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Speaker 1: Hey, everybody, Robert Evans here, and I wanted to let

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Speaker 1: you know this is a compilation episode. So every episode

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Speaker 1: of the week that just happened is here in one

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Speaker 1: convenient and with somewhat less ads package for you to

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Speaker 1: listen to in a long stretch if you want. If

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Speaker 1: you've been listening to the episodes every day this week,

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Speaker 1: there's going to be nothing new here for you, but

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Speaker 1: you can make your own decisions. Ah, it's it could

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Speaker 1: happen here a podcast about things falling apart, and today

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Speaker 1: I'm I'm happy that we're we're recording this right now,

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Speaker 1: James and Garrison, because we all just got a historic

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Speaker 1: example of something falling apart Elon Musk's Big Silly rocket.

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Speaker 1: We're recording this about a day or so after it

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Speaker 1: exploded in mid air for the Gulf Coast, showering a

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Speaker 1: turtle sanctuary with toxic waste. It's such a such a

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Speaker 1: fun news that's comically perfect. Is really it is pretty cool?

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Speaker 2: Perfect unless it crashed landed in a kitten farm. That

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Speaker 2: couldn't really be.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, perfect, No, I mean it. What's nice is that

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Speaker 1: it's given me. It's made me feel young again because

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Speaker 1: when I was a wee lad. I was attending a

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Speaker 1: speech to debate rally in Cooper, Texas when the last

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Speaker 1: Space shuttle to explode exploded directly over us, blowing out

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Speaker 1: a bunch of the windows in the building and raining. Yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: it was, it was. It was. Yeah. So I whenever

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Speaker 1: whenever a space shuttle explodes over of some sort, explodes

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Speaker 1: over Texas, I get powerful nostalgia.

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Speaker 2: Well, they they slipped the surly bonds of Verse to

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Speaker 2: blow out the windows in a high school in Cooper, Texas.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, that's that's how the line goes. It makes me

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Speaker 1: think of all the other things I was doing that day,

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Speaker 1: which was namely playing Lord of the Rings risk in

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Speaker 1: a high school gym. As we as we were wont

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Speaker 1: to do great game, one of the better, one of

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Speaker 1: the better risk covers. What are we talking about today,

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Speaker 1: friendo buddies.

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Speaker 2: Wells, Yeah, we're talking.

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Speaker 3: About talking about one one man having having a fun

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Speaker 3: time on Discord dot com.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, doing the human equivalent of being a spaceship that

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Speaker 1: explodes in the sky.

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Speaker 3: I suppose Discord is not really a dot com. It's

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Speaker 3: it's more, it's more it's more of a more of

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Speaker 3: an application now. But yes, it is what.

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Speaker 2: Good discord and that I'm permanently banned from LEA again,

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Speaker 2: what did you do to discord?

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Speaker 1: Discord should a video?

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Speaker 4: Who's on discord right? Like the worst people, all of

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Speaker 4: the worst people. You know.

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Speaker 2: We tried to start a discord for the fundraising live show,

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Speaker 2: and I tried with several emails and every time it

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Speaker 2: came back with ban evasion.

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Speaker 3: That is extremely funny, Jims.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I posted the chickens and it has never forgiven me.

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Speaker 1: Wow. Well, I mean, you know, those chickens didn't consent

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Speaker 1: and they were technically naked, so I think it does

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Speaker 1: count as revenge points are always close. Chicken peck, Oh yeah,

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Speaker 1: you're one of the pansies. There's a big conflict in

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Speaker 1: chicken owners and James has taken aside. So we're talking

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Speaker 1: this week about the discord leaks, and this is one

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Speaker 1: of those things we came into this kind of debating

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Speaker 1: how much detail to go into. But when we brought

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Speaker 1: this up, like this is something that gare James and

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Speaker 1: I is like a major thing in our bubble for

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Speaker 1: the last like week, so we've all been following it.

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Speaker 1: But when we brought this up in the work chat.

