WEBVTT - PRISM Part Two

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<v Speaker 1>Get in touch with technology with text Stuff from how

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<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com. Hey there, and welcome to text Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>My name is redacted. No, I'm Jonathan Strickling. I learned

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<v Speaker 1>today we're gonna talk a little bit more about the

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<v Speaker 1>n s A and the data collection that it's been

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<v Speaker 1>participating in. And uh, and exactly what is that? How

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<v Speaker 1>does that apply to you, whether you're an American citizen

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<v Speaker 1>or someone living abroad. What exactly is going on? And

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<v Speaker 1>and specifically what all this prism how about is about?

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<v Speaker 1>Should we be concerned? Spoiler? Yes, um concerned? At least

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<v Speaker 1>it's always good to educate yourself as much as you

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<v Speaker 1>possibly can when you're talking about classified information that is

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<v Speaker 1>being withheld from people. But let's let's start with talking

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<v Speaker 1>about a personality, someone who has been identified as being

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<v Speaker 1>the very center of this controversy, the man who leaked

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<v Speaker 1>the information to the press that let us know about

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<v Speaker 1>about prison period. Yes, Edward Snowdon. Edward Snowdon formerly a

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<v Speaker 1>technical contractor for the n s A. I am assuming

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<v Speaker 1>they have terminated that employment. Well he was, okay, so

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<v Speaker 1>so he is thirty years old right now as of

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<v Speaker 1>this podcast. He was twenty nine when he leaked this information,

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<v Speaker 1>which which seems terrifically young for being a whistleblower on

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<v Speaker 1>one of the largest intelligence gathering entities in the world.

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<v Speaker 1>Some might even go so far as to suggest that

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<v Speaker 1>he has he has effectively, at least as far as

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<v Speaker 1>the United States is concerned, thrown the rest of his

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<v Speaker 1>life away, which I mean, in other words, there were

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<v Speaker 1>some major consequences to his actions, and so that says

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<v Speaker 1>something right, well, you know, and there's there's a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of different points of view on on on him and

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<v Speaker 1>what he's done. Um, but uh, who is this guy?

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<v Speaker 1>I wanted to say a little bit about him since

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<v Speaker 1>all of this stuff that's been swirling around and um. So,

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<v Speaker 1>so he got his g D and listed the army.

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<v Speaker 1>In two thousand three, um was was discharged after breaking

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<v Speaker 1>his legs in a Special Forces training exercise. Yeah, so

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<v Speaker 1>trained for special Forces. UM then worked at the n

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<v Speaker 1>s A as a security guard and then I t

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<v Speaker 1>security in the c i A. Yeah, so he crossed

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<v Speaker 1>the cross departments. He's crossed streams. In two thousand seven,

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<v Speaker 1>the CIA sent him on assignment to Geneva, Switzerland, UM

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<v Speaker 1>and then later he signed with defense contractor UM Uh

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<v Speaker 1>booz Allen Hamilton's UM as a assist amin I see

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<v Speaker 1>right right right, So it turned out that he had

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<v Speaker 1>had an ability with computers. So it was because when

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<v Speaker 1>you think about like he started off like a security

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<v Speaker 1>guard and now he's overseeing actual information system right right,

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<v Speaker 1>like like six figure salary, Like pretty pretty important dude

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<v Speaker 1>for this contractor um uh he was. He was working

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<v Speaker 1>on an ns A contract out in Hawaii under under

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<v Speaker 1>bus Allen Hamilton's UM when he copied certain classified documents

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<v Speaker 1>and removed them entirely from his office before telling his bosses, hey,

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<v Speaker 1>I need some vacation. He specifically told them that he

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<v Speaker 1>needed to leave in order to undergo epilepsy treatments. Wow,

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<v Speaker 1>and then flew to Hong Kong and contacted the press

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<v Speaker 1>with all the stuff that we're gonna be talking about

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<v Speaker 1>in the right. And there's still quite a bit of

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<v Speaker 1>controversy about him. There are people who consider him to

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<v Speaker 1>be a whistleblower and uh and someone who has the

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<v Speaker 1>interests of the American public at heart. There are others

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<v Speaker 1>who go so far as to say that he's a

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<v Speaker 1>trader um. And there are people who say that maybe

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<v Speaker 1>traders the wrong word, but he certainly has put a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of people at risk by revealing information that was

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<v Speaker 1>supposed to be secret. So there's a there's a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of different views on this, and we're not gonna really try.

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<v Speaker 1>We're trying not to lay down on one side or

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<v Speaker 1>the other, but we we you'll probably get a little

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<v Speaker 1>hint of our own personal but least, but we don't

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<v Speaker 1>we don't mean to push them on anyone. Absolutely, Now,

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<v Speaker 1>this is this is you know, it's it's as as

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<v Speaker 1>people who talk. We do have opinions. But um, in fact,

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<v Speaker 1>we're not even sure the crazy thing is exactly what

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<v Speaker 1>he has leaked to the press. Um. We we know

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<v Speaker 1>that there was a forty one slide power point presentation

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<v Speaker 1>UM about a program called Prism, about a program called Prism. UM,

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<v Speaker 1>and there was basically what we know, And there was

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<v Speaker 1>some some information about phone program as well, because Prism

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<v Speaker 1>Prism really was mainly about uh, internet communication, but there's

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<v Speaker 1>also this element about phone records. Uh, there was about

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<v Speaker 1>the the n s A has access to information. I

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<v Speaker 1>think it's something like seven years worth of information of

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<v Speaker 1>Verizon customers phone information. Um, that's a lot of info. Oh, absolutely, Well,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, I'm just saying that we're not exactly sure

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<v Speaker 1>what documents exist and where this information has come from overall,

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<v Speaker 1>aside from this one power point presentation, which are the

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<v Speaker 1>host of works article about this pointed out that UM,

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<v Speaker 1>that this proves that, yes, international security is just as

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<v Speaker 1>boring as your job, superspies power point. I've also seen

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<v Speaker 1>quite a few people who took the power point presentation

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<v Speaker 1>and then uh distilled it down to something like twelve

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<v Speaker 1>slides and said that, you know, they obviously need some

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<v Speaker 1>some some classes on power point uh design. And in

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<v Speaker 1>my thought is like, well, I'm glad you're able to

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<v Speaker 1>to take a step back and critic makes a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit of a joke as opposed to freaking out, but

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<v Speaker 1>so okay to to catch us up on the climate

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<v Speaker 1>and overall politics of of what has led to all

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<v Speaker 1>of this mess two thousand one and to say came

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<v Speaker 1>under direct fire for failing to catch the plot of

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<v Speaker 1>the World Trade Center attack UM. And subsequently, the USA

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<v Speaker 1>Patriot Act was signed by George W. Bush with bipartisan

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<v Speaker 1>congressional support. This was the act that gave the government

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<v Speaker 1>much broader capabilities when it came to surveillance and detecting

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<v Speaker 1>potential terrorists acts um, and some would argue, in fact,

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<v Speaker 1>many have argued that it ended up violating at least

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<v Speaker 1>some freedoms of American citizens in the process. Sure, um

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<v Speaker 1>in two thousand two, and we didn't actually find out

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<v Speaker 1>about this. The the American public or the public at large,

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<v Speaker 1>did not find out about this until two thousand five.

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<v Speaker 1>H George W. Signed an executive order that specifically authorized

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<v Speaker 1>the n s A to UM to monitor international emails

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<v Speaker 1>and phone calls from people inside the US. Yeah, that

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<v Speaker 1>was skipping the part where the Special Court outlined in

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<v Speaker 1>VISA is supposed to review each case. Right, And we'll

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<v Speaker 1>talk more about VISA in a bit, But yeah, so

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<v Speaker 1>this is essentially giving even more broad powers to when

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<v Speaker 1>when when The New York Times leaked this information, and

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<v Speaker 1>the officials maintained that they were still requiring the n

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<v Speaker 1>s A to obtain arrants for entirely domestic communications, right, Um,

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<v Speaker 1>This is where it gets complicated because again we talked

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<v Speaker 1>about in our last podcast about how a foreign agent

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<v Speaker 1>can be someone who is not an American citizen, who's

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<v Speaker 1>not in the United States, and then a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>these protections that we're talking about don't apply because the

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<v Speaker 1>protections that we mostly talk about American citizens, that's what

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<v Speaker 1>the Constitution is covering. You know, we can't really cover

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<v Speaker 1>the freedoms of people in other nations because that's not

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<v Speaker 1>the role of one government to say for another. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>You know that that kind of falls more on the

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<v Speaker 1>other governments as well as the United Nations and some

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<v Speaker 1>other organizations. So uh, but when it comes to American citizens,

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<v Speaker 1>they're supposed to be certain rules that we follow. This

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<v Speaker 1>was an example of expanding those rules. All right. So

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand five that's when The New York Times ends

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<v Speaker 1>up publishing this information. Right. Also in two thousand five,

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<v Speaker 1>that was when the n s ARE created US Cyber Command,

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<v Speaker 1>which is that network warfare unit designed to specifically protect

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<v Speaker 1>against terrorist data and network threats. Two thousand six an

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<v Speaker 1>interesting note, um we it was revealed by a former

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<v Speaker 1>a T and T technician that um that the company

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<v Speaker 1>had allowed the n s A to install a computer

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<v Speaker 1>at San Francisco Switching Center, which happens to be a

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<v Speaker 1>key hub for fiber optic cables. Yeah, this was where

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<v Speaker 1>we learned about the secret rooms. Right. So this is

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<v Speaker 1>where and we'll we'll probably mention this again later on.

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<v Speaker 1>But this is where the we we learned about the

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<v Speaker 1>n s A creating special rooms and various carriers, whether

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<v Speaker 1>their phone carriers or beyond telecommunications all the way through

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<v Speaker 1>Internet carriers, that they were putting in these special secret

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<v Speaker 1>rooms that would allow them access. Anyone who had the

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<v Speaker 1>n s A clearance could gain access to it, but

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<v Speaker 1>otherwise you could not go in there. So, in other words,

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<v Speaker 1>an A T and T employee, if that A T

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<v Speaker 1>n T employee did not have special access granted by

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<v Speaker 1>the n s A, they could not go into this

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<v Speaker 1>room even though it was within a T and T.

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<v Speaker 1>This was what was allowing the n s A to

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<v Speaker 1>two intercept information without having to actually go to A

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<v Speaker 1>T and T and say, hey, hey, I want this thing.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah there, here's a list. Here's a list of the

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<v Speaker 1>stuff that we have been authorized to ask for. Give

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<v Speaker 1>it to us. Now, they don't have to go for

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<v Speaker 1>the authorization because they just have this special room. All

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<v Speaker 1>they have to do is show up and go into

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<v Speaker 1>the special room and then they run. And I'll talk

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<v Speaker 1>more about how they collect their data and the kind

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<v Speaker 1>of queries they are running, and also the sort of

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<v Speaker 1>mental gymnastics you need to do in order to understand

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<v Speaker 1>how they look at this as not being not falling

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<v Speaker 1>under that Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure.

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<v Speaker 1>If you remember from our last podcast we taught that's

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<v Speaker 1>central to a lot of the arguments against what is

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<v Speaker 1>going on with the n s A is the idea

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<v Speaker 1>that under the Constitution, we have this Fourth Amendment right

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<v Speaker 1>that protects us from unreasonable search and seizure, and the

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<v Speaker 1>government is supposed to have at least uh, they're supposed

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<v Speaker 1>to be have authorization and evidence before they can go

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<v Speaker 1>and search you as an American citizen. Again, the supplies

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<v Speaker 1>to American citizens. And it gets complicated again when we

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<v Speaker 1>talk about foreign agents who could be American citizens that

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<v Speaker 1>or or an American citizen who's talking to a foreign agent.

