Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome back to Drilled. I'm Ami Westervelt. This season,
Speaker 1: we are making our way through the book Climate Obstruction,
Speaker 1: a Global Survey. I'm getting ready to head to the
Speaker 1: annual UN Climate Summit, the COP or Conference of the
Speaker 1: Parties in November, and to prep for it, I am
Speaker 1: reading up on all of the research so far about
Speaker 1: climate obstruction and how it works around the world. In
Speaker 1: today's episode, a really important topic, especially for this year's
Speaker 1: cop which is how climate obstruction works in the Global
Speaker 1: South and how some of these structures in place continue
Speaker 1: to privilege global North countries over global South countries when
Speaker 1: we're talking about climate negotiations, which then makes it that
Speaker 1: much harder to even talk about climate policy in the
Speaker 1: Global South without it seeming like something that is patent unfair.
Speaker 1: Joining me to talk about this today are two leading
Speaker 1: experts on this question. They oversaw a chapter in this
Speaker 1: book that pulls together all the research that we have
Speaker 1: so far on it. Ruth McKee from de montfur University
Speaker 1: and Omar Faruke at Queen's University in Canada. Our conversation
Speaker 1: is coming up after this quick break. I'm going to
Speaker 1: ask you a really, really dumb, basic question and that is,
Speaker 1: please define global South for us. Let's set the context here.
Speaker 2: That basic question is probably a very whole book. So
Speaker 2: I think for setting it out into the context of
Speaker 2: this chapter, we say the global South in its geopolitical sense,
Speaker 2: So it's a group of trees that have a history
Speaker 2: of colonialism, neo imperialism, and so that historical context of
Speaker 2: non Western nations that now sit within a very different
Speaker 2: economic and social structure to Western nations that really it's
Speaker 2: driven by political and economic marginalization, which then in turn
Speaker 2: has implications, at least for us in our case, how
Speaker 2: it then stands with addressing climate the climate crisis. So
Speaker 2: we can't say the global seuth and global self countries
Speaker 2: as this one complete, same picture set of countries. Rather,
Speaker 2: it's a reflection of the geopolitical history in which we've
Speaker 2: distinguished between western Global North countries and then non Western
Speaker 2: countries in the Global South. So I think that's the
Speaker 2: best way that we come to defying the global seuth
Speaker 2: and how we deploy it in this chapter.
Speaker 1: Okay, so you talk about these five major considerations when
Speaker 1: we're looking at climate obstruction in the Global South, and
Speaker 1: I want to talk about all five of them but
Speaker 1: let's start with what you were just talking about, Ruth,
Speaker 1: that like these You know, there's a lot of very
Speaker 1: different countries in different regions of the world that are
Speaker 1: in this category of Global South. So that means that
Speaker 1: they have varying commitments, and there are varying commitments even
Speaker 1: within the countries. Can you talk about those contrasts and
Speaker 1: how they play out both within the countries and sort
Speaker 1: of beyond them and between them.
Speaker 3: Okay, so I'll pick this up.
Speaker 4: So here we are referring to the variations in climate
Speaker 4: commitments among countries in the Global South. And we see
Speaker 4: that these countries, as mentioned, given the fact that we
Speaker 4: are looking at these countries from the advantage point of
Speaker 4: history of colonialism, new colonialism and imperialism and their positions
Speaker 4: in global political economic order, we see this country's experience
Speaker 4: shared experience in terms of disadvantages in terms of economic growth, development, prosperity,
Speaker 4: and human development. So a common thing among all these
Speaker 4: countries that they are in a disadvantageous situation in terms
Speaker 4: of economic growth and development, and there shapes their commitment
Speaker 4: to climate action, their commitment to fulfilling their pledge, their
Speaker 4: commitment to the parish accord. So such disadvantages we see
Speaker 4: creating these variations in terms of commitment s. Take, for example,
Speaker 4: African countries. We can consider all those countries together in
Speaker 4: one category. For them, climate action is not a priority.
Speaker 4: Decarbonizing the economy is not a priority for them. Is
Speaker 4: energy poverty, Addressing energy poverty, reaching electricity to its population.
Speaker 4: It's something that is their priority and certainly they will
Speaker 4: consider any sort of options to fulfill that goal. So
Speaker 4: when energy poverty as a result of their advantageous situation
Speaker 4: in terms of economic growth, prosperity, and human development is
Speaker 4: a major concern, then climate action or commitment to climate
Speaker 4: pledge is something that takes a back seat. We can
Speaker 4: also think about the case of India. India is a
Speaker 4: giant economy in current times, but it is still considers
Speaker 4: energy poverty human development associated with these as is primary
Speaker 4: concerned because millions of people, hundreds of millions of people
Speaker 4: in that country that do not have access to energy.
Speaker 4: So energy poverty, energy security, and disadvantageous economic situation is
Speaker 4: something that is causing varying commitments to climate actions in
Speaker 4: many countries in the global South.
Speaker 1: It's been interesting to see the big oil majors really
Speaker 1: pick up on specifically energy poverty in Africa as like
Speaker 1: there you would think that they're all just charities trying
Speaker 1: to solve it. They talk about it all the time.
