1 00:00:02,759 --> 00:00:05,520 Speaker 1: This is Alec Baldwin and you were listening to. Here's 2 00:00:05,559 --> 00:00:09,240 Speaker 1: the thing, My chance to talk with artists, policy makers, 3 00:00:09,360 --> 00:00:14,000 Speaker 1: and performers, to hear their stories, what inspires their creations, 4 00:00:14,040 --> 00:00:18,720 Speaker 1: what decisions change their careers, what relationships influenced their work. 5 00:00:21,480 --> 00:00:25,479 Speaker 1: On March eleventh, two thousand eleven, an earthquake triggered a 6 00:00:25,600 --> 00:00:29,600 Speaker 1: tsunami that damaged the nuclear power plant in Fukushima, Japan. 7 00:00:30,360 --> 00:00:34,920 Speaker 1: It was the largest nuclear disaster since Chernobyl. Today, five 8 00:00:35,040 --> 00:00:39,120 Speaker 1: years after the accident, Greenpeace estimates the nearly one hundred 9 00:00:39,200 --> 00:00:44,159 Speaker 1: thousand people still haven't returned home. My guest today, Gregory Yasco, 10 00:00:44,440 --> 00:00:48,440 Speaker 1: was the head of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 11 00:00:48,479 --> 00:00:51,879 Speaker 1: the time. Not a job that anyone grows up planning 12 00:00:51,880 --> 00:00:55,720 Speaker 1: to be, I think. So when I got there, my 13 00:00:55,760 --> 00:01:00,080 Speaker 1: first impression was really that there's this tremendous cadre of 14 00:01:00,160 --> 00:01:06,399 Speaker 1: really dedicated, idealistic safety advocates who just want nothing more 15 00:01:06,440 --> 00:01:08,280 Speaker 1: than to make sure that nuclear power plants around the 16 00:01:08,319 --> 00:01:12,040 Speaker 1: country are safe. Are utility react utility reactors? That's right? 17 00:01:12,360 --> 00:01:15,160 Speaker 1: Which there are how many? Now? Uh, there are about 18 00:01:15,160 --> 00:01:17,480 Speaker 1: a hundred, down from one oh four one oh four, 19 00:01:17,520 --> 00:01:20,760 Speaker 1: that's right, And operating right now. There's about and the 20 00:01:20,800 --> 00:01:26,000 Speaker 1: four the close um which were Yankee for my Yankee. Uh. 21 00:01:26,560 --> 00:01:30,200 Speaker 1: There's a plant in Florida, Crystal River, two reactors in California, 22 00:01:30,240 --> 00:01:33,920 Speaker 1: Santa No Frey, Kawani which is in Wisconsin. And then 23 00:01:33,920 --> 00:01:36,000 Speaker 1: a number of plants have recently announced that they're going 24 00:01:36,000 --> 00:01:40,400 Speaker 1: to shut down Pilgrim in Vermont, UH and Fitzpatrick which 25 00:01:40,440 --> 00:01:43,560 Speaker 1: is in upstate New York right now. Of the ones 26 00:01:43,880 --> 00:01:48,120 Speaker 1: that have closed, what's been stated in the press is 27 00:01:48,160 --> 00:01:53,680 Speaker 1: that they're closing for economic reasons, that the surge of 28 00:01:53,680 --> 00:01:58,880 Speaker 1: of natural gas and to some degree renewables have really 29 00:01:58,920 --> 00:02:02,600 Speaker 1: made nuke are very expensive. Correct. Yeah, it's really actually 30 00:02:02,600 --> 00:02:05,120 Speaker 1: a combination of two things. The plant in Florida and 31 00:02:05,160 --> 00:02:09,080 Speaker 1: the plants the two reactors in California actually closed because 32 00:02:09,120 --> 00:02:12,480 Speaker 1: of safety reasons. The when you think of a nucle 33 00:02:12,520 --> 00:02:15,280 Speaker 1: power plant usually you think of some big kind of 34 00:02:15,320 --> 00:02:19,520 Speaker 1: concrete dome that encases all the vital components of the reactor, 35 00:02:19,600 --> 00:02:22,440 Speaker 1: that the actual reactor engine and all those things. Well, 36 00:02:22,480 --> 00:02:25,600 Speaker 1: in Florida, that plant they were doing some maintenance and 37 00:02:25,639 --> 00:02:29,720 Speaker 1: actually broke. It sounds a small word, but it was 38 00:02:29,760 --> 00:02:32,840 Speaker 1: a billion dollar or two billion dollar fixed that they 39 00:02:32,880 --> 00:02:35,600 Speaker 1: needed to do to to to fix this broken containment 40 00:02:35,600 --> 00:02:39,000 Speaker 1: dome and actually couldn't operate without it because it's a 41 00:02:39,080 --> 00:02:43,760 Speaker 1: it's a fundamental safe. They were doing maintenance because nucle 42 00:02:43,760 --> 00:02:46,520 Speaker 1: power plants have really not operated the way they were 43 00:02:46,520 --> 00:02:49,400 Speaker 1: supposed to. The parts have worn out earlier. And one 44 00:02:49,440 --> 00:02:51,800 Speaker 1: of the things that has worn out on these reactors 45 00:02:51,840 --> 00:02:55,480 Speaker 1: is these large components. They're bigger than a bus, and 46 00:02:55,520 --> 00:02:57,119 Speaker 1: so they had to replace some of these, and they've 47 00:02:57,120 --> 00:02:59,320 Speaker 1: done in a lot of reactors throughout the country and 48 00:02:59,600 --> 00:03:01,880 Speaker 1: actually get them out. They never had doors big enough 49 00:03:01,919 --> 00:03:03,640 Speaker 1: to get this stuff out because they were never intended 50 00:03:03,680 --> 00:03:05,839 Speaker 1: to get them out. So they had to actually cut 51 00:03:05,840 --> 00:03:10,160 Speaker 1: a hole in this giant containment, this concrete structure which 52 00:03:10,160 --> 00:03:13,200 Speaker 1: has walls that are ten ft thick or many many 53 00:03:13,240 --> 00:03:17,760 Speaker 1: feet thick, and when they cut this hole, they wound 54 00:03:17,840 --> 00:03:22,240 Speaker 1: up creating this crack that went essentially around the entire dome. 55 00:03:22,960 --> 00:03:25,480 Speaker 1: And they just were this possible thing that could happen exactly. 56 00:03:25,480 --> 00:03:27,079 Speaker 1: But the thing that you know, in a in a 57 00:03:27,160 --> 00:03:30,559 Speaker 1: highly technical industry, in an industry that touts itself on 58 00:03:30,560 --> 00:03:34,440 Speaker 1: on precision, on precision, something that should never have thought 59 00:03:34,720 --> 00:03:39,400 Speaker 1: exactly uh now, because I don't want to, you know, 60 00:03:39,440 --> 00:03:41,920 Speaker 1: beat it to death about issues of safety. I mean, 61 00:03:42,440 --> 00:03:46,640 Speaker 1: certainly in the post nine eleven world, the terrorism threat 62 00:03:46,680 --> 00:03:49,920 Speaker 1: has been thrown into the wheelbarrow of complaints against you know, 63 00:03:49,920 --> 00:03:54,760 Speaker 1: by anti nuclear reactor advocates. But prior to that, it 64 00:03:54,920 --> 00:03:59,720 Speaker 1: was about obviously storage spent fuel, and with other groups 65 00:03:59,720 --> 00:04:02,280 Speaker 1: that I worked with, it was about exposure to ambient 66 00:04:02,400 --> 00:04:06,360 Speaker 1: radiation in that field, and I was wondering when you 67 00:04:06,400 --> 00:04:11,000 Speaker 1: were there, what were the discussions about healthy levels of 68 00:04:11,040 --> 00:04:14,160 Speaker 1: exposure to ambient radiation near reactors. You know that that's 69 00:04:14,200 --> 00:04:18,680 Speaker 1: always a very controversial topic and it's it's very inconclusive. 70 00:04:18,800 --> 00:04:21,360 Speaker 1: It's hard to know really that when you're talking about 71 00:04:21,400 --> 00:04:23,800 Speaker 1: the very low levels of radiation that you get from 72 00:04:23,839 --> 00:04:27,200 Speaker 1: just ambient exposure to reactor, it's very hard to to 73 00:04:27,240 --> 00:04:30,200 Speaker 1: say one way or another that that's causing any impacts. 74 00:04:30,279 --> 00:04:32,680 Speaker 1: And we know from studies that have done to people 75 00:04:32,680 --> 00:04:37,040 Speaker 1: who survived, say the nuclear weapons that were detonated in Japan, 76 00:04:37,560 --> 00:04:40,120 Speaker 1: we certainly know that at very high levels radiation is 77 00:04:40,160 --> 00:04:43,279 Speaker 1: clearly harmful. We know that it kind of middle levels, 78 00:04:43,600 --> 00:04:45,840 Speaker 1: we have very strong evidence that it causes harm. And 79 00:04:45,839 --> 00:04:48,000 Speaker 1: then when we get into this low area, it's just 80 00:04:48,279 --> 00:04:51,919 Speaker 1: very very hard to pinpoint how this impacts people. And 81 00:04:52,000 --> 00:04:54,040 Speaker 1: I would have people come into my office. There was 82 00:04:54,120 --> 00:04:57,160 Speaker 1: one group of families who lived in and I believe 83 00:04:57,200 --> 00:05:00,520 Speaker 1: it was in Illinois, and there was a clust of 84 00:05:00,800 --> 00:05:06,760 Speaker 1: children in that community. Uh. This was around Byron or Braidwood, 85 00:05:06,760 --> 00:05:10,200 Speaker 1: I believe, UM it's a little bit further inland into 86 00:05:10,240 --> 00:05:13,880 Speaker 1: the state. And it was a family very well meaning, 87 00:05:13,960 --> 00:05:17,400 Speaker 1: very knowledgeable, and very very concerned about their children. And 88 00:05:17,520 --> 00:05:20,160 Speaker 1: I remember talking to them and we talked about this issue, 89 00:05:20,200 --> 00:05:21,760 Speaker 1: and they believe that part of the reason for this 90 00:05:21,839 --> 00:05:25,240 Speaker 1: cancer cluster in this community was generally in young children, 91 00:05:25,880 --> 00:05:28,680 Speaker 1: was that they were exposed to some kind of radiation 92 00:05:28,760 --> 00:05:31,200 Speaker 1: from the plant. And what I what I told them 93 00:05:31,200 --> 00:05:32,839 Speaker 1: and what I often tell people, there's a lot of 94 00:05:32,880 --> 00:05:34,880 Speaker 1: people in a lot of communities who work in nuclear 95 00:05:34,880 --> 00:05:36,960 Speaker 1: power plants who live near them, and we don't see 96 00:05:37,040 --> 00:05:40,040 Speaker 1: elevated cancer us. And they made a very important point 97 00:05:40,040 --> 00:05:42,000 Speaker 1: to me, and they said, but you know, those are adults. 98 00:05:43,040 --> 00:05:45,080 Speaker 1: And one of the things that we're learning now more 99 00:05:45,120 --> 00:05:48,120 Speaker 1: and more is that children respond to radiation in very 100 00:05:48,120 --> 00:05:53,440 Speaker 1: different ways, so it's not conclusive one way or another. UM. 101 00:05:53,560 --> 00:05:56,040 Speaker 1: And in the NRC when you were there or to 102 00:05:56,120 --> 00:05:58,400 Speaker 1: your knowledge your predecessors, did they want to have a 103 00:05:58,400 --> 00:06:00,640 Speaker 1: conclusion about that or did they try to side stuff? 104 00:06:00,800 --> 00:06:03,160 Speaker 1: You know, I actually tried to get an answer to that. 105 00:06:04,120 --> 00:06:07,240 Speaker 1: The basis for most of what we know about how 106 00:06:07,360 --> 00:06:11,400 Speaker 1: radiation impacts people and how it essentially causes cancer is 107 00:06:11,440 --> 00:06:13,840 Speaker 1: from a study that was done in the nineties early nineties, 108 00:06:14,120 --> 00:06:16,920 Speaker 1: and I actually as chairman, I initiated an update of 109 00:06:17,000 --> 00:06:19,559 Speaker 1: that study. Who did that study and it was actually 110 00:06:19,600 --> 00:06:22,599 Speaker 1: done by the National Cancer Institute uh And I actually 111 00:06:22,600 --> 00:06:24,520 Speaker 1: called the head of the National Cancer in Student. I said, hey, 112 00:06:24,560 --> 00:06:26,479 Speaker 1: would you like to do this? And he said, no way, 113 00:06:26,600 --> 00:06:28,679 Speaker 1: I don't want to touch that issue. It's it's too 114 00:06:28,880 --> 00:06:32,680 Speaker 1: too difficult, it's too inconclusive. And I said, you know, 115 00:06:32,920 --> 00:06:36,120 Speaker 1: we we pride ourselves as an agency and being up 116 00:06:36,160 --> 00:06:40,000 Speaker 1: to date and with the best possible information, So I'd 117 00:06:40,040 --> 00:06:42,520 Speaker 1: like an update of that study. And eventually we we 118 00:06:42,560 --> 00:06:44,560 Speaker 1: did some work and we got the National Academy of 119 00:06:44,600 --> 00:06:47,480 Speaker 1: Sciences to do a study um and so they started. 