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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of Iheartrading.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show.

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Speaker 3: My name is Matt, my name is Noah.

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Speaker 4: They call me Ben. We're joined as always with our

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Speaker 4: super producer, Dylan the Tennessee pal Fagan. Most importantly, you

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Speaker 4: are you. You are here that makes this the stuff

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Speaker 4: they don't want you to know. Thank you, as always

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Speaker 4: so much for tuning in, fellow conspiracy realist. This is

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Speaker 4: our weekly listener mail program.

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Speaker 5: This evening.

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Speaker 4: We are going to uh, we're going to talk about

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Speaker 4: some sheep. We're going to talk about something that stumped

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Speaker 4: the Pentagon.

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Speaker 5: Uh.

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Speaker 4: We might get to some of the ongoing conspiracies about

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Speaker 4: natural disasters, some alternate theories on pagers, a little fact

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Speaker 4: we mentioned about the postal service. But before we get

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Speaker 4: to any of that, we are going to hear from

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Speaker 4: Max the Unblind. Before we get to Max the Unblind,

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Speaker 4: we're gonna have a quick word from our sponsors.

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Speaker 2: And we've returned, and yes it is Max the Unblind

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Speaker 2: who left us a voicemail and we will hear from

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Speaker 2: ma'am right now.

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Speaker 5: Hello, stuff. They don't want you to know, crue. I

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Speaker 5: would like you to call me Max the Unblind, and

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Speaker 5: I would absolutely love it if you use this on

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Speaker 5: your show. I like to start off with business first.

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Speaker 5: There's been a story that's been going around here in

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Speaker 5: Kentucky about a sheriff that walked into a judges chamber

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Speaker 5: and murdered him in cold blood, apparently in Lecher County, Kentucky.

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Speaker 5: The reason I'm calling you about this is because, as

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Speaker 5: far as I can tell, no news outlet wants to

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Speaker 5: talk about this. It's actually already to find information about it.

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Speaker 5: And with this this hurricane, you know, the election stuff

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Speaker 5: like that, I'm afraid it's going to get lost in

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Speaker 5: all the news. And I'm glad that this happened, even

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Speaker 5: though you know, I don't like it when people get murdered,

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Speaker 5: because I've wanted to have an excuse to call you,

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Speaker 5: guys and thank you. I went blind about seven years ago,

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Speaker 5: and one of the first things my family did for

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Speaker 5: me was they bought me an election device because you

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Speaker 5: can use.

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Speaker 3: It with just your voice.

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Speaker 5: And you know, first thing I did was I listened

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Speaker 5: to music and to test it out. And as soon

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Speaker 5: as my family left the hospital room I was in,

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Speaker 5: I turned on your podcast. I've been listening to it

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Speaker 5: ever since. I really appreciate you guys, and that's why

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Speaker 5: my name is Max the Unblind because I'm blind, but

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Speaker 5: you guys, you guys help me see the truths truth

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Speaker 5: of thing. Anyway, I would love it if you use

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Speaker 5: it on this podcast, very specifically, if you do use

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Speaker 5: it on the podcast, please use this recording and not

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Speaker 5: the other two recordings where I sound like an idiot.

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Speaker 5: All right, thank you.

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Speaker 3: I'm sure you don't. Max appree you don't.

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Speaker 2: Well, no, he does not, but it is true. He

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Speaker 2: left messages and I kept trying to figure out, well,

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Speaker 2: oh okay, no this is the one. Oh wait, no,

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Speaker 2: this is the one, and that was the one. So

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Speaker 2: thank you so much, Max for calling in with those

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Speaker 2: kind words. That means a ton to us. You have

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Speaker 2: no idea. We hope you're doing.

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Speaker 3: Okay.

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Speaker 2: I got to spend a little bit of time with

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Speaker 2: Max on the phone, you guys, and I don't want

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Speaker 2: to go into his personal story about how he went blind,

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Speaker 2: but it is a very It's one of those strange

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Speaker 2: medical things where you go to the hospital because you're

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Speaker 2: not feeling really well. One day, your blood pressure is spiking,

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Speaker 2: and then your vision starts getting weird, and then a

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Speaker 2: couple more times it happens, and then eventually you go

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Speaker 2: blind because stuff isn't functioning. Your blood pressure isn't working properly,

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Speaker 2: something's going wrong inside, and then parts of your eye

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Speaker 2: towards the back of your head there start to go bad.

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Speaker 3: And then you lose your eyesight.

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Speaker 2: It's really unfortunate, but Max is doing really great right now,

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Speaker 2: and we couldn't be happier that we're a part of

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Speaker 2: your world, dude. Indeed, so the reason why Max called

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Speaker 2: in right he wanted a reason to call in is

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Speaker 2: about a Kentucky sheriff that allegedly killed a judge like

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Speaker 2: in the courthouse in the chambers. And at the time

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Speaker 2: when Max first called, this was just a local Kentucky story.

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Speaker 2: It wasn't being reported anywhere outside of that area since

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Speaker 2: that time, because you guys know that it's kind of

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Speaker 2: a backlog on our end of voicemails. They're not coming

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Speaker 2: in on a Tuesday and then we're getting them that

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Speaker 2: day or even on the Thursday. Generally it takes a

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Speaker 2: little while to get through them. Well, it has become

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Speaker 2: a huge story. Everybody in PR the New York Post, people, CBS, News, CNN,

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Speaker 2: everybody is talking about this. BBC's talking about this. It

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Speaker 2: is a very strange story, and I figured we'd jump

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Speaker 2: in to learn about it at least a little bit.

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Speaker 2: So first let's go to BBC, of all places, who

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Speaker 2: wrote about it on September nineteenth, twenty twenty four. The

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Speaker 2: title is if you want to look it up, Kentucky

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Speaker 2: sheriff held over fatal shooting of judge in court. I'm

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Speaker 2: going to read a bit of this written by Nadine Yusef.

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Speaker 2: District Judge Kevin Mullins died at the scene after being

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Speaker 2: shot multiple times in the Letcher County Courthouse. According to

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Speaker 2: Kentucky State Police and a person, a county sheriff named

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Speaker 2: Sean Steins, who was forty three at the time, has

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Speaker 2: been charged with one count of first degree murder, and

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Speaker 2: according to the best sources at the time, back in

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Speaker 2: the middle of September, the shooting happened after some kind

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Speaker 2: of argument inside the court. But at that time, when

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Speaker 2: it was first being talked about like this, there was

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Speaker 2: no motive. Nobody understood why it happened. There were so

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Speaker 2: many questions why in the heck would one of the

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Speaker 2: top members of law enforcement in the area walk into

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Speaker 2: a judge's chambers and shoot that judge. So the speculation,

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Speaker 2: as you can imagine, was pretty wild. It happened on

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Speaker 2: a Thursday, and right after it happened, the sheriff who

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Speaker 2: did the shooting, at least allegedly was arrested on the scene.

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Speaker 2: No problems, no incidents, no anything. He shot this person,

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Speaker 2: at least according to witnesses and according to the official story,

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Speaker 2: and then just said okay, yeah, basically take me in.

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Speaker 3: I don't know.

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Speaker 2: Have you guys heard about this story at all?

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Speaker 3: Not a bit. Yeah.

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Speaker 4: I found it on a couple of forums and I

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Speaker 4: was reading into as you said, Oh first, let me

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Speaker 4: step back, MAXI I'm blind. Thank you so much. It's

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Speaker 4: a fantastic message, and please feel free always to reach

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Speaker 4: out to us. When I first heard about this was

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Speaker 4: on some forums learning about Electric County, which I had

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Speaker 4: not heard of before this. The connections that seemed to

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Speaker 4: proliferate as people learn more about the case at first seemed,

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Speaker 4: you know, maybe people were reading tea leaves or seeing

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Speaker 4: things that weren't there. But there are a lot there's

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Speaker 4: a lot of context to this that emerged earlier. Like

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Speaker 4: I was not aware he was a bailiff before he

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Speaker 4: was sheriff, so he was working for the court previously.

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Speaker 4: And I guess he must have been a not unpopular

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Speaker 4: sheriff because he was elected twice. Right, he was re

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Speaker 4: elected in twenty eighteen, reelected in twenty twenty two.

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Speaker 3: Mm hmm.

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Speaker 4: And I got that from the New York Times, from

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Speaker 4: Emmett Lendler.

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Speaker 6: I just can't imagine what it would take for someone

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Speaker 6: to walk into a situation like that so publicly knowing

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Speaker 6: they were going to do something that was going to

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Speaker 6: end of their life for all intents and purposes, walk

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Speaker 6: out surrender like this must have been intensely personal.

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Speaker 2: Well, this is where it gets really weird. This is

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Speaker 2: coming from NPR, written on October eighth of this year.

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Speaker 2: You can look it up. The title is video shows

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Speaker 2: the moment a Kentucky judge was shot to death. Listen

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Speaker 2: to this and this is weird, police say. Lectri County

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Speaker 2: Sheriff Mickey Steins dialed his daughter's phone number from the

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Speaker 2: judge's phone then pull his gun and shot.

