1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:24,720 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. Welcome 4 00:00:24,760 --> 00:00:26,880 Speaker 1: back to the show. My name is Matt, my name 5 00:00:26,920 --> 00:00:29,159 Speaker 1: is Noel. They called me Ben. We are joined with 6 00:00:29,160 --> 00:00:32,920 Speaker 1: our super producer Paul Michig controlled decade. Most importantly, you 7 00:00:33,040 --> 00:00:36,720 Speaker 1: are you, You are here, and that makes this stuff 8 00:00:36,880 --> 00:00:41,280 Speaker 1: they don't want you to know. Nope, we several of 9 00:00:41,360 --> 00:00:43,960 Speaker 1: us have been to the UK, right, correct? Have we 10 00:00:44,000 --> 00:00:45,760 Speaker 1: all been? I have when I was very, very little, 11 00:00:45,800 --> 00:00:49,440 Speaker 1: but I don't really recall it intermally. Okay, and Paul 12 00:00:49,479 --> 00:00:51,720 Speaker 1: thumbs up, thumbs down. Have you been to London? He 13 00:00:51,800 --> 00:00:54,960 Speaker 1: has not. Okay, Paul. We will go on an adventure soon, 14 00:00:55,240 --> 00:00:58,279 Speaker 1: assuming we can get into the country after today's episode, 15 00:00:58,600 --> 00:01:00,400 Speaker 1: which is kind of a question that we have to 16 00:01:00,440 --> 00:01:03,800 Speaker 1: confront often. I had a I think we'll be fine 17 00:01:03,960 --> 00:01:07,520 Speaker 1: as we what we will find out a little bit later. Yes, 18 00:01:07,920 --> 00:01:12,800 Speaker 1: about the differences in m I hopefully, yes, Hopefully we 19 00:01:12,840 --> 00:01:15,640 Speaker 1: will be fine. You know, if the Epstein episode didn't 20 00:01:16,400 --> 00:01:19,280 Speaker 1: didn't finish us, hopefully this this one will be fine. 21 00:01:20,040 --> 00:01:23,800 Speaker 1: So we have a lot of listeners in the United Kingdom. 22 00:01:23,880 --> 00:01:26,320 Speaker 1: A lot of your fellow listeners as you are checking 23 00:01:26,319 --> 00:01:31,760 Speaker 1: out the show today are located um often in the 24 00:01:31,840 --> 00:01:35,240 Speaker 1: Anglo sphere where people speak English, right, But but there 25 00:01:35,240 --> 00:01:37,639 Speaker 1: are listeners around the world. We just got an email 26 00:01:37,720 --> 00:01:41,080 Speaker 1: from a guy in Uganda actually, which is very interesting. 27 00:01:41,920 --> 00:01:46,160 Speaker 1: He was not a fan of the above majestic interview. 28 00:01:46,560 --> 00:01:48,800 Speaker 1: By the way, you can check out our Facebook page. 29 00:01:49,480 --> 00:01:52,720 Speaker 1: Here's where it gets crazy to see our response to 30 00:01:52,840 --> 00:01:57,680 Speaker 1: this sort of stuff. But this this is a episode 31 00:01:57,680 --> 00:02:01,720 Speaker 1: that will center on the Unite a Kingdom. If you're 32 00:02:01,840 --> 00:02:06,320 Speaker 1: thinking to yourself, Matt Noel Ben Michion Control, why should 33 00:02:06,320 --> 00:02:08,280 Speaker 1: I care about this? Why does it matter to me? 34 00:02:08,440 --> 00:02:11,919 Speaker 1: I don't want to go to uh foggy London town 35 00:02:12,040 --> 00:02:16,040 Speaker 1: and this is irrelevant. Well, let's just say before you 36 00:02:16,080 --> 00:02:18,600 Speaker 1: get into your point, remember all the connections we've made 37 00:02:18,639 --> 00:02:23,880 Speaker 1: between intelligence agencies across the world, especially those that speak English, 38 00:02:24,120 --> 00:02:27,040 Speaker 1: right right, So this matters to you. If you can 39 00:02:27,120 --> 00:02:31,320 Speaker 1: understand the language in which we are conducting this podcast, 40 00:02:31,400 --> 00:02:34,520 Speaker 1: then this matters very much more so than you might assume. 41 00:02:34,800 --> 00:02:37,680 Speaker 1: Like most countries, the United Kingdom has its own variety 42 00:02:37,680 --> 00:02:41,160 Speaker 1: of intelligence services, and most people outside of the UK 43 00:02:41,360 --> 00:02:45,639 Speaker 1: we're familiar with their intelligence operations through one very important 44 00:02:45,639 --> 00:02:54,160 Speaker 1: portrayal in fiction, James Bond. Yes, right, yes, perfect Agent 45 00:02:54,240 --> 00:02:57,079 Speaker 1: Double O seven himself. I mean, I I can't even 46 00:02:57,360 --> 00:02:59,320 Speaker 1: I should have looked this up before we hopped in 47 00:02:59,360 --> 00:03:02,519 Speaker 1: the booth here. I don't even remember how many James 48 00:03:02,520 --> 00:03:06,000 Speaker 1: Bond films exist. I'm gonna have a shot in the 49 00:03:06,080 --> 00:03:09,560 Speaker 1: dark and say twelve. That sounds like the title for 50 00:03:09,720 --> 00:03:17,480 Speaker 1: James Bond film. It's not. It's more than five, Paul 51 00:03:17,760 --> 00:03:26,080 Speaker 1: is nineteen, Paul says, I mean, that's amazing, and it 52 00:03:26,160 --> 00:03:29,520 Speaker 1: also shows like, of course we would be most familiar 53 00:03:29,560 --> 00:03:33,480 Speaker 1: with intelligence agencies through this James Bond thing. There's also 54 00:03:33,560 --> 00:03:36,880 Speaker 1: an interesting study you can find if you just google 55 00:03:36,920 --> 00:03:40,480 Speaker 1: it about James Bond's drinking habit. Somebody went through all 56 00:03:40,520 --> 00:03:43,920 Speaker 1: the books and they counted every time he had a drink, 57 00:03:44,280 --> 00:03:46,840 Speaker 1: and I'm like, well, this guy is clearly wasted the 58 00:03:47,000 --> 00:03:49,880 Speaker 1: entire time, and he probably has a surotic liver. Have 59 00:03:49,960 --> 00:03:52,880 Speaker 1: you ever had a Vesper martini? That's James Bond's martini 60 00:03:52,920 --> 00:03:55,200 Speaker 1: of choice. Yeah, there's a there's there are a couple 61 00:03:55,200 --> 00:03:58,160 Speaker 1: of great Vesper places here in town, not really really 62 00:03:58,160 --> 00:04:00,600 Speaker 1: good it's like a lemon twist, and it uses lil 63 00:04:00,640 --> 00:04:03,240 Speaker 1: a instead of vermouth, I believe, which is like a 64 00:04:03,320 --> 00:04:06,240 Speaker 1: kind of dry white wine, A pair of teeth kind 65 00:04:06,280 --> 00:04:09,320 Speaker 1: of thing, very citrusy, very refreshed. I have no idea 66 00:04:09,440 --> 00:04:11,400 Speaker 1: most of the words that you just said, A pair 67 00:04:11,400 --> 00:04:17,760 Speaker 1: of teeth, the brand, it's it's it's good, it's good. 68 00:04:17,800 --> 00:04:22,000 Speaker 1: We've We also have a huge advocate for vespers in 69 00:04:22,120 --> 00:04:25,320 Speaker 1: the form of our pal Josh Clark. He's a he's 70 00:04:25,320 --> 00:04:27,800 Speaker 1: a vesper guy. Now nice. I don't know why I 71 00:04:27,800 --> 00:04:30,800 Speaker 1: said it like that changes his that shakes his moral 72 00:04:30,960 --> 00:04:32,919 Speaker 1: character to the core. I see a lot of people 73 00:04:33,080 --> 00:04:38,359 Speaker 1: riding around on the vespers. Uh. That's cute, Matt, all right, 74 00:04:40,160 --> 00:04:45,040 Speaker 1: big goof. But today we are taking a look behind 75 00:04:45,080 --> 00:04:49,880 Speaker 1: the curtain, past the sexy James Bond portrayals. Right, today, 76 00:04:49,920 --> 00:04:53,520 Speaker 1: we're looking at the real life inspiration for countless by thrillers. 77 00:04:53,680 --> 00:04:57,080 Speaker 1: Aiming to answer a disturbing question. Let's just get it 78 00:04:57,120 --> 00:04:59,400 Speaker 1: out of the way now. Is m I five a 79 00:04:59,480 --> 00:05:05,280 Speaker 1: criminal organization? Oh? That's that's heavy. It's a good way 80 00:05:05,279 --> 00:05:09,200 Speaker 1: to frame this discussion. It really absolutely is to get 81 00:05:09,279 --> 00:05:12,000 Speaker 1: some clicks, right, It's it's a it's a big question. 82 00:05:12,600 --> 00:05:14,520 Speaker 1: We're going to drill down into it. As they say 83 00:05:14,520 --> 00:05:18,280 Speaker 1: in corporate speak, let's start drilling, let's get granulars. So 84 00:05:18,440 --> 00:05:21,560 Speaker 1: what what is m I five? Well, am, I is 85 00:05:21,680 --> 00:05:23,599 Speaker 1: the most important thing you need to know here, and 86 00:05:23,640 --> 00:05:28,719 Speaker 1: that's military intelligences. Impossible. I wish that it was. I 87 00:05:28,760 --> 00:05:32,760 Speaker 1: thought it was martian intuition. In this case, it is 88 00:05:32,800 --> 00:05:37,839 Speaker 1: military intelligence. Specifically. That number afterwards is the section number, 89 00:05:37,920 --> 00:05:41,599 Speaker 1: so Section five, and it's founded in nineteen o nine, 90 00:05:42,040 --> 00:05:44,640 Speaker 1: and it wasn't called this at all times. It started 91 00:05:44,640 --> 00:05:47,839 Speaker 1: out as just something that was called the Secret Service Bureau, 92 00:05:48,000 --> 00:05:50,359 Speaker 1: because what better way to keep a secret than have 93 00:05:50,480 --> 00:05:53,960 Speaker 1: the words secret in the title? That's right, I mean 94 00:05:54,279 --> 00:05:57,479 Speaker 1: in that that secret Service in nineteen o nine, you 95 00:05:57,480 --> 00:05:59,679 Speaker 1: can see it harken back then to the United States 96 00:06:00,240 --> 00:06:03,760 Speaker 1: our own Secret Service, and it will. What we'll find 97 00:06:03,800 --> 00:06:05,920 Speaker 1: is that they do very different things, and that's why 98 00:06:05,960 --> 00:06:08,799 Speaker 1: you kind of have sections for all these different secret 99 00:06:08,880 --> 00:06:11,640 Speaker 1: services that you have. In this case, m I five 100 00:06:11,720 --> 00:06:15,240 Speaker 1: is directed by the Joint Intelligence Committee or j I C. 101 00:06:16,120 --> 00:06:19,200 Speaker 1: And this service itself is bound by this thing that 102 00:06:19,279 --> 00:06:27,480 Speaker 1: was created in nineteen eighty nine called the Security Service Acts. Right, 103 00:06:28,160 --> 00:06:31,719 Speaker 1: the what we mean when we say bound is that 104 00:06:31,800 --> 00:06:38,720 Speaker 1: the Security Service Act, essentially, I should say, ostensibly lays 105 00:06:38,800 --> 00:06:42,240 Speaker 1: the groundwork for what m I five is supposed to do, 106 00:06:42,960 --> 00:06:45,840 Speaker 1: how it does it, what it can do basically right right, 107 00:06:45,920 --> 00:06:48,880 Speaker 1: right right, and what does it do The service is 108 00:06:48,920 --> 00:06:53,679 Speaker 1: supposed to, Well, it's directed to we should say, protect 109 00:06:53,760 --> 00:06:58,799 Speaker 1: British parliamentary democracy and Britain's economic interests and a counter 110 00:06:58,920 --> 00:07:02,400 Speaker 1: terrorism and has been within the UK so counter intelligence. 