1 00:00:04,240 --> 00:00:07,200 Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with text Stuff from how 2 00:00:07,280 --> 00:00:15,840 Speaker 1: stuff works dot com. Hey there, and welcome to text Stuff. 3 00:00:16,320 --> 00:00:20,680 Speaker 1: My name is redacted. No, I'm Jonathan Strickling. I learned 4 00:00:21,480 --> 00:00:23,079 Speaker 1: today we're gonna talk a little bit more about the 5 00:00:23,160 --> 00:00:27,240 Speaker 1: n s A and the data collection that it's been 6 00:00:27,840 --> 00:00:31,160 Speaker 1: participating in. And uh, and exactly what is that? How 7 00:00:31,160 --> 00:00:34,559 Speaker 1: does that apply to you, whether you're an American citizen 8 00:00:34,640 --> 00:00:38,800 Speaker 1: or someone living abroad. What exactly is going on? And 9 00:00:38,800 --> 00:00:41,160 Speaker 1: and specifically what all this prism how about is about? 10 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:47,160 Speaker 1: Should we be concerned? Spoiler? Yes, um concerned? At least 11 00:00:47,760 --> 00:00:49,680 Speaker 1: it's always good to educate yourself as much as you 12 00:00:49,720 --> 00:00:52,519 Speaker 1: possibly can when you're talking about classified information that is 13 00:00:52,560 --> 00:00:56,440 Speaker 1: being withheld from people. But let's let's start with talking 14 00:00:56,440 --> 00:00:59,720 Speaker 1: about a personality, someone who has been identified as being 15 00:00:59,760 --> 00:01:04,000 Speaker 1: the very center of this controversy, the man who leaked 16 00:01:04,080 --> 00:01:07,240 Speaker 1: the information to the press that let us know about 17 00:01:07,280 --> 00:01:11,200 Speaker 1: about prison period. Yes, Edward Snowdon. Edward Snowdon formerly a 18 00:01:11,240 --> 00:01:14,600 Speaker 1: technical contractor for the n s A. I am assuming 19 00:01:14,680 --> 00:01:18,400 Speaker 1: they have terminated that employment. Well he was, okay, so 20 00:01:18,400 --> 00:01:21,000 Speaker 1: so he is thirty years old right now as of 21 00:01:21,040 --> 00:01:23,839 Speaker 1: this podcast. He was twenty nine when he leaked this information, 22 00:01:23,920 --> 00:01:28,360 Speaker 1: which which seems terrifically young for being a whistleblower on 23 00:01:28,480 --> 00:01:32,560 Speaker 1: one of the largest intelligence gathering entities in the world. 24 00:01:32,800 --> 00:01:35,160 Speaker 1: Some might even go so far as to suggest that 25 00:01:35,200 --> 00:01:37,840 Speaker 1: he has he has effectively, at least as far as 26 00:01:37,840 --> 00:01:40,640 Speaker 1: the United States is concerned, thrown the rest of his 27 00:01:40,680 --> 00:01:43,959 Speaker 1: life away, which I mean, in other words, there were 28 00:01:44,000 --> 00:01:48,720 Speaker 1: some major consequences to his actions, and so that says 29 00:01:48,800 --> 00:01:51,600 Speaker 1: something right, well, you know, and there's there's a lot 30 00:01:51,640 --> 00:01:53,760 Speaker 1: of different points of view on on on him and 31 00:01:53,800 --> 00:01:56,640 Speaker 1: what he's done. Um, but uh, who is this guy? 32 00:01:56,720 --> 00:01:58,560 Speaker 1: I wanted to say a little bit about him since 33 00:01:58,560 --> 00:02:00,680 Speaker 1: all of this stuff that's been swirling around and um. So, 34 00:02:00,680 --> 00:02:03,040 Speaker 1: so he got his g D and listed the army. 35 00:02:03,080 --> 00:02:06,520 Speaker 1: In two thousand three, um was was discharged after breaking 36 00:02:06,640 --> 00:02:10,359 Speaker 1: his legs in a Special Forces training exercise. Yeah, so 37 00:02:10,760 --> 00:02:13,560 Speaker 1: trained for special Forces. UM then worked at the n 38 00:02:13,639 --> 00:02:15,720 Speaker 1: s A as a security guard and then I t 39 00:02:16,160 --> 00:02:20,799 Speaker 1: security in the c i A. Yeah, so he crossed 40 00:02:20,800 --> 00:02:23,840 Speaker 1: the cross departments. He's crossed streams. In two thousand seven, 41 00:02:23,840 --> 00:02:27,280 Speaker 1: the CIA sent him on assignment to Geneva, Switzerland, UM 42 00:02:27,440 --> 00:02:31,520 Speaker 1: and then later he signed with defense contractor UM Uh 43 00:02:31,840 --> 00:02:37,360 Speaker 1: booz Allen Hamilton's UM as a assist amin I see 44 00:02:37,560 --> 00:02:39,239 Speaker 1: right right right, So it turned out that he had 45 00:02:39,280 --> 00:02:42,680 Speaker 1: had an ability with computers. So it was because when 46 00:02:42,680 --> 00:02:44,400 Speaker 1: you think about like he started off like a security 47 00:02:44,400 --> 00:02:49,360 Speaker 1: guard and now he's overseeing actual information system right right, 48 00:02:49,400 --> 00:02:52,880 Speaker 1: like like six figure salary, Like pretty pretty important dude 49 00:02:53,040 --> 00:02:55,600 Speaker 1: for this contractor um uh he was. He was working 50 00:02:55,639 --> 00:02:58,720 Speaker 1: on an ns A contract out in Hawaii under under 51 00:02:58,720 --> 00:03:03,480 Speaker 1: bus Allen Hamilton's UM when he copied certain classified documents 52 00:03:03,520 --> 00:03:07,160 Speaker 1: and removed them entirely from his office before telling his bosses, hey, 53 00:03:07,200 --> 00:03:10,280 Speaker 1: I need some vacation. He specifically told them that he 54 00:03:10,320 --> 00:03:14,040 Speaker 1: needed to leave in order to undergo epilepsy treatments. Wow, 55 00:03:14,720 --> 00:03:18,200 Speaker 1: and then flew to Hong Kong and contacted the press 56 00:03:18,360 --> 00:03:20,200 Speaker 1: with all the stuff that we're gonna be talking about 57 00:03:20,200 --> 00:03:22,440 Speaker 1: in the right. And there's still quite a bit of 58 00:03:22,440 --> 00:03:25,840 Speaker 1: controversy about him. There are people who consider him to 59 00:03:25,880 --> 00:03:29,400 Speaker 1: be a whistleblower and uh and someone who has the 60 00:03:29,440 --> 00:03:31,680 Speaker 1: interests of the American public at heart. There are others 61 00:03:31,760 --> 00:03:33,480 Speaker 1: who go so far as to say that he's a 62 00:03:33,520 --> 00:03:37,520 Speaker 1: trader um. And there are people who say that maybe 63 00:03:37,520 --> 00:03:40,840 Speaker 1: traders the wrong word, but he certainly has put a 64 00:03:40,840 --> 00:03:43,400 Speaker 1: lot of people at risk by revealing information that was 65 00:03:43,400 --> 00:03:46,480 Speaker 1: supposed to be secret. So there's a there's a lot 66 00:03:46,560 --> 00:03:49,680 Speaker 1: of different views on this, and we're not gonna really try. 67 00:03:49,800 --> 00:03:52,480 Speaker 1: We're trying not to lay down on one side or 68 00:03:52,520 --> 00:03:56,600 Speaker 1: the other, but we we you'll probably get a little 69 00:03:56,640 --> 00:03:59,000 Speaker 1: hint of our own personal but least, but we don't 70 00:03:59,080 --> 00:04:02,119 Speaker 1: we don't mean to push them on anyone. Absolutely, Now, 71 00:04:02,200 --> 00:04:04,320 Speaker 1: this is this is you know, it's it's as as 72 00:04:04,360 --> 00:04:07,400 Speaker 1: people who talk. We do have opinions. But um, in fact, 73 00:04:07,400 --> 00:04:10,000 Speaker 1: we're not even sure the crazy thing is exactly what 74 00:04:10,080 --> 00:04:11,920 Speaker 1: he has leaked to the press. Um. We we know 75 00:04:12,000 --> 00:04:14,800 Speaker 1: that there was a forty one slide power point presentation 76 00:04:15,520 --> 00:04:19,320 Speaker 1: UM about a program called Prism, about a program called Prism. UM, 77 00:04:19,360 --> 00:04:23,640 Speaker 1: and there was basically what we know, And there was 78 00:04:23,720 --> 00:04:28,919 Speaker 1: some some information about phone program as well, because Prism 79 00:04:28,960 --> 00:04:33,600 Speaker 1: Prism really was mainly about uh, internet communication, but there's 80 00:04:33,640 --> 00:04:37,880 Speaker 1: also this element about phone records. Uh, there was about 81 00:04:37,960 --> 00:04:41,640 Speaker 1: the the n s A has access to information. I 82 00:04:41,680 --> 00:04:43,920 Speaker 1: think it's something like seven years worth of information of 83 00:04:44,040 --> 00:04:49,560 Speaker 1: Verizon customers phone information. Um, that's a lot of info. Oh, absolutely, Well, 84 00:04:49,560 --> 00:04:51,760 Speaker 1: you know, I'm just saying that we're not exactly sure 85 00:04:52,000 --> 00:04:55,320 Speaker 1: what documents exist and where this information has come from overall, 86 00:04:55,360 --> 00:04:58,320 Speaker 1: aside from this one power point presentation, which are the 87 00:04:58,520 --> 00:05:01,640 Speaker 1: host of works article about this pointed out that UM, 88 00:05:01,880 --> 00:05:05,400 Speaker 1: that this proves that, yes, international security is just as 89 00:05:05,400 --> 00:05:10,520 Speaker 1: boring as your job, superspies power point. I've also seen 90 00:05:10,560 --> 00:05:12,719 Speaker 1: quite a few people who took the power point presentation 91 00:05:12,720 --> 00:05:15,799 Speaker 1: and then uh distilled it down to something like twelve 92 00:05:15,880 --> 00:05:19,200 Speaker 1: slides and said that, you know, they obviously need some 93 00:05:19,200 --> 00:05:23,800 Speaker 1: some some classes on power point uh design. And in 94 00:05:23,880 --> 00:05:26,760 Speaker 1: my thought is like, well, I'm glad you're able to 95 00:05:26,760 --> 00:05:29,240 Speaker 1: to take a step back and critic makes a little 96 00:05:29,240 --> 00:05:32,240 Speaker 1: bit of a joke as opposed to freaking out, but 97 00:05:32,320 --> 00:05:35,880 Speaker 1: so okay to to catch us up on the climate 98 00:05:36,040 --> 00:05:40,120 Speaker 1: and overall politics of of what has led to all 99 00:05:40,160 --> 00:05:42,400 Speaker 1: of this mess two thousand one and to say came 100 00:05:42,480 --> 00:05:45,640 Speaker 1: under direct fire for failing to catch the plot of 101 00:05:45,680 --> 00:05:50,880 Speaker 1: the World Trade Center attack UM. And subsequently, the USA 102 00:05:50,920 --> 00:05:55,200 Speaker 1: Patriot Act was signed by George W. Bush with bipartisan 103 00:05:55,320 --> 00:05:58,960 Speaker 1: congressional support. This was the act that gave the government 104 00:05:59,200 --> 00:06:05,000 Speaker 1: much broader capabilities when it came to surveillance and detecting 105 00:06:05,200 --> 00:06:10,480 Speaker 1: potential terrorists acts um, and some would argue, in fact, 106 00:06:10,520 --> 00:06:15,440 Speaker 1: many have argued that it ended up violating at least 107 00:06:15,520 --> 00:06:19,800 Speaker 1: some freedoms of American citizens in the process. Sure, um 108 00:06:19,839 --> 00:06:22,320 Speaker 1: in two thousand two, and we didn't actually find out 109 00:06:22,360 --> 00:06:24,640 Speaker 1: about this. The the American public or the public at large, 110 00:06:24,640 --> 00:06:26,719 Speaker 1: did not find out about this until two thousand five. 111 00:06:27,360 --> 00:06:31,039 Speaker 1: H George W. Signed an executive order that specifically authorized 112 00:06:31,080 --> 00:06:33,920 Speaker 1: the n s A to UM to monitor international emails 113 00:06:33,920 --> 00:06:38,320 Speaker 1: and phone calls from people inside the US. Yeah, that 114 00:06:38,440 --> 00:06:42,159 Speaker 1: was skipping the part where the Special Court outlined in 115 00:06:42,360 --> 00:06:45,200 Speaker 1: VISA is supposed to review each case. Right, And we'll 116 00:06:45,200 --> 00:06:47,320 Speaker 1: talk more about VISA in a bit, But yeah, so 117 00:06:47,360 --> 00:06:52,479 Speaker 1: this is essentially giving even more broad powers to when 118 00:06:52,480 --> 00:06:54,600 Speaker 1: when when The New York Times leaked this information, and 119 00:06:55,000 --> 00:06:58,840 Speaker 1: the officials maintained that they were still requiring the n 120 00:06:58,920 --> 00:07:04,920 Speaker 1: s A to obtain arrants for entirely domestic communications, right, Um, 121 00:07:04,920 --> 00:07:06,960 Speaker 1: This is where it gets complicated because