120 00:06:47,560 --> 00:06:50,240 Speaker 1: We got a lot of pressure. The industry was very 121 00:06:50,320 --> 00:06:52,200 Speaker 1: unhappy about it because they were worried it was going 122 00:06:52,279 --> 00:06:55,119 Speaker 1: to show something and they were worried it might show something, 123 00:06:55,120 --> 00:06:56,880 Speaker 1: and in their mind it would it would be a 124 00:06:56,880 --> 00:06:59,839 Speaker 1: false positive, but nonetheless it would show something that they'd 125 00:06:59,839 --> 00:07:02,240 Speaker 1: have to respond to and deal with. And in my mind, 126 00:07:02,240 --> 00:07:06,760 Speaker 1: it was about finding out information. Unfortunately, actually, just about 127 00:07:06,800 --> 00:07:09,600 Speaker 1: a year or so ago, UM, the NRC decided to 128 00:07:09,600 --> 00:07:13,480 Speaker 1: cut that effort to update that study. And why, you know, 129 00:07:13,800 --> 00:07:18,160 Speaker 1: they cited the usual concerns about time resources, which is 130 00:07:18,200 --> 00:07:20,000 Speaker 1: the one thing I learned working in Washington is that 131 00:07:20,040 --> 00:07:23,600 Speaker 1: whenever somebody cites resources as the reason to not do something, 132 00:07:23,960 --> 00:07:26,040 Speaker 1: it's usually another reason. What do you think the real 133 00:07:26,080 --> 00:07:28,840 Speaker 1: reason was? You know, I think it just comes down 134 00:07:28,880 --> 00:07:30,800 Speaker 1: to the fact that it's a very very difficult study 135 00:07:30,840 --> 00:07:34,240 Speaker 1: to do, and the industry continued to pressure them to 136 00:07:34,360 --> 00:07:36,840 Speaker 1: the point where they convinced them that it wasn't it 137 00:07:36,880 --> 00:07:39,160 Speaker 1: wasn't going to gain them any useful information. And I 138 00:07:39,200 --> 00:07:43,280 Speaker 1: think that's wrong. Even no information or no results, so 139 00:07:43,320 --> 00:07:46,000 Speaker 1: to speak, a result that says everything's fine would have 140 00:07:46,040 --> 00:07:48,440 Speaker 1: been useful. I just wanted, as a little primmer for 141 00:07:48,480 --> 00:07:50,680 Speaker 1: people to say, and you and you chime in, or 142 00:07:50,720 --> 00:07:53,680 Speaker 1: I'll stop for you to give your assessment. And this 143 00:07:53,760 --> 00:07:56,240 Speaker 1: is a very kind of a children's book version of 144 00:07:56,240 --> 00:08:01,840 Speaker 1: this even that nuclear power was developed as a weapons system, 145 00:08:01,960 --> 00:08:03,840 Speaker 1: some people turned around and said, wow, why don't we 146 00:08:03,920 --> 00:08:06,240 Speaker 1: run some pipes and boil some water here because we 147 00:08:06,240 --> 00:08:09,480 Speaker 1: have the superheated capacity and there's really no business to 148 00:08:09,520 --> 00:08:11,640 Speaker 1: be had and making just a couple of reactors here 149 00:08:11,640 --> 00:08:14,320 Speaker 1: and there to build bomb material. Uh, we're going to 150 00:08:14,400 --> 00:08:16,480 Speaker 1: have a source of energy. And you know the famous 151 00:08:16,520 --> 00:08:20,480 Speaker 1: quote too cheap to meter. They said, well, the commercial industry, 152 00:08:20,520 --> 00:08:23,160 Speaker 1: as you said, all this whole enterprise started with the 153 00:08:23,240 --> 00:08:27,240 Speaker 1: need to make nuclear weapons. And then essentially people realize, well, 154 00:08:27,240 --> 00:08:29,200 Speaker 1: we've got to do something else with the technology where 155 00:08:29,240 --> 00:08:31,400 Speaker 1: everybody across the world is going to build nuclear weapons, 156 00:08:31,400 --> 00:08:33,880 Speaker 1: so we got to get them kind of focused somewhere else, 157 00:08:33,880 --> 00:08:36,560 Speaker 1: shift their their mindset a little bit to this commercial 158 00:08:36,640 --> 00:08:39,480 Speaker 1: nuclear power. And that took a long time to develop 159 00:08:39,520 --> 00:08:42,920 Speaker 1: because it was a risky technology and there were no 160 00:08:43,000 --> 00:08:45,720 Speaker 1: companies yet who were willing to kind of bet their 161 00:08:45,760 --> 00:08:48,520 Speaker 1: whole business on this risky technology. So you had to 162 00:08:48,559 --> 00:08:51,200 Speaker 1: have something called the Price Anderson Act. Price Anderson helped 163 00:08:51,240 --> 00:08:54,160 Speaker 1: facilitate them exactly. It provided a sense with the government 164 00:08:54,200 --> 00:08:56,000 Speaker 1: said you know what, if there's an accident, we're going 165 00:08:56,040 --> 00:08:58,480 Speaker 1: to cover the liability from that act, taxpayers are going 166 00:08:58,559 --> 00:09:01,440 Speaker 1: to cover the taxpayers essentially and or essentially we won't 167 00:09:01,679 --> 00:09:04,960 Speaker 1: we won't reimburse anybody for their damages, but you'll be 168 00:09:05,040 --> 00:09:07,560 Speaker 1: kept whole as a company. And so that once that 169 00:09:07,679 --> 00:09:09,280 Speaker 1: kind of came out of the risk for that company 170 00:09:09,320 --> 00:09:11,440 Speaker 1: that other than any other enterprise would have to bear. 171 00:09:11,679 --> 00:09:13,560 Speaker 1: Exactly why do you think that they gave the price 172 00:09:13,600 --> 00:09:16,240 Speaker 1: as an exemption to that industry, You know, because I 173 00:09:16,280 --> 00:09:18,880 Speaker 1: think there wasn't There was a desire to develop this 174 00:09:18,920 --> 00:09:22,040 Speaker 1: technology and the government wanted to support it, and because 175 00:09:22,040 --> 00:09:24,760 Speaker 1: they also wanted to support it internationally. They wanted people 176 00:09:25,080 --> 00:09:27,520 Speaker 1: to take this technology. You know, you had to get 177 00:09:27,640 --> 00:09:29,560 Speaker 1: very much a situation where you had to have and 178 00:09:29,559 --> 00:09:31,960 Speaker 1: the have nots. You had that American companies wanted to 179 00:09:31,960 --> 00:09:35,280 Speaker 1: sell this technology abroad. Absolutely, we're developing a business. Exactly. 180 00:09:35,280 --> 00:09:36,760 Speaker 1: We're not just sitting there saying we want to have 181 00:09:37,040 --> 00:09:40,079 Speaker 1: to nuclear technology as an example for you. We want 182 00:09:40,080 --> 00:09:42,320 Speaker 1: to have nuclear technology as an example of a product 183 00:09:42,400 --> 00:09:44,960 Speaker 1: we can sell. Exactly, it was an American technology at 184 00:09:45,000 --> 00:09:46,880 Speaker 1: that time, and you look around the world. I wanted 185 00:09:46,880 --> 00:09:49,000 Speaker 1: to grow a business, exactly. They want to grow a business, 186 00:09:49,000 --> 00:09:52,000 Speaker 1: and they wanted to divert away from nuclear weapons. So 187 00:09:52,160 --> 00:09:54,559 Speaker 1: they did what they needed to do, and Chrice Anderson 188 00:09:54,640 --> 00:09:57,120 Speaker 1: was a big piece of it. And and then you 189 00:09:57,160 --> 00:09:59,839 Speaker 1: had this, You had this Atomic Energy Commission, which had 190 00:09:59,840 --> 00:10:03,640 Speaker 1: this responsibility to build nuclear weapons, to build nuclear power plants, 191 00:10:04,000 --> 00:10:06,480 Speaker 1: to regulate nuclear power plants, and all of that just 192 00:10:06,520 --> 00:10:09,000 Speaker 1: became too much. It was just an overload. And then 193 00:10:09,040 --> 00:10:11,480 Speaker 1: in the in the late or the early seventies, they 194 00:10:11,520 --> 00:10:13,480 Speaker 1: split it all off, and they split it all apart. 195 00:10:13,559 --> 00:10:16,160 Speaker 1: They took away the nuclear weapons work and they just 196 00:10:16,240 --> 00:10:18,520 Speaker 1: left the NRC to do the regulation. And so it's 197 00:10:18,559 --> 00:10:21,839 Speaker 1: supposed to just be the place that thanks nothing more 198 00:10:21,880 --> 00:10:24,600 Speaker 1: than safety. But also at the same time, you know, 199 00:10:24,640 --> 00:10:26,480 Speaker 1: I was I worked with her in a stern Glass, 200 00:10:27,080 --> 00:10:30,280 Speaker 1: the father, if you will, of the Baby Tooth Study, 201 00:10:30,720 --> 00:10:34,800 Speaker 1: which he credits and his allies and supporters credit as 202 00:10:34,840 --> 00:10:37,480 Speaker 1: helping to leverage the nuclear test band, treating with Kennedy 203 00:10:37,480 --> 00:10:40,800 Speaker 1: in the sixties. And what stern Glass basically said was 204 00:10:40,920 --> 00:10:44,600 Speaker 1: that a daughter element of a nuclear reaction from nuclear 205 00:10:44,640 --> 00:10:49,280 Speaker 1: bombs and so forth in the atmosphere mimicked calcium in 206 00:10:49,320 --> 00:10:52,200 Speaker 1: the developing fetus, and so you would take a children's 207 00:10:52,480 --> 00:10:56,959 Speaker 1: first set of teeth when infant children lost their first 208 00:10:56,960 --> 00:10:59,520 Speaker 1: set of teeth. We could take them. And you saw 209 00:11:00,040 --> 00:11:02,320 Speaker 1: during a certain periods of time when there was a 210 00:11:02,360 --> 00:11:05,440 Speaker 1: lot of radiation in the air from from bombs, a spike, 211 00:11:06,000 --> 00:11:08,120 Speaker 1: and when there was the Test Band treaty, it went down, 212 00:11:08,600 --> 00:11:10,480 Speaker 1: and then when the nuclear reactors were being built in 213 00:11:10,520 --> 00:11:12,720 Speaker 1: the country, it went up again. And stern Glass said, 214 00:11:12,760 --> 00:11:17,079 Speaker 1: you know, ambient exposure is higher than the NRC or 215 00:11:17,120 --> 00:11:20,440 Speaker 1: the AC wants to admit. Then there was, of course 216 00:11:20,480 --> 00:11:22,880 Speaker 1: the story that was told that Nixon wanted to have 217 00:11:22,920 --> 00:11:25,599 Speaker 1: the option in his pocket to bomb Hanoi during the 218 00:11:25,679 --> 00:11:28,920 Speaker 1: Vietnam War, and as a preventative measure, because he didn't 219 00:11:28,920 --> 00:11:31,840 Speaker 1: want to be accused of poisoning his own citizenry, he 220 00:11:31,960 --> 00:11:35,160 Speaker 1: had the a e C raised the allowable exposure to 221 00:11:35,360 --> 00:11:38,959 Speaker 1: radiation months in advance of the planned bombing. I mean, 222 00:11:38,960 --> 00:11:41,000 Speaker 1: the federal government has played a lot of games with 223 00:11:41,040 --> 00:11:43,320 Speaker 1: the American people about exposure to radiation. Is that a 224 00:11:43,320 --> 00:11:45,640 Speaker 1: fair statement. Yeah, I mean, I think in the early 225 00:11:45,760 --> 00:11:49,800 Speaker 1: stages of this industry, nobody really, nobody really understood this technology, 226 00:11:49,880 --> 00:11:53,439 Speaker 1: and into a large extent, people didn't understand the harmful 227 00:11:53,480 --> 00:11:56,319 Speaker 1: effects of radiation. I mean, it was really until we 228 00:11:56,440 --> 00:12:00,720 Speaker 1: dropped the nuclear weapons in Japan that people really understood. 