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Speaker 7: Mullins repeatedly sounds like there was a relationship going on

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Speaker 7: and he was being an angry father and like calling

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Speaker 7: him on it and saying, you know, like checking his phone,

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Speaker 7: you know, do you know what I mean?

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Speaker 3: Doesn't it sound like that?

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Speaker 2: But but listen to this further. Kentucky State Police clarified

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Speaker 2: that they have no evidence the daughter's phone number was

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Speaker 2: on the judge's phone before the sheriff dialed it, So

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Speaker 2: why would he do that?

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Speaker 4: Well, then it maybe the idea was simply to obscure

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Speaker 4: that was him hauling. But apparently he also told the

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Speaker 4: employees of the court that he needed to talk to

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Speaker 4: the judge privately, and then he surrendered himself. Right he

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Speaker 4: arrested without incident, but right right after firing the shots,

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Speaker 4: he walks outside and peaceably surrenders.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and there's video of this entire thing happening, and

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Speaker 2: people have watched it. People have watched the video because

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Speaker 2: he was charged immediately afterwards with first degree murder, and

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Speaker 2: of course the sheriff, you know it, gets arrested. He

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Speaker 2: resigns as sheriff. He pleads not guilty to murder, even

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Speaker 2: though there is video evidence of him doing it, and

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Speaker 2: like so many witnesses and it's just like.

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Speaker 4: What And it wasn't his first time on the wrong

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Speaker 4: side of a court room, right.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, well I would tell us about that.

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Speaker 4: So this is from the Courier Journal. Back in twenty

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Speaker 4: twenty two, there were allegations of some pretty nasty sexual

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Speaker 4: abuse that one of Stein's deputies had pressured a woman

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Speaker 4: into having sexual intercourse with him and return for some

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Speaker 4: kind of favorable treatment. So it occurred through a proxy

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Speaker 4: at least the pressure on this victim. Oh, and that

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Speaker 4: article is by Andrew Wolfson. You can find it suit

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Speaker 4: aledges Kentucky deputy forced woman to have sex in judge's

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Speaker 4: chamber in lieu of fees so instead of having to

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Speaker 4: pay court fees.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I'll give you a little bit more from this

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Speaker 2: NPR article because it is this is a twisted tail.

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Speaker 2: Several days before Stein's allegedly killed the judge, he was

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Speaker 2: interviewed for hours in a deposition in a suit that

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Speaker 2: names him Stein's in his capacity as sheriff. The lawsuit

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Speaker 2: claimed that Steins knew or should have known, that a

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Speaker 2: now former deputy had coerced a female drug defendant into

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Speaker 2: having sex in exchange for freeing her from house arrest.

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Speaker 2: So that's the specific there. The defendant said Deputy Ben

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Speaker 2: Fields had forster her to have sex with him in

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Speaker 2: Judge Mullen's chambers after hours, so like after the courthouses

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Speaker 2: in any kind of session, in exchange for Fields taking

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Speaker 2: off her ankle monitor.

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Speaker 4: And the person filing the suit. The victim here is

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Speaker 4: prisonamed Sabrina Atkins.

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Speaker 2: Hmmm, a man, So don't I don't know. There's even more,

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Speaker 2: I would point everybody. Was it the Courtier Journal one

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Speaker 2: the Kentucky judge shooting, what was alleged about former Sean

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Speaker 2: Stein's motive?

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Speaker 4: This is there a couple of things from the That

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Speaker 4: one is by Rachel Smith. There are a couple of

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Speaker 4: other articles from Courier Journal. Yeah, and that the one

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Speaker 4: that I was citing is from Andrew Wilson.

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Speaker 2: Okay, Well, there's a ton you can learn about this now,

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Speaker 2: and so if anybody who's interested in it, go out

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Speaker 2: there check it out. I did a quick little search

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Speaker 2: just for the latest news about this case, and it

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Speaker 2: looks like there's nothing brand new. Most of everything we've

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Speaker 2: talked about is kind of the most up to date stuff,

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Speaker 2: so do keep an eye on it. It seems like

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Speaker 2: a weird case. Probably doesn't have a lot of bigger implications,

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Speaker 2: but it is.

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Speaker 3: It is really weird.

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Speaker 4: I have to wonder what was said in that deposition.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, I just want to know.

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Speaker 2: Apparently the apparently the sheriff and the judge had like

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Speaker 2: lunch together right before the shooting occurred. They were just

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Speaker 2: hanging out with other people having lunch. Some things were said,

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Speaker 2: and then at some point it was decided I need

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Speaker 2: to shoot this guy. Pretty pretty crazy stuff, all right, Well,

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Speaker 2: thank you so much, Max the Unblind. Anytime give us

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Speaker 2: a hauler. We can't wait to hear from you again.

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Speaker 2: If you want to call in, call one eight three

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Speaker 2: three std WYTK. That's our phone number. It's a voicemail system.

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Speaker 3: Call it.

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Speaker 2: Tell us anything you'd like. For now, we're gonna hear

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Speaker 2: a word from our sponsors and we'll be right back

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Speaker 2: with more messages from you.

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Speaker 6: And we have returned with more messages from you today.

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Speaker 6: I brought two messages from you, YESU, one from t

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Speaker 6: Bow and one from Restricted Free Agent. About two very

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Speaker 6: different but then I know they have some things in common.

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Speaker 6: I guess involving perhaps shipment and receiving of goods. That's

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Speaker 6: about where the similarities in. So let's start with t

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Speaker 6: Bone with some alternative theories explaining the exploding pager slash

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Speaker 6: two way radio debacle that we've talked about recently. Hey, guys,

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Speaker 6: insert typical love the show comments here.

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Speaker 3: Okay, we're doing that in our minds and in our hearts.

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Speaker 6: Just finished listening to your discussion on the exploding pager

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Speaker 6: and walkie talkies, and I want to disagree with the

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Speaker 6: point that you thought Israel pushed the button because they

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Speaker 6: felt their long term operation to insert the rig devices

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Speaker 6: had been compromised.

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Speaker 3: I'd like to offer an alternative theory.

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Speaker 6: On the timeline of events, which I think is plausible

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Speaker 6: and could be much more condensed. Step one Israel gets

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Speaker 6: Hesbela leadership thinking their cell phones are compromised, and maybe

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Speaker 6: they are. Step two, Israel learns of the orders for

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Speaker 6: mass quantities of pagers and cell phones through the consultant

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Speaker 6: group that we talked about. It's kind of the middleman

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Speaker 6: in this deal, that's right. Step three, during shipment of

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Speaker 6: the devices, Israel intercepts them and plants the explosives. Step

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Speaker 6: four shortly thereafter, the devices are distributed, and when Israel

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Speaker 6: detects a reduction in cell phone traffic, they activate the pagers,

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Speaker 6: then the WTS a couple of days later. By modifying

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Speaker 6: the devices during shipment rather than being the manufacturer, it's

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Speaker 6: a shorter timeframe from distribution to detonation. This could enable

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Speaker 6: a quicker response and I think would make the equipment

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Speaker 6: more likely to actually be in the hands of Hesbala

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Speaker 6: operators rather than potentially innocent victims. You can call me

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Speaker 6: t Bone, feel free to read this on the air

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Speaker 6: and let me know what you think. I will say, Ben,

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Speaker 6: this isn't certainly isn't far off from what we were

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Speaker 6: talking about. I guess the main difference here is a

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Speaker 6: slight tweak in the order of operations, and also the

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Speaker 6: notion that perhaps we all I think brought this up

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Speaker 6: at one point another Perhaps Israel felt that the jig

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Speaker 6: was up and that they were about to be exposed,

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Speaker 6: perhaps and that they needed to kind of pooper get

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Speaker 6: off the pot, because they would have lost all of

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Speaker 6: the investment in this operation if if it had been

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Speaker 6: discovered and they you know, just tossed all of the phones.

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Speaker 6: I do have a question for you, Ben around t

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Speaker 6: bones point about detecting a reduction in cell phone traffic.

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Speaker 6: Do you have a sense of what that means or

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Speaker 6: like how that might be a metric they would use

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Speaker 6: in order to you know, kind of like align their timing.

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Speaker 3: Yeah.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, and it's a great point, t Bone, thank you

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Speaker 4: so much for writing in Conspiracy adiheartradio dot com if

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Speaker 4: you ever want to drop us a line here. This

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Speaker 4: is completely plausible because you we know that a nation

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Speaker 4: state with this level of intelligence would be able to

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Speaker 4: monitor phones I think pretty easily as well without having

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Speaker 4: you know, obviously we're not in the meetings about monitoring

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Speaker 4: the phones, but as as a metric, combined with later

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Speaker 4: public statements from his below, that we know that they

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Speaker 4: were directing associates of the organization to avoid using those

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Speaker 4: cell phones, even if they were, you know, their purposely

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Speaker 4: their purpose made hesblah only cell phones, so you could

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Speaker 4: see a measurable dip in there, and that might be

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Speaker 4: a metric. As you said, NOLA indicates the right time

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Speaker 4: to strike. I think we're all it just seems more

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Speaker 4: plausible that there was a There was definitely premeditation and waiting,

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Speaker 4: There was definitely maybe a jig is up. I think

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Speaker 4: it's more interesting while you're bringing up t Bone the

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Speaker 4: idea of inserting the explosive apparatus at some point in

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Speaker 4: the shipping process. You would just have to be really

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Speaker 4: quick about it, wouldn't you. Wouldn't you have to also

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Speaker 4: be able to seamlessly insert it such that it doesn't

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Speaker 4: look as though the pager has been tampered with.