again we talked 122 00:07:06,960 --> 00:07:10,320 Speaker 1: about in our last podcast about how a foreign agent 123 00:07:10,920 --> 00:07:14,360 Speaker 1: can be someone who is not an American citizen, who's 124 00:07:14,400 --> 00:07:17,760 Speaker 1: not in the United States, and then a lot of 125 00:07:17,760 --> 00:07:20,320 Speaker 1: these protections that we're talking about don't apply because the 126 00:07:20,360 --> 00:07:23,520 Speaker 1: protections that we mostly talk about American citizens, that's what 127 00:07:23,600 --> 00:07:26,800 Speaker 1: the Constitution is covering. You know, we can't really cover 128 00:07:27,160 --> 00:07:30,360 Speaker 1: the freedoms of people in other nations because that's not 129 00:07:30,520 --> 00:07:35,080 Speaker 1: the role of one government to say for another. Uh. 130 00:07:35,120 --> 00:07:37,160 Speaker 1: You know that that kind of falls more on the 131 00:07:37,240 --> 00:07:39,520 Speaker 1: other governments as well as the United Nations and some 132 00:07:39,600 --> 00:07:44,160 Speaker 1: other organizations. So uh, but when it comes to American citizens, 133 00:07:44,200 --> 00:07:47,080 Speaker 1: they're supposed to be certain rules that we follow. This 134 00:07:47,280 --> 00:07:51,800 Speaker 1: was an example of expanding those rules. All right. So 135 00:07:52,440 --> 00:07:54,640 Speaker 1: two thousand five that's when The New York Times ends 136 00:07:54,720 --> 00:07:58,360 Speaker 1: up publishing this information. Right. Also in two thousand five, 137 00:07:58,640 --> 00:08:01,679 Speaker 1: that was when the n s ARE created US Cyber Command, 138 00:08:01,720 --> 00:08:05,760 Speaker 1: which is that network warfare unit designed to specifically protect 139 00:08:06,120 --> 00:08:10,840 Speaker 1: against terrorist data and network threats. Two thousand six an 140 00:08:10,840 --> 00:08:15,240 Speaker 1: interesting note, um we it was revealed by a former 141 00:08:15,320 --> 00:08:19,080 Speaker 1: a T and T technician that um that the company 142 00:08:19,120 --> 00:08:21,400 Speaker 1: had allowed the n s A to install a computer 143 00:08:21,480 --> 00:08:24,720 Speaker 1: at San Francisco Switching Center, which happens to be a 144 00:08:24,840 --> 00:08:29,800 Speaker 1: key hub for fiber optic cables. Yeah, this was where 145 00:08:29,920 --> 00:08:34,520 Speaker 1: we learned about the secret rooms. Right. So this is 146 00:08:34,559 --> 00:08:37,559 Speaker 1: where and we'll we'll probably mention this again later on. 147 00:08:37,640 --> 00:08:41,199 Speaker 1: But this is where the we we learned about the 148 00:08:41,280 --> 00:08:44,920 Speaker 1: n s A creating special rooms and various carriers, whether 149 00:08:44,960 --> 00:08:49,280 Speaker 1: their phone carriers or beyond telecommunications all the way through 150 00:08:49,640 --> 00:08:53,760 Speaker 1: Internet carriers, that they were putting in these special secret 151 00:08:53,840 --> 00:08:58,160 Speaker 1: rooms that would allow them access. Anyone who had the 152 00:08:58,240 --> 00:09:00,280 Speaker 1: n s A clearance could gain access to it, but 153 00:09:00,320 --> 00:09:02,839 Speaker 1: otherwise you could not go in there. So, in other words, 154 00:09:03,000 --> 00:09:04,800 Speaker 1: an A T and T employee, if that A T 155 00:09:04,880 --> 00:09:08,000 Speaker 1: n T employee did not have special access granted by 156 00:09:08,000 --> 00:09:09,800 Speaker 1: the n s A, they could not go into this 157 00:09:09,920 --> 00:09:11,480 Speaker 1: room even though it was within a T and T. 158 00:09:12,480 --> 00:09:14,439 Speaker 1: This was what was allowing the n s A to 159 00:09:15,240 --> 00:09:20,120 Speaker 1: two intercept information without having to actually go to A 160 00:09:20,200 --> 00:09:22,160 Speaker 1: T and T and say, hey, hey, I want this thing. 161 00:09:22,360 --> 00:09:24,320 Speaker 1: Yeah there, here's a list. Here's a list of the 162 00:09:24,360 --> 00:09:27,320 Speaker 1: stuff that we have been authorized to ask for. Give 163 00:09:27,360 --> 00:09:29,320 Speaker 1: it to us. Now, they don't have to go for 164 00:09:29,360 --> 00:09:31,600 Speaker 1: the authorization because they just have this special room. All 165 00:09:31,640 --> 00:09:33,040 Speaker 1: they have to do is show up and go into 166 00:09:33,040 --> 00:09:36,080 Speaker 1: the special room and then they run. And I'll talk 167 00:09:36,160 --> 00:09:38,760 Speaker 1: more about how they collect their data and the kind 168 00:09:38,800 --> 00:09:42,280 Speaker 1: of queries they are running, and also the sort of 169 00:09:43,160 --> 00:09:46,600 Speaker 1: mental gymnastics you need to do in order to understand 170 00:09:46,640 --> 00:09:50,160 Speaker 1: how they look at this as not being not falling 171 00:09:50,240 --> 00:09:53,920 Speaker 1: under that Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. 172 00:09:54,400 --> 00:09:56,520 Speaker 1: If you remember from our last podcast we taught that's 173 00:09:56,520 --> 00:09:59,000 Speaker 1: central to a lot of the arguments against what is 174 00:09:59,000 --> 00:10:01,120 Speaker 1: going on with the n s A is the idea 175 00:10:01,160 --> 00:10:03,839 Speaker 1: that under the Constitution, we have this Fourth Amendment right 176 00:10:04,120 --> 00:10:06,720 Speaker 1: that protects us from unreasonable search and seizure, and the 177 00:10:06,760 --> 00:10:10,480 Speaker 1: government is supposed to have at least uh, they're supposed 178 00:10:10,520 --> 00:10:15,559 Speaker 1: to be have authorization and evidence before they can go 179 00:10:15,840 --> 00:10:20,160 Speaker 1: and search you as an American citizen. Again, the supplies 180 00:10:20,200 --> 00:10:23,080 Speaker 1: to American citizens. And it gets complicated again when we 181 00:10:23,120 --> 00:10:26,800 Speaker 1: talk about foreign agents who could be American citizens that 182 00:10:27,600 --> 00:10:30,160 Speaker 1: or or an American citizen who's talking to a foreign agent. 183 00:10:30,360 --> 00:10:35,120 Speaker 1: Right that also American communication lines. Yeah really, Oh, it's 184 00:10:35,120 --> 00:10:37,160 Speaker 1: so sticky, um and and and and again. All of 185 00:10:37,200 --> 00:10:39,240 Speaker 1: this is stuff that we already knew about. None of 186 00:10:39,280 --> 00:10:43,120 Speaker 1: this is new. None of this was leaked by every Yeah, 187 00:10:43,120 --> 00:10:46,080 Speaker 1: this was stuff that had been revealed over the years 188 00:10:46,120 --> 00:10:49,120 Speaker 1: through various means. Sometimes there were things that were just 189 00:10:49,240 --> 00:10:52,440 Speaker 1: met part of law. So if you just read the law, 190 00:10:52,480 --> 00:10:54,880 Speaker 1: you would understand it. Some of this was stuff that 191 00:10:55,320 --> 00:10:58,800 Speaker 1: wasn't laid out in the law but was later uncovered 192 00:10:58,800 --> 00:11:01,280 Speaker 1: by various news papers, things of the New York Times, 193 00:11:01,280 --> 00:11:04,400 Speaker 1: Washington Post, etcetera. Yeah. Um, the next big one was 194 00:11:04,440 --> 00:11:07,439 Speaker 1: in two thousand seven. That was the Protect America Act, 195 00:11:07,920 --> 00:11:11,360 Speaker 1: signed into law by George W. Bush. Um. This this 196 00:11:11,520 --> 00:11:16,040 Speaker 1: was this basically allowed um the Attorney General and the 197 00:11:16,080 --> 00:11:19,079 Speaker 1: Director of National Intelligence who we we We talked about 198 00:11:19,120 --> 00:11:23,720 Speaker 1: that role in the first podcast. UM two explain in 199 00:11:23,760 --> 00:11:28,080 Speaker 1: a classified document how the US would be collecting intelligence 200 00:11:28,080 --> 00:11:31,520 Speaker 1: on foreigners overseas over the course of the next year. Right. 201 00:11:31,559 --> 00:11:34,640 Speaker 1: And it it's also known as Title seven. So that's 202 00:11:34,679 --> 00:11:36,920 Speaker 1: the other name for this. If you've ever heard Title seven, 203 00:11:36,960 --> 00:11:40,200 Speaker 1: that's referring to the Protect America Act of two thousand seven, Right, Um. 204 00:11:40,360 --> 00:11:42,560 Speaker 1: And the important part about this is that, UM, it 205 00:11:42,640 --> 00:11:46,640 Speaker 1: does not require them to name specific targets or places. 206 00:11:47,160 --> 00:11:49,000 Speaker 1: They don't you don't even Yeah, you don't have to 207 00:11:49,000 --> 00:11:50,960 Speaker 1: do that, which means you don't need a warrant. Obviously, 208 00:11:50,960 --> 00:11:52,800 Speaker 1: if you if you don't have to name the specific 209 00:11:52,840 --> 00:11:55,679 Speaker 1: targets or places, then clearly the warrant is not right. 210 00:11:56,520 --> 00:11:58,320 Speaker 1: How would you get a warrant if you just said 211 00:11:58,400 --> 00:12:00,920 Speaker 1: someone somewhere is doing something. Let me look in not 212 00:12:01,120 --> 00:12:05,040 Speaker 1: that that's so. So essentially this is the warrantless wire 213 00:12:05,080 --> 00:12:08,360 Speaker 1: tapping portion of law. If you've ever heard about that, 214 00:12:08,400 --> 00:12:11,880 Speaker 1: about warrantless wire taps, that's where this comes from. And 215 00:12:11,960 --> 00:12:14,960 Speaker 1: it was supposed to just focus on, like you said, 216 00:12:15,040 --> 00:12:18,680 Speaker 1: foreign intelligence, right, it's uh, and only if the targets 217 00:12:18,679 --> 00:12:23,360 Speaker 1: were reasonably believed to be outside the US. Now what 218 00:12:23,520 --> 00:12:27,640 Speaker 1: counts for reasonable believability? I don't know, because they're not 219 00:12:27,720 --> 00:12:30,400 Speaker 1: telling me so. I mean, a lot of these terms 220 00:12:30,480 --> 00:12:33,439 Speaker 1: are vaguely defined, and many of them are vaguely defined 221 00:12:33,640 --> 00:12:36,880 Speaker 1: for a reason. It's to give as much flexibility as possible. 222 00:12:37,720 --> 00:12:41,200 Speaker 1: If you're being less charitable, it's to to to be 223 00:12:41,360 --> 00:12:45,040 Speaker 1: as draconian as possible. I wouldn't go that far. I'm 224 00:12:45,240 --> 00:12:48,800 Speaker 1: I'm thinking of the sense that I want the flexibility. Uh. 225 00:12:48,880 --> 00:12:51,880 Speaker 1: And if there ever were a point where we defined it, 226 00:12:51,880 --> 00:12:54,040 Speaker 1: it would likely be in a court case, like you 227 00:12:54,040 --> 00:12:56,200 Speaker 1: would bring something to court and the court would decide 228 00:12:56,200 --> 00:12:59,880 Speaker 1: whether or not it met some criteria for reasonable belief 229 00:12:59,880 --> 00:13:03,560 Speaker 1: of it. But that also will get into a little 230 00:13:03,559 --> 00:13:05,720 Speaker 1: bit more of a discussion. When we talk about the 231 00:13:05,840 --> 00:13:08,960 Speaker 1: n s A and uh, and and what their threshold 232 00:13:09,080 --> 00:13:12,520 Speaker 1: is for believing someone to not be an American citizen 233 00:13:12,600 --> 00:13:15,679 Speaker 1: before they start collecting all the data on them. So, anyway, 234 00:13:15,760 --> 00:13:19,360 Speaker 1: two thousand seven was the Protect America Act. What what 235 00:13:19,360 --> 00:13:22,880 Speaker 1: happens two thousand eight? Well? Okay, um, So the Protect 236 00:13:22,920 --> 00:13:26,920 Speaker 1: America Act technically expired early in two thousand eight, um, 237 00:13:27,160 --> 00:13:30,640 Speaker 1: and was subsumed by if I didn't just make that 238 00:13:30,679 --> 00:13:34,440 Speaker 1: word up, by the by the two PHISA amendments, Right, 239 00:13:34,480 --> 00:13:38,560 Speaker 1: that's the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which was originally enacted 240 00:13:38,600 --> 00:13:41,520 Speaker 1: into law in nineteen seventy eight. Now, these amendments changed 241 00:13:41,640 --> 00:13:44,960 Speaker 1: that act, right, I mean that they obviously they amended it. Now, 242 