WEBVTT - Why Facebook Might Leave the EU

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>And how the tech are you so? Not long ago,

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<v Speaker 1>David Meyer wrote a piece titled even Facebook's critics don't

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<v Speaker 1>grasp how much troubled meta is in and he wrote

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<v Speaker 1>it for Fast Company. And if you've been keeping up

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<v Speaker 1>with meta slash Facebook, you probably have a long list

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<v Speaker 1>of things that Meyer could have been referring to. Could

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<v Speaker 1>it be that various governments, such as the United States

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<v Speaker 1>are frequently scrutinizing meta and calling company leaders to appear

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<v Speaker 1>before legislative bodies to answer tough questions. Could it be

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<v Speaker 1>the fact that TikTok continues to dominate as the social

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<v Speaker 1>platform favored by younger people, meaning that meta slash Facebook's

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<v Speaker 1>user base is slowly aging out and it's not replacing

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<v Speaker 1>it when new younger users. Is it that the company

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<v Speaker 1>jumped the gun in an effort to be the front

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<v Speaker 1>runner to define whatever the heck the metaverse is going

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<v Speaker 1>to be? Well, all of those are factors that should

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<v Speaker 1>be matters of concern for Facebook executives and for shareholders.

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<v Speaker 1>But what Meyer was talking about with something else, something

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<v Speaker 1>involving privacy and the law and a change that happened

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<v Speaker 1>a couple of years ago that has affected everything. So

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<v Speaker 1>on July twenty twenty, the European Union's Court of Justice

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<v Speaker 1>made a decision that would have enormous consequences. It concluded

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<v Speaker 1>that an earlier data transfer process called the EU US

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<v Speaker 1>Privacy Shield was not sufficient to protect the private data

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<v Speaker 1>of EU citizens, and that it would thus be struck down.

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<v Speaker 1>It would be invalidated. This has massive repercussions for companies

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<v Speaker 1>like Meta, not just Mata, in fact, as repercussions for

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<v Speaker 1>any company that operates within the EU, but in fact

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<v Speaker 1>has it's you know, any kind of data transfers that

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<v Speaker 1>exit the EU. So Mark Zuckerberg said essentially that unless

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<v Speaker 1>the EU changes the stance or makes an exception for

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<v Speaker 1>the company, platforms like Facebook and Instagram will have to

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<v Speaker 1>pull out of the European Union. That sounds kind of

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<v Speaker 1>like they're making a threat, right, like somehow you know

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<v Speaker 1>Zuckerberg saying, Hey, if you don't play by my rules,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm taking my ball and going home. But really this

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<v Speaker 1>is more of a plea. It's really more, please, please,

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<v Speaker 1>please don't do this, because I can't do my thing

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<v Speaker 1>if you do. So. Today I thought I would talk

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<v Speaker 1>about what the privacy shield was, why it existed, why

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<v Speaker 1>the EU decided it wasn't sufficient, what they're planning in

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<v Speaker 1>its place, and what all this means for come Benese

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<v Speaker 1>like Meta. To do that, we actually have to look

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<v Speaker 1>back at the history of the EU and its stands

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<v Speaker 1>on data privacy and security. Now, depending on how you

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<v Speaker 1>look at it, the EU really traces its history back

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<v Speaker 1>to the conclusion of World War Two, but the single

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<v Speaker 1>market that we would refer to as the European Union

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<v Speaker 1>would not formally emerge until nine Now. Around that same time,

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<v Speaker 1>there was a growing general awareness about the Internet, in

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<v Speaker 1>large part helped by the introduction of something new called

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<v Speaker 1>the Worldwide Web, and it would take a few years

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<v Speaker 1>for the Web and the Internet at large to really

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<v Speaker 1>gain a foothold in the minds of the mainstream public,

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<v Speaker 1>but some leaders in the EU were already dealing with

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<v Speaker 1>concepts like data privacy. Data privacy doesn't just require you know,

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<v Speaker 1>digital transfers, right like, you don't have to have that

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<v Speaker 1>be part of the process for data privacy to be

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<v Speaker 1>a concern, and in fact, the countries that made up

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<v Speaker 1>the European Union had already been concerned about protecting EU

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<v Speaker 1>citizen privacy when dealing with companies that existed outside the

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<v Speaker 1>European Union. How can you guarantee that their private data

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<v Speaker 1>remains safe when it's going into the hands of companies

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<v Speaker 1>that aren't based in the European Union itself. That had

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<v Speaker 1>already been a concern, but the EU member states knew

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<v Speaker 1>that there needed to be put in place laws that

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<v Speaker 1>could protect citizen data, that there are fundamental rights associated

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<v Speaker 1>with data that have to be protected. To that end,

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<v Speaker 1>the EU built upon an earlier, non binding list of

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<v Speaker 1>guiding principles relating to protecting citizen information. These principles included

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<v Speaker 1>pretty common stuff like alerting someone as to win their

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<v Speaker 1>data would be collected, a requesting consent before the disclose

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<v Speaker 1>that information to some other party. So if you were

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<v Speaker 1>to collect an e uses and information, you would then

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<v Speaker 1>have to get their consent before you could share it

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<v Speaker 1>with someone else, and various other concepts that are pretty

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<v Speaker 1>common to what we see in in privacy protection laws.

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<v Speaker 1>They had been around before the rise of the Internet,

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<v Speaker 1>but because they were non binding, they didn't really have

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<v Speaker 1>any teeth to them. It was like, it would be

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<v Speaker 1>nice if everyone agreed to obey these things, but there

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<v Speaker 1>was no requirement to do so. The EU decided to

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<v Speaker 1>formally establish data privacy rules, though these would have limitations

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<v Speaker 1>to which we'll talk about and that. These rules became

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<v Speaker 1>known as the Data Protection Directive or dp D. This

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<v Speaker 1>directive set out the parameters for when and how entities

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<v Speaker 1>would be allowed to collect European Union citizen information and

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<v Speaker 1>how they could use it. Specifically, you know, how they

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<v Speaker 1>would be allowed to use it if it required a

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<v Speaker 1>transfer outside the EU and U, and also how they

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<v Speaker 1>were to alert citizens of things like collecting their data.