Speaker 2: Yeah.
Speaker 4: I'll just add one thing here. Carbon majors are expressing
Speaker 4: interest in many African countries to explore and to love
Speaker 4: their antebor resources by mentioning this issue of energy poverty
Speaker 4: energy security. But there is also another layer of it,
Speaker 4: and that is the interest of countries in the global North,
Speaker 4: especially European countries, which are now facing an existential trip
Speaker 4: coming from cutting off gas from Russia. So they have
Speaker 4: to find out alternative sources and they have found with
Speaker 4: their with the assistance of their carbon majors, some some
Speaker 4: African countries as a source to fill that PoID.
Speaker 5: Yeah.
Speaker 3: Yeah.
Speaker 5: I asked a fossil fuel executive recently if they were
Speaker 5: planning to invest in grid infrastructure in Mozambique to as
Speaker 5: part of their energy poverty plan, and they were like.
Speaker 4: What because most of most of these are exported to
Speaker 4: will be exported to Yes, so Ghana, for example, it
Speaker 4: will export all major part of your newly developed fossil
Speaker 4: gas to Europe. So they are not in a position
Speaker 4: like carbon maages are not in a position or not
Speaker 4: to make any commitment to do anything locally.
Speaker 1: So it is it's often said that, and obviously there's
Speaker 1: a lot of evidence to this effect as well, that
Speaker 1: you know, global salth countries contributed the least to climate change,
Speaker 1: but will face the impacts first and worst. Can you
Speaker 1: talk about how that plays into climate obstruction.
Speaker 4: That's an interesting thing that we observed in our analysis
Speaker 4: of climate actions and climate delay or obstructure in the
Speaker 4: global South. But the issue of least responsibilities is something
Speaker 4: that is used most often than not by politicians, politically leaves,
Speaker 4: and even civil society groups environmentalists noted environmentalists to sort
Speaker 4: of justify climate delay, if not climate overstruction. In this case,
Speaker 4: we are very careful in choosing our work, and that
Speaker 4: is also connected to the notion of climate justice. So
Speaker 4: it comes from that original nineteen ninety two un trible
Speaker 4: FC Climate agreement where this notion of differentiated common but
Speaker 4: differentiated responsibilities came in. So the global North, they contributed
Speaker 4: overwhelmingly to historical carbon emissions, so they created this sort
Speaker 4: of mess or climate crisis is now up on their
Speaker 4: shoulder to take the major responsibility to clean it up,
Speaker 4: and that is by reducing their emissions as well as
Speaker 4: providing technical and financial support to Global South countries to
Speaker 4: first adapt to climate crisis and then also contributing to
Speaker 4: sort of mitigation transitioning to where green energy all sorts
Speaker 4: of things. So the notion of least responsibility, historically, least
Speaker 4: responsibility is something that we find as a kind of
Speaker 4: justification for delaying climate actions or even undertaking board climate
Speaker 4: actions in many countries in the Global South, many big countries.
Speaker 4: India's name comes to our mind because India is in
Speaker 4: recent years in global even climate meetings.
Speaker 3: India is kind of playing.
Speaker 4: The role of a leader of the Global South in
Speaker 4: advocating for them using the framework of climate justice, climate fairness,
Speaker 4: all sorts of things. So we find such emphasis on
Speaker 4: least responsibility is a major factor contributing to sidelining climate
Speaker 4: actions or delaying climate actions in many countries in the
Speaker 4: Global South. And I will also add one particular point.
Speaker 4: The notion of least responsibilities is not just that sideline
Speaker 4: commitment towards renownse gas mitigation, reducing their emission. It directs
Speaker 4: their attention to most of their time energy and attention
Speaker 4: to building resilience and developing adaptation measures. So their focused
Speaker 4: on least responsibility takes all energy and resources and attention
Speaker 4: towards adaptation and resilience. And we also see how that
Speaker 4: plays out during global climate negotiations. Global South countries call
Speaker 4: for climate finance contribution equally for mitigation and adaptation and resilience. Currently,
Speaker 4: globalnot countries are interested in investing in mitigation, not much
Speaker 4: in terms of adaptation and resilience. So global health countries
Speaker 4: involve these notion of climate justice least responsibilities to intervene
Speaker 4: into that financial arrangements.
Speaker 3: Equally divided between mitigation and adaptation.
Speaker 2: And I think that goes to the problem that stands
Speaker 2: in the idea of fair share and differentiated responsibility that
Speaker 2: comes out under the Parish Agreement under Article for And
Speaker 2: I think this idea of equity and ensuring justice, it
Speaker 2: really feeds into the stalemate that then proceeds within conventions
Speaker 2: u N SAC conventions almost given the example of sort
Speaker 2: of the Indian negotiations, and it presents that another bigger
Speaker 2: question around well what do these global UNFCC convents do.