00:13:45,080 --> 00:13:48,240 Speaker 1: the original FISA Act was there to try and put 243 00:13:48,240 --> 00:13:52,960 Speaker 1: down specific rules when it comes to foreign surveillance, and 244 00:13:53,000 --> 00:13:56,320 Speaker 1: it's set down a lot of different restrictions that the 245 00:13:56,320 --> 00:13:59,680 Speaker 1: government had to obey in order to do this in 246 00:13:59,679 --> 00:14:02,760 Speaker 1: a way that was seen as responsible and accountable. The 247 00:14:02,800 --> 00:14:06,320 Speaker 1: amendments started to loosen some of those restrictions to give 248 00:14:06,480 --> 00:14:11,200 Speaker 1: the intelligence communities more freedom to pursue surveillance in an 249 00:14:11,240 --> 00:14:15,760 Speaker 1: effort to counteract any sort of uh, any sort of 250 00:14:15,920 --> 00:14:21,080 Speaker 1: anything that would endanger national security. Right. Specifically, this included, 251 00:14:21,280 --> 00:14:23,520 Speaker 1: uh one that you might and an amendment that you 252 00:14:23,600 --> 00:14:25,600 Speaker 1: might have heard of um in the news, which is 253 00:14:25,640 --> 00:14:30,440 Speaker 1: five A section seven oh two, which basically uh okay. 254 00:14:30,440 --> 00:14:33,040 Speaker 1: So so according to the Director of National Intelligence, it 255 00:14:33,120 --> 00:14:37,520 Speaker 1: facilitates the targeted acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning foreign 256 00:14:37,600 --> 00:14:42,400 Speaker 1: targets located outside the United States under court oversight. Sounds pretty, 257 00:14:42,600 --> 00:14:46,080 Speaker 1: sounds pretty on the up and up court oversight. It's 258 00:14:46,240 --> 00:14:49,920 Speaker 1: only targeting foreign targets, only foreign targets that are outside 259 00:14:49,920 --> 00:14:52,680 Speaker 1: the United States as and sound like it's too too 260 00:14:52,680 --> 00:14:56,480 Speaker 1: bad as far as encroaching upon American citizens rights, well, 261 00:14:56,520 --> 00:15:01,080 Speaker 1: the problem is that according to the washing To Post anyway, 262 00:15:01,680 --> 00:15:05,120 Speaker 1: according to two documents that they have since uncovered, um, 263 00:15:05,360 --> 00:15:09,240 Speaker 1: the their analysts only have to have a certainty rates 264 00:15:09,520 --> 00:15:13,040 Speaker 1: what someone is foreign, that someone is not of an 265 00:15:13,240 --> 00:15:16,600 Speaker 1: American citizen right or not in America even Yeah, there's 266 00:15:16,640 --> 00:15:19,680 Speaker 1: a fifty one certainty that they have to meet. So, 267 00:15:19,720 --> 00:15:23,200 Speaker 1: in other words, coin flip plus one and if you watch, 268 00:15:23,280 --> 00:15:25,520 Speaker 1: don't be dumb, it might just be a coin flip 269 00:15:25,560 --> 00:15:29,600 Speaker 1: depending upon the coin, you know, the one I'm talking about. Yeah, Like, 270 00:15:29,680 --> 00:15:32,240 Speaker 1: because the way certain coins are made, they do actually 271 00:15:32,240 --> 00:15:34,560 Speaker 1: flip on one side. A little more than the other. 272 00:15:36,040 --> 00:15:38,360 Speaker 1: This is a that's that's all they have to do. 273 00:15:38,400 --> 00:15:40,120 Speaker 1: They have to feel a little bit better than a 274 00:15:40,120 --> 00:15:43,720 Speaker 1: coin flip situation that a person is in fact of 275 00:15:44,480 --> 00:15:48,960 Speaker 1: foreign nationality not an American citizen for them to move forward, 276 00:15:49,320 --> 00:15:53,880 Speaker 1: which seems pretty low to me. Also, again, according to 277 00:15:53,880 --> 00:15:56,960 Speaker 1: the Washington Post, they have training materials that advise new 278 00:15:57,000 --> 00:16:00,400 Speaker 1: analysts that quote, it's nothing to worry about out end 279 00:16:00,480 --> 00:16:05,880 Speaker 1: quote if they accidentally collect us content, right, don't worry. 280 00:16:06,240 --> 00:16:09,160 Speaker 1: We we know what we're doing. We won't do anything here. 281 00:16:09,720 --> 00:16:12,520 Speaker 1: We promise we won't look at it. There's gonna be 282 00:16:12,640 --> 00:16:14,880 Speaker 1: editorializing at the end of this episode, by the way, folks. 283 00:16:15,000 --> 00:16:17,560 Speaker 1: Uh And and I'm just warning you now because I 284 00:16:17,600 --> 00:16:21,040 Speaker 1: do have something to say about just just the dangers 285 00:16:21,240 --> 00:16:25,600 Speaker 1: of pursuing this kind of line of thought without without 286 00:16:25,680 --> 00:16:28,680 Speaker 1: questioning it. I'm not saying that everything that's been done 287 00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:31,160 Speaker 1: is bad, but I am saying that you've got to 288 00:16:31,280 --> 00:16:36,160 Speaker 1: question things a collective. Some may or may not so anyway. Alright, 289 00:16:36,200 --> 00:16:38,400 Speaker 1: So so let's pick up with FISA here now that 290 00:16:38,480 --> 00:16:41,720 Speaker 1: this is still stuff that we knew about before Snowdon's 291 00:16:42,080 --> 00:16:47,720 Speaker 1: information lead. So FISA created Uh there's the FISA Court. Now, 292 00:16:47,720 --> 00:16:51,080 Speaker 1: the FISA Court oversees these requests that are are sent 293 00:16:51,160 --> 00:16:56,280 Speaker 1: in to U to pursue surveillance over foreign targets. Keeping 294 00:16:56,320 --> 00:16:58,360 Speaker 1: in mind this is still not for American citizens, it's 295 00:16:58,400 --> 00:17:01,880 Speaker 1: for foreign targets. The is a court is a secret court. 296 00:17:02,680 --> 00:17:04,560 Speaker 1: If you listen to our last podcast, you heard us 297 00:17:04,560 --> 00:17:07,120 Speaker 1: talk about it a little bit. It's hearings are in secret, 298 00:17:07,200 --> 00:17:10,360 Speaker 1: it's findings are in secret. There are eleven court members. 299 00:17:10,359 --> 00:17:14,480 Speaker 1: Those eleven court members are appointed by the Supreme Court 300 00:17:14,600 --> 00:17:18,480 Speaker 1: Chief Justice, and there is no um, there's no process 301 00:17:18,520 --> 00:17:22,480 Speaker 1: there to approve of those appointments. That's the Supreme Court 302 00:17:23,160 --> 00:17:26,520 Speaker 1: Chief Justice. Just as finals say, which some have argued 303 00:17:26,880 --> 00:17:30,200 Speaker 1: means that it creates a court that doesn't have diversity 304 00:17:30,240 --> 00:17:32,760 Speaker 1: in it because you only have one person and that 305 00:17:32,800 --> 00:17:36,119 Speaker 1: person may end up uh completely filling that court with 306 00:17:36,200 --> 00:17:39,320 Speaker 1: people that that that follow that same person's philosophy, the 307 00:17:39,400 --> 00:17:43,840 Speaker 1: Supreme Court Chief Justice's philosophy. Uh So there's that argument 308 00:17:43,840 --> 00:17:48,400 Speaker 1: as well. Um. Also, whenever they do serve out any 309 00:17:48,480 --> 00:17:50,679 Speaker 1: kind of warrant or order, if you've listened to our 310 00:17:50,720 --> 00:17:53,840 Speaker 1: last episode, you know there's a gag order involved with that, 311 00:17:53,920 --> 00:17:57,280 Speaker 1: which means that the recipient cannot acknowledge the fact that 312 00:17:57,320 --> 00:17:59,440 Speaker 1: they received this. They can't talk about it, they can't 313 00:17:59,440 --> 00:18:04,040 Speaker 1: reveal it, which may explain why some of the companies 314 00:18:04,040 --> 00:18:06,840 Speaker 1: that were revealed within that presentation that Lauren alluded to 315 00:18:06,840 --> 00:18:09,440 Speaker 1: at the top of the show, when they were approached 316 00:18:09,480 --> 00:18:11,720 Speaker 1: about this, they said, we don't know, we don't know 317 00:18:11,760 --> 00:18:15,200 Speaker 1: anything about this. Well, there are to two possibilities. One 318 00:18:15,280 --> 00:18:17,720 Speaker 1: is that they actually don't know about it, and that 319 00:18:17,840 --> 00:18:20,520 Speaker 1: the way that the n s A is gathering information 320 00:18:20,880 --> 00:18:26,720 Speaker 1: actually circumvents their internal workings. That's either they were they 321 00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:29,119 Speaker 1: were completely unaware of it, as they said, or they 322 00:18:29,119 --> 00:18:31,479 Speaker 1: are under a gag order and cannot say yeah. So 323 00:18:31,520 --> 00:18:34,560 Speaker 1: either way, we we can't know for sure unless someone 324 00:18:34,800 --> 00:18:37,680 Speaker 1: from those companies comes out and leaks that information. But 325 00:18:38,080 --> 00:18:44,480 Speaker 1: either way they disowned any knowledge of this. UH. Going 326 00:18:44,520 --> 00:18:47,000 Speaker 1: on to the what the what fights it can do? 327 00:18:47,200 --> 00:18:51,600 Speaker 1: They define foreign powers as any foreign government or component 328 00:18:51,800 --> 00:18:55,120 Speaker 1: of a foreign government, whether or not officially recognized by 329 00:18:55,160 --> 00:18:58,520 Speaker 1: the United States. In other words, there could be governments 330 00:18:58,560 --> 00:19:02,840 Speaker 1: out there that government is claiming that they oversee a 331 00:19:02,840 --> 00:19:06,280 Speaker 1: sovereign nation, but the United States has not officially recognized 332 00:19:06,280 --> 00:19:09,160 Speaker 1: that as a sovereign nation under FISA, that doesn't matter. 333 00:19:09,160 --> 00:19:12,320 Speaker 1: They're still classified as a foreign government. Uh. They also 334 00:19:12,400 --> 00:19:15,320 Speaker 1: defined as any faction of a foreign nation or nations, 335 00:19:15,440 --> 00:19:20,040 Speaker 1: or any foreign based political organization that isn't substantially composed 336 00:19:20,320 --> 00:19:25,120 Speaker 1: of United States persons. Uh. Faction and substantially not defined. 337 00:19:25,560 --> 00:19:31,399 Speaker 1: So don't really know what would meet that criteria. Maybe 338 00:19:31,400 --> 00:19:36,440 Speaker 1: it's don't know. Any entity, like a political organization or 339 00:19:36,480 --> 00:19:39,080 Speaker 1: a business as directed or controlled by a foreign government 340 00:19:39,160 --> 00:19:42,640 Speaker 1: also is considered a foreign power, and any group engaged 341 00:19:42,680 --> 00:19:46,960 Speaker 1: in or preparing to engage in international terrorism. That's broadly 342 00:19:46,960 --> 00:19:50,080 Speaker 1: defined as activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous 343 00:19:50,080 --> 00:19:52,600 Speaker 1: to human life, that are a violation of US criminal 344 00:19:52,680 --> 00:19:56,560 Speaker 1: laws or would be a violation if committed in the US, 345 00:19:56,680 --> 00:19:59,720 Speaker 1: or that appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce 346 00:19:59,800 --> 00:20:03,080 Speaker 1: a civilian population, to influence the policy of government by 347 00:20:03,080 --> 00:20:06,280 Speaker 1: intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a 348 00:20:06,280 --> 00:20:10,879 Speaker 1: government by assassination or kidnapping, and occur totally outside the 349 00:20:10,960 --> 00:20:14,360 Speaker 1: United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of how 350 00:20:14,400 --> 00:20:19,200 Speaker 1: they are accomplished. UH So that's the definition of foreign 351 00:20:19,240 --> 00:20:22,560 Speaker 1: power as far as foreign agent is concerned because remember 352 00:20:22,600 --> 00:20:25,919 Speaker 1: this is really involving the communications between foreign powers and 353 00:20:25,960 --> 00:20:31,000 Speaker 1: foreign agents. Foreign agent is defined under FISA as anyone 354 00:20:31,040 --> 00:20:33,080 Speaker 1: that is not a US person who is an officer 355 00:20:33,240 --> 00:20:35,840 Speaker 1: or employee of a foreign power, anyone that is not 356 00:20:35,920 --> 00:20:38,760 Speaker 1: a U S person who engages in quote unquote clandestine 357 00:20:38,840 --> 00:20:42,760 Speaker 1: intelligence activities also known as spying