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<v Speaker 1>Each member's state of the EU was responsible for establishing

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<v Speaker 1>a supervisory department to make sure that all parties were

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<v Speaker 1>complying with this directive, and the directive stated that the

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<v Speaker 1>only time data could be shared with countries outside the

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<v Speaker 1>European Union is when those countries could adequately protect the

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<v Speaker 1>data's security. So if a if a country or company

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<v Speaker 1>was unable to do that, then by this directive, it

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<v Speaker 1>would not be allowed to transfer information outside the EU

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<v Speaker 1>now right away. These rules created challenges both within and

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<v Speaker 1>without the EU and when you really break it all down,

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<v Speaker 1>all traffic on the Internet is information, and a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of that information ends up including personal identification information or

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<v Speaker 1>at least personally identify alable information. So you might argue

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<v Speaker 1>that personal information should only include stuff like, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>a legal information like a person's name, or their address,

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<v Speaker 1>or their birth date or maybe the hospital where they

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<v Speaker 1>were born. That kind of stuff. You know, information that

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<v Speaker 1>relates directly to that individual, and when you take this

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<v Speaker 1>information in a hole, it's more or less unique to

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<v Speaker 1>that person. I have to say more or less simply

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<v Speaker 1>because you know, weird stuff. Anyway, that kind of information

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<v Speaker 1>is absolutely important. It is worthy of being protected, and

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<v Speaker 1>it's very easy to define. Right. You could say, this

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<v Speaker 1>information directly corresponds to this individual, therefore we need to

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<v Speaker 1>protect it. But then there's also other information that, well,

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<v Speaker 1>not specifically about a particular individual, could collectively identify that

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<v Speaker 1>person all the same, So an IP address could be

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<v Speaker 1>part of that. You might argue that's personal information, or

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<v Speaker 1>you might argue, well, IP addresses aren't fully reliable because

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<v Speaker 1>you could use something like a VPN which would hide

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<v Speaker 1>your IP address, so you can't just rely on that

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<v Speaker 1>to identify a person. However, it falls into this gray area.

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<v Speaker 1>But then there's stuff like the person's browsing behaviors, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>what they like, what they don't like, how long they

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<v Speaker 1>stay on a page. All of these things can actually

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<v Speaker 1>start to create a digital fingerprint that points to a

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<v Speaker 1>specific person. And it sounds wild, but it really doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>take that many points of data to narrow down folks

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<v Speaker 1>and figure out who created those data points. In the

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<v Speaker 1>old days, doing that would have been tough simply because

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<v Speaker 1>you're talking about a lot of data being generated and

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<v Speaker 1>then trying to suss out what is signaled based on

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<v Speaker 1>all the noise, you know, to actually analyze that information

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<v Speaker 1>to get something useful out of it. It was a

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<v Speaker 1>time consuming process and it just you know, when you

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<v Speaker 1>look at it from a return on investment standpoint. In

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<v Speaker 1>the old days, it just it makes sense, right, unless

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<v Speaker 1>you were going after someone specific for nefarious purposes. You

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<v Speaker 1>wouldn't do that for just anybody because it was too

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<v Speaker 1>much effort. However, we have gotten a lot better at

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<v Speaker 1>analyzing enormous data sets in a short amount of time

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<v Speaker 1>using things like artificial intelligence and machine learning and various algorithms,

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<v Speaker 1>so this has become less of an obstacle. It's not

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<v Speaker 1>like science fiction level yet, but it's pretty darn close.

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<v Speaker 1>So now some of the technical restrictions that meant we

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<v Speaker 1>didn't have to worry about this so much in the

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<v Speaker 1>past aren't really a thing anymore. Anyway, The euse directive

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<v Speaker 1>meant that the United States, that the country you know,

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<v Speaker 1>where the Internet got its start, would need to figure

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<v Speaker 1>out a way to comply with this set of rules

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<v Speaker 1>if it wanted to allow information to pass between the

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<v Speaker 1>US and the EU. Because a lot of these companies,

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<v Speaker 1>their servers all exist within the United States, so by

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<v Speaker 1>the nature of their business this any any information that

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<v Speaker 1>would be coming from the European Union would have to

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<v Speaker 1>go across the Atlantic to a server in the US.

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<v Speaker 1>To that end, some EU officials began to piece together

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<v Speaker 1>what would become known as the International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles.

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<v Speaker 1>Now we're going to take a quick break, but when

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<v Speaker 1>we come back, I'll talk a bit about Safe Harbor,

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<v Speaker 1>what it was meant to do, and why it no

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<v Speaker 1>longer is a thing. But first, these messages, the International

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<v Speaker 1>Safe Harbor Privacy Principles. What the heck was this? Well,

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<v Speaker 1>it was a program that US companies could apply to join.

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<v Speaker 1>The companies would apply for certification, and that certification essentially

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<v Speaker 1>said these companies are taking the necessary steps to protect

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<v Speaker 1>user data so they can be considered to be compliant

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<v Speaker 1>with the Data Protection Directive that the EU had obviously passed.

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<v Speaker 1>So ultimately, the goal here was to prevent the accidental

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<v Speaker 1>disclosure of EU citizen private information that happened to be

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<v Speaker 1>stored on servers within the United States so it's outside

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<v Speaker 1>the e use control. This was the system by which

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<v Speaker 1>companies would guarantee they would make sure that data would

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<v Speaker 1>remain safe. The Safe Harbor system became effective in two thousand.

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<v Speaker 1>It took several years for it to formalize and then

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<v Speaker 1>to be enacted, and US companies that receive certification under

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<v Speaker 1>Safe Harbor and then registered with the EU would be

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<v Speaker 1>allowed to operate things that would transfer data between the

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<v Speaker 1>U S and EU without much trouble. Oh and in

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<v Speaker 1>order to qualify, those companies would also have to be

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<v Speaker 1>companies that were regulated by the United States FTC, Federal

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<v Speaker 1>Trade Commission, or the Department of Transportation. Those were the

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<v Speaker 1>only companies that could qualify for Safe Harbor. Anything that

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<v Speaker 1>didn't fall into those categories was an exception, and that

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<v Speaker 1>actually cuts back on a lot of businesses, believe it

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<v Speaker 1>or not. Now, something that I'm sure will not surprise

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<v Speaker 1>many of you out there is that various reviews that

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<v Speaker 1>were done on this system showed that a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>the participating US companies were not complying with the program,

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<v Speaker 1>at least not to the extent that they should. Companies

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<v Speaker 1>were found to be reluctant to actually enforce the principles

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<v Speaker 1>defined by the Safe Harbor program, and questions arose as

