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Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hey you welcome to Stuff to Blow your Mind. My

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Speaker 2: name is Robert Lamb. Joe's out today, so I'm going

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Speaker 2: to present an interview here with Paul Samansky, co author

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Speaker 2: with Jerry Drew of the new book The Battle Beyond

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Speaker 2: Fighting and Winning the Coming War in Space. Paul Smansky

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Speaker 2: has forty nine years of experience in all fields related

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Speaker 2: to space control, policy, strategy, simulation, surveillance, survivability, threat assessment,

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Speaker 2: long range strategic planning, and command and control. I do

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Speaker 2: want to advise listeners that this one gets a little

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Speaker 2: more into topics of contemporary and near future warfare. I

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Speaker 2: realize that is not everyone's cup of tea, so just

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Speaker 2: fair warning about that. But without further ado, let's get

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Speaker 2: right into this fascinating chat. Well, Paul, welcome to the show.

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Speaker 2: The new book is The Battle Beyond Fighting and Winning

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Speaker 2: the Coming War in Space, co authored with Jerry Drew.

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Speaker 2: It's a detailed breakdown of the emerging technologies and ideas

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Speaker 2: that are going to define war and warfare in space.

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Speaker 2: And you've certainly a great deal of expertise in this field.

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Speaker 2: How did you become interested in outer space and how

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Speaker 2: did your career end up moving into this domain of

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Speaker 2: space systems and space warfare.

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Speaker 3: Well, first of all, I actually have six books out.

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Speaker 3: They all begin with the title you know that you mentioned,

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Speaker 3: and then there's various details. One is about how to

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Speaker 3: fight and win space wars. Another one is on sun Zoo,

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Speaker 3: the ancient Chinese philosopher translated from two thousand years ago

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Speaker 3: to space. I always liked the bigger picture thought, and

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Speaker 3: so I've always worked at think tanks, you know, not

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Speaker 3: for fit semi government kinds of things. And the first

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Speaker 3: thing tank I worked at decades ago, I had the

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Speaker 3: option of either working nuclear war or space war. And

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Speaker 3: for a space war, you know, sounds like the what

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Speaker 3: do you call it? Star wars and sort of thing

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Speaker 3: you know from when I was growing up. So is

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Speaker 3: that sounds cooler? I guess I'll go that way. So

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Speaker 3: it was almost a random sequence of events.

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Speaker 2: Let's say the book does a great job of breaking

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Speaker 2: down a lot of the core concepts, you know, forcing

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Speaker 2: the reader to re examine basics that a lot of us,

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Speaker 2: especially general science faders like myself, probably take for granted.

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Speaker 2: So getting down to brass tax as they say, could

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Speaker 2: you remind the listeners what we're talking about when we're

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Speaker 2: talking about the space domain from a military perspective.

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Speaker 3: Well, one thing, and you know, I'm on I've been

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Speaker 3: on the board of directors of Air Force Research Lab

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Speaker 3: with you know, retired general officers and vice admirals, and

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Speaker 3: one was an astronaut who has been up in space

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Speaker 3: five times, you know, and none of them understand how

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Speaker 3: to fight space wars. Really comes down to it when

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Speaker 3: you really think about it, You're not attacking a satellite,

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Speaker 3: You're attacking the mission. Oh, this satellite's providing imagery for

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Speaker 3: the battlefield. We're about to do a sneak attack. We

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Speaker 3: better take out the guy's imagery, you know, So you

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Speaker 3: need to take out the mission. Oh, by the way,

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Speaker 3: the commander in the particular theater is going to say,

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Speaker 3: deny the adversary imagery of the battlefield over these latitude

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Speaker 3: launch coronets and resolution over the next seventy two hours.

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Speaker 3: You know, you figure out how to do it within

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Speaker 3: the laws of armed conflict. So you not only have

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Speaker 3: to take out that satellite, you have to take out

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Speaker 3: the drones you know, doing the same mission, or the

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Speaker 3: guy on a camel with binoculars, So you have to

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Speaker 3: think that bigger picture. And you know, the guys I've

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Speaker 3: worked with, they love the technology. We love the technology

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Speaker 3: in this country. But the whole point of war, and

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Speaker 3: even the ancient Greeks understood this two thousand years ago.

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Speaker 3: The whole point of war is make the other side

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Speaker 3: change their mind, you know. So getting back to you're

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Speaker 3: not attacking the satelle attacking the mission, and you're not

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Speaker 3: even really attacking the mission. You're attacking the mind of

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Speaker 3: the adversary commander who's using that imagery information. So you know,

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Speaker 3: it's kind of information warfare, whatever you want to call it.

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Speaker 3: And that's kind of hard to figure. Like, you know,

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Speaker 3: how do you model human mind? Did he get this

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Speaker 3: information or not? Did he attack left or right? You know,

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Speaker 3: if you had like an extra one hundred million dollars

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Speaker 3: some fiscal year and he said, well, gee, should I

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Speaker 3: buy one of these fancy new space weapons that we've

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Speaker 3: never tried before? Or should I re equip an army

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Speaker 3: brigade with newer tanks or something like that. Now, Okay,

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Speaker 3: there's politics and this and that, but really, what is

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Speaker 3: going to make the war end sooner? With fewer casualties,

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Speaker 3: I guess, or get your point across, you know. And

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Speaker 3: so the army they're very used to, you know, they

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Speaker 3: invented what's called operations research, so they're very used to

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Speaker 3: figuring that out, Like, well, if we take out this bridge,

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Speaker 3: it'll take them twelve hours to get bridge laying equipment,

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Speaker 3: and so we delay the forces, you know, maybe fourteen hours,

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Speaker 3: and we can calculate in general the war ends two

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Speaker 3: days early and there's you know, three percent fewer casually

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Speaker 3: something like that. I mean, something you could kind of say,

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Speaker 3: is that worth a hundred million maybe? You know, but

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Speaker 3: if you could say, oh, this crusty old general in

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Speaker 3: I don't know, North Korea or something like that, who

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Speaker 3: doesn't really believe in space, and you know, even if

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Speaker 3: he gets information from it, he's going to do what

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Speaker 3: he's going to do. He's mind to set. And so

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Speaker 3: is it worth one hundred million dollars for that space

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Speaker 3: weapon program to deny something he doesn't care about anyway?

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Speaker 3: You know, I'm being a wise guy here at this,

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Speaker 3: of course. You know. Let me tell you something a

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Speaker 3: very wise guy, and that is what is the biggest

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Speaker 3: threat from space, and that is something called fobs fractional

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Speaker 3: orbital bombardment system and that's something that the Russians invented

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Speaker 3: in the nineteen sixties. And you know, instead of sending

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Speaker 3: nuclear icbm's north you know, North Pole, they sent they

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Speaker 3: put it into space, the rocket and it comes from

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Speaker 3: the south and avoids American radars and all that stuff,

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Speaker 3: you know. And it was like two three years ago

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Speaker 3: the State Department or military I forget who said, well,

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Speaker 3: you know, China has fobs now the fractional orbital bombardments system,

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Speaker 3: And I'm thinking, okay, you have to again think the

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Speaker 3: bigger picture.