Speaker 2: Are they there to push for strong climate action or
Speaker 2: are they there to do this slowly or even muddy
Speaker 2: the waters along this path, and it actually presents a
Speaker 2: problem for the probably bold action that needs to get
Speaker 2: taken to address the climate crisis. So I think this
Speaker 2: idea of fairness, which established within within article for the
Speaker 2: Parish agreements, fundamentally is saying, well, it's equity, it's striving
Speaker 2: for equity, and so the door start from the place.
Speaker 2: But I don't think equity really means and connects with
Speaker 2: justice in and of itself, and I think that's something
Speaker 2: that underlines what these large UNFCC conference conferences do stand
Speaker 2: for with equity and increase in equity, but they can't
Speaker 2: necessarily represent justice and in this case climate justice, what
Speaker 2: we would like to see in terms of climate justice.
Speaker 2: So I think that might be one of the biggest
Speaker 2: I guess institutional problems of the unof they see in
Speaker 2: their role and how that plays out. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Relatedly, I want to have you define and talk
Speaker 1: a little bit about loss and damage because I feel like,
Speaker 1: you know, it's it gets talked about every unf Triple
Speaker 1: C conference and everyone's like, yeah, we should do it,
Speaker 1: and like we're going to do it, and then they
Speaker 1: just don't do it. So yeah, I'm I'm curious what
Speaker 1: you've found on that and how particularly the persistent failure
Speaker 1: to actually come through on loss and damage promises has
Speaker 1: made it easier for global self countries to kind of
Speaker 1: be like, well, forget it, then we can't work on
Speaker 1: this stuff if you guys aren't going to be serious
Speaker 1: about helping to fund it.
Speaker 2: I think again it goes to this stalemate and connects
Speaker 2: with what we've talked about. So this idea of loss
Speaker 2: and damage, so we mentioned this in the book, it's
Speaker 2: abound the third pillar of global climate governance. So I
Speaker 2: think it helps shift from the even the mitigating mitigation
Speaker 2: adaptation to an actual, more formal financial role of providing
Speaker 2: the finances to cover the harmful impacts, particularly in the
Speaker 2: global South. And it's based on the the unavoidable reality
Speaker 2: that climate change has and will impact on these countries
Speaker 2: more so than other countries. And that goes back to
Speaker 2: the history. Think back to those that geopolitical context and
Speaker 2: the historic colonial history, the nerperial neo imperial history that
Speaker 2: surrounds these current relations where loss and damage is there
Speaker 2: to say, well, we are going to support you and
Speaker 2: provide you resources to deal with these impacts. But fundamentally
Speaker 2: that means that Global North countries are now under I
Speaker 2: guess or seeking financial obligations. And when you've got that
Speaker 2: financial those financial obligations to contribute to that loss and
Speaker 2: damage pillar, it's giving the Again. It goes back to
Speaker 2: that contentious to your political environment with political interest, financial interest,
Speaker 2: economic stability. The conversations then go, well, how do we
Speaker 2: how can we sort of give away so much of
Speaker 2: this money to support loss and damage for the impacts
Speaker 2: that we've The Global North taken responsibility for its actions,
Speaker 2: to put plainly, but I guess that also comes and
Speaker 2: this I don't necessarily think it comes across in the chapter,
Speaker 2: but it's also reminds me of an acceptance of responsibility
Speaker 2: that the Global North is failing to achieve. More so
Speaker 2: than just not wanting to spend money, It then means
Speaker 2: that there is that responsibility in that ownership that needs
Speaker 2: to then be accepted. And I still think when it
Speaker 2: comes to the Global Norse actions Western Europe, the US
Speaker 2: keeping responsibility for that history, admitting that that's happened is
Speaker 2: what then stalls the negotiations. So we talk about word
Speaker 2: perfect policy, but an off the comment would be sort
Speaker 2: of is that a confession? Do you admit guiltyre And
Speaker 2: for me, that's the sense that that ongoing stalling, that
Speaker 2: word perfect policy idea is the attempt of cause and
Speaker 2: prevent responsibility then being ironed out into this financial support,
Speaker 2: which then again creates that stillmate, well if they're not
Speaker 2: going to do it, well we're not going to do it,
Speaker 2: and the back and forth in the back and both
Speaker 2: continues to happen. So I think loss and damage is
Speaker 2: that necessary step that needs to be taken, that financial
Speaker 2: support to deal with those consequences by the Global North.
Speaker 2: But in reality that does mean accepting more responsibility, for
Speaker 2: which many countries in the Global North, fundamentally in there
Speaker 2: are not willing to do given the complex social, political,
Speaker 2: and economic context that each country has in and of themselves.
Speaker 2: So I think loss and damage is central is But
Speaker 2: I think at the same time that's going that is
Speaker 2: stalled because it takes too much to add responsibility and
Speaker 2: thus the consequences that come with that.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I'll just add one particular point here. Even though
Speaker 4: the loss and damage, that third pillar which emerged in
Speaker 4: recent years within the human cops system, the global not
Speaker 4: country is powerful countries, particularly the European Union and the
Speaker 4: United States. They made sure that there is no such
Speaker 4: thing there within, within within decision making process as something
Speaker 4: that will point towards their legally mandatory obligation or something.