229 00:12:00,720 --> 00:12:02,760 Speaker 1: I mean, of course, you can go see the archival 230 00:12:02,760 --> 00:12:06,200 Speaker 1: footage of people looking and watching nuclear weapons tests in 231 00:12:06,240 --> 00:12:08,480 Speaker 1: the Nevada Desert, and of course those tests were originally 232 00:12:08,480 --> 00:12:11,440 Speaker 1: done above ground, and then they realized, well, you know 233 00:12:11,440 --> 00:12:15,000 Speaker 1: what that's that Eventually they recognize that's causing radiation exposures 234 00:12:15,000 --> 00:12:18,160 Speaker 1: they I mean, there's the classic community that lives in 235 00:12:18,160 --> 00:12:21,880 Speaker 1: in uh In, Utah, the so called down winders and 236 00:12:22,400 --> 00:12:25,080 Speaker 1: who were exposed to radiation from the weapons test because 237 00:12:25,080 --> 00:12:26,960 Speaker 1: they would wait until the winds were not blowing towards 238 00:12:27,040 --> 00:12:30,120 Speaker 1: Las Vegas, but blowing in that direction. Um. So, you know, 239 00:12:30,120 --> 00:12:32,280 Speaker 1: there were a lot of things that were done. I 240 00:12:32,320 --> 00:12:35,720 Speaker 1: don't I don't necessarily trying to describe motives to what 241 00:12:35,760 --> 00:12:37,880 Speaker 1: people were doing and why they did them, but it 242 00:12:38,040 --> 00:12:42,040 Speaker 1: certainly was a technology that was new and that people 243 00:12:42,040 --> 00:12:44,959 Speaker 1: didn't fully understand. And in a lot of ways, that's 244 00:12:45,000 --> 00:12:47,280 Speaker 1: what makes we understand it pretty much well. And and 245 00:12:47,360 --> 00:12:49,000 Speaker 1: that's what in a lot of ways makes it so 246 00:12:49,080 --> 00:12:51,440 Speaker 1: tragic is that we we think we understand it better, 247 00:12:51,480 --> 00:12:54,840 Speaker 1: but in some ways we don't. Um So, you look 248 00:12:54,880 --> 00:12:58,520 Speaker 1: at what happened in Japan just five years ago. UM, 249 00:12:58,679 --> 00:13:01,760 Speaker 1: here was a nuclear power land that was sitting on 250 00:13:01,800 --> 00:13:04,559 Speaker 1: the coast of Japan and there was a massive earthquake 251 00:13:04,600 --> 00:13:08,199 Speaker 1: and a tsunami and wiped out basically every safety system 252 00:13:08,280 --> 00:13:11,640 Speaker 1: and you had an accident that was spewing radiation into 253 00:13:11,679 --> 00:13:15,280 Speaker 1: the atmosphere for six months. And do you get updates 254 00:13:15,280 --> 00:13:19,280 Speaker 1: about the situation there now? I do, UM just periodically. 255 00:13:19,440 --> 00:13:23,679 Speaker 1: They encouraging, not really, UM, it's it's a it's just 256 00:13:23,760 --> 00:13:26,880 Speaker 1: a tragedy. It's it's gonna be a mess there for 257 00:13:26,960 --> 00:13:29,679 Speaker 1: decades to come. And there's really nothing. There's nothing you 258 00:13:29,720 --> 00:13:31,800 Speaker 1: can do. It's mother nature has kind of taken over. 259 00:13:31,920 --> 00:13:34,160 Speaker 1: And as much as we like to think of humans 260 00:13:34,160 --> 00:13:37,120 Speaker 1: we're all powerful and we can control Mother Nature. At 261 00:13:37,200 --> 00:13:38,920 Speaker 1: this point, the physics is more powerful. Is going to 262 00:13:39,040 --> 00:13:42,079 Speaker 1: disperse a lot of radioactivity into the ocean for decades 263 00:13:42,120 --> 00:13:44,360 Speaker 1: and that's basically what's going to have a slow seeping 264 00:13:44,400 --> 00:13:48,240 Speaker 1: basis exactly. And there's there's really nothing that can be 265 00:13:48,280 --> 00:13:51,440 Speaker 1: done about that. And one of the things that people 266 00:13:51,480 --> 00:13:55,600 Speaker 1: who were long term members of this debate I said 267 00:13:55,760 --> 00:14:00,520 Speaker 1: was the Department of Energy very cynically cited these plants 268 00:14:00,520 --> 00:14:03,320 Speaker 1: where there was as often as possible cross contamination from 269 00:14:03,400 --> 00:14:06,200 Speaker 1: chemical contamination, so you couldn't figure out who to blame 270 00:14:06,240 --> 00:14:10,199 Speaker 1: for any kind of cancer cluster or soft tissue anomalies 271 00:14:10,240 --> 00:14:13,719 Speaker 1: that were there. Oyster Creek had a lot of high 272 00:14:13,800 --> 00:14:16,719 Speaker 1: rate of cancer. They're higher for childhood cancer. It had 273 00:14:16,720 --> 00:14:21,360 Speaker 1: an autism cluster there. There was contamination there from sea 274 00:14:21,400 --> 00:14:26,160 Speaker 1: bagage and a union carbide, and a woman that was 275 00:14:26,160 --> 00:14:30,520 Speaker 1: a local advocate there prevailed upon a congressman to give 276 00:14:30,560 --> 00:14:33,000 Speaker 1: her discretionary funds that were in his budget as a 277 00:14:33,040 --> 00:14:35,800 Speaker 1: congressman to do some research there. And the moment she 278 00:14:35,840 --> 00:14:39,000 Speaker 1: obtained the funds, union card bite settles and then on 279 00:14:39,040 --> 00:14:40,520 Speaker 1: all the documents seal they don't want people to know 280 00:14:40,520 --> 00:14:42,600 Speaker 1: what's underground underground there. So you have a lot of 281 00:14:42,600 --> 00:14:45,120 Speaker 1: cross contamination there, and you have a lot of working 282 00:14:45,120 --> 00:14:47,800 Speaker 1: class people, people who really really rely on those jobs. 283 00:14:48,360 --> 00:14:50,120 Speaker 1: And some of the people I work with said that 284 00:14:50,200 --> 00:14:53,320 Speaker 1: the NRC and the and the Energy Department deliberately cited 285 00:14:53,360 --> 00:14:56,080 Speaker 1: these plants in places like that. Does that seem true 286 00:14:56,080 --> 00:15:00,920 Speaker 1: to you? You know, not really, um, I mean, I'm 287 00:15:01,000 --> 00:15:03,080 Speaker 1: just in your opinion. What would seem more to to 288 00:15:03,120 --> 00:15:05,360 Speaker 1: me is that the power company may have chosen to 289 00:15:05,400 --> 00:15:08,040 Speaker 1: do and and you know, I could see maybe reasons 290 00:15:08,080 --> 00:15:11,200 Speaker 1: why it may have been an industrial facility because ultimately 291 00:15:11,200 --> 00:15:14,720 Speaker 1: the sites were chosen by the power companies. The NRC 292 00:15:14,800 --> 00:15:17,320 Speaker 1: then has to approve the site and and and and 293 00:15:17,800 --> 00:15:21,640 Speaker 1: didn't work. That was the Yeah, they were chosen. They're 294 00:15:21,720 --> 00:15:25,040 Speaker 1: chosen by the power companies initially, um, and then again 295 00:15:25,120 --> 00:15:27,800 Speaker 1: the NRC approves it and does those things. So would 296 00:15:27,840 --> 00:15:30,160 Speaker 1: it surprise me if somebody had chosen a site that 297 00:15:30,200 --> 00:15:33,480 Speaker 1: had contamination that you know, was suited better to an 298 00:15:33,520 --> 00:15:36,320 Speaker 1: industrial facility, like a nuclear power plant than some something else. 299 00:15:36,760 --> 00:15:39,080 Speaker 1: Certainly not. I mean that would certainly make sense. And 300 00:15:39,400 --> 00:15:41,600 Speaker 1: rather than having to clean up you know, what is 301 00:15:41,640 --> 00:15:44,920 Speaker 1: a what is a potentially messy era, you build an 302 00:15:44,920 --> 00:15:46,760 Speaker 1: industrial facility over it and you don't have to deal 303 00:15:46,760 --> 00:15:49,280 Speaker 1: with that as much. So, UM, you know, I can 304 00:15:49,280 --> 00:15:51,640 Speaker 1: see where there's maybe some truth to those those legends, 305 00:15:51,680 --> 00:15:56,200 Speaker 1: in those myths. But responsible, Um, the Innescy's All plant 306 00:15:56,320 --> 00:15:59,120 Speaker 1: wasn't responsible for the site. I didn't know that. I 307 00:15:59,160 --> 00:16:01,360 Speaker 1: would have thought that the was controlling the sites themselves 308 00:16:01,360 --> 00:16:03,600 Speaker 1: as well. The sites were private, and that's why there 309 00:16:03,680 --> 00:16:06,840 Speaker 1: was that difficult transition period because you had this technology, 310 00:16:06,920 --> 00:16:09,280 Speaker 1: which was largely controlled by the government, and then they 311 00:16:09,280 --> 00:16:11,080 Speaker 1: were saying to the private sector, here, take it and 312 00:16:11,120 --> 00:16:13,440 Speaker 1: do something with it, make these power plants. And the 313 00:16:13,440 --> 00:16:15,400 Speaker 1: private sector said, we don't know anything about that, and 314 00:16:15,600 --> 00:16:17,560 Speaker 1: we don't want to bet our companies. So you know, 315 00:16:17,600 --> 00:16:19,480 Speaker 1: that's where you got prisonity, you got all these things. 316 00:16:19,520 --> 00:16:21,400 Speaker 1: So there was this push to kind of get the 317 00:16:21,440 --> 00:16:24,600 Speaker 1: private companies to do it and um and that was 318 00:16:24,680 --> 00:16:27,240 Speaker 1: the early legacy of of the of the industry. What 319 00:16:27,680 --> 00:16:32,840 Speaker 1: nuclear facility is laying on a piece of land right 320 00:16:32,880 --> 00:16:37,840 Speaker 1: now the most mimics Fukushima in your mind. We're flooding 321 00:16:37,920 --> 00:16:40,800 Speaker 1: on a massive scale. If some weather anomaly were to occur. 322 00:16:41,120 --> 00:16:44,520 Speaker 1: Where's the Fukushima that could potentially happen in the US. 323 00:16:44,760 --> 00:16:48,800 Speaker 1: It's probably in the Midwest, plants along the Mississippi along 324 00:16:50,200 --> 00:16:55,160 Speaker 1: there's a handful Iowa. I actually went the summer of Fukshima. 325 00:16:56,160 --> 00:16:58,920 Speaker 1: I actually went to one of these plants in Nebraska. 326 00:16:59,080 --> 00:17:02,520 Speaker 1: What's it called called Fort Calhoun, And I'll never forget this. 327 00:17:02,560 --> 00:17:04,879 Speaker 1: I went in a privately owned by an energy privately 328 00:17:04,920 --> 00:17:09,200 Speaker 1: owned by a Nebraska utility, and the site was almost 329 00:17:09,280 --> 00:17:12,840 Speaker 1: completely inundated with water, with water and you had to 330 00:17:12,920 --> 00:17:16,920 Speaker 1: walk on an aluminum plank from kind of where your 331 00:17:16,920 --> 00:17:20,840 Speaker 1: bridge are a long bridge, a long bridge, very long bridge. 332 00:17:20,840 --> 00:17:23,119 Speaker 1: Because there was so much flooding, and what are they 333 00:17:23,160 --> 00:17:26,000 Speaker 1: saying there about it? Well, at the time, you know, 334 00:17:26,040 --> 00:17:28,720 Speaker 1: the NFC was monitoring it, and the flood levels were 335 00:17:28,800 --> 00:17:32,160 Speaker 1: not likely to get like another six or seven inches higher, 336 00:17:32,160 --> 00:17:34,040 Speaker 1: which is where the plant would have really been in 337 00:17:34,119 --> 00:17:37,880 Speaker 1: very serious trouble. But what happens in the plant when 338 00:17:37,960 --> 00:17:40,439 Speaker 1: when that happens, what happens, Well, everything the doors are 339 00:17:40,920 --> 00:17:43,560 Speaker 1: sealed and keep the water, to keep the water out. 340 00:17:44,000 --> 00:17:46,040 Speaker 1: Is it water tight? It is water tight up to 341 00:17:46,080 --> 00:17:48,720 Speaker 1: a certain level, and they have a level at which 342 00:17:48,720 --> 00:17:51,520 Speaker 1: they're designed to be water tight, and they were about 343 00:17:51,560 --> 00:17:54,720 Speaker 1: seven I think seven inches below um, the level at 344 00:17:54,720 --> 00:17:56,760 Speaker 1: which they were no longer water tight. Now seven inches 345 00:17:56,800 --> 00:17:59,920 Speaker 1: of water spread out over you know, the entire floodplane 346 00:18:00,320 --> 00:18:02,920 Speaker 1: the I guess around Missouri River is is a lot 347 00:18:02,960 --> 00:18:07,240 Speaker 1: of water. But nonetheless there was already a tremendous flooding there, 348 00:18:08,040 --> 00:18:10,439 Speaker 1: so that was really close. And it actually it just 349 00:18:10,520 --> 00:18:14,880 Speaker 1: so happened that about a year before some really good 350 00:18:14,920 --> 00:18:18,440 Speaker 1: folks at the NRC had identified a problem at that 351 00:18:18,520 --> 00:18:22,480 Speaker 1: plant where they weren't actually watertight to the level that 352 00:18:22,560 --> 00:18:25,199 Speaker 1: they thought they were, and they identified this and they 353 00:18:25,200 --> 00:18:28,000 Speaker 1: made them fix it, and thankfully they had, because if not, 354 00:18:28,080 --> 00:18:30,440 Speaker 1: they would have been much much closer to that kind 355 00:18:30,480 --> 00:18:33,560 Speaker 1: of breaking point. Is it a densely populated area, I 356 00:18:33,560 --> 00:18:36,160 Speaker 1: would have mentioned it's not. It was near I believe 357 00:18:36,160 --> 00:18:38,960 Speaker 1: it's right outside of Omaha. Um so the plants not 358 00:18:39,000 --> 00:18:42,359 Speaker 1: that far from a population center. Is there a discussion, 359 00:18:42,440 --> 00:18:44,840 Speaker 1: I'm assuming there's a discussion. This is while you were 360 00:18:44,840 --> 00:18:49,040 Speaker 1: in charge. Was there a discussion about what steps need 361 00:18:49,080 --> 00:18:51,679 Speaker 1: to be taken. I'm assuming you can't raise the building. 