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Speaker 2: So we.

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Speaker 3: If I don't know if any of our listeners have

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Speaker 3: heard of Mayhan the control of the sea. You know,

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Speaker 3: several hundred years ago you're saying about you know, great

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Speaker 3: Britain and controlling say, well, no one's that. I've been

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Speaker 3: able to control really the seas, you know, great Britain, Oh,

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Speaker 3: the English Channel, maybe the Mediterranean, maybe around Hong Kong

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Speaker 3: and India. I've been and all that. But let's theorize

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Speaker 3: and going back to Mayhean, the US is a sea power,

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Speaker 3: it is not a land power. Good luck marching one

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Speaker 3: hundred thousand soldiers across the Atlantic ocean to defend Europe,

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Speaker 3: and we've gotten kind of arrogant that, oh, we're just

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Speaker 3: going to do all these wars around the world and

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Speaker 3: they'll never affect us because we got these oceans, the barriers,

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Speaker 3: and no one could send landing craft that far, you know,

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Speaker 3: and all that, and so we you know, we can

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Speaker 3: get away with a lot. Let's say, now, let's theorize.

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Speaker 3: Let's say you take you know, I'm being facetious here,

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Speaker 3: but two tons of concrete in space and you drop

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Speaker 3: an all eleven American aircraft carriers around the world within

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Speaker 3: forty minutes it comes down mock, I think twenty four

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Speaker 3: Anything coming from space comes that fast, three times hotter

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Speaker 3: than the surface of the Sun. It holds the carrier.

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Speaker 3: There's gonna be you know, gleaming orange, jagged metal. It's

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Speaker 3: gonna hit the ocean, the cold ocean, and a huge

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Speaker 3: steam explosion. The think sinks in a matter of minutes.

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Speaker 3: Now I'm talking about nineteen sixties technology in order to

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Speaker 3: achieve this. And oh, by the way, some reason we

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Speaker 3: screwed up and we don't have hypersonic weapons, but the

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Speaker 3: Russian have been merrily using them in Ukraine, taking out

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Speaker 3: command centers four hundred feet underground, and China the only

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Speaker 3: reason they develop their own hypersonic weapons is, oh, guess what,

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Speaker 3: take out American aircraft carriers. Because it's a point target thing.

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Speaker 3: You know, if you use it on the ground and

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Speaker 3: forces attacking on the ground, oh maybe kill fifty hundred

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Speaker 3: people whatever, But you know, take out command centers aircraft carriers.

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Speaker 3: So I guess what I'm emphasizing is you better control

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Speaker 3: space or you suddenly become a second rate power. What

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Speaker 3: can we do if we no longer have our aircraft carriers,

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Speaker 3: we no longer control the sea. Let's say China controls

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Speaker 3: the sea. They you know, all that oil in the

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Speaker 3: Middle East is worthless if you can't ship it out,

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Speaker 3: And so China starts charging transit fees, you know, anti

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Speaker 3: piracy fees or something. If you don't pay it, we'll

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Speaker 3: sink your ship too. You know, it's real easy nineteen

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Speaker 3: sixties technology. You know, we're not actually talking about the future.

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Speaker 3: It could happen tonight. So China, you know, essentially controls

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Speaker 3: the world. Seems to me, I mean this theoretical, but

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Speaker 3: I don't I can't think of any holes in that

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Speaker 3: at the moment, and I actually I'm writing a novel,

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Speaker 3: a seventh book, and that it will be out in

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Speaker 3: a few months. So okay, that's something to worry about. Now,

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Speaker 3: getting back to the the domain of space, everyone I

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Speaker 3: know keeps in the space force, and you know this

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Speaker 3: has been true of the Air Force I worked with. See.

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Speaker 3: The trouble is, can you think of the last time

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Speaker 3: that the air war was in doubt for the Air Force?

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Speaker 3: And it's like, well, early World War two, not even

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Speaker 3: late World War two, Vietnam, no, you know, in the

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Speaker 3: Middle East. No. So I think there's a certain degree

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Speaker 3: of lazy thinking that goes on because quite frankly, you

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Speaker 3: learn more from defeat than from victory. I mean, we're

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Speaker 3: teaching Russia how to really fight worse nowadays. So probably

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Speaker 3: ninety five percent of space for US is Air Force.

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Speaker 3: So I talked to these generals and you know, lieutenants

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Speaker 3: or colonels and all that, and they keep thinking, tactically, oh,

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Speaker 3: we're kind to you know, slowly maneuver to this satellite

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Speaker 3: and observe it, or maybe shoot it with a pelggon

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Speaker 3: or the French are telling me they were putting up

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Speaker 3: a laser, you know, and all that. But they're not

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Speaker 3: thinking this strategic big picture and that is well, a

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Speaker 3: satellite is strategic. It covers the world. You know, you

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Speaker 3: think you're doing something tactical. Not only are you doing

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Speaker 3: something strategic. And oh, by the way, maybe you're fighting

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Speaker 3: in the Middle of East or Ukraine or something of that,

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Speaker 3: but you're going to attack that satellite in the South Atlantic,

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Speaker 3: you know, from a ship or something, you know, with

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Speaker 3: a laser or direct assent weapon. You have to think

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Speaker 3: the bigger picture global and then you have to think

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Speaker 3: political too, I mean wars, you know political. Unfortunately, we're

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Speaker 3: used to killing people on the ground during war. We're

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Speaker 3: not used to space war. Now. I've noticed this space

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Speaker 3: force the last few years is getting people used to

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Speaker 3: that concept. You know, they keep their marketing campaign getting

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Speaker 3: more and more severe or something like that. But if

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Speaker 3: you take out someone's satellite, you know, it has consequences.

