WEBVTT - Sandy Rattray on Strategic Risk Management

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<v Speaker 1>M. This is Mesters in Business with Very Renaults on

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<v Speaker 1>Bluebird Radio. This week on the podcast, I have an

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<v Speaker 1>extra special guest. What can I say about Sandy rat Trey.

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<v Speaker 1>He is the chief investment officer of the Man Group,

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<v Speaker 1>which manages over a hundred and twenty five billion dollars UH.

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<v Speaker 1>He's the co inventor of the VIX index. He has

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<v Speaker 1>an incredible career UH both in UH equity research and

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<v Speaker 1>for derivatives as well as systematic investing UM. He's just

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<v Speaker 1>a rock star. I don't know what else to say

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<v Speaker 1>about it. The track record that the Man Group has amassed,

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<v Speaker 1>as well as how they've pushed forward UM portfolio construction

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<v Speaker 1>theory is really incredibly, incredibly influential. Not only was he

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<v Speaker 1>the co inventor of the VIX index, but he's written

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<v Speaker 1>extensively about risk management and how to design portfolios and

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<v Speaker 1>you know what to expect when you're expecting a black swan,

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<v Speaker 1>which you by definition can't know what to expect, and

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<v Speaker 1>how to build strategies that give you some degree of

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<v Speaker 1>protection against this. If you're remotely interested in hedge funds,

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<v Speaker 1>asset management, quantitative strategies, the VIX and managing risk well

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<v Speaker 1>strap yourself in because this one, uh is a good one.

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<v Speaker 1>With no further ado, my conversation with Sandy Retrey of

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<v Speaker 1>the Man Group. This is Masters in Business with very

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<v Speaker 1>Renaults on Bluebird Radio. My extra special guest this week

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<v Speaker 1>is Sandy Retrey. He is the chief Investment Officer of

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<v Speaker 1>the Man Group. He is also on the Executive Committee

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<v Speaker 1>and the Responsible Investment Committee. He is per Apps most

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<v Speaker 1>famously the co inventor of the VIX index. He's also

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<v Speaker 1>run a number of different systematic strategies for Man and

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<v Speaker 1>other organizations. The Man Group's assets under management are over

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<v Speaker 1>a hundred and twenty billion dollars and Sandy is the

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<v Speaker 1>co author of the book Strategic Risk Management, Designing Portfolios

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<v Speaker 1>and Managing Risk. Sandy Retree, Welcome to Bloomberg. Great, Thank

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<v Speaker 1>you very much, Perry. It's good to be with you.

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<v Speaker 1>So you have a really interesting background. You're deeply steeped

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<v Speaker 1>in mathematics. How did you find your way into the

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<v Speaker 1>investment business? So it's a it's a long story. I

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<v Speaker 1>as a teenager, I thought I would become a theoretical

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<v Speaker 1>physicistem that was my ambition. I went to Cambridge University

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<v Speaker 1>to study physics, and I really discovered a number of

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<v Speaker 1>things at that time. Number one, UM, I was I

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<v Speaker 1>thought quite good at physics. Turned out that I surrounded

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<v Speaker 1>myself for the whole bund of other people are also

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<v Speaker 1>pretty good, and really standing out was hard Um. And Second,

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<v Speaker 1>I think at the time the amount of innovation that

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<v Speaker 1>was taking place in physics seemed to have sort of

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<v Speaker 1>dropped off a little bit from the nineteen seventies and

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<v Speaker 1>and it was a sort of slow period in the

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<v Speaker 1>late nineteen eighties, and so that made me think, well,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe I could use these math skills for something else.

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<v Speaker 1>And that really got me into thinking about finance. So

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<v Speaker 1>I some people duck out of physics having done PhD

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<v Speaker 1>s or or taught at universities. I ducked out a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit earlier on UM, and that got me into them,

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<v Speaker 1>thinking well I should use these skills. I end up

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<v Speaker 1>joining Golden Sacks, and and there again I learned something

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<v Speaker 1>which was I thought the exciting bit would be the

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<v Speaker 1>corporate finance areas, so advising on major corporate transactions, and

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<v Speaker 1>what I realized was that that didn't really use the

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<v Speaker 1>quantz skills that I had. So I did that for

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<v Speaker 1>a couple of years, and then I moved over to

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<v Speaker 1>first sixt income research, then equity derivators research, and then

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<v Speaker 1>finally transitioned out of that into UM into more proprietary trading,

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<v Speaker 1>and then into fund management. So let's build off of that.

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<v Speaker 1>You did a lot of work on derivatives and fundamental

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<v Speaker 1>strategy of government. You then go to MAN where you're

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<v Speaker 1>running things like systematic strategies and a h L. What

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<v Speaker 1>was man h L focused on when you were managing that.

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<v Speaker 1>So when I arrived at h L, which was the

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<v Speaker 1>end of two thousand and twelve, was really a futures

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<v Speaker 1>trend following business. It was c t A and c

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<v Speaker 1>t as have been having a pretty difficult time really

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<v Speaker 1>since the end of the financial crisis. They had a

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<v Speaker 1>tremendous two thousand eight and then that really done nothing

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<v Speaker 1>in the following years. So nine eleven, twelve, we're all

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<v Speaker 1>years which essentially added up to nothing. So the fantastic

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<v Speaker 1>crisis here. Very few as the marriagers could say that

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand eight was a great year, but HL could

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<v Speaker 1>definitely say that. But then you had a long dry

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<v Speaker 1>period and people were starting to say momentum doesn't work anymore.

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<v Speaker 1>It's broken. And I think what I really did when

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<v Speaker 1>I arrived in NHL it was to say, well, I've

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<v Speaker 1>been involved in all sorts of different quant strategies in

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<v Speaker 1>my golden years, and I can use a much broader

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<v Speaker 1>perspective than maybe the futures trend followers had and look

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<v Speaker 1>to develop a much wider range of systematic stranities. So

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<v Speaker 1>when I arrived, we had a handful of models UM.

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<v Speaker 1>Today we've got three or four models running in HL,

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<v Speaker 1>so we really expanded number of models we're using. UM,

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<v Speaker 1>we expanded the number of markets that were trading, so

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<v Speaker 1>we used to trade futures, UM and effects markets and

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<v Speaker 1>my group it started trading OTC markets, but it was

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<v Speaker 1>still quite small UM, and we really picked up and

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<v Speaker 1>start trading much wider variety of markets. So now we

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<v Speaker 1>trade around seven markets around the world using system addic models.

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<v Speaker 1>And then finally we came up with different many different

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<v Speaker 1>types of funds, so very short term funds, funds which

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<v Speaker 1>are more fundamentally driven, funds which are maybe trying to

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<v Speaker 1>provide more protection characteristics, or funds trying to maximize the

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<v Speaker 1>sharp ratio. So so we really tried to grow quant

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<v Speaker 1>into many different areas. And I suppose my advantage coming

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<v Speaker 1>into a place like h L is that most people

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<v Speaker 1>in those HL and in the competitors had really grown

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<v Speaker 1>up and had the whole careers in the in the

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<v Speaker 1>c t A or the futures trend following business, and

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<v Speaker 1>I had had none of my career and futures try

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<v Speaker 1>and following, and but I had all these other influences

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<v Speaker 1>that I could bring in, And so that really was

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<v Speaker 1>how I worked with the team now to significantly expand

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<v Speaker 1>UM the business which was having a very difficult time

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<v Speaker 1>and arrived and UM declined to lesson ten billion dollars

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<v Speaker 1>of assets in the h L unit and today were

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<v Speaker 1>many times launcher than now. So I want to focus

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<v Speaker 1>on something you mentioned in passing, but it's so relevant

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<v Speaker 1>to what we've been seeing in the markets recently. You

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<v Speaker 1>said that momentum as a factor seemed to have been fading.

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<v Speaker 1>We've seen other factor based investing like value, go long

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<v Speaker 1>long periods of underperforming. There's so many different questions I

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<v Speaker 1>can ask you about this. Let's just start with is

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<v Speaker 1>that the nature of any factor or any specific trading

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<v Speaker 1>edge that they only last so long before eventually everybody

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<v Speaker 1>wise is up to them and the alpha gets arbitraged away.

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<v Speaker 1>And do you see these sort of edges disappearing more

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<v Speaker 1>quickly these days then they used to in a perhaps kindler,

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<v Speaker 1>gentler era twenty or thirty years ago. So, um, I

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<v Speaker 1>agree actually with everything you said, Barry, except for the

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<v Speaker 1>last bit about kind of legenter era. From my memory

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<v Speaker 1>twenty or thirty years ago, it was probably less kind

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<v Speaker 1>and less gentle than it is today. Um, But let's

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<v Speaker 1>let's start with factors. So I think one of the

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<v Speaker 1>things which has been interesting over my career is nobody

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<v Speaker 1>really talked about factors apart from a very small sort

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<v Speaker 1>of quant group twenty thirty years ago. Today they're in,

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<v Speaker 1>you know that they're sort of part of all our

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<v Speaker 1>portfolio marriagers at Man Group, whether they're quants or discretion marriages.

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<v Speaker 1>Everybody talks factors and so that's been a big change,

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<v Speaker 1>and they've become sort of part of, you know, just

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<v Speaker 1>sort of general dialogue when people are talking about markets.

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<v Speaker 1>The thing I'd say is that I don't think that, um,

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<v Speaker 1>the core factors which have been around in a long

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<v Speaker 1>time are going to disappear. And for me, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>as a European, I was working in New York in

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<v Speaker 1>the late nine nineties and into the two thousand's, and

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<v Speaker 1>I remember looking at front page of the Wall Street

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<v Speaker 1>Journal one day and on it it said value investing

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<v Speaker 1>is for old people and um and I you know,

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<v Speaker 1>as the European obviously, you know Europeans want to live

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<v Speaker 1>in old houses. Clearly in the US people mostly want

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<v Speaker 1>to live in new houses. So it's a big sort

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<v Speaker 1>of didn't quite understand that the the the extent of

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<v Speaker 1>the statement there, and it was a ridiculous thing to say.

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<v Speaker 1>I was a young person being included in the front

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<v Speaker 1>page of the Wall Street Journal, right in the tail

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<v Speaker 1>end of the tech bubble and just before a huge

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<v Speaker 1>outperformance of value stocks. So these factors and we should

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<v Speaker 1>talk about, you know, which are the which are the

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<v Speaker 1>actors that are likely to persist in which are not

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<v Speaker 1>um But factors like value for example, I think generally

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<v Speaker 1>don't have particularly high sharp ratios, so they're their returns

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<v Speaker 1>adjusted for risk are not particularly high. But the idea

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<v Speaker 1>that buying cheap stocks will never work again, I've never

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<v Speaker 1>thought that was a sensible thing to say or think,

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<v Speaker 1>but every now and then, you know, that's what this

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<v Speaker 1>fellow on the front page of the journal said um

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<v Speaker 1>twenty odd years ago. So I think factors, at least

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<v Speaker 1>a core set of factors are very likely to persist,

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<v Speaker 1>but it won't give particularly amazing risk adjusted returns, But

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<v Speaker 1>I think they are likely to give you positive risk

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<v Speaker 1>adjusted returns over you know, relatively long cycles. I would say, though,

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<v Speaker 1>that one of the things I've seen in the last

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<v Speaker 1>ten years or so is as people thought they understood factors,

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<v Speaker 1>and people started to find hundreds of these things. And

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<v Speaker 1>I don't think there are hundreds of real factors. Think

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<v Speaker 1>there's a small handful um of factors, and this explosion

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<v Speaker 1>really is an overfitting exercise. It's people finding patterns in

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<v Speaker 1>the data that don't really exist, and I think that's

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<v Speaker 1>something that people should be very wary of. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>I've seen data providers and firms sell their libraries of

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<v Speaker 1>factors with with you know, literally hundreds of these things,

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<v Speaker 1>and I don't think that's going to be a source

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<v Speaker 1>of returns. The final thing I should say is that

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<v Speaker 1>you mentioned momentum, and momentum is quite an interesting factor

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<v Speaker 1>because there are two very different definitions of momentum. One

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<v Speaker 1>is really used by equities people and they will go

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<v Speaker 1>along the positive momentum price momentum stocks and short the

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<v Speaker 1>negative price momentum stocks. They sometimes do it with earnings

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<v Speaker 1>as well, but basically go along the stocks which have

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<v Speaker 1>been out performing and short the stocks which have been

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<v Speaker 1>under performing. But then is a very different definition of momentum,

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<v Speaker 1>and that's what the c t as use, And they

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<v Speaker 1>don't they don't look at the price move against anything.

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<v Speaker 1>They just do it in absolute terms. And they tend

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<v Speaker 1>to do that in macro markets. So they'll create the

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<v Speaker 1>SMP or the or the the dacks or the euro

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<v Speaker 1>or gold or something like that. And and that's a

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<v Speaker 1>much different definition because it's not it's not going long

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<v Speaker 1>one set of markets and or one set of stocks

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<v Speaker 1>and short another set of stocks. It could be long everything,

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<v Speaker 1>or it could be short everything, and it gives you

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<v Speaker 1>a very different type of return profile. That second type

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<v Speaker 1>has a very nice feature, which is that it barely

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<v Speaker 1>reliably will do well in bad periods in markets. So

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<v Speaker 1>I talked about how, for example, HL two thousand eight

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<v Speaker 1>was an excellent year. Well, not many strategies that could

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<v Speaker 1>say two thousand eight was an excellent year. And that's

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<v Speaker 1>because that second definition of momentum what I would call

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<v Speaker 1>time series momentum the or univariate momentum. That that definition

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<v Speaker 1>momentum has very good protection like characteristics. It will pick

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<v Speaker 1>up on a trend, especially in negative trend in markets,

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<v Speaker 1>and jump on that trend. So it sounds like the

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<v Speaker 1>price momentum seems to be relative, while the time series

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<v Speaker 1>has a persistence that gives it a very different characteristic.

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<v Speaker 1>Or am I oversimplifying that? No? No, I think that's

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<v Speaker 1>exactly right. So I think you know, the most investing strategies,

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<v Speaker 1>including price momentum and equities, but most investing strategies have

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<v Speaker 1>what people like me would call a left tail, so

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<v Speaker 1>it make you money most of the time, and then

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<v Speaker 1>every now and then they serve your up an unpleasant surprise.

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<v Speaker 1>Time series momentum does the opposite. Time series amentum most

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<v Speaker 1>of the time gives you pretty boring returns, but every

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<v Speaker 1>now and then I'll give you a very positive surprise.

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<v Speaker 1>And and that's really rare in investing strategies. And from

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<v Speaker 1>my perspective, that's you know, that's a very attractive characteristic

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<v Speaker 1>when you're building portfolios, to have a bit of something

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<v Speaker 1>which does the opposite of most other investing strategies. Let's

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<v Speaker 1>talk a little bit about the VIX index, which you

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<v Speaker 1>were the co inventor of tell us. How does one

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<v Speaker 1>go about inventing the VIX index? Well, you know very

0:14:25.040 --> 0:14:29.240
<v Speaker 1>In short, you get lucky. So the the story behind

0:14:29.360 --> 0:14:33.200
<v Speaker 1>it is, as we talked about in our earlier segment.

