was on the phone immediately. Yeah, so I I mean

1:07:31.040 --> 1:07:34.400
<v Speaker 1>I knew you got filled. I got we got filled.

1:07:34.520 --> 1:07:37.320
<v Speaker 1>Could could have been one of the greatest buying opportunities

1:07:37.360 --> 1:07:40.840
<v Speaker 1>in decades, to say the least. Although march O nine

1:07:40.920 --> 1:07:42.720
<v Speaker 1>is looking more and more like that, the march On

1:07:42.840 --> 1:07:45.640
<v Speaker 1>nine looks pretty good. So who are some of your

1:07:45.680 --> 1:07:50.200
<v Speaker 1>early mentors? Well, yeah, again, not a mentor, but I

1:07:50.680 --> 1:07:56.520
<v Speaker 1>looked up to buffett Um and other investors who influenced you. Yeah,

1:07:57.040 --> 1:08:02.960
<v Speaker 1>you mentioned you mentioned Graham. Certainly eight um Ben Graham

1:08:02.960 --> 1:08:06.920
<v Speaker 1>certainly Phil Fisher, UM, phil Fisher being who um he

1:08:06.960 --> 1:08:10.920
<v Speaker 1>wrote Common Stocks and Uncommon profets and Buffett claims that

1:08:10.960 --> 1:08:16.280
<v Speaker 1>he is fifteen percent Fisher and Graham is what he

1:08:16.320 --> 1:08:20.559
<v Speaker 1>says his makeup. UM. One of the curious things about

1:08:20.600 --> 1:08:25.839
<v Speaker 1>being in Omaha, Uh, Barry, I had a UH class

1:08:25.880 --> 1:08:29.320
<v Speaker 1>that managed real money. These are undergraduate students. At the time,

1:08:29.320 --> 1:08:32.000
<v Speaker 1>it was the only class in the country where students

1:08:32.080 --> 1:08:36.280
<v Speaker 1>for a year long managed real money UM and UM.

1:08:36.360 --> 1:08:40.800
<v Speaker 1>The class. The the term ended right around the time

1:08:40.840 --> 1:08:44.240
<v Speaker 1>of the Berkshire Hathaway Annual meeting, and Mr Buffett was

1:08:44.280 --> 1:08:46.280
<v Speaker 1>gracious enough to come in and talk to the class

1:08:46.280 --> 1:08:50.000
<v Speaker 1>a few But I always would ask him. I said,

1:08:50.040 --> 1:08:51.960
<v Speaker 1>who's going to be in town that I can co

1:08:52.120 --> 1:08:55.800
<v Speaker 1>opt into coming and talking to my class. So it's

1:08:55.840 --> 1:08:57.920
<v Speaker 1>not enough that Warren Buffett is coming to speak to

1:08:57.960 --> 1:09:00.800
<v Speaker 1>your class. While he's there, you're twisting his arm for hey,

1:09:00.880 --> 1:09:03.400
<v Speaker 1>give me some more names. Yeah, and he Bill Ruwayne

1:09:03.600 --> 1:09:06.120
<v Speaker 1>from the Sequoia Fund came and talked to my class

1:09:06.160 --> 1:09:09.759
<v Speaker 1>one year, UM, and he had a really a very

1:09:09.800 --> 1:09:12.400
<v Speaker 1>interesting story to tell too. But let me tell you

1:09:12.479 --> 1:09:15.040
<v Speaker 1>one little, one little Buffet quip that I think tells

1:09:15.040 --> 1:09:17.840
<v Speaker 1>you all you need to know about Mr Buffett. I

1:09:17.880 --> 1:09:20.240
<v Speaker 1>would take my students to the annual meeting. He always

1:09:20.240 --> 1:09:22.200
<v Speaker 1>sent us tickets that I could take my whole class

1:09:22.360 --> 1:09:25.160
<v Speaker 1>or sixteen kids. We'd go to the annual meeting, and

1:09:25.640 --> 1:09:28.000
<v Speaker 1>we would pose every year for a picture. He would

1:09:28.040 --> 1:09:31.439
<v Speaker 1>come over and and pose for a picture. And one

1:09:31.560 --> 1:09:36.200
<v Speaker 1>year I said, Warren, I said, what right if you