111 00:07:02,640 --> 00:07:06,440 Speaker 1: M I five was founded by Captain Vernon Kell. It's 112 00:07:06,480 --> 00:07:10,680 Speaker 1: a very distinguished sounding name. Uh. The organization played a 113 00:07:10,720 --> 00:07:14,400 Speaker 1: central role in the capture of most of Imperial Germany's 114 00:07:14,440 --> 00:07:17,680 Speaker 1: intelligence agents in the UK at the beginning of World 115 00:07:17,760 --> 00:07:20,119 Speaker 1: War One. It's a big deal. Um, m I five 116 00:07:20,320 --> 00:07:22,800 Speaker 1: is not the same thing. It's important to note as 117 00:07:22,960 --> 00:07:26,320 Speaker 1: m I six and MY five is the British Security Service, 118 00:07:26,320 --> 00:07:30,640 Speaker 1: while am I six is the British Foreign Intelligence Service. So, Ben, 119 00:07:30,680 --> 00:07:32,720 Speaker 1: how how should we how should we think about this? Yeah? 120 00:07:32,880 --> 00:07:35,920 Speaker 1: I think of it as being similar in a way 121 00:07:36,160 --> 00:07:39,840 Speaker 1: for our American listeners to the relationship between the FBI 122 00:07:39,880 --> 00:07:42,040 Speaker 1: and the CIA just always kind of flum maxed me 123 00:07:42,040 --> 00:07:43,440 Speaker 1: a little bit. If I'm being honest, I think it 124 00:07:43,440 --> 00:07:46,680 Speaker 1: always flum makes the FBI and CIA themselves because they 125 00:07:46,720 --> 00:07:51,080 Speaker 1: certainly overstep into one another encroach well and often, I 126 00:07:51,120 --> 00:07:53,720 Speaker 1: mean when the CIA is dealing drugs and the FBI 127 00:07:53,800 --> 00:07:57,440 Speaker 1: has to deal with it, things get messy. Whatever, It's true. 128 00:07:57,880 --> 00:08:01,320 Speaker 1: Ultimately it's dealing with inward facing an outward facing counterintelligence 129 00:08:01,360 --> 00:08:03,960 Speaker 1: and intelligence, right, perfect, Yeah, that's the perfect way to 130 00:08:03,960 --> 00:08:08,280 Speaker 1: say it. Essentially, m I six is tasked to send 131 00:08:08,360 --> 00:08:12,200 Speaker 1: British spies abroad and m I five is there to 132 00:08:12,240 --> 00:08:16,400 Speaker 1: catch spies from other countries. So there that makes sense, right, 133 00:08:17,080 --> 00:08:21,280 Speaker 1: and there are multiple military intelligence services. I really like 134 00:08:21,360 --> 00:08:24,600 Speaker 1: they hit on this note because we need a lot 135 00:08:24,600 --> 00:08:29,200 Speaker 1: of people have kind of this Hinz fifty seven problem. 136 00:08:29,200 --> 00:08:31,320 Speaker 1: When we talked about m I five and m I six. 137 00:08:31,840 --> 00:08:33,839 Speaker 1: You know, were you ever a kid looking at Hines 138 00:08:33,960 --> 00:08:36,320 Speaker 1: fifty seven and wondering where the hell are the other 139 00:08:36,720 --> 00:08:39,000 Speaker 1: fifty six? Yeah? I want to try some of those, 140 00:08:39,040 --> 00:08:40,840 Speaker 1: at least catchups. It doesn't have to do with how 141 00:08:40,880 --> 00:08:42,679 Speaker 1: any spices or in it or something. I don't know. 142 00:08:42,720 --> 00:08:45,560 Speaker 1: I assumed it was like Baskin Robbins or they've got 143 00:08:45,600 --> 00:08:48,800 Speaker 1: the flavors and they always exceeded their flavor. We should 144 00:08:48,840 --> 00:08:52,640 Speaker 1: we should probably ask Lauren vogelbaumb or Annie Reese, there's 145 00:08:52,640 --> 00:08:55,880 Speaker 1: a plug for savers the good side showing lifestyle. But yeah, 146 00:08:56,040 --> 00:09:01,360 Speaker 1: So it turns out it was an historical advertising about 147 00:09:01,400 --> 00:09:06,959 Speaker 1: the fifty seven different varieties of sikulls pickles. O, how 148 00:09:06,960 --> 00:09:09,079 Speaker 1: do you have fifty seven different I guess you can 149 00:09:09,120 --> 00:09:14,160 Speaker 1: pickle anything, right. So, so in the case of these 150 00:09:14,240 --> 00:09:18,280 Speaker 1: multiple military intelligence services in the UK, we find that 151 00:09:18,360 --> 00:09:21,040 Speaker 1: they go all the way up to m I nineteen 152 00:09:21,520 --> 00:09:24,160 Speaker 1: and many have come and gone since the creation of 153 00:09:24,160 --> 00:09:27,760 Speaker 1: the first military intelligence service m I one, which was 154 00:09:27,840 --> 00:09:32,600 Speaker 1: created sometime during World War One, and they mainly focused 155 00:09:32,640 --> 00:09:36,720 Speaker 1: on cryptography, code breaking, counter intelligence stuff, you know what 156 00:09:36,760 --> 00:09:39,720 Speaker 1: I mean. So they were figuring out what Imperial Germany 157 00:09:39,920 --> 00:09:42,400 Speaker 1: was up to, and as we mentioned, they were quite 158 00:09:42,440 --> 00:09:45,400 Speaker 1: successful with some of this stuff, and over time various 159 00:09:45,400 --> 00:09:48,560 Speaker 1: sections folded where they merged or they changed their area 160 00:09:48,559 --> 00:09:53,360 Speaker 1: of focus. In these sections, m I one through nineteen 161 00:09:54,200 --> 00:09:58,160 Speaker 1: ran ran all sorts of different I don't want to 162 00:09:58,200 --> 00:10:02,800 Speaker 1: say hustles, but different process disease. Their activities included stuff 163 00:10:03,000 --> 00:10:06,240 Speaker 1: like specialized geographical analysis. You know, we have a desk 164 00:10:06,280 --> 00:10:08,880 Speaker 1: that just looks at Russia for instance, or one that 165 00:10:09,000 --> 00:10:11,960 Speaker 1: just looks at South America, and then they would have 166 00:10:12,000 --> 00:10:15,640 Speaker 1: things like map making, aerial photography. They would also have 167 00:10:15,760 --> 00:10:20,880 Speaker 1: things that we would normally find objectionable in Western governments today, 168 00:10:21,200 --> 00:10:25,880 Speaker 1: such as three different active propaganda and censorship bureaus. And 169 00:10:25,880 --> 00:10:27,920 Speaker 1: they were they were blatant about it. That's what it's 170 00:10:27,920 --> 00:10:30,520 Speaker 1: said on their label. But you know, a lot of 171 00:10:30,559 --> 00:10:33,320 Speaker 1: that stuff spawned out of World War Two, when the 172 00:10:33,360 --> 00:10:37,440 Speaker 1: propaganda had to be strong on all fronts, and including 173 00:10:37,440 --> 00:10:39,640 Speaker 1: with that was m MY nineteen that you already mentioned, 174 00:10:39,880 --> 00:10:43,000 Speaker 1: and that was the bureau specifically, or the I guess 175 00:10:43,240 --> 00:10:47,959 Speaker 1: section specifically designed to interrogate prisoners of war during World 176 00:10:47,960 --> 00:10:51,280 Speaker 1: War Two, which is kind of scary. That's it's like 177 00:10:51,320 --> 00:10:55,440 Speaker 1: the Black Site section. And it's also it's interesting because 178 00:10:56,840 --> 00:11:00,280 Speaker 1: the organization feels a little bit different in comparison too. 179 00:11:00,760 --> 00:11:04,840 Speaker 1: Intelligence agencies in the US, like the CIA, handles a 180 00:11:04,840 --> 00:11:08,320 Speaker 1: ton of this stuff with its own different subsections, you 181 00:11:08,360 --> 00:11:12,880 Speaker 1: know what I mean. So what does m I five do. 182 00:11:13,280 --> 00:11:18,160 Speaker 1: We've we've looked at just the broad I don't know 183 00:11:18,240 --> 00:11:20,959 Speaker 1: the broad strokes of this, but when we ask what 184 00:11:21,000 --> 00:11:23,960 Speaker 1: it actually does on the ground, we run and this 185 00:11:24,040 --> 00:11:28,239 Speaker 1: is one of those million dollars or million pounds questions. Officially, 186 00:11:28,480 --> 00:11:31,240 Speaker 1: m I five does what it says on the website, right, Yeah, 187 00:11:31,280 --> 00:11:35,880 Speaker 1: it catches spies, that's what it does. It intercepts communications, 188 00:11:35,960 --> 00:11:39,559 Speaker 1: it finds people, it conducts classified counter intelligence. I mean, 189 00:11:39,600 --> 00:11:42,839 Speaker 1: come on, that's m I five for you. And um, 190 00:11:43,120 --> 00:11:46,520 Speaker 1: what it does is it keeps the bear from the door, 191 00:11:46,720 --> 00:11:50,920 Speaker 1: that whatever, whatever scary animal. Yeah, the coyotes can't get 192 00:11:50,960 --> 00:11:54,560 Speaker 1: in because of us. Yeah, that's the I like that 193 00:11:54,640 --> 00:11:59,000 Speaker 1: Cold War reference, right, because the UK had to reorganize 194 00:11:59,040 --> 00:12:03,040 Speaker 1: a lot of their stuff and evolve their sophistication when 195 00:12:03,040 --> 00:12:07,000 Speaker 1: the KGB came out guns blazing in the Cold War. 196 00:12:07,720 --> 00:12:10,719 Speaker 1: Is interesting though, because to this day, many of these 197 00:12:10,760 --> 00:12:14,960 Speaker 1: operations in my five operations remain classified. Yeah. It's kind 198 00:12:14,960 --> 00:12:17,080 Speaker 1: of a big deal. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, I mean 199 00:12:17,120 --> 00:12:19,520 Speaker 1: a lot. It seems like in our country some of 200 00:12:19,559 --> 00:12:21,800 Speaker 1: that stuff kind of eventually over time, when it ceases 201 00:12:21,840 --> 00:12:24,880 Speaker 1: to be important for security, we get to get a 202 00:12:24,880 --> 00:12:28,520 Speaker 1: little glimpse into, you know, some of the past covert operations, right, 203 00:12:28,559 --> 00:12:30,760 Speaker 1: a little some of them. Yeah, I mean, yeah, you're 204 00:12:30,760 --> 00:12:35,560 Speaker 1: absolutely correct. One thing that's one thing that's tough for 205 00:12:35,600 --> 00:12:40,920 Speaker 1: the British public is that without information about a lot 206 00:12:40,920 --> 00:12:43,640 Speaker 1: of these operations, many of which were fairly recent in 207 00:12:43,640 --> 00:12:47,880 Speaker 1: the nineteen eighties and stuff. Without that information, it's tough 208 00:12:47,920 --> 00:12:52,280 Speaker 1: to gauge how successful or unsuccessful this organization is because 209 00:12:52,320 --> 00:12:55,640 Speaker 1: if they're doing everything right, you never hear about them. 210 00:12:55,720 --> 00:12:58,240 Speaker 1: You know, you only hear about them when something goes 211 00:12:58,840 --> 00:13:01,800 Speaker 1: pear shaped, which I believe of his British slang, or 212 00:13:01,840 --> 00:13:06,280 Speaker 1: something goes really right and another person leaks information right. 213 00:13:06,600 --> 00:13:09,160 Speaker 1: And that's how we do know of some intelligence failures. 214 00:13:09,280 --> 00:13:13,400 Speaker 1: For instance, one of m I five officers, a guy 215 00:13:13,480 --> 00:13:16,800 Speaker 1: named Michael Bettany, was caught trying to sell information to 216 00:13:16,840 --> 00:13:20,360 Speaker 1: the KGB and he got caught. He got convicted of espionage. 217 00:13:20,440 --> 00:13:23,480 Speaker 1: The big question is what did he did? He successfully 218 00:13:23,480 --> 00:13:26,760 Speaker 1: sell SUF some stuff beforehand? Yeah, did he get away 219 00:13:26,760 --> 00:13:30,280 Speaker 1: with it before he got caught? And was he the 220 00:13:30,320 --> 00:13:35,120 Speaker 1: only guy selling information? I certainly doubt it. YEA, probably not. 221 00:13:35,600 --> 00:13:39,800 Speaker 1: And you know, these organizations you have to continually justify 222 00:13:40,600 --> 00:13:43,840 Speaker 1: your the reason that you're getting so much money from 223 00:13:43,880 --> 00:13:45,920 Speaker 1: the public, I guess tax dollars and all of that 224 00:13:46,240 --> 00:13:50,520 Speaker 1: with any intelligence community or organization. And as a Cold 225 00:13:50,520 --> 00:13:53,480 Speaker 1: War came to an end and they switched gears again 226 00:13:53,520 --> 00:13:56,920 Speaker 1: because there were terrorist threats coming from Northern Ireland UH 227 00:13:57,120 --> 00:14:02,200 Speaker 1: states such as Libya where Colonel Gaddafi was operating, and 228 00:14:02,240 --> 00:14:04,360 Speaker 1: that was a threat, at least at the time it 229 00:14:04,480 --> 00:14:07,400 Speaker 1: perceived threat. These were some of the major threats at 230 00:14:07,480 --> 00:14:09,839 Speaker 1: least according to the m I five for a little 231 00:14:09,840 --> 00:14:12,280 Speaker 1: while there. And then you know, like we said, the 232 00:14:12,280 --> 00:14:14,480 Speaker 1: Cold War is coming to an end. Now we're in 233 00:14:14,520 --> 00:14:17,199 Speaker 1: the nineties, and there were some major reforms went into place, 234 00:14:17,320 --> 00:14:19,800 Speaker 1: and the service actually around this time gained its first 235 00:14:19,960 --> 00:14:24,400 Speaker 1: female Director General, Yeah, Dame Stella Remington, who held the 236 00:14:24,440 --> 00:14:28,440 Speaker 1: position from two to nineteen nineties six. And then the 237 00:14:28,560 --> 00:14:31,479 Speaker 1: rise of Islamis terrorism at the end of the nineties, 238 00:14:31,560 --> 00:14:35,000 Speaker 1: culminating in the nine eleven attacks in two thousand one, 239 00:14:35,160 --> 00:14:40,040 Speaker 1: lad to massive changes in the way m I five operated. Yeah. Absolutely, 240 00:14:40,080 --> 00:14:43,920 Speaker 1: And look, folks, it's no secret the counter intelligence is 241 00:14:43,960 --> 00:14:48,560 Speaker 1: a murky murky business. Operations often edge in de morally 242 00:14:48,720 --> 00:14:52,960 Speaker 1: and legally gray areas. Over the course of its existence, 243 00:14:53,200 --> 00:14:56,720 Speaker 1: like many other intelligence agencies, m I five has conducted 244 00:14:56,800 --> 00:15:01,320 Speaker 1: numerous secret operations, often without any look oversight, and often 245 00:15:01,680 --> 00:15:06,160 Speaker 1: even without governmental oversight. The left hand doesn't know what 246 00:15:06,280 --> 00:15:09,120 Speaker 1: the right hand is doing, and many people would say 247 00:15:09,160 --> 00:15:12,520 Speaker 1: that is the way it should be. Sure, Sure, sometimes 248 00:15:12,760 --> 00:15:15,080 Speaker 1: even people who don't work for m I five, mostly 249 00:15:15,080 --> 00:15:17,000 Speaker 1: people who work for m I five probaly say that. 250 00:15:17,720 --> 00:15:21,560 Speaker 1: But yeah, I see the point about compartmentalized information, right, 251 00:15:21,640 --> 00:15:25,840 Speaker 1: there's there's a need to have that sort of operational security. 252 00:15:26,160 --> 00:15:29,200 Speaker 1: But critics don't buy this. Critics alleged that m I 253 00:15:29,240 --> 00:15:33,360 Speaker 1: five is much more than a counter intelligence agency. In fact, 254 00:15:33,400 --> 00:15:36,840 Speaker 1: they argue, while m I five functions as a spy service, 255 00:15:37,160 --> 00:15:43,440 Speaker 1: it also effectively functions as a criminal empire. Whoa yeah, 256 00:15:43,680 --> 00:15:48,280 Speaker 1: like hydro level, Well, what the hell are we talking about? 257 00:15:48,440 --> 00:15:58,440 Speaker 1: Will tell you after a word from our sponsor, Here's 258 00:15:58,440 --> 00:16:02,240 Speaker 1: where it gets crazy. While the m I five might 259 00:16:02,400 --> 00:16:06,320 Speaker 1: not be a criminal organization at least to its parent government, 260 00:16:07,120 --> 00:16:10,600 Speaker 1: ye old, let's just call it, what do we call it, 261 00:16:10,600 --> 00:16:14,480 Speaker 1: the Parliamentary United Kingdom in their government and you know, 262 00:16:14,560 --> 00:16:18,600 Speaker 1: perhaps the Queen and all of her subjects, um, but 263 00:16:18,640 --> 00:16:23,840 Speaker 1: it certainly functions as a criminal organization at least at times. Uh, 264 00:16:23,880 --> 00:16:26,400 Speaker 1: you know, and we're not again, we're not just throwing 265 00:16:27,280 --> 00:16:30,640 Speaker 1: throwing a ninja stars? Is that okay to say we're 266 00:16:30,680 --> 00:16:33,600 Speaker 1: not just throwing ninja stars at at Britain. We've seen 267 00:16:33,680 --> 00:16:36,920 Speaker 1: this occur, as we said earlier, with many other intelligence 268 00:16:36,960 --> 00:16:41,360 Speaker 1: services within many other countries. But it does function as 269 00:16:41,360 --> 00:16:45,680 Speaker 1: a criminal organization sometimes. And we know this. This isn't 270 00:16:45,680 --> 00:16:50,600 Speaker 1: a theory, This isn't some to boil Internet bloggery. Here. 271 00:16:50,920 --> 00:16:54,600 Speaker 1: It turns out that in two thousand eighteen, declassified documents 272 00:16:54,600 --> 00:17:00,000 Speaker 1: showed that the government of the United Kingdom allows m 273 00:16:59,920 --> 00:17:04,200 Speaker 1: I fives agents and informants to carry out crime within 274 00:17:04,240 --> 00:17:08,239 Speaker 1: the UK UH without consequence. They've been allowed to do 275 00:17:08,280 --> 00:17:13,080 Speaker 1: this for at least thirty years. Seriously, it's a it's 276 00:17:13,080 --> 00:17:16,840 Speaker 1: a license to kill, it's a license to torture, pillage. 