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Speaker 2: Exactly you, guys, I don't want a t Bone thing.

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Speaker 2: Thank you for this. I'm gonna quickly reference another voicemail

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Speaker 2: that Plebe Fri end of the show Pleb sent in.

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Speaker 2: Rather than an intercepting and you know, inserting the explosives,

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Speaker 2: what if it was a swap, Like if you just

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Speaker 2: imagine boxes of pagers and the intelligence is aware of

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Speaker 2: which like pager models they are. They've already prefabricated the

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Speaker 2: exact same type of pager, just with the explosive in it.

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Speaker 2: So when the call to have these shipped from the

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Speaker 2: consultant right or ordered via the consultant, they literally just

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Speaker 2: switch boxes rather than having to open individual pages.

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Speaker 4: That's a cool thought.

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Speaker 3: Please, it is.

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Speaker 6: And I guess, guys, as another of the added details here,

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Speaker 6: maybe we didn't discuss was that not only are they

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Speaker 6: distributing pagers but also burner cell phones, and that they're

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Speaker 6: in control of those as well, and that that's what's

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Speaker 6: allowing them to monitor the traffic, because that definitely was

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Speaker 6: in the point here in step two that t boone outline,

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Speaker 6: Israel learn of the orders from mass quantities of pagers

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Speaker 6: and cell phones through the consultant group. During shipment of

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Speaker 6: the devices, Israel intercepts them and plants the explosives, but

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Speaker 6: not in cell phones.

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Speaker 3: There are no exploding cell phones, only exploding pagers.

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Speaker 4: You also wouldn't need physical access to those cell phones,

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Speaker 4: if I'm understanding this correctly, You also wouldn't need physical

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Speaker 4: access to those cell phones to monitor.

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Speaker 3: That's what I'm saying.

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Speaker 6: They're in control, they just don't have to, like I mean,

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Speaker 6: to your point, then they could monitor maybe if they

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Speaker 6: didn't know which phones they were, but I guess if

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Speaker 6: they're going dark and going into kind of like operations mode,

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Speaker 6: they wouldn't be using the phones as much. They'd be

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Speaker 6: relying specifically on the pagers, and so that's why they're

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Speaker 6: looking for the drop in cell phone used. And at

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Speaker 6: that point, most likely the people that would be mobilized

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Speaker 6: using the pagers, would be members of HESBLO.

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Speaker 4: And it may even be I mean this is purely

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Speaker 4: conspiratorial speculation. It may even be the kind of thing

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Speaker 4: where you drive people to those decisions, right like you

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Speaker 4: let it be known that the cell phones are compromised,

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Speaker 4: thus pushing.

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Speaker 3: People toward the pagers, Yes.

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Speaker 4: And then they pushed toward the walkie talkies, and you've

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Speaker 4: got them there as well. These are possible, and I

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Speaker 4: do believe that we will t bone learn more about

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Speaker 4: the specifics of that operation later on in the future.

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Speaker 4: We just don't know when. Probably not immediately, but in

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Speaker 4: a few years. These kind of things usually get the

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Speaker 4: story gets told, you.

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Speaker 3: Know, guys.

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Speaker 6: Thinking about the story again and kind of trying to

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Speaker 6: look at it from different angle made me think of

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Speaker 6: another story or kind of perked my ears up when

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Speaker 6: I heard a mention of this other story. The FBI

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Speaker 6: actually basically started their own startup company that offered these

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Speaker 6: cell phones that were very attractive to criminals because they

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Speaker 6: offer this kind of like special encryption or whatever, and

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Speaker 6: they marketed them, you know, the FBI, to criminals, and

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Speaker 6: then we're able to use them when they were in

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Speaker 6: the criminal's hands to execute a massive sting operation. So

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Speaker 6: this kind of felt like a precedent almost that we

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Speaker 6: didn't talk about, and I thought that was something that

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Speaker 6: would be worth mentioning here.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, anom A n O M. That's the that's the

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Speaker 4: FBI phone, right. I only know about this. There's a

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Speaker 4: book called Dark One Dark Wire, and it's coming out

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Speaker 4: as a Netflix series. Actually, that was the news that

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Speaker 4: brought up in the press recently. I didn't know that,

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Speaker 4: but I remember the book by guy named Joseph Cox.

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Speaker 4: It's a great read. But I'm so glad you brought

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Speaker 4: that up, Noel, because look, these kind of operations don't

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Speaker 4: go as planned all the time, right, because they're often

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Speaker 4: at the forefront of technology. If you want to learn

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Speaker 4: more about anom which which you just mentioned there, Noel,

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Speaker 4: check out Dark Wire, the incredible true story the largest

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Speaker 4: sting operation ever. It also reminds me too of the

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Speaker 4: Long Lines building and our long standing fascination with that.

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Speaker 4: You probably know about this already, t Bote, but check

390
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Speaker 4: out the Long Line story if you haven't heard it before.

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Speaker 4: It is it is the true story of why there

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Speaker 4: is a ginormous windowless skyscraper in the heart of Manhattan.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it's the place where the intelligence community literally splits

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Speaker 2: all communications off, so that there is the communications that

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Speaker 2: occur and then the intelligence apparatus feed of the exact

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Speaker 2: same copied communications.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, just absolutely, And I think it's still on the

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Speaker 3: feed somewhere.

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Speaker 6: Didn't we record a live episode about the Longlines Building

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Speaker 6: years back?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, you can search that out.

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Speaker 6: But I just want to mention too, just in terms

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Speaker 6: of the precedent of the ANOM story. They the FBI

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Speaker 6: got twelve thousand units of this product into the hands

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Speaker 6: of various criminals, from drug traffickers to members of organized

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Speaker 6: crime and all of that stuff.

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Speaker 3: So it you know, the novelty of.

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Speaker 6: The Israel version of the grift I guess as implanting explosives,

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Speaker 6: but that could have just easily been done in this situation,

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Speaker 6: though maybe the net was a little wider, but in

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Speaker 6: terms of like the types of folks that got it,

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Speaker 6: and they were mainly appealing to them as a business,

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Speaker 6: and they were breaching out and buying them directly as

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Speaker 6: opposed to intercepting them. And you know from a company

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Speaker 6: that these individuals were already purchasing them from.

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Speaker 3: But I do think it's interesting parallels there.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, because you know, if you look at the ADOM

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Speaker 4: operation from the FBI's perspective, like we said, after there

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Speaker 4: after people who are engaged in things like drug trafficking, right,

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Speaker 4: which is not a capital punishment offense in the United States.

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Speaker 4: So blowing up the cell phone and killing them is,

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Speaker 4: you know, circumvents the way rule of law is supposed

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Speaker 4: to work in this country. But I think you're absolutely right.

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Speaker 4: You're astute there that this is another precedent I was

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Speaker 4: focusing I guess with I think thank you for me

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Speaker 4: it's the explosive.

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Speaker 3: As Yeah, that's the new twist on this.

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Speaker 6: Well, thank you Tibo and really quickly, guys, I know

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Speaker 6: I'm running a little out of time, but I just

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Speaker 6: thought this was worth reading. Got another one here coming

431
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Speaker 6: from Restricted Free Agent. He asks us to use this

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Speaker 6: moniker because of what he's talking about. He knows this

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Speaker 6: organization could potentially come after him for what he's about

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Speaker 6: to tell us. I love the show, says Restricted Free Agent.

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Speaker 6: I've been catching up, so I'm sorry if you've already

436
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Speaker 6: covered this. We have it about ten months back and

437
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Speaker 6: listen to you guys or stuff you should know every

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Speaker 6: day on the route to keep my sanity. I'm a

439
00:23:36,640 --> 00:23:38,720
Speaker 6: letter carrier and have been for a little over a decade,

440
00:23:38,760 --> 00:23:41,720
Speaker 6: and we're divided into city carriers and rural carriers, which

441
00:23:41,760 --> 00:23:44,359
Speaker 6: is just a dumb fact for you. As a city carrier.

442
00:23:44,520 --> 00:23:46,800
Speaker 6: We've been without a contract for almost a year and

443
00:23:46,840 --> 00:23:49,560
Speaker 6: a half. They spent all of COVID telling us how

444
00:23:49,600 --> 00:23:52,400
Speaker 6: important we were. We watched ups get a huge pay

445
00:23:52,480 --> 00:23:55,040
Speaker 6: raise as a reward for how they dealt with COVID.