Speaker 4: So they then they make sure that such arrangements loss
Speaker 4: and damage will not really bind them towards any sort
Speaker 4: of legal obligations.
Speaker 3: So even though.
Speaker 4: That that that was removed this processes in the past
Speaker 4: several years, it is only about financial support. Is not
Speaker 4: compensation or reparation those words and not. There is is
Speaker 4: simply financial support for Global South countries, and we see
Speaker 4: very little in terms of financial contribution to that fund
Speaker 4: as of now.
Speaker 3: Very little.
Speaker 1: This has come up already a little bit the structural
Speaker 1: issues in geopolitical shifts in climate politics, which are very
Speaker 1: very complicated. So can I have you talk about the
Speaker 1: traditional approach to development and especially you know, development and
Speaker 1: growth and how that kind of often gets pitted against
Speaker 1: climate action.
Speaker 4: Yeah, so this is something that we discussed at length,
Speaker 4: not just in this chapter, but also while preparing APOL
Speaker 4: brief and eventually this chapter. This traditional approach to development,
Speaker 4: shaped by the ironclad belief in a new classical economic
Speaker 4: system emphasizing growth, development, prosperity, improved human development through market
Speaker 4: driven processes is something that is that has historically shaped
Speaker 4: development approaches around the world, not just in the global South,
Speaker 4: around the world, in global North as well.
Speaker 3: The main focus is that, okay, if we focus.
Speaker 4: On economic growth, market driven economic growth, it will increase
Speaker 4: not just economic share of these countries, but also increase competitiveness.
Speaker 4: And in that process of achieving growth, prosperity and improved
Speaker 4: human development, suddenly greenhouse gas.
Speaker 3: Emission will will shoot up.
Speaker 4: And the logic is that countries will be able to
Speaker 4: address high greenhouse gas emissions at some point in their
Speaker 4: development trajectory by using resources that they accumulated through this
Speaker 4: path of economic growth and prosperity through their actions in
Speaker 4: this process.
Speaker 3: So is the market driven approach.
Speaker 4: We characterize it as traditional approach in the sense actually
Speaker 4: the appropriate word would be the mainstream, dominant approach to development,
Speaker 4: focusing on market driven mechanisms. We call it mainstream or
Speaker 4: dominant because there are other approaches as well, focusing on sustainability,
Speaker 4: focusing on inclusion and other issues which involved include critique
Speaker 4: of these traditional approaches. So the idea is that I'm
Speaker 4: summarizing this complex phenomenon, the idea is relying on market
Speaker 4: driven processes to develop resources to address economic concerns.
Speaker 3: Along the way.
Speaker 4: We will contribute to greenhouse gas emations, but we will
Speaker 4: be able to deal with that at some point in
Speaker 4: that trajectory by relying on resources accumulated from this process.
Speaker 2: And I think it's important to add there as well,
Speaker 2: is that we think about marketing that market driven approach,
Speaker 2: that dominant approach. And we don't necessarily touch on this
Speaker 2: in the chapter, but there's a lot of literature as
Speaker 2: well as scientific evidence that attributes and we have to
Speaker 2: acknowledge the tribute between these market driven, dominant approach neoclass
Speaker 2: economics that have expanded across the world over the past
Speaker 2: one hundred years and have had such a negative impact
Speaker 2: on the environment with the rise in greenhouse gas emissions.
Speaker 2: So I think it's fair to say. I'm not going
Speaker 2: to say that capitalism is killing the climate. That's not
Speaker 2: what I'm saying. I'm saying that there's certainly a relationship
Speaker 2: between how the market is structured and how and the
Speaker 2: impact that it has had on greenhouse gas emissions. Thus,
Speaker 2: when you have that very much tunnel vision that dominates
Speaker 2: the economy as well as dominates the political environment. You
Speaker 2: will then constantly feed into a developmental model that will
Speaker 2: pit the environment against economic growth and prosperity. So until
Speaker 2: we you cannot divorce the two. So until you start
Speaker 2: to see an alternative to that development model, then trying
Speaker 2: to address this the climate crisis will, I guess, facilitate
Speaker 2: the opportunity for obstruction to happen. So we talk about
Speaker 2: in some of the outside literature, for instance, we create
Speaker 2: new environments for say, crime to take place. So we
Speaker 2: talk about how in the case of carbon credit systems,
Speaker 2: so we've talked about fraud within carbon credit credit systems,
Speaker 2: you've created for an environment for a crime to take place.
Speaker 2: But that new environment is also based on climate chip,
Speaker 2: this neo classical approach that will negatively impact the environment.
Speaker 2: So you're opening doors to try and address the climate crisis,
Speaker 2: but within an environment which is not going to do so.
Speaker 2: And I think that's an important point to show why
Speaker 2: actually approaches to development that dominate the that dominate society,
Speaker 2: that will dominate UNFCC negotiations, that dominate politics, will fundamentally
Speaker 2: store the progress required and become obstacles in and of themselves.
Speaker 3: Have a hard this phrase in Canada de carganized oil.