277 00:17:17,040 --> 00:17:25,840 Speaker 1: Did you just say a license to kill? Yes, I mean, 278 00:17:25,920 --> 00:17:28,840 Speaker 1: come on, man, that's great. I can't believe I didn't 279 00:17:28,880 --> 00:17:32,119 Speaker 1: think of that. That's awesome. Yeah, yeah, I mean that. 280 00:17:32,800 --> 00:17:35,320 Speaker 1: But really, the bit we did was awesome. But the 281 00:17:35,359 --> 00:17:40,159 Speaker 1: fact that they can just go murder people is not cool. 282 00:17:40,280 --> 00:17:42,000 Speaker 1: And and and as it turns out, which was a 283 00:17:42,040 --> 00:17:44,240 Speaker 1: bummer to me or to my kid's self, they don't 284 00:17:44,240 --> 00:17:47,120 Speaker 1: actually have a license. They can flash before they kill someone, 285 00:17:47,200 --> 00:17:49,960 Speaker 1: letting them know that it's legit. It's more of an expression. 286 00:17:50,320 --> 00:17:55,520 Speaker 1: Maybe we should just manufacture our own, not to use, 287 00:17:55,600 --> 00:17:58,080 Speaker 1: but just to have just on a T shirt. Maybe 288 00:17:58,320 --> 00:18:00,719 Speaker 1: we like, how would you feel if you stole someone's 289 00:18:00,760 --> 00:18:04,639 Speaker 1: wallet and you're going through the wallet and you found 290 00:18:04,840 --> 00:18:08,560 Speaker 1: like three different fake forms of identification right all the 291 00:18:08,600 --> 00:18:11,880 Speaker 1: same phase, three different names, three different profiles, and then 292 00:18:11,920 --> 00:18:15,240 Speaker 1: you saw like this mysterious license to kill? What would 293 00:18:15,240 --> 00:18:18,399 Speaker 1: you do with that wallet? I would put it right 294 00:18:18,440 --> 00:18:21,320 Speaker 1: back down, wipe. I'd first, I'd wipe my prints from it. 295 00:18:21,560 --> 00:18:26,600 Speaker 1: There you go right back down on the ground. Clever, clever, alright, well, 296 00:18:26,640 --> 00:18:29,240 Speaker 1: I know what you guys are getting for the holidays. 297 00:18:30,680 --> 00:18:33,120 Speaker 1: You'd also have to check local security cameras in any 298 00:18:33,160 --> 00:18:36,679 Speaker 1: CCTV that's around to make sure to destroy those tapes. 299 00:18:38,160 --> 00:18:40,800 Speaker 1: And you probably want to drop your phone too, because 300 00:18:40,800 --> 00:18:46,000 Speaker 1: that GPS record would be there. You know what were 301 00:18:46,040 --> 00:18:48,160 Speaker 1: We might be taking this thought experiment a little too 302 00:18:48,160 --> 00:18:51,040 Speaker 1: far right now, If you do have a license to kill, 303 00:18:51,080 --> 00:18:53,440 Speaker 1: and you can tell us about it without killing us, 304 00:18:53,480 --> 00:18:56,000 Speaker 1: we would love to hear your experiences. We will do 305 00:18:56,040 --> 00:18:59,200 Speaker 1: our best to keep you anonymous. Just put it out there. 306 00:19:00,880 --> 00:19:04,960 Speaker 1: What I guess You're right, No, it's as we'll see. 307 00:19:05,000 --> 00:19:07,560 Speaker 1: They kind of did have not not a badge. They 308 00:19:07,560 --> 00:19:10,520 Speaker 1: could wave around, but they did have documented proof that 309 00:19:10,560 --> 00:19:13,119 Speaker 1: the government at all levels that were aware of it, 310 00:19:13,200 --> 00:19:17,560 Speaker 1: approved of this. It was called a secret and concealed policy. 311 00:19:17,680 --> 00:19:22,760 Speaker 1: This would allow the security service to authorize participation in murder, torture, 312 00:19:23,000 --> 00:19:28,960 Speaker 1: sexual assault, or other grave criminality if just a few 313 00:19:28,960 --> 00:19:31,639 Speaker 1: folks believed it was in the in the service of 314 00:19:31,640 --> 00:19:37,159 Speaker 1: the greater good in the public interest. Uh, that is 315 00:19:37,200 --> 00:19:41,399 Speaker 1: so creepy and discussing, and I wonder how many other 316 00:19:41,560 --> 00:19:45,560 Speaker 1: intelligence organizations have an active policy like that, a secret 317 00:19:45,560 --> 00:19:51,119 Speaker 1: and concealed policy. Okay, so this this was basically a 318 00:19:51,160 --> 00:19:55,919 Speaker 1: criminal authorization, just literally that you can do crime and 319 00:19:55,960 --> 00:19:58,440 Speaker 1: it's okay. But it's like a further greater good clause, 320 00:19:58,600 --> 00:20:03,760 Speaker 1: right right, that's the implication here. Yeah. But yes, but 321 00:20:04,040 --> 00:20:07,000 Speaker 1: this is something that has been around for thirty years 322 00:20:07,040 --> 00:20:09,600 Speaker 1: and it was only first acknowledged in a British court 323 00:20:09,640 --> 00:20:12,639 Speaker 1: when an alliance of human rights groups argued that it 324 00:20:12,720 --> 00:20:16,720 Speaker 1: was unlawful to have this kind of policy, like maybe not, 325 00:20:16,920 --> 00:20:20,399 Speaker 1: let's not do this, and it was completely secret like 326 00:20:20,440 --> 00:20:25,160 Speaker 1: they were practicing omerta until two thousand and twelve, Prime 327 00:20:25,200 --> 00:20:29,800 Speaker 1: Minister David Cameron wrote to Sir Mark Waller, the Intelligence 328 00:20:29,840 --> 00:20:33,840 Speaker 1: Service Commissioner at the time, asking him to keep the 329 00:20:33,960 --> 00:20:38,360 Speaker 1: policy under review, which is, we've got a quote, it's 330 00:20:38,480 --> 00:20:40,399 Speaker 1: very British in the way it's written, but we'll give 331 00:20:40,440 --> 00:20:42,840 Speaker 1: it a shot. I'm gonna do a British accent. Let's see, 332 00:20:42,920 --> 00:20:46,320 Speaker 1: in the discharge of their function to protect national security, 333 00:20:46,600 --> 00:20:50,720 Speaker 1: the Security Services longstanding policy for the agent handless to 334 00:20:50,760 --> 00:20:54,560 Speaker 1: agree to agents participating in crime in circumstances where it 335 00:20:54,600 --> 00:20:58,600 Speaker 1: is considered such involvement is necessary and proportionate in providing 336 00:20:58,640 --> 00:21:02,000 Speaker 1: on maintaining access to intelligence that will allow the disruption 337 00:21:02,080 --> 00:21:07,720 Speaker 1: of most serious crimes or threats to national security. Oh wow, 338 00:21:07,760 --> 00:21:10,360 Speaker 1: that was great. Firing like that. It sounds nice, but 339 00:21:10,480 --> 00:21:13,000 Speaker 1: it sounds like he's describing marzipan. It sounds like he's 340 00:21:13,040 --> 00:21:15,159 Speaker 1: reading like a Winnie the Poosh story or something. You know, 341 00:21:15,359 --> 00:21:20,199 Speaker 1: it's totally um. It's a clause for undercover agents, right, 342 00:21:20,240 --> 00:21:23,479 Speaker 1: that's all. That's what that is. Well, I mean that 343 00:21:23,480 --> 00:21:26,879 Speaker 1: part is. But yeah, it's saying like, if you have 344 00:21:26,920 --> 00:21:31,440 Speaker 1: an informant who is operating maybe in something like gun 345 00:21:31,560 --> 00:21:34,239 Speaker 1: running or human trafficking circles, and you need to keep 346 00:21:34,280 --> 00:21:37,600 Speaker 1: them embedded. Question in the States, you see it in 347 00:21:37,600 --> 00:21:39,679 Speaker 1: the movies. I'm just one. Want to see what you 348 00:21:39,680 --> 00:21:42,760 Speaker 1: guys think about this. Whenever an undercover agent is offered drugs, 349 00:21:43,200 --> 00:21:46,160 Speaker 1: they they go to whatever lengths they can to not 350 00:21:46,240 --> 00:21:48,679 Speaker 1: actually do the drugs. If they're like, you know, you know, 351 00:21:48,760 --> 00:21:50,440 Speaker 1: like to prove you're not a cop, do the drugs 352 00:21:50,520 --> 00:21:53,359 Speaker 1: or whatever, it's like, oops, oops, I dropped the drugs. 353 00:21:53,440 --> 00:21:56,800 Speaker 1: You know. No, I'm wondering, like, do you think we 354 00:21:56,880 --> 00:22:00,880 Speaker 1: have It does seem like it's not it's frowned upon 355 00:22:01,119 --> 00:22:03,800 Speaker 1: for undercover cops to like get deep and start like 356 00:22:03,880 --> 00:22:06,399 Speaker 1: doing drugs. It sounds like there's a order, there's a 357 00:22:06,400 --> 00:22:08,960 Speaker 1: there's a boundary we that we would prefer not to cross. 