446
00:23:55,119 --> 00:23:58,040
Speaker 6: But our union and the Post Office have been yanking

447
00:23:58,040 --> 00:24:00,960
Speaker 6: our chain while telling us how important we are to

448
00:24:01,080 --> 00:24:05,280
Speaker 6: democracy for this election. It's pretty insulting, and even more

449
00:24:05,320 --> 00:24:09,040
Speaker 6: so because we aren't allowed to strike due to federal law.

450
00:24:09,119 --> 00:24:11,639
Speaker 3: It's called the Lloyd la Falette Act.

451
00:24:12,040 --> 00:24:14,840
Speaker 6: This was new to I think Ben, you and me,

452
00:24:14,960 --> 00:24:16,840
Speaker 6: and I'm sure Matt that you might not be fully

453
00:24:16,840 --> 00:24:20,080
Speaker 6: aware of this either, the Lloyd la Fallette Act. The

454
00:24:20,160 --> 00:24:22,920
Speaker 6: last time the letter carriers did strike, the National Guard

455
00:24:23,040 --> 00:24:26,880
Speaker 6: was called in and failed miserably to do our jobs. Again,

456
00:24:26,920 --> 00:24:33,040
Speaker 6: the National Guard called in to replace the Yes, the scats.

457
00:24:32,680 --> 00:24:33,399
Speaker 3: One hundred percent.

458
00:24:33,640 --> 00:24:36,720
Speaker 6: The Post office is filled with bloat and corruption, but

459
00:24:36,960 --> 00:24:39,720
Speaker 6: the people delivering your mail don't have a contract and

460
00:24:39,800 --> 00:24:42,560
Speaker 6: are the only ones out in the elements and will

461
00:24:42,600 --> 00:24:45,000
Speaker 6: be blamed after this election no matter.

462
00:24:44,960 --> 00:24:47,360
Speaker 3: What we do by whoever loses.

463
00:24:47,800 --> 00:24:51,159
Speaker 6: Also, politicians pay almost nothing for all that junk election

464
00:24:51,280 --> 00:24:55,359
Speaker 6: mail you throw away every day. I sure do sometimes

465
00:24:55,400 --> 00:24:59,359
Speaker 6: keep some of the really absurd ones as little historical keepsakes.

466
00:24:59,640 --> 00:25:02,400
Speaker 6: We have carriers who are on government assistance, and I've

467
00:25:02,480 --> 00:25:05,359
Speaker 6: never once heard about our lack of contract on the

468
00:25:05,400 --> 00:25:07,600
Speaker 6: news because it's the definition.

469
00:25:07,320 --> 00:25:08,600
Speaker 3: Of stuff they don't want you to know.

470
00:25:09,359 --> 00:25:14,000
Speaker 4: Oh beautiful, well done, restrictive free agent. And we definitely

471
00:25:14,040 --> 00:25:16,920
Speaker 4: want to get that out into the world because, as

472
00:25:16,920 --> 00:25:20,679
Speaker 4: he said, Noel, if you were startle to realize that

473
00:25:20,760 --> 00:25:26,000
Speaker 4: there's not a legal ability to strike, it just it

474
00:25:26,040 --> 00:25:30,520
Speaker 4: doesn't make sense because we associate unions so inextricably with

475
00:25:30,760 --> 00:25:36,600
Speaker 4: that kind of exercise of worker power. And actually reached

476
00:25:36,600 --> 00:25:39,680
Speaker 4: out to a buddy of ours who is a postal

477
00:25:39,760 --> 00:25:44,840
Speaker 4: service worker in Colorado and wanted to talk to my

478
00:25:45,000 --> 00:25:48,919
Speaker 4: local mail carrier about this. But he's busy, you know,

479
00:25:49,240 --> 00:25:51,880
Speaker 4: because when I see him is a work So I'm

480
00:25:51,880 --> 00:25:53,000
Speaker 4: going to try to catch him.

481
00:25:53,160 --> 00:25:53,960
Speaker 3: I'm going to try to.

482
00:25:53,880 --> 00:25:58,280
Speaker 4: Catch him when he goes by our local diner in

483
00:25:58,320 --> 00:26:00,680
Speaker 4: the neighborhood here, but hopefully we can and gets more

484
00:26:00,840 --> 00:26:04,200
Speaker 4: firsthand evidence. But yeah, thank you so much. Restrictive free agent,

485
00:26:04,400 --> 00:26:10,119
Speaker 4: that is, it just doesn't like I understand it. I understand,

486
00:26:10,200 --> 00:26:13,280
Speaker 4: you know, the idea that the mail must always continue,

487
00:26:13,760 --> 00:26:16,959
Speaker 4: but it feels like you could make a strong argument

488
00:26:17,840 --> 00:26:21,400
Speaker 4: that need has been weaponized against the actual carriers.

489
00:26:21,840 --> 00:26:23,720
Speaker 6: Yeah, and we know that the US Post Service has

490
00:26:23,760 --> 00:26:27,200
Speaker 6: been in a pretty tough spot in recent history, under

491
00:26:27,200 --> 00:26:29,919
Speaker 6: attack one hundred percent, and it just doesn't seem like

492
00:26:30,000 --> 00:26:34,720
Speaker 6: this level of harsh kind of treatment would be conducive

493
00:26:34,800 --> 00:26:38,560
Speaker 6: to retaining high quality employees.

494
00:26:38,560 --> 00:26:40,920
Speaker 4: Or a sustainable we're going to say, I mean, it's

495
00:26:40,960 --> 00:26:43,760
Speaker 4: it almost if it feels like we can not not

496
00:26:44,040 --> 00:26:49,359
Speaker 4: associate it with the the move to cripple and gut

497
00:26:49,480 --> 00:26:52,159
Speaker 4: the USPS, which has been going on for decades, you know,

498
00:26:52,200 --> 00:26:57,280
Speaker 4: and further privatizing the mail, you know, through ups. Oh,

499
00:26:57,400 --> 00:27:01,080
Speaker 4: that's very similar to PGL and PGA three ups and

500
00:27:01,160 --> 00:27:02,920
Speaker 4: through FedEx and stuff like that. And we've got a

501
00:27:02,960 --> 00:27:06,280
Speaker 4: lot of people working for those private organizations and they

502
00:27:06,359 --> 00:27:08,159
Speaker 4: have their own stuff they don't want you to know

503
00:27:08,280 --> 00:27:10,760
Speaker 4: as well. And I'm sure you know that too. Restrictive

504
00:27:10,800 --> 00:27:13,200
Speaker 4: free agent. But this is I agree, this is something

505
00:27:13,320 --> 00:27:16,720
Speaker 4: people need to be talking about more often. Not to

506
00:27:16,760 --> 00:27:19,719
Speaker 4: be too Joni Mitchell about it, but the US Postal

507
00:27:19,760 --> 00:27:22,000
Speaker 4: Service is something you might not miss till its gone,

508
00:27:22,240 --> 00:27:23,800
Speaker 4: you know what I mean. And there are people who

509
00:27:23,840 --> 00:27:27,440
Speaker 4: want to cut those public services that you pay for

510
00:27:28,000 --> 00:27:31,520
Speaker 4: as a as a person in the United States.

511
00:27:32,200 --> 00:27:37,280
Speaker 2: Yeah, I'm just guys, just as a person who experiences mail,

512
00:27:38,000 --> 00:27:40,680
Speaker 2: the ye old snail mail. It is one of those

513
00:27:40,720 --> 00:27:45,840
Speaker 2: things that feels like eventually we're probably gonna move away from.

514
00:27:46,200 --> 00:27:50,680
Speaker 2: And I don't know, simply because unless you're unless you're

515
00:27:51,800 --> 00:27:55,760
Speaker 2: in a specific job or of a specific standing where

516
00:27:55,800 --> 00:27:59,119
Speaker 2: you're constantly sending correspondence back and forth or you know,

517
00:27:59,280 --> 00:28:03,840
Speaker 2: legal document or things like that, there's no reason for it.

518
00:28:04,400 --> 00:28:08,800
Speaker 2: And generally you would use like a secured FedEx shipment

519
00:28:08,880 --> 00:28:11,480
Speaker 2: or something for a legal document. So it is crazy

520
00:28:11,520 --> 00:28:14,359
Speaker 2: to think about. And that's nothing against you, restricted free agent,

521
00:28:14,440 --> 00:28:16,760
Speaker 2: or anybody who's working in that field. It just feels

522
00:28:16,840 --> 00:28:19,119
Speaker 2: like something that humans are moving away from.

523
00:28:19,160 --> 00:28:21,560
Speaker 6: Well, and I can't imagine that restricted free agent is

524
00:28:21,600 --> 00:28:23,000
Speaker 6: going to put up with this kind of crap for

525
00:28:23,080 --> 00:28:26,320
Speaker 6: much longer before they start to look elsewhere. Whether it

526
00:28:26,400 --> 00:28:30,800
Speaker 6: be fed x ups or some other private organization for employment.