0:14:33.400 --> 0:14:36.320
<v Speaker 1>I was working in New York basically and see clients

0:14:36.360 --> 0:14:38.560
<v Speaker 1>and every time you went to somebody's office to be

0:14:38.600 --> 0:14:42.520
<v Speaker 1>a TV screen in the in the fire in the

0:14:42.640 --> 0:14:45.560
<v Speaker 1>entrance area, and they would have prices of all sorts

0:14:45.600 --> 0:14:47.880
<v Speaker 1>of things coming across that screen, you know, the sort

0:14:47.880 --> 0:14:51.160
<v Speaker 1>of the price of crude ale, the treasury bond yield,

0:14:51.160 --> 0:14:53.000
<v Speaker 1>the sple hundred level, that sort of thing, and it

0:14:53.040 --> 0:14:55.720
<v Speaker 1>would have the VIX on it. And so there was

0:14:55.760 --> 0:14:58.560
<v Speaker 1>a VIX, but that was the VIX was the only

0:14:58.600 --> 0:15:00.600
<v Speaker 1>thing that seemed to come across the greens that you

0:15:00.640 --> 0:15:06.640
<v Speaker 1>couldn't trade. And so the story really came because a

0:15:06.800 --> 0:15:09.320
<v Speaker 1>colleague of mine at Golden Sacks came to me one

0:15:09.360 --> 0:15:12.320
<v Speaker 1>evening and said, you know, I've had this call um

0:15:12.360 --> 0:15:15.360
<v Speaker 1>from a client who wants to do a trade on

0:15:15.400 --> 0:15:20.040
<v Speaker 1>the VIX. Could we do that? And my colleague ran

0:15:20.720 --> 0:15:24.360
<v Speaker 1>options trading and I ran the drug to his research

0:15:24.920 --> 0:15:31.200
<v Speaker 1>a bit of Goldman and we got our heads together

0:15:31.360 --> 0:15:33.760
<v Speaker 1>and I went and found the formula for the VIX

0:15:33.880 --> 0:15:36.920
<v Speaker 1>as stood as as pre existed, and we worked at

0:15:37.000 --> 0:15:38.920
<v Speaker 1>it just wasn't possible for us to do a trade

0:15:38.960 --> 0:15:41.240
<v Speaker 1>on that. It wasn't designed in a way that you

0:15:41.320 --> 0:15:47.400
<v Speaker 1>could hedge a trade on the VIX. So we came

0:15:47.480 --> 0:15:49.800
<v Speaker 1>up with a kind of crazy idea which was, Okay,

0:15:49.800 --> 0:15:52.240
<v Speaker 1>well there's this VIX thing which was owned by the

0:15:52.280 --> 0:15:55.560
<v Speaker 1>cbo E, but you couldn't trade it. And there was

0:15:55.560 --> 0:15:57.120
<v Speaker 1>a good reason why you couldn't trade it, because you

0:15:57.120 --> 0:16:00.120
<v Speaker 1>couldn't hedge it. So why don't we change it? And

0:16:00.320 --> 0:16:03.880
<v Speaker 1>so we came up with a completely different formula. It

0:16:03.920 --> 0:16:08.200
<v Speaker 1>turned out to give fairly similar levels to the old VIX,

0:16:09.200 --> 0:16:11.680
<v Speaker 1>but but it was a completely different formula, didn't use

0:16:11.680 --> 0:16:15.680
<v Speaker 1>black sholes at all and um and we thought, well, hey,

0:16:15.720 --> 0:16:20.960
<v Speaker 1>this this formula actually you could hedge UM futures contract

0:16:21.080 --> 0:16:24.480
<v Speaker 1>on or something like that. And so what we then

0:16:24.520 --> 0:16:29.000
<v Speaker 1>did is I was quite friendly with a fellow called

0:16:29.000 --> 0:16:32.440
<v Speaker 1>Bill Speth, but the CBOE, who has had of research there.

0:16:32.920 --> 0:16:34.880
<v Speaker 1>And I called Bill and said, you know, you have

0:16:35.000 --> 0:16:36.720
<v Speaker 1>this VIX but you make no money out of it,

0:16:36.760 --> 0:16:39.240
<v Speaker 1>because you just published this thing and doesn't give you

0:16:39.280 --> 0:16:42.200
<v Speaker 1>any income. And we've got an idea how you could

0:16:42.280 --> 0:16:45.560
<v Speaker 1>change it to make it something that could be traded,

0:16:45.600 --> 0:16:47.680
<v Speaker 1>and maybe you could launch futures contracts on that, and

0:16:47.720 --> 0:16:50.120
<v Speaker 1>so that might be interesting to you. And then I

0:16:50.240 --> 0:16:52.840
<v Speaker 1>launched into a long description of the math behind that formula,

0:16:53.320 --> 0:16:56.680
<v Speaker 1>and UM Bill very wisely said, you know, maybe you

0:16:56.680 --> 0:16:59.160
<v Speaker 1>could send me a letter with that formula. So so

0:16:59.200 --> 0:17:02.640
<v Speaker 1>I sent him a letter and which was actually, with

0:17:02.680 --> 0:17:04.600
<v Speaker 1>the benefit of findset quite helpful because now I have

0:17:04.640 --> 0:17:07.920
<v Speaker 1>a quite clear record of when we communicated this formula

0:17:08.640 --> 0:17:12.119
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand three to the cbo E UM and

0:17:13.200 --> 0:17:16.360
<v Speaker 1>UM and within six months we had a new VIX

0:17:16.880 --> 0:17:21.320
<v Speaker 1>being calculated using this new formula, and another six months

0:17:21.359 --> 0:17:24.600
<v Speaker 1>later the cbo E, which until that point was only

0:17:24.640 --> 0:17:28.520
<v Speaker 1>an options exchange, had launched futures contracts on it. And

0:17:28.560 --> 0:17:30.919
<v Speaker 1>so there was a series of sort of you know,

0:17:31.040 --> 0:17:33.880
<v Speaker 1>lucky moments in there. A client came and asked a question.

0:17:34.680 --> 0:17:37.760
<v Speaker 1>I happened to know Bill at the cbo E, so

0:17:38.080 --> 0:17:41.640
<v Speaker 1>I knew somebody to call. They happened to be interested

0:17:41.720 --> 0:17:46.000
<v Speaker 1>in in launching futures contracts and our timing was was

0:17:46.040 --> 0:17:49.920
<v Speaker 1>spot on. So there was a whole series of bits

0:17:49.960 --> 0:17:53.280
<v Speaker 1>of luck along the way. And what really happened after

0:17:53.320 --> 0:17:57.240
<v Speaker 1>that is another good learning experience for me, which is

0:17:57.720 --> 0:17:59.680
<v Speaker 1>at a boss at the time who said, look, you

0:17:59.680 --> 0:18:02.320
<v Speaker 1>should talk to all the salespeople and find out if

0:18:02.320 --> 0:18:05.960
<v Speaker 1>they're gonna bring in business on this new Vix thing

0:18:06.080 --> 0:18:07.800
<v Speaker 1>that you've been working on. So I spoke to the

0:18:07.840 --> 0:18:10.720
<v Speaker 1>salespeople and we did a little survey, and you know,

0:18:10.760 --> 0:18:14.120
<v Speaker 1>I was going to retire on the proceeds of this survey.

0:18:14.119 --> 0:18:16.199
<v Speaker 1>It was just amazing how much business we were going

0:18:16.240 --> 0:18:19.000
<v Speaker 1>to do. Day one comes along, I wait for the

0:18:19.040 --> 0:18:22.359
<v Speaker 1>phone to ring, and it doesn't ring. They two comes along,

0:18:23.119 --> 0:18:26.320
<v Speaker 1>the phone still doesn't ring, and by day three you

0:18:26.400 --> 0:18:30.440
<v Speaker 1>sort of get it. You know, it's nothing's happening. And amazingly,

0:18:30.560 --> 0:18:33.119
<v Speaker 1>the first significant trades we got done were actually with

0:18:33.240 --> 0:18:37.439
<v Speaker 1>investors outside of the us UM and they were the

0:18:37.440 --> 0:18:39.480
<v Speaker 1>people that still have got the early stages of this

0:18:39.680 --> 0:18:43.080
<v Speaker 1>new market in in Vix going. The other thing that

0:18:43.160 --> 0:18:46.639
<v Speaker 1>happened was my boss said, you should call, you know,

0:18:46.680 --> 0:18:48.920
<v Speaker 1>some of the other banks and and see if they're

0:18:48.920 --> 0:18:52.040
<v Speaker 1>going to support this thing. So I called nine other banks,

0:18:52.080 --> 0:18:54.280
<v Speaker 1>and nine out of nine said they had no interest

0:18:54.320 --> 0:18:58.080
<v Speaker 1>in supporting it. So it wasn't a particularly auspicious beginning,

0:18:58.520 --> 0:19:00.920
<v Speaker 1>you know that, And it took a little bit of persistence.

0:19:00.920 --> 0:19:05.480
<v Speaker 1>Now today it's this huge market and it trades enormous volumes,

0:19:05.520 --> 0:19:09.240
<v Speaker 1>but it's a good sort of lesson in terms of

0:19:09.240 --> 0:19:12.639
<v Speaker 1>how difficult it is to get something new going. So

0:19:12.640 --> 0:19:14.800
<v Speaker 1>so let's talk a little bit about what the VIX

0:19:14.880 --> 0:19:20.360
<v Speaker 1>index does and some of the misunderstandings around it. When

0:19:20.440 --> 0:19:24.720
<v Speaker 1>when you talk to people, especially traders on the equity side,

0:19:25.160 --> 0:19:29.360
<v Speaker 1>they look at it as the fear index. It measures volatility,

0:19:29.400 --> 0:19:35.840
<v Speaker 1>but but to be more precise, it's really measuring volatility expectations. Right, Yes,

0:19:36.160 --> 0:19:40.720
<v Speaker 1>I think the the word fear gauge or fear index

0:19:40.960 --> 0:19:45.880
<v Speaker 1>is actually pretty accurate. But you're also absolutely correct that

0:19:46.480 --> 0:19:51.479
<v Speaker 1>what the VIX actually is is the market's expectation of

0:19:51.600 --> 0:19:56.679
<v Speaker 1>alterality over the next thirty calendar days. And so it

0:19:56.880 --> 0:20:04.000
<v Speaker 1>is a it's a market price, and inevitably because the

0:20:04.200 --> 0:20:07.840
<v Speaker 1>volatality cannot mathematically go below zero, there's no such thing

0:20:07.880 --> 0:20:11.680
<v Speaker 1>as vaultality below zero. But it's unlimited on the upside,

0:20:11.720 --> 0:20:14.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, there's no limit to how high vaultality can be.

0:20:15.080 --> 0:20:16.640
<v Speaker 1>Then if you go to the market and say, hey,

0:20:16.680 --> 0:20:19.920
<v Speaker 1>give me a price for the next thirty days of alterality,

0:20:20.000 --> 0:20:22.320
<v Speaker 1>it's generally going to overestimate because it's going to have

0:20:22.400 --> 0:20:25.960
<v Speaker 1>to protect itself a bit against the possibility of huge

0:20:25.960 --> 0:20:28.480
<v Speaker 1>swings upwards and the fact that there's a floor. It

0:20:28.520 --> 0:20:32.640
<v Speaker 1>can't go below zero. So your description is absolutely correct.

0:20:33.080 --> 0:20:38.040
<v Speaker 1>It's the market's expectation of realized volatility over the next

0:20:38.080 --> 0:20:41.760
<v Speaker 1>thirty calendar days, but it has some features built into it.

0:20:41.760 --> 0:20:46.080
<v Speaker 1>It's always going to overestimate because you're effectively selling insurance

0:20:46.119 --> 0:20:48.880
<v Speaker 1>if you're selling the vics and and people don't sell

0:20:48.960 --> 0:20:51.720
<v Speaker 1>insurance cheap for the most part. That makes a whole

0:20:51.720 --> 0:20:54.120
<v Speaker 1>lot of sense. I know that a lot of traders

0:20:54.160 --> 0:20:59.560
<v Speaker 1>seem to conflate volatility with risk. How do you define

0:20:59.600 --> 0:21:02.359
<v Speaker 1>the different is between the two. It's a very good question,

0:21:02.359 --> 0:21:05.000
<v Speaker 1>and I think you know something I've thought about a

0:21:05.080 --> 0:21:09.840
<v Speaker 1>lot over the years, um and there's many different versions

0:21:09.880 --> 0:21:13.840
<v Speaker 1>of this. I think so most models, most risk models

0:21:13.920 --> 0:21:18.280
<v Speaker 1>do estimate volatility. They give you a var number, which

0:21:18.359 --> 0:21:24.240
<v Speaker 1>is basically a manipulated volatility number, or a risk in

0:21:24.359 --> 0:21:28.000
<v Speaker 1>stand deviations, or an expectation of loss or something like that,

0:21:28.720 --> 0:21:33.280
<v Speaker 1>and they're useful numbers, but in the end, I'm pretty

0:21:33.320 --> 0:21:37.359
<v Speaker 1>sure that both you and certainly I would never clue

0:21:37.400 --> 0:21:41.880
<v Speaker 1>what the volatility of our personal portfolios was last year

0:21:41.960 --> 0:21:45.040
<v Speaker 1>in a very volatile year. But we have a pretty

0:21:45.040 --> 0:21:47.359
<v Speaker 1>good idea of what the worst point is, you know,

0:21:47.400 --> 0:21:50.120
<v Speaker 1>when when we have the most losses of most pain

0:21:50.240 --> 0:21:53.720
<v Speaker 1>in our portfolios, and that's got nothing to do with voltility.

0:21:53.800 --> 0:21:57.160
<v Speaker 1>That's a draw down. So in the end, actually the

0:21:57.280 --> 0:21:59.840
<v Speaker 1>risk that a lot of us really experience and worry

0:21:59.880 --> 0:22:04.879
<v Speaker 1>of out his drawdowns. It's not volatility, which is mathematical

0:22:04.920 --> 0:22:08.000
<v Speaker 1>formula which describes the shape of a of a distribution,

0:22:08.600 --> 0:22:12.840
<v Speaker 1>and that I think is something which is difficult because

0:22:13.000 --> 0:22:18.760
<v Speaker 1>estimating drawdowns is extremely hard. Estimating volatility is actually fairly straightforward.

0:22:19.040 --> 0:22:21.760
<v Speaker 1>But the two don't really connect. And so why do

0:22:21.800 --> 0:22:24.680
<v Speaker 1>people estimate volatility? Because it's useful. It gives you how

0:22:24.680 --> 0:22:28.640
<v Speaker 1>wide the distribution will be. You can estimate it quite accurately,

0:22:28.680 --> 0:22:30.959
<v Speaker 1>you can forecast it quite well as well. You can

0:22:31.000 --> 0:22:34.439
<v Speaker 1>forecast volatality much better than you can forecast returns. So

0:22:34.480 --> 0:22:37.040
<v Speaker 1>all of that is useful. But what's not useful is

0:22:37.080 --> 0:22:41.640
<v Speaker 1>that we don't really worry in the end about what

0:22:41.680 --> 0:22:44.840
<v Speaker 1>I've altilt he was last year or what it will

0:22:44.880 --> 0:22:46.919
<v Speaker 1>be next year. What we really worry about is how

0:22:47.000 --> 0:22:49.560
<v Speaker 1>much we lost or how much we might lose. That

0:22:49.680 --> 0:22:53.760
<v Speaker 1>sort of that that pain threshold, and volatility doesn't really

0:22:53.840 --> 0:22:58.960
<v Speaker 1>connect with that. So unfortunately, really useful statistic drawdowns very

0:22:58.960 --> 0:23:02.159
<v Speaker 1>hard to estimate, and people don't really estimate it. The

0:23:02.200 --> 0:23:05.960
<v Speaker 1>other statistic volatility is useful, but it's in my view,

0:23:06.000 --> 0:23:09.760
<v Speaker 1>not the most useful estimate of of of risk because

0:23:09.800 --> 0:23:13.760
<v Speaker 1>we actually experience it. That's that's really kind of intriguing.

0:23:14.320 --> 0:23:18.960
<v Speaker 1>So so not only can you go long the vix um,

0:23:18.960 --> 0:23:21.720
<v Speaker 1>but some people can go short the VIX not not

0:23:21.880 --> 0:23:26.159
<v Speaker 1>exactly um a hedge if you have a long portfolio,

0:23:26.240 --> 0:23:29.200
<v Speaker 1>but I guess if you're short, maybe that that useful.

0:23:29.359 --> 0:23:33.000
<v Speaker 1>What do you think of of how people have been

0:23:33.240 --> 0:23:36.679
<v Speaker 1>using the VIX, either as a risk management tool or

0:23:36.720 --> 0:23:40.240
<v Speaker 1>as a way to UM get some non correlated exposure

0:23:40.280 --> 0:23:43.360
<v Speaker 1>to their to their equity holdings. Well, I think there's

0:23:43.359 --> 0:23:49.359
<v Speaker 1>a few things in there. Firstly, the the VIX and

0:23:49.440 --> 0:23:52.840
<v Speaker 1>the price of futures on the VIX will nearly always

0:23:53.240 --> 0:23:56.480
<v Speaker 1>disagree in generally, the futures will be higher than the

0:23:56.520 --> 0:23:59.359
<v Speaker 1>current level. So you know, as we're speaking now, the

0:23:59.440 --> 0:24:03.920
<v Speaker 1>VIX is a round sixteen better futures contract three months

0:24:03.920 --> 0:24:07.919
<v Speaker 1>out is trading at almost twenty one, so five points higher,

0:24:08.160 --> 0:24:10.600
<v Speaker 1>and that is a normal state of affairs. And as

0:24:10.600 --> 0:24:14.560
<v Speaker 1>we talked about earlier on voltialty, because voltality can't go

0:24:14.640 --> 0:24:17.359
<v Speaker 1>below zero than people, and it can go to an

0:24:17.440 --> 0:24:22.639
<v Speaker 1>unlimited upside level than people, generally the market will overestimate

0:24:23.440 --> 0:24:26.040
<v Speaker 1>volatilty to give it a little bit of an insurance

0:24:26.040 --> 0:24:30.240
<v Speaker 1>premium in there. Now, in terms of trading and investing

0:24:30.440 --> 0:24:33.160
<v Speaker 1>with the VIX, I think this thing is quite important

0:24:33.240 --> 0:24:35.560
<v Speaker 1>to know. So if you buy an ETS on the VIX,

0:24:35.640 --> 0:24:37.840
<v Speaker 1>for example, then it is going to have to hedge

0:24:37.840 --> 0:24:41.640
<v Speaker 1>itself with these futures contracts, and these futures contracts will

0:24:41.680 --> 0:24:45.560
<v Speaker 1>trade a lot higher. I said twenty one for September,

0:24:45.720 --> 0:24:49.680
<v Speaker 1>verus is sixteen now, so that's almost a thirty percent higher.