1:09:36.240 --> 1:09:39.400
<v Speaker 1>were teaching this class, what books would you use? And

1:09:39.520 --> 1:09:42.559
<v Speaker 1>he said, let me think about that, Bob, that sounds

1:09:42.600 --> 1:09:45.600
<v Speaker 1>like a Buffet response. Three days later, Barry, this is

1:09:45.720 --> 1:09:48.160
<v Speaker 1>three days after the annual meeting. I get a letter

1:09:48.240 --> 1:09:52.400
<v Speaker 1>in the mail, Bob, and it was handwritten Bob. I

1:09:52.479 --> 1:09:56.320
<v Speaker 1>would have the students read Security Analysis by Ben Graham,

1:09:56.680 --> 1:10:01.519
<v Speaker 1>The Intelligent Investor, Security annalys by Graham, and uh the

1:10:01.600 --> 1:10:04.599
<v Speaker 1>Intelligent Investor by Ben Graham, and Common Stocks and Uncommon

1:10:04.680 --> 1:10:08.760
<v Speaker 1>Profits by Phil Fisher. H But he remembered me, and

1:10:08.880 --> 1:10:11.800
<v Speaker 1>it wasn't that he had somebody writing that down wrote it.

1:10:12.080 --> 1:10:14.640
<v Speaker 1>He remembered that I had asked that question, and I

1:10:14.800 --> 1:10:18.320
<v Speaker 1>was the least important person that day to Mr Buffett's

1:10:18.720 --> 1:10:21.200
<v Speaker 1>annual meeting. But he remembered me, and I got it.

1:10:21.479 --> 1:10:24.240
<v Speaker 1>Three days later and I hope you have that that

1:10:24.479 --> 1:10:27.800
<v Speaker 1>letter it's framed. No, no doubt about that. So you

1:10:27.920 --> 1:10:31.080
<v Speaker 1>mentioned three books? Any other books worth bringing up? Yeah,

1:10:31.200 --> 1:10:34.600
<v Speaker 1>margin of Safety? Mr Buffett also said Seth Clarmon. He

1:10:34.680 --> 1:10:38.000
<v Speaker 1>said yeah. I asked him, I said, who's the next

1:10:38.080 --> 1:10:41.360
<v Speaker 1>Warren Buffett? And he said Seth Clarmon. And so I

1:10:41.479 --> 1:10:45.439
<v Speaker 1>looked and Seth Clarmon wrote Margin of Safety. I had

1:10:45.520 --> 1:10:48.920
<v Speaker 1>my students buried by that book. Get out of here,

1:10:49.040 --> 1:10:51.880
<v Speaker 1>so we can't. We used that in class and we

1:10:52.040 --> 1:10:56.200
<v Speaker 1>bought sixteen copies, me and the students. That might be

1:10:56.320 --> 1:11:00.840
<v Speaker 1>the best investment those kids ever made, compounded annual the

1:11:00.960 --> 1:11:06.240
<v Speaker 1>actual value of the book from press. And I had

1:11:06.240 --> 1:11:07.840
<v Speaker 1>a student. I still keep in touch with some of

1:11:07.920 --> 1:11:09.800
<v Speaker 1>these kids. And I had a student call me and say,

1:11:10.760 --> 1:11:13.800
<v Speaker 1>I just got two grand out of that book. He says,

1:11:13.840 --> 1:11:17.400
<v Speaker 1>I can buy the pdf. The pdf is on the internet,

1:11:17.520 --> 1:11:19.439
<v Speaker 1>is free. You can pick it up for for nothing.

1:11:20.120 --> 1:11:22.000
<v Speaker 1>I would want to save the book, but that's just me.