Speaker 1: Yes, we've heard it in the US too. Occidental Petroleum
Speaker 1: claims to have shipped the first barrel of net zero
Speaker 1: oil carbon negative oil. It's outrageous.
Speaker 4: Yeah, it's beyond comprehensional. Like the fraud and all sorts
Speaker 4: of things are now so deeply greened in thought processes
Speaker 4: of our policy makers that they can say something decarbonized
Speaker 4: oil and that's how you reach you near zero goal.
Speaker 1: It blows my mind that people are like, but it
Speaker 1: makes sense on the spreadsheet, though the atmosphere doesn't care
Speaker 1: about your spreadsheet. Actually, I want to ask you guys
Speaker 1: about how these two things that we've been talking about
Speaker 1: kind of come together. Because there's the really complex unf
Speaker 1: triple C stuff happening, and then there's all of the
Speaker 1: market forces stuff, and I feel like it is creating
Speaker 1: this situation where a lot of global salt countries are
Speaker 1: getting into the oil business now and they're talking about
Speaker 1: using that money to pay for climate adaptation because there's
Speaker 1: such a failure on international climate negotiations to get money
Speaker 1: to deal with this problem that they're now dependent on
Speaker 1: oil companies and the money from them to pay for it.
Speaker 4: You mentioned that in you Know Not to us, citing
Speaker 4: particularly the case of Guyana right.
Speaker 3: Yes, there.
Speaker 4: I have watched many speeches by Guyana's president. Yeah, talks
Speaker 4: very eloquently and captivate audience.
Speaker 1: They were a really early mover on carbon credits too,
Speaker 1: actually because.
Speaker 4: Because they have intact forests and very rich biodiverse forest
Speaker 4: areas so that they can use that. But in terms
Speaker 4: of the issue of extractive industry logics to address climate action,
Speaker 4: Guyana is is such a fascinating case to see how
Speaker 4: they present their case, and it shows, as you rightly
Speaker 4: pointed out, the the failure of you and trible C
Speaker 4: system to mobilize financial support for these countries Guyana. Most
Speaker 4: I guess vast area of that country is below the
Speaker 4: sea level and it will go underwater coming a few years,
Speaker 4: and it will require tones of resources and technical know
Speaker 4: how to address those concerns.
Speaker 3: So who will pay for that?
Speaker 4: They are like oil discovery is something that provided them
Speaker 4: with this opportunity. But I'm not quite sure whether I'm
Speaker 4: very pessimistic in this regard. I'm not quite sure whether
Speaker 4: even if you and trible FC system mobilizes trillions for
Speaker 4: Global South countries. It will persuade them to move away
Speaker 4: from extractive development pathway.
Speaker 3: Yeah, because I have.
Speaker 4: Seen from you reporting also about Guyana that there is
Speaker 4: a deep connections between carbon majors and politically leafs within Guyana.
Speaker 2: Yeah.
Speaker 4: So, and this president, the current president, he acknowledged several
Speaker 4: times the contract between Guyana and and and the oil
Speaker 4: company is one sided and his administration cannot really do
Speaker 4: much to address this disparity in the contract. Yeah, because
Speaker 4: they politically lease and carbon majors are on the same
Speaker 4: page in terms of exploiting resources as well as exploiting
Speaker 4: a poor country in the globalself.
Speaker 1: Okay, I want to talk about how these doew political
Speaker 1: things show up with respect to then not just the
Speaker 1: approach to development, but the actual investments in development from
Speaker 1: the development banks. So I'll give another example from Guyana.
Speaker 1: There was this really interesting thing that happened in the
Speaker 1: course of them kind of building out their oil industry
Speaker 1: where at a certain point the Biden administration in the
Speaker 1: US said, that's it, inter America is development big. We're
Speaker 1: not going to fund fossil fuel infrastructure anymore. And so
Speaker 1: the Vice president said, while then they should stop funding
Speaker 1: fossil fuel infrastructure in their own country. It was like,
Speaker 1: he's not wrong, he's got a point. But they just
Speaker 1: kind of went, okay, fine and went and got the
Speaker 1: money from China instead. So it's a good example of okay,
Speaker 1: so it shifts, but then it just kind of comes
Speaker 1: back around.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I'm saying in terms of geopolitics, we emphasize one
Speaker 4: particular point, not just the role of New Development Bank
Speaker 4: led by Briggs, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa,
Speaker 4: and recently they also added ten more countries.
Speaker 3: So it breaks.
Speaker 4: Plus will emphasize one particular, one peculiar thing in terms
Speaker 4: of this geopolitical shift, and that is the rise of
Speaker 4: a new development mechanism known as self cooperation. So, for example,
Speaker 4: historically it is widely documented by scholars that global North countries,
Speaker 4: especially the US and European powers, they used two major
Speaker 4: international financial institutions, the War Bank and International Monetary Firm,
Speaker 4: to actually control first implement their preferred development and economic
Speaker 4: agendas in countries in the global South, as well as
Speaker 4: as exerting control over over them. So with the rise
Speaker 4: of bricks and the financial mechanism that they created with
Speaker 4: the new banking systems like the New Development Bank Asian
Speaker 4: Infrastructure Investment Bank. We see a new development mechanism is emerging.