0:24:50.040 --> 0:24:52.920
<v Speaker 1>And by September, one of two things has to happen.

0:24:52.960 --> 0:24:54.800
<v Speaker 1>Either the VIX has to go up to twenty one,

0:24:55.080 --> 0:24:57.920
<v Speaker 1>or the futures contract will go down to sixteen. More lightly,

0:24:57.960 --> 0:25:00.360
<v Speaker 1>the futures contract will go down to sixty. And so

0:25:00.640 --> 0:25:03.639
<v Speaker 1>I think people often don't understand this when they're buying

0:25:03.720 --> 0:25:06.840
<v Speaker 1>a vix et f that they're not buying the level

0:25:06.880 --> 0:25:09.320
<v Speaker 1>of the vix they see on the on the screen

0:25:09.400 --> 0:25:12.320
<v Speaker 1>on their television screens or on their Bloomberg terminals or

0:25:12.320 --> 0:25:16.359
<v Speaker 1>wherever they see it. They're they're buying effectively a future

0:25:16.480 --> 0:25:18.920
<v Speaker 1>on the vix which generally is trading a much higher level,

0:25:18.960 --> 0:25:21.879
<v Speaker 1>and so they will have expected losses built in. That

0:25:22.160 --> 0:25:25.560
<v Speaker 1>is something which then some people on the other side

0:25:25.560 --> 0:25:27.119
<v Speaker 1>have said, well, this is very exciting. You know I

0:25:27.160 --> 0:25:31.560
<v Speaker 1>can I can sell the vix at twenty one in September,

0:25:31.600 --> 0:25:33.760
<v Speaker 1>and I expect it will go to sixteen. I can

0:25:33.800 --> 0:25:37.680
<v Speaker 1>make thirty percent in three months. And they're absolutely right,

0:25:38.640 --> 0:25:42.320
<v Speaker 1>you can and most likely will make thirty percent in

0:25:42.400 --> 0:25:45.000
<v Speaker 1>three months. But and the butt is a big thing.

0:25:45.359 --> 0:25:49.040
<v Speaker 1>If if something bad happens between now in September, then

0:25:49.160 --> 0:25:52.680
<v Speaker 1>you know, you can make very very significant losses because

0:25:52.880 --> 0:25:55.240
<v Speaker 1>the vix can just, you know, very very quickly go

0:25:55.400 --> 0:25:58.080
<v Speaker 1>up to very high levels. So what people often do

0:25:58.200 --> 0:26:02.159
<v Speaker 1>is they say that buying the vix that gives me

0:26:02.280 --> 0:26:05.840
<v Speaker 1>some protection against crises. If there's a crisis, then it

0:26:05.840 --> 0:26:08.000
<v Speaker 1>will lightly go up, and they're right, but they do

0:26:08.080 --> 0:26:11.040
<v Speaker 1>have to understand that it's not the VIX going from

0:26:11.080 --> 0:26:13.399
<v Speaker 1>the current sixteen to say eighteen. It's got to go

0:26:13.480 --> 0:26:16.520
<v Speaker 1>above that twenty one that's priced in in September before

0:26:16.560 --> 0:26:19.639
<v Speaker 1>you make any money. Um. But it can be a

0:26:19.680 --> 0:26:22.720
<v Speaker 1>protection strategy and insurance strategy. And then you've got people

0:26:22.720 --> 0:26:26.960
<v Speaker 1>on the other side who, let's say, look, I don't

0:26:27.000 --> 0:26:29.080
<v Speaker 1>expect something bad to happen, and I can earn this

0:26:29.320 --> 0:26:33.399
<v Speaker 1>very large insurance premium UM if I'm prepared to go

0:26:33.520 --> 0:26:35.680
<v Speaker 1>short the VIX and you of course can do that

0:26:35.800 --> 0:26:39.960
<v Speaker 1>through futures contracts, but you can also do it through ets.

0:26:40.560 --> 0:26:43.480
<v Speaker 1>I think my real observation on this those you know,

0:26:43.480 --> 0:26:45.679
<v Speaker 1>I've tried to give as clear an explanation as I

0:26:45.720 --> 0:26:48.240
<v Speaker 1>can of how this is working, but it's quite subtle.

0:26:48.480 --> 0:26:50.399
<v Speaker 1>This is not a simple thing. And I think a

0:26:50.440 --> 0:26:52.920
<v Speaker 1>lot of people that trade the VIX cts don't really

0:26:53.000 --> 0:26:57.320
<v Speaker 1>understand what's going on underneath the surface of the TS contract.

0:26:57.359 --> 0:27:00.080
<v Speaker 1>And there's a lot going on underneath the surface. So

0:27:00.080 --> 0:27:03.400
<v Speaker 1>so let's talk a little bit about um, people trading

0:27:03.560 --> 0:27:06.639
<v Speaker 1>products that they didn't really understand. And who better to

0:27:06.680 --> 0:27:10.600
<v Speaker 1>ask you the co inventor of the VIX back in

0:27:10.720 --> 0:27:15.600
<v Speaker 1>ten we saw the notes UH that were based on

0:27:15.640 --> 0:27:18.159
<v Speaker 1>the VIX and Credit Swiss was one of the larger

0:27:18.400 --> 0:27:21.879
<v Speaker 1>underwriters of these. UM just blow up and sent the

0:27:21.960 --> 0:27:25.439
<v Speaker 1>VIC spiking. I kind of remember we kissed fifty I

0:27:25.480 --> 0:27:28.760
<v Speaker 1>could I could be wrong about that, UM, but that

0:27:28.880 --> 0:27:32.240
<v Speaker 1>whole series of products, those short term E t N

0:27:32.359 --> 0:27:35.520
<v Speaker 1>s UM x I V was one and s v

0:27:35.800 --> 0:27:40.000
<v Speaker 1>x Y was another. UM. They just blew up spectacularly.

0:27:41.119 --> 0:27:44.920
<v Speaker 1>As you're watching this from from your seat, what are

0:27:44.920 --> 0:27:47.840
<v Speaker 1>you thinking about? Gee? Look what look? I lent the

0:27:47.920 --> 0:27:50.560
<v Speaker 1>keys to the car to the kids and they seem

0:27:50.640 --> 0:27:54.159
<v Speaker 1>to have wrecked it. Oh. I think I think your

0:27:54.240 --> 0:27:59.320
<v Speaker 1>description that Barry is pretty fair. When we did the works,

0:27:59.680 --> 0:28:01.840
<v Speaker 1>I'm Aaron. I did the work back in two thousand

0:28:01.880 --> 0:28:04.800
<v Speaker 1>three two four. The boss that asked me to do

0:28:04.800 --> 0:28:06.879
<v Speaker 1>the various other things that we talked about said, you know,

0:28:06.920 --> 0:28:09.760
<v Speaker 1>you should look at creating an ETF on this thing,

0:28:10.280 --> 0:28:12.720
<v Speaker 1>and so we did. Then we got together with one

0:28:12.720 --> 0:28:17.000
<v Speaker 1>of the very big E t F providers and they said, well, look,

0:28:17.040 --> 0:28:19.040
<v Speaker 1>maybe you could do some modeling of how this thing

0:28:19.080 --> 0:28:23.080
<v Speaker 1>will behave and we did that and we concluded this

0:28:23.160 --> 0:28:25.720
<v Speaker 1>is just not a good product. You know, people it's

0:28:25.760 --> 0:28:30.280
<v Speaker 1>got some nasty characteristics, and so we decided, along with

0:28:30.359 --> 0:28:33.560
<v Speaker 1>that large firm, that we should not sell E T

0:28:33.800 --> 0:28:37.400
<v Speaker 1>s on the vix. Now, other people took a different view,

0:28:37.520 --> 0:28:39.600
<v Speaker 1>and so your analogy of kind of the kids getting

0:28:39.600 --> 0:28:42.719
<v Speaker 1>the keys to the car more or less accurate. Actually,

0:28:43.200 --> 0:28:46.760
<v Speaker 1>I think the the the so I don't like the

0:28:46.800 --> 0:28:49.920
<v Speaker 1>E t F products mostly because they're very complicated. They

0:28:49.920 --> 0:28:53.160
<v Speaker 1>look simple on the outside, but underneath them they're very complicated,

0:28:53.400 --> 0:28:57.000
<v Speaker 1>and I don't think people always understand all that complexity.

0:28:57.080 --> 0:29:01.480
<v Speaker 1>So the events that happened in fabruy E two thousand

0:29:01.560 --> 0:29:06.680
<v Speaker 1>eighteen were these short vix et s and the short

0:29:06.760 --> 0:29:11.120
<v Speaker 1>vix ets trying to earn this insurance premium. So lots

0:29:11.160 --> 0:29:14.840
<v Speaker 1>of people, lots of all streets were happy owners of

0:29:15.000 --> 0:29:19.280
<v Speaker 1>these short vix ets. The problem with them is that

0:29:19.800 --> 0:29:22.760
<v Speaker 1>what the t F does then, is it it issues

0:29:22.880 --> 0:29:25.800
<v Speaker 1>units to people like you or I UM and then

0:29:25.840 --> 0:29:28.960
<v Speaker 1>has to sell futures contracts against it. If the price

0:29:29.000 --> 0:29:31.680
<v Speaker 1>of the vix starts going up, it needs to start

0:29:31.720 --> 0:29:34.680
<v Speaker 1>buying those contracts back, and if it goes up a lot,

0:29:34.720 --> 0:29:36.400
<v Speaker 1>it needs to buy a heck of a lot of them.

0:29:36.680 --> 0:29:39.880
<v Speaker 1>And so you have some volatility very late in the closing,

0:29:40.320 --> 0:29:42.880
<v Speaker 1>towards the end of the day UM, and I think

0:29:42.880 --> 0:29:45.160
<v Speaker 1>it was February five, if I remember rightly, two thousand

0:29:45.240 --> 0:29:48.000
<v Speaker 1>eighteen and UM, and they needed to buy a heck

0:29:48.000 --> 0:29:49.760
<v Speaker 1>of a lot of futures contracts in a very short

0:29:49.760 --> 0:29:51.840
<v Speaker 1>period of time. What did that do It push the

0:29:51.880 --> 0:29:54.360
<v Speaker 1>thing up even more, and so it kind of created

0:29:54.400 --> 0:29:59.280
<v Speaker 1>its own volatility and its own noise UM in that period.

0:29:59.640 --> 0:30:03.000
<v Speaker 1>So I think that it's a pretty good example of

0:30:03.040 --> 0:30:08.000
<v Speaker 1>an unintended consequence from a financial product. And again, you know,

0:30:08.080 --> 0:30:14.280
<v Speaker 1>it's quite a complicated concept. Along vix CTF is complicated

0:30:14.320 --> 0:30:17.480
<v Speaker 1>as short vic CTF is very complicated, and I think

0:30:17.480 --> 0:30:21.479
<v Speaker 1>from that perspective and people probably had some surprising results

0:30:21.480 --> 0:30:22.880
<v Speaker 1>that you know, a lot of people lost a lot

0:30:22.920 --> 0:30:26.440
<v Speaker 1>of money, some of the issues of these short vix

0:30:26.480 --> 0:30:29.560
<v Speaker 1>cts made a lot of money UM at the same time,

0:30:29.600 --> 0:30:31.960
<v Speaker 1>and it felt like a pretty bad state of affairs

0:30:32.040 --> 0:30:35.480
<v Speaker 1>to me. Let's talk a little bit about your book, UM,

0:30:35.520 --> 0:30:38.360
<v Speaker 1>which was written with Harvey Campbell, who was a prior

0:30:38.440 --> 0:30:43.760
<v Speaker 1>guest and and just a delightful individual. What compelled you

0:30:43.760 --> 0:30:48.320
<v Speaker 1>guys to write this book? This is a pretty UM

0:30:48.360 --> 0:30:52.480
<v Speaker 1>in the Weeds Inside Baseball sort of sort of book.

0:30:53.200 --> 0:30:56.040
<v Speaker 1>Yeah you're you're right, it's absolutely in the Weeds type

0:30:56.080 --> 0:31:00.720
<v Speaker 1>of book. What got us going on this was really

0:31:00.720 --> 0:31:05.080
<v Speaker 1>a sense that for many portfolio managers, risk management is

0:31:05.120 --> 0:31:08.520
<v Speaker 1>something which comes afterwards they build their portfolio, and then

0:31:08.560 --> 0:31:11.840
<v Speaker 1>the risk team do something later on and tell them

0:31:11.840 --> 0:31:14.400
<v Speaker 1>whether it's okay or not. And we thought that that's

0:31:14.440 --> 0:31:16.880
<v Speaker 1>actually a very bad way to run portfolios. In a

0:31:16.960 --> 0:31:20.560
<v Speaker 1>much better way is to have the alpha side of

0:31:20.600 --> 0:31:24.000
<v Speaker 1>building portfolios in the risk side to be equal partners.

0:31:24.040 --> 0:31:26.440
<v Speaker 1>And that's something that we've really tried to build as

0:31:26.480 --> 0:31:29.640
<v Speaker 1>a culture of a man group that risk is part

0:31:29.680 --> 0:31:32.480
<v Speaker 1>of the investment team. It's, as they sometimes put it,

0:31:32.760 --> 0:31:35.040
<v Speaker 1>if risk is the police for other people that come

0:31:35.160 --> 0:31:37.440
<v Speaker 1>kind of knocking on your door telling you've done something wrong.

0:31:37.880 --> 0:31:41.000
<v Speaker 1>That's that's not really a good way of running portfolios.

0:31:41.240 --> 0:31:44.040
<v Speaker 1>What do you really want is as you're building the portfolios,

0:31:44.080 --> 0:31:47.920
<v Speaker 1>the risk and the alphabets to to come as as

0:31:47.960 --> 0:31:53.520
<v Speaker 1>equal partners. And the reason for that is, firstly, huge

0:31:53.520 --> 0:31:56.040
<v Speaker 1>amounts of damage tend to be done when there is

0:31:56.080 --> 0:31:58.840
<v Speaker 1>bad risk management in stress periods that people aren't prepared

0:31:58.880 --> 0:32:01.880
<v Speaker 1>for those stress periods, they make bad decisions, and those

0:32:01.880 --> 0:32:06.680
<v Speaker 1>stress periods lose a lot of money, often crystallize losses,

0:32:06.800 --> 0:32:09.520
<v Speaker 1>that sort of thing. So so firstly, if you don't

0:32:09.600 --> 0:32:13.720
<v Speaker 1>have a proper risk approach to building portfolios when you

0:32:14.120 --> 0:32:18.560
<v Speaker 1>enter chop your periods in markets, then you're likely to

0:32:18.600 --> 0:32:22.719
<v Speaker 1>make bad decisions. That The second, which I mentioned earlier

0:32:22.760 --> 0:32:26.880
<v Speaker 1>on is kind of surprisingly. It's actually much easier to

0:32:27.000 --> 0:32:31.440
<v Speaker 1>forecast risk than it is to forecast returns, and you

0:32:31.440 --> 0:32:35.800
<v Speaker 1>can use that to give yourself more stable portfolios. And

0:32:35.840 --> 0:32:39.040
<v Speaker 1>so we were really trying to say that you can

0:32:39.200 --> 0:32:43.760
<v Speaker 1>blend the alpha side of portfolio management with the risk

0:32:43.800 --> 0:32:46.280
<v Speaker 1>side as equal partners, and you'll build better and more

0:32:46.280 --> 0:32:49.520
<v Speaker 1>stable portfolios which will actually do better over the long

0:32:49.640 --> 0:32:52.440
<v Speaker 1>run because you won't end up making bad decisions during

0:32:52.480 --> 0:32:55.640
<v Speaker 1>the during the stress periods. So let's talk about that

0:32:55.720 --> 0:33:00.560
<v Speaker 1>last quote, it's easier to forecast risk then return. I'm

0:33:00.560 --> 0:33:02.880
<v Speaker 1>going to play devil's advocate and take the other side

0:33:02.880 --> 0:33:06.120
<v Speaker 1>of that argument. Hey, we know over long periods of

0:33:06.200 --> 0:33:11.160
<v Speaker 1>time what historical asset class returns are, and so we

0:33:11.240 --> 0:33:17.480
<v Speaker 1>can reasonably forecast eight percent over twenty years for equities UM,

0:33:17.520 --> 0:33:21.800
<v Speaker 1>but we can forecast the sort of UM black swans

0:33:21.800 --> 0:33:23.600
<v Speaker 1>that show up every now and then that are just