358 00:22:09,320 --> 00:22:11,760 Speaker 1: They probably would have avoid it, but it comes in. 359 00:22:12,160 --> 00:22:14,800 Speaker 1: It comes into that idea the greater good right accomplishing 360 00:22:14,840 --> 00:22:17,959 Speaker 1: the sting or the operation. So I am sure there 361 00:22:18,000 --> 00:22:20,800 Speaker 1: are people who have, maybe in the d A or something, 362 00:22:21,600 --> 00:22:25,320 Speaker 1: been forced to do cocaine or something like that, But 363 00:22:25,480 --> 00:22:30,320 Speaker 1: I don't I don't know if there's a strict, a 364 00:22:30,480 --> 00:22:34,080 Speaker 1: strict bright line policy wise. I don't think there can be. 365 00:22:34,800 --> 00:22:37,399 Speaker 1: I think because all of its circumstantial, right, especially when 366 00:22:37,400 --> 00:22:40,720 Speaker 1: you're dealing with this, if this is full on national 367 00:22:40,760 --> 00:22:43,760 Speaker 1: security for the past thirty years. I can't even imagine 368 00:22:43,840 --> 00:22:46,800 Speaker 1: the some of the terrible things that some of these 369 00:22:46,840 --> 00:22:49,439 Speaker 1: agents have had to do, Like you're saying, in the 370 00:22:49,520 --> 00:22:53,440 Speaker 1: human trafficking fields and drug fields and we're murder like 371 00:22:53,560 --> 00:22:56,520 Speaker 1: in murder in order to then get a bigger fish 372 00:22:56,640 --> 00:22:59,960 Speaker 1: essentially down the line. And you also have to wonder, Okay, 373 00:23:00,040 --> 00:23:03,679 Speaker 1: let's put ourselves in that hypothetical position. Let's say Paul 374 00:23:03,760 --> 00:23:08,240 Speaker 1: mission controlled decond is a big time like Narco's level 375 00:23:08,720 --> 00:23:11,879 Speaker 1: Colombian drug cartel leader. Right, I can see it, and 376 00:23:11,960 --> 00:23:15,080 Speaker 1: we're we're up and comers, We're gonna be lieutenants, and 377 00:23:15,160 --> 00:23:18,040 Speaker 1: he's like, do this, uh, do this cocaine in front 378 00:23:18,040 --> 00:23:22,800 Speaker 1: of me? It's cocaine, and we would we would look 379 00:23:23,240 --> 00:23:27,119 Speaker 1: very suspicious if we just fumbled, just dropped it, because 380 00:23:27,600 --> 00:23:30,639 Speaker 1: I don't know. I don't know a ton about um 381 00:23:31,280 --> 00:23:33,600 Speaker 1: about that drug, but I do know about the general 382 00:23:33,640 --> 00:23:35,920 Speaker 1: trends of addiction and people who are into that kind 383 00:23:35,920 --> 00:23:39,119 Speaker 1: of stuff. Don't just drop it. Yeah, in that case, 384 00:23:39,160 --> 00:23:42,119 Speaker 1: I think the fumble move would be to accidentally drop 385 00:23:42,200 --> 00:23:44,320 Speaker 1: it on one of the guys that you know is 386 00:23:44,320 --> 00:23:46,680 Speaker 1: not an undercover agent, so that it's oh well, we 387 00:23:46,720 --> 00:23:49,560 Speaker 1: didn't waste it. It just it's all over that guy. Now, 388 00:23:50,160 --> 00:23:52,280 Speaker 1: I don't know, man, I think you have to do it. 389 00:23:52,320 --> 00:23:54,159 Speaker 1: If you're at that point, it's like that. It's it 390 00:23:54,200 --> 00:23:56,080 Speaker 1: can't be like that scene in that Woody Allen movie 391 00:23:56,119 --> 00:23:59,320 Speaker 1: where he sneezes the cocaine off the dish or whatever, 392 00:23:59,680 --> 00:24:01,919 Speaker 1: and it's basically like a party foul. It's more like 393 00:24:02,480 --> 00:24:05,919 Speaker 1: you're gonna get shot in the face foul. Yeah. But 394 00:24:06,040 --> 00:24:08,719 Speaker 1: then if you're talking about the bigger operations, where you're 395 00:24:08,720 --> 00:24:11,160 Speaker 1: actually out in the field doing things other than drugs, 396 00:24:11,240 --> 00:24:14,800 Speaker 1: the actual criminal acts, that's where it gets a little, um, 397 00:24:15,800 --> 00:24:18,800 Speaker 1: I don't know, it gets murky for me right right right, 398 00:24:18,880 --> 00:24:22,400 Speaker 1: Like if you are embedded as an enforcer and you're 399 00:24:22,440 --> 00:24:24,720 Speaker 1: sent to beat the crap out of someone, you know 400 00:24:24,800 --> 00:24:26,199 Speaker 1: what I mean. And I'm sure there have been in 401 00:24:26,200 --> 00:24:30,040 Speaker 1: the past undercover agents who have to performatively beat the 402 00:24:30,040 --> 00:24:33,640 Speaker 1: snot out of one another just to make make sure 403 00:24:33,680 --> 00:24:37,800 Speaker 1: they look like they're legit. So, yes, the informant stuff 404 00:24:38,640 --> 00:24:40,600 Speaker 1: that that's part of it, and that doesn't seem that 405 00:24:40,640 --> 00:24:44,080 Speaker 1: far out. But when Cameron is writing this letter to 406 00:24:44,160 --> 00:24:49,359 Speaker 1: Sir Mark Waller, he essentially says, look, We're not going 407 00:24:49,440 --> 00:24:53,480 Speaker 1: to ask you to tell us whether like, we don't 408 00:24:53,520 --> 00:24:55,680 Speaker 1: want you to feel as if you have to report 409 00:24:55,720 --> 00:24:59,920 Speaker 1: it to anybody if you get what I'm saying, anyone, 410 00:25:00,040 --> 00:25:03,080 Speaker 1: and and you don't have to worry about whether or 411 00:25:03,080 --> 00:25:08,919 Speaker 1: not it's legal at all. That's just crazy, man. Is 412 00:25:08,920 --> 00:25:10,440 Speaker 1: that one of those things where it sort of exists 413 00:25:10,440 --> 00:25:14,920 Speaker 1: in like an extra legal area, right, Yeah. And most 414 00:25:14,920 --> 00:25:17,040 Speaker 1: people in the government had no idea what was happening, 415 00:25:17,440 --> 00:25:18,919 Speaker 1: you know what I mean. I think most people in 416 00:25:19,000 --> 00:25:22,080 Speaker 1: Parliament at that time would have said, you know, we 417 00:25:22,119 --> 00:25:26,960 Speaker 1: should we should not give people these licensees for wanton destruction. 418 00:25:28,160 --> 00:25:31,960 Speaker 1: Cameron to be fair, We're gonna try to be fair here, 419 00:25:32,240 --> 00:25:35,400 Speaker 1: said he had considered making the letter public in uh 420 00:25:35,440 --> 00:25:39,240 Speaker 1: in the interest of transparency, but decided against it because 421 00:25:39,280 --> 00:25:41,880 Speaker 1: he thought it might be damaging to the national interest 422 00:25:42,440 --> 00:25:46,480 Speaker 1: also known as his political career. That's what I think. 423 00:25:47,280 --> 00:25:50,560 Speaker 1: I think. I think he was saying damaging to the 424 00:25:50,640 --> 00:25:53,919 Speaker 1: national interests, but he meant damaging to his political career. 425 00:25:54,560 --> 00:25:57,959 Speaker 1: Kind of a typo, maybe a welly flippan. I can 426 00:25:58,000 --> 00:25:59,879 Speaker 1: see that. I can see that, man, I mean, I 427 00:26:00,040 --> 00:26:02,439 Speaker 1: can see where you become prime minister. You get with 428 00:26:02,800 --> 00:26:06,000 Speaker 1: of something like this, and as a citizen, it gives 429 00:26:06,000 --> 00:26:08,840 Speaker 1: you pause just knowing that it's happening, right, no matter 430 00:26:09,320 --> 00:26:12,439 Speaker 1: where what your beliefs are in what you're holding that office. 431 00:26:12,840 --> 00:26:14,639 Speaker 1: And it does seem like he kind of rode the 432 00:26:14,680 --> 00:26:17,440 Speaker 1: fence there a little bit of should I shouldn't I 433 00:26:17,480 --> 00:26:19,919 Speaker 1: tell anybody about this? This is really left up but 434 00:26:20,119 --> 00:26:25,439 Speaker 1: in the in the in the let's keep national security 435 00:26:25,480 --> 00:26:28,000 Speaker 1: in public interest in order, and let's just balance it 436 00:26:28,040 --> 00:26:30,960 Speaker 1: out and say, let's just keep it quiet. Like, wasn't 437 00:26:30,960 --> 00:26:34,160 Speaker 1: it the whole idea that he basically just um he 438 00:26:34,200 --> 00:26:37,040 Speaker 1: said he told this guy not to comment on the legality. 439 00:26:37,080 --> 00:26:39,600 Speaker 1: That was the whole idea. Yeah, so it's the policy 440 00:26:39,760 --> 00:26:43,520 Speaker 1: is under review. Doing air quotes here, I hope you 441 00:26:43,560 --> 00:26:47,520 Speaker 1: can hear them. The policies under review. However, what that 442 00:26:47,680 --> 00:26:53,360 Speaker 1: essentially means is provide cover for us and don't like, Okay, look, 443 00:26:53,480 --> 00:26:56,879 Speaker 1: sometimes you gotta you gotta break a few innocent eggs 444 00:26:57,119 --> 00:26:59,119 Speaker 1: if you really want to cook a terrorism omlet you 445 00:26:59,160 --> 00:27:02,639 Speaker 1: know what I mean. Shee. So that's yeah, that's exactly 446 00:27:02,640 --> 00:27:05,639 Speaker 1: what happens that don't comment on the legality, don't refer 447 00:27:05,680 --> 00:27:08,840 Speaker 1: it to any prosecuting body. Don't refer to law enforcement. 448 00:27:09,240 --> 00:27:13,640 Speaker 1: Let's keep this between us. Let's let's have a greater good. 449 00:27:14,160 --> 00:27:18,960 Speaker 1: So the argument was essentially that for most of history, 450 00:27:19,160 --> 00:27:22,520 Speaker 1: most of modern British history, they have been following one 451 00:27:22,840 --> 00:27:27,000 Speaker 1: of two paths as just a nation. That was the 452 00:27:27,119 --> 00:27:30,560 Speaker 1: rule of law and then there were criminal acts. Right. 453 00:27:32,119 --> 00:27:36,360 Speaker 1: But they called this strategy the third direction. Great boy 454 00:27:36,440 --> 00:27:40,040 Speaker 1: band right? Right? Do you guys remember Glee? Do you 455 00:27:40,080 --> 00:27:45,119 Speaker 1: remember their band? Uh? One direction? What was direction? Was 456 00:27:45,160 --> 00:27:48,640 Speaker 1: a real band? What am I thinking of? Well, there 457 00:27:48,680 --> 00:27:54,560 Speaker 1: was that U plus me equals us? New direction, New direction, 458 00:27:54,720 --> 00:27:59,760 Speaker 1: New direction. It's a pun new direction. I say, yeah, 459 00:28:00,280 --> 00:28:04,720 Speaker 1: very body like boys soul from always Stunning Philodelphia. But 460 00:28:05,359 --> 00:28:10,920 Speaker 1: they called this thing, seriously, the third direction. Nobody acknowledged 461 00:28:10,960 --> 00:28:14,879 Speaker 1: it until this year in a British court when that 462 00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:18,119 Speaker 1: alliance of human rights groups that Matt mentioned earlier, um 463 00:28:18,720 --> 00:28:21,760 Speaker 1: Privacy International. Who are the other ones? Yeah? Those guys 464 00:28:21,800 --> 00:28:25,040 Speaker 1: over at p I. Then we've got reprieved the Committee 465 00:28:25,040 --> 00:28:28,600 Speaker 1: on the Administration of Justice and the Pat Finnickan Center. 