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<v Speaker 1>to whether or not the industry could really be self regulating,

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<v Speaker 1>like can we trust these companies to regulate themselves? And

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<v Speaker 1>of course we can't. All right, so quick side rant,

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<v Speaker 1>But this applies directly to the topic. So, the currency

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<v Speaker 1>of the modern world isn't bitcoin, It's not any other

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<v Speaker 1>cryptocurrency because it goes a level deeper than that. The

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<v Speaker 1>currency of the modern world is information. Data is valuable

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<v Speaker 1>you or data is valuable. If it weren't companies like

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<v Speaker 1>Meta Slash, Facebook or Google, they wouldn't even exist if

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<v Speaker 1>your data had no value. These companies depend upon us

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<v Speaker 1>generating information, which the companies can then leverage in various ways. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>an obvious way they do this is through advertising, specifically

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<v Speaker 1>targeted advertising. You know, by analyzing the information I generate,

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<v Speaker 1>a platform like Facebook or Google can suss out what

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<v Speaker 1>matters to me and to compare my experience with ads

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<v Speaker 1>that are more likely to get my attention and my action.

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<v Speaker 1>That is money right there that is incredibly valuable to

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<v Speaker 1>these platforms. It's incredibly valuable to the advertisers and to

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<v Speaker 1>their clients. So my information does have value. Yours does too.

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<v Speaker 1>But even beyond targeted advertising, this information has incredible value.

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<v Speaker 1>Through real time analysis of browsing data across millions or

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<v Speaker 1>hundreds of millions of users, platforms can detect and respond

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<v Speaker 1>to trends before anyone is even aware that there is

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<v Speaker 1>a trend there. So I think back to the description

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<v Speaker 1>of chaos theory that says, imagine the flap of butterflies

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<v Speaker 1>wings in South America setting into motion the variables that

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<v Speaker 1>are necessary to generate a typhoon that hits Southeast Asia.

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<v Speaker 1>That it without that one instigating event, the variables are

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<v Speaker 1>not in the right place to make that happen. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>think for a moment about how many people use platforms

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<v Speaker 1>like Google or Amazon or Facebook individually that users. Data

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<v Speaker 1>is valuable, right, but collectively across all users, that can

0:14:47.040 --> 0:14:51.040
<v Speaker 1>drive corporate strategy. So there should be absolutely no surprise

0:14:51.080 --> 0:14:56.520
<v Speaker 1>that companies are eager to exploit information personal information. It's

0:14:56.680 --> 0:15:01.280
<v Speaker 1>key to their business model and their success. Which is

0:15:01.320 --> 0:15:03.680
<v Speaker 1>why it's also not a big surprise that a lot

0:15:03.680 --> 0:15:06.080
<v Speaker 1>of companies were slacking off when it came to self

0:15:06.120 --> 0:15:10.800
<v Speaker 1>regulation and complying with the principles of safe harbor. If

0:15:10.840 --> 0:15:12.840
<v Speaker 1>the companies could get away with it, if they could

0:15:12.920 --> 0:15:17.200
<v Speaker 1>operate without having to actually worry about complying with these rules,

0:15:17.480 --> 0:15:19.960
<v Speaker 1>then they do it. And I'm sure there were no

0:15:20.040 --> 0:15:24.320
<v Speaker 1>shortage of companies that weren't being outright nefarious or flaunting

0:15:24.360 --> 0:15:27.800
<v Speaker 1>the law or anything like that. But we're falling short

0:15:27.840 --> 0:15:30.160
<v Speaker 1>of holding up to their end of the bargain, you know,

0:15:30.320 --> 0:15:32.720
<v Speaker 1>because it's also hard to do. It's hard to pull

0:15:32.760 --> 0:15:35.760
<v Speaker 1>off and still do business in a way that is

0:15:35.800 --> 0:15:39.600
<v Speaker 1>cost effective. Right, in order to comply with these rules,

0:15:40.160 --> 0:15:43.880
<v Speaker 1>you do have to spend some money, honestly, was what

0:15:44.000 --> 0:15:46.320
<v Speaker 1>it really comes down to. It might not be money money,

0:15:46.320 --> 0:15:49.360
<v Speaker 1>it might be more assets and resources or time or whatever,

0:15:50.200 --> 0:15:53.720
<v Speaker 1>but it's ultimately a cost. Whatever the reason, it was

0:15:53.720 --> 0:15:57.760
<v Speaker 1>clear that this particular approach to protecting information wasn't sufficient

0:15:57.840 --> 0:16:01.320
<v Speaker 1>if the EU actually wanted to keep EU citizen information

0:16:01.360 --> 0:16:05.120
<v Speaker 1>secure and servers that weren't even in the European Union

0:16:05.600 --> 0:16:07.640
<v Speaker 1>all right. Flash forward to two thousand and twelve, the

0:16:07.680 --> 0:16:10.440
<v Speaker 1>EU decided it needed to take another stab at creating

0:16:10.480 --> 0:16:15.080
<v Speaker 1>a unified data protection law to replace the Data Protection Directive.

0:16:15.760 --> 0:16:19.320
<v Speaker 1>So the Director had ultimately been too lucy goosey, and

0:16:19.360 --> 0:16:22.440
<v Speaker 1>that meant that different member nations had different principles and

0:16:22.600 --> 0:16:27.640
<v Speaker 1>enforcement strategies. It was two piecemeal and it wasn't unified

0:16:27.720 --> 0:16:31.160
<v Speaker 1>the way a European Union needed to be. So this

0:16:31.360 --> 0:16:35.080
<v Speaker 1>new law would resolve the various differences between the different

0:16:35.280 --> 0:16:38.520
<v Speaker 1>implementations and the member states of the EU and create

0:16:38.520 --> 0:16:42.120
<v Speaker 1>a more coherent policy that it was EU wide and

0:16:42.160 --> 0:16:47.320
<v Speaker 1>would protect citizen data privacy. That took four years two

0:16:47.640 --> 0:16:52.040
<v Speaker 1>actually formalize, but in April fourteen sixteen, the EU approved

0:16:52.320 --> 0:16:55.160
<v Speaker 1>the new set of rules called the General Data Protection

0:16:55.200 --> 0:16:59.120
<v Speaker 1>Regulation or g d p R, and this became a

0:16:59.200 --> 0:17:02.480
<v Speaker 1>truly huge deal for any company outside the EU that