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Speaker 1: Daniel had no idea that this had gone on. So

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Speaker 1: we're going to start with a pretty basic overview of

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Speaker 1: what people are calling the largest leak of top secret

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Speaker 1: US military and defense data since you know Snowden. So

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Speaker 1: we're we're going to go over all of that right now.

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Speaker 1: I think I want to start by talking about out

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Speaker 1: an MMO RPG called war Thunder.

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Speaker 2: This is a can you break down MMO RPG for

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Speaker 2: those of us.

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Speaker 1: It's it's a it's like World of Warcraft. It's a

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Speaker 1: big video game that is play that you play online

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Speaker 1: with a bunch of strangers. It's a free game. You

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Speaker 1: use like modern military weapons to like fight other players.

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Speaker 1: And it's kind of well known for having extremely realistic

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Speaker 1: renderings and sort of depictions of the functionality of modern

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Speaker 1: tanks and armored transports and fighter planes and naval vessels.

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Speaker 1: Right so, and it's it's it's like it's it's a

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Speaker 1: game for war nerds, right Like there's you you utilize

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Speaker 1: like radar in a way that's broadly realistic, Like if

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Speaker 1: you shoot, you know, if one tank shoots in another,

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Speaker 1: the tank's weaponry works the way it's supposed to in

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Speaker 1: the real world. The armor is vulnerable where it's vulnerable

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Speaker 1: in the real world. And this is like the appeal

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Speaker 1: to the kind of nerds who play this game, and

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Speaker 1: as you might guess, from a bunch of people who

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Speaker 1: really want to, like, in the most realistic way possible,

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Speaker 1: render and fight each other with modern military vehicles. A

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Speaker 1: significant number of these dudes are members of various different

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Speaker 1: like defense departments right, or at least are employed in

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Speaker 1: some degree of various different national military forces several different

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Speaker 1: As a result, like when arguments happen, you know, with

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Speaker 1: any MMLRPG, if you're playing like World of Warcraft, right,

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Speaker 1: and like something gets nerved or something isn't working as

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Speaker 1: well as it's opposed to, you'll get these like massive

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Speaker 1: threads in the forums where people are like arguing about

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Speaker 1: how something needs to be changed or changed back, or

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Speaker 1: how there's a glitch or whatever. And because war Thunder

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Speaker 1: is so based in realism, when you have these arguments online,

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Speaker 1: it's often like, well, you know, the F fifteen shouldn't

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Speaker 1: work this way, it should work this way, and people

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Speaker 1: will get into arguments about that, and then someone will

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Speaker 1: as happened like a couple of weeks ago, I think

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Speaker 1: someone will post sensitive and information about the F fifteen

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Speaker 1: Strike Eagle in order to prove that it would function

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Speaker 1: the way that they are arguing it should function in

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Speaker 1: this forum debate. That happened earlier this year, and I

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Speaker 1: think with the F fifteen, it wasn't technically top secret information.

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Speaker 1: It was information that US citizens were allowed to have

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Speaker 1: but not allowed to post online because that's a violation

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Speaker 1: of something called ITAR, which is a thing that governs

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Speaker 1: the export, essentially of military information and technology. But on

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Speaker 1: another situation, I think, like a year or so ago,

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Speaker 1: information of it, I believe the F twenty two was

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Speaker 1: posted that was extremely sensitive. It was like top secret.

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Speaker 1: And these are again like some dude who's got some

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Speaker 1: sort of military job and has a clearance and thinks

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Speaker 1: that the right way to use it is arguing about

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Speaker 1: the video game war Thunder. These are not just Americans.

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Speaker 1: I want to be clear about that. In July of

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Speaker 1: twenty twenty one, there was a player arguing about a

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Speaker 1: Challenger two tank who claimed to have been a former

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Speaker 1: tank commander with the British Army, and he shared information

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Speaker 1: from the Army Equipment Support publication. The information had been

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Speaker 1: labeled unclassified, but it was actually classified, and other lakes

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Speaker 1: has been a little more galling. A French Army soldier

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Speaker 1: leaked information on the Clerk main battle tank that was

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Speaker 1: top secret, and a Chinese user leaked capabilities at the

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Speaker 1: Chinese Army's DTC ten one hundred and twenty five millimeters

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Speaker 1: anti tank round that should not have been leaked. So

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Speaker 1: thisat shit keeps happening in war Thunder. It's like a joke,

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Speaker 1: like the war Thunder account when these discord leaks happened

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Speaker 1: a week or so ago, like joked about it. But

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Speaker 1: like the thing that the game is known for, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: is these like different people in different national defense apparati

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Speaker 1: can't stop themselves from like leaking stop secret info about vehicles.