527
00:28:31,600 --> 00:28:34,000
Speaker 3: I think that's it for me. Guys, thanks to t

528
00:28:34,160 --> 00:28:36,400
Speaker 3: Bone and Restricted Free Agent for your messages.

529
00:28:36,440 --> 00:28:38,440
Speaker 6: Let's take a word from our sponsor and come back

530
00:28:38,480 --> 00:28:40,560
Speaker 6: with one more segment of listener mail.

531
00:28:47,040 --> 00:28:50,200
Speaker 4: And we have returned. This is the final act of

532
00:28:50,400 --> 00:28:54,960
Speaker 4: our weekly listener mail segment. We are going to hear

533
00:28:55,240 --> 00:28:57,760
Speaker 4: let's say, we'll keep it really brief because there are

534
00:28:57,760 --> 00:29:00,640
Speaker 4: two things want to get to. We're going to save

535
00:29:00,840 --> 00:29:05,920
Speaker 4: the Hurricane Helene and Milton conspiracy theories for a future episode.

536
00:29:05,960 --> 00:29:09,800
Speaker 4: It's our update on natural disasters, so stay tuned for that.

537
00:29:10,120 --> 00:29:12,320
Speaker 4: In the meantime, we had a lot of people writing

538
00:29:12,480 --> 00:29:17,040
Speaker 4: in about the hybrid sheep story that we talked about

539
00:29:17,080 --> 00:29:23,000
Speaker 4: briefly on our Strange News segment. And you guys remember

540
00:29:23,040 --> 00:29:26,680
Speaker 4: this story. This is about Arthur Schubarth Jack to his

541
00:29:26,760 --> 00:29:31,640
Speaker 4: friends who illegally bred and sold these gigantic sheep hybrid

542
00:29:31,680 --> 00:29:35,760
Speaker 4: sheep clones to big Game preserves. He recently got sentenced

543
00:29:35,800 --> 00:29:39,880
Speaker 4: to six months in prison and twenty four grand USD

544
00:29:39,960 --> 00:29:43,520
Speaker 4: and fines. So Jasper and many other folks wrote in

545
00:29:43,640 --> 00:29:46,800
Speaker 4: about this. Hello, folks, says Jasper. There are two main

546
00:29:47,000 --> 00:29:49,560
Speaker 4: dangers that were probably considered in the indictment of the

547
00:29:49,600 --> 00:29:53,040
Speaker 4: guy cloning sheep. One these sheep were hybrids. He used

548
00:29:53,040 --> 00:29:56,440
Speaker 4: tissue from a large wild sheep called the Marco Polo sheep,

549
00:29:56,720 --> 00:30:01,840
Speaker 4: and artificially inseminated female clones using collected from the testicles

550
00:30:01,880 --> 00:30:06,000
Speaker 4: of a hunted bighorn sheep. If the resultant hybrids went

551
00:30:06,040 --> 00:30:09,719
Speaker 4: on to breed with wild bighorn sheeps, whether by escaping

552
00:30:09,760 --> 00:30:13,240
Speaker 4: their pins or big horn sheep passed through their pastures,

553
00:30:13,760 --> 00:30:16,680
Speaker 4: that could mess up the genetic integrity of the species

554
00:30:17,080 --> 00:30:20,680
Speaker 4: and introduce traits that might reduce the ability of bighorn

555
00:30:20,760 --> 00:30:24,000
Speaker 4: sheep to survive in the rocky mountains. So no pause there,

556
00:30:24,000 --> 00:30:26,920
Speaker 4: because that's a pretty interesting argument, right, the creation of

557
00:30:26,960 --> 00:30:31,040
Speaker 4: an invasive species or the eradication of a species because

558
00:30:31,080 --> 00:30:32,520
Speaker 4: of invasive genetic traits.

559
00:30:33,200 --> 00:30:36,600
Speaker 2: Wow, invasive genetics, that's a concept.

560
00:30:36,720 --> 00:30:37,680
Speaker 4: That's a dangerous one.

561
00:30:37,720 --> 00:30:38,080
Speaker 3: Agreed.

562
00:30:38,840 --> 00:30:42,200
Speaker 4: And the next point, which we were not aware of,

563
00:30:42,600 --> 00:30:46,800
Speaker 4: Jasper tells us bighorn sheep are very susceptible to infections

564
00:30:46,800 --> 00:30:51,440
Speaker 4: that don't cause serious diseases in other sheep. A major example,

565
00:30:51,560 --> 00:30:54,480
Speaker 4: and thank you for the pronunciation note here, Jasper is

566
00:30:55,080 --> 00:30:59,240
Speaker 4: Mycoplasma ovia nomine ovia mine.

567
00:30:58,960 --> 00:31:04,840
Speaker 3: Domino patri a blessing from a priest.

568
00:31:05,520 --> 00:31:09,560
Speaker 4: So in domestic sheep, this causes mild or asymptomatic illness,

569
00:31:10,040 --> 00:31:13,120
Speaker 4: but it will absolutely obliterate the big horn sheep in

570
00:31:13,160 --> 00:31:16,440
Speaker 4: an area if it's introduced. And Jasper is telling you

571
00:31:16,560 --> 00:31:21,120
Speaker 4: us this because Jasper is friends with some colleagues that

572
00:31:21,400 --> 00:31:26,760
Speaker 4: research this specific infection in domestic sheep. So there are

573
00:31:26,800 --> 00:31:31,960
Speaker 4: these incredibly robust, rigid regulations about what species of sheep

574
00:31:32,040 --> 00:31:35,720
Speaker 4: or goat can be imported and from where, and how

575
00:31:35,760 --> 00:31:38,920
Speaker 4: they can be kept to minimize the potential of cross

576
00:31:38,960 --> 00:31:43,760
Speaker 4: contact with big horn sheep. This is not a hypothetical risk. Jasper,

577
00:31:43,920 --> 00:31:47,680
Speaker 4: you linked us to a great source from the Justice

578
00:31:47,720 --> 00:31:50,800
Speaker 4: Department of the United States themselves, And I think when

579
00:31:50,840 --> 00:31:54,960
Speaker 4: stuff gets to the DOJ, it means it's pretty serious.

580
00:31:55,040 --> 00:31:58,800
Speaker 4: Because it reminds me we talked a little bit about this.

581
00:31:58,840 --> 00:32:02,200
Speaker 4: It reminds me of the restraints that UH Hawaii has

582
00:32:02,560 --> 00:32:07,400
Speaker 4: on the importation of food or animals right or especially fruits,

583
00:32:07,440 --> 00:32:12,280
Speaker 4: and imagine invasive species that seem fun at first, like

584
00:32:12,400 --> 00:32:15,760
Speaker 4: probably hamsters. They probably can't bring hamsters into Hawaii. They'll

585
00:32:15,800 --> 00:32:18,320
Speaker 4: just overrun the place because they want be a hamster.

586
00:32:18,400 --> 00:32:25,400
Speaker 4: Why moving? So we had another We had another person

587
00:32:25,640 --> 00:32:31,080
Speaker 4: follow up with a more i would say character centric

588
00:32:31,680 --> 00:32:37,520
Speaker 4: opinion on this guy. Arthur Shoebarth agent Alkaline says recently

589
00:32:37,560 --> 00:32:40,360
Speaker 4: in our local news, this story has been blowing up.

590
00:32:41,080 --> 00:32:45,440
Speaker 4: This guy, Arthur's shoe Barth also owns a sketchy local

591
00:32:45,560 --> 00:32:49,800
Speaker 4: pet store in Great Falls, Montana. They kept all the animals,

592
00:32:49,800 --> 00:32:55,120
Speaker 4: including puppies and kittens in aquariums and at one point monkeys,

593
00:32:55,520 --> 00:32:57,720
Speaker 4: but that was before I lived there. How it stays

594
00:32:57,760 --> 00:33:01,560
Speaker 4: open is anybody's guests. It's no prize. They showed absolutely

595
00:33:01,600 --> 00:33:05,480
Speaker 4: no regard for endangered animals or animals at all. Thanks

596
00:33:05,480 --> 00:33:07,280
Speaker 4: guys a huge fan. Keep it real.

597
00:33:07,760 --> 00:33:11,760
Speaker 3: There's a lot more to sheep law that I ever

598
00:33:11,880 --> 00:33:14,560
Speaker 3: considered it. The specialty of the loss like bird law.

599
00:33:15,040 --> 00:33:18,400
Speaker 6: Yeah, yeah, I mean, I guess the invasive species aspect

600
00:33:18,440 --> 00:33:20,920
Speaker 6: of it didn't really occur to me right up front,

601
00:33:21,000 --> 00:33:23,000
Speaker 6: but it makes sense when you do have an economy

602
00:33:23,040 --> 00:33:27,040
Speaker 6: that's like so dependent on that particular type of animal.