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<v Speaker 1>Right that also American communication lines. Yeah really, Oh, it's

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<v Speaker 1>so sticky, um and and and and again. All of

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<v Speaker 1>this is stuff that we already knew about. None of

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<v Speaker 1>this is new. None of this was leaked by every Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>this was stuff that had been revealed over the years

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<v Speaker 1>through various means. Sometimes there were things that were just

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<v Speaker 1>met part of law. So if you just read the law,

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<v Speaker 1>you would understand it. Some of this was stuff that

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<v Speaker 1>wasn't laid out in the law but was later uncovered

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<v Speaker 1>by various news papers, things of the New York Times,

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<v Speaker 1>Washington Post, etcetera. Yeah. Um, the next big one was

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<v Speaker 1>in two thousand seven. That was the Protect America Act,

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<v Speaker 1>signed into law by George W. Bush. Um. This this

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<v Speaker 1>was this basically allowed um the Attorney General and the

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<v Speaker 1>Director of National Intelligence who we we We talked about

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<v Speaker 1>that role in the first podcast. UM two explain in

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<v Speaker 1>a classified document how the US would be collecting intelligence

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<v Speaker 1>on foreigners overseas over the course of the next year. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>And it it's also known as Title seven. So that's

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<v Speaker 1>the other name for this. If you've ever heard Title seven,

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<v Speaker 1>that's referring to the Protect America Act of two thousand seven, Right, Um.

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<v Speaker 1>And the important part about this is that, UM, it

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<v Speaker 1>does not require them to name specific targets or places.

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<v Speaker 1>They don't you don't even Yeah, you don't have to

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<v Speaker 1>do that, which means you don't need a warrant. Obviously,

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<v Speaker 1>if you if you don't have to name the specific

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<v Speaker 1>targets or places, then clearly the warrant is not right.

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<v Speaker 1>How would you get a warrant if you just said

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<v Speaker 1>someone somewhere is doing something. Let me look in not

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<v Speaker 1>that that's so. So essentially this is the warrantless wire

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<v Speaker 1>tapping portion of law. If you've ever heard about that,

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<v Speaker 1>about warrantless wire taps, that's where this comes from. And

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<v Speaker 1>it was supposed to just focus on, like you said,

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<v Speaker 1>foreign intelligence, right, it's uh, and only if the targets

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<v Speaker 1>were reasonably believed to be outside the US. Now what

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<v Speaker 1>counts for reasonable believability? I don't know, because they're not

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<v Speaker 1>telling me so. I mean, a lot of these terms

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<v Speaker 1>are vaguely defined, and many of them are vaguely defined

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<v Speaker 1>for a reason. It's to give as much flexibility as possible.

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<v Speaker 1>If you're being less charitable, it's to to to be

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<v Speaker 1>as draconian as possible. I wouldn't go that far. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>I'm thinking of the sense that I want the flexibility. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>And if there ever were a point where we defined it,

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<v Speaker 1>it would likely be in a court case, like you

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<v Speaker 1>would bring something to court and the court would decide

0:12:56.200 --> 0:12:59.880
<v Speaker 1>whether or not it met some criteria for reasonable belief

0:12:59.880 --> 0:13:03.560
<v Speaker 1>of it. But that also will get into a little

0:13:03.559 --> 0:13:05.720
<v Speaker 1>bit more of a discussion. When we talk about the

0:13:05.840 --> 0:13:08.960
<v Speaker 1>n s A and uh, and and what their threshold

0:13:09.080 --> 0:13:12.520
<v Speaker 1>is for believing someone to not be an American citizen

0:13:12.600 --> 0:13:15.679
<v Speaker 1>before they start collecting all the data on them. So, anyway,

0:13:15.760 --> 0:13:19.360
<v Speaker 1>two thousand seven was the Protect America Act. What what

0:13:19.360 --> 0:13:22.880
<v Speaker 1>happens two thousand eight? Well? Okay, um, So the Protect

0:13:22.920 --> 0:13:26.920
<v Speaker 1>America Act technically expired early in two thousand eight, um,

0:13:27.160 --> 0:13:30.640
<v Speaker 1>and was subsumed by if I didn't just make that

0:13:30.679 --> 0:13:34.440
<v Speaker 1>word up, by the by the two PHISA amendments, Right,

0:13:34.480 --> 0:13:38.560
<v Speaker 1>that's the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which was originally enacted

0:13:38.600 --> 0:13:41.520
<v Speaker 1>into law in nineteen seventy eight. Now, these amendments changed

0:13:41.640 --> 0:13:44.960
<v Speaker 1>that act, right, I mean that they obviously they amended it. Now,

0:13:45.080 --> 0:13:48.240
<v Speaker 1>the original FISA Act was there to try and put

0:13:48.240 --> 0:13:52.960
<v Speaker 1>down specific rules when it comes to foreign surveillance, and

0:13:53.000 --> 0:13:56.320
<v Speaker 1>it's set down a lot of different restrictions that the

0:13:56.320 --> 0:13:59.680
<v Speaker 1>government had to obey in order to do this in

0:13:59.679 --> 0:14:02.760
<v Speaker 1>a way that was seen as responsible and accountable. The

0:14:02.800 --> 0:14:06.320
<v Speaker 1>amendments started to loosen some of those restrictions to give

0:14:06.480 --> 0:14:11.200
<v Speaker 1>the intelligence communities more freedom to pursue surveillance in an

0:14:11.240 --> 0:14:15.760
<v Speaker 1>effort to counteract any sort of uh, any sort of

0:14:15.920 --> 0:14:21.080
<v Speaker 1>anything that would endanger national security. Right. Specifically, this included,

0:14:21.280 --> 0:14:23.520
<v Speaker 1>uh one that you might and an amendment that you

0:14:23.600 --> 0:14:25.600
<v Speaker 1>might have heard of um in the news, which is

0:14:25.640 --> 0:14:30.440
<v Speaker 1>five A section seven oh two, which basically uh okay.

0:14:30.440 --> 0:14:33.040
<v Speaker 1>So so according to the Director of National Intelligence, it

0:14:33.120 --> 0:14:37.520
<v Speaker 1>facilitates the targeted acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning foreign

0:14:37.600 --> 0:14:42.400
<v Speaker 1>targets located outside the United States under court oversight. Sounds pretty,

0:14:42.600 --> 0:14:46.080
<v Speaker 1>sounds pretty on the up and up court oversight. It's

0:14:46.240 --> 0:14:49.920
<v Speaker 1>only targeting foreign targets, only foreign targets that are outside

0:14:49.920 --> 0:14:52.680
<v Speaker 1>the United States as and sound like it's too too

0:14:52.680 --> 0:14:56.480
<v Speaker 1>bad as far as encroaching upon American citizens rights, well,

0:14:56.520 --> 0:15:01.080
<v Speaker 1>the problem is that according to the washing To Post anyway,

0:15:01.680 --> 0:15:05.120
<v Speaker 1>according to two documents that they have since uncovered, um,

0:15:05.360 --> 0:15:09.240
<v Speaker 1>the their analysts only have to have a certainty rates

0:15:09.520 --> 0:15:13.040
<v Speaker 1>what someone is foreign, that someone is not of an

0:15:13.240 --> 0:15:16.600
<v Speaker 1>American citizen right or not in America even Yeah, there's

0:15:16.640 --> 0:15:19.680
<v Speaker 1>a fifty one certainty that they have to meet. So,

0:15:19.720 --> 0:15:23.200
<v Speaker 1>in other words, coin flip plus one and if you watch,

0:15:23.280 --> 0:15:25.520
<v Speaker 1>don't be dumb, it might just be a coin flip

0:15:25.560 --> 0:15:29.600
<v Speaker 1>depending upon the coin, you know, the one I'm talking about. Yeah, Like,

0:15:29.680 --> 0:15:32.240
<v Speaker 1>because the way certain coins are made, they do actually

0:15:32.240 --> 0:15:34.560
<v Speaker 1>flip on one side. A little more than the other.

0:15:36.040 --> 0:15:38.360
<v Speaker 1>This is a that's that's all they have to do.

0:15:38.400 --> 0:15:40.120
<v Speaker 1>They have to feel a little bit better than a

0:15:40.120 --> 0:15:43.720
<v Speaker 1>coin flip situation that a person is in fact of

0:15:44.480 --> 0:15:48.960
<v Speaker 1>foreign nationality not an American citizen for them to move forward,

0:15:49.320 --> 0:15:53.880
<v Speaker 1>which seems pretty low to me. Also, again, according to

0:15:53.880 --> 0:15:56.960
<v Speaker 1>the Washington Post, they have training materials that advise new

0:15:57.000 --> 0:16:00.400
<v Speaker 1>analysts that quote, it's nothing to worry about out end

0:16:00.480 --> 0:16:05.880
<v Speaker 1>quote if they accidentally collect us content, right, don't worry.

0:16:06.240 --> 0:16:09.160
<v Speaker 1>We we know what we're doing. We won't do anything here.

0:16:09.720 --> 0:16:12.520
<v Speaker 1>We promise we won't look at it. There's gonna be

0:16:12.640 --> 0:16:14.880
<v Speaker 1>editorializing at the end of this episode, by the way, folks.

0:16:15.000 --> 0:16:17.560
<v Speaker 1>Uh And and I'm just warning you now because I

0:16:17.600 --> 0:16:21.040
<v Speaker 1>do have something to say about just just the dangers

0:16:21.240 --> 0:16:25.600
<v Speaker 1>of pursuing this kind of line of thought without without

0:16:25.680 --> 0:16:28.680
<v Speaker 1>questioning it. I'm not saying that everything that's been done

0:16:28.840 --> 0:16:31.160
<v Speaker 1>is bad, but I am saying that you've got to

0:16:31.280 --> 0:16:36.160
<v Speaker 1>question things a collective. Some may or may not so anyway. Alright,

0:16:36.200 --> 0:16:38.400
<v Speaker 1>So so let's pick up with FISA here now that

0:16:38.480 --> 0:16:41.720
<v Speaker 1>this is still stuff that we knew about before Snowdon's

0:16:42.080 --> 0:16:47.720
<v Speaker 1>information lead. So FISA created Uh there's the FISA Court. Now,

0:16:47.720 --> 0:16:51.080
<v Speaker 1>the FISA Court oversees these requests that are are sent

0:16:51.160 --> 0:16:56.280
<v Speaker 1>in to U to pursue surveillance over foreign targets. Keeping

0:16:56.320 --> 0:16:58.360
<v Speaker 1>in mind this is still not for American citizens, it's

0:16:58.400 --> 0:17:01.880
<v Speaker 1>for foreign targets. The is a court is a secret court.

0:17:02.680 --> 0:17:04.560
<v Speaker 1>If you listen to our last podcast, you heard us

0:17:04.560 --> 0:17:07.120
<v Speaker 1>talk about it a little bit. It's hearings are in secret,

0:17:07.200 --> 0:17:10.360
<v Speaker 1>it's findings are in secret. There are eleven court members.