362 00:18:51,680 --> 00:18:54,040 Speaker 1: How do you drop the water level? Yeah? You you 363 00:18:54,040 --> 00:18:56,000 Speaker 1: you shut down the plant. That's the first thing you do, 364 00:18:56,160 --> 00:18:57,800 Speaker 1: and I mean they had shut down. You do you 365 00:18:57,840 --> 00:19:01,640 Speaker 1: dig another floodplain somewhere. You know, there's really nothing Army, 366 00:19:02,160 --> 00:19:03,720 Speaker 1: there's nothing they can do. There's nothing you do with 367 00:19:03,800 --> 00:19:08,120 Speaker 1: the flood with the floodwaters keep rising, they keep rising, exactly. 368 00:19:08,920 --> 00:19:12,280 Speaker 1: The flooding was larger result of Army core dams, so 369 00:19:12,640 --> 00:19:15,840 Speaker 1: they control all this. It's actually fascinating. All this water 370 00:19:15,920 --> 00:19:19,480 Speaker 1: comes from like Montana and Wyoming, all these from the mountains, 371 00:19:19,520 --> 00:19:21,280 Speaker 1: from the mountains, and all the snow melts, and they 372 00:19:21,280 --> 00:19:23,879 Speaker 1: had a massive snowpack that year. And so all this 373 00:19:24,160 --> 00:19:26,919 Speaker 1: water comes through a series of dams that are controlled 374 00:19:26,960 --> 00:19:29,719 Speaker 1: by the Army Corps of Engineers, and they have limits 375 00:19:29,760 --> 00:19:32,480 Speaker 1: on how much water they let go for farming, for 376 00:19:32,880 --> 00:19:36,359 Speaker 1: industrial use, for agriculture, all these different things, and so 377 00:19:36,400 --> 00:19:39,320 Speaker 1: they control that to a certain extent. But if there's 378 00:19:39,680 --> 00:19:41,800 Speaker 1: so much water, they have to let the water go. 379 00:19:42,440 --> 00:19:44,679 Speaker 1: And so they were letting water go, and it was 380 00:19:44,680 --> 00:19:46,840 Speaker 1: bringing the level of this river up, and it was, 381 00:19:46,960 --> 00:19:48,639 Speaker 1: you know, there they were guaranteed to us that they 382 00:19:48,640 --> 00:19:52,159 Speaker 1: weren't gonna let open up flood gates enough that it 383 00:19:52,200 --> 00:19:55,119 Speaker 1: could flood the site more, but nonetheless it was it 384 00:19:55,200 --> 00:19:59,200 Speaker 1: was a precarious situation. Where are you from Upstate New York, 385 00:19:59,240 --> 00:20:02,240 Speaker 1: from Albany, you're from all. But what did your father do? 386 00:20:02,440 --> 00:20:06,040 Speaker 1: He was an industrial engineer, specifically, what kind of worked 387 00:20:06,320 --> 00:20:08,560 Speaker 1: he worked? He actually worked. I like to say, my 388 00:20:08,640 --> 00:20:12,680 Speaker 1: dad's is the history of the depleting manufacturing industry and 389 00:20:12,760 --> 00:20:16,000 Speaker 1: upstate New York. He started out in textiles um and 390 00:20:16,640 --> 00:20:19,040 Speaker 1: we lived up in Glen's Falls, which had a big 391 00:20:19,080 --> 00:20:21,280 Speaker 1: textile industry. He worked there for a while. He worked 392 00:20:21,280 --> 00:20:24,760 Speaker 1: in factories, he he designed assembly lines and figured out 393 00:20:24,760 --> 00:20:28,560 Speaker 1: how to move products through factories and u um, so 394 00:20:28,640 --> 00:20:31,720 Speaker 1: he I got kind of my engineering technical sense from him. 395 00:20:32,040 --> 00:20:34,680 Speaker 1: Are you many siblings? Are you? How many? One sister? 396 00:20:35,280 --> 00:20:37,600 Speaker 1: As she an engineer too, she's a she's a she's 397 00:20:37,600 --> 00:20:41,280 Speaker 1: a musician. So she's a musical engineer. Someone had to 398 00:20:41,320 --> 00:20:45,560 Speaker 1: bring some soul. That's right, this dining room table. And then, uh, 399 00:20:45,600 --> 00:20:48,080 Speaker 1: where did you go into crowd Cornell University? And where'd 400 00:20:48,119 --> 00:20:51,480 Speaker 1: you go to graduate school? Madison, Wisconsin? And what did 401 00:20:51,520 --> 00:20:55,000 Speaker 1: you study? Physics? Physics? I was a physicist. And what 402 00:20:55,040 --> 00:20:58,240 Speaker 1: did you do when you got out of school? I went, 403 00:20:58,400 --> 00:21:01,560 Speaker 1: I did a fellowship and which put me in Washington, 404 00:21:01,720 --> 00:21:05,320 Speaker 1: d c. As a really great fellowship program from something 405 00:21:05,359 --> 00:21:08,160 Speaker 1: called the Association for the American Association for the Vans 406 00:21:08,160 --> 00:21:11,680 Speaker 1: from the Science. So it's a big scientific member society 407 00:21:11,720 --> 00:21:15,720 Speaker 1: and they take about twenty or thirty uh fresh PhDs 408 00:21:15,800 --> 00:21:19,359 Speaker 1: like myself or senior scientists, and they throw him into 409 00:21:19,400 --> 00:21:22,159 Speaker 1: an office in Congress and kind of introduce you to 410 00:21:22,200 --> 00:21:24,119 Speaker 1: the political process. And so that's how kind of how 411 00:21:24,119 --> 00:21:26,120 Speaker 1: I got my start working in Washington. How long did 412 00:21:26,119 --> 00:21:28,199 Speaker 1: you do the fellowship? It was a year and then 413 00:21:28,200 --> 00:21:29,800 Speaker 1: where did you go? Then I went to work for 414 00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:32,600 Speaker 1: Harry Read, Nevada Senator. How long were you with him? 415 00:21:33,040 --> 00:21:36,679 Speaker 1: About four years. How did you working with Read shape 416 00:21:36,720 --> 00:21:40,399 Speaker 1: your view of politics and how did you employ the 417 00:21:40,560 --> 00:21:43,159 Speaker 1: perspective when you were working at the NRC. You know, 418 00:21:43,400 --> 00:21:45,359 Speaker 1: the thing that I learned from him is that the 419 00:21:45,440 --> 00:21:49,080 Speaker 1: most important aspect of politics, and really what makes politics 420 00:21:49,119 --> 00:21:53,040 Speaker 1: work is your word. And you have to be honest 421 00:21:53,080 --> 00:21:56,080 Speaker 1: with people, and you have to um follow through on 422 00:21:56,119 --> 00:21:59,760 Speaker 1: your commitments. And the thing that he is masterful at 423 00:22:00,119 --> 00:22:02,840 Speaker 1: better than anyone I know, is he understands what people 424 00:22:02,880 --> 00:22:04,520 Speaker 1: mean when they say yes and when they say no. 425 00:22:05,000 --> 00:22:06,679 Speaker 1: And he knows when he yes means a yes, and 426 00:22:06,800 --> 00:22:08,119 Speaker 1: yes and means a no, and he knows when a 427 00:22:08,160 --> 00:22:14,360 Speaker 1: no means a no, no means yes. Coming up Gregory 428 00:22:14,480 --> 00:22:18,240 Speaker 1: Yazco on what he thinks is the future of nuclear power, 429 00:22:18,760 --> 00:22:22,480 Speaker 1: also why he resigned as chairman of the US Nuclear 430 00:22:22,560 --> 00:22:29,000 Speaker 1: Regulatory Commission before his term was up. Explore the Here's 431 00:22:29,040 --> 00:22:33,040 Speaker 1: the Thing Archives where I speak with Antonio Jujas, an 432 00:22:33,080 --> 00:22:36,600 Speaker 1: investigative reporter who continues to cover the effects of the 433 00:22:36,640 --> 00:22:40,480 Speaker 1: two thousand ten BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 434 00:22:41,440 --> 00:22:45,120 Speaker 1: What this industry has done is taken a natural resource 435 00:22:45,480 --> 00:22:49,080 Speaker 1: and turned it into a weapon of mass destruction. Take 436 00:22:49,119 --> 00:23:04,600 Speaker 1: a listen at Here's the Thing dot org. This is 437 00:23:04,640 --> 00:23:08,879 Speaker 1: Alec Baldwin and you're listening to Here's the Thing. My 438 00:23:08,960 --> 00:23:13,960 Speaker 1: guest today is Gregory yasco physicist and former chairman of 439 00:23:14,000 --> 00:23:19,360 Speaker 1: the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. How to dispose of nuclear 440 00:23:19,440 --> 00:23:23,520 Speaker 1: waste has been a problem for scientists since the technology 441 00:23:23,640 --> 00:23:27,000 Speaker 1: was first invented. I worked a lot on Yucky Mountain, 442 00:23:27,040 --> 00:23:31,800 Speaker 1: which is the was the plan nuclear waste repository in Nevada, 443 00:23:32,160 --> 00:23:33,760 Speaker 1: so the place where they were going to take all 444 00:23:33,880 --> 00:23:37,639 Speaker 1: the leftover fuel spent fuel to take us through a 445 00:23:37,720 --> 00:23:41,119 Speaker 1: quick a quick trot through the history of that, I 446 00:23:41,160 --> 00:23:44,320 Speaker 1: mean spent feel hasn't always been kept on site at 447 00:23:44,320 --> 00:23:47,560 Speaker 1: the reactors. As we grew more and more reactors, no 448 00:23:47,560 --> 00:23:50,159 Speaker 1: one sent it off site. No one. There's a few 449 00:23:50,280 --> 00:23:53,040 Speaker 1: companies I think in South Carolina where they own a 450 00:23:53,119 --> 00:23:55,200 Speaker 1: number of plants and they've taken some of their fuel 451 00:23:55,200 --> 00:23:57,640 Speaker 1: and they put it, say at one plants they consolidated. 