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Speaker 5: It's very funny.

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Speaker 2: I guess the only reason I know why War th

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Speaker 2: Under exists. I think it's the only reason why we

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Speaker 2: know a decent amount of what like what by we

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Speaker 2: here and meaning that could like I guess, uh, like

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Speaker 2: Western militaries no, which of course we are all members of.

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Speaker 2: No about like Russian main battle tanks is from war

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Speaker 2: under leaks.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, very funny.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, and you have to assume I would be surprised

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Speaker 1: if no one had tried just like having you know,

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Speaker 1: an agent from a national security agency in uh oh

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Speaker 1: for sure, but they're trying to like be like trying

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Speaker 1: to like provoke arguments about Chinese tanks or whatever. I'd

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Speaker 1: be shocked if that hasn't happened.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, like the overlap between like people who might play

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Speaker 2: warth Under anyway and people who might work for a

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Speaker 2: national security agency, Like those Van diagrams are a circle.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, exactly. So it's one of those things where this

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Speaker 1: happens a bunch on war th Under. But it's just

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Speaker 1: kind of something people joke about because these leaks like

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Speaker 1: they're meaningful. I guess to like militaries care about them.

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Speaker 1: But like you sitting at home, you hear like, oh, hey,

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Speaker 1: details of like the couple of construction of the new

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Speaker 1: Abrams like models as leaked. That's not like the same

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Speaker 1: as I don't know, Chelsea Manning leaking information about like

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Speaker 1: war crimes by the US military in Iraq, or Edward

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Speaker 1: Snowden leaking info about like the NSA. Like it's a

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Speaker 1: little less relevant to most people. What we started seeing

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Speaker 1: a couple of weeks ago is documents top secret label documents,

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Speaker 1: like actual pictures of straight up, unredacted, top secret US

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Speaker 1: Defense Department documents just kind of filtering out over various discords,

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Speaker 1: and they were kind of appearing in random little bits.

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Speaker 1: You'd see one that was like an update on the

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Speaker 1: war in Ukraine that was kind of showing concerns that

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Speaker 1: the US military had about the ability of the Ukrainian

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Speaker 1: military to carry out the counter offensive that everybody's expecting

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Speaker 1: in the near future. You have like casualty estimates from

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Speaker 1: the US military. Another document that was leak had like

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Speaker 1: a bunch of information inside the Russian General Staff. So

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Speaker 1: these are number one, very serious leaks, right you're talking about,

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Speaker 1: especially with the leaks from inside Putin's kind of inner circle.

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Speaker 1: You're talking about leaks that could potentially expose a major

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Speaker 1: US source inside the Russian government. And you're also talking

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Speaker 1: about leaks that just kind of revealed the degree to

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Speaker 1: which the CIA has an enormous amount of information apparently

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Speaker 1: at least about what's happening inside the Kremlin.

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Speaker 4: You know.

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Speaker 1: So these are very significant leaks, but they didn't appear.

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Speaker 1: They weren't being like you know, kind of filtered out

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Speaker 1: and released by an agency like Wiki leaks. They weren't

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Speaker 1: being sent to journalists. They were just kind of showing

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Speaker 1: up in these you know, Discord is basically a series

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Speaker 1: of chat rooms, and they were just kind of showing

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Speaker 1: up in different discords. So this is, you know, a mystery,

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Speaker 1: and it's the kind of mystery that, like a certain

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Speaker 1: kind of person who is extremely online is not going

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Speaker 1: to be able to get out of their head and

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Speaker 1: is going to kind of try to trace back to

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Speaker 1: its origin. And in the case of this specific mystery,

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Speaker 1: the nerd who could not get it out of their

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Speaker 1: head and decided to trace it back to its origin

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Speaker 1: was my former boss at Bellingcat, Eric Tohler. Eric is

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Speaker 1: a very nice guy, probably the most talented and skilled

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Speaker 1: researcher that I've ever met in my life. And you know,

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Speaker 1: Eric started seeing these, like everyone else, these top secret documents,

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Speaker 1: and was like, where the fuck are these coming from?