in the United States 358 00:20:42,760 --> 00:20:46,800 Speaker 1: on behalf of a foreign power, or any US person 359 00:20:46,880 --> 00:20:50,240 Speaker 1: that does the same and maybe violating the law. That's 360 00:20:50,320 --> 00:20:54,359 Speaker 1: an important distinction their US person who is also not 361 00:20:54,440 --> 00:20:56,920 Speaker 1: only acting as a foreign agent but also violating the law. 362 00:20:57,359 --> 00:20:58,840 Speaker 1: So if you're not a U S person, you don't 363 00:20:58,840 --> 00:21:01,639 Speaker 1: have to be suspected of a crime. You just have 364 00:21:01,760 --> 00:21:04,600 Speaker 1: to be foreign That's that's all you have to be. 365 00:21:05,040 --> 00:21:06,439 Speaker 1: If you are a U S person, then you have 366 00:21:06,560 --> 00:21:09,520 Speaker 1: to h be suspected of a crime on top of 367 00:21:09,560 --> 00:21:12,320 Speaker 1: being a foreign agent. And anyone, whether a U S 368 00:21:12,359 --> 00:21:15,200 Speaker 1: person or not, who engages in or prepares for acts 369 00:21:15,280 --> 00:21:18,760 Speaker 1: of international terrorism or sabotage is also defined as an 370 00:21:18,760 --> 00:21:23,840 Speaker 1: agent of foreign power under FISA. So that's what is 371 00:21:23,960 --> 00:21:26,240 Speaker 1: really the concern here. That's the n s A says 372 00:21:26,280 --> 00:21:30,359 Speaker 1: that they are only interested in these communications between foreign 373 00:21:30,400 --> 00:21:33,560 Speaker 1: powers and foreign agents. Any other information that they gather 374 00:21:33,680 --> 00:21:37,200 Speaker 1: that happens to be about American citizens is completely coincidental, 375 00:21:37,280 --> 00:21:39,359 Speaker 1: has nothing to do with what they are interested in, 376 00:21:39,600 --> 00:21:42,800 Speaker 1: and you should just stop worrying. And so that is 377 00:21:42,840 --> 00:21:45,280 Speaker 1: the the body of the law as as we have 378 00:21:45,440 --> 00:21:49,520 Speaker 1: known it. UM. Unfortunately, there are a little bit of 379 00:21:49,680 --> 00:21:52,120 Speaker 1: extra bits here and there that only came to light 380 00:21:52,640 --> 00:21:55,200 Speaker 1: when when Snowden leaked some information. But we will talk 381 00:21:55,240 --> 00:21:58,000 Speaker 1: about that in the second half of the show. And 382 00:21:58,480 --> 00:22:01,359 Speaker 1: right now we should take a quick break to thank 383 00:22:01,359 --> 00:22:05,960 Speaker 1: our sponsors. Sounds good to me. Let's take that break, alright. 384 00:22:06,000 --> 00:22:07,760 Speaker 1: So were back. So when we left off, it was 385 00:22:07,880 --> 00:22:11,639 Speaker 1: just before we started learning about the additional information that 386 00:22:11,720 --> 00:22:15,400 Speaker 1: was leaked by Snowdon and UM, you had something about 387 00:22:15,800 --> 00:22:18,240 Speaker 1: you know, we mentioned in that last that last half 388 00:22:18,240 --> 00:22:24,200 Speaker 1: that you know, if any American citizen information is collected, 389 00:22:25,000 --> 00:22:29,159 Speaker 1: that's okay, yeah, well okay. So so part part of 390 00:22:29,160 --> 00:22:31,199 Speaker 1: what we found out thanks to Snowden is that on 391 00:22:31,320 --> 00:22:36,520 Speaker 1: July nine, UM guidelines were proved by the Secret fives 392 00:22:36,560 --> 00:22:40,440 Speaker 1: A Court and also Attorney General Eric Holder UM that 393 00:22:40,440 --> 00:22:43,119 Speaker 1: that although the n s A is required to UM 394 00:22:43,440 --> 00:22:47,960 Speaker 1: minimize the collection of data from U. S citizens, UM 395 00:22:48,000 --> 00:22:53,960 Speaker 1: any inadvertently acquired domestic communications can be kept under certain 396 00:22:54,000 --> 00:22:59,640 Speaker 1: circumstances with no warrant for up to five years. Yeah, 397 00:23:00,200 --> 00:23:03,639 Speaker 1: that's um that's a big question mark there, right, I 398 00:23:03,640 --> 00:23:07,600 Speaker 1: mean that definitely sounds like without a warrant. So already 399 00:23:08,440 --> 00:23:11,640 Speaker 1: that seems to violate the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. 400 00:23:11,720 --> 00:23:14,240 Speaker 1: I'm sure there are other arguments against that, but it's 401 00:23:14,240 --> 00:23:18,040 Speaker 1: it's under certain circumstances. WHI again unless that's unless we 402 00:23:18,119 --> 00:23:20,879 Speaker 1: get the full definition of what those circumstances are, then 403 00:23:20,920 --> 00:23:23,040 Speaker 1: it's hard to say. So so far, it seems to 404 00:23:23,119 --> 00:23:26,520 Speaker 1: be that that um, if the communications are encrypted and 405 00:23:26,800 --> 00:23:29,639 Speaker 1: or reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime that 406 00:23:29,720 --> 00:23:32,840 Speaker 1: has been, is being or is about to be committed. Um. 407 00:23:33,000 --> 00:23:36,400 Speaker 1: Or if the communications are reasonably believed to contain um 408 00:23:36,680 --> 00:23:41,000 Speaker 1: uh technical information about cybersecurity. See, and this is another 409 00:23:41,040 --> 00:23:45,480 Speaker 1: one of those things where the reasonable belief is the blaw. Yeah, 410 00:23:45,520 --> 00:23:48,119 Speaker 1: how do we define that? And again, a lot of 411 00:23:48,160 --> 00:23:53,720 Speaker 1: these these more or less vague words like reasonable um, 412 00:23:53,840 --> 00:23:55,680 Speaker 1: A lot of these things are things that only get 413 00:23:56,080 --> 00:23:59,680 Speaker 1: defined when we challenge stuff in court. In the United States, 414 00:24:00,040 --> 00:24:02,120 Speaker 1: That's how we end up getting focus on a lot 415 00:24:02,160 --> 00:24:04,480 Speaker 1: of our laws is that you know, the laws will 416 00:24:04,520 --> 00:24:07,439 Speaker 1: be written in such a way, sometimes on purpose and 417 00:24:07,520 --> 00:24:10,040 Speaker 1: sometimes not on purpose, but written in such a way 418 00:24:10,080 --> 00:24:13,000 Speaker 1: as to be a little vague. And then in court 419 00:24:13,040 --> 00:24:16,320 Speaker 1: cases that's when the judges have to decide, how how 420 00:24:16,359 --> 00:24:20,240 Speaker 1: does this law actually apply? What is the practical application 421 00:24:20,280 --> 00:24:22,440 Speaker 1: of it? And that might be the case with these 422 00:24:23,200 --> 00:24:26,080 Speaker 1: UM In the meanwhile leading leading up to this league 423 00:24:26,240 --> 00:24:34,959 Speaker 1: between s A hired employees UM mostly in UH comp science, engineering, 424 00:24:35,000 --> 00:24:38,320 Speaker 1: and intelligence analysis, which makes sense. I mean that they're 425 00:24:38,400 --> 00:24:44,639 Speaker 1: their focus is on intercepting and decrypting electronic communications communications 426 00:24:44,680 --> 00:24:47,360 Speaker 1: in general, but electronic in particular, and especially since it's 427 00:24:47,400 --> 00:24:49,920 Speaker 1: you know, yes, becoming more and more electronic, it makes 428 00:24:49,960 --> 00:24:51,760 Speaker 1: it makes sense. But it's also like that's that's a 429 00:24:51,760 --> 00:24:54,760 Speaker 1: lot of employees during a time of economic downturn. I 430 00:24:54,800 --> 00:24:58,960 Speaker 1: do foresee a time where, because of the dangers associated 431 00:24:59,040 --> 00:25:03,040 Speaker 1: now of elector ronic communication being intercepted and eventually decrypted, 432 00:25:03,400 --> 00:25:06,199 Speaker 1: that we will move to a more raven based communication 433 00:25:06,240 --> 00:25:10,879 Speaker 1: system all our game of Thrones winter is coming. I'm 434 00:25:10,920 --> 00:25:13,159 Speaker 1: glad that you're just working that and everywhere you can. UM. 435 00:25:13,200 --> 00:25:19,520 Speaker 1: In December of Obama and Congress extended the Amendments Act 436 00:25:19,560 --> 00:25:21,960 Speaker 1: for another five years. That was that was on the 437 00:25:22,040 --> 00:25:24,320 Speaker 1: up and up. That was, that was things what people 438 00:25:24,359 --> 00:25:27,000 Speaker 1: knew about. Yeah. Yeah, so this wasn't like some sort 439 00:25:27,000 --> 00:25:29,840 Speaker 1: of secret court meeting or whatever. But again, unless you 440 00:25:29,960 --> 00:25:32,880 Speaker 1: had actually been paying attention to what the FISA Amendments Act, 441 00:25:33,200 --> 00:25:36,240 Speaker 1: what what that entailed, then you might not you know, 442 00:25:36,480 --> 00:25:37,520 Speaker 1: you might not have been aware of it. And I 443 00:25:37,520 --> 00:25:39,720 Speaker 1: don't think I was aware of it, and I certainly wasn't. 444 00:25:39,960 --> 00:25:41,840 Speaker 1: But then I'm not a very politically aware of person 445 00:25:41,840 --> 00:25:47,000 Speaker 1: in general. Yeah. Um. In April, another one of those 446 00:25:47,000 --> 00:25:50,720 Speaker 1: things that we found out from snowdon Um, the FISA 447 00:25:50,800 --> 00:25:54,600 Speaker 1: Court ordered Verizon to provide a whole bunch of information 448 00:25:54,720 --> 00:25:58,360 Speaker 1: about a whole bunch of stuff, um, millions of calls 449 00:25:58,560 --> 00:26:02,760 Speaker 1: from millions of customers, both within and without the United States. 450 00:26:02,880 --> 00:26:05,920 Speaker 1: Right now, this was all meta data, which I'll talk 451 00:26:05,960 --> 00:26:09,000 Speaker 1: more about later, but meta data, justin in general, is 452 00:26:09,040 --> 00:26:13,359 Speaker 1: information about information. So in this case, the the order 453 00:26:13,480 --> 00:26:17,200 Speaker 1: for Verizon was to give all this information about calls, 454 00:26:17,280 --> 00:26:19,840 Speaker 1: like the duration of the call, the time it was made, 455 00:26:19,960 --> 00:26:22,359 Speaker 1: what kind of hardware was being used. The content of 456 00:26:22,400 --> 00:26:24,640 Speaker 1: the call was not in question, right, so you could 457 00:26:24,640 --> 00:26:28,440 Speaker 1: not This wasn't for a verizon to hand over records 458 00:26:28,520 --> 00:26:31,280 Speaker 1: of actual like what was actually being said in the 459 00:26:31,280 --> 00:26:35,679 Speaker 1: phone call. It was just everything else. However, that being said, 460 00:26:36,720 --> 00:26:39,520 Speaker 1: there are a lot of examples that people have shown 461 00:26:39,600 --> 00:26:42,720 Speaker 1: about how just getting the meta data gives you a 462 00:26:42,840 --> 00:26:45,920 Speaker 1: lot of information about what was going on just based 463 00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:49,200 Speaker 1: upon the time the location. Although I should also say 464 00:26:49,280 --> 00:26:54,200 Speaker 1: that geospatial information in general has been left out according 465 00:26:54,240 --> 00:26:55,640 Speaker 1: to what the n s A has said that they 466 00:26:55,640 --> 00:26:59,919 Speaker 1: did not collect collect GPS information or anything like that, 467 00:27:01,200 --> 00:27:04,720 Speaker 1: at least that's what they've said. But but just knowing 468 00:27:04,840 --> 00:27:08,040 Speaker 1: when someone called, how long the conversation was, who they 469 00:27:08,080 --> 00:27:10,800 Speaker 1: were calling, they can give you a lot of information 470 00:27:10,800 --> 00:27:14,040 Speaker 1: about people, oh sure, about about movement and write what's 471 00:27:14,040 --> 00:27:16,480 Speaker 1: going on? Um okay. And so so this next point 472 00:27:16,520 --> 00:27:18,760 Speaker 1: in the timeline is is where everything kind of dovetails, 473 00:27:18,800 --> 00:27:22,920 Speaker 1: because on June six, the Guardian and the Washington Post 474 00:27:23,000 --> 00:27:27,480 Speaker 1: published reports based on Snowdon's leaked slides. We didn't know 475 00:27:27,520 --> 00:27:29,919 Speaker 1: that it was Edward Snowe yet. Actually, um that was 476 00:27:29,960 --> 00:27:32,120 Speaker 1: not for another couple of days. But you know, yeah, 477 00:27:32,160 --> 00:27:34,119 Speaker 1: that's when we got that that forty one slide power 478 00:27:34,119 --> 00:27:38,520 Speaker 1: point presentation and um or or or we we didn't 479 00:27:38,520 --> 00:27:40,440 Speaker 1: see all of it at that point, but a bunch 480 00:27:40,480 --> 00:27:42,760 Speaker 1: of information about it. There was a bunch of misinformation 481 00:27:43,320 --> 00:27:47,560 Speaker 1: about it. Actually. According to those initial reports, um uh, 482 00:27:47,680 --> 00:27:50,360 Speaker 1: it said that PRISM allowed the government to directly access 483 00:27:50,440 --> 00:27:53,439 Speaker 1: the servers of places like Google and Microsoft and Apple, 484 00:27:53,920 --> 00:27:55,959 Speaker 1: um and and that has been revealed to be not 485 00:27:56,040 --> 00:27:59,639 Speaker 1: the case. Yeah, this was this was the company's Again, 486 00:28:00,280 --> 00:28:03,840 Speaker 1: the companies were allowed to at least deny certain things 487 00:28:03,920 --> 00:28:07,200 Speaker 1: if they are part of this program. Like we've said before, 488 00:28:07,520 --> 00:28:10,480 Speaker 1: they're under a gag order, which means they cannot acknowledge 489 00:28:10,480 --> 00:28:12,080 Speaker 1: it in any way. And in fact, several of the 490 00:28:12,080 --> 00:28:15,679 Speaker 1: companies have have petitioned the government to allow them to 491 00:28:16,280 --> 00:28:20,240 Speaker 1: talk more about what's going on, saying that more transparency 492 00:28:20,600 --> 00:28:24,119 Speaker 1: would mean more trust because they're they're in a terrible 493 00:28:24,160 --> 00:28:27,959 Speaker 1: position right if they are being legally bound to participate 494 00:28:28,000 --> 00:28:30,200 Speaker 1: in this program. And there's some question as to whether 495 00:28:30,280 --> 00:28:35,000 Speaker 1: or not the participation or the levels of participation meet 496 00:28:35,119 --> 00:28:37,560 Speaker 1: or exceed requirements, because there are some companies that have 497 00:28:37,560 --> 00:28:40,479 Speaker 1: been said they're not only participating, they seem to be 498 00:28:40,520 --> 00:28:45,040 Speaker 1: eagerly participated. But besides that, I mean, if they're bound 499 00:28:45,200 --> 00:28:48,080 Speaker 1: to participate, they have to buy law, but they also, 500 00:28:48,240 --> 00:28:51,120 Speaker 1: by law, can't talk about it. Then they're putting this 501 00:28:51,120 --> 00:28:56,480 Speaker 1: position where trust is starting to recede, and so right 502 00:28:56,520 --> 00:28:58,480 Speaker 1: the consumers are all thinking, well, I don't want to 503 00:28:58,560 --> 00:29:01,560 Speaker 1: use your product because you're part of this program according 504 00:29:01,600 --> 00:29:04,840 Speaker 1: to this forty one slide presentation. And you know, they're 505 00:29:04,880 --> 00:29:07,400 Speaker 1: big companies that were named in this. Microsoft was the 506 00:29:07,440 --> 00:29:10,560 Speaker 1: first one to officially join that program, I think something 507 00:29:10,960 --> 00:29:12,920 Speaker 1: along the lines of like two thousand seven according to 508 00:29:12,920 --> 00:29:17,240 Speaker 1: the presentation. But then you had Google, Apple, Facebook, YouTube, 509 00:29:17,280 --> 00:29:21,080 Speaker 1: I mean, big companies that handle millions of people's information 510 00:29:21,120 --> 00:29:24,360 Speaker 1: on a daily basis, and they were all named in 511 00:29:24,440 --> 00:29:28,480 Speaker 1: this presentation. So if they were compelled to be part 512 00:29:28,480 --> 00:29:31,560 Speaker 1: of this because it's it's by law, they have to, 513 00:29:32,680 --> 00:29:34,640 Speaker 1: but they can't talk about it puts them in a 514 00:29:34,720 --> 00:29:38,280 Speaker 1: terrible position. And if it actually ends up being that 515 00:29:38,600 --> 00:29:41,520 Speaker 1: their participation is not nearly as bad as what our 516 00:29:41,520 --> 00:29:44,840 Speaker 1: imaginations have created, they want to be able to address 517 00:29:44,880 --> 00:29:48,760 Speaker 1: that and say, just let us tell people that, yes, 518 00:29:48,800 --> 00:29:51,000 Speaker 1: we're part of this program, but this is exactly what 519 00:29:51,320 --> 00:29:54,040 Speaker 1: is going on and it's within these parameters and nothing 520 00:29:54,080 --> 00:29:56,840 Speaker 1: outside of this is happening. So you are you can 521 00:29:56,920 --> 00:29:59,200 Speaker 1: you can rest assured that your privacy is still safe. 522 00:29:59,560 --> 00:30:01,360 Speaker 1: That's the message they want to send out, but they 523 00:30:01,400 --> 00:30:04,080 Speaker 1: can't talk about it, right not yeah, yeah. All we've 524 00:30:04,080 --> 00:30:06,560 Speaker 1: got to go on is these leaked reports UM, which 525 00:30:06,720 --> 00:30:10,160 Speaker 1: which it now seems like upon closer observation, that UM 526 00:30:10,160 --> 00:30:13,440 Speaker 1: that actually the companies were setting up UM secure servers 527 00:30:13,520 --> 00:30:17,120 Speaker 1: or or drop boxes to facilitate transfers between themselves in 528 00:30:17,120 --> 00:30:19,880 Speaker 1: the n s A. Not that again they have admitted 529 00:30:19,920 --> 00:30:22,000 Speaker 1: to being part of it yet because they can't UM. 530 00:30:22,560 --> 00:30:25,440 Speaker 1: June seventh, The very next day, The Guardian reported that 531 00:30:25,480 --> 00:30:30,800 Speaker 1: the UKH, the the United Kingdoms UM Government Communications Headquarters 532 00:30:31,200 --> 00:30:33,040 Speaker 1: UM which which is which is their kind of an 533 00:30:33,120 --> 00:30:36,400 Speaker 1: essay equivalent, was also involved in prison and has been 534 00:30:36,440 --> 00:30:42,320 Speaker 1: able to view private Internet user data since UH. June 535 00:30:42,400 --> 00:30:45,000 Speaker 1: nine was when Snowdon came out and said that he 536 00:30:45,640 --> 00:30:49,520 Speaker 1: was the guy who leaked the stuff UM, upon which 537 00:30:49,640 --> 00:30:52,760 Speaker 1: lots lots of of bad news has been rained down 538 00:30:52,800 --> 00:30:55,680 Speaker 1: upon him from the government because clearly they were not happy. 539 00:30:56,480 --> 00:31:00,640 Speaker 1: On June eleventh, a a bill from I Partison I 540 00:31:00,640 --> 00:31:05,800 Speaker 1: believe Members of Congress was submitted to UM to declassify 541 00:31:06,000 --> 00:31:10,160 Speaker 1: secret court opinions UM that that drive prison surveillance This 542 00:31:10,240 --> 00:31:13,160 Speaker 1: is actually a revision of a bill from December twelve, 543 00:31:13,320 --> 00:31:15,640 Speaker 1: so this has been kicking around for a while. But 544 00:31:15,640 --> 00:31:18,080 Speaker 1: but people are I mean, people in Congress are listening 545 00:31:18,080 --> 00:31:19,920 Speaker 1: to the to to what we are saying that they're 546 00:31:19,920 --> 00:31:22,400 Speaker 1: listening to our concerns and they they want to do 547 00:31:22,480 --> 00:31:24,400 Speaker 1: something about it. And you should keep in mind that 548 00:31:24,520 --> 00:31:29,880 Speaker 1: the politicians involved, even the ones who who object to this, 549 00:31:30,360 --> 00:31:35,080 Speaker 1: we're also bound by the same restrictions that other people were. 550 00:31:35,120 --> 00:31:37,640 Speaker 1: They could not talk about it because it was secret, 551 00:31:37,680 --> 00:31:41,320 Speaker 1: it was classified. So you know, it's a frustrating situation 552 00:31:41,360 --> 00:31:43,960 Speaker 1: all around when you have this secret court. In fact, 553 00:31:43,960 --> 00:31:45,240 Speaker 1: there are a lot of people who have argued that 554 00:31:45,280 --> 00:31:48,720 Speaker 1: the whole concept of a secret court is a bad 555 00:31:48,800 --> 00:31:54,000 Speaker 1: idea because it breeds distrust. So even if everyone is 556 00:31:54,040 --> 00:31:57,280 Speaker 1: behaving perfectly on the up and up, everyone is following 557 00:31:57,320 --> 00:32:00,440 Speaker 1: all the rules and respecting as much of the you know, 558 00:32:00,480 --> 00:32:03,960 Speaker 1: as much as they can. Uh, because it's secret, it 559 00:32:04,440 --> 00:32:08,560 Speaker 1: just engenders this the sense of mistrust, and that alone 560 00:32:08,640 --> 00:32:11,960 Speaker 1: is enough to need us too. We need to address it. Uh. 561 00:32:12,000 --> 00:32:13,840 Speaker 1: And like you said, you know, we talked about the 562 00:32:13,880 --> 00:32:18,240 Speaker 1: FISA court and how many how many requests were denied? 563 00:32:18,800 --> 00:32:23,320 Speaker 1: Eleven out of thousands of requests about so if you 564 00:32:23,360 --> 00:32:29,560 Speaker 1: find out so so eleven or thirty four thousand requests 565 00:32:29,560 --> 00:32:33,400 Speaker 1: were denied, which makes makes you wonder what's going on? 566 00:32:33,560 --> 00:32:37,200 Speaker 1: Is is it just that the requests are all that 567 00:32:37,200 --> 00:32:39,880 Speaker 1: that water tight, they are just that amazing, or is 568 00:32:39,920 --> 00:32:42,640 Speaker 1: it that the standards are really low? What was it 569 00:32:42,680 --> 00:32:46,760 Speaker 1: about those eleven that they don't made them be denied? So? Uh, 570 00:32:46,800 --> 00:32:48,920 Speaker 1: and that's the That's the thing is that it brings 571 00:32:49,000 --> 00:32:50,960 Speaker 1: up these kind of conversations and no one can talk 572 00:32:51,000 --> 00:32:54,040 Speaker 1: about them because they're classified. So it is a really 573 00:32:54,080 --> 00:32:59,520 Speaker 1: sticky situation. UM. As of June, Snowdon under under attack 574 00:32:59,520 --> 00:33:01,880 Speaker 1: from the United States. UM. You know, people, I think 575 00:33:01,880 --> 00:33:06,080 Speaker 1: there were there were like warrants for treason out for 576 00:33:06,120 --> 00:33:08,520 Speaker 1: his arrest. There were. Treason is one of those tough things. 577 00:33:08,680 --> 00:33:11,000 Speaker 1: But there were some people who who were saying that 578 00:33:11,040 --> 00:33:13,680 Speaker 1: maybe this can't count as treason because it's a very 579 00:33:13,720 --> 00:33:17,240 Speaker 1: specific charge, but that he certainly broke US law that 580 00:33:17,320 --> 00:33:19,600 Speaker 1: was beyond question. At any rate. He fled Hong Kong 581 00:33:19,640 --> 00:33:21,920 Speaker 1: from Moscow, UM which is where he has been held 582 00:33:22,040 --> 00:33:25,200 Speaker 1: hold up since UM in in like the airport and 583 00:33:25,280 --> 00:33:28,320 Speaker 1: surrounding hotels, which is the airport is the the area 584 00:33:28,400 --> 00:33:32,360 Speaker 1: that he's in the international zone is technically not Russian soil. 585 00:33:33,040 --> 00:33:34,840 Speaker 1: It's kind of like when you go to an embassy 586 00:33:35,000 --> 00:33:37,040 Speaker 1: and you're in a foreign country, but you go to 587 00:33:37,080 --> 00:33:39,760 Speaker 1: the United States embassy, for example somewhere, and then you 588 00:33:39,800 --> 00:33:43,200 Speaker 1: are technically on US soil while you're on the embassy grounds, 589 00:33:43,760 --> 00:33:45,680 Speaker 1: but you leave U s simbassy grounds, you're back in 590 00:33:45,720 --> 00:33:48,720 Speaker 1: the foreign nation. Yeah, okay. So, so he's been hanging 591 00:33:48,760 --> 00:33:51,720 Speaker 1: out there and petitioning various countries for asylum, um, none 592 00:33:51,800 --> 00:33:55,400 Speaker 1: of which have really granted him asylum to his um satisfaction. 