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Speaker 3: Now there's a problem and a beauty with space too,

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Speaker 3: and that is conflict escalation letter and I go over

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Speaker 3: that in the book too. I've started learned that countries

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Speaker 3: are just like children. They'll do anything they want if

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Speaker 3: they can get away with it from their parents. Parents

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Speaker 3: being the United Nations, their own people or whatever. And

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Speaker 3: so you could think you could go to CIA headquarters

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Speaker 3: in Virginia. There's a wall with all the stars of

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Speaker 3: the agents who died in the line of duty. You know,

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Speaker 3: did any of those start a war? Do we even

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Speaker 3: know who they were? I heard I think it was

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Speaker 3: two years ago there was an incident between an American

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Speaker 3: and a Russian submarine in the Sea of Japan. You know,

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Speaker 3: I just read in the paper and that's all they say,

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Speaker 3: an incident because there's no news camera taking it. You know,

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Speaker 3: they don't know. So what I'm getting at is spy warfare,

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Speaker 3: undersea warfare, space warfare. You can get away with a lot,

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Speaker 3: and we have. There's been more intense space war since

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Speaker 3: the nineteen sixties. I can, you know, show you a

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Speaker 3: bunch of those. And like I said, this the war

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Speaker 3: that happened in twenty fourteen Ukraine. I could mathematically prove

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Speaker 3: that through the orbital dynamics. So you really have to

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Speaker 3: thank the bigger picture. You can't think, oh, this satellite

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Speaker 3: is going to come snuggle up to me and start,

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Speaker 3: you know, messing with me or something like that, because

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Speaker 3: that takes days and weeks to accomplish. Well, my simulations

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Speaker 3: have shown space wars over with in twenty four to

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Speaker 3: forty eight hours. You know, a real one. Oh, I've

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Speaker 3: got fifty space weapons going out right now, so you know,

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Speaker 3: I think in some sense we would self deter You know,

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Speaker 3: I've heard at least years ago that we wouldn't attack

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Speaker 3: a satellite that attacked us unless we knew who owned

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Speaker 3: this satellite, you know, And that's kind of hard to do.

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Speaker 3: They're kind of arrogant too, and say, oh, we know

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Speaker 3: what satellites have been launched, and blah blah blah and

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Speaker 3: all that. And I say, well, you know, every two

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Speaker 3: weeks I download the official Air Force Satellite Orbital Catalog,

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Speaker 3: and forty percent of the objects there are considered unknowns.

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Speaker 3: We don't know who launched them, who owns them, and

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Speaker 3: what the mission is, so you know, you know of

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Speaker 3: what's really happening. And so the first step to defeat

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Speaker 3: in space is over confidence. Oh yeah, you know, we're

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Speaker 3: Air Force. We've won every single air war we've had,

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Speaker 3: and we'll win the space war. It doesn't take much.

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Speaker 3: The most popular method is cyber warfare. Any country on

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Speaker 3: Earth has clever young kids who can be hackers and

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Speaker 3: hack a satellite. Every country on Earth has university with

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Speaker 3: high powered lasers that you can kind of gin up

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Speaker 3: and make more accurate and or whatever and mess with satellites.

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Speaker 3: I mean, I have a laser I got on Amazon

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Speaker 3: seven want laser handheld that'll start my furniture on fire

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Speaker 3: across the room in a fraction of a second. You know,

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Speaker 3: we'll put that out of satellite or whatever.

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Speaker 2: You know.

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Speaker 3: I don't think people are really thinking these big pictures

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Speaker 3: and getting at the popularity of cyber warfare. Let me

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Speaker 3: do a thought experiment, and that is let's say you're

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Speaker 3: in a trench in Ukraine and you can hear the

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Speaker 3: Russian tanks revving up, you know, ready to come attack you.

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Speaker 3: And some egghead scientists comes into your trench and he

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Speaker 3: has this black box with the big red button. He says, oh,

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Speaker 3: I've been developing this for years. It's a cyber weapon

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Speaker 3: that you know, if you push that red button, the

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Speaker 3: Russian tanks will stop. You'll mess with their computers or whatever,

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Speaker 3: you know. And you know, I haven't tested this in

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Speaker 3: the field, but it worked in the lab. Don't worry.

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Speaker 3: And and the poor soldiers there, well, what about a

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Speaker 3: bazookah I said, oh, sorreh, well, used up all your

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Speaker 3: funding on this, you know, cyber weapon. You know, so

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Speaker 3: the Russian tanks attack, Oh, they push that button, you know,

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Speaker 3: the tank stop and thirty seconds later they reboot and

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Speaker 3: squish you. You know. So I don't know about you,

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Speaker 3: but as a guy, I find it much more emotionally

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Speaker 3: satisfying to see a burning hole in the ground where

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Speaker 3: the tank used to be, you know, as I did

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Speaker 3: the job. And it's the same kind of with space. Now,

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Speaker 3: of course, I have a whole other briefing. I can

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Speaker 3: present sometime ninety four ways to attack satellites without creating debris.

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Speaker 3: You really don't have to do the debris thing, but

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Speaker 3: you're really not sure. You know, people when they're about

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Speaker 3: to die get very clever. So you're really not sure

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Speaker 3: if the satellite's faking its death, especially if you use

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Speaker 3: the cyber means. You know, you're not even sure exactly

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Speaker 3: who attacked you. I mean, let's say we're at war

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Speaker 3: in the Western Pacific, China, Taiwan, whatever, and you wake

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Speaker 3: up one morning and several of your satellites stopped working. Well,

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Speaker 3: you know, my computer stopped working last month. You know,

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Speaker 3: maybe that same thing happened. Maybe a solar flares irradiated

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Speaker 3: too much, maybe a micro meteorite hit it. Oh it's

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Speaker 3: human cause. Oh this you know, Romanian satellite came too

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Speaker 3: close accidentally you know, Oh, no human cause and intentional. Okay,

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Speaker 3: what is the intent now? Let's say, oh, it's the

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Speaker 3: Chinese attacking us where we were the Well, maybe it's

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Speaker 3: the Russians of the North Koreans messing with you and

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Speaker 3: starting to stir the pot. How do you know who's

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Speaker 3: doing it, what their intent is? Are they going against

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Speaker 3: command and control, decapitation, communication satellites, are the imagery satellites navigation?

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Speaker 3: Are they doing a demonstration attack, like, well, we're showing

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Speaker 3: we're really serious now kind of thing.

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Speaker 2: One of the things that I found really interesting in

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Speaker 2: the book was talking about these various ways, and I

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Speaker 2: believe these are a mix of proven technologies and maybe

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Speaker 2: some of them are more possible for the future, but

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Speaker 2: the ways that satellites can and will do battle with

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Speaker 2: one another. I believe you already mentioned grappling as a

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Speaker 2: mechanical grappling, but there are some other techniques in there,

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Speaker 2: and I thought you might discuss some of those.

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Speaker 3: Well, I've come up with some on my own head.

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Speaker 3: But you know, most of not all satellites have to

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Speaker 3: point very accurately at the Earth, their antennas, their imagery, whatever.