466 00:28:29,000 --> 00:28:32,600 Speaker 1: According to the legal team representing this alliance, the third 467 00:28:32,640 --> 00:28:36,560 Speaker 1: Direction policy is likely to have enabled the Security Service 468 00:28:36,640 --> 00:28:41,640 Speaker 1: to conceal wide ranging illegal activity, and they brought this 469 00:28:41,720 --> 00:28:47,440 Speaker 1: case before an investigatory powers tribunal. The trial included as 470 00:28:47,480 --> 00:28:52,400 Speaker 1: a bonus a the publication of a heavily redacted document, 471 00:28:52,920 --> 00:28:56,040 Speaker 1: a guideline essentially for how to break the law and 472 00:28:56,080 --> 00:28:58,120 Speaker 1: get away with it. This is how you do it. 473 00:28:58,520 --> 00:29:00,920 Speaker 1: And like a lot of government documents, you can find 474 00:29:01,040 --> 00:29:04,880 Speaker 1: copies of this published in a couple of different um 475 00:29:04,880 --> 00:29:11,080 Speaker 1: places in British media, but tons of like the entire 476 00:29:11,120 --> 00:29:14,000 Speaker 1: paragraphs are blacked out. They're not going to admit this stuff, 477 00:29:14,080 --> 00:29:17,280 Speaker 1: right because it's still the great boogeyman of national security. 478 00:29:18,760 --> 00:29:20,560 Speaker 1: And you know, the timing of the letter was also 479 00:29:20,640 --> 00:29:24,160 Speaker 1: really strange here because just two weeks after this highly 480 00:29:24,160 --> 00:29:28,480 Speaker 1: redacted document gets released, it's made public. Mr Cameron, our buddy, 481 00:29:28,640 --> 00:29:33,240 Speaker 1: admitted that there was this thing called state collusion in 482 00:29:33,280 --> 00:29:40,280 Speaker 1: the murder of Belfast Solicitor Patrick Finniken and UM state 483 00:29:41,000 --> 00:29:46,000 Speaker 1: state collusion, what does that mean? That means essentially the 484 00:29:46,040 --> 00:29:52,480 Speaker 1: camera is arguing some faction of the intelligence apparatus or 485 00:29:52,520 --> 00:29:57,480 Speaker 1: the state apparatus of the United Kingdom may have aided 486 00:29:58,560 --> 00:30:01,360 Speaker 1: aided in this guy's death, or may have at the 487 00:30:01,480 --> 00:30:05,200 Speaker 1: very least been criminally negligent and protecting them, right, that's 488 00:30:05,240 --> 00:30:08,520 Speaker 1: the most fair way to say it. They get into 489 00:30:08,600 --> 00:30:13,520 Speaker 1: some very very very dirty things when they were attempting 490 00:30:13,560 --> 00:30:18,200 Speaker 1: to retain Northern Ireland, you know. And we'll tell you 491 00:30:18,240 --> 00:30:29,120 Speaker 1: more about the trial after a word from our sponsor. So, 492 00:30:29,200 --> 00:30:32,160 Speaker 1: according to Sir James E. D q C, that stands 493 00:30:32,160 --> 00:30:35,080 Speaker 1: for Queen's Counsel. Those are the guys who have the wigs. 494 00:30:35,160 --> 00:30:39,920 Speaker 1: The name for those wigs is peruke. That's so Perukea salt, 495 00:30:41,680 --> 00:30:43,240 Speaker 1: what was the one? What was the one you did 496 00:30:43,240 --> 00:30:46,800 Speaker 1: off air? Perukea is on fire? Peruke I learned more 497 00:30:46,840 --> 00:30:48,640 Speaker 1: about the history of peruke. You can check out me 498 00:30:48,640 --> 00:30:50,880 Speaker 1: and Ben's other podcast, Ridiculous History, where we do an 499 00:30:51,000 --> 00:30:53,959 Speaker 1: episode about what the heck's up with those crazy British 500 00:30:54,000 --> 00:30:57,320 Speaker 1: lawyer wigs, which is yeah, which is one of our 501 00:30:57,360 --> 00:31:01,600 Speaker 1: first episodes. To be kind or be brutal, it's up 502 00:31:01,640 --> 00:31:03,640 Speaker 1: to you. We just want you to know. That's a 503 00:31:03,680 --> 00:31:05,280 Speaker 1: great word, and that's going to do it then, and 504 00:31:05,320 --> 00:31:08,320 Speaker 1: it's going to do then. That's true. That's true. So 505 00:31:09,080 --> 00:31:13,360 Speaker 1: this guy, Sir James dy q C, is representing the 506 00:31:13,440 --> 00:31:17,080 Speaker 1: intelligence agencies, the Home Office in the Foreign Office, and 507 00:31:17,160 --> 00:31:22,040 Speaker 1: he told this Investigatory Powers Tribunal that details of m 508 00:31:22,080 --> 00:31:24,880 Speaker 1: I five's conduct had to be kept secret even in 509 00:31:24,920 --> 00:31:27,920 Speaker 1: the modern day and could not be aired in open court. 510 00:31:28,120 --> 00:31:31,000 Speaker 1: He argued that the claim should be restricted to investigating 511 00:31:31,080 --> 00:31:35,200 Speaker 1: over a sensible time period, at most six years. Wow, 512 00:31:35,360 --> 00:31:40,400 Speaker 1: six years to keep all your secrets right? Interesting? So 513 00:31:40,400 --> 00:31:43,400 Speaker 1: what did the Alliance of Human Rights organizations say to that? 514 00:31:43,840 --> 00:31:48,000 Speaker 1: So in their argument, the claimants site Finnikin's murder as 515 00:31:48,040 --> 00:31:53,640 Speaker 1: an illustration of the considerable public importance of the issues raised. 516 00:31:54,040 --> 00:31:59,080 Speaker 1: It also refers to allegations that Freddie SCA great name, 517 00:31:59,400 --> 00:32:02,760 Speaker 1: It's pretty good, was a former senior member of the 518 00:32:02,800 --> 00:32:06,360 Speaker 1: I r A and a security service agent working under 519 00:32:06,400 --> 00:32:10,160 Speaker 1: the code name Oh my god, I love this Steak 520 00:32:10,240 --> 00:32:16,040 Speaker 1: Knife s T a k E. That's a good DJ 521 00:32:16,200 --> 00:32:19,480 Speaker 1: name right there, DJ steake Knife. How about that? Huh 522 00:32:19,840 --> 00:32:25,080 Speaker 1: oh wow, that's great. Yeah, that's so skep a k A. 523 00:32:25,240 --> 00:32:30,240 Speaker 1: Steak Knife was we have to say, allegedly still but 524 00:32:30,480 --> 00:32:34,400 Speaker 1: was involved in kidnap, torture and murder while working as 525 00:32:34,440 --> 00:32:39,440 Speaker 1: an agent employed by m I five. So the roundabout way, 526 00:32:39,680 --> 00:32:43,640 Speaker 1: the United the government of the United Kingdom was paying 527 00:32:43,680 --> 00:32:47,800 Speaker 1: this guy to kidnap torture and murder people for the 528 00:32:47,840 --> 00:32:52,160 Speaker 1: greater good, for the greater good right. M I five 529 00:32:52,240 --> 00:32:56,000 Speaker 1: has refused to answer the claimants questions about the scoop 530 00:32:56,160 --> 00:32:59,600 Speaker 1: of this third direction policy, including whether it could I 531 00:32:59,680 --> 00:33:04,800 Speaker 1: Prince will authorize murder, torture, in humane and degrading treatment, UH, 532 00:33:04,880 --> 00:33:09,560 Speaker 1: sexual assault, kidnapping, or false imprisonment. The Security Services lawyers 533 00:33:09,600 --> 00:33:13,440 Speaker 1: also said to answer such questions would reveal the facts 534 00:33:13,440 --> 00:33:16,640 Speaker 1: of conduct that they wished to keep secret. So it's 535 00:33:16,720 --> 00:33:20,160 Speaker 1: kind of like a trust us we're doing the right thing. 536 00:33:20,400 --> 00:33:22,120 Speaker 1: We can't tell you what we're doing, and we can't 537 00:33:22,120 --> 00:33:27,680 Speaker 1: tell you why. Other than that, not very convincing argument, No, 538 00:33:27,720 --> 00:33:30,880 Speaker 1: not at all. And we also have other examples of 539 00:33:31,000 --> 00:33:33,840 Speaker 1: some strange things that ended up coming to light, or 540 00:33:33,880 --> 00:33:36,560 Speaker 1: at least things that maybe never wanted to see the 541 00:33:36,640 --> 00:33:39,640 Speaker 1: light of day. There were some papers released by the 542 00:33:39,680 --> 00:33:43,040 Speaker 1: Irish state that showed um that there was this loyalist 543 00:33:43,280 --> 00:33:46,280 Speaker 1: paramilitary group, or at least members of one of these groups, 544 00:33:46,320 --> 00:33:50,520 Speaker 1: specifically the Ultier Volunteer Force. They're a paramilitary group out 545 00:33:50,560 --> 00:33:54,600 Speaker 1: of Northern Ireland. They claimed that m I five asked 546 00:33:54,640 --> 00:33:59,600 Speaker 1: them to assassinate the then Prime Minister of Ireland Charles 547 00:33:59,680 --> 00:34:04,720 Speaker 1: High in nineteen eighty five, and um, we went to 548 00:34:04,760 --> 00:34:07,200 Speaker 1: this BBC source to learn a little bit more about this. 549 00:34:07,720 --> 00:34:12,200 Speaker 1: But it's very I don't know, it's very strange because 550 00:34:12,239 --> 00:34:15,399 Speaker 1: it was it was a letter just kind of your 551 00:34:15,440 --> 00:34:19,200 Speaker 1: standard letter sent to somebody, like a correspondence, and it 552 00:34:19,280 --> 00:34:22,920 Speaker 1: just happened to include a couple of documents and um, 553 00:34:22,960 --> 00:34:26,960 Speaker 1: a couple literally guys who just said, hey, by the way, 554 00:34:27,280 --> 00:34:29,200 Speaker 1: m I five asked us to kill you one time. 555 00:34:29,560 --> 00:34:32,799 Speaker 1: We didn't do it, yeah, but but you know, you 556 00:34:32,840 --> 00:34:35,880 Speaker 1: should know it's crazy. It was sent two years after 557 00:34:35,920 --> 00:34:39,719 Speaker 1: the alleged I guess assassination or of the hit was 558 00:34:39,760 --> 00:34:42,960 Speaker 1: put on him. I guess um. It contained a long 559 00:34:42,960 --> 00:34:47,720 Speaker 1: long list of collusion allegations against the British Intelligence Service. 