452 00:23:57,680 --> 00:24:01,360 Speaker 1: But essentially, yes, always was on a plan somewhere exactly. Yeah, 453 00:24:01,520 --> 00:24:04,480 Speaker 1: in pools and containment pools, in pools and in kind 454 00:24:04,480 --> 00:24:08,840 Speaker 1: of big concrete silos with water. Uh No, it doesn't 455 00:24:08,840 --> 00:24:10,960 Speaker 1: always have to be filled with water to make it 456 00:24:11,119 --> 00:24:13,760 Speaker 1: correct to take away the danger, that's right, it just 457 00:24:13,800 --> 00:24:15,400 Speaker 1: needs Why are the ones that are kept in water 458 00:24:15,440 --> 00:24:17,199 Speaker 1: for people who don't know anything about physics, why are 459 00:24:17,200 --> 00:24:19,800 Speaker 1: they kept in water? It's essentially to cool them off. 460 00:24:20,440 --> 00:24:22,560 Speaker 1: So the water acts as a kind of a heat bath, 461 00:24:22,600 --> 00:24:25,080 Speaker 1: and it takes away the heat from the fuel because 462 00:24:25,080 --> 00:24:28,480 Speaker 1: it's very physical, it's physically hot temperature from a temperature perspective, 463 00:24:29,119 --> 00:24:31,920 Speaker 1: Once the nuclear reaction is over, they're still really really hot, 464 00:24:32,240 --> 00:24:33,800 Speaker 1: so it's like it's like you don't cool off for 465 00:24:33,880 --> 00:24:36,720 Speaker 1: like a long time. Exactly. Yeah, it's like your electric 466 00:24:36,800 --> 00:24:39,560 Speaker 1: stove and they're radioactive and honestly, and so we need 467 00:24:39,600 --> 00:24:44,280 Speaker 1: to So So when did the conversation begin as to 468 00:24:44,800 --> 00:24:47,840 Speaker 1: spend fuel having to be stored at an external quote 469 00:24:47,920 --> 00:24:52,200 Speaker 1: unquote facility? When did that begin? The first discussions were 470 00:24:52,359 --> 00:24:55,199 Speaker 1: very academic discussions, probably in the fifties and sixties, but 471 00:24:55,240 --> 00:24:58,320 Speaker 1: they weren't anything that was a practical solution for anybody 472 00:24:58,440 --> 00:25:01,440 Speaker 1: knew this stuff had to had to go somewhe they 473 00:25:01,480 --> 00:25:03,520 Speaker 1: they didn't know where it had to go, but scientists 474 00:25:03,560 --> 00:25:05,679 Speaker 1: decided that the best place to put it was somewhere 475 00:25:05,680 --> 00:25:08,080 Speaker 1: in the ground, to bury it in a mountain somewhere 476 00:25:08,240 --> 00:25:13,000 Speaker 1: or something like that. It took the industry probably until 477 00:25:13,200 --> 00:25:16,040 Speaker 1: the mid eighties and the government in the mid eighties 478 00:25:16,080 --> 00:25:19,040 Speaker 1: to really come up with a solution. So you're talking 479 00:25:19,040 --> 00:25:22,760 Speaker 1: about kind of the peak of the nuclear power boom, 480 00:25:22,800 --> 00:25:25,280 Speaker 1: and it's only then that Congress is passing a law 481 00:25:25,359 --> 00:25:27,720 Speaker 1: that says, okay, we we've got to figure out what 482 00:25:27,760 --> 00:25:29,760 Speaker 1: to do with this stuff. So a lot of plants 483 00:25:29,760 --> 00:25:32,000 Speaker 1: were built without any path for that fuel to to 484 00:25:32,040 --> 00:25:35,320 Speaker 1: go anywhere. Most plants really were built that way. Most 485 00:25:35,520 --> 00:25:39,800 Speaker 1: lay people who understand this only when it's written brightest 486 00:25:39,840 --> 00:25:43,680 Speaker 1: in the headlines yuck a mountainous the as the name 487 00:25:43,880 --> 00:25:46,239 Speaker 1: that that comes to mind as a facility that was 488 00:25:46,320 --> 00:25:51,280 Speaker 1: designated in Nevada, uh to store spent fuel. And describe 489 00:25:51,280 --> 00:25:53,639 Speaker 1: for me the history of that enterprise. Well, that was 490 00:25:53,680 --> 00:25:58,359 Speaker 1: a very very political process because nobody wants this stuff. 491 00:25:59,000 --> 00:26:02,040 Speaker 1: And back in the in the seventies, people tried to 492 00:26:02,080 --> 00:26:04,560 Speaker 1: find a place in in the Midwest and they couldn't. 493 00:26:05,000 --> 00:26:07,040 Speaker 1: So Congress stepped in and said, well, we're gonna solve it. 494 00:26:07,240 --> 00:26:11,360 Speaker 1: We're gonna come up with an objective, fair set of criteria. 495 00:26:11,600 --> 00:26:14,320 Speaker 1: And was it objective and fair? It started out that way, 496 00:26:14,359 --> 00:26:16,600 Speaker 1: but as most political things are, they wind up not 497 00:26:16,680 --> 00:26:20,600 Speaker 1: being how so, because the danger to Nevada residents who've 498 00:26:20,600 --> 00:26:24,359 Speaker 1: obviously had their exposure from other uh Nevada residents are 499 00:26:24,400 --> 00:26:28,359 Speaker 1: down winders themselves, correct from for decades of bomb testing 500 00:26:28,400 --> 00:26:31,040 Speaker 1: in New Mexico and so forth. And then there were 501 00:26:31,080 --> 00:26:34,840 Speaker 1: bomb test in Nevadas from Las Vegas, right outside Las Vegas. 502 00:26:34,840 --> 00:26:38,280 Speaker 1: So so, um, what was the danger to them? How 503 00:26:38,320 --> 00:26:40,720 Speaker 1: far has Yuck a mountain from Las Vegas. It's about 504 00:26:40,760 --> 00:26:43,040 Speaker 1: ninety miles from Las Vegas. Not that far, not that far. 505 00:26:43,119 --> 00:26:46,000 Speaker 1: And what's most important is that the highways that get you, 506 00:26:46,080 --> 00:26:49,199 Speaker 1: they're all take you through Las Vegas. So all the 507 00:26:49,240 --> 00:26:52,160 Speaker 1: fuel would have to be essentially transported without a big issue. 508 00:26:52,320 --> 00:26:56,320 Speaker 1: There was a fatation exactly, yeah, the transportation and kind 509 00:26:56,320 --> 00:26:58,400 Speaker 1: of a sense on the nevad AND's part that they 510 00:26:58,400 --> 00:27:00,919 Speaker 1: had done their part for the country. Mean, there's a 511 00:27:00,960 --> 00:27:04,000 Speaker 1: lot of radioactive material buried in the Nevada desert from 512 00:27:04,040 --> 00:27:06,399 Speaker 1: all the nuclear weapons tests that we're done. So so 513 00:27:06,480 --> 00:27:09,920 Speaker 1: people who so elected officials whether it be Read or 514 00:27:09,960 --> 00:27:13,360 Speaker 1: others and residents there who are advocates. They basically said, 515 00:27:13,480 --> 00:27:15,960 Speaker 1: we've done enough. That was that was the viewpoint. Yeah, 516 00:27:16,359 --> 00:27:18,680 Speaker 1: and Reed was opposed to. It was opposed to. And 517 00:27:18,760 --> 00:27:21,200 Speaker 1: we even in spite of reeds opposition, How much money 518 00:27:21,280 --> 00:27:23,840 Speaker 1: was spent developing yuck A Mountain before they abandoned the project. 519 00:27:23,880 --> 00:27:27,280 Speaker 1: It was billions of dollars. How how did that happen? Well, essentially, 520 00:27:27,280 --> 00:27:29,119 Speaker 1: Congress passed the law that said we don't care with 521 00:27:29,240 --> 00:27:30,679 Speaker 1: Nevada things, and we're going to do it, and they 522 00:27:30,720 --> 00:27:35,159 Speaker 1: overrode any of Reed's protests or the indigenous protests, and 523 00:27:35,200 --> 00:27:38,360 Speaker 1: then they started to build this thing. And what essentially 524 00:27:38,480 --> 00:27:42,840 Speaker 1: is it. They dug a number of tunnels, they did tests, 525 00:27:43,040 --> 00:27:45,680 Speaker 1: and then it's now closed. So there's pad locks and 526 00:27:45,720 --> 00:27:50,240 Speaker 1: gates barring the entriens of dollars with tunnels. Yeah, exactly 527 00:27:50,680 --> 00:27:53,000 Speaker 1: one tunnel, yeah, one or two tunnels. Yeah. They would 528 00:27:53,000 --> 00:27:56,560 Speaker 1: have stored the facilita the material in several different you know, 529 00:27:56,640 --> 00:28:00,400 Speaker 1: kind of containment. Uh said, they would have get out 530 00:28:00,440 --> 00:28:03,400 Speaker 1: like a cave and opened up the mountain and then 531 00:28:03,520 --> 00:28:06,720 Speaker 1: brought the nuclear waste in. Over decades or actually over 532 00:28:06,840 --> 00:28:09,280 Speaker 1: centuries and then kind of eventually just closed the gate 533 00:28:09,320 --> 00:28:13,720 Speaker 1: and walked away, shut the door, and not at all. Maybe, 534 00:28:13,760 --> 00:28:17,840 Speaker 1: but much of the spent fuel produced in the entire 535 00:28:18,000 --> 00:28:23,240 Speaker 1: United States would be in one facility ninety miles from 536 00:28:23,520 --> 00:28:26,040 Speaker 1: Were there any other plans you heard? Were there any 537 00:28:26,040 --> 00:28:28,760 Speaker 1: other proposals you heard for what to do with spent 538 00:28:28,840 --> 00:28:30,920 Speaker 1: fuel that you were excited by the youth thought were 539 00:28:30,920 --> 00:28:34,800 Speaker 1: worth investigating. In a lot of ways, the best alternative 540 00:28:34,880 --> 00:28:36,719 Speaker 1: is probably to leave it where it is, you know 541 00:28:36,840 --> 00:28:39,160 Speaker 1: it really, I mean there are some places where you 542 00:28:39,200 --> 00:28:41,520 Speaker 1: don't want to keep it, you know, the probably Indian Point, 543 00:28:41,600 --> 00:28:43,760 Speaker 1: which is close to New York City. Um, so some 544 00:28:43,840 --> 00:28:45,440 Speaker 1: of the fuel you want to move, You want to 545 00:28:45,480 --> 00:28:49,520 Speaker 1: get it into maybe another location. Um, but you know 546 00:28:49,560 --> 00:28:52,400 Speaker 1: they're really it's you know, it's like it's it's there there. 547 00:28:52,400 --> 00:28:55,120 Speaker 1: You're not saying that just as a practical political concern. 548 00:28:55,080 --> 00:28:58,200 Speaker 1: I mean, let everybody share in the risk. You think, 549 00:28:58,280 --> 00:29:00,920 Speaker 1: for for from an engineering standpoint, from a physics standpoint, 550 00:29:00,920 --> 00:29:02,360 Speaker 1: it's better to leave it there. Yeah, I think it 551 00:29:02,440 --> 00:29:04,280 Speaker 1: is right now. I mean, we certainly in supporting it 552 00:29:04,320 --> 00:29:06,840 Speaker 1: is dangerous. Transporting it adds risk, and we just we 553 00:29:06,880 --> 00:29:09,080 Speaker 1: don't have any place to put it so right now 554 00:29:09,120 --> 00:29:11,320 Speaker 1: it can end up in containers and putting at the 555 00:29:11,320 --> 00:29:15,480 Speaker 1: bottom of the ocean doesn't work. You know, I'm not 556 00:29:15,560 --> 00:29:18,360 Speaker 1: in favor. You could do it, You could do it 557 00:29:18,520 --> 00:29:23,000 Speaker 1: would center, Yeah, it would eventually leak, and eventually will 558 00:29:23,040 --> 00:29:26,160 Speaker 1: I mean all containers you put stuff in the exception, 559 00:29:26,480 --> 00:29:30,520 Speaker 1: there's there's nothing you can make that's gonna that's essentially 560 00:29:30,640 --> 00:29:33,320 Speaker 1: forever last for millennia, which is what you need, is 561 00:29:33,400 --> 00:29:37,120 Speaker 1: what you need. Yeah, that's interesting. So you are working 562 00:29:37,120 --> 00:29:40,080 Speaker 1: with Read for four years and you're working on yuck 563 00:29:40,080 --> 00:29:42,760 Speaker 1: A Mountain for four years most of the four years 564 00:29:42,920 --> 00:29:44,480 Speaker 1: or the most of the four years. When you leave Read, 565 00:29:44,520 --> 00:29:46,920 Speaker 1: where do you go to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 566 00:29:46,920 --> 00:29:49,520 Speaker 1: do what I started out as a commissioner. So there's 567 00:29:49,600 --> 00:29:53,680 Speaker 1: five people that make the decisions for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 568 00:29:54,040 --> 00:29:56,720 Speaker 1: Um I was one of those five. It was a long, 569 00:29:57,280 --> 00:29:59,640 Speaker 1: hard fight by Senator Reid to get me on that 570 00:30:00,200 --> 00:30:03,720 Speaker 1: on that hard because I was viewed. Um I had 571 00:30:03,720 --> 00:30:05,640 Speaker 1: worked for Senator Read and before that, when I was 572 00:30:05,680 --> 00:30:09,600 Speaker 1: the fellow I worked for now Senator Ed Markey. Um well, 573 00:30:09,640 --> 00:30:12,760 Speaker 1: there you go. That kind of not going to make 574 00:30:12,800 --> 00:30:16,880 Speaker 1: friends in any industry, certainly too cozy with Ed Markey. 575 00:30:17,080 --> 00:30:19,520 Speaker 1: I learned a lot from him, and then I went 576 00:30:19,600 --> 00:30:22,040 Speaker 1: to work for Senator Reid, who is almost the exact 577 00:30:22,120 --> 00:30:25,280 Speaker 1: opposite personality, but they're both equally effective, just in completely 578 00:30:25,280 --> 00:30:28,560 Speaker 1: different ways. And so I kind of went to the 579 00:30:28,680 --> 00:30:31,680 Speaker 1: NRC with what I kind of called the scarlet and 580 00:30:32,400 --> 00:30:35,160 Speaker 1: for nuclear because I worked for two of probably the 581 00:30:35,160 --> 00:30:38,840 Speaker 1: biggest antagonists to the nuclear industry in a way, uh, 582 00:30:38,960 --> 00:30:41,280 Speaker 1: Senor Read because of his opposition to yuck him outain 583 00:30:41,720 --> 00:30:45,200 Speaker 1: and now Senator Markey because of his strong advocacy for 584 00:30:45,280 --> 00:30:48,160 Speaker 1: nuclear safety. Uh. And so there was a lot of 585 00:30:48,200 --> 00:30:51,200 Speaker 1: resistance to me joining the nuclear reactor viewed as someone 586 00:30:51,200 --> 00:30:56,360 Speaker 1: who was not pro industry, and industry obviously exerts a 587 00:30:56,360 --> 00:31:00,240 Speaker 1: lot of pressure not just on the regulations that are 588 00:31:00,320 --> 00:31:04,040 Speaker 1: passed by the NRC, but the enforcement of those regulations. 