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Speaker 1: And this is one of those things we'll talk about.

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Speaker 1: It's become extremely controversial among a certain set of people

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Speaker 1: in the day since. But when this kind of started,

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Speaker 1: Number one, you can't really deny there was an intense

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Speaker 1: public interest in figuring out what the origin point of

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Speaker 1: these was because that was the only way to figure

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Speaker 1: out are the these actual leaks. When you see something

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Speaker 1: that's just like listed as a top secret document randomly

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Speaker 1: on the internet, if you call up the US government

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Speaker 1: and you say, hey, is this real top secret impot,

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Speaker 1: They're not gonna say yes, right like, you don't get

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Speaker 1: that response from them, I mean.

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Speaker 3: And especially right now with all of like the AI

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Speaker 3: chat generation tools, Generating fake documents is one of the

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Speaker 3: main things people are doing for disinfo, generating like fake sources,

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Speaker 3: fake documents. Of course, you can like edit things further

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Speaker 3: to like make them seem more realistic, but yes, you

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Speaker 3: have someone who is extremely curious is going to wonder

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Speaker 3: if this is actually like a real thing or if

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Speaker 3: this is just some like bullshit prank or something.

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Speaker 1: And there were edits of these documents did also go violin.

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Speaker 1: In fact, Kucker Carlson one of the one of the

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Speaker 1: original documents shows kind of US estimates for killed in

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Speaker 1: action on Ukraine's on the Ukrainian side and on the

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Speaker 1: Russian side in the war. Obviously, it showed more Russian

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Speaker 1: casualties than Ukrainian casualties, which is consistent with all previous reporting,

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Speaker 1: but the edit of it showed something like many times

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Speaker 1: as many Ukrainian dead as Russian dead, which is something

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Speaker 1: that was valuable for the people who are trying to

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Speaker 1: argue that this war is unwinnable on behalf of the Ukrainians.

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Speaker 1: Guys like Tucker Carlson who covered the leaks on his

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Speaker 1: show and knowingly used the fake edit of the leak,

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Speaker 1: I can't imagine. I have to assume it was knowingly

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Speaker 1: because he had been very well exposed by that point,

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Speaker 1: so there's really no other explanation, I think. But anyway,

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Speaker 1: the fact that there were edits of these documents that

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Speaker 1: were not legitimate going around, it's just kind of part

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Speaker 1: of why there was a legitimate public interest in trying

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Speaker 1: to figure out where the fuck are these things coming from.

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Speaker 1: Eric is again an extremely good researcher, and through a

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Speaker 1: mix of open source intelligence and eventually just kind of

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Speaker 1: like calling up people and talking to them, he found

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Speaker 1: what appeared to be the source of these leaks, which

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Speaker 1: was an invitation only clubhouse on scored of like thirty

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Speaker 1: ish people, most of whom were teenagers. Over time, it

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Speaker 1: kind of became clear that this group was a bunch

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Speaker 1: of kind of young people who had gotten together during

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Speaker 1: the pandemic to talk about you know, games. These guys

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Speaker 1: are all gamers. Most of them were like kids in

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Speaker 1: high school, they kind of were cut off from their friends,

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Speaker 1: so they wanted a place to be social. They would

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Speaker 1: share memes, including like extremely racist, you know, borderline Nazi shit.

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Speaker 1: They would like watch movies over and like chat over

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Speaker 1: kind of the voice app. They were all what you

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Speaker 1: call tradcats, which is like basically weirdo Catholic fundamentalists, like

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Speaker 1: I think a lot of them deny Vatican two, that

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Speaker 1: sort of shit. It's like a whole thing. A lot

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Speaker 1: of them were that at least, so there was a

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Speaker 1: lot of like praying and anyway, a bunch of weirdos.