0:33:23.720 --> 0:33:31.400
<v Speaker 1>completely unexpected and are amongst the quote unknown unknowns. Tell

0:33:31.440 --> 0:33:35.520
<v Speaker 1>me what's wrong with that perspective that looks at extrapolating

0:33:35.560 --> 0:33:38.600
<v Speaker 1>long term returns versus hey, we have no idea what

0:33:38.680 --> 0:33:40.840
<v Speaker 1>the next random events is going to be. Yeah, I

0:33:40.840 --> 0:33:43.400
<v Speaker 1>think what's wrong with that is that you've tried to

0:33:43.400 --> 0:33:46.720
<v Speaker 1>compare forecasting very long run returns and then said that

0:33:46.760 --> 0:33:49.840
<v Speaker 1>I need to forecast short term risk. And so let

0:33:49.840 --> 0:33:53.360
<v Speaker 1>me sort of decompose that a little bit more. Many times,

0:33:53.480 --> 0:33:57.160
<v Speaker 1>people when they when they forecast returns, and we're all

0:33:57.160 --> 0:34:00.239
<v Speaker 1>guilty of this, we end up being pretty influence by

0:34:00.280 --> 0:34:03.360
<v Speaker 1>what happened in the last month or two, and so

0:34:03.400 --> 0:34:06.000
<v Speaker 1>we say, you know, people, many people, for example, are

0:34:06.000 --> 0:34:11.240
<v Speaker 1>pretty positive about equity market returns globally and maybe especially

0:34:11.239 --> 0:34:13.920
<v Speaker 1>in the US. And one of the reasons that really

0:34:14.040 --> 0:34:17.279
<v Speaker 1>is that we've had good returns, you know, really since

0:34:17.320 --> 0:34:20.800
<v Speaker 1>March shows since April last year, and people are extrapolating,

0:34:20.800 --> 0:34:23.640
<v Speaker 1>they're just stretching forwards. But if you look at the data,

0:34:23.920 --> 0:34:25.800
<v Speaker 1>and if you look at the data over long periods

0:34:25.800 --> 0:34:29.640
<v Speaker 1>of time, you find the correlation between past returns and

0:34:29.800 --> 0:34:33.920
<v Speaker 1>next month's returns is about zero in almost all markets

0:34:33.960 --> 0:34:37.360
<v Speaker 1>around the world, equity markets, bond markets, commodity markets just

0:34:37.400 --> 0:34:40.840
<v Speaker 1>about zero. There has no last month's returns have close

0:34:40.920 --> 0:34:45.040
<v Speaker 1>to zero predictive ability of telling you what next month's

0:34:45.040 --> 0:34:46.960
<v Speaker 1>returns are going to be. If you now do that

0:34:47.000 --> 0:34:50.680
<v Speaker 1>on risk and you calculate the fertility of markets last

0:34:50.719 --> 0:34:52.759
<v Speaker 1>month or the month before or the month before that,

0:34:53.000 --> 0:34:56.239
<v Speaker 1>lets hee has very high predictive ability. So people like

0:34:56.320 --> 0:34:59.440
<v Speaker 1>me would call this the serial correlation. So the serial

0:34:59.480 --> 0:35:02.920
<v Speaker 1>correlation the returns in other words, from last month or

0:35:02.960 --> 0:35:05.480
<v Speaker 1>two months ago or three months ago to this month's

0:35:05.480 --> 0:35:08.839
<v Speaker 1>returns is close to zero, you might as well call

0:35:08.880 --> 0:35:10.920
<v Speaker 1>it zero. So close to zero. If you do the

0:35:10.960 --> 0:35:14.120
<v Speaker 1>same thing in volatility, and you can do this across

0:35:14.200 --> 0:35:17.279
<v Speaker 1>equity markets in the US, but also across other parts

0:35:17.320 --> 0:35:21.360
<v Speaker 1>of the world, bond markets, commodity markets, currency markets, that

0:35:22.040 --> 0:35:25.040
<v Speaker 1>zerial correlation is around forty percent. So that's telling you

0:35:25.040 --> 0:35:27.080
<v Speaker 1>that last month's vulatility is actually telling you quite a

0:35:27.120 --> 0:35:30.759
<v Speaker 1>lot about this month's faultiality. And so whilst you might

0:35:30.800 --> 0:35:32.680
<v Speaker 1>be able to make a statement about you know, twenty

0:35:32.800 --> 0:35:36.719
<v Speaker 1>year expected returns um I suspect both you and I

0:35:36.800 --> 0:35:38.520
<v Speaker 1>will be, you know, at least twenty years older, and

0:35:38.600 --> 0:35:41.279
<v Speaker 1>that your point and whether anybody will really hold us

0:35:41.280 --> 0:35:45.239
<v Speaker 1>to it or whether it's the useful observation will be

0:35:45.719 --> 0:35:49.120
<v Speaker 1>tricky to to to really evaluate. But for most people

0:35:49.160 --> 0:35:52.000
<v Speaker 1>they need to have nearer term forecasts in order to

0:35:52.000 --> 0:35:53.799
<v Speaker 1>be able to make their decisions. And I think they

0:35:53.800 --> 0:35:57.520
<v Speaker 1>make a mistake that they think they can forecast returns

0:35:57.560 --> 0:36:00.680
<v Speaker 1>often by extrapolating from past months or turns, And the

0:36:00.719 --> 0:36:04.360
<v Speaker 1>evidence is that you shouldn't extractly. There's no extrapolation to

0:36:04.440 --> 0:36:08.400
<v Speaker 1>be done. Whilst a risk you can that that is

0:36:08.520 --> 0:36:10.840
<v Speaker 1>very parallel to what we were talking about earlier with

0:36:10.960 --> 0:36:15.160
<v Speaker 1>price versus time series. So equities follow a random walk,

0:36:15.719 --> 0:36:20.360
<v Speaker 1>but volatility and risk tends to be persistent and enhance

0:36:20.440 --> 0:36:25.800
<v Speaker 1>more likely to have some time series correlation. I think

0:36:26.000 --> 0:36:30.560
<v Speaker 1>that's what I'm hearing, Am I am I saying that right? Yeah, absolutely, absolutely,

0:36:30.600 --> 0:36:34.080
<v Speaker 1>the the there's a very small and what the c

0:36:34.280 --> 0:36:37.239
<v Speaker 1>t a s try and do, but the futures trend

0:36:37.320 --> 0:36:41.080
<v Speaker 1>followers is that there's there's a very small effect to

0:36:41.160 --> 0:36:44.680
<v Speaker 1>being able to pick up some persistence in returns, but

0:36:44.719 --> 0:36:46.840
<v Speaker 1>you have to do it across hundreds of markets and

0:36:46.920 --> 0:36:49.560
<v Speaker 1>you have to do it consistently over time, and you'll

0:36:49.640 --> 0:36:51.920
<v Speaker 1>just managed to eke out a little bit of alpha

0:36:51.920 --> 0:36:55.520
<v Speaker 1>about doing that, but altility is much easier. So what

0:36:55.680 --> 0:37:00.680
<v Speaker 1>should managers do proactively to prepare for are not the

0:37:00.800 --> 0:37:04.040
<v Speaker 1>known risk but the unknown risks? And and really just

0:37:04.160 --> 0:37:07.239
<v Speaker 1>over the past twenty years, we had nine eleven, we

0:37:07.320 --> 0:37:11.920
<v Speaker 1>had the Great Financial Crisis, we had the VICS meltdown,

0:37:11.960 --> 0:37:17.000
<v Speaker 1>and more recently we had the COVID pandemic. How how

0:37:17.080 --> 0:37:23.200
<v Speaker 1>can a fund manager build protection against these black swans

0:37:23.239 --> 0:37:28.000
<v Speaker 1>into their process? Well, so I think the first thing

0:37:28.120 --> 0:37:30.520
<v Speaker 1>that I portfolio managed to do is realize that you

0:37:30.600 --> 0:37:34.000
<v Speaker 1>cannot forecast these events. And you know, I speak, at

0:37:34.040 --> 0:37:35.879
<v Speaker 1>least I used to speak at conferences a lot when

0:37:35.920 --> 0:37:40.080
<v Speaker 1>we've still had conferences, and you know, people would ask me, well,

0:37:40.120 --> 0:37:42.879
<v Speaker 1>what's the black swan event that's going to happen this year?

0:37:43.520 --> 0:37:47.240
<v Speaker 1>And I also that was the most ridiculous question because

0:37:48.040 --> 0:37:52.120
<v Speaker 1>you know, clearly all of these events are unfoecastable, and

0:37:52.280 --> 0:37:55.319
<v Speaker 1>generally the ones that you forecast will happen don't end

0:37:55.400 --> 0:37:58.000
<v Speaker 1>up being the thing that takes place. So I think

0:37:58.040 --> 0:37:59.880
<v Speaker 1>the first thing is to show a lot of human

0:38:00.080 --> 0:38:04.080
<v Speaker 1>tear about our ability to forecast what what the bad

0:38:04.080 --> 0:38:06.240
<v Speaker 1>events will be. The only thing I can really feel

0:38:06.239 --> 0:38:08.400
<v Speaker 1>confident about is that there will be more bad events

0:38:08.440 --> 0:38:10.360
<v Speaker 1>in the future. You know, it seems that they just

0:38:10.440 --> 0:38:15.600
<v Speaker 1>keep coming, but they have different shapes and forms. And

0:38:15.680 --> 0:38:17.839
<v Speaker 1>maybe as a side anecdote on that, we have an

0:38:17.880 --> 0:38:20.160
<v Speaker 1>excellent risk manager at Man Group and at the end

0:38:20.200 --> 0:38:23.120
<v Speaker 1>of two thousand nineteen and a sort of planning exercise

0:38:23.160 --> 0:38:25.200
<v Speaker 1>who was giving all the risk that could affect markets.

0:38:25.239 --> 0:38:27.759
<v Speaker 1>And you had about twenty of these things, and one

0:38:27.800 --> 0:38:30.279
<v Speaker 1>of them was epidemic. And I looked at this at

0:38:30.320 --> 0:38:32.880
<v Speaker 1>the end of two thousand nineteen and I said, epidemic. Well,

0:38:32.920 --> 0:38:35.520
<v Speaker 1>I mean, like, you know, I don't know much about epidemics,

0:38:35.520 --> 0:38:38.000
<v Speaker 1>but I can't say it's impossible. But it doesn't seem

0:38:38.080 --> 0:38:40.279
<v Speaker 1>very lightly. So we did exactly nothing about the risk

0:38:40.320 --> 0:38:43.200
<v Speaker 1>of epidemic. And if he got the word almost right,

0:38:43.400 --> 0:38:46.480
<v Speaker 1>pandemic instead of epidemic. But you know, even if you

0:38:46.520 --> 0:38:48.600
<v Speaker 1>have it on your list of things, which my risk

0:38:48.680 --> 0:38:52.080
<v Speaker 1>manager did, um, it's very hard to act on it.

0:38:52.160 --> 0:38:55.600
<v Speaker 1>So I think humility in terms of ability to forecast

0:38:55.640 --> 0:38:58.600
<v Speaker 1>these things really important. If you think you can forecast,

0:38:58.920 --> 0:39:01.840
<v Speaker 1>you'll probably make them. State by protecting yourselves against the

0:39:01.880 --> 0:39:06.000
<v Speaker 1>wrong thing. Once you've got over that and said likely

0:39:06.000 --> 0:39:08.840
<v Speaker 1>it probably can't forecast the next bad thing, then I

0:39:08.840 --> 0:39:11.560
<v Speaker 1>think what becomes much more important is, Okay, now you

0:39:11.600 --> 0:39:15.920
<v Speaker 1>need a strategy that is going to be relatively insensitive

0:39:16.080 --> 0:39:20.320
<v Speaker 1>to the nature of the bad thing. In other words,

0:39:21.040 --> 0:39:26.759
<v Speaker 1>whether it's a tech bubble collapse or um credit crisis,

0:39:27.120 --> 0:39:31.400
<v Speaker 1>or you know, something entirely different to war, or a pandemic,

0:39:31.560 --> 0:39:33.560
<v Speaker 1>or it could be any of these things. Obviously you

0:39:33.600 --> 0:39:36.680
<v Speaker 1>need a strategy which is going to be robust to

0:39:36.840 --> 0:39:40.760
<v Speaker 1>any of those things coming along. And my own suggestion

0:39:40.800 --> 0:39:44.279
<v Speaker 1>on this would be that it's it's too expensive to

0:39:44.320 --> 0:39:48.799
<v Speaker 1>buy put options. Buying put options on the sp you

0:39:48.840 --> 0:39:50.680
<v Speaker 1>can do every now and then, but you can't do

0:39:50.719 --> 0:39:53.960
<v Speaker 1>it all the time. It's just it just becomes too costly.

0:39:54.400 --> 0:39:56.200
<v Speaker 1>And so you're gonna have to have a strategy which

0:39:56.239 --> 0:40:00.759
<v Speaker 1>relies a little bit more on either assets in your

0:40:00.760 --> 0:40:03.239
<v Speaker 1>portfolio which you think are likely to do well in

0:40:03.280 --> 0:40:06.200
<v Speaker 1>a stress period. That could be gold in my view,

0:40:06.239 --> 0:40:09.400
<v Speaker 1>it's not terribly reliable. It could be gold. It could

0:40:09.400 --> 0:40:12.400
<v Speaker 1>be U strategury bonds or other government bonds around the world.

0:40:12.719 --> 0:40:15.600
<v Speaker 1>Of course, if the problem emerges from the bond market,

0:40:15.640 --> 0:40:19.120
<v Speaker 1>it's not really going to help you. Um. And you know, people,

0:40:19.560 --> 0:40:22.040
<v Speaker 1>I think forget that they have definitely been problems from

0:40:22.040 --> 0:40:23.640
<v Speaker 1>the bond markets. You just need to look back a

0:40:23.719 --> 0:40:28.400
<v Speaker 1>little bit to the early es or before then to

0:40:28.480 --> 0:40:30.480
<v Speaker 1>see that actually there were plenty of problems that came

0:40:30.600 --> 0:40:33.239
<v Speaker 1>from the bond market. And or you could have some

0:40:33.320 --> 0:40:38.319
<v Speaker 1>sort of trading strategy, and certainly for me this time

0:40:38.360 --> 0:40:41.240
<v Speaker 1>series momentum, which we touched on in our first segment,

0:40:41.800 --> 0:40:46.759
<v Speaker 1>this idea that you can build a trading strategy like

0:40:46.800 --> 0:40:50.040
<v Speaker 1>the c t as have done, which relies on just

0:40:50.120 --> 0:40:53.960
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of persistence in returns and looks for

0:40:54.000 --> 0:40:56.360
<v Speaker 1>them everywhere. That can be a very good way of

0:40:56.400 --> 0:41:00.239
<v Speaker 1>building a defensive strategy. So, in other words, if we

0:41:00.360 --> 0:41:02.520
<v Speaker 1>describe a crisis, and I can't tell you whether it

0:41:02.560 --> 0:41:07.880
<v Speaker 1>comes from a war, credit crisis, an epidemic, something else,

0:41:08.239 --> 0:41:11.240
<v Speaker 1>but typically in a crisis like that, you will tend

0:41:11.280 --> 0:41:13.560
<v Speaker 1>to have equities going down, you will tend to have

0:41:13.640 --> 0:41:17.280
<v Speaker 1>bonds going up, you'll tend to have gold going up. Um.

0:41:17.320 --> 0:41:19.200
<v Speaker 1>It's a bit harder to tell what might happen to

0:41:19.360 --> 0:41:22.319
<v Speaker 1>energy prices, but those moves tend to persist for a bit.

0:41:22.480 --> 0:41:25.240
<v Speaker 1>They tend to know equities fall and then they keep falling,

0:41:25.280 --> 0:41:27.480
<v Speaker 1>and bonds might go up and they keep rising, and

0:41:27.600 --> 0:41:30.600
<v Speaker 1>gold the same thing. And you can build a strategy

0:41:30.640 --> 0:41:34.160
<v Speaker 1>which encapsulates and tries to capture that effect. Then you

0:41:34.160 --> 0:41:37.480
<v Speaker 1>can build something which is robust and is not depending

0:41:37.600 --> 0:41:39.719
<v Speaker 1>on your ability to put your finger on what the

0:41:39.760 --> 0:41:42.880
<v Speaker 1>next bad event might be. So in the book, you

0:41:42.880 --> 0:41:45.479
<v Speaker 1>you get into the nitty gritty, you you go over

0:41:46.000 --> 0:41:50.640
<v Speaker 1>details of a new risk management approach to portfolio design.