0:17:02.600 --> 0:17:06.560
<v Speaker 1>wanted to do business inside the EU, particularly for Internet

0:17:06.560 --> 0:17:11.000
<v Speaker 1>based companies. The rules covered any entity that processed or

0:17:11.040 --> 0:17:15.480
<v Speaker 1>transmitted data from within the EU to somewhere else. A

0:17:15.560 --> 0:17:18.440
<v Speaker 1>whole bunch of other stuff was in those rules too,

0:17:18.480 --> 0:17:20.359
<v Speaker 1>But I've done episodes about g d p R in

0:17:20.359 --> 0:17:23.000
<v Speaker 1>the past, so we're just gonna say this was a

0:17:23.040 --> 0:17:28.160
<v Speaker 1>more broad, sweeping, and yet unified approach to data privacy,

0:17:28.200 --> 0:17:30.960
<v Speaker 1>and it created big old headaches for companies around the

0:17:30.960 --> 0:17:33.680
<v Speaker 1>world to ensure that they were compliant with g DPR.

0:17:34.080 --> 0:17:37.480
<v Speaker 1>In fact, to this day, that's still a big thing. Ultimately,

0:17:38.040 --> 0:17:40.119
<v Speaker 1>that's at the heart of the meta problem we were

0:17:40.160 --> 0:17:43.000
<v Speaker 1>talking about. It was g d p R that would

0:17:43.040 --> 0:17:45.760
<v Speaker 1>necessitate things like a pop up message that would alert

0:17:45.840 --> 0:17:49.200
<v Speaker 1>users to a sites reliance on web cookies, for example,

0:17:49.240 --> 0:17:53.040
<v Speaker 1>because that's a type of tracking. It would also require

0:17:53.119 --> 0:17:56.719
<v Speaker 1>foreign services to expressly ask for the consent of users

0:17:56.720 --> 0:17:59.479
<v Speaker 1>in order to collect their data. And you know, companies

0:17:59.520 --> 0:18:01.800
<v Speaker 1>tried to find in different creative ways to get around

0:18:01.840 --> 0:18:05.440
<v Speaker 1>that to maximize the number of people who had quote

0:18:05.520 --> 0:18:09.960
<v Speaker 1>unquote uh agree to this by making it a difficult

0:18:09.960 --> 0:18:13.520
<v Speaker 1>thing to opt out of. That doesn't fly very well

0:18:13.520 --> 0:18:14.840
<v Speaker 1>on the g d PR. There are a lot of

0:18:14.840 --> 0:18:18.920
<v Speaker 1>regulatory agencies that pounce on that kind of practice. They're

0:18:18.920 --> 0:18:21.840
<v Speaker 1>also supposed to explain how information is going to be used,

0:18:21.880 --> 0:18:24.159
<v Speaker 1>and to give people the opportunity to opt out of

0:18:24.200 --> 0:18:26.960
<v Speaker 1>any data collection and that kind of thing. So the

0:18:27.040 --> 0:18:30.359
<v Speaker 1>g d p R replaced the Data Protection Directive and

0:18:30.400 --> 0:18:35.320
<v Speaker 1>became enforceable in all right now in the meantime where

0:18:35.560 --> 0:18:38.639
<v Speaker 1>that was happening, the Safe Harbor Principles, which remember this

0:18:38.720 --> 0:18:42.720
<v Speaker 1>was a framework that companies could follow in order to

0:18:42.720 --> 0:18:47.119
<v Speaker 1>be considered UH safe under g d p R rules

0:18:48.119 --> 0:18:52.919
<v Speaker 1>that had already been invalidated by the EU in ten

0:18:53.520 --> 0:18:55.720
<v Speaker 1>They said, well, you know, Data Protection Directive is not

0:18:55.840 --> 0:18:59.400
<v Speaker 1>sufficient and Safe Harbor, which was designed to work within

0:18:59.520 --> 0:19:03.600
<v Speaker 1>Data protet Action Directive that by extension, is not sufficient,

0:19:03.680 --> 0:19:07.040
<v Speaker 1>so it doesn't apply anymore. It was not robust enough

0:19:07.440 --> 0:19:10.920
<v Speaker 1>to satisfy the requirements of the upcoming g DPR. So

0:19:11.200 --> 0:19:14.520
<v Speaker 1>the European Commission and the United States government negotiated a

0:19:14.560 --> 0:19:19.760
<v Speaker 1>new political agreement to codify rules on how commercial transatlantic

0:19:19.800 --> 0:19:23.479
<v Speaker 1>exchanges of personal information from EU citizens to U S

0:19:23.480 --> 0:19:28.040
<v Speaker 1>servers could actually happen. Those rules would become known as

0:19:28.080 --> 0:19:33.359
<v Speaker 1>the EU US Privacy Shield. Like the Safe Harbor Principles,

0:19:33.400 --> 0:19:35.720
<v Speaker 1>this was really meant to create a framework in which

0:19:35.760 --> 0:19:41.040
<v Speaker 1>companies could operate legally within the European Union. US companies

0:19:41.080 --> 0:19:43.440
<v Speaker 1>that gather user data would have to comply with this

0:19:43.600 --> 0:19:46.159
<v Speaker 1>set of rules in order to make services available to

0:19:46.200 --> 0:19:49.960
<v Speaker 1>citizens in the EU, Otherwise they would be violating privacy

0:19:50.040 --> 0:19:54.000
<v Speaker 1>law in Europe. Like the previous system, the Privacy Shield

0:19:54.040 --> 0:19:57.840
<v Speaker 1>includes guiding principles that all organizations are expected to follow.