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Speaker 1: And the head of this group of weirdos was the

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Speaker 1: oldest of them, a guy who was known on like

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Speaker 1: in the discord as og and Og. He's a was

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Speaker 1: you know, in the Land of the Teenagers, the person

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Speaker 1: in the early twenties who can buy an AR fifteen

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Speaker 1: is king. And so this this guy is in his

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Speaker 1: early twenties. He's in the military, which he talks about.

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Speaker 1: He posts videos of himself like shooting guns and like

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Speaker 1: you know, saying racial slurs and like signposting to these

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Speaker 1: like you know, weird memes and stuff that they're all into,

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Speaker 1: which to them like makes him seem extremely cool.

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Speaker 6: Right.

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Speaker 1: It's one of those things when you kind of read

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Speaker 1: the different coverage of this, it's there's a little bit

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Speaker 1: of like weird culty stuff going on. I don't know

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Speaker 1: if i'd say that it was a cult in more

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Speaker 1: than just like in.

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Speaker 3: Every discord server is a cult exactly.

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Speaker 1: The insular online communities like this very often reproduce aspects

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Speaker 1: of cult dynamics. Right, Yeah, Hey, everybody, Robert here. We

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Speaker 1: had a lot audio error obviously in the recording. I

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Speaker 1: wanted to clarify this section because it was kind of garbled.

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Speaker 1: The name of the discord server they were in was

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Speaker 1: thug Shaker Central, which is potentially a reference to one

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Speaker 1: of a couple of things. You'll find some disagreement about

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Speaker 1: this online, but it's not really relevant. That's the discord

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Speaker 1: name that they've worked under. You get, like the overall

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Speaker 1: point of this, it's a bunch of like kids who

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Speaker 1: are fans of games. They're fans of like this YouTuber Oxide.

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Speaker 1: It's like a little group of dudes who got together

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Speaker 1: via fandom and the pandemic and over the course of

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Speaker 1: years developed like a shared culture, and part of the

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Speaker 1: shared culture is this guy og who's the older one

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Speaker 1: of them, you know, trying to keep them aware of

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Speaker 1: what he thought was important about kind of global politics,

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Speaker 1: and that particularly included aspects of battlefield conditions in Ukraine,

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Speaker 1: information about North Korean ballistic missiles, all of this kind

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Speaker 1: of stuf ugh that he had access to because spoilers

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Speaker 1: he was in an Air National Guard wing as an

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Speaker 1: intelligence and like it was in the intelligence sector of

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Speaker 1: like an Air National Guard ring, and he had a

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Speaker 1: security classification, right, And once this all got revealed, people

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Speaker 1: are like, why the fuck is a twenty one year

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Speaker 1: old because that's this guy's age have access to top

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Speaker 1: secret data, And everyone who knows anything about the way

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Speaker 1: our government classifies information was like most of the people

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Speaker 1: have access are like twenty Yeah, it fits our wars

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Speaker 1: fifty year olds.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I think it just genuinely, like you know, like

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Speaker 2: if we've been around war and conflict of the people

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Speaker 2: who do it quite long, I think most people would

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Speaker 2: be genuinely burn away that most people doing it are children.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, And this has caused like obviously some problems before

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Speaker 1: for the Defense Department, but it's also like it's kind

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Speaker 1: of a thorny problem because like most of your workforce

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Speaker 1: are always going to be young kids. These are spoiler's

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Speaker 1: shitty jobs often and that's the only one who will

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Speaker 1: do a lot of them. And also just like if

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Speaker 1: you're fighting a war, most of the people you have

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Speaker 1: that are going to be tasked the field intelligence are

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Speaker 1: going to be in this age. And see, it's not

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Speaker 1: at all weird that this guy had access to this shit.