603
00:33:27,280 --> 00:33:30,040
Speaker 6: And I did not realize that there were certain species

604
00:33:30,040 --> 00:33:33,200
Speaker 6: that were more susceptible to these types of diseases that

605
00:33:33,240 --> 00:33:36,200
Speaker 6: could result from this sort of you know, breeding.

606
00:33:37,080 --> 00:33:38,600
Speaker 4: And we know what a lot of us in the

607
00:33:38,640 --> 00:33:42,600
Speaker 4: audience are thinking. Can I still use sheep law as

608
00:33:42,640 --> 00:33:46,080
Speaker 4: part of my cover identity on an operation? The answer

609
00:33:46,200 --> 00:33:48,880
Speaker 4: is probably not, because it turns out there are real

610
00:33:48,920 --> 00:33:51,360
Speaker 4: sheep laws and you have to know what they are

611
00:33:51,440 --> 00:33:55,400
Speaker 4: if you're going to plausibly impersonate a sheep attorney a

612
00:33:55,720 --> 00:33:56,760
Speaker 4: big horn lawyer.

613
00:33:57,360 --> 00:33:57,760
Speaker 3: Wow.

614
00:33:58,400 --> 00:34:00,560
Speaker 4: Yeah, there's a word for somewhere.

615
00:34:00,640 --> 00:34:05,240
Speaker 2: Yeah, dude, guys. I found a Facebook page titled closed

616
00:34:05,240 --> 00:34:08,920
Speaker 2: down Jack's Pet Center in Great Falls, Montana, and it

617
00:34:08,960 --> 00:34:13,600
Speaker 2: has a bunch of information and photos of this guy's

618
00:34:13,680 --> 00:34:16,120
Speaker 2: weird pet story that Alkaline mentioned.

619
00:34:16,800 --> 00:34:20,239
Speaker 4: Hmm, that's I mean, it sounds like it's been a

620
00:34:20,280 --> 00:34:26,400
Speaker 4: controversy for a while. Also, Alkaline didn't read this particular

621
00:34:26,440 --> 00:34:30,200
Speaker 4: phrase you used, but you said hand monkeys were also

622
00:34:30,360 --> 00:34:34,200
Speaker 4: kept in aquariums. I didn't know that hand monkeys are

623
00:34:34,239 --> 00:34:38,600
Speaker 4: a thing. We found finger monkeys, the smallest pet monkey

624
00:34:38,640 --> 00:34:42,960
Speaker 4: you can own. They're pigmy marmosets. They're just like six

625
00:34:43,040 --> 00:34:46,440
Speaker 4: inches big, not counting the tail, So maybe that's what

626
00:34:46,480 --> 00:34:51,000
Speaker 4: you're talking about it. They've got these big magua vibes.

627
00:34:51,400 --> 00:34:54,640
Speaker 4: They look like Pokemon. I kind of want to hang

628
00:34:54,680 --> 00:34:57,680
Speaker 4: out with one dude. Or if we're the CIA, well

629
00:34:57,760 --> 00:34:59,640
Speaker 4: let's figure out how we can use them to spy.

630
00:35:00,360 --> 00:35:03,800
Speaker 4: M hm, we have one more here. We'll get to

631
00:35:03,920 --> 00:35:06,600
Speaker 4: letters from home next week. But we have won from

632
00:35:06,760 --> 00:35:12,080
Speaker 4: some anonymous sources. Folks on Instagram as well. Hit us

633
00:35:12,120 --> 00:35:14,319
Speaker 4: to this crazy story. I don't know if you guys

634
00:35:14,360 --> 00:35:18,480
Speaker 4: have heard about this, but not too too long ago,

635
00:35:19,160 --> 00:35:24,000
Speaker 4: mystery drones swarmed a US military base for seventeen days,

636
00:35:24,480 --> 00:35:28,759
Speaker 4: and as of last week, the Pentagon still officially doesn't

637
00:35:28,800 --> 00:35:32,920
Speaker 4: know what's happening. This was over Langley Air Force Bace

638
00:35:33,400 --> 00:35:39,200
Speaker 4: on Virginia's shoreline like Okay, for several nights. Military personnel

639
00:35:39,760 --> 00:35:42,200
Speaker 4: in this place that is home to a bunch of

640
00:35:42,239 --> 00:35:45,960
Speaker 4: the US's most advanced fighter jets, including Deaf twenty two's.

641
00:35:46,440 --> 00:35:51,319
Speaker 4: They had said, somebody is breaching our airspace. We like,

642
00:35:51,400 --> 00:35:54,200
Speaker 4: this is airspace over Langley. This is one of the

643
00:35:54,200 --> 00:35:59,759
Speaker 4: most tightly controlled airspaces in the country, and about forty

644
00:35:59,800 --> 00:36:03,440
Speaker 4: five five minutes to an hour after sunset, a bunch

645
00:36:03,520 --> 00:36:06,560
Speaker 4: of drones would arrive in the sky. They were roughly

646
00:36:06,640 --> 00:36:09,640
Speaker 4: twenty feet long, fly at more than one hundred miles

647
00:36:09,640 --> 00:36:13,520
Speaker 4: an hour at an altitude of three to four thousand feet,

648
00:36:14,000 --> 00:36:17,120
Speaker 4: and then other drones would come in one by one.

649
00:36:17,280 --> 00:36:20,520
Speaker 4: Want a shout out to Gordon Luebold, Lari Siligman, and

650
00:36:20,719 --> 00:36:24,920
Speaker 4: Aruna Viswanatha over at MSN for this article. You can

651
00:36:24,960 --> 00:36:28,440
Speaker 4: find it there easily. The drones had a predictable path.

652
00:36:28,680 --> 00:36:32,799
Speaker 4: They headed south across Chesapeake toward Norfolk. This means they

653
00:36:32,840 --> 00:36:35,480
Speaker 4: went over the area that is the home base of

654
00:36:35,560 --> 00:36:39,800
Speaker 4: Seal Team six and the world's largest naval port, Naval

655
00:36:39,840 --> 00:36:44,120
Speaker 4: station Norfolk. Nobody knew who the drones were coming from.

656
00:36:44,600 --> 00:36:47,880
Speaker 4: Was it possibly another agency, another department and they just

657
00:36:47,960 --> 00:36:52,040
Speaker 4: had you know, crossed wires of paperwork. Was it possible

658
00:36:52,200 --> 00:36:56,560
Speaker 4: that they were a test from rival powers? I mean, look,

659
00:36:56,600 --> 00:36:59,400
Speaker 4: a little quad copter you could buy off TIMU or

660
00:36:59,440 --> 00:37:02,480
Speaker 4: Amazon and is not going to be one hundred miles

661
00:37:02,480 --> 00:37:04,760
Speaker 4: an hour capable, and it's not going to be twenty

662
00:37:04,800 --> 00:37:08,440
Speaker 4: feet long, right unless I'm looking at the wrong drones.

663
00:37:08,680 --> 00:37:12,720
Speaker 3: I don't think you are. Nope, No, okay, I.

664
00:37:12,560 --> 00:37:14,000
Speaker 4: Was hoping you guys were going to tell me, No,

665
00:37:14,280 --> 00:37:16,840
Speaker 4: you can totally get like five of those and you

666
00:37:16,880 --> 00:37:20,920
Speaker 4: get a price break. Yet this so this story is

667
00:37:20,960 --> 00:37:25,839
Speaker 4: still developing. We haven't found an answer yet, but we

668
00:37:25,880 --> 00:37:31,200
Speaker 4: know we know that there appears to be abnormal or

669
00:37:31,280 --> 00:37:36,360
Speaker 4: unusual drone activity over US government sites in This occurred

670
00:37:36,480 --> 00:37:40,840
Speaker 4: in December of twenty twenty three, so just when you know,

671
00:37:40,880 --> 00:37:42,919
Speaker 4: we just learned about it and it happened a while back.

672
00:37:43,200 --> 00:37:46,560
Speaker 4: But two months before that, in October of twenty twenty three,

673
00:37:47,000 --> 00:37:51,920
Speaker 4: five drones flew over a nuclear weapon experiment site in

674
00:37:51,960 --> 00:37:57,400
Speaker 4: the US and they never got caught. This was in Vegas,

675
00:37:58,000 --> 00:38:02,000
Speaker 4: and they don't know who operated the drones in Nevada,

676
00:38:02,080 --> 00:38:06,400
Speaker 4: they don't know why they were there, what they were

677
00:38:06,440 --> 00:38:10,719
Speaker 4: attempting to do. And a spokesperson for the facility, which

678
00:38:10,760 --> 00:38:13,920
Speaker 4: is run by the Energy Department, said they've upgraded their

679
00:38:13,960 --> 00:38:17,560
Speaker 4: system now to detect and counter drones, which means, you know,

680
00:38:17,719 --> 00:38:22,240
Speaker 4: cough cough, shoot them down or disable them. I'm wondering

681
00:38:22,320 --> 00:38:24,319
Speaker 4: how they do it too, because you guys remember the

682
00:38:24,560 --> 00:38:28,359
Speaker 4: uh oh gosh, you guys remember the training programs where

683
00:38:28,400 --> 00:38:32,000
Speaker 4: people were teaching predatory birds to attack drones.