0:17:10.359 --> 0:17:14.480
<v Speaker 1>Those eleven court members are appointed by the Supreme Court

0:17:14.600 --> 0:17:18.480
<v Speaker 1>Chief Justice, and there is no um, there's no process

0:17:18.520 --> 0:17:22.480
<v Speaker 1>there to approve of those appointments. That's the Supreme Court

0:17:23.160 --> 0:17:26.520
<v Speaker 1>Chief Justice. Just as finals say, which some have argued

0:17:26.880 --> 0:17:30.200
<v Speaker 1>means that it creates a court that doesn't have diversity

0:17:30.240 --> 0:17:32.760
<v Speaker 1>in it because you only have one person and that

0:17:32.800 --> 0:17:36.119
<v Speaker 1>person may end up uh completely filling that court with

0:17:36.200 --> 0:17:39.320
<v Speaker 1>people that that that follow that same person's philosophy, the

0:17:39.400 --> 0:17:43.840
<v Speaker 1>Supreme Court Chief Justice's philosophy. Uh So there's that argument

0:17:43.840 --> 0:17:48.400
<v Speaker 1>as well. Um. Also, whenever they do serve out any

0:17:48.480 --> 0:17:50.679
<v Speaker 1>kind of warrant or order, if you've listened to our

0:17:50.720 --> 0:17:53.840
<v Speaker 1>last episode, you know there's a gag order involved with that,

0:17:53.920 --> 0:17:57.280
<v Speaker 1>which means that the recipient cannot acknowledge the fact that

0:17:57.320 --> 0:17:59.440
<v Speaker 1>they received this. They can't talk about it, they can't

0:17:59.440 --> 0:18:04.040
<v Speaker 1>reveal it, which may explain why some of the companies

0:18:04.040 --> 0:18:06.840
<v Speaker 1>that were revealed within that presentation that Lauren alluded to

0:18:06.840 --> 0:18:09.440
<v Speaker 1>at the top of the show, when they were approached

0:18:09.480 --> 0:18:11.720
<v Speaker 1>about this, they said, we don't know, we don't know

0:18:11.760 --> 0:18:15.200
<v Speaker 1>anything about this. Well, there are to two possibilities. One

0:18:15.280 --> 0:18:17.720
<v Speaker 1>is that they actually don't know about it, and that

0:18:17.840 --> 0:18:20.520
<v Speaker 1>the way that the n s A is gathering information

0:18:20.880 --> 0:18:26.720
<v Speaker 1>actually circumvents their internal workings. That's either they were they

0:18:26.720 --> 0:18:29.119
<v Speaker 1>were completely unaware of it, as they said, or they

0:18:29.119 --> 0:18:31.479
<v Speaker 1>are under a gag order and cannot say yeah. So

0:18:31.520 --> 0:18:34.560
<v Speaker 1>either way, we we can't know for sure unless someone

0:18:34.800 --> 0:18:37.680
<v Speaker 1>from those companies comes out and leaks that information. But

0:18:38.080 --> 0:18:44.480
<v Speaker 1>either way they disowned any knowledge of this. UH. Going

0:18:44.520 --> 0:18:47.000
<v Speaker 1>on to the what the what fights it can do?

0:18:47.200 --> 0:18:51.600
<v Speaker 1>They define foreign powers as any foreign government or component

0:18:51.800 --> 0:18:55.120
<v Speaker 1>of a foreign government, whether or not officially recognized by

0:18:55.160 --> 0:18:58.520
<v Speaker 1>the United States. In other words, there could be governments

0:18:58.560 --> 0:19:02.840
<v Speaker 1>out there that government is claiming that they oversee a

0:19:02.840 --> 0:19:06.280
<v Speaker 1>sovereign nation, but the United States has not officially recognized

0:19:06.280 --> 0:19:09.160
<v Speaker 1>that as a sovereign nation under FISA, that doesn't matter.

0:19:09.160 --> 0:19:12.320
<v Speaker 1>They're still classified as a foreign government. Uh. They also

0:19:12.400 --> 0:19:15.320
<v Speaker 1>defined as any faction of a foreign nation or nations,

0:19:15.440 --> 0:19:20.040
<v Speaker 1>or any foreign based political organization that isn't substantially composed

0:19:20.320 --> 0:19:25.120
<v Speaker 1>of United States persons. Uh. Faction and substantially not defined.

0:19:25.560 --> 0:19:31.399
<v Speaker 1>So don't really know what would meet that criteria. Maybe

0:19:31.400 --> 0:19:36.440
<v Speaker 1>it's don't know. Any entity, like a political organization or

0:19:36.480 --> 0:19:39.080
<v Speaker 1>a business as directed or controlled by a foreign government

0:19:39.160 --> 0:19:42.640
<v Speaker 1>also is considered a foreign power, and any group engaged

0:19:42.680 --> 0:19:46.960
<v Speaker 1>in or preparing to engage in international terrorism. That's broadly

0:19:46.960 --> 0:19:50.080
<v Speaker 1>defined as activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous

0:19:50.080 --> 0:19:52.600
<v Speaker 1>to human life, that are a violation of US criminal

0:19:52.680 --> 0:19:56.560
<v Speaker 1>laws or would be a violation if committed in the US,

0:19:56.680 --> 0:19:59.720
<v Speaker 1>or that appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce

0:19:59.800 --> 0:20:03.080
<v Speaker 1>a civilian population, to influence the policy of government by

0:20:03.080 --> 0:20:06.280
<v Speaker 1>intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a

0:20:06.280 --> 0:20:10.879
<v Speaker 1>government by assassination or kidnapping, and occur totally outside the

0:20:10.960 --> 0:20:14.360
<v Speaker 1>United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of how

0:20:14.400 --> 0:20:19.200
<v Speaker 1>they are accomplished. UH So that's the definition of foreign

0:20:19.240 --> 0:20:22.560
<v Speaker 1>power as far as foreign agent is concerned because remember

0:20:22.600 --> 0:20:25.919
<v Speaker 1>this is really involving the communications between foreign powers and

0:20:25.960 --> 0:20:31.000
<v Speaker 1>foreign agents. Foreign agent is defined under FISA as anyone

0:20:31.040 --> 0:20:33.080
<v Speaker 1>that is not a US person who is an officer

0:20:33.240 --> 0:20:35.840
<v Speaker 1>or employee of a foreign power, anyone that is not

0:20:35.920 --> 0:20:38.760
<v Speaker 1>a U S person who engages in quote unquote clandestine

0:20:38.840 --> 0:20:42.760
<v Speaker 1>intelligence activities also known as spying in the United States

0:20:42.760 --> 0:20:46.800
<v Speaker 1>on behalf of a foreign power, or any US person

0:20:46.880 --> 0:20:50.240
<v Speaker 1>that does the same and maybe violating the law. That's

0:20:50.320 --> 0:20:54.359
<v Speaker 1>an important distinction their US person who is also not

0:20:54.440 --> 0:20:56.920
<v Speaker 1>only acting as a foreign agent but also violating the law.

0:20:57.359 --> 0:20:58.840
<v Speaker 1>So if you're not a U S person, you don't

0:20:58.840 --> 0:21:01.639
<v Speaker 1>have to be suspected of a crime. You just have

0:21:01.760 --> 0:21:04.600
<v Speaker 1>to be foreign That's that's all you have to be.

0:21:05.040 --> 0:21:06.439
<v Speaker 1>If you are a U S person, then you have

0:21:06.560 --> 0:21:09.520
<v Speaker 1>to h be suspected of a crime on top of

0:21:09.560 --> 0:21:12.320
<v Speaker 1>being a foreign agent. And anyone, whether a U S

0:21:12.359 --> 0:21:15.200
<v Speaker 1>person or not, who engages in or prepares for acts

0:21:15.280 --> 0:21:18.760
<v Speaker 1>of international terrorism or sabotage is also defined as an

0:21:18.760 --> 0:21:23.840
<v Speaker 1>agent of foreign power under FISA. So that's what is

0:21:23.960 --> 0:21:26.240
<v Speaker 1>really the concern here. That's the n s A says

0:21:26.280 --> 0:21:30.359
<v Speaker 1>that they are only interested in these communications between foreign

0:21:30.400 --> 0:21:33.560
<v Speaker 1>powers and foreign agents. Any other information that they gather

0:21:33.680 --> 0:21:37.200
<v Speaker 1>that happens to be about American citizens is completely coincidental,

0:21:37.280 --> 0:21:39.359
<v Speaker 1>has nothing to do with what they are interested in,

0:21:39.600 --> 0:21:42.800
<v Speaker 1>and you should just stop worrying. And so that is

0:21:42.840 --> 0:21:45.280
<v Speaker 1>the the body of the law as as we have

0:21:45.440 --> 0:21:49.520
<v Speaker 1>known it. UM. Unfortunately, there are a little bit of

0:21:49.680 --> 0:21:52.120
<v Speaker 1>extra bits here and there that only came to light

0:21:52.640 --> 0:21:55.200
<v Speaker 1>when when Snowden leaked some information. But we will talk

0:21:55.240 --> 0:21:58.000
<v Speaker 1>about that in the second half of the show. And

0:21:58.480 --> 0:22:01.359
<v Speaker 1>right now we should take a quick break to thank

0:22:01.359 --> 0:22:05.960
<v Speaker 1>our sponsors. Sounds good to me. Let's take that break, alright.

0:22:06.000 --> 0:22:07.760
<v Speaker 1>So were back. So when we left off, it was

0:22:07.880 --> 0:22:11.639
<v Speaker 1>just before we started learning about the additional information that

0:22:11.720 --> 0:22:15.400
<v Speaker 1>was leaked by Snowdon and UM, you had something about

0:22:15.800 --> 0:22:18.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, we mentioned in that last that last half

0:22:18.240 --> 0:22:24.200
<v Speaker 1>that you know, if any American citizen information is collected,

0:22:25.000 --> 0:22:29.159
<v Speaker 1>that's okay, yeah, well okay. So so part part of

0:22:29.160 --> 0:22:31.199
<v Speaker 1>what we found out thanks to Snowden is that on

0:22:31.320 --> 0:22:36.520
<v Speaker 1>July nine, UM guidelines were proved by the Secret fives

0:22:36.560 --> 0:22:40.440
<v Speaker 1>A Court and also Attorney General Eric Holder UM that

0:22:40.440 --> 0:22:43.119
<v Speaker 1>that although the n s A is required to UM

0:22:43.440 --> 0:22:47.960
<v Speaker 1>minimize the collection of data from U. S citizens, UM

0:22:48.000 --> 0:22:53.960
<v Speaker 1>any inadvertently acquired domestic communications can be kept under certain

0:22:54.000 --> 0:22:59.640
<v Speaker 1>circumstances with no warrant for up to five years. Yeah,

0:23:00.200 --> 0:23:03.639
<v Speaker 1>that's um that's a big question mark there, right, I

0:23:03.640 --> 0:23:07.600
<v Speaker 1>mean that definitely sounds like without a warrant. So already

0:23:08.440 --> 0:23:11.640
<v Speaker 1>that seems to violate the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.

0:23:11.720 --> 0:23:14.240
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure there are other arguments against that, but it's

0:23:14.240 --> 0:23:18.040
<v Speaker 1>it's under certain circumstances. WHI again unless that's unless we

0:23:18.119 --> 0:23:20.879
<v Speaker 1>get the full definition of what those circumstances are, then

0:23:20.920 --> 0:23:23.040
<v Speaker 1>it's hard to say. So so far, it seems to

0:23:23.119 --> 0:23:26.520
<v Speaker 1>be that that um, if the communications are encrypted and

0:23:26.800 --> 0:23:29.639
<v Speaker 1>or reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime that

0:23:29.720 --> 0:23:32.840
<v Speaker 1>has been, is being or is about to be committed. Um.