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Speaker 3: So they had what are called star sensors, you know,

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Speaker 3: in the back of satellite, look at the stars, and

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Speaker 3: they could orient themselves because there's no up so to speak,

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Speaker 3: in space. And I theorize, well, if you've got one

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Speaker 3: of these inspector maintenance satellites, whatever, and you float behind

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Speaker 3: it and present an upside down star chart to it

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Speaker 3: with the satellite flip over, because these are just dumb machines,

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Speaker 3: you know, So there's a lot of techniques. I don't know,

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Speaker 3: you know, if that would work. Certainly to my mind,

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Speaker 3: it's most effective weapon, not timeliness wise, but if someone

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Speaker 3: comes up there with the manipulator and you know China,

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Speaker 3: they gleefully told us about one of their supposedly dead

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Speaker 3: satellites and they used a satellite, came up close with

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Speaker 3: manipular arm and pulled it to what's called well sort

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Speaker 3: of graveyard orbit. It's very suspicious, but any rate, so

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Speaker 3: you can pull satellite out of orbit. But it's an

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Speaker 3: ideal weapon. A satellite coming up close to you, because

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Speaker 3: it's sort of like taking a satellite, putting in a wheelbarrow,

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Speaker 3: going in your garage and going at it. Well, let's

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Speaker 3: drill a hole, let's cut this wire, let's bend this,

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Speaker 3: let's all that. You know. Oh, let's paint the optics

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Speaker 3: with something that you know floats away a few weeks

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Speaker 3: later or something. You know. So you do a lot

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Speaker 3: of messing and there's a lot of people and unfortunately

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Speaker 3: one of them's Eline muss And I love Musk, but

336
00:20:58,400 --> 00:21:01,280
Speaker 3: who want to play the commercial entities who want to

337
00:21:01,280 --> 00:21:07,800
Speaker 3: play with army soldiers like children, And you know, Musk said, oh,

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Speaker 3: I'm going to give Ukraine these starlink terminals and all that.

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Speaker 3: And I'm pretty sure Russia attacked his systems for that,

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Speaker 3: but they don't really understand the consequences. And it's sort

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Speaker 3: of like Merchant Marine in World War Two. Well they

342
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Speaker 3: got sank two, you know. And I think I believe

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Speaker 3: there have been attacks on multiple satellite systems, not only

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Speaker 3: cyber attacks but others during the Ukrainian conflict. So this

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Speaker 3: thought that oh, I'm just going to play war and

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Speaker 3: the military is doing that too, that we're going to

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Speaker 3: take these satellites commercial statists and use them. And you know,

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Speaker 3: the commercial ones have really cool technology and probably cheaper

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Speaker 3: and so forth, But who pays for them when they

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Speaker 3: get attacked? I don't know how that works. And you know,

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Speaker 3: they live in what I consider Disney fantasy worlds like Starlink.

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Speaker 3: I don't know, ten fifteen thousand satellites, Well, you got

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Speaker 3: to attack each one. No, you know, I've seen cyber

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Speaker 3: warfare techniques like thirty five years ago, going through the

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Speaker 3: electrical plug into your computer and all. I mean, people

356
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Speaker 3: are very clever. They'll always find a way. And I've

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Speaker 3: you know, theorized well Elon's Starlink satellites have a they

358
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Speaker 3: can tell how close they're coming to each other and

359
00:22:31,760 --> 00:22:33,680
Speaker 3: have an algorithm to say, oh we're too close, let's

360
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Speaker 3: go away. Well, you do a cyber attack. You put

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Speaker 3: a negative sign in that algorithm, and when they get

362
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Speaker 3: too close to the satellites start moving even closer and

363
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Speaker 3: you kill them all at once. You know, I mean,

364
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Speaker 3: there's always a way on that. So I think it's

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Speaker 3: easy for us to lose a war in space due

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Speaker 3: to overconfidence, due to not thinking strategically. You know, what

367
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Speaker 3: exactly are the consequences, I guess militarily politically, and also

368
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Speaker 3: getting back to your teaching your adversary how to fight

369
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Speaker 3: you better ten years later or whatever. So maybe it

370
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Speaker 3: should withhold some weapons and shape not only the future

371
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Speaker 3: battlefield but the future political environment of well, oh gee,

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Speaker 3: look at this, we want that space war. Look at

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Speaker 3: all the junks flown around. Well, now all your allies

374
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Speaker 3: hate you. Now they are all these treaties restricting you.

375
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Speaker 3: Maybe you should have thought of that beforehand and said, well,

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Speaker 3: let's do it this way, maneuver this way, or whatever,

377
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Speaker 3: and so more improbable this new treaty won't be so

378
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Speaker 3: bad or something. I mean, think of the political now.

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Speaker 3: For years I've said, oh, look at this cool multi

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Speaker 3: billion dollar space weapons program, you know, And I said, well,

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Speaker 3: you know, we're starting to develop this now, why don't

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Speaker 3: we get the State Department in on this early on?

383
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Speaker 3: Because they're going to be part of I don't know

384
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Speaker 3: what used to be called National command authorities, but they're

385
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Speaker 3: going to be in the room with the President's deciding

386
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Speaker 3: whether attack or not. And if the State Department got

387
00:24:13,320 --> 00:24:15,720
Speaker 3: on early, they could say, well, if you tweak it

388
00:24:15,760 --> 00:24:19,960
Speaker 3: slightly later on, there would be more probably will prove

389
00:24:20,000 --> 00:24:23,479
Speaker 3: it or something, you know. And I was always told, oh,

390
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Speaker 3: we can't truss the State Department. You know, they'll just reveal,

391
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Speaker 3: you know, what we got or whatever. And you know,

392
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Speaker 3: all governments are like that, each department hates each other

393
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Speaker 3: and all that. But I've got over twenty eight thousand

394
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Speaker 3: members in my space warfare discussion group on LinkedIn, and

395
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Speaker 3: one of them is a former assistant Secretary of State,

396
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Speaker 3: and he says, yeah, they're right. State Department never knew

397
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Speaker 3: a treaty. It didn't like for space, you know, restricting

398
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Speaker 3: something in space. You know. So we've got all these

399
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Speaker 3: kind of undercurrents and getting back to children playing with toys,

400
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Speaker 3: it's conceivable that let's say the Space for US attacks

401
00:25:02,280 --> 00:25:05,480
Speaker 3: the satellite. They're certainly not going to tell the State Department.

402
00:25:05,960 --> 00:25:09,080
Speaker 3: There's certainly probably not going to tell the Navy or

403
00:25:09,080 --> 00:25:13,400
Speaker 3: the army or whatever. You know, we all have our secrets,

404
00:25:13,440 --> 00:25:14,160
Speaker 3: I guess.

405
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Speaker 2: You know. When I first started reading about the various

406
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Speaker 2: like anti satellite strategies in the book, I was reminded,

407
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Speaker 2: almost vaguely of a childhood viewing of the nineteen sixty

408
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Speaker 2: seven James Bond film He only lived twice, in which

409
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Speaker 2: we see early on in the picture a mysterious orbital

410
00:25:31,320 --> 00:25:34,960
Speaker 2: spacecraft capturing essentially kind of consuming another.

411
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Speaker 3: Space clamshell, if I recall.

412
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Speaker 2: Yeah, so you know, I don't know how this roughly

413
00:25:40,440 --> 00:25:43,360
Speaker 2: relates to the idea of mechanical grappling, or if this

414
00:25:43,440 --> 00:25:46,760
Speaker 2: is like a snapshot of some you know, filtered through

415
00:25:46,800 --> 00:25:50,040
Speaker 2: fiction sort of, you know, nineteen sixties, late nineteen sixties

416
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Speaker 2: understanding of conflict between spacecraft.