684
00:38:32,840 --> 00:38:36,640
Speaker 6: No, that sounds terrifying, though, Are these like falconers?

685
00:38:36,680 --> 00:38:40,799
Speaker 4: Like, yeah, it's they're red tailed hawks. And I think

686
00:38:40,960 --> 00:38:44,440
Speaker 4: you are correct now, I think there are falconers involved.

687
00:38:44,640 --> 00:38:47,520
Speaker 4: The story came out like, oh my gosh, get this.

688
00:38:47,880 --> 00:38:50,960
Speaker 4: Twenty fourteen was ten years ago, guys, The story came

689
00:38:50,960 --> 00:38:51,879
Speaker 4: out ten years ago.

690
00:38:51,960 --> 00:38:53,280
Speaker 3: Wow. Old.

691
00:38:55,320 --> 00:38:59,600
Speaker 4: So I'm sure that program continues apace. But this is

692
00:38:59,680 --> 00:39:04,160
Speaker 4: also telling us something big is a foot or in

693
00:39:04,200 --> 00:39:05,480
Speaker 4: the sky, because.

694
00:39:05,600 --> 00:39:07,160
Speaker 2: Did you just say bigfoot in the sky?

695
00:39:07,480 --> 00:39:10,240
Speaker 3: A foot in the sky. It couldn't be a bigot

696
00:39:10,280 --> 00:39:10,719
Speaker 3: in the sky.

697
00:39:11,400 --> 00:39:13,759
Speaker 4: It's a it's a bigfoot swing as far as puns go.

698
00:39:14,120 --> 00:39:18,600
Speaker 4: But it reminds me too of the Chinese spy balloon

699
00:39:18,920 --> 00:39:22,160
Speaker 4: that floated across the country while we were recording.

700
00:39:22,239 --> 00:39:24,640
Speaker 3: How could we forget the Chinese spy balloon?

701
00:39:24,880 --> 00:39:27,879
Speaker 4: Right, Yes, we'll always have the Chinese spy balloon. And

702
00:39:27,960 --> 00:39:33,000
Speaker 4: so these drones, over the course of more than two weeks,

703
00:39:33,800 --> 00:39:40,080
Speaker 4: flying off, circling back. I'm wondering why they couldn't track them,

704
00:39:40,480 --> 00:39:43,000
Speaker 4: Like why they couldn't find where they were landing, because

705
00:39:43,000 --> 00:39:45,280
Speaker 4: they had to be landing somewhere nearby, right, they couldn't

706
00:39:45,320 --> 00:39:51,600
Speaker 4: be just flying over the Atlantic every night shortly after us.

707
00:39:52,120 --> 00:39:55,240
Speaker 3: No, they'd have to have some sort of pit stop location.

708
00:39:56,360 --> 00:40:01,560
Speaker 4: So do you guys have any guesses? Before we wrapped today.

709
00:40:01,880 --> 00:40:03,560
Speaker 3: Bro, your guess is as good as mine.

710
00:40:04,320 --> 00:40:07,600
Speaker 4: I guess these are all horrible, and the doctor SUSI

711
00:40:08,000 --> 00:40:14,200
Speaker 4: and level. My guess is maybe someone is like the

712
00:40:14,239 --> 00:40:19,520
Speaker 4: best possible scenario is that someone is doing internal testing

713
00:40:19,680 --> 00:40:22,800
Speaker 4: what we would call pen testing, right, penetration testing, the

714
00:40:22,920 --> 00:40:26,719
Speaker 4: drone equivalent of white hat hacking. Then, I don't know,

715
00:40:27,239 --> 00:40:29,560
Speaker 4: it's equally interesting to see how they were figuring out

716
00:40:30,160 --> 00:40:33,319
Speaker 4: how they might try to catch these One guy said, hey,

717
00:40:33,400 --> 00:40:35,320
Speaker 4: why don't we get the US Coast Guard to shoot

718
00:40:35,400 --> 00:40:38,200
Speaker 4: nets at them. I'm sure somebody brought up the falcon thing,

719
00:40:38,680 --> 00:40:41,560
Speaker 4: and then someone else said what if we use directed energy?

720
00:40:42,360 --> 00:40:45,880
Speaker 4: And then someone in the FAA also probably responded on

721
00:40:45,920 --> 00:40:48,120
Speaker 4: the email or in the meeting and said, yeah, the

722
00:40:48,160 --> 00:40:50,799
Speaker 4: problem with directed energy is that you know, you might

723
00:40:50,960 --> 00:40:53,680
Speaker 4: miss and hit an aircraft.

724
00:40:54,000 --> 00:40:55,480
Speaker 3: Yeah, with people on it.

725
00:40:56,080 --> 00:41:00,879
Speaker 2: All right, a counter drone program. And these drones have

726
00:41:01,680 --> 00:41:07,600
Speaker 2: tethered electro magnets attached to them, so they fly close

727
00:41:07,680 --> 00:41:10,520
Speaker 2: to the other drones and then they zap them with

728
00:41:10,560 --> 00:41:12,920
Speaker 2: the electromagnet and then bring the drones back.

729
00:41:13,560 --> 00:41:18,080
Speaker 4: Hmm, there we go. I like that. I like the

730
00:41:18,160 --> 00:41:21,640
Speaker 4: use of the magnets. I also, you know, if we're

731
00:41:21,640 --> 00:41:24,560
Speaker 4: talking about government largesse. Why don't we just build a

732
00:41:24,680 --> 00:41:28,919
Speaker 4: duplicate of all this stuff over there in Norfolk Rangley, Right,

733
00:41:29,200 --> 00:41:32,640
Speaker 4: and then now we just have two. I feel like

734
00:41:32,680 --> 00:41:35,520
Speaker 4: I pay a lot of taxes. I feel like we

735
00:41:35,600 --> 00:41:38,719
Speaker 4: could do that, So do just.

736
00:41:40,520 --> 00:41:42,560
Speaker 2: You know, guys, I'll always think it. We really need

737
00:41:42,600 --> 00:41:45,919
Speaker 2: a second pentagon just in case the first one gets compromised.

738
00:41:46,080 --> 00:41:51,200
Speaker 4: Yes, yes, we'll call the first one pentagony Pentagon one.

739
00:41:51,320 --> 00:41:54,279
Speaker 4: It works in print, never mind, but yeah, we'll have

740
00:41:54,640 --> 00:41:58,680
Speaker 4: We'll have P and two P or not two P,

741
00:42:01,600 --> 00:42:06,680
Speaker 4: that's the question. Yeah. So a there is an explanation

742
00:42:06,760 --> 00:42:10,040
Speaker 4: spinning this story out a little bit, and please check

743
00:42:10,040 --> 00:42:14,040
Speaker 4: out the articles because it's a fantastic explanation. After everybody

744
00:42:14,120 --> 00:42:17,040
Speaker 4: was trying to figure out what happened, there was a

745
00:42:17,120 --> 00:42:21,080
Speaker 4: rainy morning on January sixth, a guy named Fegion She

746
00:42:21,760 --> 00:42:26,040
Speaker 4: has parked a rented Tesla near Newport News, Virginia, eleven

747
00:42:26,080 --> 00:42:29,480
Speaker 4: miles from Langley, and he is a student at the

748
00:42:29,560 --> 00:42:33,520
Speaker 4: University of Minnesota, and he was trying to fly a drone.

749
00:42:33,600 --> 00:42:35,839
Speaker 4: He told people in the area that his drone got

750
00:42:35,920 --> 00:42:37,960
Speaker 4: stuck in a tree and he tried to free it

751
00:42:38,120 --> 00:42:42,160
Speaker 4: using his controller when a neighbor called the police. The

752
00:42:42,200 --> 00:42:45,200
Speaker 4: police show up and they say, hey, man, this is

753
00:42:45,360 --> 00:42:49,680
Speaker 4: terrible weather to fly a drone. And this is like

754
00:42:49,880 --> 00:42:52,640
Speaker 4: the black mirror version of a cat stuck in a tree.

755
00:42:52,719 --> 00:42:55,160
Speaker 4: So they tell him to call the fire department and

756
00:42:55,200 --> 00:42:59,880
Speaker 4: they'll help him out. Instead, she returns his car, his tesla.

757
00:43:00,200 --> 00:43:02,760
Speaker 4: He takes an Amtrak to DC and then he flies

758
00:43:02,800 --> 00:43:06,800
Speaker 4: to California. So this is, by the way, the behavior

759
00:43:06,840 --> 00:43:10,960
Speaker 4: of someone who's been made and not a UFM student.