Speaker 4: So if Inter American Development Bank with as a result
Speaker 4: of the influence of the US administration, decides not to
Speaker 4: invest in in fossil fuel based development projects in Global South,
Speaker 4: they now have option to approach another funding mechanism, and
Speaker 4: that funding mechanism is quite different in terms of conditionally
Speaker 4: it is attached to those development projects. So traditionally World
Speaker 4: Bank and International Monetary Fund they attached many draconian conditions
Speaker 4: to each and every of their loan agreements. And these
Speaker 4: new arrangements that we see now emerging, they do not
Speaker 4: approach development interventions in the same way attaching conditions predetermined
Speaker 4: conditions to loan programs. Rather, they consider national needs, economic
Speaker 4: needs of their member countries and how they characterize a
Speaker 4: particular development projects and financial needs. And it is the
Speaker 4: job of these new development mechanisms New Development Bank or
Speaker 4: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to finance those projects that will
Speaker 4: lead to economic growth, prosperity, etc. And again here comes
Speaker 4: the influence of these as Ruth mentioned earlier, these tunnel
Speaker 4: vision of market driven development and climate action projects. So so
Speaker 4: we see these these South South cooperation along with these
Speaker 4: newly created development new new development banks are really shaping
Speaker 4: the trajectory in in in the in the global South.
Speaker 4: There are some critiques that it may lead to greenhouse
Speaker 4: gas emissions, and we see from evidence although we cannot
Speaker 4: quite clearly establish the correlation between the existence of the
Speaker 4: creation of these new development banks and the rising greenhouse
Speaker 4: gas emissions in the global South countries. But suddenly there
Speaker 4: there are forceful critique of these South South mechanisms that are.
Speaker 3: That are sort of not paying serious.
Speaker 4: Attention to climate climate concerns arising out of their their actions.
Speaker 4: For example, I can I can take here one mentioned
Speaker 4: here one example very briefly, Bangladesh in South Asia is
Speaker 4: now developing many several huge coal power plants. Historically, word
Speaker 4: Bank and Asian Development Bank, these two financial institutions were
Speaker 4: the major provider of financial support for major infrastructure development
Speaker 4: projects in Bangladesh and elsewhere. Since word Bank particularly decided
Speaker 4: some years ago not to finance in fossil ficial based
Speaker 4: development projects, particularly in several countries Bangladesh is one of them,
Speaker 4: then Bangladesh found another way to secure financial support, and
Speaker 4: they leveraged South South cooperation.
Speaker 3: Mechanism brought China India to.
Speaker 4: Support their fossil will based infrastructure development projects. So even
Speaker 4: though civil society groups environmentalists they vehemently opposed some of
Speaker 4: those projects, particularly one which is located near a unisqu
Speaker 4: heritage site, a fragile macro forest, they failed to persuade
Speaker 4: both Bangladeshi government as well as their southern partners China
Speaker 4: India to relocate or even cancel the project. So South
Speaker 4: South mechanism, new development banks, new financing mechanisms is certainly
Speaker 4: shaking up the climate actions and policies in the Global South.
Speaker 1: Okay, let's talk about how multinational corporations fall into this.
Speaker 1: They're so helpful. How do they show up in this
Speaker 1: complicated mix of thing. How we touched on this a
Speaker 1: little bit that they often have a relationship with political
Speaker 1: elites in Global South countries. But again with the caveat
Speaker 1: that this term incorporates a whole lot of different countries.
Speaker 1: How are multi national corporations getting involved here?
Speaker 2: It's another complex the story to tell, and it just
Speaker 2: dives into some of the things that we've covered previously.
Speaker 2: But I think a good way to do is illustrated.
Speaker 2: So when we discuss some of these this in the chapter,
Speaker 2: we look at the Brazilian type of business sector context,
Speaker 2: and it's important to realize that it's not just island
Speaker 2: gas corporations. I think fundamentally there's a different and what
Speaker 2: we talked about, what we know already about climate obstruction previously,
Speaker 2: and what we hear a lot about in the news
Speaker 2: focus on island gas, sext On, Mobile, Wile Shell, all
Speaker 2: of those island gas actors which have had a significant
Speaker 2: impact on greenhouse gas emissions. But other sectors, like the
Speaker 2: agribusiness sector are growing and increasingly high high pollutant industries.