0:19:58.400 --> 0:20:02.320
<v Speaker 1>While it beefed up some other protections incorporated into the

0:20:02.400 --> 0:20:06.399
<v Speaker 1>previous systems, critics were worried that there were still some

0:20:06.480 --> 0:20:10.959
<v Speaker 1>big gaps in the Privacy Shield process and that ultimately

0:20:11.600 --> 0:20:14.800
<v Speaker 1>it would get challenged and struck down by the European Commission,

0:20:15.400 --> 0:20:18.639
<v Speaker 1>and those concerns likely went into overdrive in twenty seventeen

0:20:19.080 --> 0:20:22.480
<v Speaker 1>when then President Donald Trump signed an executive order that

0:20:22.600 --> 0:20:26.520
<v Speaker 1>denied US privacy protections to anyone who is not a

0:20:26.640 --> 0:20:30.159
<v Speaker 1>US citizen or resident. So, in other words, according to

0:20:30.200 --> 0:20:34.159
<v Speaker 1>that executive order, US companies would not be held accountable

0:20:34.720 --> 0:20:38.280
<v Speaker 1>for guaranteeing data privacy and security for any non US

0:20:38.359 --> 0:20:42.440
<v Speaker 1>citizens or residents. Considering that g DPR demands that any

0:20:42.600 --> 0:20:47.040
<v Speaker 1>entity that transfers e U citizen data overseas must protect

0:20:47.040 --> 0:20:50.480
<v Speaker 1>that information, that was a problem. By the way. Joe

0:20:50.520 --> 0:20:54.560
<v Speaker 1>Biden would later rescind that executive order in one but

0:20:54.600 --> 0:20:58.880
<v Speaker 1>by then things that already changed in Europe. So we're

0:20:58.920 --> 0:21:02.320
<v Speaker 1>going to talk about those chain ages and how Privacy

0:21:02.320 --> 0:21:05.399
<v Speaker 1>Shield would follow in the footsteps of Safe Harbor and

0:21:05.480 --> 0:21:17.560
<v Speaker 1>get invalidated after we come back from these messages. So,

0:21:17.680 --> 0:21:20.800
<v Speaker 1>as I was alluding before the break the critics of

0:21:20.840 --> 0:21:25.680
<v Speaker 1>the Privacy Shield process who said this is not going

0:21:25.760 --> 0:21:28.679
<v Speaker 1>to be seen as sufficient, that we're absolutely right. The

0:21:28.720 --> 0:21:32.800
<v Speaker 1>EU Commission reviewed the Privacy Shield policy in twenty and

0:21:32.840 --> 0:21:36.280
<v Speaker 1>determined that it was not enough to protect EU citizen

0:21:36.560 --> 0:21:40.800
<v Speaker 1>private data and struck it down. Specifically, there were concerns

0:21:40.840 --> 0:21:44.200
<v Speaker 1>that the US government would be able to conduct surveillance

0:21:44.320 --> 0:21:48.479
<v Speaker 1>on EU citizen data and that under EU law that

0:21:48.520 --> 0:21:51.880
<v Speaker 1>was a violation of of human rights and freedom rights

0:21:51.880 --> 0:21:56.000
<v Speaker 1>of EU citizens. So there was a need to formulate

0:21:56.160 --> 0:22:00.639
<v Speaker 1>yet another data privacy framework that would address this issue,

0:22:01.080 --> 0:22:04.240
<v Speaker 1>and that's kind of where we are now. See, without

0:22:04.240 --> 0:22:07.800
<v Speaker 1>a framework, it becomes very difficult to do business in

0:22:07.840 --> 0:22:11.440
<v Speaker 1>the European Union. The framework, you know, it smooths things out,

0:22:11.520 --> 0:22:15.680
<v Speaker 1>it speeds things up because it's it's one point one

0:22:15.720 --> 0:22:19.879
<v Speaker 1>system that companies in say, well specifically the United States,

0:22:20.160 --> 0:22:24.760
<v Speaker 1>can go through in order to qualify to do business

0:22:24.800 --> 0:22:29.320
<v Speaker 1>in the EU and be considered compliant with the rules

0:22:29.320 --> 0:22:34.639
<v Speaker 1>of g d p R. So this new framework is

0:22:34.680 --> 0:22:38.000
<v Speaker 1>still taking shape. It doesn't exist yet, it is in

0:22:38.080 --> 0:22:41.800
<v Speaker 1>the process of existing, and it will take even longer

0:22:41.840 --> 0:22:45.160
<v Speaker 1>for the EU to formalize and adopt and enforce that

0:22:45.280 --> 0:22:49.239
<v Speaker 1>rule once it is finished. In the meantime, we're in

0:22:49.280 --> 0:22:53.040
<v Speaker 1>an era where things are really unstable now. One way

0:22:53.080 --> 0:22:56.679
<v Speaker 1>companies have managed to continue to operate in the absence

0:22:56.840 --> 0:23:00.320
<v Speaker 1>of a formal framework is to file what are called

0:23:00.560 --> 0:23:05.240
<v Speaker 1>standard contractual clauses or sc c s with the EU.

0:23:06.480 --> 0:23:09.200
<v Speaker 1>You can think of this as essentially being a legal agreement,

0:23:10.160 --> 0:23:14.680
<v Speaker 1>and that this legal agreement provides a guarantee that the

0:23:14.760 --> 0:23:20.600
<v Speaker 1>non EU company is taking pains to conform to g

0:23:20.680 --> 0:23:25.239
<v Speaker 1>d p R requirements, so it's essentially saying, you know,

0:23:25.600 --> 0:23:30.600
<v Speaker 1>we're obeying the rules. Securing sccs can be time consuming

0:23:30.680 --> 0:23:34.240
<v Speaker 1>and it isn't a smooth process, at least not as

0:23:34.240 --> 0:23:38.840
<v Speaker 1>smooth as being able to just apply to a framework

0:23:39.119 --> 0:23:43.159
<v Speaker 1>like Privacy Shield or Safe Harbor, so it can be

0:23:43.200 --> 0:23:46.200
<v Speaker 1>a bit of a headache. And now let's talk about

0:23:46.200 --> 0:23:50.320
<v Speaker 1>Ireland and its Data Protection Commission or DPC, because this

0:23:50.359 --> 0:23:55.000
<v Speaker 1>relates directly to the Meta story. The DPC determined back

0:23:55.080 --> 0:24:00.440
<v Speaker 1>in twenty that two of Meta's platforms, namely face Book

0:24:00.680 --> 0:24:04.560
<v Speaker 1>and Instagram, relied on a data controller that could not

0:24:04.800 --> 0:24:09.280
<v Speaker 1>provide a guarantee that data from Irish citizens would be

0:24:09.280 --> 0:24:14.280
<v Speaker 1>protected from US government surveillance, and so by extension that

0:24:14.320 --> 0:24:18.280
<v Speaker 1>would violate data privacy laws in the EU. That would

0:24:18.320 --> 0:24:22.720
<v Speaker 1>also mean that Meta would not qualify for an sc C,

0:24:23.080 --> 0:24:27.199
<v Speaker 1>at least in terms of Facebook and Instagram. WhatsApp, a

0:24:27.240 --> 0:24:30.960
<v Speaker 1>totally different platform, uses a completely different data controller and