760
00:43:11,280 --> 00:43:14,720
Speaker 4: And so the drone falls to the ground. The Feds

761
00:43:14,800 --> 00:43:18,040
Speaker 4: get it, and they find that the drone has photographs

762
00:43:18,239 --> 00:43:22,520
Speaker 4: navy vessels and dry dock shots taken around midnight, and

763
00:43:23,080 --> 00:43:29,360
Speaker 4: some shots were of vessels that were being constructed in

764
00:43:29,440 --> 00:43:34,319
Speaker 4: the shipyard. They arrest him on January eighteenth, just a

765
00:43:34,320 --> 00:43:37,480
Speaker 4: few days later, as he is about to hop a

766
00:43:37,520 --> 00:43:41,719
Speaker 4: flight to China on a one way ticket, and he said, look, no,

767
00:43:41,840 --> 00:43:44,520
Speaker 4: I'm not you know, I'm not doing anything crazy. I

768
00:43:44,680 --> 00:43:48,200
Speaker 4: just like chips, you guys, I didn't know it was

769
00:43:48,239 --> 00:43:49,320
Speaker 4: restricted airspace.

770
00:43:49,480 --> 00:43:53,120
Speaker 3: I love boats are cool, you know, dude, Yeah, of course.

771
00:43:53,840 --> 00:43:56,279
Speaker 2: And I was just heading back, you know, I was

772
00:43:56,320 --> 00:43:58,880
Speaker 2: just doing my thing here, doing my little hobby and

773
00:43:58,960 --> 00:43:59,480
Speaker 2: I'm just going.

774
00:43:59,480 --> 00:43:59,919
Speaker 3: To head home.

775
00:44:00,800 --> 00:44:04,360
Speaker 4: And so spoiler, they don't buy his story. They say

776
00:44:04,600 --> 00:44:08,520
Speaker 4: that he is guilty of unlawfully and knowingly taking photos

777
00:44:08,560 --> 00:44:12,319
Speaker 4: of classified naval installations. And this is the first case

778
00:44:12,360 --> 00:44:16,720
Speaker 4: of a drone that came up under USS bionage law.

779
00:44:18,239 --> 00:44:21,360
Speaker 4: He said he had been on vacation, he flew drones

780
00:44:21,360 --> 00:44:25,319
Speaker 4: of Mill Night for fun, his h The judge ends

781
00:44:25,400 --> 00:44:28,480
Speaker 4: up saying some the six months in prison and she's

782
00:44:28,560 --> 00:44:31,640
Speaker 4: attorney against the award for the For the best quote

783
00:44:31,640 --> 00:44:35,640
Speaker 4: in the case, Chao Mingcheng says, if he was a

784
00:44:35,680 --> 00:44:39,520
Speaker 4: foreign agent, he would be the worst spy ever known,

785
00:44:40,080 --> 00:44:43,960
Speaker 4: like worse than James Bond. And that's where we're going

786
00:44:44,040 --> 00:44:46,120
Speaker 4: to end the story. You can learn more, but I like,

787
00:44:46,280 --> 00:44:51,520
Speaker 4: let's end on this question. Guys, there was more than

788
00:44:51,560 --> 00:44:58,000
Speaker 4: one drone. What happened to the other? You know, college students.

789
00:44:57,880 --> 00:45:00,800
Speaker 3: Don't don't dum lifting dude.

790
00:45:01,280 --> 00:45:04,239
Speaker 2: They investigated a haunted house together and then it's.

791
00:45:04,160 --> 00:45:07,920
Speaker 6: Sorry it was old man Willickers from the Haunted amusement

792
00:45:08,000 --> 00:45:08,880
Speaker 6: park called.

793
00:45:09,760 --> 00:45:13,640
Speaker 4: Yeah, they've trained the falcons to attack the people controlling

794
00:45:13,680 --> 00:45:17,640
Speaker 4: the drones now too, death by falcon, Big big things

795
00:45:17,640 --> 00:45:21,560
Speaker 4: that Jasper DJ big, big things to ancient alkaline maxium,

796
00:45:21,600 --> 00:45:24,439
Speaker 4: blind t bone, restricted agent, everybody who wrote in.

797
00:45:24,520 --> 00:45:26,799
Speaker 6: Guys really quickly, as we wrap up, have you heard

798
00:45:26,840 --> 00:45:30,160
Speaker 6: the theory that these Tesla robots are actually just being

799
00:45:30,239 --> 00:45:32,400
Speaker 6: controlled remote controlled by somebody?

800
00:45:33,120 --> 00:45:33,400
Speaker 3: Yes?

801
00:45:33,680 --> 00:45:36,359
Speaker 4: And have you heard that the guy who did the

802
00:45:36,480 --> 00:45:38,360
Speaker 4: design for what film.

803
00:45:38,280 --> 00:45:42,040
Speaker 6: I Robot, I Robote Alex Proyees, who also directed The

804
00:45:42,120 --> 00:45:45,839
Speaker 6: Crow and Dark City the design Furst City. I love

805
00:45:45,960 --> 00:45:48,719
Speaker 6: Dark City and I love the original Crow, but the

806
00:45:48,760 --> 00:45:53,080
Speaker 6: both the vehicles and the robots themselves appear to have

807
00:45:53,120 --> 00:45:56,160
Speaker 6: been completely lifted from that film.

808
00:45:56,400 --> 00:45:57,960
Speaker 3: Yeah, dude, Yeah, very much so.

809
00:45:58,480 --> 00:46:03,320
Speaker 4: And we want to hear your ideas, your new leads,

810
00:46:03,440 --> 00:46:06,399
Speaker 4: join the cause, folks, tell us the stuff they don't

811
00:46:06,400 --> 00:46:09,000
Speaker 4: want you to know, and give us the ideas that

812
00:46:09,040 --> 00:46:12,879
Speaker 4: you'd like us to use in future episodes. We try

813
00:46:12,960 --> 00:46:16,759
Speaker 4: to be easy to find by any number of mediums.

814
00:46:16,800 --> 00:46:19,279
Speaker 4: You can give us an email, you can give us

815
00:46:19,280 --> 00:46:21,720
Speaker 4: a call. You can also right now find us online

816
00:46:21,719 --> 00:46:23,759
Speaker 4: because you're probably listening on your phone.

817
00:46:23,560 --> 00:46:25,400
Speaker 3: By hook and or by crook.

818
00:46:25,520 --> 00:46:28,120
Speaker 6: You can find us at the handle Conspiracy Stuff, where

819
00:46:28,160 --> 00:46:30,160
Speaker 6: we exist on Facebook, where we have our Facebook group.

820
00:46:30,200 --> 00:46:31,640
Speaker 3: Here's where it gets crazy.

821
00:46:31,560 --> 00:46:34,839
Speaker 6: On YouTube where we have video concep galore for you

822
00:46:34,880 --> 00:46:39,359
Speaker 6: to enjoy, as well as on x FKA, Twitter if

823
00:46:39,360 --> 00:46:42,200
Speaker 6: you'd like to find us on Instagram and TikTok. However,

824
00:46:42,280 --> 00:46:45,120
Speaker 6: we are conspiracy stuff show in those locations.

825
00:46:45,840 --> 00:46:48,080
Speaker 2: Our phone number, should you wish to call it is

826
00:46:48,160 --> 00:46:52,480
Speaker 2: one eight three three std WYTK. When you call in,

827
00:46:52,560 --> 00:46:54,520
Speaker 2: give yourself a cool nickname and let us know if

828
00:46:54,560 --> 00:46:56,160
Speaker 2: we can use your name and message on the air.

829
00:46:56,239 --> 00:46:58,080
Speaker 2: If you've got more to say than could fit in

830
00:46:58,120 --> 00:47:01,080
Speaker 2: a three minute voicemail, instead send us a good old

831
00:47:01,080 --> 00:47:01,800
Speaker 2: fashioned email.

832
00:47:01,960 --> 00:47:03,239
Speaker 3: We are the.

833
00:47:03,280 --> 00:47:06,880
Speaker 4: Entities read every single piece of correspondence we receive, and

834
00:47:06,960 --> 00:47:10,160
Speaker 4: email is one of our favorite ways to get in

835
00:47:10,239 --> 00:47:13,080
Speaker 4: touch with you. Send us the links, send us the video,

836
00:47:13,200 --> 00:47:17,200
Speaker 4: send us the Send us the strange audio you can't explain.

837
00:47:17,400 --> 00:47:20,319
Speaker 4: We want to hear it, see it, read it, experience it.

838
00:47:20,360 --> 00:47:22,680
Speaker 4: Take it's through the edge of the rabbit hole. We

839
00:47:22,760 --> 00:47:25,919
Speaker 4: will do the rest. Always suckers for a great pun

840
00:47:26,280 --> 00:47:28,080
Speaker 4: and you can't wait to read what you write. So

841
00:47:28,200 --> 00:47:31,200
Speaker 4: join us out here in the dark conspiracy at iHeartRadio

842
00:47:31,360 --> 00:47:50,200
Speaker 4: dot com.

843
00:47:50,400 --> 00:47:52,440
Speaker 2: Stuff they Don't Want You to Know is a production

844
00:47:52,560 --> 00:47:57,080
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

845
00:47:57,200 --> 00:47:59,960
Speaker 2: Apple podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.