589 00:31:04,560 --> 00:31:06,800 Speaker 1: And then of course they influence who's on that commission 590 00:31:06,840 --> 00:31:08,760 Speaker 1: exactly or they try to exert some influence on that. 591 00:31:09,080 --> 00:31:12,040 Speaker 1: So what they do they really do so uh, they're 592 00:31:12,160 --> 00:31:16,240 Speaker 1: very influential in working with senators to giving money to 593 00:31:16,320 --> 00:31:20,160 Speaker 1: campaigns and and just these are positions that are they 594 00:31:20,200 --> 00:31:23,440 Speaker 1: are nominated by the President and then confirmed by the Senate, 595 00:31:23,760 --> 00:31:25,880 Speaker 1: so you have to get the okay of of enough 596 00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:29,000 Speaker 1: of really a majority parts group of people. Yeah, exactly. 597 00:31:29,320 --> 00:31:31,200 Speaker 1: And so you were a commissioner at the NARC for 598 00:31:31,240 --> 00:31:34,320 Speaker 1: how long? For about four years? And during that time, 599 00:31:34,360 --> 00:31:39,120 Speaker 1: what was something that struck you as particularly troublesome or 600 00:31:39,440 --> 00:31:43,000 Speaker 1: dramatic or noteworthy while you're on, Well, we were really 601 00:31:43,040 --> 00:31:45,280 Speaker 1: dealing then with a lot of still a lot of 602 00:31:45,280 --> 00:31:49,920 Speaker 1: the legacies of the nine eleven attack and nuclear security now, right, 603 00:31:49,960 --> 00:31:52,040 Speaker 1: so now the security issue comes popping to the four 604 00:31:52,120 --> 00:31:54,840 Speaker 1: if you will you and it was two thousand five, 605 00:31:55,720 --> 00:31:59,120 Speaker 1: so it was still about four years after, so it's 606 00:31:59,200 --> 00:32:01,360 Speaker 1: royally now by the time you get in there, exactly. 607 00:32:01,560 --> 00:32:04,080 Speaker 1: But what struck me is how long it was taking. 608 00:32:04,960 --> 00:32:07,440 Speaker 1: And you know, a lot of ways I would have 609 00:32:07,440 --> 00:32:11,600 Speaker 1: thought that, Okay, you know, problems were identified right after eleven, 610 00:32:11,840 --> 00:32:13,760 Speaker 1: and those problems should have been fixed within a couple 611 00:32:13,840 --> 00:32:15,720 Speaker 1: of years. But one of the things you see in 612 00:32:15,720 --> 00:32:19,240 Speaker 1: this industry is that everything takes longer and longer and longer. 613 00:32:19,240 --> 00:32:22,320 Speaker 1: And some of that is is just because the industry 614 00:32:22,360 --> 00:32:26,960 Speaker 1: understands that if you delay things, the public outcry goes down, 615 00:32:27,400 --> 00:32:30,560 Speaker 1: the interest among members of Congress goes down because they 616 00:32:30,560 --> 00:32:34,360 Speaker 1: have a shorter attention span than a lot of institutions, 617 00:32:34,360 --> 00:32:37,800 Speaker 1: and so you know, as time goes on, the impetus 618 00:32:37,880 --> 00:32:42,600 Speaker 1: and the will to make reforms relaxes. So the longer 619 00:32:42,680 --> 00:32:44,960 Speaker 1: you can take to do things usually the better off 620 00:32:45,120 --> 00:32:47,560 Speaker 1: it will be for for the industry. And so I 621 00:32:47,680 --> 00:32:49,800 Speaker 1: was surprised by how long this was still going on 622 00:32:49,800 --> 00:32:51,680 Speaker 1: and how many things were still needing to be done. 623 00:32:52,280 --> 00:32:56,320 Speaker 1: It was really my first exposure to this idea that 624 00:32:56,400 --> 00:32:58,520 Speaker 1: you know, the industry is is going to have access 625 00:32:58,880 --> 00:33:00,680 Speaker 1: and they're going to make argument, and you know they're 626 00:33:00,680 --> 00:33:05,000 Speaker 1: not unreasonable arguments, but they're not always necessarily, in my view, 627 00:33:05,000 --> 00:33:07,160 Speaker 1: consistent with where is the industry? Where are they right? 628 00:33:08,640 --> 00:33:11,600 Speaker 1: Where we're anti nuclear advocates think they're wrong, Where do 629 00:33:11,640 --> 00:33:14,440 Speaker 1: you think they're right? I think they are. I'm not 630 00:33:14,440 --> 00:33:16,560 Speaker 1: sure that they're right, and I'm not sure that they're wrong, 631 00:33:16,800 --> 00:33:19,320 Speaker 1: but they have a fair point about the cost of 632 00:33:19,320 --> 00:33:21,600 Speaker 1: what they're doing. And the way I always looked at 633 00:33:21,640 --> 00:33:24,760 Speaker 1: my jobs, what in terms of the realities of um, 634 00:33:24,840 --> 00:33:26,360 Speaker 1: you know, if they're gonna if we're gonna require them 635 00:33:26,400 --> 00:33:29,160 Speaker 1: to modify the plant, it's going to cost a certain 636 00:33:29,200 --> 00:33:32,080 Speaker 1: amount of money. That money is going to be charged 637 00:33:32,080 --> 00:33:34,040 Speaker 1: to the people who buy their electricity, and it's going 638 00:33:34,080 --> 00:33:38,400 Speaker 1: to raise electricity rates. So that's a legitimate, in my mind, 639 00:33:38,440 --> 00:33:40,920 Speaker 1: concern on their part because there are companies of a 640 00:33:40,960 --> 00:33:45,040 Speaker 1: public service Commission issue, though exactly it's never the issue 641 00:33:45,080 --> 00:33:47,720 Speaker 1: for the NRC, and that was always where I drew 642 00:33:47,760 --> 00:33:51,080 Speaker 1: the line. While they may make those arguments, that's not 643 00:33:51,160 --> 00:33:53,600 Speaker 1: really the argument that the NRC is responsible for them 644 00:33:53,640 --> 00:33:56,400 Speaker 1: passing on the coast rate pairs and not your issue. Exactly, 645 00:33:56,400 --> 00:33:58,520 Speaker 1: it's not urg But you know, when you go and 646 00:33:58,520 --> 00:34:01,440 Speaker 1: testify in front of Congress and a senator complains about 647 00:34:01,440 --> 00:34:03,400 Speaker 1: how their electricity rates are going to go up and 648 00:34:03,480 --> 00:34:05,760 Speaker 1: they're hearing from the utility, it's because of the NRC. 649 00:34:06,120 --> 00:34:10,040 Speaker 1: There's that subtle pressure for the industry is passing on 650 00:34:10,120 --> 00:34:13,160 Speaker 1: the buck to the NRC and saying that they're because 651 00:34:13,160 --> 00:34:15,560 Speaker 1: you're demanding that they do exact safety things. Yea, the 652 00:34:15,600 --> 00:34:18,920 Speaker 1: average reactor was licensed for what period of forty years initially, 653 00:34:18,920 --> 00:34:20,880 Speaker 1: and some of them, forgive me an example of someone 654 00:34:21,000 --> 00:34:24,720 Speaker 1: who's extending that least far beyond forty years. Almost every 655 00:34:24,719 --> 00:34:27,800 Speaker 1: plant in the country they want what they want another 656 00:34:27,880 --> 00:34:30,800 Speaker 1: twenty and now they're starting to ask for another twenty 657 00:34:30,840 --> 00:34:33,480 Speaker 1: beyond that, So to go up to eight, I think 658 00:34:33,520 --> 00:34:36,040 Speaker 1: that's too long. Um, I really do. I think you're 659 00:34:36,040 --> 00:34:40,919 Speaker 1: starting to push the boundaries of equipment and material degradation 660 00:34:41,200 --> 00:34:44,120 Speaker 1: and just the performance is going to suffer. And we're 661 00:34:44,120 --> 00:34:46,400 Speaker 1: seeing that. I mean, we know that that that's happening, 662 00:34:46,400 --> 00:34:49,120 Speaker 1: and that's why you're seeing plants shut down. You know, 663 00:34:49,160 --> 00:34:52,000 Speaker 1: they say it's because electricity rates are so low because 664 00:34:52,000 --> 00:34:55,160 Speaker 1: of natural gas and um, but it's really a combination 665 00:34:55,200 --> 00:34:57,360 Speaker 1: of that, combined with the fact that they have to 666 00:34:57,360 --> 00:35:00,719 Speaker 1: make modifications to the plant because they're getting old. So 667 00:35:00,920 --> 00:35:03,960 Speaker 1: I never think this issue of economics, it's it's never 668 00:35:04,040 --> 00:35:08,120 Speaker 1: separated from safety. It's always very very closely related to safety, 669 00:35:08,160 --> 00:35:11,279 Speaker 1: because the reason nuclear power is expensive is because of 670 00:35:11,400 --> 00:35:14,719 Speaker 1: all the safety systems you need to make it safer. 671 00:35:15,239 --> 00:35:17,360 Speaker 1: Are there models on the drawing board that are smaller 672 00:35:17,400 --> 00:35:20,200 Speaker 1: and safer? There there are models that are smaller. I'm 673 00:35:20,239 --> 00:35:23,680 Speaker 1: not sure that anybody has actually produced a detailed design 674 00:35:23,760 --> 00:35:26,600 Speaker 1: that's safer. But when you build them smaller, you start 675 00:35:26,680 --> 00:35:28,920 Speaker 1: to really run out of a use for them, and 676 00:35:29,000 --> 00:35:31,359 Speaker 1: it's almost like building. You know, somebody's saying, well, you know, 677 00:35:32,160 --> 00:35:36,320 Speaker 1: long haul semis um they get much better gas mileage 678 00:35:36,320 --> 00:35:38,120 Speaker 1: if they were a lot smaller. And they would say 679 00:35:38,120 --> 00:35:40,880 Speaker 1: the size of a pickup truck, but you can't haul 680 00:35:41,040 --> 00:35:43,560 Speaker 1: as much cargo with a small pickup truck as you 681 00:35:43,600 --> 00:35:46,560 Speaker 1: can with a big semi. So four years as a 682 00:35:46,600 --> 00:35:51,120 Speaker 1: commissioner from two thousand nine, and then what happens? Then 683 00:35:51,160 --> 00:35:53,680 Speaker 1: I became chairman. Okay, now did that happen? Uh? So 684 00:35:53,840 --> 00:35:58,320 Speaker 1: Senator reid Um advocated and lobby the president and Obama 685 00:35:58,400 --> 00:36:00,759 Speaker 1: is president. That's right, President, that's the only way you're 686 00:36:00,760 --> 00:36:03,719 Speaker 1: getting in right, Yeah, that's right. Um. Yeah. And then 687 00:36:03,719 --> 00:36:07,319 Speaker 1: I became a chairman. And and then what did you 688 00:36:07,360 --> 00:36:10,480 Speaker 1: want to do when you became chairman? Your agenda? Uh? 689 00:36:11,080 --> 00:36:16,800 Speaker 1: Improved safety? Uh specifically how restores flooding things like in Nebraska? 690 00:36:16,800 --> 00:36:19,399 Speaker 1: Addressing those issues? You know. I actually the first thing 691 00:36:19,400 --> 00:36:22,200 Speaker 1: I did as chairman as I sat down and I 692 00:36:22,280 --> 00:36:24,360 Speaker 1: took a bunch of staff together in the agency, and 693 00:36:24,360 --> 00:36:26,719 Speaker 1: I said, tell me what we need to do. What 694 00:36:26,800 --> 00:36:28,520 Speaker 1: are all the issues that we need to work on 695 00:36:28,560 --> 00:36:31,160 Speaker 1: and we need to folk they knew, and I came 696 00:36:31,239 --> 00:36:34,319 Speaker 1: up with actually this really long plan. Who was your predecessor? 