417
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Speaker 3: Uh. Yeah, well it's certainly the Chinese did the grappling

418
00:25:58,280 --> 00:26:02,840
Speaker 3: the Urugo or something. Certainly, but though that was a

419
00:26:02,920 --> 00:26:10,320
Speaker 3: supposedly dead object. If the satellite's non cooperative, though, you

420
00:26:10,400 --> 00:26:15,200
Speaker 3: can certainly do the grappling, you know, over the South

421
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Speaker 3: Pacific where we don't have any radars or something. Maybe

422
00:26:18,200 --> 00:26:20,800
Speaker 3: you could do it fast enough before we understand or

423
00:26:20,800 --> 00:26:23,920
Speaker 3: we don't have any ground control stations to say tell

424
00:26:23,960 --> 00:26:27,280
Speaker 3: the satellite, oh, start spinning or something like that. You know,

425
00:26:27,920 --> 00:26:32,919
Speaker 3: so as soon as you're accomplishing a counter space thing

426
00:26:33,119 --> 00:26:37,080
Speaker 3: or something that you know is trying to defend yourself, Uh,

427
00:26:37,400 --> 00:26:40,320
Speaker 3: the enemy has won, because if you start spinning, you

428
00:26:40,320 --> 00:26:44,399
Speaker 3: can't do your mission anymore, you know, and he's probably

429
00:26:44,440 --> 00:26:47,919
Speaker 3: attacking at some critical time in the battlefield, and so

430
00:26:48,080 --> 00:26:50,240
Speaker 3: he's you know, he's done his job. You don't have

431
00:26:50,280 --> 00:26:56,040
Speaker 3: to necessarily kill the satellite. And quite frankly, there's three

432
00:26:56,119 --> 00:26:59,359
Speaker 3: major areas that we've talked about for years. I mean,

433
00:26:59,400 --> 00:27:03,040
Speaker 3: you go against satellite, you can go against the ground controller,

434
00:27:03,640 --> 00:27:06,320
Speaker 3: or you can go against the link between the two.

435
00:27:06,760 --> 00:27:12,280
Speaker 3: And that's all three ways to do it. So there's

436
00:27:12,400 --> 00:27:15,200
Speaker 3: multiple ways to skin a cat I guess or something

437
00:27:15,280 --> 00:27:20,159
Speaker 3: like that that doesn't necessarily involve debris generation. But the

438
00:27:20,280 --> 00:27:23,359
Speaker 3: James Bond thing, you know, capturing, yeah, you probably could

439
00:27:23,400 --> 00:27:26,600
Speaker 3: do that. As a matter of fact, you could look up.

440
00:27:26,640 --> 00:27:31,199
Speaker 3: I think NASA had some net to capture satellites they

441
00:27:31,200 --> 00:27:35,240
Speaker 3: were doing research on. I remember seeing that, and I

442
00:27:35,280 --> 00:27:39,120
Speaker 3: suppose the net might work if it's you know, spinning

443
00:27:39,200 --> 00:27:41,760
Speaker 3: or something. But I've had my own theories, like what

444
00:27:41,840 --> 00:27:46,639
Speaker 3: I call the porcupine defense, and that is, you know,

445
00:27:46,680 --> 00:27:49,359
Speaker 3: in the nineteen sixties, satellites used to have the long

446
00:27:49,400 --> 00:27:52,359
Speaker 3: antennas sticking out of the ball. You know, well, if

447
00:27:52,359 --> 00:27:56,760
Speaker 3: you had these long wires that you inferled out going

448
00:27:56,800 --> 00:27:59,520
Speaker 3: out I don't know, half a kilometer or something like that,

449
00:28:00,320 --> 00:28:02,880
Speaker 3: nobody could approach you they tangle up in the wires.

450
00:28:03,920 --> 00:28:06,280
Speaker 3: Maybe the wires you have them electrostatic, and they give

451
00:28:06,320 --> 00:28:09,359
Speaker 3: them a shock or maybe somehow acidic or I don't know.

452
00:28:11,040 --> 00:28:14,800
Speaker 3: I think some simple defenses like that. Maybe for close approaches.

453
00:28:15,960 --> 00:28:19,920
Speaker 3: People talk about, oh, well we'll start maneuvering out of

454
00:28:19,960 --> 00:28:23,200
Speaker 3: the way we see it coming. Oh. You know, first

455
00:28:23,200 --> 00:28:27,280
Speaker 3: of all, if you let's say you had a space

456
00:28:27,320 --> 00:28:34,320
Speaker 3: weapon where I called lagrange points, they're equal gravitational potential

457
00:28:35,040 --> 00:28:37,680
Speaker 3: to retain the Earth and the Moon, and so they

458
00:28:37,720 --> 00:28:39,880
Speaker 3: just sort of sit their way out, you know, I

459
00:28:39,960 --> 00:28:42,200
Speaker 3: don't know, hundreds of thousands of miles something like that,

460
00:28:42,640 --> 00:28:44,400
Speaker 3: and all it takes is just a little bit of

461
00:28:44,440 --> 00:28:48,239
Speaker 3: feel to you know, hit it and have it come

462
00:28:48,360 --> 00:28:53,360
Speaker 3: screaming back down the gravity. Well, and come attack your satellite.

463
00:28:54,080 --> 00:28:56,960
Speaker 3: And if your satellite, oh I see something coming, I'm

464
00:28:57,000 --> 00:29:00,240
Speaker 3: going to maneuver a kilometer or two away. Well, well,

465
00:29:00,440 --> 00:29:05,480
Speaker 3: just looking at the physics the geometry. If you're fifty

466
00:29:05,520 --> 00:29:09,160
Speaker 3: thousand miles away and you sell how removed a few kilometers, Well,

467
00:29:09,200 --> 00:29:13,400
Speaker 3: I change a micro radian or something of my trajectory,

468
00:29:13,840 --> 00:29:18,280
Speaker 3: and I'm coming in like really fast, And I don't

469
00:29:18,320 --> 00:29:21,840
Speaker 3: know if there's much you can do. I mean, everything

470
00:29:23,200 --> 00:29:26,880
Speaker 3: can be easily hypervelocity in space, and it's not like

471
00:29:26,920 --> 00:29:31,560
Speaker 3: you're going to have fifty feet of concrete on your

472
00:29:31,560 --> 00:29:34,120
Speaker 3: satellite trying to defend from something coming in. I don't

473
00:29:34,160 --> 00:29:37,760
Speaker 3: think you can defend anything. And you know, the Air

474
00:29:37,760 --> 00:29:40,600
Speaker 3: Force all, oh, we're going to defend these commercial satellites,

475
00:29:40,640 --> 00:29:43,280
Speaker 3: and I don't know what that really means. Maybe you

476
00:29:43,400 --> 00:29:46,600
Speaker 3: try to jam the weapon coming at you or something

477
00:29:46,680 --> 00:29:49,400
Speaker 3: like that. But I think a lot of people living

478
00:29:49,440 --> 00:29:53,000
Speaker 3: in fantasy world's when it comes to space warfare.