0:23:33.000 --> 0:23:36.400
<v Speaker 1>Or if the communications are reasonably believed to contain um

0:23:36.680 --> 0:23:41.000
<v Speaker 1>uh technical information about cybersecurity. See, and this is another

0:23:41.040 --> 0:23:45.480
<v Speaker 1>one of those things where the reasonable belief is the blaw. Yeah,

0:23:45.520 --> 0:23:48.119
<v Speaker 1>how do we define that? And again, a lot of

0:23:48.160 --> 0:23:53.720
<v Speaker 1>these these more or less vague words like reasonable um,

0:23:53.840 --> 0:23:55.680
<v Speaker 1>A lot of these things are things that only get

0:23:56.080 --> 0:23:59.680
<v Speaker 1>defined when we challenge stuff in court. In the United States,

0:24:00.040 --> 0:24:02.120
<v Speaker 1>That's how we end up getting focus on a lot

0:24:02.160 --> 0:24:04.480
<v Speaker 1>of our laws is that you know, the laws will

0:24:04.520 --> 0:24:07.439
<v Speaker 1>be written in such a way, sometimes on purpose and

0:24:07.520 --> 0:24:10.040
<v Speaker 1>sometimes not on purpose, but written in such a way

0:24:10.080 --> 0:24:13.000
<v Speaker 1>as to be a little vague. And then in court

0:24:13.040 --> 0:24:16.320
<v Speaker 1>cases that's when the judges have to decide, how how

0:24:16.359 --> 0:24:20.240
<v Speaker 1>does this law actually apply? What is the practical application

0:24:20.280 --> 0:24:22.440
<v Speaker 1>of it? And that might be the case with these

0:24:23.200 --> 0:24:26.080
<v Speaker 1>UM In the meanwhile leading leading up to this league

0:24:26.240 --> 0:24:34.959
<v Speaker 1>between s A hired employees UM mostly in UH comp science, engineering,

0:24:35.000 --> 0:24:38.320
<v Speaker 1>and intelligence analysis, which makes sense. I mean that they're

0:24:38.400 --> 0:24:44.639
<v Speaker 1>their focus is on intercepting and decrypting electronic communications communications

0:24:44.680 --> 0:24:47.360
<v Speaker 1>in general, but electronic in particular, and especially since it's

0:24:47.400 --> 0:24:49.920
<v Speaker 1>you know, yes, becoming more and more electronic, it makes

0:24:49.960 --> 0:24:51.760
<v Speaker 1>it makes sense. But it's also like that's that's a

0:24:51.760 --> 0:24:54.760
<v Speaker 1>lot of employees during a time of economic downturn. I

0:24:54.800 --> 0:24:58.960
<v Speaker 1>do foresee a time where, because of the dangers associated

0:24:59.040 --> 0:25:03.040
<v Speaker 1>now of elector ronic communication being intercepted and eventually decrypted,

0:25:03.400 --> 0:25:06.199
<v Speaker 1>that we will move to a more raven based communication

0:25:06.240 --> 0:25:10.879
<v Speaker 1>system all our game of Thrones winter is coming. I'm

0:25:10.920 --> 0:25:13.159
<v Speaker 1>glad that you're just working that and everywhere you can. UM.

0:25:13.200 --> 0:25:19.520
<v Speaker 1>In December of Obama and Congress extended the Amendments Act

0:25:19.560 --> 0:25:21.960
<v Speaker 1>for another five years. That was that was on the

0:25:22.040 --> 0:25:24.320
<v Speaker 1>up and up. That was, that was things what people

0:25:24.359 --> 0:25:27.000
<v Speaker 1>knew about. Yeah. Yeah, so this wasn't like some sort

0:25:27.000 --> 0:25:29.840
<v Speaker 1>of secret court meeting or whatever. But again, unless you

0:25:29.960 --> 0:25:32.880
<v Speaker 1>had actually been paying attention to what the FISA Amendments Act,

0:25:33.200 --> 0:25:36.240
<v Speaker 1>what what that entailed, then you might not you know,

0:25:36.480 --> 0:25:37.520
<v Speaker 1>you might not have been aware of it. And I

0:25:37.520 --> 0:25:39.720
<v Speaker 1>don't think I was aware of it, and I certainly wasn't.

0:25:39.960 --> 0:25:41.840
<v Speaker 1>But then I'm not a very politically aware of person

0:25:41.840 --> 0:25:47.000
<v Speaker 1>in general. Yeah. Um. In April, another one of those

0:25:47.000 --> 0:25:50.720
<v Speaker 1>things that we found out from snowdon Um, the FISA

0:25:50.800 --> 0:25:54.600
<v Speaker 1>Court ordered Verizon to provide a whole bunch of information

0:25:54.720 --> 0:25:58.360
<v Speaker 1>about a whole bunch of stuff, um, millions of calls

0:25:58.560 --> 0:26:02.760
<v Speaker 1>from millions of customers, both within and without the United States.

0:26:02.880 --> 0:26:05.920
<v Speaker 1>Right now, this was all meta data, which I'll talk

0:26:05.960 --> 0:26:09.000
<v Speaker 1>more about later, but meta data, justin in general, is

0:26:09.040 --> 0:26:13.359
<v Speaker 1>information about information. So in this case, the the order

0:26:13.480 --> 0:26:17.200
<v Speaker 1>for Verizon was to give all this information about calls,

0:26:17.280 --> 0:26:19.840
<v Speaker 1>like the duration of the call, the time it was made,

0:26:19.960 --> 0:26:22.359
<v Speaker 1>what kind of hardware was being used. The content of

0:26:22.400 --> 0:26:24.640
<v Speaker 1>the call was not in question, right, so you could

0:26:24.640 --> 0:26:28.440
<v Speaker 1>not This wasn't for a verizon to hand over records

0:26:28.520 --> 0:26:31.280
<v Speaker 1>of actual like what was actually being said in the

0:26:31.280 --> 0:26:35.679
<v Speaker 1>phone call. It was just everything else. However, that being said,

0:26:36.720 --> 0:26:39.520
<v Speaker 1>there are a lot of examples that people have shown

0:26:39.600 --> 0:26:42.720
<v Speaker 1>about how just getting the meta data gives you a

0:26:42.840 --> 0:26:45.920
<v Speaker 1>lot of information about what was going on just based

0:26:46.000 --> 0:26:49.200
<v Speaker 1>upon the time the location. Although I should also say

0:26:49.280 --> 0:26:54.200
<v Speaker 1>that geospatial information in general has been left out according

0:26:54.240 --> 0:26:55.640
<v Speaker 1>to what the n s A has said that they

0:26:55.640 --> 0:26:59.919
<v Speaker 1>did not collect collect GPS information or anything like that,

0:27:01.200 --> 0:27:04.720
<v Speaker 1>at least that's what they've said. But but just knowing

0:27:04.840 --> 0:27:08.040
<v Speaker 1>when someone called, how long the conversation was, who they

0:27:08.080 --> 0:27:10.800
<v Speaker 1>were calling, they can give you a lot of information

0:27:10.800 --> 0:27:14.040
<v Speaker 1>about people, oh sure, about about movement and write what's

0:27:14.040 --> 0:27:16.480
<v Speaker 1>going on? Um okay. And so so this next point

0:27:16.520 --> 0:27:18.760
<v Speaker 1>in the timeline is is where everything kind of dovetails,

0:27:18.800 --> 0:27:22.920
<v Speaker 1>because on June six, the Guardian and the Washington Post

0:27:23.000 --> 0:27:27.480
<v Speaker 1>published reports based on Snowdon's leaked slides. We didn't know

0:27:27.520 --> 0:27:29.919
<v Speaker 1>that it was Edward Snowe yet. Actually, um that was

0:27:29.960 --> 0:27:32.120
<v Speaker 1>not for another couple of days. But you know, yeah,

0:27:32.160 --> 0:27:34.119
<v Speaker 1>that's when we got that that forty one slide power

0:27:34.119 --> 0:27:38.520
<v Speaker 1>point presentation and um or or or we we didn't

0:27:38.520 --> 0:27:40.440
<v Speaker 1>see all of it at that point, but a bunch

0:27:40.480 --> 0:27:42.760
<v Speaker 1>of information about it. There was a bunch of misinformation

0:27:43.320 --> 0:27:47.560
<v Speaker 1>about it. Actually. According to those initial reports, um uh,

0:27:47.680 --> 0:27:50.360
<v Speaker 1>it said that PRISM allowed the government to directly access

0:27:50.440 --> 0:27:53.439
<v Speaker 1>the servers of places like Google and Microsoft and Apple,

0:27:53.920 --> 0:27:55.959
<v Speaker 1>um and and that has been revealed to be not

0:27:56.040 --> 0:27:59.639
<v Speaker 1>the case. Yeah, this was this was the company's Again,

0:28:00.280 --> 0:28:03.840
<v Speaker 1>the companies were allowed to at least deny certain things

0:28:03.920 --> 0:28:07.200
<v Speaker 1>if they are part of this program. Like we've said before,

0:28:07.520 --> 0:28:10.480
<v Speaker 1>they're under a gag order, which means they cannot acknowledge

0:28:10.480 --> 0:28:12.080
<v Speaker 1>it in any way. And in fact, several of the

0:28:12.080 --> 0:28:15.679
<v Speaker 1>companies have have petitioned the government to allow them to

0:28:16.280 --> 0:28:20.240
<v Speaker 1>talk more about what's going on, saying that more transparency

0:28:20.600 --> 0:28:24.119
<v Speaker 1>would mean more trust because they're they're in a terrible

0:28:24.160 --> 0:28:27.959
<v Speaker 1>position right if they are being legally bound to participate

0:28:28.000 --> 0:28:30.200
<v Speaker 1>in this program. And there's some question as to whether

0:28:30.280 --> 0:28:35.000
<v Speaker 1>or not the participation or the levels of participation meet

0:28:35.119 --> 0:28:37.560
<v Speaker 1>or exceed requirements, because there are some companies that have

0:28:37.560 --> 0:28:40.479
<v Speaker 1>been said they're not only participating, they seem to be

0:28:40.520 --> 0:28:45.040
<v Speaker 1>eagerly participated. But besides that, I mean, if they're bound

0:28:45.200 --> 0:28:48.080
<v Speaker 1>to participate, they have to buy law, but they also,

0:28:48.240 --> 0:28:51.120
<v Speaker 1>by law, can't talk about it. Then they're putting this

0:28:51.120 --> 0:28:56.480
<v Speaker 1>position where trust is starting to recede, and so right

0:28:56.520 --> 0:28:58.480
<v Speaker 1>the consumers are all thinking, well, I don't want to

0:28:58.560 --> 0:29:01.560
<v Speaker 1>use your product because you're part of this program according

0:29:01.600 --> 0:29:04.840
<v Speaker 1>to this forty one slide presentation. And you know, they're

0:29:04.880 --> 0:29:07.400
<v Speaker 1>big companies that were named in this. Microsoft was the

0:29:07.440 --> 0:29:10.560
<v Speaker 1>first one to officially join that program, I think something

0:29:10.960 --> 0:29:12.920
<v Speaker 1>along the lines of like two thousand seven according to

0:29:12.920 --> 0:29:17.240
<v Speaker 1>the presentation. But then you had Google, Apple, Facebook, YouTube,

0:29:17.280 --> 0:29:21.080
<v Speaker 1>I mean, big companies that handle millions of people's information

0:29:21.120 --> 0:29:24.360
<v Speaker 1>on a daily basis, and they were all named in

0:29:24.440 --> 0:29:28.480
<v Speaker 1>this presentation. So if they were compelled to be part

0:29:28.480 --> 0:29:31.560
<v Speaker 1>of this because it's it's by law, they have to,

0:29:32.680 --> 0:29:34.640
<v Speaker 1>but they can't talk about it puts them in a

0:29:34.720 --> 0:29:38.280
<v Speaker 1>terrible position. And if it actually ends up being that

0:29:38.600 --> 0:29:41.520
<v Speaker 1>their participation is not nearly as bad as what our

0:29:41.520 --> 0:29:44.840
<v Speaker 1>imaginations have created, they want to be able to address

0:29:44.880 --> 0:29:48.760
<v Speaker 1>that and say, just let us tell people that, yes,

0:29:48.800 --> 0:29:51.000
<v Speaker 1>we're part of this program, but this is exactly what

0:29:51.320 --> 0:29:54.040
<v Speaker 1>is going on and it's within these parameters and nothing

0:29:54.080 --> 0:29:56.840
<v Speaker 1>outside of this is happening. So you are you can

0:29:56.920 --> 0:29:59.200
<v Speaker 1>you can rest assured that your privacy is still safe.