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Speaker 1: What is weird is that so he starts off kind

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Speaker 1: of like arguing, you know, sometimes he'll bring up stuff

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Speaker 1: that he knows that's from classified documents while he's arguing,

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Speaker 1: you know, about the war in Ukraine or whatever with

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Speaker 1: these friends online, and then he starts doing like a

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Speaker 1: series of regular updates where he'll basically he'll type out

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Speaker 1: details from like a bunch of different top secret documents

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Speaker 1: and he's massive, long and apparently kind of hard to

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Speaker 1: read posts, and he'll just like post them into the

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Speaker 1: chat to kind of keep his friends abreast of what

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Speaker 1: he thinks is you know, important, But he gets frustrated

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Speaker 1: over time that like they're not reading this shit because

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Speaker 1: it's really boring and like kind of weird to just

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Speaker 1: info up top secret info, and they don't. These kids

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Speaker 1: don't again, like these other folks are like in high school.

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Speaker 1: They don't really realize where he's getting the info or

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Speaker 1: what he has, but they do. The folks who do

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Speaker 1: pay attention recognize over time that like stuff will happen

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Speaker 1: in the real world that corresponds to something he posted

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Speaker 1: a couple of weeks ago, and they're like, wow, he

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Speaker 1: seems to have like actually really good information. Eventually, Og

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Speaker 1: gets frustrated because he's not no one's paying attention to

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Speaker 1: his posts, so he starts taking photos of just the

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Speaker 1: top secret documents themselves and posting them in the discord day.

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Speaker 2: Amazing.

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Speaker 1: Now this is unbelievably illegal.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, he really crosed a line there. I just don't

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Speaker 2: believe it'd be dumb.

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Speaker 1: By the way. It was illegal before, but this is

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Speaker 1: really illegal.

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Speaker 2: In terms of like allowing yourself making it so much

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Speaker 2: easier for the consequences you're fucking around to find you

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Speaker 2: like that. He crushed the rubicon right there.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, so, and now we have to face the hard

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Speaker 3: question is this guy an illegalist king or is he

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Speaker 3: more problematic? And this is this is the question that

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Speaker 3: we have to actually focus on now stop because it is.

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Speaker 3: It is, on one hand, pretty funny. It's exceedmely funny.

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Speaker 1: There's zero argument there among people who aren't ship heads.

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Speaker 1: It's very funny.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it's very funny that like he could be doing

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Speaker 2: an illegalism without with zero intention of doing so.

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Speaker 1: Now, I do think there's a some people have kind

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Speaker 1: of errantly called him a whistleblower. I just not.

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Speaker 3: That's not active. That is, that is not what he's doing.

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Speaker 3: He's a Nazi who's posting top secret information to impress

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Speaker 3: children online.

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Speaker 1: That's right, Garrison. I do think we have to. I

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Speaker 1: think we have to. Let's let's dig into that a

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Speaker 1: little bit, because a whistleblower is somebody who exposes information

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Speaker 1: from inside of an organization for some sort of purpose. Right,

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Speaker 1: they believe that what's going on is wrong. They think that, like,

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Speaker 1: they believe there's some sort of public interest in information

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Speaker 1: that is being kind of siloed inside of an organization

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Speaker 1: that they're a part of, and they release that organization. Right, fundamentally,

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Speaker 1: that's what a whistleblower is. This guy was telling his

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Speaker 1: friends and this thirty person discord, do not post these

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Speaker 1: anywhere else. This is not stuff that you're allowed to share.

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Speaker 1: This is just for your eyes because we're friends, right.

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Speaker 1: He does not intend for this to get out. But

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Speaker 1: here's the thing. All of his friends in this group

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Speaker 1: are like dumb kids, and just like those people on

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Speaker 1: war Thunder, they start getting into arguments with people outside

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Speaker 1: of the discords yet and other discords discords. One of

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Speaker 1: them is a fan discord for some other YouTuber, one

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Speaker 1: of them is the discord is a Minecraft discord, and

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Speaker 1: they get into arguments with random other users about like

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Speaker 1: the war in Ukraine and stuff. And when they're having

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Speaker 1: those arguments, they'll hear someone make a point and they'll