479
00:30:01,760 --> 00:30:06,800
Speaker 2: Now, speaking of fantasy and James Bond, science fiction, science

480
00:30:06,800 --> 00:30:08,960
Speaker 2: fiction in general has of course been long obsessed with

481
00:30:09,040 --> 00:30:12,640
Speaker 2: visions of space warfare. Can you think of any examples

482
00:30:12,760 --> 00:30:16,160
Speaker 2: that tackle the technology or just sort of the concept

483
00:30:16,800 --> 00:30:19,080
Speaker 2: of space warfare as we're discussing it now in a

484
00:30:19,080 --> 00:30:21,720
Speaker 2: way that lines up with the technologies and strategies we're

485
00:30:21,720 --> 00:30:22,440
Speaker 2: actually facing.

486
00:30:22,960 --> 00:30:25,360
Speaker 3: I can't think of any at the moment. First of all,

487
00:30:25,920 --> 00:30:27,800
Speaker 3: you know, you have tie fighters. I don't think you

488
00:30:27,840 --> 00:30:30,480
Speaker 3: can be manned. Man. You have all this extra weight

489
00:30:30,600 --> 00:30:34,920
Speaker 3: of oxygen and all the warmth, and they couldn't take

490
00:30:35,000 --> 00:30:39,320
Speaker 3: the G forces. If again, you're doing this maneuvering. You know,

491
00:30:39,360 --> 00:30:41,920
Speaker 3: all these things seem to have aliens and all because

492
00:30:41,960 --> 00:30:44,720
Speaker 3: there's more exciting. I don't know if I know of

493
00:30:44,800 --> 00:30:49,960
Speaker 3: any thing. I think the expanse I think that got

494
00:30:50,000 --> 00:30:54,400
Speaker 3: the closest to some of those space battles, you know,

495
00:30:54,480 --> 00:30:59,560
Speaker 3: between opposing space cruisers or whatever. I suppose you'd still

496
00:30:59,560 --> 00:31:03,200
Speaker 3: have to have kinetic one way or the other, because oh,

497
00:31:03,240 --> 00:31:06,160
Speaker 3: you got these great lasers. Well if you had a

498
00:31:06,200 --> 00:31:09,840
Speaker 3: mirror like finish on their spacecraft and you know, if

499
00:31:09,880 --> 00:31:14,800
Speaker 3: you spin it, it'd be you know, depositing the radiation

500
00:31:15,200 --> 00:31:19,200
Speaker 3: all around. And it's like we have ground based lasers,

501
00:31:19,680 --> 00:31:22,600
Speaker 3: but they can't go out to geosynchronous orbit. It just

502
00:31:22,720 --> 00:31:25,240
Speaker 3: isn't powerful enough. So if you're talking about I don't

503
00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:28,280
Speaker 3: know if battles would be from fifty thousand kilometers apart

504
00:31:28,400 --> 00:31:32,960
Speaker 3: or something. I just don't know about how all that

505
00:31:33,000 --> 00:31:37,520
Speaker 3: would work. And you know, maybe we're really talking about

506
00:31:37,560 --> 00:31:41,120
Speaker 3: AI and the machines will be fighting the machines in

507
00:31:41,160 --> 00:31:44,720
Speaker 3: one way or the other, you know, getting back to

508
00:31:45,680 --> 00:31:50,080
Speaker 3: space war, and why would you rather have a bunch

509
00:31:50,120 --> 00:31:54,040
Speaker 3: of satellites broken in space, hopefully without debris, because you

510
00:31:54,040 --> 00:31:57,160
Speaker 3: don't have to use debris causing things, then a bunch

511
00:31:57,200 --> 00:32:02,520
Speaker 3: of broken Ukrainian cities, and you know you're not killing anyone.

512
00:32:02,600 --> 00:32:06,160
Speaker 3: There's no sense to attack the International Space Station though,

513
00:32:06,520 --> 00:32:10,120
Speaker 3: just as a funny aside, who knows, twenty five thirty

514
00:32:10,200 --> 00:32:13,120
Speaker 3: years ago it is as some space conference in coverall springs,

515
00:32:13,160 --> 00:32:17,520
Speaker 3: you know, Air Force and the general giving the presentation, who,

516
00:32:17,560 --> 00:32:20,480
Speaker 3: by the way, dressed up in a World War two

517
00:32:20,720 --> 00:32:24,240
Speaker 3: outfit and acted like patent, you know, with a big

518
00:32:24,360 --> 00:32:27,080
Speaker 3: American flag bearing. Anyway, I stopped him on the way

519
00:32:27,080 --> 00:32:29,520
Speaker 3: out and I says, well, you know, the Russia is

520
00:32:29,560 --> 00:32:34,600
Speaker 3: on the International Space Station and we are doing like

521
00:32:34,640 --> 00:32:38,000
Speaker 3: the left hook or whatever. And he had binocas the

522
00:32:38,080 --> 00:32:41,080
Speaker 3: Russian cosmonaut had binoculars on there. What would you do?

523
00:32:41,440 --> 00:32:44,440
Speaker 3: And his first response was I'll shoot him. You know, well,

524
00:32:44,480 --> 00:32:47,800
Speaker 3: I don't know about discharging a weapon in you know,

525
00:32:48,520 --> 00:32:51,320
Speaker 3: putting a hole through the sides letting oxygen out, and

526
00:32:52,480 --> 00:32:55,280
Speaker 3: even the political implications, but of course, you know, generals,

527
00:32:55,560 --> 00:32:59,200
Speaker 3: I guess sort of think that way on it. I

528
00:32:59,320 --> 00:33:02,480
Speaker 3: even had some if he used five point seven by

529
00:33:02,480 --> 00:33:08,720
Speaker 3: two to eight bullet, it can penetrate the was a

530
00:33:08,840 --> 00:33:14,920
Speaker 3: Lexan armored goggles of an astronaut and the what is

531
00:33:14,960 --> 00:33:20,960
Speaker 3: the bulletproof suits, but it can't penetrate the bulkheads, the

532
00:33:21,000 --> 00:33:27,560
Speaker 3: metal bulkheads, you know, oh, kevlar suits. So boarding space stations?

533
00:33:28,080 --> 00:33:29,920
Speaker 3: Would we ever board the Chinese one?

534
00:33:30,280 --> 00:33:30,440
Speaker 2: Oh?