0:29:59.560 --> 0:30:01.360
<v Speaker 1>That's the message they want to send out, but they

0:30:01.400 --> 0:30:04.080
<v Speaker 1>can't talk about it, right not yeah, yeah. All we've

0:30:04.080 --> 0:30:06.560
<v Speaker 1>got to go on is these leaked reports UM, which

0:30:06.720 --> 0:30:10.160
<v Speaker 1>which it now seems like upon closer observation, that UM

0:30:10.160 --> 0:30:13.440
<v Speaker 1>that actually the companies were setting up UM secure servers

0:30:13.520 --> 0:30:17.120
<v Speaker 1>or or drop boxes to facilitate transfers between themselves in

0:30:17.120 --> 0:30:19.880
<v Speaker 1>the n s A. Not that again they have admitted

0:30:19.920 --> 0:30:22.000
<v Speaker 1>to being part of it yet because they can't UM.

0:30:22.560 --> 0:30:25.440
<v Speaker 1>June seventh, The very next day, The Guardian reported that

0:30:25.480 --> 0:30:30.800
<v Speaker 1>the UKH, the the United Kingdoms UM Government Communications Headquarters

0:30:31.200 --> 0:30:33.040
<v Speaker 1>UM which which is which is their kind of an

0:30:33.120 --> 0:30:36.400
<v Speaker 1>essay equivalent, was also involved in prison and has been

0:30:36.440 --> 0:30:42.320
<v Speaker 1>able to view private Internet user data since UH. June

0:30:42.400 --> 0:30:45.000
<v Speaker 1>nine was when Snowdon came out and said that he

0:30:45.640 --> 0:30:49.520
<v Speaker 1>was the guy who leaked the stuff UM, upon which

0:30:49.640 --> 0:30:52.760
<v Speaker 1>lots lots of of bad news has been rained down

0:30:52.800 --> 0:30:55.680
<v Speaker 1>upon him from the government because clearly they were not happy.

0:30:56.480 --> 0:31:00.640
<v Speaker 1>On June eleventh, a a bill from I Partison I

0:31:00.640 --> 0:31:05.800
<v Speaker 1>believe Members of Congress was submitted to UM to declassify

0:31:06.000 --> 0:31:10.160
<v Speaker 1>secret court opinions UM that that drive prison surveillance This

0:31:10.240 --> 0:31:13.160
<v Speaker 1>is actually a revision of a bill from December twelve,

0:31:13.320 --> 0:31:15.640
<v Speaker 1>so this has been kicking around for a while. But

0:31:15.640 --> 0:31:18.080
<v Speaker 1>but people are I mean, people in Congress are listening

0:31:18.080 --> 0:31:19.920
<v Speaker 1>to the to to what we are saying that they're

0:31:19.920 --> 0:31:22.400
<v Speaker 1>listening to our concerns and they they want to do

0:31:22.480 --> 0:31:24.400
<v Speaker 1>something about it. And you should keep in mind that

0:31:24.520 --> 0:31:29.880
<v Speaker 1>the politicians involved, even the ones who who object to this,

0:31:30.360 --> 0:31:35.080
<v Speaker 1>we're also bound by the same restrictions that other people were.

0:31:35.120 --> 0:31:37.640
<v Speaker 1>They could not talk about it because it was secret,

0:31:37.680 --> 0:31:41.320
<v Speaker 1>it was classified. So you know, it's a frustrating situation

0:31:41.360 --> 0:31:43.960
<v Speaker 1>all around when you have this secret court. In fact,

0:31:43.960 --> 0:31:45.240
<v Speaker 1>there are a lot of people who have argued that

0:31:45.280 --> 0:31:48.720
<v Speaker 1>the whole concept of a secret court is a bad

0:31:48.800 --> 0:31:54.000
<v Speaker 1>idea because it breeds distrust. So even if everyone is

0:31:54.040 --> 0:31:57.280
<v Speaker 1>behaving perfectly on the up and up, everyone is following

0:31:57.320 --> 0:32:00.440
<v Speaker 1>all the rules and respecting as much of the you know,

0:32:00.480 --> 0:32:03.960
<v Speaker 1>as much as they can. Uh, because it's secret, it

0:32:04.440 --> 0:32:08.560
<v Speaker 1>just engenders this the sense of mistrust, and that alone

0:32:08.640 --> 0:32:11.960
<v Speaker 1>is enough to need us too. We need to address it. Uh.

0:32:12.000 --> 0:32:13.840
<v Speaker 1>And like you said, you know, we talked about the

0:32:13.880 --> 0:32:18.240
<v Speaker 1>FISA court and how many how many requests were denied?

0:32:18.800 --> 0:32:23.320
<v Speaker 1>Eleven out of thousands of requests about so if you

0:32:23.360 --> 0:32:29.560
<v Speaker 1>find out so so eleven or thirty four thousand requests

0:32:29.560 --> 0:32:33.400
<v Speaker 1>were denied, which makes makes you wonder what's going on?

0:32:33.560 --> 0:32:37.200
<v Speaker 1>Is is it just that the requests are all that

0:32:37.200 --> 0:32:39.880
<v Speaker 1>that water tight, they are just that amazing, or is

0:32:39.920 --> 0:32:42.640
<v Speaker 1>it that the standards are really low? What was it

0:32:42.680 --> 0:32:46.760
<v Speaker 1>about those eleven that they don't made them be denied? So? Uh,

0:32:46.800 --> 0:32:48.920
<v Speaker 1>and that's the That's the thing is that it brings

0:32:49.000 --> 0:32:50.960
<v Speaker 1>up these kind of conversations and no one can talk

0:32:51.000 --> 0:32:54.040
<v Speaker 1>about them because they're classified. So it is a really

0:32:54.080 --> 0:32:59.520
<v Speaker 1>sticky situation. UM. As of June, Snowdon under under attack

0:32:59.520 --> 0:33:01.880
<v Speaker 1>from the United States. UM. You know, people, I think

0:33:01.880 --> 0:33:06.080
<v Speaker 1>there were there were like warrants for treason out for

0:33:06.120 --> 0:33:08.520
<v Speaker 1>his arrest. There were. Treason is one of those tough things.

0:33:08.680 --> 0:33:11.000
<v Speaker 1>But there were some people who who were saying that

0:33:11.040 --> 0:33:13.680
<v Speaker 1>maybe this can't count as treason because it's a very

0:33:13.720 --> 0:33:17.240
<v Speaker 1>specific charge, but that he certainly broke US law that

0:33:17.320 --> 0:33:19.600
<v Speaker 1>was beyond question. At any rate. He fled Hong Kong

0:33:19.640 --> 0:33:21.920
<v Speaker 1>from Moscow, UM which is where he has been held

0:33:22.040 --> 0:33:25.200
<v Speaker 1>hold up since UM in in like the airport and

0:33:25.280 --> 0:33:28.320
<v Speaker 1>surrounding hotels, which is the airport is the the area

0:33:28.400 --> 0:33:32.360
<v Speaker 1>that he's in the international zone is technically not Russian soil.

0:33:33.040 --> 0:33:34.840
<v Speaker 1>It's kind of like when you go to an embassy

0:33:35.000 --> 0:33:37.040
<v Speaker 1>and you're in a foreign country, but you go to

0:33:37.080 --> 0:33:39.760
<v Speaker 1>the United States embassy, for example somewhere, and then you

0:33:39.800 --> 0:33:43.200
<v Speaker 1>are technically on US soil while you're on the embassy grounds,

0:33:43.760 --> 0:33:45.680
<v Speaker 1>but you leave U s simbassy grounds, you're back in

0:33:45.720 --> 0:33:48.720
<v Speaker 1>the foreign nation. Yeah, okay. So, so he's been hanging

0:33:48.760 --> 0:33:51.720
<v Speaker 1>out there and petitioning various countries for asylum, um, none

0:33:51.800 --> 0:33:55.400
<v Speaker 1>of which have really granted him asylum to his um satisfaction.

0:33:55.440 --> 0:33:58.560
<v Speaker 1>Ecuador was going to and then backed off. Some say

0:33:58.600 --> 0:34:02.200
<v Speaker 1>that the president of Ecuador was kind of just trying

0:34:02.240 --> 0:34:05.080
<v Speaker 1>to grandstand a little bit and and kind of tweak

0:34:05.160 --> 0:34:07.280
<v Speaker 1>the nose of the United States. Actually, that's a great,

0:34:07.640 --> 0:34:11.080
<v Speaker 1>kind of funny little story in a way. So I'm

0:34:11.120 --> 0:34:13.439
<v Speaker 1>paraphrasing here because again I didn't put this in my notes,

0:34:13.480 --> 0:34:15.120
<v Speaker 1>but this is kind of the story. So the president

0:34:15.160 --> 0:34:18.560
<v Speaker 1>of says that, you know, they're going to grant asylum

0:34:18.640 --> 0:34:23.040
<v Speaker 1>to Snowdon, and Snowdon had actually petitioned Ecuador for asylum.

0:34:23.080 --> 0:34:26.280
<v Speaker 1>And then there were people who were saying that if

0:34:26.320 --> 0:34:29.400
<v Speaker 1>they were to do this, that the United States would

0:34:29.480 --> 0:34:35.880
<v Speaker 1>revoke certain beneficial trade agreements with Ecuador. And so what

0:34:35.960 --> 0:34:40.400
<v Speaker 1>the President said was that he had he negated those agreements.

0:34:40.400 --> 0:34:42.120
<v Speaker 1>He said, all right, those agreements are gone. In fact,

0:34:42.160 --> 0:34:44.320
<v Speaker 1>only are those agreements are gone. I'm going to replace

0:34:44.360 --> 0:34:47.200
<v Speaker 1>them with twenty three million dollars that Ecuador is going

0:34:47.239 --> 0:34:49.759
<v Speaker 1>to give the United States so that the US can

0:34:49.840 --> 0:34:55.680
<v Speaker 1>research human rights issues. Yeah, which was you know, essentially yeah,

0:34:55.760 --> 0:34:59.480
<v Speaker 1>it was essentially international burn. But but since then he

0:34:59.520 --> 0:35:01.799
<v Speaker 1>has back to weigh and Ecuador has has kind of

0:35:02.320 --> 0:35:06.120
<v Speaker 1>revoked its its offer of asylum, and in the meantime,

0:35:06.160 --> 0:35:10.160
<v Speaker 1>Snowdon himself has had his international passport revoked, so he

0:35:10.239 --> 0:35:14.160
<v Speaker 1>cannot travel and he's not you know, so now he's

0:35:14.160 --> 0:35:17.120
<v Speaker 1>seeking asylum in Russia. But that's currently being held up

0:35:17.160 --> 0:35:21.040
<v Speaker 1>in in a lot of bureaucratic processes which anyone who

0:35:21.080 --> 0:35:25.120
<v Speaker 1>has studied Russian politics will not be surprised by. Um,

0:35:25.320 --> 0:35:29.080
<v Speaker 1>the Russians and the United States big fans of bureaucracy,

0:35:29.320 --> 0:35:32.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, I'm not I'm not saying Russia's alone in that.