1:11:22.680 --> 1:11:26.799
<v Speaker 1>Um are so, for better or worse? What has changed

1:11:26.880 --> 1:11:30.280
<v Speaker 1>since you joined the industry? Boy? A lot's change. There's

1:11:30.320 --> 1:11:34.600
<v Speaker 1>more algorithmic trading, more high frequency trading, and you know,

1:11:35.280 --> 1:11:38.200
<v Speaker 1>on balance, I think that's a really bad thing. They

1:11:38.320 --> 1:11:41.360
<v Speaker 1>say that it helps liquidity, but you know, I was

1:11:41.439 --> 1:11:44.040
<v Speaker 1>in I was in your camp, and I have guys

1:11:44.160 --> 1:11:47.600
<v Speaker 1>like who guests of the show. David Booth of d

1:11:47.800 --> 1:11:51.360
<v Speaker 1>f A, Bill McNabb CEO and chairman of Van Guard

1:11:51.920 --> 1:11:56.000
<v Speaker 1>both insist to me that h f T has made

1:11:56.040 --> 1:11:58.600
<v Speaker 1>their costs lower. It doesn't feel that way to me,

1:11:58.800 --> 1:12:00.840
<v Speaker 1>but that's what they've said. Yeah, it doesn't feel that

1:12:00.920 --> 1:12:03.200
<v Speaker 1>way to me too. You know, I said earlier, I

1:12:03.280 --> 1:12:07.400
<v Speaker 1>think there's constant talking heads on TV encouraging people to

1:12:08.600 --> 1:12:11.840
<v Speaker 1>have investment activity, is what I'd call it. I think

1:12:11.920 --> 1:12:15.560
<v Speaker 1>we've gone to more trading and less investing. Um. You know,

1:12:15.840 --> 1:12:19.880
<v Speaker 1>I think that people like my sister, who's a lay investor,

1:12:20.520 --> 1:12:24.800
<v Speaker 1>I think that you should have constant action. And when

1:12:24.880 --> 1:12:27.760
<v Speaker 1>she calls me and says, well, you know, you haven't

1:12:27.840 --> 1:12:30.320
<v Speaker 1>suggested that I do anything, And I said, well, Nancy,

1:12:30.400 --> 1:12:33.479
<v Speaker 1>I have you in Berkshire, Hathaway, you've done. Just just

1:12:33.880 --> 1:12:37.120
<v Speaker 1>sit and be happy. My colleague Josh Brown has a

1:12:37.240 --> 1:12:40.200
<v Speaker 1>quote I love, and he says, the solution to high

1:12:40.280 --> 1:12:44.479
<v Speaker 1>frequency trading is low frequency trade. So the less you trade,

1:12:44.600 --> 1:12:48.160
<v Speaker 1>the less likely you are to do something. Really silly.

1:12:48.360 --> 1:12:51.799
<v Speaker 1>I think we have much more informational availability to investors,

1:12:51.840 --> 1:12:54.000
<v Speaker 1>and I think that's a good thing, as does everybody.

1:12:54.360 --> 1:12:58.240
<v Speaker 1>The takeaway the conversation with clients are what about this? Well,

1:12:59.080 --> 1:13:01.719
<v Speaker 1>who doesn't know that? Therefore that's in the stock price?

1:13:02.200 --> 1:13:05.400
<v Speaker 1>The way a piece of information is gonna give you

1:13:05.560 --> 1:13:10.760
<v Speaker 1>an a investing advantage if it's a unique analysis or

1:13:10.880 --> 1:13:14.000
<v Speaker 1>unique piece of data, assuming it doesn't get you sent

1:13:14.120 --> 1:13:17.640
<v Speaker 1>to jail. So that really eliminates a lot of the

1:13:18.080 --> 1:13:20.000
<v Speaker 1>But I think, Barry, it's more what you do with

1:13:20.160 --> 1:13:23.280
<v Speaker 1>that information, because Warren Buffett looks the same information I

1:13:23.400 --> 1:13:25.720
<v Speaker 1>look at and he does a lot more with it

1:13:25.840 --> 1:13:28.439
<v Speaker 1>than I do. And but what I always say is

1:13:28.479 --> 1:13:30.960
<v Speaker 1>the great thing about investing is you don't have to

1:13:31.040 --> 1:13:33.720
<v Speaker 1>have an original idea. You just have to be able

1:13:33.760 --> 1:13:35.960
<v Speaker 1>to recognize a really good idea when it comes through.