593 00:33:55,440 --> 00:33:58,560 Speaker 1: Ecuador was going to and then backed off. Some say 594 00:33:58,600 --> 00:34:02,200 Speaker 1: that the president of Ecuador was kind of just trying 595 00:34:02,240 --> 00:34:05,080 Speaker 1: to grandstand a little bit and and kind of tweak 596 00:34:05,160 --> 00:34:07,280 Speaker 1: the nose of the United States. Actually, that's a great, 597 00:34:07,640 --> 00:34:11,080 Speaker 1: kind of funny little story in a way. So I'm 598 00:34:11,120 --> 00:34:13,439 Speaker 1: paraphrasing here because again I didn't put this in my notes, 599 00:34:13,480 --> 00:34:15,120 Speaker 1: but this is kind of the story. So the president 600 00:34:15,160 --> 00:34:18,560 Speaker 1: of says that, you know, they're going to grant asylum 601 00:34:18,640 --> 00:34:23,040 Speaker 1: to Snowdon, and Snowdon had actually petitioned Ecuador for asylum. 602 00:34:23,080 --> 00:34:26,280 Speaker 1: And then there were people who were saying that if 603 00:34:26,320 --> 00:34:29,400 Speaker 1: they were to do this, that the United States would 604 00:34:29,480 --> 00:34:35,880 Speaker 1: revoke certain beneficial trade agreements with Ecuador. And so what 605 00:34:35,960 --> 00:34:40,400 Speaker 1: the President said was that he had he negated those agreements. 606 00:34:40,400 --> 00:34:42,120 Speaker 1: He said, all right, those agreements are gone. In fact, 607 00:34:42,160 --> 00:34:44,320 Speaker 1: only are those agreements are gone. I'm going to replace 608 00:34:44,360 --> 00:34:47,200 Speaker 1: them with twenty three million dollars that Ecuador is going 609 00:34:47,239 --> 00:34:49,759 Speaker 1: to give the United States so that the US can 610 00:34:49,840 --> 00:34:55,680 Speaker 1: research human rights issues. Yeah, which was you know, essentially yeah, 611 00:34:55,760 --> 00:34:59,480 Speaker 1: it was essentially international burn. But but since then he 612 00:34:59,520 --> 00:35:01,799 Speaker 1: has back to weigh and Ecuador has has kind of 613 00:35:02,320 --> 00:35:06,120 Speaker 1: revoked its its offer of asylum, and in the meantime, 614 00:35:06,160 --> 00:35:10,160 Speaker 1: Snowdon himself has had his international passport revoked, so he 615 00:35:10,239 --> 00:35:14,160 Speaker 1: cannot travel and he's not you know, so now he's 616 00:35:14,160 --> 00:35:17,120 Speaker 1: seeking asylum in Russia. But that's currently being held up 617 00:35:17,160 --> 00:35:21,040 Speaker 1: in in a lot of bureaucratic processes which anyone who 618 00:35:21,080 --> 00:35:25,120 Speaker 1: has studied Russian politics will not be surprised by. Um, 619 00:35:25,320 --> 00:35:29,080 Speaker 1: the Russians and the United States big fans of bureaucracy, 620 00:35:29,320 --> 00:35:32,200 Speaker 1: you know, I'm not I'm not saying Russia's alone in that. 621 00:35:32,239 --> 00:35:35,680 Speaker 1: The US certainly has more than its share, uh as 622 00:35:35,719 --> 00:35:37,880 Speaker 1: as do a lot of nations. And and that that 623 00:35:38,120 --> 00:35:41,120 Speaker 1: kind of sort of brings us up to up to today, 624 00:35:41,320 --> 00:35:44,720 Speaker 1: ish UM. You know, right now there are a whole 625 00:35:44,760 --> 00:35:47,759 Speaker 1: bunch of different people suing the US government UM on 626 00:35:47,760 --> 00:35:51,719 Speaker 1: on grounds of illegal and unconstitutional programs that tread upon 627 00:35:51,760 --> 00:35:54,320 Speaker 1: the Fourth Amendment rights of its people. Right. And again, 628 00:35:54,360 --> 00:35:56,440 Speaker 1: this all has to be decided in court. It's not 629 00:35:56,560 --> 00:35:59,440 Speaker 1: like there's just an automax switch or anything. This actually 630 00:35:59,440 --> 00:36:03,719 Speaker 1: has to go through a process before it's decided an 631 00:36:03,719 --> 00:36:07,440 Speaker 1: official capacity whether or not it is in fact unconstitutional 632 00:36:07,640 --> 00:36:10,960 Speaker 1: of course UM. As of July and an alliance of 633 00:36:11,239 --> 00:36:17,280 Speaker 1: thirty six companies, investors, charities, and trade organizations, including Google, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, 634 00:36:17,560 --> 00:36:21,520 Speaker 1: wrote a letter to President Obama UM asking for permission 635 00:36:21,600 --> 00:36:24,719 Speaker 1: to take the number of government requests for information about 636 00:36:24,719 --> 00:36:27,680 Speaker 1: their users public right, to essentially say like, this is 637 00:36:27,719 --> 00:36:29,840 Speaker 1: why you don't need to worry, because the numbers that 638 00:36:29,840 --> 00:36:31,920 Speaker 1: are in your head are totally different from the numbers 639 00:36:31,920 --> 00:36:35,320 Speaker 1: that exist in reality, right, and might not really matter 640 00:36:35,400 --> 00:36:38,080 Speaker 1: as we get further into this podcast, but it's an 641 00:36:38,120 --> 00:36:40,879 Speaker 1: interesting thing to say, Well, you know, it's a lot 642 00:36:40,920 --> 00:36:45,160 Speaker 1: of these companies do report. UM already report government requests 643 00:36:45,200 --> 00:36:48,120 Speaker 1: for for ferncuation and they're there are companies like Twitter 644 00:36:48,600 --> 00:36:51,600 Speaker 1: that said we are not playing ball with this. I mean, 645 00:36:51,680 --> 00:36:54,440 Speaker 1: you know, there's a lot of people have praised Twitter 646 00:36:55,000 --> 00:36:57,719 Speaker 1: because they have a very firm stance on this, saying, 647 00:36:57,800 --> 00:37:00,520 Speaker 1: unless you follow the specific rules that were laid out, 648 00:37:01,160 --> 00:37:04,560 Speaker 1: uh and and to our satisfaction, we're not going to 649 00:37:04,640 --> 00:37:08,000 Speaker 1: just hand over data. So that's kind of interesting, you know. Again, 650 00:37:08,040 --> 00:37:12,280 Speaker 1: it all depends upon the individual organization. Also, late breaking 651 00:37:12,280 --> 00:37:14,400 Speaker 1: news as of the recording of this podcast, so in 652 00:37:14,520 --> 00:37:19,440 Speaker 1: full disclosure, we're recording this podcast July two, thirteen, UH 653 00:37:19,480 --> 00:37:22,360 Speaker 1: and today the New York Times reported that the U. S. 654 00:37:22,400 --> 00:37:26,239 Speaker 1: House of Representatives defeated legislation that would have blocked the 655 00:37:26,320 --> 00:37:28,759 Speaker 1: n s A from collecting phone records. We'll talk more 656 00:37:28,800 --> 00:37:31,239 Speaker 1: about the phone record program and a little bit. Uh. 657 00:37:31,239 --> 00:37:34,040 Speaker 1: That was defeated at a vote of two seventeen to 658 00:37:34,120 --> 00:37:36,799 Speaker 1: two hundred five, So it was incredibly close, and it 659 00:37:36,880 --> 00:37:41,080 Speaker 1: had weird coalitions on both sides that were bipartisan. So 660 00:37:41,160 --> 00:37:44,880 Speaker 1: you had, you know, libertarians, Democrats, and Republicans on one side, 661 00:37:44,920 --> 00:37:47,200 Speaker 1: and then essentially Democrats and Republands on the other side 662 00:37:47,200 --> 00:37:51,000 Speaker 1: because all the libertarians I think sided against sided for 663 00:37:51,040 --> 00:37:54,920 Speaker 1: the legislation, but it was eventually it was voted down. Um. Now, 664 00:37:55,440 --> 00:37:58,200 Speaker 1: there still could be debate within the Senate, so we 665 00:37:58,239 --> 00:38:00,840 Speaker 1: could still see movement on this in the United States 666 00:38:00,840 --> 00:38:05,279 Speaker 1: government in the that branch of uh of government, but 667 00:38:06,200 --> 00:38:09,720 Speaker 1: the House of Representatives have already kind of shot that down. 668 00:38:10,400 --> 00:38:14,040 Speaker 1: And also there have been several politicians who have said 669 00:38:14,080 --> 00:38:16,960 Speaker 1: that the sections and the Patriot Act that essentially allow 670 00:38:17,120 --> 00:38:20,000 Speaker 1: for this to happen, they come up for renewal again 671 00:38:20,000 --> 00:38:24,920 Speaker 1: in and that they feel that those sections will not 672 00:38:25,000 --> 00:38:30,520 Speaker 1: be renewed based upon the reaction that this this information 673 00:38:30,640 --> 00:38:34,440 Speaker 1: has created, and that it would be very politically difficult 674 00:38:34,880 --> 00:38:38,960 Speaker 1: to renew that now. They say that, but it's now 675 00:38:39,680 --> 00:38:42,200 Speaker 1: is a couple of years away. You never know what 676 00:38:42,239 --> 00:38:45,080 Speaker 1: can happen between now and then that could change people's minds. 677 00:38:45,080 --> 00:38:48,799 Speaker 1: But as of right now, they're saying that those those 678 00:38:48,800 --> 00:38:51,799 Speaker 1: sections that have actually allowed for this to kind of happen, 679 00:38:51,800 --> 00:38:54,680 Speaker 1: they have given the legal foundation for this, may not 680 00:38:54,719 --> 00:38:57,560 Speaker 1: be renewed in a couple of years. UM. So that 681 00:38:57,640 --> 00:39:00,200 Speaker 1: kind of brings us a little bit up to the 682 00:39:00,719 --> 00:39:04,280 Speaker 1: discussion of what these programs actually are. So let's start 683 00:39:04,320 --> 00:39:08,800 Speaker 1: going back a little bit again. There was a program 684 00:39:08,840 --> 00:39:12,600 Speaker 1: started under George W. Bush called Stellar Wind, and Stellar 685 00:39:12,640 --> 00:39:16,520 Speaker 1: Wind was really more of an umbrella term for surveillance programs, 686 00:39:16,520 --> 00:39:23,040 Speaker 1: specifically the surveillance programs main Way, Marina, Nucleon and PRISM. Uh. 687 00:39:23,120 --> 00:39:26,640 Speaker 1: Now these are paired up. Main Way and Nucleon are 688 00:39:26,719 --> 00:39:31,480 Speaker 1: both programs that involve telecommunications and phone records and uh 689 00:39:31,520 --> 00:39:34,440 Speaker 1: and phone content as it turns out, and Marina and 690 00:39:34,480 --> 00:39:39,560 Speaker 1: Prism our internet communications. No, no, no, technically Stellar Wind Um, 691 00:39:39,640 --> 00:39:42,040 Speaker 1: its cover was blown by William Binney a couple of 692 00:39:42,080 --> 00:39:46,200 Speaker 1: years back. And uh, it only continued until two seven 693 00:39:46,200 --> 00:39:50,280 Speaker 1: it was shut down, and then the actual programs underneath 694 00:39:50,320 --> 00:39:55,040 Speaker 1: it still kept going. So so while while the parent 695 00:39:55,680 --> 00:40:00,840 Speaker 1: program was dismantled, the actual activities continued U. So, for example, 696 00:40:01,040 --> 00:40:04,200 Speaker 1: the programs the main Way in Nucleon programs the phone 697 00:40:04,239 --> 00:40:08,839 Speaker 1: communication ones. Um, we're well, well, first of all, Main 698 00:40:08,880 --> 00:40:11,759 Speaker 1: Way was all about metadata. And again we've talked about 699 00:40:11,760 --> 00:40:15,040 Speaker 1: this metadata is that information about information, So all the 700 00:40:15,080 --> 00:40:18,760 Speaker 1: information about the phone call, apart from the actual content 701 00:40:18,960 --> 00:40:23,359 Speaker 1: of the call, that was the the the main focus there. 702 00:40:23,880 --> 00:40:26,400 Speaker 1: And it can, like we said, give a lot of 703 00:40:26,400 --> 00:40:29,200 Speaker 1: information about the people involved in any communication, even if 704 00:40:29,200 --> 00:40:32,800 Speaker 1: you don't have the content. Now, the justification for gathering 705 00:40:32,840 --> 00:40:35,400 Speaker 1: this is that the U S court systems have said 706 00:40:35,560 --> 00:40:40,640 Speaker 1: repeatedly the metadata falls outside the information that the average 707 00:40:40,719 --> 00:40:44,920 Speaker 1: US citizen can expect a reasonable have a reasonable expectation 708 00:40:44,960 --> 00:40:48,960 Speaker 1: of privacy about so reasonable expectation of privacy involves everything 709 00:40:49,000 --> 00:40:51,400 Speaker 1: like the actual communication that you would have with someone, 710 00:40:51,480 --> 00:40:54,239 Speaker 1: but the fact that you talked to someone that you 711 00:40:54,280 --> 00:40:57,560 Speaker 1: do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. According to 712 00:40:57,920 --> 00:41:01,320 Speaker 1: several different court cases, UM and the n s A 713 00:41:01,400 --> 00:41:04,080 Speaker 1: said it only gathered metadat in the course of an investigation. 