535
00:33:30,480 --> 00:33:34,680
Speaker 3: My book does that. But because it's a theoretical sort

536
00:33:34,720 --> 00:33:36,800
Speaker 3: of theoretical. There's a lot of things in the book

537
00:33:36,840 --> 00:33:39,000
Speaker 3: that have happened to me in the past, but I

538
00:33:39,080 --> 00:33:40,000
Speaker 3: won't say which.

539
00:33:40,480 --> 00:33:43,840
Speaker 2: Now we've been talking about space weaponry and the near

540
00:33:43,880 --> 00:33:46,880
Speaker 2: future of space warfare. But what does all of this

541
00:33:46,960 --> 00:33:50,080
Speaker 2: mean for say, the future of space exploration as well

542
00:33:50,080 --> 00:33:53,360
Speaker 2: as like planetary defense against near Earth objects.

543
00:33:53,680 --> 00:33:58,600
Speaker 3: Well, I remember there were something on YouTube that's saying, boy,

544
00:33:58,600 --> 00:34:00,840
Speaker 3: if NASA had the budget of the military, this is

545
00:34:00,880 --> 00:34:05,880
Speaker 3: what they could do. So you know, what's more important

546
00:34:05,880 --> 00:34:11,319
Speaker 3: to you self defense military wise, or well science and

547
00:34:11,400 --> 00:34:13,759
Speaker 3: oh this is kind of cool and maybe fifty years

548
00:34:13,760 --> 00:34:15,880
Speaker 3: from now will be on Mars or something, you know,

549
00:34:17,640 --> 00:34:20,320
Speaker 3: So it's all a matter priority. And you could say, well,

550
00:34:20,320 --> 00:34:24,560
Speaker 3: what about exploring under the sea and things like that.

551
00:34:24,719 --> 00:34:28,120
Speaker 3: So I don't know, it's you know, it's an emotional

552
00:34:28,200 --> 00:34:33,239
Speaker 3: decision for countries to say, well, what's more important to us?

553
00:34:33,880 --> 00:34:34,160
Speaker 2: Now?

554
00:34:34,719 --> 00:34:38,960
Speaker 3: I think we're probably almost there or very soon that

555
00:34:39,160 --> 00:34:43,000
Speaker 3: if a country loses the war in space, they lose

556
00:34:43,040 --> 00:34:46,880
Speaker 3: the war in the ground. I mean, think of the

557
00:34:47,000 --> 00:34:51,640
Speaker 3: US again in the Western Pacific. Would they be able

558
00:34:51,680 --> 00:34:55,040
Speaker 3: to communicate to the carrier battle groups without satellites? I

559
00:34:55,080 --> 00:34:59,000
Speaker 3: don't know if they u tropal scatter calm anymore? You know,

560
00:34:59,160 --> 00:35:02,239
Speaker 3: would we have our aircraft flying when we don't even

561
00:35:02,320 --> 00:35:04,480
Speaker 3: know where we're flying, We don't have imagery, and we

562
00:35:04,600 --> 00:35:08,240
Speaker 3: don't know how to avoid the you know, the anti

563
00:35:08,320 --> 00:35:11,239
Speaker 3: aircraft and what targets to service and all. I mean,

564
00:35:11,239 --> 00:35:15,120
Speaker 3: you get to the point where war in space maybe

565
00:35:15,200 --> 00:35:20,759
Speaker 3: is morally better than war on the ground. So how

566
00:35:20,800 --> 00:35:24,720
Speaker 3: important is that to a society versus Oh, yeah, NASA,

567
00:35:24,840 --> 00:35:27,680
Speaker 3: we're exploring this and that. Now I could again be

568
00:35:27,719 --> 00:35:32,160
Speaker 3: a wise guy and say, boy, elon, the commercial world

569
00:35:32,239 --> 00:35:34,360
Speaker 3: sure did a better job of trying to get to

570
00:35:34,400 --> 00:35:38,800
Speaker 3: the Moon than NASA, did you know? They really seemed

571
00:35:38,800 --> 00:35:40,680
Speaker 3: to be failing there and all that. So yeah, they

572
00:35:40,800 --> 00:35:45,239
Speaker 3: pour money into NASA, and or maybe we should just

573
00:35:45,280 --> 00:35:48,600
Speaker 3: fund the commercial world to do that kind of thing,

574
00:35:49,160 --> 00:35:53,160
Speaker 3: or maybe we should just get contributions from people who

575
00:35:53,200 --> 00:35:56,400
Speaker 3: think it's really cool to go to the moon, or something.

576
00:35:56,440 --> 00:35:59,680
Speaker 3: I mean again, I might be an old fogy here,

577
00:35:59,719 --> 00:36:07,000
Speaker 3: but the Mars, you know, the dust is extremely poisonous

578
00:36:07,680 --> 00:36:11,200
Speaker 3: and the radiation is extremely bad, and so you're gonna

579
00:36:11,239 --> 00:36:13,640
Speaker 3: end up being underground ninety nine percent of the time.

580
00:36:14,440 --> 00:36:17,319
Speaker 3: You're gonna get really tired of that red not sing

581
00:36:17,360 --> 00:36:19,080
Speaker 3: blue and all that. So I can see, you know,

582
00:36:19,320 --> 00:36:22,000
Speaker 3: if I was younger, Oh yeah, you know, go, you know,

583
00:36:22,320 --> 00:36:25,440
Speaker 3: colonize Mars and all that. Yeah, someday maybe we put

584
00:36:25,520 --> 00:36:29,799
Speaker 3: atmosphere on that, but you're talking beyond our lifetimes. And

585
00:36:29,920 --> 00:36:30,799
Speaker 3: same with the Moon.

586
00:36:30,840 --> 00:36:31,000
Speaker 2: Now.

587
00:36:31,000 --> 00:36:35,279
Speaker 3: The Moon is really weird. I remember when I first

588
00:36:35,320 --> 00:36:38,640
Speaker 3: started out in the seventies and someone telling me, oh, yeah,

589
00:36:38,840 --> 00:36:41,239
Speaker 3: NASA asked the Air Force, well do you want a

590
00:36:41,280 --> 00:36:43,680
Speaker 3: base on the Moon? You know, and the Air Force

591
00:36:43,680 --> 00:36:45,879
Speaker 3: sort of scratched his heads, like, I don't know, it's

592
00:36:45,960 --> 00:36:48,879
Speaker 3: kind of far away. I guess not, you know. And

593
00:36:48,960 --> 00:36:51,279
Speaker 3: no one in my entire career, no one's cared about

594
00:36:51,280 --> 00:36:55,000
Speaker 3: the Moon except the last five, six, seven years. And

595
00:36:55,040 --> 00:36:59,600
Speaker 3: they're all sorts of like here at Albuquerque, Oh, we're

596
00:36:59,600 --> 00:37:02,000
Speaker 3: gonna put cell phone service on the Moon. What the

597
00:37:02,000 --> 00:37:04,319
Speaker 3: hell you're talking about? You know, you're gonna pay ten