560 00:34:47,800 --> 00:34:52,040 Speaker 1: So are various services that the British intelligence has um 561 00:34:52,160 --> 00:34:54,160 Speaker 1: this guy. It was addressed to Mr Hahi and it 562 00:34:54,200 --> 00:34:58,120 Speaker 1: read we were approached by an m I five officer. 563 00:34:58,520 --> 00:35:01,800 Speaker 1: He asked us to execut you you and it said 564 00:35:01,800 --> 00:35:06,040 Speaker 1: that these this paramilitary group had been supplied with quote 565 00:35:06,080 --> 00:35:10,640 Speaker 1: details that would have compromised this guy's personal security, including 566 00:35:10,640 --> 00:35:13,719 Speaker 1: aerial photographs of his family home, his cars, and his 567 00:35:13,800 --> 00:35:20,560 Speaker 1: private yacht. So for uh an imperfect comparison. It's similar 568 00:35:20,600 --> 00:35:26,960 Speaker 1: to say, the CIA um taking over Newfoundland and the 569 00:35:27,000 --> 00:35:31,319 Speaker 1: people of Newfoundland wanting to make a united Canada, and 570 00:35:31,360 --> 00:35:35,359 Speaker 1: so the CIA contacts someone in Canada and says, kill 571 00:35:35,680 --> 00:35:40,480 Speaker 1: whomever is in charge of this unity group in Newfoundland 572 00:35:40,680 --> 00:35:43,520 Speaker 1: or killed the kill the prime minister of Canada so 573 00:35:43,560 --> 00:35:46,480 Speaker 1: we can keep our part. Yeah, And I guess they 574 00:35:46,520 --> 00:35:51,520 Speaker 1: didn't imagine that the people who were not necessarily the 575 00:35:51,600 --> 00:35:55,680 Speaker 1: friends of the British Intelligence Service would They wouldn't just say, oh, yeah, okay, 576 00:35:55,680 --> 00:35:58,760 Speaker 1: sure boss. Well maybe they just said, you know, killing 577 00:35:58,840 --> 00:36:02,160 Speaker 1: prime ministers step too far. I guess that's what I'm saying. Yeah, 578 00:36:02,239 --> 00:36:05,120 Speaker 1: like they didn't expect that to occur. That seems very 579 00:36:05,120 --> 00:36:08,960 Speaker 1: strange to me. In two thousand ten, Benyam Mohammed al 580 00:36:09,040 --> 00:36:12,360 Speaker 1: Abshi went to court to hold m I five accountable 581 00:36:12,400 --> 00:36:16,200 Speaker 1: for collusion in his torture at the hands of Uncle Sam. 582 00:36:16,320 --> 00:36:20,719 Speaker 1: And then there's the example of Shakiramir who said m 583 00:36:20,760 --> 00:36:23,440 Speaker 1: I five watched him being tortured in two thousand and 584 00:36:23,520 --> 00:36:27,279 Speaker 1: one that was really brutal too. Yeah. The guy he 585 00:36:27,400 --> 00:36:31,640 Speaker 1: was in guantanamobile, right, and he he said, like several 586 00:36:31,680 --> 00:36:34,160 Speaker 1: times British officers would be in the room while he's 587 00:36:34,200 --> 00:36:38,480 Speaker 1: being beaten, just brutally beaten, his head slammed against the wall. Yeah, 588 00:36:38,920 --> 00:36:42,560 Speaker 1: pretty pretty crazy stuff. It's truly disturbing because now with 589 00:36:42,640 --> 00:36:48,240 Speaker 1: all this new information, this um admission on the part 590 00:36:48,360 --> 00:36:52,360 Speaker 1: of the British government that that these sorts of things occur, 591 00:36:52,719 --> 00:36:55,960 Speaker 1: many of those previous allegations of criminal activity on the 592 00:36:56,000 --> 00:36:58,560 Speaker 1: part of m I five that were once dismissed as 593 00:36:58,600 --> 00:37:04,279 Speaker 1: out and out conspiracy theory seem increasingly maybe not plausible, 594 00:37:04,320 --> 00:37:08,480 Speaker 1: maybe well, maybe not probable, but certainly less impossible. They've 595 00:37:08,480 --> 00:37:11,960 Speaker 1: been implicated in the murder of anti nuclear activists Hilda Worl. 596 00:37:12,280 --> 00:37:15,960 Speaker 1: They've been accused of creating a far right neo Nazi group, 597 00:37:16,080 --> 00:37:22,040 Speaker 1: Combat eighteen. Their profile peaked in February when they orchestrated 598 00:37:22,040 --> 00:37:24,920 Speaker 1: a riot in Dublin that led to a cancelation of 599 00:37:24,920 --> 00:37:29,000 Speaker 1: a football match between England and Ireland. One theory suggests 600 00:37:29,000 --> 00:37:31,840 Speaker 1: that British intelligence wanted to create a magnet for the 601 00:37:31,880 --> 00:37:36,040 Speaker 1: most extreme parts of these political parties. One member who 602 00:37:36,120 --> 00:37:39,280 Speaker 1: was convicted of murder in nine guy named Charlie Sargent, 603 00:37:39,600 --> 00:37:43,080 Speaker 1: has been accused of being an m I five informant 604 00:37:43,120 --> 00:37:46,440 Speaker 1: with some pretty solid evidence, and then we did the 605 00:37:46,480 --> 00:37:50,680 Speaker 1: death of Commander Buster Crab and a previous episodes a 606 00:37:50,800 --> 00:37:54,520 Speaker 1: Crab where he never surfaced, and it seems that maybe 607 00:37:54,560 --> 00:37:57,800 Speaker 1: someone on the inside was responsible. Weren't They're frogmen involved 608 00:37:57,840 --> 00:38:01,120 Speaker 1: in that story? Yes, yeah, what about cra men? They 609 00:38:01,239 --> 00:38:04,840 Speaker 1: never made it to Crab, mainly because the difficulty of 610 00:38:04,880 --> 00:38:10,040 Speaker 1: making forward backward motion. That's hard, yeah, scuttling, scuttling. So Bett, 611 00:38:10,120 --> 00:38:14,799 Speaker 1: you mentioned Colonel Muamar Gaddafi earlier as well, right, oh, yeah, 612 00:38:14,840 --> 00:38:16,680 Speaker 1: And in ninety six, there was a bomb that was 613 00:38:16,719 --> 00:38:19,319 Speaker 1: placed under a car that was I guess thought to 614 00:38:19,440 --> 00:38:22,080 Speaker 1: be the vehicle that Gaddafi was going to be traveling 615 00:38:22,080 --> 00:38:26,319 Speaker 1: in in his motorcade, but uh, well he wasn't in 616 00:38:26,320 --> 00:38:29,320 Speaker 1: that vehicle. The car did explode, the bomb did explode, 617 00:38:29,440 --> 00:38:32,719 Speaker 1: and several bodyguards were killed. There was an ensuing gun 618 00:38:32,760 --> 00:38:38,480 Speaker 1: battle that killed several people, and there were even um 619 00:38:38,520 --> 00:38:40,720 Speaker 1: there would be assassins, you know, the people that planted 620 00:38:40,760 --> 00:38:43,319 Speaker 1: the bomb and everything. They had links style Quaeda, and 621 00:38:43,360 --> 00:38:46,880 Speaker 1: it's thought that maybe maybe m I five had a 622 00:38:46,920 --> 00:38:49,680 Speaker 1: little bit of a hand. Inness, right, the head of 623 00:38:49,680 --> 00:38:52,200 Speaker 1: the Libyan desk for m I five at the time 624 00:38:52,280 --> 00:38:56,400 Speaker 1: was a guy named David Shayler, and in seven he 625 00:38:56,520 --> 00:39:00,359 Speaker 1: left the service, leaked this information at these accusations, these 626 00:39:00,400 --> 00:39:03,760 Speaker 1: allegations to the press. He was forced to flee to France, 627 00:39:03,800 --> 00:39:07,719 Speaker 1: and in he claimed that the plot to kill Gaddafi 628 00:39:07,800 --> 00:39:11,880 Speaker 1: had been funded by m I six cooperation with m 629 00:39:11,880 --> 00:39:14,879 Speaker 1: I five. There's you know, taking out ahead a leader 630 00:39:14,960 --> 00:39:17,560 Speaker 1: like that of a country is no small deal. Well, 631 00:39:17,560 --> 00:39:22,160 Speaker 1: and there's compelling it's night compelling evidence. There's proof that 632 00:39:22,719 --> 00:39:27,480 Speaker 1: ultimately the French government was behind the assassination of Gaddafi 633 00:39:27,960 --> 00:39:32,480 Speaker 1: to preserve financial hegemony because they wanted, you know Goodafi 634 00:39:33,840 --> 00:39:36,759 Speaker 1: did many, many terrible things, but the thing France was 635 00:39:36,840 --> 00:39:41,120 Speaker 1: most frightened of him doing was to create a continental 636 00:39:41,160 --> 00:39:46,040 Speaker 1: African currency, a denoor. So mess with the money, right, 637 00:39:46,200 --> 00:39:51,480 Speaker 1: That's what happens in the oil the new series Starry 638 00:39:51,520 --> 00:39:56,040 Speaker 1: Matt Frederick's always money in the banana stand. So what 639 00:39:56,120 --> 00:39:58,760 Speaker 1: does this all mean? This is, this is pretty strange 640 00:39:58,880 --> 00:40:02,319 Speaker 1: because it's rare are for this kind of information to 641 00:40:02,560 --> 00:40:05,879 Speaker 1: come out in such a blatant way. Break the law 642 00:40:05,960 --> 00:40:09,480 Speaker 1: for the greater good. Most intelligence agencies, I would say, 643 00:40:09,560 --> 00:40:13,200 Speaker 1: practice that, right. The problem is the goal post of 644 00:40:13,440 --> 00:40:17,480 Speaker 1: that defines greater good is always moving who's good for 645 00:40:17,600 --> 00:40:21,480 Speaker 1: whom exactly exactly, And at this point many of us 646 00:40:21,560 --> 00:40:23,720 Speaker 1: listening to the show today will have a hard time 647 00:40:23,800 --> 00:40:27,040 Speaker 1: being surprised. Some of us might even support this policy, 648 00:40:27,360 --> 00:40:28,799 Speaker 1: you know what I mean. There are people who say 649 00:40:28,840 --> 00:40:31,960 Speaker 1: that torture is a terrible thing, but ultimately it saves lives. 