714 00:41:04,560 --> 00:41:07,000 Speaker 1: But these rules are so vaguely defined. And there's that 715 00:41:07,080 --> 00:41:09,560 Speaker 1: three hop approach that we've talked about before, the three 716 00:41:09,560 --> 00:41:12,719 Speaker 1: hop approaches that actually maybe we haven't mentioned this yet. 717 00:41:12,760 --> 00:41:16,160 Speaker 1: The three hop approaches this idea that you can target 718 00:41:16,280 --> 00:41:20,600 Speaker 1: a person and then go one person out from your target, 719 00:41:21,120 --> 00:41:24,000 Speaker 1: then go another person out, and then go another person 720 00:41:24,080 --> 00:41:27,040 Speaker 1: out when you when you are actually investigating the target. 721 00:41:27,120 --> 00:41:30,000 Speaker 1: So if you have identified a target as a foreign agent, 722 00:41:30,680 --> 00:41:33,400 Speaker 1: you can then investigate everyone that foreign agent talked to 723 00:41:33,920 --> 00:41:35,680 Speaker 1: and then go move outward from there. So it's a 724 00:41:35,760 --> 00:41:40,399 Speaker 1: ripple effect. Now, let's assume just for a second that 725 00:41:41,040 --> 00:41:46,200 Speaker 1: every single person has forty unique contacts, So forty forty 726 00:41:46,239 --> 00:41:49,160 Speaker 1: contacts that are that are not shared with the other 727 00:41:49,239 --> 00:41:53,320 Speaker 1: people that they have contacted with. Uh. You know, we 728 00:41:53,600 --> 00:41:56,000 Speaker 1: have closer to like two hundred total, but a lot 729 00:41:56,040 --> 00:41:59,640 Speaker 1: of those are going to be duplicates, right, So if 730 00:41:59,800 --> 00:42:02,200 Speaker 1: I have forty unique contacts and each of them have 731 00:42:02,280 --> 00:42:06,000 Speaker 1: forty unique contacts, three hop analysis would end up looking 732 00:42:06,040 --> 00:42:11,000 Speaker 1: at two point five million people because as you look 733 00:42:11,040 --> 00:42:16,359 Speaker 1: at those forty contacts and they have forty contexts. So 734 00:42:17,239 --> 00:42:19,759 Speaker 1: that has raised people to say, well, how can you 735 00:42:19,800 --> 00:42:23,399 Speaker 1: suggest that you are having a targeted investigation if this 736 00:42:23,640 --> 00:42:25,600 Speaker 1: rule allows you to look at two and a half 737 00:42:25,680 --> 00:42:29,719 Speaker 1: million people, some of whom are undoubtedly American citizens in 738 00:42:29,840 --> 00:42:33,760 Speaker 1: some of these cases. And then I say, is um, 739 00:42:33,800 --> 00:42:36,000 Speaker 1: Actually they have their own reasons behind it. They say 740 00:42:36,040 --> 00:42:38,160 Speaker 1: that they're being very responsible with this, but it does 741 00:42:38,280 --> 00:42:42,280 Speaker 1: raise those questions. Now again, this is meant to target 742 00:42:42,360 --> 00:42:45,960 Speaker 1: those foreign agents with a certainty that they are in 743 00:42:46,040 --> 00:42:49,640 Speaker 1: fact non American citizens. Uh. And it looks like what 744 00:42:49,680 --> 00:42:52,840 Speaker 1: the NSA is doing is gathering all this meta data 745 00:42:52,880 --> 00:42:57,040 Speaker 1: and storing it. Now they're the meta data on both 746 00:42:57,040 --> 00:43:02,040 Speaker 1: of these programs on both Main Way Marina are Uh, 747 00:43:02,080 --> 00:43:04,160 Speaker 1: you know both the phone and the internet stuff. It's 748 00:43:04,200 --> 00:43:08,759 Speaker 1: all being stored and it's being collected from everyone. That's 749 00:43:08,800 --> 00:43:11,080 Speaker 1: what it looks like like. It's not just the four 750 00:43:11,160 --> 00:43:14,280 Speaker 1: and it's not like they're targeting foreign targets and saying, 751 00:43:14,560 --> 00:43:17,399 Speaker 1: let's collect all their informations, pick this one thread out 752 00:43:17,480 --> 00:43:19,960 Speaker 1: and collect the only that it's everything, and then they 753 00:43:19,960 --> 00:43:22,520 Speaker 1: pick the threads out of the everything. Yeah, what what 754 00:43:22,800 --> 00:43:24,799 Speaker 1: they have? The way, the way it's supposed to work, 755 00:43:24,840 --> 00:43:28,680 Speaker 1: according to what I've read, is that they collect absolutely everything, 756 00:43:28,719 --> 00:43:31,920 Speaker 1: all this meta data of both phone and internet communication, 757 00:43:32,680 --> 00:43:35,480 Speaker 1: and then when they've identified a foreign target, they then 758 00:43:35,520 --> 00:43:40,040 Speaker 1: provide do a search query on that target within all 759 00:43:40,120 --> 00:43:43,640 Speaker 1: the information they've collected. So, in other words, they're they're 760 00:43:43,680 --> 00:43:47,160 Speaker 1: doing searches on everything, but they don't they don't look 761 00:43:47,160 --> 00:43:50,239 Speaker 1: at everything. They just have it. Now, some people have 762 00:43:50,320 --> 00:43:53,200 Speaker 1: said just by having it, just by collecting all this 763 00:43:53,280 --> 00:43:56,560 Speaker 1: information about people, whether their American citizens or not, means 764 00:43:56,560 --> 00:44:01,279 Speaker 1: you're violating Americans and Fourth Amendment rights, that that is 765 00:44:01,400 --> 00:44:05,440 Speaker 1: unreasonable search and seizure. It's at least seizure, if not search. 766 00:44:05,480 --> 00:44:07,919 Speaker 1: And they're arguing, well, it's not search and seizure because 767 00:44:07,920 --> 00:44:11,120 Speaker 1: all we're doing is making sure we have access to it. 768 00:44:11,120 --> 00:44:14,000 Speaker 1: It's not seizure because it is it is free to 769 00:44:14,239 --> 00:44:17,160 Speaker 1: us to collect. So they're saying that, yes, we have 770 00:44:17,360 --> 00:44:20,760 Speaker 1: this information, but we're not doing anything with it until 771 00:44:20,840 --> 00:44:24,560 Speaker 1: we have the actual authorization and the probable cause to 772 00:44:24,680 --> 00:44:27,320 Speaker 1: go after. Just because we are technically diverting this stream 773 00:44:27,360 --> 00:44:29,560 Speaker 1: into a giant hard drive and hanging onto that hard 774 00:44:29,600 --> 00:44:32,000 Speaker 1: drive doesn't mean that we are quote unquote seizing anything 775 00:44:32,080 --> 00:44:35,439 Speaker 1: because we have not because we haven't looked at it. Yeah, 776 00:44:35,560 --> 00:44:37,600 Speaker 1: that's kind of the the wide boils down to. So 777 00:44:37,680 --> 00:44:39,960 Speaker 1: then you have to go with does that argument hold 778 00:44:39,960 --> 00:44:42,480 Speaker 1: water or not? Does that make sense? Uh? And some 779 00:44:42,480 --> 00:44:44,640 Speaker 1: people have said that that's the wrong way to go 780 00:44:44,719 --> 00:44:47,279 Speaker 1: about it. They should be getting the authorization and then 781 00:44:47,360 --> 00:44:50,880 Speaker 1: going after all that data that's related to that authorization, 782 00:44:51,200 --> 00:44:54,840 Speaker 1: but leave everything else alone. Uh, that might not be practical, 783 00:44:54,920 --> 00:44:56,800 Speaker 1: and in fact, that might very well technically that that 784 00:44:56,840 --> 00:45:00,480 Speaker 1: would be a ridiculous undertaking, honestly. And and it's not 785 00:45:00,719 --> 00:45:03,719 Speaker 1: like data is color coded as it's running through the 786 00:45:03,760 --> 00:45:06,279 Speaker 1: Internet tubes to to to let you know these things. 787 00:45:06,360 --> 00:45:10,040 Speaker 1: So most of these collection systems they have in place 788 00:45:10,200 --> 00:45:15,000 Speaker 1: are creating databases based on keywords like anything that's anything 789 00:45:15,000 --> 00:45:20,000 Speaker 1: that's automatically detecting a keyword, and this includes actual phone conversations. 790 00:45:20,280 --> 00:45:23,320 Speaker 1: When you get to Nucleon and PRISM, that no longer 791 00:45:23,400 --> 00:45:27,200 Speaker 1: is dealing just with metadata, that's actually dealing with content itself, 792 00:45:27,239 --> 00:45:31,359 Speaker 1: the actual stuff that's going on in these communications. So 793 00:45:31,520 --> 00:45:34,319 Speaker 1: you get these keyword databases that are created and then 794 00:45:34,320 --> 00:45:36,840 Speaker 1: you can search those uh. And again the n s 795 00:45:36,920 --> 00:45:39,759 Speaker 1: A says, yes, we have them, but we're not searching them, 796 00:45:40,120 --> 00:45:43,719 Speaker 1: you know, without reason. We only search them after we've 797 00:45:43,760 --> 00:45:48,480 Speaker 1: we've established this this uh probable cause, the authorization et 798 00:45:48,560 --> 00:45:53,239 Speaker 1: cetera under the secret court that you can't know about. Um. 799 00:45:53,280 --> 00:45:56,040 Speaker 1: And so that's that's kind of where we are now. 800 00:45:56,120 --> 00:45:59,160 Speaker 1: So Nucleon is the one with the phones. And again 801 00:45:59,400 --> 00:46:03,120 Speaker 1: they're actually able to sort out phone conversations based on 802 00:46:03,200 --> 00:46:06,799 Speaker 1: keywords that are detected within those conversations and then store them. 803 00:46:06,800 --> 00:46:10,160 Speaker 1: And they're they've built a data center in Utah that 804 00:46:10,320 --> 00:46:13,120 Speaker 1: is about a one and a half million square feet 805 00:46:13,120 --> 00:46:15,440 Speaker 1: in size, which for those of you who have been 806 00:46:15,480 --> 00:46:18,160 Speaker 1: to the Las Vegas Convention Center, that's about half the 807 00:46:18,200 --> 00:46:20,719 Speaker 1: size of the Las Vegas Convention Center. If you add 808 00:46:20,760 --> 00:46:25,320 Speaker 1: up all the convention center space. UM and that's that's huge. 809 00:46:25,480 --> 00:46:28,200 Speaker 1: It's just filled with computers that are storing information, and 810 00:46:28,239 --> 00:46:30,560 Speaker 1: of course we're generating more and more information every single day. 811 00:46:31,120 --> 00:46:34,760 Speaker 1: Um and Uh. And in some cases they have access 812 00:46:34,800 --> 00:46:38,000 Speaker 1: to special lockdown rooms like we've mentioned before, where they 813 00:46:38,040 --> 00:46:41,279 Speaker 1: don't necessarily have to ask a provider for anything. They 814 00:46:41,280 --> 00:46:43,000 Speaker 1: can just go into the lockdown room and then run 815 00:46:43,040 --> 00:46:46,360 Speaker 1: the query. Again, they have to have the authorization to 816 00:46:46,440 --> 00:46:51,560 Speaker 1: do this legally. Now that that includes both Nucleon and PRISM, 817 00:46:51,760 --> 00:46:56,160 Speaker 1: which cover those content. Uh, let's talk about a little bit, 818 00:46:56,239 --> 00:46:58,399 Speaker 1: just really briefly, kind of wrap this up and talk 819 00:46:58,440 --> 00:47:00,960 Speaker 1: about some of the responses we've seen. I've got two 820 00:47:01,000 --> 00:47:05,000 Speaker 1: specific ones I wanted to mention, uh, responses to this 821 00:47:05,080 --> 00:47:07,879 Speaker 1: information coming to light. Keeping in mind that a lot 822 00:47:07,880 --> 00:47:10,440 Speaker 1: of the politicians knew at least some of this already 823 00:47:10,440 --> 00:47:13,560 Speaker 1: because they were on the committees that formed this stuff, 824 00:47:14,040 --> 00:47:18,279 Speaker 1: but we're not able to really talk about it. Representative F. 825 00:47:18,520 --> 00:47:23,360 Speaker 1: James Simpson Brenner Jr. Who is a representative from Wisconsin. 826 00:47:23,400 --> 00:47:26,759 Speaker 1: He's a Republican. He's also one of the architects of 827 00:47:26,840 --> 00:47:31,279 Speaker 1: the Patriot Act, said that Congress intended the patriotch to 828 00:47:31,280 --> 00:47:35,960 Speaker 1: allow the intelligence communities to access targeted information for specific investigations. 