0:24:31.240 --> 0:24:34.359
<v Speaker 1>is not part of this like WhatsApp, can operate in

0:24:34.400 --> 0:24:37.679
<v Speaker 1>the EU find because it is not subject to the

0:24:37.800 --> 0:24:43.720
<v Speaker 1>same vulnerabilities that Facebook and Instagram are. Then, last month,

0:24:43.760 --> 0:24:46.600
<v Speaker 1>which for those listening in the future would be July

0:24:46.880 --> 0:24:52.360
<v Speaker 1>of two thousand twenty two, the DPC, this regulatory agency

0:24:52.359 --> 0:24:57.639
<v Speaker 1>in Ireland, filed an updated draft order to shut down

0:24:57.720 --> 0:25:01.560
<v Speaker 1>Instagram and Facebook services in the U and filed that

0:25:01.640 --> 0:25:05.920
<v Speaker 1>with other regulators within the EU. So the other member

0:25:06.000 --> 0:25:09.960
<v Speaker 1>states that have regulated Tory agencies, they all received a

0:25:10.040 --> 0:25:14.359
<v Speaker 1>filing of this updated draft decision. While the contents of

0:25:14.359 --> 0:25:17.440
<v Speaker 1>that order weren't made entirely public, it did become clear

0:25:17.560 --> 0:25:21.840
<v Speaker 1>that DPC was telling other regulators that they should halt

0:25:22.000 --> 0:25:25.600
<v Speaker 1>Facebook and Instagram's ability to transfer EU citizen data to

0:25:25.640 --> 0:25:30.480
<v Speaker 1>the US because it could not guarantee safety against US surveillance.

0:25:30.920 --> 0:25:35.320
<v Speaker 1>This would effectively shut down Facebook and Instagram within the

0:25:35.359 --> 0:25:41.160
<v Speaker 1>European Union and to EU citizens. So let's get into

0:25:41.240 --> 0:25:45.600
<v Speaker 1>some complicated political stuff now. Under Article sixty of the

0:25:45.680 --> 0:25:48.600
<v Speaker 1>g d p R, the rest of the EU's data

0:25:48.640 --> 0:25:53.240
<v Speaker 1>protection agencies have four weeks from that filing to comment

0:25:53.400 --> 0:25:57.640
<v Speaker 1>on the dpc's conclusion. Uh. Those four weeks are up

0:25:57.680 --> 0:26:01.160
<v Speaker 1>this week, by the way. So if after four weeks

0:26:01.200 --> 0:26:05.679
<v Speaker 1>there are no objections to the dpc's decision, which is

0:26:05.840 --> 0:26:09.880
<v Speaker 1>again to essentially shutter Facebook and Instagram within the EU,

0:26:10.560 --> 0:26:17.200
<v Speaker 1>that decision then becomes binding YEWSA. Now, if there are objections,

0:26:17.440 --> 0:26:21.320
<v Speaker 1>which you know likely there are some, then the DPC,

0:26:21.760 --> 0:26:25.800
<v Speaker 1>the Irish regulatory agency, has two weeks to respond and

0:26:25.840 --> 0:26:30.720
<v Speaker 1>address any objections, or alternatively, they can choose not to

0:26:30.800 --> 0:26:34.920
<v Speaker 1>change anything and just submit their decision to the European

0:26:35.320 --> 0:26:38.879
<v Speaker 1>Data Protection Board or e d p B. This is

0:26:38.920 --> 0:26:43.760
<v Speaker 1>like the overall regulatory agency the agency of regulatory agencies,

0:26:44.320 --> 0:26:47.080
<v Speaker 1>and the e d p B would then decide whether

0:26:47.200 --> 0:26:50.440
<v Speaker 1>or not the decision should apply across the European Union.

0:26:50.680 --> 0:26:53.600
<v Speaker 1>The e d p B, which by the way is

0:26:53.680 --> 0:26:57.200
<v Speaker 1>hard to say quickly, would have one month to make

0:26:57.240 --> 0:27:00.520
<v Speaker 1>that decision, uh, though it could also request a month

0:27:00.560 --> 0:27:04.600
<v Speaker 1>extension if the board determined that the matter is complicated

0:27:04.720 --> 0:27:08.399
<v Speaker 1>enough to warrant more consideration, So two months maximum to

0:27:08.480 --> 0:27:12.760
<v Speaker 1>decide on this matter. At that point, After a month

0:27:12.840 --> 0:27:15.520
<v Speaker 1>or two months if it's extended, the board would go

0:27:15.640 --> 0:27:19.320
<v Speaker 1>to a vote. If the vote passes in either direction

0:27:19.359 --> 0:27:23.600
<v Speaker 1>by two thirds majority, then that's the decision. So you

0:27:23.640 --> 0:27:26.040
<v Speaker 1>have to have a two thirds majority for there to

0:27:26.080 --> 0:27:28.720
<v Speaker 1>be a clear decision on the matter. If it doesn't

0:27:28.720 --> 0:27:31.800
<v Speaker 1>get two thirds, then the whole thing is given another

0:27:31.880 --> 0:27:35.240
<v Speaker 1>two weeks of debate and then it goes to another vote,

0:27:35.280 --> 0:27:38.920
<v Speaker 1>and then this one just requires a simple majority. So

0:27:39.080 --> 0:27:42.000
<v Speaker 1>it does get bureaucratically complicated. If like all of this

0:27:42.160 --> 0:27:46.320
<v Speaker 1>plays out, now, will that happen? That's hard to say.