0:35:32.239 --> 0:35:35.680
<v Speaker 1>The US certainly has more than its share, uh as

0:35:35.719 --> 0:35:37.880
<v Speaker 1>as do a lot of nations. And and that that

0:35:38.120 --> 0:35:41.120
<v Speaker 1>kind of sort of brings us up to up to today,

0:35:41.320 --> 0:35:44.720
<v Speaker 1>ish UM. You know, right now there are a whole

0:35:44.760 --> 0:35:47.759
<v Speaker 1>bunch of different people suing the US government UM on

0:35:47.760 --> 0:35:51.719
<v Speaker 1>on grounds of illegal and unconstitutional programs that tread upon

0:35:51.760 --> 0:35:54.320
<v Speaker 1>the Fourth Amendment rights of its people. Right. And again,

0:35:54.360 --> 0:35:56.440
<v Speaker 1>this all has to be decided in court. It's not

0:35:56.560 --> 0:35:59.440
<v Speaker 1>like there's just an automax switch or anything. This actually

0:35:59.440 --> 0:36:03.719
<v Speaker 1>has to go through a process before it's decided an

0:36:03.719 --> 0:36:07.440
<v Speaker 1>official capacity whether or not it is in fact unconstitutional

0:36:07.640 --> 0:36:10.960
<v Speaker 1>of course UM. As of July and an alliance of

0:36:11.239 --> 0:36:17.280
<v Speaker 1>thirty six companies, investors, charities, and trade organizations, including Google, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook,

0:36:17.560 --> 0:36:21.520
<v Speaker 1>wrote a letter to President Obama UM asking for permission

0:36:21.600 --> 0:36:24.719
<v Speaker 1>to take the number of government requests for information about

0:36:24.719 --> 0:36:27.680
<v Speaker 1>their users public right, to essentially say like, this is

0:36:27.719 --> 0:36:29.840
<v Speaker 1>why you don't need to worry, because the numbers that

0:36:29.840 --> 0:36:31.920
<v Speaker 1>are in your head are totally different from the numbers

0:36:31.920 --> 0:36:35.320
<v Speaker 1>that exist in reality, right, and might not really matter

0:36:35.400 --> 0:36:38.080
<v Speaker 1>as we get further into this podcast, but it's an

0:36:38.120 --> 0:36:40.879
<v Speaker 1>interesting thing to say, Well, you know, it's a lot

0:36:40.920 --> 0:36:45.160
<v Speaker 1>of these companies do report. UM already report government requests

0:36:45.200 --> 0:36:48.120
<v Speaker 1>for for ferncuation and they're there are companies like Twitter

0:36:48.600 --> 0:36:51.600
<v Speaker 1>that said we are not playing ball with this. I mean,

0:36:51.680 --> 0:36:54.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, there's a lot of people have praised Twitter

0:36:55.000 --> 0:36:57.719
<v Speaker 1>because they have a very firm stance on this, saying,

0:36:57.800 --> 0:37:00.520
<v Speaker 1>unless you follow the specific rules that were laid out,

0:37:01.160 --> 0:37:04.560
<v Speaker 1>uh and and to our satisfaction, we're not going to

0:37:04.640 --> 0:37:08.000
<v Speaker 1>just hand over data. So that's kind of interesting, you know. Again,

0:37:08.040 --> 0:37:12.280
<v Speaker 1>it all depends upon the individual organization. Also, late breaking

0:37:12.280 --> 0:37:14.400
<v Speaker 1>news as of the recording of this podcast, so in

0:37:14.520 --> 0:37:19.440
<v Speaker 1>full disclosure, we're recording this podcast July two, thirteen, UH

0:37:19.480 --> 0:37:22.360
<v Speaker 1>and today the New York Times reported that the U. S.

0:37:22.400 --> 0:37:26.239
<v Speaker 1>House of Representatives defeated legislation that would have blocked the

0:37:26.320 --> 0:37:28.759
<v Speaker 1>n s A from collecting phone records. We'll talk more

0:37:28.800 --> 0:37:31.239
<v Speaker 1>about the phone record program and a little bit. Uh.

0:37:31.239 --> 0:37:34.040
<v Speaker 1>That was defeated at a vote of two seventeen to

0:37:34.120 --> 0:37:36.799
<v Speaker 1>two hundred five, So it was incredibly close, and it

0:37:36.880 --> 0:37:41.080
<v Speaker 1>had weird coalitions on both sides that were bipartisan. So

0:37:41.160 --> 0:37:44.880
<v Speaker 1>you had, you know, libertarians, Democrats, and Republicans on one side,

0:37:44.920 --> 0:37:47.200
<v Speaker 1>and then essentially Democrats and Republands on the other side

0:37:47.200 --> 0:37:51.000
<v Speaker 1>because all the libertarians I think sided against sided for

0:37:51.040 --> 0:37:54.920
<v Speaker 1>the legislation, but it was eventually it was voted down. Um. Now,

0:37:55.440 --> 0:37:58.200
<v Speaker 1>there still could be debate within the Senate, so we

0:37:58.239 --> 0:38:00.840
<v Speaker 1>could still see movement on this in the United States

0:38:00.840 --> 0:38:05.279
<v Speaker 1>government in the that branch of uh of government, but

0:38:06.200 --> 0:38:09.720
<v Speaker 1>the House of Representatives have already kind of shot that down.

0:38:10.400 --> 0:38:14.040
<v Speaker 1>And also there have been several politicians who have said

0:38:14.080 --> 0:38:16.960
<v Speaker 1>that the sections and the Patriot Act that essentially allow

0:38:17.120 --> 0:38:20.000
<v Speaker 1>for this to happen, they come up for renewal again

0:38:20.000 --> 0:38:24.920
<v Speaker 1>in and that they feel that those sections will not

0:38:25.000 --> 0:38:30.520
<v Speaker 1>be renewed based upon the reaction that this this information

0:38:30.640 --> 0:38:34.440
<v Speaker 1>has created, and that it would be very politically difficult

0:38:34.880 --> 0:38:38.960
<v Speaker 1>to renew that now. They say that, but it's now

0:38:39.680 --> 0:38:42.200
<v Speaker 1>is a couple of years away. You never know what

0:38:42.239 --> 0:38:45.080
<v Speaker 1>can happen between now and then that could change people's minds.

0:38:45.080 --> 0:38:48.799
<v Speaker 1>But as of right now, they're saying that those those

0:38:48.800 --> 0:38:51.799
<v Speaker 1>sections that have actually allowed for this to kind of happen,

0:38:51.800 --> 0:38:54.680
<v Speaker 1>they have given the legal foundation for this, may not

0:38:54.719 --> 0:38:57.560
<v Speaker 1>be renewed in a couple of years. UM. So that

0:38:57.640 --> 0:39:00.200
<v Speaker 1>kind of brings us a little bit up to the

0:39:00.719 --> 0:39:04.280
<v Speaker 1>discussion of what these programs actually are. So let's start

0:39:04.320 --> 0:39:08.800
<v Speaker 1>going back a little bit again. There was a program

0:39:08.840 --> 0:39:12.600
<v Speaker 1>started under George W. Bush called Stellar Wind, and Stellar

0:39:12.640 --> 0:39:16.520
<v Speaker 1>Wind was really more of an umbrella term for surveillance programs,

0:39:16.520 --> 0:39:23.040
<v Speaker 1>specifically the surveillance programs main Way, Marina, Nucleon and PRISM. Uh.

0:39:23.120 --> 0:39:26.640
<v Speaker 1>Now these are paired up. Main Way and Nucleon are

0:39:26.719 --> 0:39:31.480
<v Speaker 1>both programs that involve telecommunications and phone records and uh

0:39:31.520 --> 0:39:34.440
<v Speaker 1>and phone content as it turns out, and Marina and

0:39:34.480 --> 0:39:39.560
<v Speaker 1>Prism our internet communications. No, no, no, technically Stellar Wind Um,

0:39:39.640 --> 0:39:42.040
<v Speaker 1>its cover was blown by William Binney a couple of

0:39:42.080 --> 0:39:46.200
<v Speaker 1>years back. And uh, it only continued until two seven

0:39:46.200 --> 0:39:50.280
<v Speaker 1>it was shut down, and then the actual programs underneath

0:39:50.320 --> 0:39:55.040
<v Speaker 1>it still kept going. So so while while the parent

0:39:55.680 --> 0:40:00.840
<v Speaker 1>program was dismantled, the actual activities continued U. So, for example,

0:40:01.040 --> 0:40:04.200
<v Speaker 1>the programs the main Way in Nucleon programs the phone

0:40:04.239 --> 0:40:08.839
<v Speaker 1>communication ones. Um, we're well, well, first of all, Main

0:40:08.880 --> 0:40:11.759
<v Speaker 1>Way was all about metadata. And again we've talked about

0:40:11.760 --> 0:40:15.040
<v Speaker 1>this metadata is that information about information, So all the

0:40:15.080 --> 0:40:18.760
<v Speaker 1>information about the phone call, apart from the actual content

0:40:18.960 --> 0:40:23.359
<v Speaker 1>of the call, that was the the the main focus there.

0:40:23.880 --> 0:40:26.400
<v Speaker 1>And it can, like we said, give a lot of

0:40:26.400 --> 0:40:29.200
<v Speaker 1>information about the people involved in any communication, even if

0:40:29.200 --> 0:40:32.800
<v Speaker 1>you don't have the content. Now, the justification for gathering

0:40:32.840 --> 0:40:35.400
<v Speaker 1>this is that the U S court systems have said

0:40:35.560 --> 0:40:40.640
<v Speaker 1>repeatedly the metadata falls outside the information that the average

0:40:40.719 --> 0:40:44.920
<v Speaker 1>US citizen can expect a reasonable have a reasonable expectation

0:40:44.960 --> 0:40:48.960
<v Speaker 1>of privacy about so reasonable expectation of privacy involves everything

0:40:49.000 --> 0:40:51.400
<v Speaker 1>like the actual communication that you would have with someone,

0:40:51.480 --> 0:40:54.239
<v Speaker 1>but the fact that you talked to someone that you

0:40:54.280 --> 0:40:57.560
<v Speaker 1>do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. According to

0:40:57.920 --> 0:41:01.320
<v Speaker 1>several different court cases, UM and the n s A

0:41:01.400 --> 0:41:04.080
<v Speaker 1>said it only gathered metadat in the course of an investigation.

0:41:04.560 --> 0:41:07.000
<v Speaker 1>But these rules are so vaguely defined. And there's that

0:41:07.080 --> 0:41:09.560
<v Speaker 1>three hop approach that we've talked about before, the three

0:41:09.560 --> 0:41:12.719
<v Speaker 1>hop approaches that actually maybe we haven't mentioned this yet.

0:41:12.760 --> 0:41:16.160
<v Speaker 1>The three hop approaches this idea that you can target

0:41:16.280 --> 0:41:20.600
<v Speaker 1>a person and then go one person out from your target,

0:41:21.120 --> 0:41:24.000
<v Speaker 1>then go another person out, and then go another person

0:41:24.080 --> 0:41:27.040
<v Speaker 1>out when you when you are actually investigating the target.

0:41:27.120 --> 0:41:30.000
<v Speaker 1>So if you have identified a target as a foreign agent,

0:41:30.680 --> 0:41:33.400
<v Speaker 1>you can then investigate everyone that foreign agent talked to

0:41:33.920 --> 0:41:35.680
<v Speaker 1>and then go move outward from there. So it's a

0:41:35.760 --> 0:41:40.399
<v Speaker 1>ripple effect. Now, let's assume just for a second that

0:41:41.040 --> 0:41:46.200
<v Speaker 1>every single person has forty unique contacts, So forty forty

0:41:46.239 --> 0:41:49.160
<v Speaker 1>contacts that are that are not shared with the other

0:41:49.239 --> 0:41:53.320
<v Speaker 1>people that they have contacted with. Uh. You know, we

0:41:53.600 --> 0:41:56.000
<v Speaker 1>have closer to like two hundred total, but a lot

0:41:56.040 --> 0:41:59.640
<v Speaker 1>of those are going to be duplicates, right, So if

0:41:59.800 --> 0:42:02.200
<v Speaker 1>I have forty unique contacts and each of them have

0:42:02.280 --> 0:42:06.000
<v Speaker 1>forty unique contacts, three hop analysis would end up looking

0:42:06.040 --> 0:42:11.000
<v Speaker 1>at two point five million people because as you look

0:42:11.040 --> 0:42:16.359
<v Speaker 1>at those forty contacts and they have forty contexts. So

0:42:17.239 --> 0:42:19.759
<v Speaker 1>that has raised people to say, well, how can you

0:42:19.800 --> 0:42:23.399
<v Speaker 1>suggest that you are having a targeted investigation if this

0:42:23.640 --> 0:42:25.600
<v Speaker 1>rule allows you to look at two and a half

0:42:25.680 --> 0:42:29.719
<v Speaker 1>million people, some of whom are undoubtedly American citizens in

0:42:29.840 --> 0:42:33.760
<v Speaker 1>some of these cases. And then I say, is um,