1:13:36.720 --> 1:13:40.960
<v Speaker 1>So the my last two questions my favorite questions. So

1:13:41.240 --> 1:13:44.479
<v Speaker 1>if a millennial or someone just graduating college where to

1:13:44.560 --> 1:13:47.360
<v Speaker 1>come to you and say I'm interested in the career

1:13:47.400 --> 1:13:49.840
<v Speaker 1>in finance, what sort of advice would you give them?

1:13:50.360 --> 1:13:52.920
<v Speaker 1>My son is a millennial. My son is twenty one,

1:13:53.640 --> 1:13:56.360
<v Speaker 1>and he has a different outlook than I did, And

1:13:56.600 --> 1:14:00.160
<v Speaker 1>maybe it's a Maybe it's our upbringings because um, he

1:14:00.280 --> 1:14:03.360
<v Speaker 1>grew up in a an environment where he didn't want

1:14:03.400 --> 1:14:06.960
<v Speaker 1>for anything. I grew up in a lower middle class environment.

1:14:07.640 --> 1:14:11.000
<v Speaker 1>Um I wanted to do well. My son wants to

1:14:11.120 --> 1:14:16.879
<v Speaker 1>do good. I think that this profession, the financial services profession,

1:14:17.040 --> 1:14:20.720
<v Speaker 1>can afford somebody the opportunity to do both. You can

1:14:20.880 --> 1:14:24.479
<v Speaker 1>really do well in terms of financially well, but you

1:14:24.600 --> 1:14:28.280
<v Speaker 1>can really do good. And I think that's very appealing

1:14:28.400 --> 1:14:31.679
<v Speaker 1>to millennials. You know, if you put somebody on proper

1:14:31.760 --> 1:14:37.200
<v Speaker 1>financial puttings footing, sound financial footing, that's life changing. And

1:14:37.320 --> 1:14:39.560
<v Speaker 1>I think that if you do that right, and you

1:14:40.360 --> 1:14:41.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, you do a good job at that, you

1:14:41.920 --> 1:14:43.519
<v Speaker 1>can put your head on the pillow at night and

1:14:43.560 --> 1:14:45.960
<v Speaker 1>feel pretty good about what you do. And you can

1:14:46.000 --> 1:14:48.840
<v Speaker 1>also live a pretty good life, to say the least.

1:14:49.080 --> 1:14:51.080
<v Speaker 1>And it's how much of that wanting to do good

1:14:51.120 --> 1:14:53.639
<v Speaker 1>as a function of the fact that he's twenty one

1:14:54.160 --> 1:14:57.320
<v Speaker 1>and when you're young and idealistic and life has kick

1:14:57.400 --> 1:14:59.600
<v Speaker 1>the hell out of you, yet you can look at

1:14:59.600 --> 1:15:01.680
<v Speaker 1>the world that way. Well, I think I've gone the

1:15:01.720 --> 1:15:04.080
<v Speaker 1>other way. I think I started wanting to do well

1:15:04.280 --> 1:15:07.920
<v Speaker 1>and now have done well and want to do good.

1:15:08.360 --> 1:15:13.559
<v Speaker 1>That seems to be a pretty traditional factor for people.

1:15:14.120 --> 1:15:16.960
<v Speaker 1>Once you realize that all your material needs are met,

1:15:17.080 --> 1:15:19.400
<v Speaker 1>and how fortunate you are to be born in the

1:15:19.520 --> 1:15:22.519
<v Speaker 1>United States, born in the century, and being a career

1:15:22.640 --> 1:15:25.120
<v Speaker 1>that pays you more than anyone has any right to

1:15:25.200 --> 1:15:28.680
<v Speaker 1>expect in a given lifetime relative to the rest of

1:15:28.960 --> 1:15:33.760
<v Speaker 1>the um world, you start to think, Hey, I want

1:15:33.760 --> 1:15:37.479
<v Speaker 1>to give some back and just recognize how appreciative I

1:15:37.560 --> 1:15:41.120
<v Speaker 1>am of the opportunities that were afforded to me that

1:15:41.240 --> 1:15:43.639
<v Speaker 1>might not have been afforded to everybody you know. For instance,

1:15:43.680 --> 1:15:46.800
<v Speaker 1>people may roll our eyes about somebody who sells insurance that,

1:15:46.960 --> 1:15:50.120
<v Speaker 1>oh god, who would want to sell insurance? Well, my