Speaker 2: It's just they'll be concentrated in different locations, and one
Speaker 2: of those is basically in Brazil. The aga sector is
Speaker 2: now one of the biggest I guess exports that come
Speaker 2: within the that come from the country. And one of
Speaker 2: the key things that we have to think about in
Speaker 2: the context of Brazil is the deep interrelation between the
Speaker 2: agribusiness sector and their influence on the political system and
Speaker 2: particularly what we call the ruralistic caucus that has and
Speaker 2: is able to exert a significant level of influence over
Speaker 2: Brazilian politics, and when you had Bolsonaro in power, and
Speaker 2: we could speak to Bolsonaro and his a certain alignment,
Speaker 2: we say, the now president of the United States, but
Speaker 2: at the time alignment and that shift towards as far right,
Speaker 2: but beyond even Bolsceonaro's reign. In Brazil, the ruralistic caucus
Speaker 2: has a significant and has always had a significant presence
Speaker 2: within the National Congress, and I think as a result,
Speaker 2: those ties with corporate actors to the political system in
Speaker 2: that country in particular, has allowed, I guess, a natural
Speaker 2: alignment between the political priority that comes from generating and
Speaker 2: expanding growth in Brazil. It's that national priority improves the
Speaker 2: welfare of the population. All of that, even though we
Speaker 2: know that that doesn't necessarily repeat and fall down and
Speaker 2: trickle down into improving the lives of millions of people.
Speaker 2: But nonetheless that those two priorities, the government priorities and
Speaker 2: corporate priorities, fundamentally are aligned. And it is those multinational
Speaker 2: corporations that are around different states that have power and
Speaker 2: control within these different they've got the political alliances. I
Speaker 2: guess that they're then able to shape national level agendas
Speaker 2: for economic growth, which often relates to these carbon intensive
Speaker 2: industries and high profit making industries as well. And so
Speaker 2: these multinational they have that lobby capacity I guess, to
Speaker 2: really connect their ideas, their interests with political interests in
Speaker 2: thus what is seemingly the public interest. And it's important
Speaker 2: to recognize that the public have their own opinions, can
Speaker 2: have their own ideas around climate action, can resist it.
Speaker 2: But the overarching impact is spoken through the media as well,
Speaker 2: and it's the narratives, the constant narratives that you will see,
Speaker 2: including those in right wing literature and Brazil, that feed
Speaker 2: in and continue Let's grow the economy, let's push this sector.
Speaker 2: Let's not worry too much about climate change just yet,
Speaker 2: because we need to. We need to improve the conditions
Speaker 2: and lives of the public keep and there. So I
Speaker 2: think it's that I guess, political power that they're able
Speaker 2: to harness, but also their role in managing the media
Speaker 2: as well. And we've seen that with the history of
Speaker 2: exonomobile and the infiltration of stay. Oil and gas is
Speaker 2: something natural to society, it's so normalized within but behind
Speaker 2: naturalizing and normalizing oil and gas, it's normalizing the political economy,
Speaker 2: continuing the neoclassical model of economics to continue that. And
Speaker 2: so I think that's one big way in which multinationals
Speaker 2: are able to capture state, but also how states can
Speaker 2: align with multinational interests. So I think it's a two
Speaker 2: it's a two waves, a very complex relationship that allows
Speaker 2: these large sectors to continue do what they're doing without
Speaker 2: the rape percussions afterwards. And it even plays out in
Speaker 2: sort of legislation stay for instance and changing land uses.
Speaker 2: For instance, between sort of nineteen nineteen twenty eighteen and Brazil,
Speaker 2: there was this change in policy around land uses. So
Speaker 2: it's AFO LU so it's the agricultural forestry and other
Speaker 2: land uses. So that's how we refer to one way
Speaker 2: in which emissions are and the way emissions are come
Speaker 2: from the agriculture folcy or the land uses industry. But
Speaker 2: that also ties with the land grabbing that would then
Speaker 2: be exerted in terms of environmental protection. So essentially it's
Speaker 2: actually during the bolscenario administration, environmental protection essentially decreased, so
Speaker 2: legislation was cre and it was adjusted to boost, for instance,
Speaker 2: agricultural production, so that in the agribusiness step there was
Speaker 2: able to have an influence over those policies, so they're
Speaker 2: able to essentially target the political system and influence policy
Speaker 2: development so that it becomes open to opportunities to continue
Speaker 2: extracting resources, in this case making sure there's room for
Speaker 2: agricultural development. But that impact on say, land use in
Speaker 2: Brazil is the same type of impact on environmental protection
Speaker 2: policies that the fossil fuel industry is able to exert
Speaker 2: stay in the US. So I think there's a similar
Speaker 2: picture that appears that we've seen in the global South,
Speaker 2: that was seen in the global North, that then also
Speaker 2: appears in the global South that is facilitated by these
Speaker 2: multinational corporations. So while there are distinctions to how multinational
Speaker 2: corporations and states interacting the global South and it's impact
Speaker 2: in climate obstruction, there are some commonalities and I guess
Speaker 2: common lawgus operendi that exist, and particularly around changing and
Speaker 2: adapting policy for their interests. So there's evidence, I guess
Speaker 2: that there's a consistent pattern of multinational corporations working with
Speaker 2: states invested interests to exploit under the guise I guess
Speaker 2: of development, continuing this neo classic economic growth model and
Speaker 2: of all the consequences of that that come from environmental destruction, marginalization,
Speaker 2: moving people out of their communities, such as in the
Speaker 2: case of the indigenous people in the Amazon rainforest. So
Speaker 2: I think it's a common you'll see common examples from
Speaker 2: multinational corporations and states in the Global South and how
Speaker 2: they operate to obstruct climb and action that we've seen
Speaker 2: in other in the Global North, like the US, although
Speaker 2: it's not necessarily one, which is of what you might
Speaker 2: be used to of open denial and just the purposeful
Speaker 2: dismantling of environmental protections that are most ideological anti sie
Speaker 2: in space that we've seen maybees in some of the
Speaker 2: Global North countries. So the same partner emerges, is what
Speaker 2: I'm trying to say.