829 00:47:36,000 --> 00:47:40,360 Speaker 1: And he says, how can every call that every American 830 00:47:40,440 --> 00:47:43,680 Speaker 1: makes or receives be relevant to a specific investigation? So 831 00:47:43,719 --> 00:47:46,520 Speaker 1: again he's asking that same question, how can you justify 832 00:47:46,560 --> 00:47:50,400 Speaker 1: collecting everything? Um And then I say says, well, we 833 00:47:50,440 --> 00:47:54,560 Speaker 1: don't consider the collecting part to be seizure, Like we don't. 834 00:47:55,920 --> 00:47:58,040 Speaker 1: It's on a server, but we're not doing anything with it, 835 00:47:58,040 --> 00:48:01,440 Speaker 1: we're not searching it. But there are other arguments that 836 00:48:01,480 --> 00:48:03,040 Speaker 1: are being made. They're saying this is kind of a 837 00:48:03,080 --> 00:48:07,480 Speaker 1: slippery slop technicality. Yeah, shut up right, Like like what 838 00:48:07,600 --> 00:48:10,160 Speaker 1: if you wanted to search it? You totally could write, 839 00:48:10,239 --> 00:48:12,799 Speaker 1: you know whatever. The legal the legal definition of shut 840 00:48:12,840 --> 00:48:14,719 Speaker 1: up is is what a lot of people are saying 841 00:48:14,800 --> 00:48:17,640 Speaker 1: right now. Yeah. So there and there are people who 842 00:48:17,640 --> 00:48:20,080 Speaker 1: are pointing out that, yes, if you have someone who 843 00:48:20,200 --> 00:48:23,359 Speaker 1: has that access, then they can take advantage of it. 844 00:48:23,440 --> 00:48:25,480 Speaker 1: Even if the n s A is doing everything on 845 00:48:25,520 --> 00:48:27,520 Speaker 1: the up and up, if there's just one person who 846 00:48:27,600 --> 00:48:31,680 Speaker 1: has that access, they could have you know. And uh, 847 00:48:31,800 --> 00:48:34,520 Speaker 1: and so there's like and if your response is well, 848 00:48:34,560 --> 00:48:37,920 Speaker 1: how could that happen? You point to Edward Snowdon and 849 00:48:37,960 --> 00:48:41,440 Speaker 1: you say it has happened. Snowden did it. Snowdon did 850 00:48:41,440 --> 00:48:44,000 Speaker 1: it in a way that alerted us to this, which 851 00:48:44,320 --> 00:48:47,160 Speaker 1: for a lot of people means that he's a whistleblower, 852 00:48:47,440 --> 00:48:50,000 Speaker 1: but that that's an example saying here's someone who did 853 00:48:50,040 --> 00:48:54,439 Speaker 1: an unauthorized access of that information. And Snowdon had even 854 00:48:54,480 --> 00:48:57,480 Speaker 1: said that it would be possible for him to listen 855 00:48:57,480 --> 00:49:00,480 Speaker 1: in on any phone call at all if he wanted to. UH, 856 00:49:00,520 --> 00:49:02,160 Speaker 1: and the n s A has said that it's not 857 00:49:02,280 --> 00:49:04,880 Speaker 1: entirely true. You have to get the approval process. But 858 00:49:05,239 --> 00:49:07,840 Speaker 1: there are others who say, well, what is that approval process? 859 00:49:07,880 --> 00:49:11,160 Speaker 1: How how extensive is it? Does it just require you 860 00:49:11,200 --> 00:49:13,000 Speaker 1: to go to someone and say, hey, can I listen 861 00:49:13,040 --> 00:49:15,160 Speaker 1: to this call? There's sure that you can do it? 862 00:49:15,280 --> 00:49:17,560 Speaker 1: Or is it really formal? And we don't really know, 863 00:49:17,719 --> 00:49:20,880 Speaker 1: We don't know. Yeah, UM, I I like your last 864 00:49:20,880 --> 00:49:22,879 Speaker 1: one to close this out with. I do have one 865 00:49:22,880 --> 00:49:26,680 Speaker 1: from Obama um UH. President Obama has has said about 866 00:49:26,680 --> 00:49:29,239 Speaker 1: the issue. UM I came in with a healthy skepticism 867 00:49:29,280 --> 00:49:32,680 Speaker 1: about these programs. My team evaluated them, We scrubbed them thoroughly. 868 00:49:32,920 --> 00:49:35,480 Speaker 1: We actually expanded some of the oversight and increased some 869 00:49:35,520 --> 00:49:39,480 Speaker 1: of the safeguards you can't have one percent security and 870 00:49:39,520 --> 00:49:44,479 Speaker 1: also then have one percent privacy and zero inconvenience. Yeah, 871 00:49:44,600 --> 00:49:46,600 Speaker 1: there are some Founding fathers who had something to say 872 00:49:46,600 --> 00:49:49,360 Speaker 1: about security and liberty, but I don't want to go 873 00:49:49,440 --> 00:49:53,719 Speaker 1: into that. So, but they're the last one. And yes, 874 00:49:53,760 --> 00:49:56,840 Speaker 1: that's that's so, that's was the president's approach. And again, 875 00:49:57,160 --> 00:49:59,000 Speaker 1: it may very well be that all of that is 876 00:49:59,040 --> 00:50:01,839 Speaker 1: completely sincere and honest, but we just don't know because 877 00:50:01,880 --> 00:50:06,480 Speaker 1: it's classified, right, and it kind of and I was 878 00:50:06,520 --> 00:50:09,680 Speaker 1: probably reading that more snarkily than than than the president 879 00:50:09,880 --> 00:50:12,240 Speaker 1: that it sticks in my crawl a little bit because 880 00:50:12,480 --> 00:50:16,200 Speaker 1: one of the things I specifically remember the Obama administration 881 00:50:16,360 --> 00:50:21,960 Speaker 1: championing when they when when they first came into political power, 882 00:50:22,080 --> 00:50:26,200 Speaker 1: was that they were going to really focus on transparency 883 00:50:26,560 --> 00:50:29,319 Speaker 1: in the government. Now, you can argue that when it 884 00:50:29,360 --> 00:50:34,680 Speaker 1: comes to intelligence transparency is it's counterproductive, it is dangerous, 885 00:50:35,120 --> 00:50:38,840 Speaker 1: But when you look at this information that's been revealed 886 00:50:38,880 --> 00:50:42,399 Speaker 1: and you see the reaction, you can understand why transparency 887 00:50:42,440 --> 00:50:44,560 Speaker 1: is also something that you have to at least consider, 888 00:50:44,719 --> 00:50:49,080 Speaker 1: at least talk about, here's here's the legal procedure that 889 00:50:49,120 --> 00:50:51,560 Speaker 1: we do, and here's how we do it. That doesn't 890 00:50:51,600 --> 00:50:55,640 Speaker 1: necessarily tell you anything about who's being targeted, although we've 891 00:50:55,640 --> 00:50:57,719 Speaker 1: got plenty of nations out there who are now up 892 00:50:57,719 --> 00:51:01,759 Speaker 1: in arms about this, and then we wanted to end this. Uh. 893 00:51:01,840 --> 00:51:06,439 Speaker 1: The former president Jimmy Carter said about Snowdon, he said, 894 00:51:06,800 --> 00:51:11,279 Speaker 1: he's obviously violated the laws of America for which he's responsible, 895 00:51:11,480 --> 00:51:14,400 Speaker 1: but I think the invasion of human rights and American 896 00:51:14,440 --> 00:51:17,600 Speaker 1: privacy has gone too far. I think that the secrecy 897 00:51:17,640 --> 00:51:20,560 Speaker 1: that has been surrounding this invasion of privacy has been excessive. 898 00:51:20,840 --> 00:51:22,719 Speaker 1: So I think that the bringing of it to the 899 00:51:22,719 --> 00:51:26,680 Speaker 1: public notice has probably been in the long term beneficial. 900 00:51:26,960 --> 00:51:29,160 Speaker 1: So in other words, he says, Snowdon is still responsible 901 00:51:29,160 --> 00:51:32,080 Speaker 1: for his actions and maybe he should be held accountable. 902 00:51:32,160 --> 00:51:35,000 Speaker 1: That's not what he's arguing here. What he's arguing is 903 00:51:35,040 --> 00:51:37,359 Speaker 1: that this is stuff that we kind of needed to know. 904 00:51:37,480 --> 00:51:39,359 Speaker 1: And keep in mind, this is the same president who 905 00:51:39,520 --> 00:51:43,800 Speaker 1: signed FAISA into law in place, so that's an interesting 906 00:51:43,840 --> 00:51:46,960 Speaker 1: thing to end on. Now. Again, we have our own 907 00:51:47,000 --> 00:51:49,439 Speaker 1: opinions about this, and obviously, I mean, you you can 908 00:51:49,480 --> 00:51:52,200 Speaker 1: tell what they are. It's not like we've been terribly 909 00:51:52,280 --> 00:51:55,120 Speaker 1: subtle or but that's not you know, we're not trying 910 00:51:55,160 --> 00:51:57,600 Speaker 1: to We've not been nearly as secretive as the n 911 00:51:57,719 --> 00:52:01,319 Speaker 1: s A and sorry, and and and again it may 912 00:52:01,400 --> 00:52:03,520 Speaker 1: turn out like I'm trying to keep as open in 913 00:52:03,600 --> 00:52:06,840 Speaker 1: mind about this as possible. But it's just that a 914 00:52:06,880 --> 00:52:09,279 Speaker 1: lot of warning flags have been raised because of this, 915 00:52:09,600 --> 00:52:13,799 Speaker 1: and national securities is certainly extraordinarily important all the time. YEA. 916 00:52:14,239 --> 00:52:16,879 Speaker 1: So it's not that it's not that we are going 917 00:52:16,920 --> 00:52:19,400 Speaker 1: to say that we know better than anybody else. Obviously 918 00:52:19,440 --> 00:52:22,080 Speaker 1: that's not the case. Mostly what we want is just 919 00:52:22,160 --> 00:52:25,560 Speaker 1: more information, because Uh, it is very easy to come 920 00:52:25,560 --> 00:52:27,759 Speaker 1: to the wrong conclusion when you don't have enough, and 921 00:52:27,840 --> 00:52:30,600 Speaker 1: I am fully aware of that. But it does raise 922 00:52:30,680 --> 00:52:32,560 Speaker 1: some concerns, and I'm glad that there are people who 923 00:52:32,600 --> 00:52:36,200 Speaker 1: are looking into it and and really examining this and 924 00:52:36,239 --> 00:52:38,840 Speaker 1: making sure that this that the n Essays approach is 925 00:52:38,880 --> 00:52:42,000 Speaker 1: in fact the best one to do, as opposed to 926 00:52:42,040 --> 00:52:45,360 Speaker 1: some alternative And uh. And so you know, whether you 927 00:52:45,440 --> 00:52:49,120 Speaker 1: think Snowdon is a hero or a villain, personally, I 928 00:52:49,200 --> 00:52:51,080 Speaker 1: kind of just I don't really think of him as either. 929 00:52:51,120 --> 00:52:53,080 Speaker 1: I think of him as a human being who acted 930 00:52:53,160 --> 00:52:57,040 Speaker 1: on his own principles which were not in alignment with 931 00:52:57,120 --> 00:53:02,240 Speaker 1: the principles of his contractual employe er. Um, that sometimes happens. 932 00:53:02,440 --> 00:53:05,160 Speaker 1: I mean, that's why we have uh that's why things 933 00:53:05,200 --> 00:53:07,600 Speaker 1: like weight leaks even exist because if there weren't people 934 00:53:07,640 --> 00:53:10,360 Speaker 1: like that, then there'd be no leaked information. I I 935 00:53:10,640 --> 00:53:16,120 Speaker 1: agree with with former President Carter. Yeah, I agree. So 936 00:53:16,480 --> 00:53:18,799 Speaker 1: we're wrapping this up, guys. If you have suggestions for 937 00:53:18,920 --> 00:53:22,319 Speaker 1: future topics, we do plan on eventually covering topics like 938 00:53:22,360 --> 00:53:26,399 Speaker 1: the actual technical approaches to things like wire tapping and 939 00:53:26,600 --> 00:53:30,600 Speaker 1: this prism approach. How might uh N s A gathered 940 00:53:30,640 --> 00:53:34,720 Speaker 1: data without even approaching a major company. There are some 941 00:53:34,880 --> 00:53:38,440 Speaker 1: kind of tricky things they might do. Um, but we'll 942 00:53:38,480 --> 00:53:41,000 Speaker 1: talk about that in another episode and we'll break it up. 943 00:53:41,040 --> 00:53:45,000 Speaker 1: We're gonna do something fun next time. So robot puppies. 944 00:53:45,640 --> 00:53:49,319 Speaker 1: Robot puppies. Yeah, more togogy. So we're wrapping this up. 945 00:53:49,320 --> 00:53:51,719 Speaker 1: If you have any suggestions for future episodes, please get 946 00:53:51,760 --> 00:53:56,000 Speaker 1: into contact with us. We can be contacted at email address, 947 00:53:56,280 --> 00:53:59,040 Speaker 1: tech stuff at Discovery dot com, or drop us a 948 00:53:59,080 --> 00:54:00,919 Speaker 1: line on Facebook or Twitter. You can find us their 949 00:54:01,080 --> 00:54:03,759 Speaker 1: tech stuff hs W and Lauren and I will talk 950 00:54:03,760 --> 00:54:13,080 Speaker 1: to you again. Really ru Rue for more on this 951 00:54:13,280 --> 00:54:15,759 Speaker 1: and thousands of other topics, does it, how stuff works, 952 00:54:15,800 --> 00:54:27,680 Speaker 1: dot com