1:15:50.320 --> 1:15:54.559
<v Speaker 1>son saw an instance where his uncle, my brother in law,

1:15:54.720 --> 1:15:58.640
<v Speaker 1>was tragically killed in a car accident. His family they

1:15:58.720 --> 1:16:02.120
<v Speaker 1>had life insurance on him. Uh, the the the agent

1:16:02.400 --> 1:16:05.320
<v Speaker 1>basically delivered a check for two million dollars. So the

1:16:05.400 --> 1:16:07.439
<v Speaker 1>house is paid for, the kids, college is paid for,

1:16:07.600 --> 1:16:11.240
<v Speaker 1>retirement is set up, and although it's a terrible tragedy,

1:16:11.960 --> 1:16:15.000
<v Speaker 1>at least it isn't a second tragedy when everybody is

1:16:15.040 --> 1:16:17.040
<v Speaker 1>set back in their lives and can't achieve what they

1:16:17.080 --> 1:16:18.880
<v Speaker 1>want to achieve, and you know he saw that, and

1:16:18.960 --> 1:16:21.160
<v Speaker 1>I think that's shaping what he might want to do.

1:16:21.760 --> 1:16:24.280
<v Speaker 1>So you could do well by doing good in other words,

1:16:24.800 --> 1:16:27.280
<v Speaker 1>And our last question, I know they're gonna kick us

1:16:27.280 --> 1:16:29.400
<v Speaker 1>out of here any second. What is it that you

1:16:29.560 --> 1:16:33.240
<v Speaker 1>know about investing that you wish you knew thirty years

1:16:33.280 --> 1:16:35.479
<v Speaker 1>ago when you were just getting out of school, but

1:16:35.680 --> 1:16:38.679
<v Speaker 1>perhaps didn't thirty years ago. Well, I I sure wish

1:16:38.720 --> 1:16:41.560
<v Speaker 1>I would have seen the mortgage crisis coming. Um. You know,

1:16:41.640 --> 1:16:44.800
<v Speaker 1>it's funny, Barry, how many people now claim to have

1:16:44.960 --> 1:16:47.160
<v Speaker 1>saw that coming. Really annoying to those of us who

1:16:47.200 --> 1:16:49.439
<v Speaker 1>saw it coming. All these people who are making that

1:16:49.600 --> 1:16:54.160
<v Speaker 1>claim it is I certainly didn't see that coming. You know,

1:16:54.520 --> 1:16:57.320
<v Speaker 1>the thing that I see about investments is the the

1:16:57.680 --> 1:17:00.680
<v Speaker 1>complexity of investments is just crazy. Ze I remember I

1:17:00.760 --> 1:17:03.519
<v Speaker 1>had a student who went to work for Solomon Brothers,

1:17:04.200 --> 1:17:06.759
<v Speaker 1>and he was on the mortgage desk and he called

1:17:06.800 --> 1:17:08.800
<v Speaker 1>me and he said, I would like to ask you

1:17:08.840 --> 1:17:11.600
<v Speaker 1>if you'd be interested in helping us um do a

1:17:11.720 --> 1:17:14.439
<v Speaker 1>little consulting in on the mortgage back desk. And he

1:17:14.560 --> 1:17:18.000
<v Speaker 1>sent me everything that he had on mortgage back securities,

1:17:18.000 --> 1:17:20.640
<v Speaker 1>which were nascent at the time, and I said, I,

1:17:21.000 --> 1:17:23.799
<v Speaker 1>I don't understand anybody can I don't understand how anybody

1:17:23.800 --> 1:17:26.800
<v Speaker 1>can value these things. I have no idea because they're

1:17:26.840 --> 1:17:30.320
<v Speaker 1>so complex. Well, great, we've we've hit our target. It

1:17:30.680 --> 1:17:32.479
<v Speaker 1>turned out that that was what it was, and I

1:17:32.479 --> 1:17:35.640
<v Speaker 1>couldn't provide him any help. Well, long story short, I

1:17:35.760 --> 1:17:39.280
<v Speaker 1>think I was right. Um, but I think Barry that

1:17:40.600 --> 1:17:43.200
<v Speaker 1>the theme that I would say is that I think

1:17:43.280 --> 1:17:48.160
<v Speaker 1>that the investment world has gotten unnecessarily complex. Now is

1:17:48.240 --> 1:17:51.120
<v Speaker 1>it safe to say that that's a feature, not a bug.