0:27:46.440 --> 0:27:49.560
<v Speaker 1>Let's take a few different scenarios in turn. So Ireland's

0:27:49.600 --> 0:27:53.600
<v Speaker 1>DPC filed the decision in early July, it's already been

0:27:53.640 --> 0:27:57.040
<v Speaker 1>four weeks. So if no other data protection agency in

0:27:57.040 --> 0:28:00.399
<v Speaker 1>the EU has objected to the dpc's conclusion whom the

0:28:00.440 --> 0:28:03.880
<v Speaker 1>decision becomes binding and will know really soon. If some

0:28:03.960 --> 0:28:07.000
<v Speaker 1>data protection agency objected, well, then that adds another two

0:28:07.000 --> 0:28:10.480
<v Speaker 1>weeks for the DPC to respond, at which point, if

0:28:10.480 --> 0:28:14.439
<v Speaker 1>there are no other objections, boom, decision becomes binding or

0:28:14.520 --> 0:28:19.080
<v Speaker 1>the DPC might submit this decision to the overall agency,

0:28:19.160 --> 0:28:22.040
<v Speaker 1>the e d p B. And boy, how do these

0:28:22.080 --> 0:28:24.480
<v Speaker 1>initialisms are really getting clunky? And the e d p

0:28:24.680 --> 0:28:28.200
<v Speaker 1>B would have at least one month at most two

0:28:28.440 --> 0:28:30.679
<v Speaker 1>to come to a vote on the matter. If the

0:28:30.840 --> 0:28:34.040
<v Speaker 1>vote fails to gain two thirds majority in either direction,

0:28:34.119 --> 0:28:37.199
<v Speaker 1>then again another two weeks and then it goes to

0:28:37.240 --> 0:28:41.120
<v Speaker 1>another vote with majority rules. Meta has indicated that it

0:28:41.200 --> 0:28:44.320
<v Speaker 1>might have to shut down its services of Facebook and

0:28:44.320 --> 0:28:47.960
<v Speaker 1>Instagram in the EU anyway, at least until the new

0:28:48.000 --> 0:28:51.720
<v Speaker 1>framework takes effect. The new framework is called the Transatlantic

0:28:51.880 --> 0:28:56.320
<v Speaker 1>Data Privacy Framework, and even then it's uncertain because, after all,

0:28:56.400 --> 0:29:01.000
<v Speaker 1>the European Commission has already determined that two seating frameworks,

0:29:01.040 --> 0:29:05.680
<v Speaker 1>safe Harbor and Privacy Shield, that were meant to be

0:29:05.840 --> 0:29:10.520
<v Speaker 1>in in compliance with EU law, we're lacking and both

0:29:10.560 --> 0:29:13.920
<v Speaker 1>of those got struck down, So there's no guarantee that

0:29:14.040 --> 0:29:17.880
<v Speaker 1>the same thing would not happen yet. Again, this raises

0:29:17.880 --> 0:29:20.760
<v Speaker 1>the question if it's even possible for a company like

0:29:20.840 --> 0:29:23.320
<v Speaker 1>Meta to operate these services in the EU, at least

0:29:23.360 --> 0:29:26.600
<v Speaker 1>the way it has been doing without a massive overhaul

0:29:27.160 --> 0:29:31.080
<v Speaker 1>and its data handling services. Maybe if Meta were to

0:29:31.200 --> 0:29:36.560
<v Speaker 1>establish EU centric servers that were separate from everything else,

0:29:36.560 --> 0:29:39.600
<v Speaker 1>it was not sending EU data to any place outside

0:29:39.640 --> 0:29:43.080
<v Speaker 1>the European Union. It was like a EU specific version

0:29:43.080 --> 0:29:46.640
<v Speaker 1>of Facebook and an EU specific version of Instagram. Maybe

0:29:46.640 --> 0:29:49.200
<v Speaker 1>then it would be fine, but that would be kind

0:29:49.200 --> 0:29:51.160
<v Speaker 1>of ridiculous. Also, I have a feeling that a lot

0:29:51.160 --> 0:29:53.160
<v Speaker 1>of users would be upset that they wouldn't be able

0:29:53.240 --> 0:29:58.600
<v Speaker 1>to access or interact with stuff outside the EU. Or

0:29:58.640 --> 0:30:01.920
<v Speaker 1>if Meta were able to guarantee that it's, you know,

0:30:02.000 --> 0:30:05.920
<v Speaker 1>the the agencies that are handling data from the EU

0:30:06.000 --> 0:30:11.040
<v Speaker 1>to the US were in fact, uh protected against US surveillance,

0:30:11.080 --> 0:30:13.760
<v Speaker 1>then maybe it would be all right. But it can't,

0:30:13.880 --> 0:30:18.080
<v Speaker 1>at least not now. Now. It's possible that this new framework,

0:30:18.120 --> 0:30:21.600
<v Speaker 1>once enacted, would allow METTA to continue operating Facebook and

0:30:21.640 --> 0:30:25.400
<v Speaker 1>Instagram within the EU through some sort of exception, though

0:30:25.440 --> 0:30:29.000
<v Speaker 1>again there's no guarantee that this framework will withstand court scrutiny.

0:30:29.120 --> 0:30:33.000
<v Speaker 1>Over time. This is the situation that Meyer referred to

0:30:33.120 --> 0:30:36.239
<v Speaker 1>in that article in Fast Company that Meta may have

0:30:36.400 --> 0:30:40.080
<v Speaker 1>no choice but to stop offering Facebook and Instagram services

0:30:40.320 --> 0:30:44.360
<v Speaker 1>to EU citizens. Meyer also quotes a Facebook investor named

0:30:44.520 --> 0:30:48.080
<v Speaker 1>Robert mcnami who snarkily said that this could be a

0:30:48.120 --> 0:30:51.400
<v Speaker 1>real disaster for Meta because users would soon figure out

0:30:51.440 --> 0:30:54.680
<v Speaker 1>that they're much better off without access to those platforms.

0:30:55.200 --> 0:30:58.360
<v Speaker 1>I happen to agree with macnamy as someone who got

0:30:58.400 --> 0:31:02.160
<v Speaker 1>off of Instagram and Facebook. Um, I feel like I'm

0:31:02.200 --> 0:31:05.840
<v Speaker 1>better off for doing that. Better off in the larger sense.