Speaker 3: I don't know.
Speaker 1: I feel like every time I'm looking at this, I
Speaker 1: just come to the conclusion that it's maybe slightly better
Speaker 1: hidden in some Global North countries. And that's about it.
Speaker 1: They've slapped a code of paint on it. But I
Speaker 1: just want to ask you guys this last question, if
Speaker 1: you have a minute about what can be done to
Speaker 1: fight climate instruction in the Global South and what has
Speaker 1: worked and what does that fight kind of look like.
Speaker 2: I think maybe It's one of the things I want
Speaker 2: to start off with is actually to begin with the
Speaker 2: risks that people face. So I think it's fundamentally we
Speaker 2: have to be aware that a fight can take place
Speaker 2: and we can push forward for change. But I think
Speaker 2: actually navigating say if you're an academic or you're an
Speaker 2: environmental group working on local level mobilization, that's one of
Speaker 2: the key ways in which groups have already started to
Speaker 2: do this. But we have to think about the risks
Speaker 2: that people are faced. So we've heard about things like
Speaker 2: environmental defenders and environmental defenders who have been targeted as
Speaker 2: they try to challenge the deforestation across the ants on
Speaker 2: and when you've got such a lock in between the
Speaker 2: extractive industries, state interests, political interests, corporate interests, it presents
Speaker 2: a risk that I think has to then be thought
Speaker 2: very carefully in terms of what actions can be taken.
Speaker 2: So we know that we've got engagement from NGOs within
Speaker 2: UNFCC negotiations, but when you've got countries where NGOs are
Speaker 2: going in so countries from the Global South with their
Speaker 2: NGO representatives, there a fewer number who are able to
Speaker 2: access those platforms to engage in the negotiations process, so
Speaker 2: at a at an international level and capacity wise being
Speaker 2: able to influence those higher level decisions becomes harder and
Speaker 2: harder and harder. And I think that also speaks to
Speaker 2: the problems of these big multi lateral agreements that don't
Speaker 2: and are not really they are doing something, but still
Speaker 2: don't seem to take the bold steps. And so I
Speaker 2: think it's really important that we turn to local level
Speaker 2: but also be vitally aware of the complexities of within countries,
Speaker 2: what's going on, how political conditions are perceived, what you
Speaker 2: can take for instance, even in the global West, the
Speaker 2: global North, the approach to environmental protesters and terrorism child
Speaker 2: is stacked on to and I'm not so environmental groups,
Speaker 2: so that local level mobilization that has to come from
Speaker 2: the people. But it's also to be fundamentally aware that
Speaker 2: this political and social context needs to be navigated very carefully,
Speaker 2: as there is this particularly a global shift to the
Speaker 2: political right as well, which we can see is being
Speaker 2: exerted across the world. So I wanted to get that
Speaker 2: hard conversation out there.
Speaker 4: Oh, do you have anything, I'll just add one one
Speaker 4: particular issue to the local dimensions of environmental climate mobilization.
Speaker 3: I'd also suggest that.
Speaker 4: Legal mechanisms, legal venues, legal fight is something.
Speaker 1: ICG thing is interesting. I just haven't.
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, it's the new thing that happened, if just
Speaker 4: two days ago. So the local court mobilization is something
Speaker 4: that I see a fruitful way to really put pressure
Speaker 4: on political elids. In our writing we mentioned in a
Speaker 4: chapter we mentioned one case of Sri Lanka which in
Speaker 4: both Sri Lanka and Bangladesh vibrant environmental mobilization contested fossil
Speaker 4: fuel energy infrastructure projects. Sri Lankan mobilization succeeded bangladesh Shi
Speaker 4: case failed because in the case of Sri Lanka environmental advocates,
Speaker 4: they engage their core system and.
Speaker 3: That actually persuaded forced the Sri.
Speaker 4: Lankan government to cancel the project and negotiate a renewable
Speaker 4: energy projects with Indian, Indian and financiers. So local mobilization again,
Speaker 4: I will emphasize one particular thing that is being aware
Speaker 4: of local political contexts, particularly with this growing trend of
Speaker 4: criminalizing energy and climate politics in the home of liberal
Speaker 4: democratic principles in the global not we are now seeing
Speaker 4: activists are given jail sentences three four, five, six years
Speaker 4: for just protesting, participating in progress, So being aware of political, economic,
Speaker 4: and legal context. But I'm pessimistic about transnational global thing.
Speaker 4: I'm more interested in locally rooted activism.
Speaker 3: But again being aware of political maneuvering that is happening
Speaker 3: within their context.
Speaker 4: That is something that gives us hope at least from
Speaker 4: different places around the world that you say