598
00:37:04,360 --> 00:37:08,279
Speaker 3: thousand dollars a minute for three astronauts, you know, and oh,

599
00:37:08,280 --> 00:37:11,920
Speaker 3: you're putting these surveillance sensors on the dark side of

600
00:37:11,920 --> 00:37:16,960
Speaker 3: the moon, you know, surveilling what. And everyone seems very

601
00:37:17,000 --> 00:37:19,680
Speaker 3: worried about the whole thing. Now, I could be a

602
00:37:19,680 --> 00:37:23,279
Speaker 3: conspiracy to alien this, and I don't think so, or

603
00:37:23,320 --> 00:37:29,600
Speaker 3: maybe am I I theorize that. You know, when China,

604
00:37:29,680 --> 00:37:32,879
Speaker 3: when they land their TAKEO knots on the Moon, they

605
00:37:32,880 --> 00:37:38,080
Speaker 3: plant the flag abrogate the outer space treaty that says

606
00:37:38,120 --> 00:37:42,120
Speaker 3: you can't own crestal bodies, abrogate that. Ten minutes where

607
00:37:42,160 --> 00:37:43,879
Speaker 3: they land on the Moon, say now we own the Moon,

608
00:37:44,560 --> 00:37:48,759
Speaker 3: you know, sort of like Spain and Portugal I guess

609
00:37:48,800 --> 00:37:51,840
Speaker 3: did for the Western hemisphere. Cour it's good luck defending

610
00:37:51,840 --> 00:37:55,160
Speaker 3: that kind of So I wonder if they're worried about

611
00:37:55,160 --> 00:37:59,840
Speaker 3: that in some sense. And I also point out we

612
00:38:00,080 --> 00:38:03,000
Speaker 3: have this nineteen sixty seven outer space treatise as you

613
00:38:03,040 --> 00:38:06,799
Speaker 3: can't own celestial bodies. Well there's over eighty countries that

614
00:38:06,920 --> 00:38:11,759
Speaker 3: never sign that. I theorize that Elon can take one

615
00:38:11,760 --> 00:38:14,520
Speaker 3: of his es. He was building some launch ships. I

616
00:38:14,520 --> 00:38:17,440
Speaker 3: don't know he gave up on that, but you ship

617
00:38:17,440 --> 00:38:20,480
Speaker 3: it out to the territorial waters of one of these

618
00:38:20,520 --> 00:38:23,200
Speaker 3: countries and launched the moon and say, and now we

619
00:38:23,320 --> 00:38:27,760
Speaker 3: own the moon, or that country Ecuador or whatever owns

620
00:38:27,800 --> 00:38:30,319
Speaker 3: the moon and leases it back to Eline for ninety

621
00:38:30,400 --> 00:38:33,920
Speaker 3: nine years, like Hong Kong. You know, I'm not a lawyer,

622
00:38:34,000 --> 00:38:35,239
Speaker 3: but sounds like you could do that.

623
00:38:36,800 --> 00:38:42,000
Speaker 2: Fascinating. Well, Paul, where can people follow you online? Obviously

624
00:38:42,080 --> 00:38:44,760
Speaker 2: the book again is The Battle Beyond Fighting and Winning

625
00:38:44,760 --> 00:38:47,040
Speaker 2: the Coming War in Space or this is one of

626
00:38:47,080 --> 00:38:48,839
Speaker 2: the books. This is the one that I looked at

627
00:38:48,880 --> 00:38:52,520
Speaker 2: for the interview that's out now. But if people just

628
00:38:52,560 --> 00:38:54,759
Speaker 2: want to follow you, keep up with your work, learn more,

629
00:38:54,800 --> 00:38:55,640
Speaker 2: where can they find you?

630
00:38:55,880 --> 00:38:59,640
Speaker 3: Well, I'm mostly on LinkedIn, so you can, like say,

631
00:39:00,000 --> 00:39:03,920
Speaker 3: twenty eight thousand members of people who are interested in

632
00:39:04,040 --> 00:39:08,640
Speaker 3: space warfare, So you can communicate through there, you know,

633
00:39:08,800 --> 00:39:13,080
Speaker 3: just send me a request I guess or that and

634
00:39:13,120 --> 00:39:16,600
Speaker 3: tell me who you are or whatever. Also, if you

635
00:39:16,680 --> 00:39:19,920
Speaker 3: looked up The Battle Beyond How to Fight Win Space

636
00:39:19,960 --> 00:39:25,520
Speaker 3: Wars on Amazon, you'll see all six books, and there's

637
00:39:25,600 --> 00:39:29,600
Speaker 3: way I think they have ways of liking me there

638
00:39:29,680 --> 00:39:31,839
Speaker 3: and you know, communicating that way. I think there's even

639
00:39:31,880 --> 00:39:34,560
Speaker 3: a website associated with it and all that, and that's

640
00:39:34,640 --> 00:39:36,239
Speaker 3: that's probably the best way.

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Speaker 2: All right. Well, thanks again for coming on the shows.

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00:39:38,480 --> 00:39:39,360
Speaker 2: Has been very insightful.

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Speaker 3: Okay, thank you for the opportunity.

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Speaker 2: All right. Thanks again to Paul Samanski for coming on

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Speaker 2: the show and chatting with me again. The book, co

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00:39:49,719 --> 00:39:52,600
Speaker 2: authored with Jerry Drew, is The Battle Beyond Fighting and

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00:39:52,640 --> 00:39:55,480
Speaker 2: Winning the Coming War in Space and it is available now.

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Speaker 2: If you would like to reach out to Joe and myself,

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00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:02,240
Speaker 2: well you can do so in a number of ways.

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Speaker 2: I'll share that email in just a second. But hey,

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Speaker 2: you can follow Stuff to Blow your Mind the podcast

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00:40:07,760 --> 00:40:10,480
Speaker 2: feed anywhere to get your podcast core science and culture

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00:40:10,480 --> 00:40:14,160
Speaker 2: episodes on Tuesdays and Thursdays, listener mail on Monday's short

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00:40:14,160 --> 00:40:16,720
Speaker 2: form episode on Wednesdays, and on Fridays, we set aside

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Speaker 2: most serious concerns to just talk about a weird film

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00:40:19,200 --> 00:40:22,560
Speaker 2: on Weird House Cinema. Thanks as always to the excellent

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00:40:22,600 --> 00:40:25,399
Speaker 2: JJ Possway for producing the show. And if you want

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Speaker 2: to shoot us that email, you can do so at

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Speaker 2: contact at Stuff to Blow your Mind dot com.

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Speaker 1: Stuff to Blow your Mind is production of iHeartRadio. For

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00:40:40,719 --> 00:40:43,479
Speaker 1: more podcasts from my Heart Radio, visit the iHeartRadio, app,

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Speaker 1: Apple podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.

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Speaker 3: Not the f