0:41:51.480 --> 0:41:55.640
<v Speaker 1>I want to ask, how did those strategies do in

0:41:55.960 --> 0:41:58.839
<v Speaker 1>back tests looking at OH eight or nine, and how

0:41:58.880 --> 0:42:04.879
<v Speaker 1>do they do in the real war world in March. Well,

0:42:04.880 --> 0:42:07.319
<v Speaker 1>so for us, actually, I don't think O eight O

0:42:07.440 --> 0:42:10.840
<v Speaker 1>nine really was back test because we were actually trading

0:42:10.880 --> 0:42:14.640
<v Speaker 1>most of these strategies at that time. But so I

0:42:14.719 --> 0:42:20.360
<v Speaker 1>think we actually have pretty good life experience. And the

0:42:20.400 --> 0:42:26.720
<v Speaker 1>first thing I should say, March of was an extraordinary crisis,

0:42:26.760 --> 0:42:30.440
<v Speaker 1>and all all crises are extraordinary, but one of the

0:42:30.480 --> 0:42:35.279
<v Speaker 1>things which was most extraordinary about March was that it

0:42:36.120 --> 0:42:38.799
<v Speaker 1>markets fell very quickly. What we've seen that before, but

0:42:38.880 --> 0:42:42.520
<v Speaker 1>then they reverted remarkably quickly, and really the most similar

0:42:42.640 --> 0:42:46.799
<v Speaker 1>crisis in terms of market action that you can put

0:42:46.800 --> 0:42:50.120
<v Speaker 1>your finger on since the Second World War was the

0:42:50.160 --> 0:42:55.080
<v Speaker 1>October seven crisis, so that that very rapid fall you

0:42:55.160 --> 0:43:00.160
<v Speaker 1>had followed by an almost equally rapid recovery. So so

0:43:00.480 --> 0:43:03.680
<v Speaker 1>that might say, well, you know, if you fitted, if

0:43:03.680 --> 0:43:06.879
<v Speaker 1>you've sort of tested your crisis protection on all these

0:43:06.880 --> 0:43:10.759
<v Speaker 1>slower crises, then maybe you wouldn't do too well in

0:43:10.840 --> 0:43:13.080
<v Speaker 1>this faster crisis. And it's actually not what we found.

0:43:13.080 --> 0:43:16.120
<v Speaker 1>So we found that, um, we had you know, quite

0:43:16.160 --> 0:43:22.840
<v Speaker 1>good strength of our strategies during um the March April period.

0:43:22.920 --> 0:43:27.239
<v Speaker 1>So for example, futures trend firing, something we talked about

0:43:27.280 --> 0:43:30.920
<v Speaker 1>quite a lot, um did you know, really rather well

0:43:31.120 --> 0:43:35.080
<v Speaker 1>in March and April of last year. But we also

0:43:35.120 --> 0:43:39.560
<v Speaker 1>talk about for example, rebouncing and and and trying to

0:43:39.600 --> 0:43:44.720
<v Speaker 1>stop rebouncing, which can can have the nasty effect of

0:43:44.920 --> 0:43:48.280
<v Speaker 1>buying the losers, and then if the losers carry on falling,

0:43:48.800 --> 0:43:51.000
<v Speaker 1>then you will, damn it, you just bought a whole

0:43:51.040 --> 0:43:53.880
<v Speaker 1>bunch of losers in time for another month's falls. And

0:43:53.920 --> 0:43:57.480
<v Speaker 1>we found that if you if you have UH strategies

0:43:57.560 --> 0:44:00.840
<v Speaker 1>which try and control your rebouncing, but they have to

0:44:00.840 --> 0:44:03.560
<v Speaker 1>have relatively rapid they have to be quite fast strategies,

0:44:03.600 --> 0:44:05.600
<v Speaker 1>and that would be my real point. So most of

0:44:05.600 --> 0:44:08.839
<v Speaker 1>our protection strategies are quite fast. The signals are quite quick.

0:44:08.880 --> 0:44:14.520
<v Speaker 1>They use data that goes back typically a few weeks um,

0:44:14.640 --> 0:44:18.440
<v Speaker 1>and they can move positions around quite rapidly. And that

0:44:18.480 --> 0:44:21.319
<v Speaker 1>worked pretty well in March and April last year. If

0:44:21.320 --> 0:44:23.680
<v Speaker 1>you do much slower strategies, you would not have had

0:44:23.680 --> 0:44:27.560
<v Speaker 1>the protection characteristics right and and and to put some

0:44:27.680 --> 0:44:35.439
<v Speaker 1>numbers on on the speed of March, we smp um.

0:44:35.480 --> 0:44:39.520
<v Speaker 1>That was the fastest drop in history, and I believe

0:44:40.200 --> 0:44:44.080
<v Speaker 1>it was just a day under a month, maybe a

0:44:44.080 --> 0:44:47.439
<v Speaker 1>few days under a month. And then the recovery from

0:44:47.640 --> 0:44:50.480
<v Speaker 1>the end of March beginning of April was back to

0:44:50.480 --> 0:44:54.759
<v Speaker 1>break even by August. That that's a pretty astounding turnaround,

0:44:55.640 --> 0:45:04.240
<v Speaker 1>arguably faster than the recovery from seven, which was itself

0:45:04.280 --> 0:45:09.719
<v Speaker 1>pretty quick, wasn't it Absolutely so, it was just totally extraordinary.

0:45:09.760 --> 0:45:12.520
<v Speaker 1>And from that perspective, you know, the past didn't give

0:45:12.520 --> 0:45:15.480
<v Speaker 1>you a particularly good guide as to how how that

0:45:15.520 --> 0:45:19.040
<v Speaker 1>crisis would would unfold. And then maybe that sort of

0:45:19.040 --> 0:45:22.759
<v Speaker 1>retrates my point a little bit that you can't you

0:45:22.880 --> 0:45:25.839
<v Speaker 1>can't build protection strategies which are really trying to put

0:45:25.880 --> 0:45:28.279
<v Speaker 1>your finger on exactly what's going to happen. You have

0:45:28.360 --> 0:45:31.800
<v Speaker 1>to you have to be aware that your forecasting ability

0:45:31.960 --> 0:45:34.520
<v Speaker 1>is poor, UM, and you've really got to have a

0:45:34.920 --> 0:45:37.440
<v Speaker 1>strategic response. And that's why we call the book strategic

0:45:37.480 --> 0:45:40.280
<v Speaker 1>risk Management. It's really a set of strategies that the plan.

0:45:41.000 --> 0:45:42.799
<v Speaker 1>And you can't make the plan up on the fly.

0:45:43.239 --> 0:45:45.080
<v Speaker 1>You know what. You really the worst thing you could

0:45:45.080 --> 0:45:47.800
<v Speaker 1>have been doing last year is making up your protection

0:45:47.840 --> 0:45:51.320
<v Speaker 1>strategy during March. It was too late by that point.

0:45:51.480 --> 0:45:53.880
<v Speaker 1>You have to make up your your protection strategy in

0:45:53.920 --> 0:45:56.200
<v Speaker 1>the months and years before then, and then you had

0:45:56.200 --> 0:45:59.160
<v Speaker 1>to be implementing it during March. So there was a

0:45:59.239 --> 0:46:01.600
<v Speaker 1>quote of yours really liked, and I want to ask

0:46:01.640 --> 0:46:05.600
<v Speaker 1>you about this quote. We are in a riskier environment

0:46:05.680 --> 0:46:09.759
<v Speaker 1>than we have been in the past twenty years for

0:46:09.880 --> 0:46:15.239
<v Speaker 1>the foreseeable future. Unquote the past twenty years. Really there

0:46:15.280 --> 0:46:18.399
<v Speaker 1>were a lot of risky events that took place, from

0:46:18.480 --> 0:46:21.480
<v Speaker 1>nine eleven to the Great Financial Crisis to the pandemic.

0:46:22.000 --> 0:46:26.000
<v Speaker 1>What makes this a riskier environment and why do you

0:46:26.080 --> 0:46:30.440
<v Speaker 1>see this as um being a persistent risk for the

0:46:30.680 --> 0:46:35.279
<v Speaker 1>for the next foreseeable future. So the reason that I

0:46:35.320 --> 0:46:39.200
<v Speaker 1>think we're in this highly or much riskier environment that

0:46:39.280 --> 0:46:43.359
<v Speaker 1>we've been in is because markets are much less diversified

0:46:43.400 --> 0:46:46.759
<v Speaker 1>than at any point in my career. And so you know,

0:46:46.800 --> 0:46:50.040
<v Speaker 1>I started trading markets when I was at high school

0:46:50.080 --> 0:46:53.919
<v Speaker 1>in the late nineties, and at that time people got

0:46:54.000 --> 0:46:58.640
<v Speaker 1>very worried that the Japanese market was round of the

0:46:58.719 --> 0:47:02.560
<v Speaker 1>MSCI world. Well, today the US market is two thirds

0:47:02.560 --> 0:47:06.120
<v Speaker 1>of the MSCI world. So it's and that's the highest

0:47:06.120 --> 0:47:07.920
<v Speaker 1>way to to ever be in such the highest way

0:47:08.000 --> 0:47:11.680
<v Speaker 1>that any one country has ever been in the global

0:47:11.719 --> 0:47:14.640
<v Speaker 1>Equity Index. And then if you now dig in within

0:47:14.719 --> 0:47:17.719
<v Speaker 1>the US market, and this is a little tougher to do,

0:47:18.560 --> 0:47:22.160
<v Speaker 1>but if you dig into the proportion of the U

0:47:22.200 --> 0:47:24.640
<v Speaker 1>s ecty market made up by tech, and the reason

0:47:24.640 --> 0:47:27.640
<v Speaker 1>it's difficult is they changed the classification system a couple

0:47:27.640 --> 0:47:30.680
<v Speaker 1>of years ago, then you'll see the tech is a

0:47:30.719 --> 0:47:33.160
<v Speaker 1>bigger portion of the US equity market than it has

0:47:33.200 --> 0:47:37.440
<v Speaker 1>ever been, including in the late in the tech bubble.

0:47:37.680 --> 0:47:42.640
<v Speaker 1>So you have an incredibly concentrated equity market both globally

0:47:42.800 --> 0:47:46.680
<v Speaker 1>into the US and also by sector within the US.

0:47:46.760 --> 0:47:49.480
<v Speaker 1>And for me, that means that you know, this is

0:47:49.520 --> 0:47:52.240
<v Speaker 1>not sort of looking at the vix today, tomorrow, yesterday, whatever.

0:47:52.440 --> 0:47:57.360
<v Speaker 1>More strategically, the market feels much more likely to be

0:47:57.400 --> 0:48:03.200
<v Speaker 1>able to produce unpleasant outcomes because the only freelance you

0:48:03.200 --> 0:48:07.359
<v Speaker 1>haven't financed the diversification you have the least diversification I've

0:48:07.360 --> 0:48:11.680
<v Speaker 1>ever seen. Huh, that's kind of interesting. So we have concentrated,

0:48:12.120 --> 0:48:16.359
<v Speaker 1>non diversified portfolios. And one of the things we've seen

0:48:16.520 --> 0:48:21.239
<v Speaker 1>is domestically, the US seems to be a higher poor

0:48:21.360 --> 0:48:25.080
<v Speaker 1>proportion of global equity markets. And then within the US,

0:48:25.320 --> 0:48:28.840
<v Speaker 1>the text actor continues to increase its waiting when the

0:48:29.000 --> 0:48:33.680
<v Speaker 1>sp What does that mean for the future of of

0:48:33.840 --> 0:48:40.520
<v Speaker 1>risk and managing it? Well, I look, I think it

0:48:40.560 --> 0:48:42.560
<v Speaker 1>means firstly that you know, you need to be just

0:48:42.640 --> 0:48:47.680
<v Speaker 1>aware of this, that that the market is so heavily concentrated.

0:48:48.239 --> 0:48:52.480
<v Speaker 1>Um the I think the what can you do about it?

0:48:52.360 --> 0:48:55.840
<v Speaker 1>It is probably the real question. And I think that

0:48:55.920 --> 0:48:59.520
<v Speaker 1>this is a pretty big challenge for people because historically

0:48:59.680 --> 0:49:04.239
<v Speaker 1>the answer was, well, if if I want to build

0:49:04.280 --> 0:49:07.759
<v Speaker 1>a balanced portfolio, then I'll hold some equities, and then

0:49:07.880 --> 0:49:13.839
<v Speaker 1>I'll hold some government bonds, often US treasury bonds um

0:49:14.200 --> 0:49:16.319
<v Speaker 1>as the sort of as the ballast as the thing

0:49:16.400 --> 0:49:19.440
<v Speaker 1>which gives a bit of stability to my equity portfolio.

0:49:19.880 --> 0:49:22.879
<v Speaker 1>But where we are today, I think people are are

0:49:23.440 --> 0:49:27.400
<v Speaker 1>much less convinced that treasury bonds will be the ballast

0:49:28.120 --> 0:49:31.359
<v Speaker 1>that they have been historically. In particular, you know, if

0:49:31.360 --> 0:49:35.759
<v Speaker 1>we continue to get high inflation numbers, then I don't

0:49:35.760 --> 0:49:38.200
<v Speaker 1>think anybody is good to argue that high inflation is

0:49:38.239 --> 0:49:41.680
<v Speaker 1>good for government bonds. It's is clearly bad for government bonds.

0:49:42.440 --> 0:49:46.080
<v Speaker 1>And so your challenge is that the way you built

0:49:46.120 --> 0:49:49.520
<v Speaker 1>stable portfolios in the past, there's balancing of equities and bonds,

0:49:50.560 --> 0:49:55.000
<v Speaker 1>is really much less suited to the current environment than

0:49:55.040 --> 0:49:57.640
<v Speaker 1>it was to the to the past environment. So what

0:49:57.680 --> 0:49:59.840
<v Speaker 1>can you do about it? But I think what most

0:50:00.000 --> 0:50:02.440
<v Speaker 1>people that I speak with at least to think of

0:50:02.520 --> 0:50:05.680
<v Speaker 1>doing about it is saying, well, I need to own

0:50:05.880 --> 0:50:10.840
<v Speaker 1>something other than treasury bonds to balance out my equity risk.

0:50:11.480 --> 0:50:15.560
<v Speaker 1>And for some people that's private equity, for some people

0:50:16.680 --> 0:50:20.680
<v Speaker 1>that's hedge funds or alternatives. For some people it's infrastructure

0:50:20.960 --> 0:50:24.759
<v Speaker 1>or housing or other forms of real estate. But I

0:50:24.800 --> 0:50:27.200
<v Speaker 1>think it's reasonably clear in my mind that you need

0:50:27.239 --> 0:50:30.239
<v Speaker 1>to you need to think about balancing your portfolio, and

0:50:30.280 --> 0:50:33.400
<v Speaker 1>then you need to think pretty carefully about whether bonds

0:50:33.719 --> 0:50:37.560
<v Speaker 1>give you the same level of protection or balancing them

0:50:37.600 --> 0:50:40.200
<v Speaker 1>may then they would have done in the last twenty

0:50:40.200 --> 0:50:44.120
<v Speaker 1>thirty years. From my own perspective, if I look back

0:50:44.160 --> 0:50:48.480
<v Speaker 1>at the last twenty years in particular, it's a very

0:50:48.600 --> 0:50:51.480
<v Speaker 1>dangerous period to look at when you look at equities

0:50:51.480 --> 0:50:54.839
<v Speaker 1>and bonds. Over the last twenty years, when equities went down,

0:50:55.360 --> 0:50:58.640
<v Speaker 1>bonds nearly always went up in price, and and so

0:50:58.719 --> 0:51:00.840
<v Speaker 1>we've got used to this idea of bonds being the

0:51:01.000 --> 0:51:04.680
<v Speaker 1>protecting asset. But if you look before then, and you

0:51:04.719 --> 0:51:07.560
<v Speaker 1>can look back for in hundreds of years worth of data,

0:51:08.320 --> 0:51:10.920
<v Speaker 1>both in the US and then also the UK, whether

0:51:11.040 --> 0:51:14.600
<v Speaker 1>bond market started earlier than the US market, you see

0:51:14.600 --> 0:51:17.359
<v Speaker 1>that for almost all of history, except for the last

0:51:17.360 --> 0:51:20.520
<v Speaker 1>twenty years. When equities went down, bonds went down at

0:51:20.560 --> 0:51:23.879
<v Speaker 1>the same time. And so for me, I think it's

0:51:23.920 --> 0:51:27.200
<v Speaker 1>a very important question for investors, which is you need

0:51:27.239 --> 0:51:30.080
<v Speaker 1>to balance the risk in your portfolio. Are bonds the

0:51:30.120 --> 0:51:32.879
<v Speaker 1>answer to it? In my view, they're probably much less

0:51:32.920 --> 0:51:35.160
<v Speaker 1>the answer than they were historically, So then you need

0:51:35.239 --> 0:51:37.799
<v Speaker 1>to look at other asset classes and think more creatively

0:51:37.800 --> 0:51:40.000
<v Speaker 1>about how you do that. And the fact that I

0:51:40.000 --> 0:51:43.600
<v Speaker 1>think that equities public equities are as risky as they've

0:51:43.600 --> 0:51:46.800
<v Speaker 1>ever been from a strategic perspective, means that question is

0:51:46.800 --> 0:51:50.200
<v Speaker 1>actually as important as it's ever been to think about. Huh,

0:51:50.400 --> 0:51:54.280
<v Speaker 1>that's that's really kind of intriguing. Um. So, So, sticking

0:51:54.280 --> 0:51:58.160
<v Speaker 1>with the theme of risk, what does this concentration mean

0:51:58.640 --> 0:52:01.799
<v Speaker 1>and this lack of diversific asian mean in terms of,

0:52:02.480 --> 0:52:05.400
<v Speaker 1>you know, calibrating what we should be expecting. Should we

0:52:05.480 --> 0:52:09.759
<v Speaker 1>be looking for larger moves in the future, or you know,

0:52:10.080 --> 0:52:14.440
<v Speaker 1>how do you approach this um philosophically when you're thinking

0:52:14.440 --> 0:52:18.399
<v Speaker 1>about what you want to do with your portfolios? Yeah,

0:52:18.560 --> 0:52:20.400
<v Speaker 1>I think that you know, right now or in a

0:52:20.480 --> 0:52:24.279
<v Speaker 1>relatively sort of quiet summer period, and so markets have

0:52:24.400 --> 0:52:29.239
<v Speaker 1>been relatively stable. But but I looking beyond just a

0:52:29.280 --> 0:52:34.320
<v Speaker 1>short term than this lack of diversification, markets definitely means

0:52:34.360 --> 0:52:37.680
<v Speaker 1>that we should expect to see bigger moves in both directions.