0:42:33.800 --> 0:42:36.000
<v Speaker 1>Actually they have their own reasons behind it. They say

0:42:36.040 --> 0:42:38.160
<v Speaker 1>that they're being very responsible with this, but it does

0:42:38.280 --> 0:42:42.280
<v Speaker 1>raise those questions. Now again, this is meant to target

0:42:42.360 --> 0:42:45.960
<v Speaker 1>those foreign agents with a certainty that they are in

0:42:46.040 --> 0:42:49.640
<v Speaker 1>fact non American citizens. Uh. And it looks like what

0:42:49.680 --> 0:42:52.840
<v Speaker 1>the NSA is doing is gathering all this meta data

0:42:52.880 --> 0:42:57.040
<v Speaker 1>and storing it. Now they're the meta data on both

0:42:57.040 --> 0:43:02.040
<v Speaker 1>of these programs on both Main Way Marina are Uh,

0:43:02.080 --> 0:43:04.160
<v Speaker 1>you know both the phone and the internet stuff. It's

0:43:04.200 --> 0:43:08.759
<v Speaker 1>all being stored and it's being collected from everyone. That's

0:43:08.800 --> 0:43:11.080
<v Speaker 1>what it looks like like. It's not just the four

0:43:11.160 --> 0:43:14.280
<v Speaker 1>and it's not like they're targeting foreign targets and saying,

0:43:14.560 --> 0:43:17.399
<v Speaker 1>let's collect all their informations, pick this one thread out

0:43:17.480 --> 0:43:19.960
<v Speaker 1>and collect the only that it's everything, and then they

0:43:19.960 --> 0:43:22.520
<v Speaker 1>pick the threads out of the everything. Yeah, what what

0:43:22.800 --> 0:43:24.799
<v Speaker 1>they have? The way, the way it's supposed to work,

0:43:24.840 --> 0:43:28.680
<v Speaker 1>according to what I've read, is that they collect absolutely everything,

0:43:28.719 --> 0:43:31.920
<v Speaker 1>all this meta data of both phone and internet communication,

0:43:32.680 --> 0:43:35.480
<v Speaker 1>and then when they've identified a foreign target, they then

0:43:35.520 --> 0:43:40.040
<v Speaker 1>provide do a search query on that target within all

0:43:40.120 --> 0:43:43.640
<v Speaker 1>the information they've collected. So, in other words, they're they're

0:43:43.680 --> 0:43:47.160
<v Speaker 1>doing searches on everything, but they don't they don't look

0:43:47.160 --> 0:43:50.239
<v Speaker 1>at everything. They just have it. Now, some people have

0:43:50.320 --> 0:43:53.200
<v Speaker 1>said just by having it, just by collecting all this

0:43:53.280 --> 0:43:56.560
<v Speaker 1>information about people, whether their American citizens or not, means

0:43:56.560 --> 0:44:01.279
<v Speaker 1>you're violating Americans and Fourth Amendment rights, that that is

0:44:01.400 --> 0:44:05.440
<v Speaker 1>unreasonable search and seizure. It's at least seizure, if not search.

0:44:05.480 --> 0:44:07.919
<v Speaker 1>And they're arguing, well, it's not search and seizure because

0:44:07.920 --> 0:44:11.120
<v Speaker 1>all we're doing is making sure we have access to it.

0:44:11.120 --> 0:44:14.000
<v Speaker 1>It's not seizure because it is it is free to

0:44:14.239 --> 0:44:17.160
<v Speaker 1>us to collect. So they're saying that, yes, we have

0:44:17.360 --> 0:44:20.760
<v Speaker 1>this information, but we're not doing anything with it until

0:44:20.840 --> 0:44:24.560
<v Speaker 1>we have the actual authorization and the probable cause to

0:44:24.680 --> 0:44:27.320
<v Speaker 1>go after. Just because we are technically diverting this stream

0:44:27.360 --> 0:44:29.560
<v Speaker 1>into a giant hard drive and hanging onto that hard

0:44:29.600 --> 0:44:32.000
<v Speaker 1>drive doesn't mean that we are quote unquote seizing anything

0:44:32.080 --> 0:44:35.439
<v Speaker 1>because we have not because we haven't looked at it. Yeah,

0:44:35.560 --> 0:44:37.600
<v Speaker 1>that's kind of the the wide boils down to. So

0:44:37.680 --> 0:44:39.960
<v Speaker 1>then you have to go with does that argument hold

0:44:39.960 --> 0:44:42.480
<v Speaker 1>water or not? Does that make sense? Uh? And some

0:44:42.480 --> 0:44:44.640
<v Speaker 1>people have said that that's the wrong way to go

0:44:44.719 --> 0:44:47.279
<v Speaker 1>about it. They should be getting the authorization and then

0:44:47.360 --> 0:44:50.880
<v Speaker 1>going after all that data that's related to that authorization,

0:44:51.200 --> 0:44:54.840
<v Speaker 1>but leave everything else alone. Uh, that might not be practical,

0:44:54.920 --> 0:44:56.800
<v Speaker 1>and in fact, that might very well technically that that

0:44:56.840 --> 0:45:00.480
<v Speaker 1>would be a ridiculous undertaking, honestly. And and it's not

0:45:00.719 --> 0:45:03.719
<v Speaker 1>like data is color coded as it's running through the

0:45:03.760 --> 0:45:06.279
<v Speaker 1>Internet tubes to to to let you know these things.

0:45:06.360 --> 0:45:10.040
<v Speaker 1>So most of these collection systems they have in place

0:45:10.200 --> 0:45:15.000
<v Speaker 1>are creating databases based on keywords like anything that's anything

0:45:15.000 --> 0:45:20.000
<v Speaker 1>that's automatically detecting a keyword, and this includes actual phone conversations.

0:45:20.280 --> 0:45:23.320
<v Speaker 1>When you get to Nucleon and PRISM, that no longer

0:45:23.400 --> 0:45:27.200
<v Speaker 1>is dealing just with metadata, that's actually dealing with content itself,

0:45:27.239 --> 0:45:31.359
<v Speaker 1>the actual stuff that's going on in these communications. So

0:45:31.520 --> 0:45:34.319
<v Speaker 1>you get these keyword databases that are created and then

0:45:34.320 --> 0:45:36.840
<v Speaker 1>you can search those uh. And again the n s

0:45:36.920 --> 0:45:39.759
<v Speaker 1>A says, yes, we have them, but we're not searching them,

0:45:40.120 --> 0:45:43.719
<v Speaker 1>you know, without reason. We only search them after we've

0:45:43.760 --> 0:45:48.480
<v Speaker 1>we've established this this uh probable cause, the authorization et

0:45:48.560 --> 0:45:53.239
<v Speaker 1>cetera under the secret court that you can't know about. Um.

0:45:53.280 --> 0:45:56.040
<v Speaker 1>And so that's that's kind of where we are now.

0:45:56.120 --> 0:45:59.160
<v Speaker 1>So Nucleon is the one with the phones. And again

0:45:59.400 --> 0:46:03.120
<v Speaker 1>they're actually able to sort out phone conversations based on

0:46:03.200 --> 0:46:06.799
<v Speaker 1>keywords that are detected within those conversations and then store them.

0:46:06.800 --> 0:46:10.160
<v Speaker 1>And they're they've built a data center in Utah that

0:46:10.320 --> 0:46:13.120
<v Speaker 1>is about a one and a half million square feet

0:46:13.120 --> 0:46:15.440
<v Speaker 1>in size, which for those of you who have been

0:46:15.480 --> 0:46:18.160
<v Speaker 1>to the Las Vegas Convention Center, that's about half the

0:46:18.200 --> 0:46:20.719
<v Speaker 1>size of the Las Vegas Convention Center. If you add

0:46:20.760 --> 0:46:25.320
<v Speaker 1>up all the convention center space. UM and that's that's huge.

0:46:25.480 --> 0:46:28.200
<v Speaker 1>It's just filled with computers that are storing information, and

0:46:28.239 --> 0:46:30.560
<v Speaker 1>of course we're generating more and more information every single day.

0:46:31.120 --> 0:46:34.760
<v Speaker 1>Um and Uh. And in some cases they have access

0:46:34.800 --> 0:46:38.000
<v Speaker 1>to special lockdown rooms like we've mentioned before, where they

0:46:38.040 --> 0:46:41.279
<v Speaker 1>don't necessarily have to ask a provider for anything. They

0:46:41.280 --> 0:46:43.000
<v Speaker 1>can just go into the lockdown room and then run

0:46:43.040 --> 0:46:46.360
<v Speaker 1>the query. Again, they have to have the authorization to

0:46:46.440 --> 0:46:51.560
<v Speaker 1>do this legally. Now that that includes both Nucleon and PRISM,

0:46:51.760 --> 0:46:56.160
<v Speaker 1>which cover those content. Uh, let's talk about a little bit,

0:46:56.239 --> 0:46:58.399
<v Speaker 1>just really briefly, kind of wrap this up and talk

0:46:58.440 --> 0:47:00.960
<v Speaker 1>about some of the responses we've seen. I've got two

0:47:01.000 --> 0:47:05.000
<v Speaker 1>specific ones I wanted to mention, uh, responses to this

0:47:05.080 --> 0:47:07.879
<v Speaker 1>information coming to light. Keeping in mind that a lot

0:47:07.880 --> 0:47:10.440
<v Speaker 1>of the politicians knew at least some of this already

0:47:10.440 --> 0:47:13.560
<v Speaker 1>because they were on the committees that formed this stuff,

0:47:14.040 --> 0:47:18.279
<v Speaker 1>but we're not able to really talk about it. Representative F.

0:47:18.520 --> 0:47:23.360
<v Speaker 1>James Simpson Brenner Jr. Who is a representative from Wisconsin.

0:47:23.400 --> 0:47:26.759
<v Speaker 1>He's a Republican. He's also one of the architects of

0:47:26.840 --> 0:47:31.279
<v Speaker 1>the Patriot Act, said that Congress intended the patriotch to

0:47:31.280 --> 0:47:35.960
<v Speaker 1>allow the intelligence communities to access targeted information for specific investigations.

0:47:36.000 --> 0:47:40.360
<v Speaker 1>And he says, how can every call that every American

0:47:40.440 --> 0:47:43.680
<v Speaker 1>makes or receives be relevant to a specific investigation? So

0:47:43.719 --> 0:47:46.520
<v Speaker 1>again he's asking that same question, how can you justify

0:47:46.560 --> 0:47:50.400
<v Speaker 1>collecting everything? Um And then I say says, well, we

0:47:50.440 --> 0:47:54.560
<v Speaker 1>don't consider the collecting part to be seizure, Like we don't.

0:47:55.920 --> 0:47:58.040
<v Speaker 1>It's on a server, but we're not doing anything with it,

0:47:58.040 --> 0:48:01.440
<v Speaker 1>we're not searching it. But there are other arguments that

0:48:01.480 --> 0:48:03.040
<v Speaker 1>are being made. They're saying this is kind of a

0:48:03.080 --> 0:48:07.480
<v Speaker 1>slippery slop technicality. Yeah, shut up right, Like like what

0:48:07.600 --> 0:48:10.160
<v Speaker 1>if you wanted to search it? You totally could write,

0:48:10.239 --> 0:48:12.799
<v Speaker 1>you know whatever. The legal the legal definition of shut

0:48:12.840 --> 0:48:14.719
<v Speaker 1>up is is what a lot of people are saying

0:48:14.800 --> 0:48:17.640
<v Speaker 1>right now. Yeah. So there and there are people who

0:48:17.640 --> 0:48:20.080
<v Speaker 1>are pointing out that, yes, if you have someone who

0:48:20.200 --> 0:48:23.359
<v Speaker 1>has that access, then they can take advantage of it.