697 00:36:34,840 --> 00:36:37,520 Speaker 1: It was a man named Dale Klein. He was appointed 698 00:36:37,520 --> 00:36:41,480 Speaker 1: by President Bush pro industry, pro industry, Okay, absolutely, yeah, 699 00:36:41,680 --> 00:36:44,279 Speaker 1: And so I was here. I was this um you know, really, 700 00:36:44,960 --> 00:36:47,920 Speaker 1: if anything, you could characterize me as agnostic about nuclear 701 00:36:47,960 --> 00:36:50,560 Speaker 1: technology and put in this position now to lead it. 702 00:36:50,640 --> 00:36:53,400 Speaker 1: Was the youngest chairman in the history the agency. And 703 00:36:53,480 --> 00:36:55,439 Speaker 1: my first job was to ask everybody what we should 704 00:36:55,480 --> 00:36:58,120 Speaker 1: do for safety? And I tell you it caused a 705 00:36:58,160 --> 00:37:01,719 Speaker 1: lot of waves. Um. Why because people didn't want to 706 00:37:01,760 --> 00:37:05,120 Speaker 1: know the answer. Uh. My colleagues on the commission who 707 00:37:05,120 --> 00:37:11,400 Speaker 1: were um Bush appointees, which uh the Republicans? Um, there 708 00:37:11,440 --> 00:37:14,080 Speaker 1: were essentially two at the time when I started as chairman. 709 00:37:14,120 --> 00:37:18,520 Speaker 1: Two Republicans typically are five, yeah, but because of the problems, 710 00:37:19,320 --> 00:37:21,920 Speaker 1: it sometimes gets down to fewer than five. And so 711 00:37:22,239 --> 00:37:24,120 Speaker 1: when you when you were on the board, yeah, you 712 00:37:24,160 --> 00:37:26,359 Speaker 1: were one of three. Yes, I was one of four, 713 00:37:26,400 --> 00:37:29,279 Speaker 1: and then very quickly another left. And so then when 714 00:37:29,320 --> 00:37:32,239 Speaker 1: I became chairman, Um, the other two were Republicans, the 715 00:37:32,239 --> 00:37:36,239 Speaker 1: other Bush appointees, and they were not happy with you 716 00:37:36,320 --> 00:37:40,080 Speaker 1: being elevated to chairman. I was naive about that, UM, 717 00:37:40,120 --> 00:37:43,040 Speaker 1: and I knew there was a lot of opposition to me, UM, 718 00:37:43,080 --> 00:37:45,319 Speaker 1: But I just chalked it up to the It's just 719 00:37:45,400 --> 00:37:47,799 Speaker 1: the process. It's a game. It's a game. Yeah, there's 720 00:37:47,800 --> 00:37:49,560 Speaker 1: the back and forth in the tussle and the tug 721 00:37:49,560 --> 00:37:52,120 Speaker 1: of war and then you know, and if you play rugby, 722 00:37:52,160 --> 00:37:54,239 Speaker 1: then you shake hands. Yeah, because these guys really didn't 723 00:37:54,239 --> 00:37:55,920 Speaker 1: want to shake hands with They did so far want 724 00:37:55,920 --> 00:37:57,800 Speaker 1: to rip your arm off. They haven't yet wanted to 725 00:37:57,800 --> 00:38:00,680 Speaker 1: shake my hands. So and they and when I was there, 726 00:38:00,719 --> 00:38:03,640 Speaker 1: and the first thing then was I had the audacity 727 00:38:03,719 --> 00:38:05,480 Speaker 1: to kind of come up with a list of things 728 00:38:05,480 --> 00:38:07,680 Speaker 1: that we needed to focus on. And do you actually 729 00:38:07,680 --> 00:38:10,800 Speaker 1: wanted to be the chairman of the of the nuclear 730 00:38:10,800 --> 00:38:15,640 Speaker 1: regulatory I wanted to be. So you had the audacity 731 00:38:15,680 --> 00:38:19,040 Speaker 1: to try to regulate the nuclear and you had a 732 00:38:19,080 --> 00:38:22,120 Speaker 1: list of things. And what was the most problematic for them? 733 00:38:22,120 --> 00:38:24,000 Speaker 1: What was the one that they just couldn't believe? What 734 00:38:24,080 --> 00:38:27,480 Speaker 1: took your hand that you were a communist? I think 735 00:38:27,480 --> 00:38:29,799 Speaker 1: it was tone more than anything. But it was just 736 00:38:29,920 --> 00:38:32,800 Speaker 1: talking about we knew the list of things they were present. 737 00:38:32,920 --> 00:38:35,440 Speaker 1: I'll give I'll give you an example of a story. Um. So, 738 00:38:35,480 --> 00:38:37,279 Speaker 1: one of the first things that happened when I when 739 00:38:37,280 --> 00:38:41,080 Speaker 1: I started as chairman um the agency had been reviewing 740 00:38:41,120 --> 00:38:43,319 Speaker 1: the design for a new reactor for a very long 741 00:38:43,360 --> 00:38:47,000 Speaker 1: time a reactor by Westinghouse. So it tended to be 742 00:38:47,080 --> 00:38:48,680 Speaker 1: a new design that would be built and in fact 743 00:38:48,800 --> 00:38:51,719 Speaker 1: is being built right now. But the staff was having 744 00:38:51,719 --> 00:38:54,520 Speaker 1: some problems, usual the agency employees, the kind of the 745 00:38:54,640 --> 00:38:58,000 Speaker 1: nuts and bolts, the workers in the in at the NRC, 746 00:38:58,640 --> 00:39:01,040 Speaker 1: and they were worried because there was a safety problem 747 00:39:01,080 --> 00:39:03,160 Speaker 1: they thought with this, with this plant, and they wanted 748 00:39:03,160 --> 00:39:05,400 Speaker 1: it fixed. So they came and they sat down to 749 00:39:05,440 --> 00:39:08,239 Speaker 1: my office and they said, you know what, we're we're exasperated. 750 00:39:08,320 --> 00:39:11,000 Speaker 1: We can't get Westinghouse to listen to us. They won't 751 00:39:11,040 --> 00:39:13,160 Speaker 1: make changes. We're at our wits end. We're going to 752 00:39:13,200 --> 00:39:15,399 Speaker 1: send them a letter that essentially says, if you don't 753 00:39:15,480 --> 00:39:18,160 Speaker 1: change things, we're don We're not going to review this anymore. 754 00:39:18,200 --> 00:39:21,440 Speaker 1: We don't think it's safe. I said, great, I'll support you, 755 00:39:21,480 --> 00:39:25,200 Speaker 1: I'll back you up. Let's do a press release. So 756 00:39:25,239 --> 00:39:27,799 Speaker 1: we did this. We issued the press release, and then, um, 757 00:39:28,680 --> 00:39:30,400 Speaker 1: I think it was a week or so or a 758 00:39:30,440 --> 00:39:32,040 Speaker 1: couple of days later, I was going to a big 759 00:39:32,080 --> 00:39:35,239 Speaker 1: industry conference, and uh, it was I thought a very 760 00:39:35,239 --> 00:39:37,439 Speaker 1: important conference. I gave a speech, talked about a number 761 00:39:37,440 --> 00:39:39,360 Speaker 1: of safety issues. But I walked in. There's always a 762 00:39:39,360 --> 00:39:42,120 Speaker 1: reception before that, and I walked into the reception. It 763 00:39:42,160 --> 00:39:44,560 Speaker 1: was almost like I was Moses and the sea had parted. 764 00:39:45,120 --> 00:39:47,319 Speaker 1: All the industry people just looked at me and kind 765 00:39:47,320 --> 00:39:50,840 Speaker 1: of moved away, exactly and um, and then slowly, you know, 766 00:39:50,880 --> 00:39:52,440 Speaker 1: I would mingle and people would come up to me 767 00:39:52,480 --> 00:39:54,279 Speaker 1: and talk to me, and because at the end, they're 768 00:39:54,320 --> 00:39:58,000 Speaker 1: all just people. But basically what I heard was, you know, 769 00:39:58,280 --> 00:40:02,040 Speaker 1: we didn't have any problem with if you having the 770 00:40:02,120 --> 00:40:04,840 Speaker 1: staff send this letter to Westinghouse. We actually thought it 771 00:40:04,840 --> 00:40:06,640 Speaker 1: was a good idea because you know, some of the 772 00:40:06,640 --> 00:40:09,200 Speaker 1: folks in the industry, we're thinking Westinghouse wasn't main attention. 773 00:40:09,320 --> 00:40:11,160 Speaker 1: But what they said was, but why do you have 774 00:40:11,200 --> 00:40:13,480 Speaker 1: to do a press release? Why do you have to 775 00:40:13,520 --> 00:40:16,799 Speaker 1: make it public that there was a problem. And to me, 776 00:40:16,920 --> 00:40:19,400 Speaker 1: that was just a reflection of the kind of the 777 00:40:19,440 --> 00:40:24,040 Speaker 1: relationship that had developed where problems were not talked about. 778 00:40:25,320 --> 00:40:27,839 Speaker 1: It's not an as need to know basically exactly, Yeah, 779 00:40:27,880 --> 00:40:29,359 Speaker 1: you're one of us. We need to keep this quiet. 780 00:40:29,400 --> 00:40:32,640 Speaker 1: We're working up between, you know, behind closed doors ourselves. Yeah, exactly, 781 00:40:32,680 --> 00:40:35,360 Speaker 1: to know that's what people in your position do exactly. 782 00:40:35,440 --> 00:40:37,160 Speaker 1: And that was what I what I was told I 783 00:40:37,239 --> 00:40:39,600 Speaker 1: was flabber gas. Transparency was something that was important to you, 784 00:40:39,800 --> 00:40:42,319 Speaker 1: very important public having in some knowledge and also a 785 00:40:42,400 --> 00:40:45,560 Speaker 1: knowledge that you were doing your job exactly. Yeah, And 786 00:40:45,600 --> 00:40:47,279 Speaker 1: that's what I told him. I said, you know, I 787 00:40:47,320 --> 00:40:50,400 Speaker 1: have a responsibility to this agency. Why is it okay 788 00:40:50,440 --> 00:40:52,520 Speaker 1: when we do when we issue you a license to 789 00:40:52,520 --> 00:40:54,759 Speaker 1: build a plan, do you want a big public ceremony, 790 00:40:55,080 --> 00:41:01,919 Speaker 1: But when we you know, have a concern of the responsibility. Now, 791 00:41:01,960 --> 00:41:04,080 Speaker 1: this was how early on in your tenure. This was 792 00:41:04,200 --> 00:41:05,839 Speaker 1: very early, within the first couple of months. And then 793 00:41:05,920 --> 00:41:07,960 Speaker 1: be things unraveled. Is it's safe to say. I think 794 00:41:07,960 --> 00:41:10,239 Speaker 1: what really started to create the problems was when the 795 00:41:10,239 --> 00:41:13,759 Speaker 1: Fukushima nuclear accident happens. But this is yeah, and this 796 00:41:13,800 --> 00:41:17,560 Speaker 1: is in two thousand eleven, UH and UM there's a 797 00:41:17,600 --> 00:41:21,720 Speaker 1: major nuclear accident in Japan, and uh I got thrust 798 00:41:21,880 --> 00:41:26,440 Speaker 1: into responding to this as part of the US government's team, 799 00:41:26,480 --> 00:41:29,400 Speaker 1: and the NRC became really a big player in in 800 00:41:29,480 --> 00:41:31,960 Speaker 1: dealing with this accident, and we made a number of 801 00:41:31,960 --> 00:41:35,120 Speaker 1: decisions about what people should do Americans in particular in 802 00:41:35,200 --> 00:41:38,360 Speaker 1: Japan and UM, they were a little bit more conservative 803 00:41:38,360 --> 00:41:41,240 Speaker 1: decisions than what the Japanese government was saying for their people, 804 00:41:41,840 --> 00:41:45,040 Speaker 1: and that that created some blowback. The first thing that 805 00:41:45,080 --> 00:41:47,400 Speaker 1: I said was that Americans need to stay fifty miles 806 00:41:47,400 --> 00:41:51,080 Speaker 1: away from that reactor. And um, in the United States, 807 00:41:51,120 --> 00:41:54,400 Speaker 1: we don't tell people to stay fifty miles away from reactors. 808 00:41:54,440 --> 00:41:56,759 Speaker 1: We tell them in an emergency essentially have to plan 809 00:41:56,880 --> 00:42:00,000 Speaker 1: to stay about ten miles away. And that's a big 810 00:42:00,080 --> 00:42:02,959 Speaker 1: problem because you take a plant like Indian Point, which 811 00:42:02,960 --> 00:42:05,640 Speaker 1: is about thirty five miles from where we are here. UM, 812 00:42:05,680 --> 00:42:08,120 Speaker 1: that's well within fifty miles. So that started to create 813 00:42:08,120 --> 00:42:09,960 Speaker 1: this I can imagine. What was happening was that all 814 00:42:10,120 --> 00:42:11,960 Speaker 1: my colleagues on the Commission were getting calls from the 815 00:42:11,960 --> 00:42:14,480 Speaker 1: industry saying, what's he doing? Why is he doing this? 816 00:42:14,560 --> 00:42:16,719 Speaker 1: And this was not a decision that I that I 817 00:42:16,800 --> 00:42:19,319 Speaker 1: made with my colleagues on the Commission, was done in 818 00:42:19,400 --> 00:42:23,160 Speaker 1: my role and responsibility as chairman. I started getting questions 819 00:42:23,200 --> 00:42:27,880 Speaker 1: from senators, very pro industry senators, why was I not 820 00:42:28,000 --> 00:42:30,239 Speaker 1: telling my colleagues on the Commission what I was doing, 821 00:42:30,239 --> 00:42:32,719 Speaker 1: which I was telling them, And so just spiraled into 822 00:42:32,760 --> 00:42:38,440 Speaker 1: this this chaos of of confusion and innuendo and their hearings, 823 00:42:38,640 --> 00:42:41,520 Speaker 1: and there are hearings, there's a congressional hearing. Who who's 824 00:42:41,719 --> 00:42:45,360 Speaker 1: the chair of those hearings? Darryl Issa actually chair to 825 00:42:45,480 --> 00:42:49,959 Speaker 1: hearing UM about my management style at the NBC so which, 826 00:42:50,080 --> 00:42:52,240 Speaker 1: you know, if you think about all the useful ways 827 00:42:52,280 --> 00:42:55,319 Speaker 1: that Congress can spend its time trying to understand how 828 00:42:55,360 --> 00:42:57,600 Speaker 1: the nfrc's managed, doesn't seem to be one of to 829 00:42:57,800 --> 00:43:00,880 Speaker 1: have a trial and to be person created by Daryl. 