0:52:37.719 --> 0:52:40.640
<v Speaker 1>Just to be clear, both upwards and downwards. Um, it

0:52:40.719 --> 0:52:42.799
<v Speaker 1>does not mean that markets couldn't go up a whole

0:52:42.840 --> 0:52:45.680
<v Speaker 1>bunch more from here. It just means that they're lately

0:52:45.800 --> 0:52:50.080
<v Speaker 1>to be more roletile than we've been used to in

0:52:50.120 --> 0:52:53.000
<v Speaker 1>the last few years. And so I think it's really

0:52:53.520 --> 0:52:56.040
<v Speaker 1>having a plan of action and being prepared for how

0:52:56.080 --> 0:52:58.640
<v Speaker 1>you respond to that, because in the end, for most

0:52:58.640 --> 0:53:01.120
<v Speaker 1>of us, the big up moves, I mean, maybe we

0:53:01.200 --> 0:53:03.480
<v Speaker 1>were underinvested in we have a bit of regret about it,

0:53:03.480 --> 0:53:05.839
<v Speaker 1>but you don't have much pain from the big up moves.

0:53:05.880 --> 0:53:07.920
<v Speaker 1>It's the big down moves that that caused all the

0:53:07.960 --> 0:53:10.359
<v Speaker 1>pain and caused cause the bad decisions to be made.

0:53:10.600 --> 0:53:12.640
<v Speaker 1>So I think it's having a plan of action. And

0:53:12.680 --> 0:53:14.879
<v Speaker 1>I would argue that you know, here we are sitting

0:53:14.880 --> 0:53:19.040
<v Speaker 1>in a relatively comfortable moment in markets currently, and you know,

0:53:19.080 --> 0:53:22.239
<v Speaker 1>if we're fortunate, then the summer will be enjoyable for

0:53:22.280 --> 0:53:26.520
<v Speaker 1>all of us and not too not too noisy. That's

0:53:26.560 --> 0:53:28.719
<v Speaker 1>a great time to be thinking about your plans for

0:53:28.760 --> 0:53:31.279
<v Speaker 1>how you'd respond if there was a if there was

0:53:31.320 --> 0:53:37.000
<v Speaker 1>a negative altality event. Really really quite quite interesting. So

0:53:37.120 --> 0:53:40.120
<v Speaker 1>let's talk a little bit about some strategies you mentioned,

0:53:40.560 --> 0:53:44.000
<v Speaker 1>alternatives like private equity and hedge funds. What can one

0:53:44.080 --> 0:53:49.480
<v Speaker 1>do to hedge against the risk of increased volatility in

0:53:49.520 --> 0:53:54.480
<v Speaker 1>the future. Well, I think you know, you can do

0:53:54.560 --> 0:53:57.440
<v Speaker 1>direct hedges, but they tend to be very expensive. So

0:53:57.600 --> 0:54:00.520
<v Speaker 1>you could go and buy futures on tracts on the

0:54:00.600 --> 0:54:02.680
<v Speaker 1>VIX or something like that, but they will turn out

0:54:02.680 --> 0:54:05.080
<v Speaker 1>to be very costly few over time, as we've talked

0:54:05.120 --> 0:54:08.279
<v Speaker 1>about now earlier sections, So more likely what you need

0:54:08.360 --> 0:54:10.719
<v Speaker 1>to do is to think about assets that will just

0:54:10.840 --> 0:54:16.080
<v Speaker 1>behave differently um to equity markets. And as equity markets

0:54:16.080 --> 0:54:21.000
<v Speaker 1>have become more concentrated, especially into tech um it's uh

0:54:22.120 --> 0:54:25.480
<v Speaker 1>to be precise about that. It's tech and communication services

0:54:25.520 --> 0:54:29.239
<v Speaker 1>of the two classifications that people use today. So as

0:54:29.280 --> 0:54:32.399
<v Speaker 1>it's become more concentrated into that into those sectors, then

0:54:32.440 --> 0:54:34.680
<v Speaker 1>you need, I think to think about things which will

0:54:34.719 --> 0:54:39.000
<v Speaker 1>be not so affected by a negative price move in

0:54:39.040 --> 0:54:43.920
<v Speaker 1>those and I think that private equity in the end,

0:54:43.960 --> 0:54:46.359
<v Speaker 1>it has a lot of equity market exposure into it,

0:54:46.400 --> 0:54:49.680
<v Speaker 1>but you tend to see the price action more slowly.

0:54:50.239 --> 0:54:54.680
<v Speaker 1>But infrastructure that's you know, could behave very differently. Hedge funds,

0:54:54.719 --> 0:54:57.000
<v Speaker 1>if they're good, hedge funds should have lots of protection

0:54:57.040 --> 0:55:00.480
<v Speaker 1>strategies built in and lots of short holding as well

0:55:00.480 --> 0:55:05.000
<v Speaker 1>as long holdings, and so should be less sensitive. We

0:55:05.120 --> 0:55:06.920
<v Speaker 1>talked about c T A S a little bit, one

0:55:06.960 --> 0:55:09.080
<v Speaker 1>of the few strategies which has a right tail to

0:55:09.160 --> 0:55:11.640
<v Speaker 1>it run the left tail that could be part of

0:55:11.680 --> 0:55:16.680
<v Speaker 1>your list of strategies as well. I think the core

0:55:16.760 --> 0:55:20.120
<v Speaker 1>things from my perspective would be recognize that you're not

0:55:20.160 --> 0:55:22.960
<v Speaker 1>gonna build a forecast the next difficult events number one.

0:55:23.640 --> 0:55:26.919
<v Speaker 1>Number two, you can't forecast it, then don't tin all

0:55:27.000 --> 0:55:30.920
<v Speaker 1>your diversification on a single thing. Have a range of

0:55:31.000 --> 0:55:36.279
<v Speaker 1>protection strategies out there. And number three would we make

0:55:36.280 --> 0:55:39.120
<v Speaker 1>sure those protection strategies are not too expensive to run.

0:55:39.480 --> 0:55:41.719
<v Speaker 1>And that, of course is the disadvantage of buying put

0:55:41.719 --> 0:55:44.200
<v Speaker 1>options on the SMP or buying VIC futures that they're

0:55:44.280 --> 0:55:46.400
<v Speaker 1>very expensive to run. So you need something that you

0:55:46.400 --> 0:55:48.399
<v Speaker 1>can actually put up with for a period of time.

0:55:48.960 --> 0:55:51.000
<v Speaker 1>I often see people that go and buy those more

0:55:51.040 --> 0:55:53.200
<v Speaker 1>expensive strategies and they do it for six months or

0:55:53.239 --> 0:55:55.719
<v Speaker 1>twelve months or eighteen months, and then they give up.

0:55:56.200 --> 0:55:58.480
<v Speaker 1>And oftentimes they managed to give up just before the

0:55:58.480 --> 0:56:02.200
<v Speaker 1>next bad event happens. That's been a terrible outcome. Yeah.

0:56:02.239 --> 0:56:05.440
<v Speaker 1>With with earthquake insurance, it turns out that there's always

0:56:05.480 --> 0:56:08.800
<v Speaker 1>a spike right after an earthquake, which is the least

0:56:09.120 --> 0:56:12.160
<v Speaker 1>likely time for there to be another earthquake, and by

0:56:12.160 --> 0:56:16.440
<v Speaker 1>the time enough time elapses where risk has gone up dramatically.

0:56:16.920 --> 0:56:20.480
<v Speaker 1>People have forgotten about it and they let that um,

0:56:20.560 --> 0:56:24.560
<v Speaker 1>that risk lapse. Um, I wanna. I want to emphasize

0:56:24.560 --> 0:56:26.760
<v Speaker 1>something you said, And it comes back to that question

0:56:26.800 --> 0:56:30.080
<v Speaker 1>someone ask you at the conference. You're not really thinking

0:56:30.120 --> 0:56:34.279
<v Speaker 1>about the specifics of the potential risk. It almost doesn't

0:56:34.320 --> 0:56:36.439
<v Speaker 1>matter if it's a bond risk or an equity miss

0:56:36.520 --> 0:56:41.360
<v Speaker 1>risk or some geopolitical risk. It's hey, we can expect

0:56:41.360 --> 0:56:44.320
<v Speaker 1>these asset classes to go down, these st classes to

0:56:44.360 --> 0:56:47.320
<v Speaker 1>go up with a whole lot of increase in volatility.

0:56:47.680 --> 0:56:52.520
<v Speaker 1>The black swan matters less than your preparation for some

0:56:53.239 --> 0:56:59.680
<v Speaker 1>unforeseen event? Am I stating that correctly? Absolutely? Yes. And

0:57:00.000 --> 0:57:02.879
<v Speaker 1>we've talked a little bit about how, and people ask

0:57:02.920 --> 0:57:05.239
<v Speaker 1>me at conferences forecast the next black swan. I think

0:57:05.239 --> 0:57:07.720
<v Speaker 1>it's actually the question I get asked the most. Because

0:57:08.000 --> 0:57:11.560
<v Speaker 1>I'm a strong believer in this phrase that there's no

0:57:11.680 --> 0:57:13.640
<v Speaker 1>such thing as a bad question. But I think that

0:57:13.680 --> 0:57:17.760
<v Speaker 1>one actually might be the bad question, because by definition,

0:57:17.840 --> 0:57:19.960
<v Speaker 1>you can't forecast the black swan. That's kind of what

0:57:20.000 --> 0:57:22.960
<v Speaker 1>a black swant is forecast of all. So So let's

0:57:23.000 --> 0:57:27.000
<v Speaker 1>talk a little bit about the technology you guys use

0:57:27.240 --> 0:57:31.040
<v Speaker 1>to create these models too, and to model out risks

0:57:31.120 --> 0:57:35.680
<v Speaker 1>and and other strategies. You build all that stuff in house. There,

0:57:35.840 --> 0:57:38.600
<v Speaker 1>you're not really a big buyer of off the shelf

0:57:39.360 --> 0:57:43.000
<v Speaker 1>UM risk management technology. Tell us a little bit about

0:57:43.760 --> 0:57:48.880
<v Speaker 1>your approach, which seems to be pretty comprehensive to thinking

0:57:48.920 --> 0:57:54.800
<v Speaker 1>about and planning for unforeseen risk. Yes, so, I mean

0:57:54.800 --> 0:57:56.440
<v Speaker 1>that's the first thing i'd say is that we essentially

0:57:56.480 --> 0:58:00.480
<v Speaker 1>build all of our own technology. We don't really buy technology.

0:58:00.520 --> 0:58:02.720
<v Speaker 1>We we buy the hardware, of course, but but we

0:58:02.840 --> 0:58:05.880
<v Speaker 1>write all the software, all the code ourselves. And that's

0:58:05.920 --> 0:58:09.040
<v Speaker 1>because we think that the things you can buy off

0:58:09.040 --> 0:58:11.080
<v Speaker 1>the shelf, or everyone can buy it off the shelf,

0:58:11.120 --> 0:58:14.400
<v Speaker 1>and therefore it's not really going to be a competitive advantage.

0:58:14.440 --> 0:58:16.800
<v Speaker 1>It's going to be it's going to be maybe a

0:58:16.880 --> 0:58:20.720
<v Speaker 1>base standard. And not trying to criticize the external products.

0:58:20.720 --> 0:58:22.320
<v Speaker 1>I just think that if you really want to have

0:58:22.360 --> 0:58:28.000
<v Speaker 1>an edge UM in building risk models or building short

0:58:28.120 --> 0:58:32.280
<v Speaker 1>term forecasters of risk or return or whatever, you need

0:58:32.320 --> 0:58:36.600
<v Speaker 1>to write your own code, your own software, and and

0:58:36.600 --> 0:58:38.400
<v Speaker 1>and you need to put a lot of effort into that,

0:58:38.920 --> 0:58:40.919
<v Speaker 1>and you need to create an environment where you can

0:58:41.000 --> 0:58:44.440
<v Speaker 1>hire the best software developers. And I often see people

0:58:44.440 --> 0:58:46.280
<v Speaker 1>saying well, you know, I hired a bunch of quants

0:58:46.280 --> 0:58:49.200
<v Speaker 1>and I had a bunch of developers as if you know,

0:58:49.240 --> 0:58:51.480
<v Speaker 1>that's the sort of a generic thing like buying a

0:58:51.480 --> 0:58:55.120
<v Speaker 1>loaf of bread or something. It's just not it's you know,

0:58:55.160 --> 0:58:59.080
<v Speaker 1>the best developers hundreds maybe even thousands of times as

0:58:59.120 --> 0:59:03.040
<v Speaker 1>productive as the average developers. So getting those best de

0:59:03.160 --> 0:59:06.680
<v Speaker 1>plenty your organization really important, and thinking about why they

0:59:06.680 --> 0:59:09.280
<v Speaker 1>would want to work for you and not want to

0:59:09.320 --> 0:59:13.400
<v Speaker 1>work for somebody else, that's pretty important. UM. So I

0:59:13.440 --> 0:59:15.720
<v Speaker 1>think for us, we felt that we can have an

0:59:15.800 --> 0:59:19.080
<v Speaker 1>edge by building better technology than you can buy off

0:59:19.080 --> 0:59:23.040
<v Speaker 1>the shelf and UM and then in order to get that,

0:59:23.080 --> 0:59:27.960
<v Speaker 1>we've invested a huge amount in providing UM a good

0:59:28.080 --> 0:59:33.600
<v Speaker 1>environment for UH quantitative researchers and technologists to operate in.

0:59:33.680 --> 0:59:35.520
<v Speaker 1>And just to give you a sort of a side

0:59:35.520 --> 0:59:38.520
<v Speaker 1>example of that, we open source quite a lot of

0:59:38.560 --> 0:59:41.360
<v Speaker 1>our code. So that means that, you know, we pay

0:59:41.440 --> 0:59:43.880
<v Speaker 1>our developers to write code for us, and then we

0:59:43.960 --> 0:59:45.640
<v Speaker 1>go and stick it on a website for other people

0:59:45.680 --> 0:59:47.959
<v Speaker 1>to download it if they want. So why on earth,

0:59:48.080 --> 0:59:50.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, what would possess you to do something like that?

0:59:50.480 --> 0:59:54.080
<v Speaker 1>And the reason that we do it is that that

0:59:54.120 --> 0:59:57.840
<v Speaker 1>then provides advertising to people that we're actually really serious

0:59:58.480 --> 1:00:02.880
<v Speaker 1>software develop opers and that we take our code really seriously.

1:00:03.240 --> 1:00:05.560
<v Speaker 1>And if you're a young software developer, you'll probably see

1:00:05.600 --> 1:00:07.560
<v Speaker 1>the stuff that we've published and say, well, you know,

1:00:07.600 --> 1:00:09.360
<v Speaker 1>actually I wouldn't mind working in a place like that

1:00:09.440 --> 1:00:14.800
<v Speaker 1>because code and and and technology and standards and all

1:00:14.800 --> 1:00:18.800
<v Speaker 1>those sorts of things are really high at at this firm.