0:48:23.440 --> 0:48:25.480
<v Speaker 1>Even if the n s A is doing everything on

0:48:25.520 --> 0:48:27.520
<v Speaker 1>the up and up, if there's just one person who

0:48:27.600 --> 0:48:31.680
<v Speaker 1>has that access, they could have you know. And uh,

0:48:31.800 --> 0:48:34.520
<v Speaker 1>and so there's like and if your response is well,

0:48:34.560 --> 0:48:37.920
<v Speaker 1>how could that happen? You point to Edward Snowdon and

0:48:37.960 --> 0:48:41.440
<v Speaker 1>you say it has happened. Snowden did it. Snowdon did

0:48:41.440 --> 0:48:44.000
<v Speaker 1>it in a way that alerted us to this, which

0:48:44.320 --> 0:48:47.160
<v Speaker 1>for a lot of people means that he's a whistleblower,

0:48:47.440 --> 0:48:50.000
<v Speaker 1>but that that's an example saying here's someone who did

0:48:50.040 --> 0:48:54.439
<v Speaker 1>an unauthorized access of that information. And Snowdon had even

0:48:54.480 --> 0:48:57.480
<v Speaker 1>said that it would be possible for him to listen

0:48:57.480 --> 0:49:00.480
<v Speaker 1>in on any phone call at all if he wanted to. UH,

0:49:00.520 --> 0:49:02.160
<v Speaker 1>and the n s A has said that it's not

0:49:02.280 --> 0:49:04.880
<v Speaker 1>entirely true. You have to get the approval process. But

0:49:05.239 --> 0:49:07.840
<v Speaker 1>there are others who say, well, what is that approval process?

0:49:07.880 --> 0:49:11.160
<v Speaker 1>How how extensive is it? Does it just require you

0:49:11.200 --> 0:49:13.000
<v Speaker 1>to go to someone and say, hey, can I listen

0:49:13.040 --> 0:49:15.160
<v Speaker 1>to this call? There's sure that you can do it?

0:49:15.280 --> 0:49:17.560
<v Speaker 1>Or is it really formal? And we don't really know,

0:49:17.719 --> 0:49:20.880
<v Speaker 1>We don't know. Yeah, UM, I I like your last

0:49:20.880 --> 0:49:22.879
<v Speaker 1>one to close this out with. I do have one

0:49:22.880 --> 0:49:26.680
<v Speaker 1>from Obama um UH. President Obama has has said about

0:49:26.680 --> 0:49:29.239
<v Speaker 1>the issue. UM I came in with a healthy skepticism

0:49:29.280 --> 0:49:32.680
<v Speaker 1>about these programs. My team evaluated them, We scrubbed them thoroughly.

0:49:32.920 --> 0:49:35.480
<v Speaker 1>We actually expanded some of the oversight and increased some

0:49:35.520 --> 0:49:39.480
<v Speaker 1>of the safeguards you can't have one percent security and

0:49:39.520 --> 0:49:44.479
<v Speaker 1>also then have one percent privacy and zero inconvenience. Yeah,

0:49:44.600 --> 0:49:46.600
<v Speaker 1>there are some Founding fathers who had something to say

0:49:46.600 --> 0:49:49.360
<v Speaker 1>about security and liberty, but I don't want to go

0:49:49.440 --> 0:49:53.719
<v Speaker 1>into that. So, but they're the last one. And yes,

0:49:53.760 --> 0:49:56.840
<v Speaker 1>that's that's so, that's was the president's approach. And again,

0:49:57.160 --> 0:49:59.000
<v Speaker 1>it may very well be that all of that is

0:49:59.040 --> 0:50:01.839
<v Speaker 1>completely sincere and honest, but we just don't know because

0:50:01.880 --> 0:50:06.480
<v Speaker 1>it's classified, right, and it kind of and I was

0:50:06.520 --> 0:50:09.680
<v Speaker 1>probably reading that more snarkily than than than the president

0:50:09.880 --> 0:50:12.240
<v Speaker 1>that it sticks in my crawl a little bit because

0:50:12.480 --> 0:50:16.200
<v Speaker 1>one of the things I specifically remember the Obama administration

0:50:16.360 --> 0:50:21.960
<v Speaker 1>championing when they when when they first came into political power,

0:50:22.080 --> 0:50:26.200
<v Speaker 1>was that they were going to really focus on transparency

0:50:26.560 --> 0:50:29.319
<v Speaker 1>in the government. Now, you can argue that when it

0:50:29.360 --> 0:50:34.680
<v Speaker 1>comes to intelligence transparency is it's counterproductive, it is dangerous,

0:50:35.120 --> 0:50:38.840
<v Speaker 1>But when you look at this information that's been revealed

0:50:38.880 --> 0:50:42.399
<v Speaker 1>and you see the reaction, you can understand why transparency

0:50:42.440 --> 0:50:44.560
<v Speaker 1>is also something that you have to at least consider,

0:50:44.719 --> 0:50:49.080
<v Speaker 1>at least talk about, here's here's the legal procedure that

0:50:49.120 --> 0:50:51.560
<v Speaker 1>we do, and here's how we do it. That doesn't

0:50:51.600 --> 0:50:55.640
<v Speaker 1>necessarily tell you anything about who's being targeted, although we've

0:50:55.640 --> 0:50:57.719
<v Speaker 1>got plenty of nations out there who are now up

0:50:57.719 --> 0:51:01.759
<v Speaker 1>in arms about this, and then we wanted to end this. Uh.

0:51:01.840 --> 0:51:06.439
<v Speaker 1>The former president Jimmy Carter said about Snowdon, he said,

0:51:06.800 --> 0:51:11.279
<v Speaker 1>he's obviously violated the laws of America for which he's responsible,

0:51:11.480 --> 0:51:14.400
<v Speaker 1>but I think the invasion of human rights and American

0:51:14.440 --> 0:51:17.600
<v Speaker 1>privacy has gone too far. I think that the secrecy

0:51:17.640 --> 0:51:20.560
<v Speaker 1>that has been surrounding this invasion of privacy has been excessive.

0:51:20.840 --> 0:51:22.719
<v Speaker 1>So I think that the bringing of it to the

0:51:22.719 --> 0:51:26.680
<v Speaker 1>public notice has probably been in the long term beneficial.

0:51:26.960 --> 0:51:29.160
<v Speaker 1>So in other words, he says, Snowdon is still responsible

0:51:29.160 --> 0:51:32.080
<v Speaker 1>for his actions and maybe he should be held accountable.

0:51:32.160 --> 0:51:35.000
<v Speaker 1>That's not what he's arguing here. What he's arguing is

0:51:35.040 --> 0:51:37.359
<v Speaker 1>that this is stuff that we kind of needed to know.

0:51:37.480 --> 0:51:39.359
<v Speaker 1>And keep in mind, this is the same president who

0:51:39.520 --> 0:51:43.800
<v Speaker 1>signed FAISA into law in place, so that's an interesting

0:51:43.840 --> 0:51:46.960
<v Speaker 1>thing to end on. Now. Again, we have our own

0:51:47.000 --> 0:51:49.439
<v Speaker 1>opinions about this, and obviously, I mean, you you can

0:51:49.480 --> 0:51:52.200
<v Speaker 1>tell what they are. It's not like we've been terribly

0:51:52.280 --> 0:51:55.120
<v Speaker 1>subtle or but that's not you know, we're not trying

0:51:55.160 --> 0:51:57.600
<v Speaker 1>to We've not been nearly as secretive as the n

0:51:57.719 --> 0:52:01.319
<v Speaker 1>s A and sorry, and and and again it may

0:52:01.400 --> 0:52:03.520
<v Speaker 1>turn out like I'm trying to keep as open in

0:52:03.600 --> 0:52:06.840
<v Speaker 1>mind about this as possible. But it's just that a

0:52:06.880 --> 0:52:09.279
<v Speaker 1>lot of warning flags have been raised because of this,

0:52:09.600 --> 0:52:13.799
<v Speaker 1>and national securities is certainly extraordinarily important all the time. YEA.

0:52:14.239 --> 0:52:16.879
<v Speaker 1>So it's not that it's not that we are going

0:52:16.920 --> 0:52:19.400
<v Speaker 1>to say that we know better than anybody else. Obviously

0:52:19.440 --> 0:52:22.080
<v Speaker 1>that's not the case. Mostly what we want is just

0:52:22.160 --> 0:52:25.560
<v Speaker 1>more information, because Uh, it is very easy to come

0:52:25.560 --> 0:52:27.759
<v Speaker 1>to the wrong conclusion when you don't have enough, and

0:52:27.840 --> 0:52:30.600
<v Speaker 1>I am fully aware of that. But it does raise

0:52:30.680 --> 0:52:32.560
<v Speaker 1>some concerns, and I'm glad that there are people who

0:52:32.600 --> 0:52:36.200
<v Speaker 1>are looking into it and and really examining this and

0:52:36.239 --> 0:52:38.840
<v Speaker 1>making sure that this that the n Essays approach is

0:52:38.880 --> 0:52:42.000
<v Speaker 1>in fact the best one to do, as opposed to

0:52:42.040 --> 0:52:45.360
<v Speaker 1>some alternative And uh. And so you know, whether you

0:52:45.440 --> 0:52:49.120
<v Speaker 1>think Snowdon is a hero or a villain, personally, I

0:52:49.200 --> 0:52:51.080
<v Speaker 1>kind of just I don't really think of him as either.

0:52:51.120 --> 0:52:53.080
<v Speaker 1>I think of him as a human being who acted

0:52:53.160 --> 0:52:57.040
<v Speaker 1>on his own principles which were not in alignment with

0:52:57.120 --> 0:53:02.240
<v Speaker 1>the principles of his contractual employe er. Um, that sometimes happens.

0:53:02.440 --> 0:53:05.160
<v Speaker 1>I mean, that's why we have uh that's why things

0:53:05.200 --> 0:53:07.600
<v Speaker 1>like weight leaks even exist because if there weren't people

0:53:07.640 --> 0:53:10.360
<v Speaker 1>like that, then there'd be no leaked information. I I

0:53:10.640 --> 0:53:16.120
<v Speaker 1>agree with with former President Carter. Yeah, I agree. So

0:53:16.480 --> 0:53:18.799
<v Speaker 1>we're wrapping this up, guys. If you have suggestions for

0:53:18.920 --> 0:53:22.319
<v Speaker 1>future topics, we do plan on eventually covering topics like

0:53:22.360 --> 0:53:26.399
<v Speaker 1>the actual technical approaches to things like wire tapping and

0:53:26.600 --> 0:53:30.600
<v Speaker 1>this prism approach. How might uh N s A gathered

0:53:30.640 --> 0:53:34.720
<v Speaker 1>data without even approaching a major company. There are some

0:53:34.880 --> 0:53:38.440
<v Speaker 1>kind of tricky things they might do. Um, but we'll

0:53:38.480 --> 0:53:41.000
<v Speaker 1>talk about that in another episode and we'll break it up.

0:53:41.040 --> 0:53:45.000
<v Speaker 1>We're gonna do something fun next time. So robot puppies.

0:53:45.640 --> 0:53:49.319
<v Speaker 1>Robot puppies. Yeah, more togogy. So we're wrapping this up.

0:53:49.320 --> 0:53:51.719
<v Speaker 1>If you have any suggestions for future episodes, please get

0:53:51.760 --> 0:53:56.000
<v Speaker 1>into contact with us. We can be contacted at email address,

0:53:56.280 --> 0:53:59.040
<v Speaker 1>tech stuff at Discovery dot com, or drop us a

0:53:59.080 --> 0:54:00.919
<v Speaker 1>line on Facebook or Twitter. You can find us their

0:54:01.080 --> 0:54:03.759
<v Speaker 1>tech stuff hs W and Lauren and I will talk

0:54:03.760 --> 0:54:13.080
<v Speaker 1>to you again. Really ru Rue for more on this

0:54:13.280 --> 0:54:15.759
<v Speaker 1>and thousands of other topics, does it, how stuff works,

0:54:15.800 --> 0:54:27.680
<v Speaker 1>dot com