830 00:43:02,200 --> 00:43:04,880 Speaker 1: When I watched this documentary which shows this hearing, and 831 00:43:04,880 --> 00:43:08,280 Speaker 1: it actually shows a view from where the congress people 832 00:43:08,320 --> 00:43:10,239 Speaker 1: looked down to the witnesses, and I was one of 833 00:43:10,239 --> 00:43:12,839 Speaker 1: the witnesses, and that was the first time I ever 834 00:43:12,880 --> 00:43:15,759 Speaker 1: saw what I looked like during these hearings, because of 835 00:43:15,760 --> 00:43:18,680 Speaker 1: course I'm not watching my face, and I'd never gone 836 00:43:18,719 --> 00:43:21,560 Speaker 1: back to look at a TV broadcast or anything. And 837 00:43:21,640 --> 00:43:24,200 Speaker 1: I when I saw the documentary for the first time, 838 00:43:24,200 --> 00:43:26,160 Speaker 1: I was shocked. I realized I didn't have a good 839 00:43:26,160 --> 00:43:29,880 Speaker 1: poker face at all. And I was just I was angry, 840 00:43:29,920 --> 00:43:34,680 Speaker 1: I was confused, I was outraged, offended um the accusations 841 00:43:34,680 --> 00:43:37,239 Speaker 1: that were being made about me, and and and really 842 00:43:37,239 --> 00:43:40,120 Speaker 1: the triviality of the whole thing that at the end 843 00:43:40,120 --> 00:43:44,480 Speaker 1: of it, there were conflicts over policy, and in a way, 844 00:43:44,640 --> 00:43:47,480 Speaker 1: those were difficult conflicts, but they were conflicts in a 845 00:43:47,520 --> 00:43:49,920 Speaker 1: way we were supposed to have because these were serious 846 00:43:50,000 --> 00:43:54,239 Speaker 1: issues and a serious accident and happened. Then they accused 847 00:43:54,320 --> 00:43:57,680 Speaker 1: me of um. Probably the worst accusation was that I 848 00:43:57,719 --> 00:44:01,080 Speaker 1: was abusive to women, which was just so ridiculous that 849 00:44:01,280 --> 00:44:03,920 Speaker 1: I couldn't even fathom that somebody would say this about me. 850 00:44:03,960 --> 00:44:06,200 Speaker 1: I mean, to me, it was just farcical. It was hard. 851 00:44:06,280 --> 00:44:11,080 Speaker 1: I had I had a group of sixteen personal staff 852 00:44:11,120 --> 00:44:13,399 Speaker 1: that kind of worked directly in my office, and none 853 00:44:13,440 --> 00:44:17,000 Speaker 1: of them corroborated them, of course, and and half of 854 00:44:17,000 --> 00:44:19,439 Speaker 1: them were women. But that was the low point. Yeah, 855 00:44:19,440 --> 00:44:21,960 Speaker 1: that was definitely the low point. Yeah, yeah, But you resigned. 856 00:44:22,560 --> 00:44:25,479 Speaker 1: I resigned then that following summer, So this happened around 857 00:44:25,560 --> 00:44:28,360 Speaker 1: Christmas or in December two thousand eleven, and then I 858 00:44:28,400 --> 00:44:30,719 Speaker 1: resigned in June of two twelve. Was that hard for 859 00:44:30,760 --> 00:44:32,160 Speaker 1: you to do? It was very hard for me to do. 860 00:44:32,200 --> 00:44:33,560 Speaker 1: But did you feel it wasn't the best interests of 861 00:44:33,600 --> 00:44:35,279 Speaker 1: the organization? Is that why you did it? Yeah? I 862 00:44:35,280 --> 00:44:38,520 Speaker 1: did it. It It was it was incentive Read's best interests, 863 00:44:39,120 --> 00:44:41,280 Speaker 1: because he still had an interest, I think, in trying 864 00:44:41,320 --> 00:44:44,080 Speaker 1: to help make sure that the NRC was doing its job. 865 00:44:44,320 --> 00:44:47,879 Speaker 1: And he came to me and suggested that then might 866 00:44:47,920 --> 00:44:50,279 Speaker 1: be a good time to really step down. And I 867 00:44:50,320 --> 00:44:54,400 Speaker 1: realized at that point I had done a lot. I 868 00:44:54,440 --> 00:44:57,240 Speaker 1: had gotten in a set of reforms after the accident, 869 00:44:57,280 --> 00:44:59,960 Speaker 1: and this is also what generated a lot of the opposition. 870 00:45:00,120 --> 00:45:03,359 Speaker 1: I was very aggressive in pushing for reforms. We got 871 00:45:03,400 --> 00:45:05,440 Speaker 1: a group of people at the NRC to do a 872 00:45:05,480 --> 00:45:07,759 Speaker 1: study of what we needed to fix, and it was 873 00:45:08,120 --> 00:45:11,520 Speaker 1: in my mind a very very reasonable answer that they 874 00:45:11,560 --> 00:45:14,520 Speaker 1: came up with, UM, and I pushed to get that 875 00:45:14,719 --> 00:45:18,480 Speaker 1: full report implemented. And of course, you know, the industry 876 00:45:18,560 --> 00:45:21,040 Speaker 1: chopped at a commissioner's chopped at, and everybody kind of 877 00:45:21,040 --> 00:45:23,759 Speaker 1: tore it apart. UM. But I pushed and we got 878 00:45:23,760 --> 00:45:25,880 Speaker 1: a lot of that done. And so once once I 879 00:45:25,920 --> 00:45:28,200 Speaker 1: had done that, you know, there, I felt you would 880 00:45:28,200 --> 00:45:30,640 Speaker 1: accomplish something. I had felt I had accomplished something. Yeah, 881 00:45:30,800 --> 00:45:35,400 Speaker 1: and it was it was time. Now you have a 882 00:45:35,480 --> 00:45:38,720 Speaker 1: unique vantage point from your job and from your career 883 00:45:39,040 --> 00:45:42,239 Speaker 1: at the overall picture of energy in this country, and 884 00:45:42,320 --> 00:45:45,480 Speaker 1: where do you see this country twenty and thirty and 885 00:45:45,520 --> 00:45:47,960 Speaker 1: fifty years from now in a doable way, not some 886 00:45:48,080 --> 00:45:50,799 Speaker 1: pie in the skyway. Where do you see us ending 887 00:45:50,840 --> 00:45:55,440 Speaker 1: up energy? Was what's going to happen to our energy picture. 888 00:45:56,600 --> 00:45:59,799 Speaker 1: It's going to be more localized, and it's going to 889 00:45:59,840 --> 00:46:04,600 Speaker 1: be more renewables. We build really big power plants, and 890 00:46:04,640 --> 00:46:07,000 Speaker 1: then we build really big transmission lines, and we ship 891 00:46:07,040 --> 00:46:09,520 Speaker 1: all that power where we need it to homes to businesses. 892 00:46:10,360 --> 00:46:12,399 Speaker 1: I think what's going to happen over time is that 893 00:46:12,520 --> 00:46:15,960 Speaker 1: more and more electricity is going to be generated at 894 00:46:16,000 --> 00:46:19,560 Speaker 1: your home, in your local community. It's it's going to 895 00:46:19,640 --> 00:46:23,960 Speaker 1: be cheaper, it's more resilient from a security standpoint, it's 896 00:46:23,960 --> 00:46:27,360 Speaker 1: more resilient against natural hazards. Battery storage will be a 897 00:46:27,360 --> 00:46:29,160 Speaker 1: big piece of it. I mean, one of the activity 898 00:46:29,200 --> 00:46:31,320 Speaker 1: will get better. But one of the things that's really unique, 899 00:46:31,320 --> 00:46:34,279 Speaker 1: if we don't think about yet, is that, let say 900 00:46:34,280 --> 00:46:38,480 Speaker 1: everybody starts driving their cars with electric cars. So one 901 00:46:38,480 --> 00:46:40,040 Speaker 1: of the things you can do, you drive your car 902 00:46:40,080 --> 00:46:42,080 Speaker 1: all day, it charges up the battery. You get home, 903 00:46:43,040 --> 00:46:45,800 Speaker 1: you plug that car, and now you're not necessarily charging 904 00:46:45,840 --> 00:46:48,239 Speaker 1: the battery from your home, but using the battery as 905 00:46:48,280 --> 00:46:51,680 Speaker 1: kind of a buffer to back up your electricity at 906 00:46:51,719 --> 00:46:53,880 Speaker 1: home when maybe you're the sun is not shine anymore, 907 00:46:53,880 --> 00:46:56,840 Speaker 1: the wind is not blowing anymore, and so you've got 908 00:46:56,840 --> 00:46:59,920 Speaker 1: this potential, this massive fleet of batteries that's going to 909 00:47:00,040 --> 00:47:02,960 Speaker 1: be out there. Uh, and you can use that. So 910 00:47:03,440 --> 00:47:06,640 Speaker 1: I think the systems aren't really there yet, but we're 911 00:47:06,640 --> 00:47:09,759 Speaker 1: getting close. And I think with the rapid pace of 912 00:47:09,760 --> 00:47:13,759 Speaker 1: technological change, we can't even envision yet how we're going 913 00:47:13,800 --> 00:47:16,120 Speaker 1: to have electricity in the future. I really think that. 914 00:47:16,480 --> 00:47:18,360 Speaker 1: But I think we're not going to have it the 915 00:47:18,360 --> 00:47:21,200 Speaker 1: way we have it now. And the the analogy I 916 00:47:21,200 --> 00:47:24,680 Speaker 1: always think about as I think about hot water, right, 917 00:47:25,239 --> 00:47:29,880 Speaker 1: you you could easily have designed our entire water system 918 00:47:30,160 --> 00:47:33,919 Speaker 1: so that you have big power plants that make hot 919 00:47:33,960 --> 00:47:36,759 Speaker 1: water and ship that hot water in pipes to your 920 00:47:36,760 --> 00:47:38,880 Speaker 1: house and you turn on the hot water and the 921 00:47:38,920 --> 00:47:41,080 Speaker 1: hot water comes out. But that's not the way we 922 00:47:41,120 --> 00:47:42,799 Speaker 1: did it. The way we did it is we built 923 00:47:42,840 --> 00:47:45,799 Speaker 1: hot water heaters in the home, so when you turn 924 00:47:45,880 --> 00:47:47,839 Speaker 1: on the water to get your hot water, it's being 925 00:47:47,880 --> 00:47:51,319 Speaker 1: produced locally and uh. And again the key being, we 926 00:47:51,400 --> 00:47:56,120 Speaker 1: don't have to achieve saturation where every sphere in the 927 00:47:56,160 --> 00:47:59,200 Speaker 1: country is covered by what they can, they can produce. 928 00:47:59,640 --> 00:48:02,520 Speaker 1: All you have to do is knockdown consumption. All we 929 00:48:02,560 --> 00:48:06,040 Speaker 1: have to do is knock down oil consumption, and then 930 00:48:06,160 --> 00:48:07,640 Speaker 1: what a triumph that would be. We don't have to 931 00:48:07,640 --> 00:48:09,600 Speaker 1: replace it. We're never gonna be replacing were never. Do 932 00:48:09,640 --> 00:48:11,920 Speaker 1: you agree? Yeah? Yeah, I mean if you think about 933 00:48:12,040 --> 00:48:15,520 Speaker 1: carbon dioxide limits and greenhouse gas limits, we're not talking 934 00:48:15,560 --> 00:48:18,640 Speaker 1: about getting to zero carbon dioxide emissions, we're talking about 935 00:48:18,640 --> 00:48:24,120 Speaker 1: reducing by So you don't have to completely replace some 936 00:48:24,200 --> 00:48:26,320 Speaker 1: of these older technologies. You just have to replace a 937 00:48:26,400 --> 00:48:32,120 Speaker 1: portion of them. Gregory Yasco is finishing a book on 938 00:48:32,200 --> 00:48:35,720 Speaker 1: nuclear power and working to create a company to develop 939 00:48:35,840 --> 00:48:41,040 Speaker 1: offshore wind facilities. This is Alec Baldwin and you were 940 00:48:41,040 --> 00:48:42,319 Speaker 1: listening to here's the thing