1:00:19.080 --> 1:00:24.960
<v Speaker 1>So that's how we think about UM investing in technology,

1:00:25.200 --> 1:00:30.400
<v Speaker 1>investing in developers, creating a culture where developers and quant

1:00:30.440 --> 1:00:35.280
<v Speaker 1>researchers really want to work. And the reason for that, UM,

1:00:35.760 --> 1:00:38.600
<v Speaker 1>why would we carry on doing all this investment? It

1:00:38.800 --> 1:00:41.040
<v Speaker 1>is really that you need you It's a very competitive

1:00:41.080 --> 1:00:43.120
<v Speaker 1>business and you need to stay ahead all the time

1:00:43.480 --> 1:00:45.479
<v Speaker 1>and you need to carry on innovating all the time.

1:00:45.520 --> 1:00:49.040
<v Speaker 1>And if you don't, then somebody will eat your lunch.

1:00:49.400 --> 1:00:52.760
<v Speaker 1>So from our perspective, we're always building new models. We're

1:00:52.800 --> 1:00:55.840
<v Speaker 1>always coming up with new approaches to estimate risk. We're

1:00:55.840 --> 1:00:58.800
<v Speaker 1>always worrying about, you know, how can we find a

1:00:58.800 --> 1:01:03.000
<v Speaker 1>new alpha source, what my go wrong? UM? And how

1:01:03.040 --> 1:01:06.960
<v Speaker 1>a market is changing in their structure this uh, you know,

1:01:07.040 --> 1:01:11.080
<v Speaker 1>big effect of more retail investment in retail investors in

1:01:11.600 --> 1:01:14.720
<v Speaker 1>equity markets today, how should we respond to that. That's

1:01:14.800 --> 1:01:17.680
<v Speaker 1>really something which is just a very ongoing and continuous

1:01:17.720 --> 1:01:20.520
<v Speaker 1>form of a place for us to invest, and when

1:01:20.560 --> 1:01:22.520
<v Speaker 1>we try and get the benefits out of out of

1:01:22.560 --> 1:01:26.120
<v Speaker 1>that over long term, m really really kind of interesting.

1:01:26.400 --> 1:01:28.960
<v Speaker 1>Let's talk a little bit about machine learning. You guys

1:01:28.960 --> 1:01:33.720
<v Speaker 1>have been on the cutting edge of that, including a

1:01:33.840 --> 1:01:39.160
<v Speaker 1>collaboration with the University of Oxford at the Oxford Man Institute.

1:01:40.000 --> 1:01:43.760
<v Speaker 1>Tell us what you guys are doing with machine learning

1:01:43.840 --> 1:01:50.120
<v Speaker 1>and does any of this relate back to volatility? So

1:01:50.640 --> 1:01:53.960
<v Speaker 1>what we're doing with machine learning is we're really saying

1:01:54.120 --> 1:01:59.360
<v Speaker 1>that financial markets have patterns in them which you can

1:01:59.520 --> 1:02:02.360
<v Speaker 1>dig out often profit from if you um if you

1:02:02.600 --> 1:02:06.360
<v Speaker 1>look hard enough. The problem in financial markets is that

1:02:06.400 --> 1:02:10.240
<v Speaker 1>the patterns are are pretty weak. You know, they're not

1:02:10.440 --> 1:02:14.000
<v Speaker 1>They're not simple patterns. There are people like me would

1:02:14.000 --> 1:02:16.880
<v Speaker 1>say there's a low signal to noise ratio. There's a

1:02:16.920 --> 1:02:19.240
<v Speaker 1>lot of noise and not very much signal out there.

1:02:19.960 --> 1:02:22.680
<v Speaker 1>So what are we using machine learning for. We're using

1:02:22.680 --> 1:02:25.760
<v Speaker 1>it for a number of different things, but the underlying

1:02:25.920 --> 1:02:31.480
<v Speaker 1>theme is that most models that people use in markets,

1:02:31.520 --> 1:02:32.800
<v Speaker 1>and you could even think of it just as a

1:02:32.880 --> 1:02:37.160
<v Speaker 1>value model. You know, you pee, for example, price over earnings.

1:02:37.720 --> 1:02:39.920
<v Speaker 1>That's a linear model. It seems to sort of assume

1:02:40.000 --> 1:02:43.160
<v Speaker 1>that price goes up in line with earnings. But we

1:02:43.200 --> 1:02:45.480
<v Speaker 1>all know that when you look at markets, if there's

1:02:45.520 --> 1:02:47.800
<v Speaker 1>one thing they don't ever do, it's move in a

1:02:47.920 --> 1:02:50.720
<v Speaker 1>linear or straight line fashion. They move into every shape

1:02:50.760 --> 1:02:54.440
<v Speaker 1>you could imagine except for the straight line. And UM,

1:02:54.480 --> 1:02:56.440
<v Speaker 1>And what machine learning is really trying to do is

1:02:56.480 --> 1:03:00.680
<v Speaker 1>to say, can I find much more subtle patterns? Um

1:03:00.840 --> 1:03:03.840
<v Speaker 1>the straight line, which is what most of finance actually

1:03:03.960 --> 1:03:07.800
<v Speaker 1>ends up using for modeling, And here are some examples

1:03:07.800 --> 1:03:11.640
<v Speaker 1>of that. One that I'm particularly excited about is UM

1:03:11.760 --> 1:03:15.560
<v Speaker 1>what we would call natural language processing, which is having

1:03:15.640 --> 1:03:19.880
<v Speaker 1>machines read text. Now we all know that there's far

1:03:19.960 --> 1:03:22.040
<v Speaker 1>too much for us all to read. You know, nobody

1:03:22.080 --> 1:03:27.479
<v Speaker 1>can read every analyst report, every company earning statement, every

1:03:27.520 --> 1:03:32.280
<v Speaker 1>annual report, attend every investor or day. Those are too much.

1:03:32.760 --> 1:03:36.240
<v Speaker 1>So wouldn't it be wonderful if you could have machines

1:03:36.320 --> 1:03:37.920
<v Speaker 1>to all that reading for you and tell you what

1:03:38.000 --> 1:03:40.040
<v Speaker 1>to think at the end of it. And that might

1:03:40.120 --> 1:03:44.280
<v Speaker 1>sound like science fiction, and at a certain level, I

1:03:44.280 --> 1:03:48.439
<v Speaker 1>think it probably is. Science fiction today. But five years ago,

1:03:48.560 --> 1:03:52.880
<v Speaker 1>if you said, well, machines will process images, will process

1:03:52.960 --> 1:03:55.680
<v Speaker 1>pictures better than humans, I think people would look at

1:03:55.720 --> 1:03:57.720
<v Speaker 1>you a bit funny and say, you know, well, no, no,

1:03:57.880 --> 1:04:00.520
<v Speaker 1>not really. Now you know you have that on your phone.

1:04:00.680 --> 1:04:02.960
<v Speaker 1>You just type a word into your phone, into your

1:04:02.960 --> 1:04:05.960
<v Speaker 1>photos library and just watch it happen in action. It's

1:04:06.120 --> 1:04:09.680
<v Speaker 1>just extraordinary how it will find all the pictures that

1:04:09.840 --> 1:04:13.480
<v Speaker 1>reflect the words that you've that you've typed in. So

1:04:13.840 --> 1:04:18.240
<v Speaker 1>machines definitely do process images better than humans. It's well known.

1:04:18.360 --> 1:04:21.720
<v Speaker 1>For example, processing X ray images looking at for cancers

1:04:21.880 --> 1:04:25.240
<v Speaker 1>is much better done today by humans, by machines and

1:04:25.280 --> 1:04:27.120
<v Speaker 1>by humans. You might want the human at the end,

1:04:27.440 --> 1:04:29.320
<v Speaker 1>but you want the machine to do all the sifting

1:04:30.040 --> 1:04:33.040
<v Speaker 1>type work. And so one example of machine learning is

1:04:33.080 --> 1:04:36.160
<v Speaker 1>getting machines to understand text and tell you, you know,

1:04:36.880 --> 1:04:40.400
<v Speaker 1>go ahead, machine read every analyst report on you know,

1:04:40.680 --> 1:04:43.840
<v Speaker 1>these hundred stocks, and tell me you know, not only

1:04:43.880 --> 1:04:46.640
<v Speaker 1>the analyst reports, but all the newspapers in every language

1:04:46.680 --> 1:04:49.040
<v Speaker 1>around the world, all the ending schools, read all of it,

1:04:49.320 --> 1:04:51.760
<v Speaker 1>and then tell me what to think. Um, that is

1:04:51.800 --> 1:04:54.040
<v Speaker 1>something which today is science fiction, but I don't think

1:04:54.080 --> 1:04:56.840
<v Speaker 1>it will be in five years time. M that's that's

1:04:56.880 --> 1:05:00.760
<v Speaker 1>really kind of intriguing. My last regg your question I

1:05:01.200 --> 1:05:03.960
<v Speaker 1>have to ask you is, so you spent most of

1:05:04.000 --> 1:05:08.680
<v Speaker 1>your career developing quantitative strategies. What are some of the

1:05:08.680 --> 1:05:17.919
<v Speaker 1>biggest changes you've noticed. I think the firstly is actually

1:05:17.920 --> 1:05:21.120
<v Speaker 1>a bit striking what hasn't changed? So a lot of

1:05:21.120 --> 1:05:25.680
<v Speaker 1>things haven't changed. You know, the many of the standard

1:05:25.720 --> 1:05:28.920
<v Speaker 1>models today are basically the same as the standard models

1:05:28.960 --> 1:05:31.440
<v Speaker 1>twenty thirty years ago. We still use black sholes for

1:05:31.480 --> 1:05:34.800
<v Speaker 1>pricing options. We'll still use the Barre risk model for

1:05:34.960 --> 1:05:41.000
<v Speaker 1>calculating equity risk in portfolios. We still send data in

1:05:41.120 --> 1:05:43.040
<v Speaker 1>very similar ways to the way that we sent it

1:05:43.080 --> 1:05:46.520
<v Speaker 1>twenty thirty years ago, for the most part, in really

1:05:46.640 --> 1:05:48.920
<v Speaker 1>terrible file formats. But nobody seems to come up with

1:05:48.920 --> 1:05:53.320
<v Speaker 1>a better convention that everyone will accept. Um. So there's

1:05:53.320 --> 1:05:56.320
<v Speaker 1>a lot of stuff that hasn't changed, But I think

1:05:56.840 --> 1:05:59.160
<v Speaker 1>there are some things which have changed. The first is

1:05:59.240 --> 1:06:02.480
<v Speaker 1>that people often like to sort of characterize the world.

1:06:02.480 --> 1:06:08.040
<v Speaker 1>There's there's the quantz versus the discretionary people. So the quants,

1:06:08.160 --> 1:06:10.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, the model driven people in some sort of

1:06:10.760 --> 1:06:14.000
<v Speaker 1>battle with the discretionary people. And I say, I don't

1:06:14.080 --> 1:06:17.480
<v Speaker 1>view it that way at all. I think that everyone

1:06:17.640 --> 1:06:19.720
<v Speaker 1>is becoming much more quantitative in the way that they

1:06:19.760 --> 1:06:22.320
<v Speaker 1>build and run their portfolios. The tools that we all

1:06:22.360 --> 1:06:27.560
<v Speaker 1>have today on our Bloomberg terminals or on websites or

1:06:28.480 --> 1:06:32.080
<v Speaker 1>products that we can buy from third parties or build ourselves,

1:06:32.360 --> 1:06:36.800
<v Speaker 1>were essentially unimaginable um five or ten years ago, and

1:06:36.840 --> 1:06:41.200
<v Speaker 1>everybody's got them. So give you an example. Fifteen twenty

1:06:41.280 --> 1:06:45.480
<v Speaker 1>years ago, I was building quite sophisticated screening tools that

1:06:45.520 --> 1:06:49.480
<v Speaker 1>would search equity markets for opportunities. Today you can basically

1:06:49.520 --> 1:06:52.640
<v Speaker 1>do what I built on a Bloomberg terminal. So everybody's

1:06:52.680 --> 1:06:54.640
<v Speaker 1>got it, or everybody that's got a Bloomberg terminal has

1:06:54.640 --> 1:06:59.160
<v Speaker 1>got it. So there's been you know, all investors, not

1:06:59.320 --> 1:07:01.760
<v Speaker 1>just the quants, but the discretion marriage as well. They've

1:07:01.800 --> 1:07:05.000
<v Speaker 1>all become more quantitative. We've seen it was trading as well.

1:07:05.280 --> 1:07:08.840
<v Speaker 1>Trading used to be people shouting each other on a

1:07:08.880 --> 1:07:11.840
<v Speaker 1>trading floor. Today it's it's all machines and in almost

1:07:11.920 --> 1:07:15.320
<v Speaker 1>every market around the world, and very sophisticated machines and

1:07:15.680 --> 1:07:19.680
<v Speaker 1>very sophisticated algorithms trading with each other. So what I

1:07:19.880 --> 1:07:22.920
<v Speaker 1>think I've really seen is everything in markets has become

1:07:23.000 --> 1:07:26.560
<v Speaker 1>more quantitative. But then there are some things which have

1:07:26.680 --> 1:07:32.160
<v Speaker 1>been kind of, you know, unattainable. So far, credit markets

1:07:32.200 --> 1:07:37.080
<v Speaker 1>have remained stubbornly sort of immune to being taken over

1:07:37.200 --> 1:07:42.360
<v Speaker 1>by more quantitative strategies. So far, private equity is the same.

1:07:42.480 --> 1:07:44.920
<v Speaker 1>It's it's really done in the same way as it

1:07:45.040 --> 1:07:48.520
<v Speaker 1>was twenty or thirty years ago. Um, And I think

1:07:48.520 --> 1:07:50.920
<v Speaker 1>that will probably change over time. Was certainly starting to

1:07:50.960 --> 1:07:54.000
<v Speaker 1>see that in credit, for example, where the markets are

1:07:54.040 --> 1:07:57.800
<v Speaker 1>starting to trade more like equity markets or futures markets,

1:07:58.080 --> 1:08:00.720
<v Speaker 1>and it is starting to be possible to build the

1:08:00.800 --> 1:08:03.960
<v Speaker 1>same sorts of risk models and the same sorts of

1:08:03.960 --> 1:08:08.240
<v Speaker 1>of alpha models, of return forecasting models in credit that

1:08:08.320 --> 1:08:10.600
<v Speaker 1>you've had in equities for a long time. So I

1:08:10.600 --> 1:08:13.320
<v Speaker 1>think my real thing is that everything has become more quantitative,

1:08:13.360 --> 1:08:14.720
<v Speaker 1>and I think it is going to become a whole

1:08:14.720 --> 1:08:18.519
<v Speaker 1>bunch more quantitative over the next twenty years. Alright, so

1:08:18.600 --> 1:08:20.960
<v Speaker 1>let's jump to our favorite questions that we ask all

1:08:21.000 --> 1:08:25.080
<v Speaker 1>our guests. Tell us what you've been streaming this past year,

1:08:25.320 --> 1:08:29.400
<v Speaker 1>or anything interesting that you're watching on Netflix or Amazon

1:08:29.439 --> 1:08:35.639
<v Speaker 1>Prime or or whatever. Um. I'm not a huge watcher

1:08:35.720 --> 1:08:39.840
<v Speaker 1>of things on streaming services. But you know, I have

1:08:40.040 --> 1:08:45.240
<v Speaker 1>been um watching a rewatching a series of films by

1:08:45.280 --> 1:08:49.360
<v Speaker 1>a famous British actor called Bill Nike, written by a

1:08:49.400 --> 1:08:52.559
<v Speaker 1>playwright called David Hair. The first of them is called

1:08:52.600 --> 1:08:57.920
<v Speaker 1>Page eight and there are quite sophisticated plays about um

1:08:58.880 --> 1:09:02.760
<v Speaker 1>An m I six agent and his life struggles. So

1:09:02.880 --> 1:09:06.479
<v Speaker 1>that's what I've been streaming, and I you can find

1:09:06.520 --> 1:09:10.439
<v Speaker 1>it on on on Netflix. Page eight is the is

1:09:10.479 --> 1:09:12.840
<v Speaker 1>the first of them. Well, we'll definitely check that out.

1:09:13.280 --> 1:09:16.720
<v Speaker 1>Tell me us, tell us a little bit about your

1:09:16.800 --> 1:09:22.720
<v Speaker 1>mentors who helped to shape your career. So I was

1:09:22.840 --> 1:09:27.920
<v Speaker 1>very fortunate in the first fifteen years of my career

1:09:27.960 --> 1:09:30.479
<v Speaker 1>I was at Golden Sacks. It was an outstanding place

1:09:30.520 --> 1:09:36.599
<v Speaker 1>to work. The people that I particularly worked with over

1:09:36.640 --> 1:09:43.120
<v Speaker 1>that period were really two or three folks. Um Manny Roman,

1:09:43.240 --> 1:09:46.599
<v Speaker 1>who today is the CEO of Pimco, I worked with

1:09:46.960 --> 1:09:51.720
<v Speaker 1>pretty much twenty five years, both at Golden Sacks as

1:09:51.760 --> 1:09:54.080
<v Speaker 1>well as at Man Group. Before he went off to PIMCO.