1:17:51.640 --> 1:17:54.080
<v Speaker 1>It's not an accident that it happens that way, but

1:17:54.680 --> 1:17:57.080
<v Speaker 1>there's not an element of design. I don't think it's

1:17:57.080 --> 1:18:00.600
<v Speaker 1>an accident that it happens. I think that the the

1:18:00.760 --> 1:18:06.360
<v Speaker 1>eye banking community is a pretty um sophisticated, savvy, and

1:18:06.560 --> 1:18:11.320
<v Speaker 1>very intelligent group, and I think that they can uh

1:18:12.760 --> 1:18:15.759
<v Speaker 1>come up with a lot of different products, financial products

1:18:15.880 --> 1:18:19.759
<v Speaker 1>that it's very that they are. They're very difficult to value,

1:18:19.960 --> 1:18:21.840
<v Speaker 1>and I think that there's a thing out there that

1:18:22.160 --> 1:18:26.520
<v Speaker 1>that people are unwilling to say the words I don't understand,

1:18:27.479 --> 1:18:29.280
<v Speaker 1>and I think that's one of Mr. But that's one

1:18:29.280 --> 1:18:31.240
<v Speaker 1>of the things I've learned from Mr Buffett is that

1:18:31.960 --> 1:18:35.639
<v Speaker 1>he stays away from investments that he doesn't understand. Famously

1:18:35.680 --> 1:18:38.519
<v Speaker 1>stayed away from technologies in the late nineties. Everyone said

1:18:38.520 --> 1:18:41.559
<v Speaker 1>he was a dinosaur, and then a year later everything

1:18:41.680 --> 1:18:44.920
<v Speaker 1>crashes on him. Um, it's the idea of your circle

1:18:44.960 --> 1:18:48.040
<v Speaker 1>of competence, So not how big your circle of competence is,

1:18:48.120 --> 1:18:50.760
<v Speaker 1>it's that you stay within its perimeter. So what is

1:18:50.840 --> 1:18:52.920
<v Speaker 1>that one thing you would that would have helped you

1:18:53.000 --> 1:18:55.599
<v Speaker 1>in your career had you known it thirty years ago. Well,

1:18:55.720 --> 1:18:58.080
<v Speaker 1>I think I did know it, and I think it's

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<v Speaker 1>that I think that you stay within that circle of competence,

1:19:01.680 --> 1:19:05.040
<v Speaker 1>and I think that if I could help people, it

1:19:05.160 --> 1:19:07.280
<v Speaker 1>would have been that I would have hammered on that.

1:19:08.280 --> 1:19:12.040
<v Speaker 1>Don't be ashamed to say that you don't understand something.

1:19:13.080 --> 1:19:16.640
<v Speaker 1>Dr Bob Johnson, this has been absolutely fascinating. Thank you

1:19:16.760 --> 1:19:21.160
<v Speaker 1>for being so generous with your time. If you've enjoyed

1:19:21.240 --> 1:19:23.800
<v Speaker 1>this conversation, look up an inch or down an inch

1:19:23.960 --> 1:19:27.439
<v Speaker 1>on Apple iTunes and you'll see the other let's call

1:19:27.520 --> 1:19:32.439
<v Speaker 1>it ninety or so uh podcast radio broadcast conversations that

1:19:32.560 --> 1:19:35.439
<v Speaker 1>we've been doing. I would be remiss if I did

1:19:35.520 --> 1:19:39.360
<v Speaker 1>not thank Taylor Riggs and Charlie Volmer, my uh producer

1:19:39.439 --> 1:19:42.160
<v Speaker 1>and booker for the show. And Michael bat Nick, the

1:19:42.200 --> 1:19:45.040
<v Speaker 1>head of research who helps me put together all of

1:19:45.120 --> 1:19:50.200
<v Speaker 1>these scintillating conversations. I'm Barry Ridhults. You've been listening to

1:19:50.360 --> 1:19:52.880
<v Speaker 1>Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.