0:31:06.160 --> 0:31:08.760
<v Speaker 1>I do miss being able to interact with my friends

0:31:08.920 --> 0:31:12.880
<v Speaker 1>in a concentrated, easy way. It does take a little

0:31:12.920 --> 0:31:16.959
<v Speaker 1>more effort, and you quickly figure out which friends decide

0:31:16.960 --> 0:31:21.320
<v Speaker 1>you're worth that effort, all right. Obviously, the loss of

0:31:21.360 --> 0:31:24.080
<v Speaker 1>a market the size of the European Union would be

0:31:24.160 --> 0:31:27.760
<v Speaker 1>a huge blow to Meta, a company that's already dealing

0:31:28.240 --> 0:31:31.320
<v Speaker 1>with other crises. Not still too early to say if

0:31:31.360 --> 0:31:34.160
<v Speaker 1>that's definitely gonna happen, But no matter what the outcome,

0:31:34.760 --> 0:31:38.960
<v Speaker 1>this ongoing struggle to find ways for non EU companies

0:31:39.000 --> 0:31:42.840
<v Speaker 1>to comply with EU privacy laws is going to be

0:31:42.920 --> 0:31:46.240
<v Speaker 1>an enormous challenge it has been and it will continue

0:31:46.280 --> 0:31:51.120
<v Speaker 1>to be. EU regulators and politicians are exceedingly wary about

0:31:51.120 --> 0:31:54.120
<v Speaker 1>the sincerity of US companies when it comes to their

0:31:54.120 --> 0:31:58.280
<v Speaker 1>claims of protecting information, and for good reason. There's lots

0:31:58.280 --> 0:32:01.400
<v Speaker 1>of evidence to point that we should be suspicious of

0:32:01.440 --> 0:32:04.360
<v Speaker 1>those kinds of claims. And while I have focused on

0:32:04.400 --> 0:32:07.320
<v Speaker 1>Meta in this episode, the truth is those requirements apply

0:32:07.440 --> 0:32:11.240
<v Speaker 1>to all non EU companies. H And I've been really

0:32:11.320 --> 0:32:14.600
<v Speaker 1>focusing on the US here, but that applies to anything

0:32:14.640 --> 0:32:18.080
<v Speaker 1>outside the EU. So doing business in the Internet age

0:32:18.360 --> 0:32:21.760
<v Speaker 1>and doing business within the EU is going to require

0:32:21.840 --> 0:32:25.920
<v Speaker 1>regular investment to assure the EU that companies are playing

0:32:25.920 --> 0:32:28.960
<v Speaker 1>by the rules. And uh, that's just gonna be difficult.

0:32:29.400 --> 0:32:33.160
<v Speaker 1>You have entire companies that exists as consulting firms to

0:32:33.320 --> 0:32:36.760
<v Speaker 1>help other companies make sure that they are complying by

0:32:36.800 --> 0:32:40.520
<v Speaker 1>the rules, because the cost of business if you're found

0:32:40.640 --> 0:32:44.200
<v Speaker 1>by some regulatory agency in the EU too have fallen short,

0:32:44.840 --> 0:32:47.840
<v Speaker 1>is enormous. That's what Meta is going through now. I

0:32:47.880 --> 0:32:51.280
<v Speaker 1>don't know if Facebook and and Instagram or are not

0:32:51.400 --> 0:32:54.920
<v Speaker 1>long for this world in the EU. UM, we will

0:32:54.960 --> 0:32:57.200
<v Speaker 1>have to keep our eyes on it. It wouldn't surprise

0:32:57.280 --> 0:33:00.840
<v Speaker 1>me if we see politicians struggle to make sure that

0:33:00.880 --> 0:33:04.800
<v Speaker 1>there remains access within the EU for these platforms. They're

0:33:04.840 --> 0:33:08.440
<v Speaker 1>incredibly popular, they're important for things like small businesses within

0:33:08.480 --> 0:33:11.680
<v Speaker 1>the EU. But you know, you have the regulators and

0:33:11.680 --> 0:33:15.120
<v Speaker 1>then you have the politicians, and politicians move slowly when

0:33:15.160 --> 0:33:19.760
<v Speaker 1>it comes to creating these policies that sometimes get overturned

0:33:20.000 --> 0:33:25.960
<v Speaker 1>later on, regulators move way faster. So it may see

0:33:25.960 --> 0:33:29.280
<v Speaker 1>that we'll see in eruptions in service, perhaps with a return.

0:33:29.360 --> 0:33:31.560
<v Speaker 1>I mean there you would have to imagine that Meta

0:33:31.560 --> 0:33:34.320
<v Speaker 1>would want to return even if it's business is curtailed

0:33:34.920 --> 0:33:38.800
<v Speaker 1>for you know, some indeterminate length of time, because you

0:33:38.800 --> 0:33:41.720
<v Speaker 1>don't want to leave money on the table. Anyway, I

0:33:41.840 --> 0:33:44.959
<v Speaker 1>thought that that was an interesting topic. It relates heavily

0:33:45.000 --> 0:33:50.480
<v Speaker 1>to technology because ultimately it is very hard to guarantee

0:33:51.400 --> 0:33:56.240
<v Speaker 1>data security. Uh, it's it's hard to do because often

0:33:56.800 --> 0:33:59.840
<v Speaker 1>you come up with ways that data is really valuable

0:34:00.040 --> 0:34:02.720
<v Speaker 1>you want to use it, and sometimes that breaks the

0:34:02.800 --> 0:34:07.040
<v Speaker 1>rules or sometimes it's it's just hard because creating any

0:34:07.160 --> 0:34:11.840
<v Speaker 1>secure system is incredibly difficult. If someone's really determined to

0:34:11.880 --> 0:34:15.400
<v Speaker 1>get access to a secure system, often they can find

0:34:15.400 --> 0:34:19.919
<v Speaker 1>a way. So yeah, a difficult difficult challenge and uh

0:34:20.000 --> 0:34:23.839
<v Speaker 1>you know, the European Union has created laws that in

0:34:23.920 --> 0:34:30.360
<v Speaker 1>many ways have made it difficult to innovate uh in

0:34:30.360 --> 0:34:34.120
<v Speaker 1>in certain ways and also comply with those laws. That's

0:34:34.120 --> 0:34:36.800
<v Speaker 1>not necessarily a bad thing, you know. It may be

0:34:37.000 --> 0:34:40.359
<v Speaker 1>that whatever the innovation was isn't worth the trade off

0:34:40.440 --> 0:34:44.560
<v Speaker 1>in privacy and security, but it also means that it

0:34:44.840 --> 0:34:50.040
<v Speaker 1>creates this extra hurdle that innovators and companies and and

0:34:50.239 --> 0:34:53.120
<v Speaker 1>all sorts of people have to get over in order

0:34:53.160 --> 0:34:56.440
<v Speaker 1>to make their vision a reality. Um. Yeah, it's a

0:34:56.440 --> 0:34:59.640
<v Speaker 1>balancing act. Well, that's it for this episode. If you

0:34:59.680 --> 0:35:02.600
<v Speaker 1>have some sugestions for future episodes of tech Stuff, please

0:35:02.640 --> 0:35:04.319
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0:35:04.360 --> 0:35:07.000
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0:35:26.160 --> 0:35:35.560
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0:35:35.640 --> 0:35:39.120
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