1:09:54.880 --> 1:09:58.760
<v Speaker 1>Worked with a fellow called Garish Ready who went on

1:09:58.840 --> 1:10:02.040
<v Speaker 1>to run a fund of funds business called Prisma Um

1:10:02.120 --> 1:10:04.320
<v Speaker 1>and a fellow called Mark Zorak, who went on to

1:10:04.400 --> 1:10:08.600
<v Speaker 1>be a professor at Cornell, and I think it was

1:10:08.640 --> 1:10:11.679
<v Speaker 1>important to me to have a variety of different people

1:10:12.080 --> 1:10:15.800
<v Speaker 1>to learn from and to sort of build different experiences.

1:10:15.840 --> 1:10:18.760
<v Speaker 1>All three of them are extremely different people, but I

1:10:18.840 --> 1:10:22.920
<v Speaker 1>really learned, I think, both how to manage people and

1:10:22.960 --> 1:10:26.040
<v Speaker 1>how to get to the core of a problem. I think,

1:10:26.040 --> 1:10:28.519
<v Speaker 1>how to work out what was important and what was

1:10:28.600 --> 1:10:32.519
<v Speaker 1>not important, and not to give different practice of equal

1:10:32.560 --> 1:10:36.960
<v Speaker 1>weight when you're making decisions. And I learned that differently

1:10:37.080 --> 1:10:40.559
<v Speaker 1>from from each of those um three people who are

1:10:40.600 --> 1:10:44.439
<v Speaker 1>really sort of my core mentors. Very interesting, tell us

1:10:44.479 --> 1:10:46.759
<v Speaker 1>about some of your favorite books. What are you reading

1:10:46.840 --> 1:10:51.760
<v Speaker 1>right now and what are some of your all time faves. Well, so,

1:10:51.920 --> 1:10:56.640
<v Speaker 1>I'm I am very interested in architecture, and so I

1:10:56.680 --> 1:11:02.439
<v Speaker 1>tend to read relatively quirky and eclectic books. I'm currently

1:11:02.479 --> 1:11:05.920
<v Speaker 1>reading something about Nordic Modernism, which I suspect will not

1:11:05.960 --> 1:11:08.880
<v Speaker 1>be that popular with your audience. It's a niche area.

1:11:09.439 --> 1:11:15.680
<v Speaker 1>UM but um So, I I think architectural theory is

1:11:15.680 --> 1:11:18.000
<v Speaker 1>something which I'm very interested in. In another life, I

1:11:18.080 --> 1:11:20.840
<v Speaker 1>might have been an architect. Um So that's sort of

1:11:20.880 --> 1:11:24.720
<v Speaker 1>one area of interest for me. Um. I'm actually a

1:11:24.840 --> 1:11:27.280
<v Speaker 1>keen piano player as well. So I know you asked

1:11:27.320 --> 1:11:29.680
<v Speaker 1>about books, but I play a lot of music, and

1:11:29.880 --> 1:11:34.559
<v Speaker 1>at the moment I'm um playing um, some early twentieth

1:11:34.600 --> 1:11:40.280
<v Speaker 1>century music by Debussy, which drives my family nuts because

1:11:40.280 --> 1:11:42.920
<v Speaker 1>it's very hard to play, but if you play it well,

1:11:42.960 --> 1:11:44.720
<v Speaker 1>it sounds good. I'm not sure I've mastered how to

1:11:44.720 --> 1:11:47.160
<v Speaker 1>play it well yet, So that's another sort of core

1:11:47.240 --> 1:11:49.360
<v Speaker 1>part of my life is try and play the piano

1:11:49.439 --> 1:11:52.559
<v Speaker 1>for at least an hour every day and that sort

1:11:52.600 --> 1:11:55.800
<v Speaker 1>of straightens out my mind at the end of the day. Um.

1:11:55.960 --> 1:12:00.760
<v Speaker 1>And in fiction, I amid I'm really a sort of

1:12:00.840 --> 1:12:06.479
<v Speaker 1>enthusiast for mid twentieth century writers, So Treuman, Capote or

1:12:06.680 --> 1:12:09.360
<v Speaker 1>Gray and Green or sort of that. That group of

1:12:10.280 --> 1:12:14.400
<v Speaker 1>writers are all my favorites. Very interesting. You know, there's

1:12:14.439 --> 1:12:18.080
<v Speaker 1>some really fascinating I know you're not a big video guy,

1:12:18.200 --> 1:12:23.839
<v Speaker 1>but on YouTube there are some really fascinating shows about music,

1:12:24.160 --> 1:12:29.479
<v Speaker 1>like Song Exploder or Polyphonic or there's just a run

1:12:29.600 --> 1:12:36.280
<v Speaker 1>of things that take apart various genres of music from

1:12:36.360 --> 1:12:41.320
<v Speaker 1>a musicologists or historians perspective. There if you're if you're

1:12:41.320 --> 1:12:44.479
<v Speaker 1>a classical music fan and play the piano, you may

1:12:44.600 --> 1:12:48.200
<v Speaker 1>find some of that stuff interesting because the parallels back

1:12:48.280 --> 1:12:52.559
<v Speaker 1>and forth between classical music and pop music. The pop

1:12:52.600 --> 1:12:57.320
<v Speaker 1>audience is not familiar with it, but the classical fans

1:12:57.439 --> 1:12:59.759
<v Speaker 1>clearly are. You you might find some of that stuff

1:12:59.760 --> 1:13:04.280
<v Speaker 1>in interesting. Um. And actually there are very strong parallels

1:13:04.320 --> 1:13:07.599
<v Speaker 1>between music and architecture as well. Architecture is all about rhythms.

1:13:07.680 --> 1:13:09.960
<v Speaker 1>People often don't see it, but they're there. Well you,

1:13:10.200 --> 1:13:13.559
<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna assume that someone like you read godal escher

1:13:13.640 --> 1:13:18.280
<v Speaker 1>Bach twenty years ago. Um, am, I uh so they're

1:13:18.439 --> 1:13:23.320
<v Speaker 1>the same parallels between pattern and repetition and and how

1:13:23.479 --> 1:13:27.519
<v Speaker 1>they things morph over time. It's it's it's really and

1:13:27.720 --> 1:13:30.840
<v Speaker 1>and I never thought about architecture, um the way music

1:13:30.960 --> 1:13:33.439
<v Speaker 1>and math show up and and art show up. But

1:13:33.920 --> 1:13:37.160
<v Speaker 1>I guess in a lot of ways, especially with UM,

1:13:37.880 --> 1:13:42.760
<v Speaker 1>with with larger buildings, clearly some of those fractal progressions

1:13:42.800 --> 1:13:45.880
<v Speaker 1>are are there. I'm we're really off on a on

1:13:46.000 --> 1:13:49.400
<v Speaker 1>a digression. Let me let me go to my next question. UM,

1:13:49.520 --> 1:13:51.479
<v Speaker 1>what sort of advice would you give to a recent

1:13:51.560 --> 1:13:57.000
<v Speaker 1>college grad who is interested in a career in quantitative

1:13:57.080 --> 1:14:03.599
<v Speaker 1>strategies or risk management and find it so My advice

1:14:03.680 --> 1:14:06.360
<v Speaker 1>would be not to get too narrow too quickly, and

1:14:06.600 --> 1:14:09.800
<v Speaker 1>to try and build as broad a range of experience

1:14:09.880 --> 1:14:12.680
<v Speaker 1>as you can. In my case, I did quite a

1:14:12.760 --> 1:14:15.400
<v Speaker 1>few things in the early years of my career and

1:14:15.479 --> 1:14:18.920
<v Speaker 1>they really turned out to be differentiated for me later on.

1:14:19.240 --> 1:14:21.880
<v Speaker 1>So I worked a bill in corporate finance. I worked

1:14:21.920 --> 1:14:23.720
<v Speaker 1>out it wasn't for me, but I learned to heck

1:14:23.760 --> 1:14:25.880
<v Speaker 1>of a lot in my a couple of years of

1:14:25.960 --> 1:14:29.480
<v Speaker 1>doing corporate finance, I worked and fixed income and equities

1:14:29.520 --> 1:14:31.599
<v Speaker 1>and credit. I work on the cell side as well

1:14:31.680 --> 1:14:35.000
<v Speaker 1>as the buy side, and that was incredibly valuable to me.

1:14:35.720 --> 1:14:39.000
<v Speaker 1>It gave me just different approaches to problems when I

1:14:39.640 --> 1:14:41.519
<v Speaker 1>came across them. So I think that's the first piece

1:14:41.560 --> 1:14:44.320
<v Speaker 1>of advice. The second piece of advice, I think is

1:14:44.479 --> 1:14:48.040
<v Speaker 1>that like most quants, I thought I was good at

1:14:48.080 --> 1:14:51.720
<v Speaker 1>math and um and you know it probably wasn't bad

1:14:51.760 --> 1:14:53.640
<v Speaker 1>at it. But it turns out that actually there are

1:14:53.640 --> 1:14:57.040
<v Speaker 1>a lot of people that are good at math, and I,

1:14:57.640 --> 1:15:00.280
<v Speaker 1>from my perspective, learned that I had some skills which

1:15:00.320 --> 1:15:03.719
<v Speaker 1>maybe differentiated me a little bit from the core skill

1:15:04.000 --> 1:15:05.840
<v Speaker 1>of all these other people that were good at math

1:15:06.280 --> 1:15:09.120
<v Speaker 1>and those in my case where I was good at

1:15:09.160 --> 1:15:11.839
<v Speaker 1>making decisions I think I remained good at making decisions.

1:15:11.880 --> 1:15:13.560
<v Speaker 1>I can see things, I don't have to spend a

1:15:13.600 --> 1:15:15.800
<v Speaker 1>lot of time thinking about it. I can decide and

1:15:15.960 --> 1:15:18.920
<v Speaker 1>move on and have too much regret. And I learned

1:15:18.960 --> 1:15:23.160
<v Speaker 1>that I was, I think, better than many quants a

1:15:23.320 --> 1:15:27.759
<v Speaker 1>communicating a quantitative things in straightforward English, which most quants

1:15:27.800 --> 1:15:29.760
<v Speaker 1>are not pretty good at. And so I really tried

1:15:29.800 --> 1:15:32.560
<v Speaker 1>to work out what are my other strengths that my

1:15:32.720 --> 1:15:36.479
<v Speaker 1>differentiating strengths, and and and and tried to use those.

1:15:37.120 --> 1:15:39.600
<v Speaker 1>And I would recommend any quant workout. If you're just

1:15:39.640 --> 1:15:41.720
<v Speaker 1>going to go straight for a math competition, you know

1:15:41.800 --> 1:15:43.680
<v Speaker 1>there's some people who are pretty damn good at math

1:15:43.760 --> 1:15:45.360
<v Speaker 1>out there, so you're going to have to think about

1:15:45.400 --> 1:15:48.240
<v Speaker 1>your extra strengths to things which separate you from the crowd.

1:15:48.960 --> 1:15:51.120
<v Speaker 1>That makes a lot of sense in our final question,

1:15:51.840 --> 1:15:54.519
<v Speaker 1>what do you know about the world of investing today?

1:15:54.880 --> 1:15:57.920
<v Speaker 1>You wish you knew thirty or so years ago when

1:15:58.000 --> 1:16:03.800
<v Speaker 1>you were first getting started. So I think thirty or

1:16:03.840 --> 1:16:08.479
<v Speaker 1>so years ago. Um. I think the thing that I

1:16:08.680 --> 1:16:13.320
<v Speaker 1>most didn't realize was how much more tech and quant

1:16:13.439 --> 1:16:18.840
<v Speaker 1>focused the world was going to become. And I slightly

1:16:19.040 --> 1:16:24.040
<v Speaker 1>under emphasized my quantum tech skills at that time. So

1:16:24.400 --> 1:16:26.960
<v Speaker 1>that's the first thing I think, and I shouldn't have done.

1:16:27.000 --> 1:16:29.479
<v Speaker 1>You know, today it all feels very obvious that tech

1:16:29.520 --> 1:16:32.920
<v Speaker 1>has dominated our lives so much, and behind most tech

1:16:33.000 --> 1:16:35.360
<v Speaker 1>through a lot of algorithms, but thirty years ago it

1:16:35.520 --> 1:16:39.000
<v Speaker 1>wasn't so obvious. So that's the first thing. I think.

1:16:39.080 --> 1:16:41.960
<v Speaker 1>The second thing that I wish i'd known thirty years

1:16:42.000 --> 1:16:46.640
<v Speaker 1>ago was that it's very easy to gravitate towards the

1:16:46.720 --> 1:16:51.120
<v Speaker 1>glamorous businesses. So when I was sitting on trading floors

1:16:51.160 --> 1:16:55.360
<v Speaker 1>that called them sacks, then the glamorous bit was was

1:16:55.479 --> 1:16:58.000
<v Speaker 1>trading what we call the exotic derivatives or the more

1:16:58.080 --> 1:17:03.400
<v Speaker 1>complicated derivatives contracts. But actually that business almost doesn't exist anymore.

1:17:03.880 --> 1:17:06.320
<v Speaker 1>It does exist, but it's really much smaller than it

1:17:06.520 --> 1:17:09.120
<v Speaker 1>was twenty years ago. And that's what everyone sort have

1:17:09.160 --> 1:17:11.679
<v Speaker 1>wanted to do. And then there were other things which

1:17:11.720 --> 1:17:17.800
<v Speaker 1>were apparently less interesting, like understanding equity in disease um

1:17:18.320 --> 1:17:21.960
<v Speaker 1>or um or building quant equity models or something like that,

1:17:22.040 --> 1:17:24.160
<v Speaker 1>and those turned out to be much bigger things. So

1:17:24.240 --> 1:17:26.519
<v Speaker 1>I think the second thing which I've realized, which I

1:17:26.600 --> 1:17:29.720
<v Speaker 1>wish i'd realized, and understood twenty years ago is the

1:17:29.800 --> 1:17:32.720
<v Speaker 1>glamorous stuff is not always the stuff to go for.

1:17:33.240 --> 1:17:36.559
<v Speaker 1>Often it's the stuff that actually people sort of think

1:17:36.560 --> 1:17:39.200
<v Speaker 1>maybe it's a bit boring or something like that. Um,

1:17:39.600 --> 1:17:42.800
<v Speaker 1>but there are very often the big opportunities lie in

1:17:42.880 --> 1:17:45.200
<v Speaker 1>the stuff that people think is a bit boring. M

1:17:45.920 --> 1:17:49.840
<v Speaker 1>really quite quite interesting. Thank you, Sandy for being so

1:17:50.160 --> 1:17:53.280
<v Speaker 1>generous with your time. We have been speaking with Sandy

1:17:53.600 --> 1:17:56.640
<v Speaker 1>rat Trey. He is the chief investment officer of the

1:17:56.800 --> 1:18:00.519
<v Speaker 1>hundred billion dollar Man Group, as well as the co

1:18:00.760 --> 1:18:03.920
<v Speaker 1>inventor of the VIX index and the author of the

1:18:04.000 --> 1:18:09.120
<v Speaker 1>book Strategic Risk Management. If you enjoyed this conversation, well,

1:18:09.240 --> 1:18:12.080
<v Speaker 1>be sure and check out any of our previous three

1:18:12.479 --> 1:18:16.200
<v Speaker 1>d and fifty or so UH interviews that we've done

1:18:16.280 --> 1:18:20.880
<v Speaker 1>over the past seven years. You can find those at iTunes, Spotify,

1:18:21.720 --> 1:18:26.400
<v Speaker 1>a cast, wherever final podcasts are sold. We love your comments,

1:18:26.439 --> 1:18:31.360
<v Speaker 1>feedback and suggestions right to us at m IB podcast

1:18:31.600 --> 1:18:34.880
<v Speaker 1>at Bloomberg dot net. You can sign up for my

1:18:35.160 --> 1:18:38.760
<v Speaker 1>daily reading list at Rit Halts dot com. Check out

1:18:38.840 --> 1:18:43.360
<v Speaker 1>my weekly column on Bloomberg dot com slash Opinion. Follow

1:18:43.400 --> 1:18:47.479
<v Speaker 1>me on Twitter at rit Halts. I would be remiss

1:18:47.520 --> 1:18:50.000
<v Speaker 1>if I did not thank the crack staff that helps

1:18:50.040 --> 1:18:55.479
<v Speaker 1>put these conversations together each week. Charlie Vollmer is my

1:18:55.840 --> 1:19:00.400
<v Speaker 1>audio engineer. Paris Walt is my producer. A tick to

1:19:00.520 --> 1:19:04.479
<v Speaker 1>Val Brunn is our project manager. Michael Batnick is our

1:19:04.520 --> 1:19:09.080
<v Speaker 1>head of research. I'm Barry Ridholtz. You've been listening to

1:19:09.240 --> 1:19:11.840
<v Speaker 1>Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.