650 00:40:32,480 --> 00:40:34,920 Speaker 1: We have an episode on why that is not true 651 00:40:35,840 --> 00:40:40,480 Speaker 1: as well. Yeah, yeah, but but there are points to 652 00:40:40,520 --> 00:40:43,720 Speaker 1: be made that if you it's not an easy task 653 00:40:43,840 --> 00:40:48,000 Speaker 1: to stop the you know that, in your worldview, the 654 00:40:48,040 --> 00:40:50,239 Speaker 1: worst people in the world from doing the worst things. 655 00:40:50,239 --> 00:40:52,680 Speaker 1: That's not an easy task to prevent that from happening, 656 00:40:53,000 --> 00:40:56,800 Speaker 1: and you do have to perhaps do some bad things. 657 00:40:57,120 --> 00:40:59,719 Speaker 1: It's just I think in this case, it's that gray 658 00:40:59,760 --> 00:41:03,399 Speaker 1: area of how bad is too bad for the thing 659 00:41:03,440 --> 00:41:05,560 Speaker 1: for the good guys to do to prevent the bad guys. 660 00:41:05,640 --> 00:41:08,080 Speaker 1: What's the idea that to like, counter to the bad guys, 661 00:41:08,120 --> 00:41:10,560 Speaker 1: you gotta stoop to their level on some we gotta 662 00:41:10,600 --> 00:41:14,319 Speaker 1: play by their rules otherwise you're gonna get stepped all 663 00:41:14,320 --> 00:41:17,279 Speaker 1: over right in theory? Yeah, yeah, I mean it's a 664 00:41:17,280 --> 00:41:19,439 Speaker 1: good point. Did they tell you, guys, we watched True 665 00:41:19,480 --> 00:41:24,400 Speaker 1: Detective recently season two. Season one, thank god. Yeah, I 666 00:41:24,680 --> 00:41:27,120 Speaker 1: have a friend that really says, revisit season two, give 667 00:41:27,120 --> 00:41:29,799 Speaker 1: another chance. I I've heard that, I've heard that before, 668 00:41:29,880 --> 00:41:31,440 Speaker 1: but I need to take a break. Season one was 669 00:41:31,480 --> 00:41:33,759 Speaker 1: just so great. There's a quote that's not a spoiler, 670 00:41:34,200 --> 00:41:37,880 Speaker 1: but this, this conversation reminds me of it. Um. The 671 00:41:38,040 --> 00:41:42,520 Speaker 1: two main characters, Marty and Rust, are having a philosophical 672 00:41:44,120 --> 00:41:47,399 Speaker 1: discussion about the nature of good and evil, and at 673 00:41:47,440 --> 00:41:50,759 Speaker 1: some point the conversation, Marty says Marty asked if if 674 00:41:50,960 --> 00:41:55,640 Speaker 1: they're good people, and Russ says, no, we're bad, but 675 00:41:55,719 --> 00:41:57,920 Speaker 1: they need bad men like us to keep the others 676 00:41:57,960 --> 00:42:00,880 Speaker 1: from the door. And that at a bear from the 677 00:42:00,920 --> 00:42:04,040 Speaker 1: beginning of the show. Yeah, exactly or Jack Nicholson, right, 678 00:42:04,680 --> 00:42:08,600 Speaker 1: not not as a not as a character, just him, 679 00:42:08,760 --> 00:42:11,600 Speaker 1: he's keep I don't know. He's a creepy looking guy. 680 00:42:11,640 --> 00:42:13,879 Speaker 1: I don't know. I wouldn't want him knock him. Yeah, 681 00:42:13,920 --> 00:42:17,640 Speaker 1: I don't know well enough to remark on his door policy. 682 00:42:17,920 --> 00:42:21,400 Speaker 1: I guess. I guess The big question is do we 683 00:42:21,520 --> 00:42:24,640 Speaker 1: have to have the bad guys inside the door keeping 684 00:42:24,680 --> 00:42:26,719 Speaker 1: the other bad guys from the door. Why can't we 685 00:42:26,760 --> 00:42:31,880 Speaker 1: just build a giant wall and keep everybody out topical 686 00:42:32,080 --> 00:42:38,000 Speaker 1: topical questions, so totally kidding him, totally. Well, it's a 687 00:42:38,000 --> 00:42:42,160 Speaker 1: good question, though, because should m I five allow its 688 00:42:42,200 --> 00:42:45,080 Speaker 1: agents and informants to break the law? Does it really 689 00:42:46,320 --> 00:42:50,200 Speaker 1: does it really become a necessary evil on the way 690 00:42:50,200 --> 00:42:54,440 Speaker 1: to achieving a greater good? Right? And if so, for who? 691 00:42:54,560 --> 00:42:58,520 Speaker 1: What laws they break? How do we measure the success 692 00:42:58,680 --> 00:43:01,280 Speaker 1: or the efficiency of something like this if it's conducted 693 00:43:01,400 --> 00:43:04,200 Speaker 1: entirely in secret. What sort of oversight should the public 694 00:43:04,440 --> 00:43:08,120 Speaker 1: and our government agencies have on this process? Because right 695 00:43:08,160 --> 00:43:10,799 Speaker 1: now the answer is not, they have not. They have 696 00:43:10,800 --> 00:43:14,560 Speaker 1: a letter from two thousand twelve that's like, don't send 697 00:43:14,600 --> 00:43:18,560 Speaker 1: this to anybody. Basically, David Cameron sent a no snitching letter. 698 00:43:20,200 --> 00:43:23,919 Speaker 1: That's exactly what happened, and that's where we are today, 699 00:43:24,120 --> 00:43:30,160 Speaker 1: no snitching boys and girls. Snitches end up in stitches. Yeah, well, 700 00:43:30,200 --> 00:43:32,680 Speaker 1: tell us what you think. Find us on Instagram, Facebook 701 00:43:32,680 --> 00:43:36,719 Speaker 1: and Twitter and let us know. Are these things necessary evils? 702 00:43:37,239 --> 00:43:41,480 Speaker 1: Is allowing the collapse of the rule of law in 703 00:43:41,719 --> 00:43:46,960 Speaker 1: one scenario really necessary to allow the enforcement of rule 704 00:43:47,000 --> 00:43:50,480 Speaker 1: of law in another situation? Right? That's ultimately the question 705 00:43:50,560 --> 00:43:52,680 Speaker 1: really is um And by the way, I was just 706 00:43:52,680 --> 00:43:55,960 Speaker 1: gonna bring this up before we ended at the Tenderfoot 707 00:43:56,000 --> 00:43:58,839 Speaker 1: holiday party thing that we were at the three of Us, 708 00:43:59,280 --> 00:44:02,720 Speaker 1: I ran into a gentleman. Paul Dicken was there too, 709 00:44:02,800 --> 00:44:05,680 Speaker 1: but we ran into a gentleman who truly truly believes 710 00:44:05,680 --> 00:44:07,439 Speaker 1: and had a long discussion with me about it that 711 00:44:07,680 --> 00:44:10,640 Speaker 1: the British government still controls the United States. Overheard that, 712 00:44:10,719 --> 00:44:13,360 Speaker 1: and I didn't want to jump in he truly believed it. 713 00:44:13,600 --> 00:44:15,440 Speaker 1: I should I talked to him. I know, well, I 714 00:44:15,640 --> 00:44:18,359 Speaker 1: kind of. I didn't want to go any deeper than 715 00:44:18,400 --> 00:44:21,160 Speaker 1: we already had in the conversation because it's one of 716 00:44:21,200 --> 00:44:23,200 Speaker 1: those that doesn't really go anywhere. After you hit a 717 00:44:23,239 --> 00:44:25,600 Speaker 1: certain wall. It's like, yeah, well, we can't prove anything, 718 00:44:25,840 --> 00:44:28,359 Speaker 1: but that's an interesting idea. Did you tell me did 719 00:44:28,360 --> 00:44:30,879 Speaker 1: an episode on it? I did. Did you tell him 720 00:44:30,920 --> 00:44:34,399 Speaker 1: that he can contact us via a telephone call? We're 721 00:44:34,400 --> 00:44:36,640 Speaker 1: just a phone call away. I did. I said call 722 00:44:36,840 --> 00:44:41,680 Speaker 1: one eight three three. STD w t K brought the 723 00:44:41,760 --> 00:44:44,880 Speaker 1: STD back for this one because it's not about awful 724 00:44:44,920 --> 00:44:47,520 Speaker 1: things like the last one. Oh h. And I also 725 00:44:47,840 --> 00:44:51,040 Speaker 1: also want to just in the interest of full transparency, 726 00:44:51,400 --> 00:44:54,320 Speaker 1: I'm not at death's door, but I am in I 727 00:44:54,360 --> 00:44:57,880 Speaker 1: am darn sure on like the sub basement of sickness 728 00:44:58,040 --> 00:45:00,680 Speaker 1: right now. So that's why it's my voice sounds a 729 00:45:00,719 --> 00:45:04,520 Speaker 1: little bad if you heard any any mucacy noises. Sorry, folks, 730 00:45:04,600 --> 00:45:06,799 Speaker 1: that was me. Should be hale and hearty later. Are 731 00:45:06,800 --> 00:45:12,120 Speaker 1: you down with the sickness? I'm always I'm always up 732 00:45:12,160 --> 00:45:15,160 Speaker 1: to something. It's just extra deep. I like it. It's 733 00:45:15,200 --> 00:45:19,080 Speaker 1: nice and gravelly. Thanks guys. Paul will surely snip out 734 00:45:19,080 --> 00:45:22,719 Speaker 1: all the snot sounds. Thanks Paul. So yeah, let us 735 00:45:23,000 --> 00:45:24,799 Speaker 1: let us know what you think and check in with 736 00:45:24,840 --> 00:45:27,400 Speaker 1: your fellow listeners. We'd like to take this debate to 737 00:45:27,600 --> 00:45:30,080 Speaker 1: the internet, and we mentioned earlier in the show, but 738 00:45:30,120 --> 00:45:33,120 Speaker 1: you can find us at our Facebook site. Here's where 739 00:45:33,120 --> 00:45:36,080 Speaker 1: it gets crazy. If you love all that but you 740 00:45:36,120 --> 00:45:38,720 Speaker 1: don't want to do any of it, whatever your reasons, 741 00:45:38,760 --> 00:45:41,000 Speaker 1: maybe we have some good news for you. You can 742 00:45:41,040 --> 00:45:43,720 Speaker 1: write to us directly. We are conspiracy It How stuff 743 00:45:43,719 --> 00:46:04,840 Speaker 1: Works dot com.