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Speaker 1: think back to a top secret document that OGPO and

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Speaker 1: they'll be like, well, I know you're wrong because I've

401
00:22:02,520 --> 00:22:06,639
Speaker 1: seen like some CIA like satellite footage that like shows

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Speaker 1: that this isn't accurate. And rather than being like, well,

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Speaker 1: I guess I can't prove this person wrong on the

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Speaker 1: internet without exposing my friend in our private discord to

405
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Speaker 1: being imprisoned for the decade, they just grab top secret

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Speaker 1: documents that he posted and they post them in these

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Speaker 1: other discords. And that's how this shit breaks containment. Right now,

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Speaker 1: It's one of those things I do want to note that, like,

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Speaker 1: these are not generally speaking, super pleasant people. OG is

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Speaker 1: the kind of guy who, like one of his big

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Speaker 1: arguments that he tries to like make to these kids,

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Speaker 1: he like claims that based on the top secret info

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Speaker 1: he has, which he posts, nothing that proves this, the

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Speaker 1: mass shooting in Buffalo, New York by that Nazi at

415
00:22:54,680 --> 00:23:00,399
Speaker 1: that majority you know, black frequented grocery store, that that

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Speaker 1: was like a government plot to institute gun control, and shit,

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00:23:03,640 --> 00:23:05,920
Speaker 1: it was a false flag. So he's not just posting good.

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Speaker 1: He's like lying here too, because obviously there's no intelligence

419
00:23:09,840 --> 00:23:12,440
Speaker 1: to post backing that up. He just he's just kind

420
00:23:12,480 --> 00:23:15,040
Speaker 1: of trying to It's a mix of he's trying to

421
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Speaker 1: like prove that, you know, he's trying to make arguments

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00:23:17,520 --> 00:23:20,600
Speaker 1: about like what's happening, you know, in various overseas conflicts

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Speaker 1: using at US intel, but he's also just like spreading

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Speaker 1: different kind of conspiracy theories that he has to these

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Speaker 1: kids who are by and large looking up to him.

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Speaker 1: There's a couple like the Washington Post has done some

427
00:23:34,040 --> 00:23:35,719
Speaker 1: really deep reporting where they talk to some of these

428
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Speaker 1: kids who they're like, yeah, man, we loved him, Like

429
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Speaker 1: when he realized this shit had broken containment, he like

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Speaker 1: called us and we were all crying because we knew

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Speaker 1: he was going to go to prison. Like there they

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Speaker 1: seem legitimately distraught. Yeah, there's like lines like he said

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Speaker 1: something had happened, and he prayed to God that this

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Speaker 1: event would not happen, but now it's in God's hands.

435
00:23:57,440 --> 00:24:01,199
Speaker 1: Like these are like weirdo ashy. I hesitate to like

436
00:24:02,080 --> 00:24:05,960
Speaker 1: condemn like the literal children too much because they're very vulnerable.

437
00:24:06,000 --> 00:24:09,920
Speaker 1: This guy is like by This guy is a bad

438
00:24:10,000 --> 00:24:13,920
Speaker 1: person who is deeply like in a very fucked up way,

439
00:24:13,960 --> 00:24:17,679
Speaker 1: influencing this group of like thirty ish teenagers on the

440
00:24:17,760 --> 00:24:21,480
Speaker 1: internet in his like weird politics. It's not great. Now

441
00:24:21,480 --> 00:24:23,960
Speaker 1: that's separate from the question of like is there a

442
00:24:24,040 --> 00:24:26,480
Speaker 1: value to these leagues, which we can talk about in

443
00:24:26,520 --> 00:24:29,440
Speaker 1: a little bit. But so as we've talked about Eric

444
00:24:29,520 --> 00:24:32,760
Speaker 1: Tohler tracks down where this is happening, tracks down like

445
00:24:32,960 --> 00:24:36,680
Speaker 1: the name Og publishes a piece on Belling Cat. It's

446
00:24:36,720 --> 00:24:38,840
Speaker 1: sort of ripped off by like I don't know it

447
00:24:38,880 --> 00:24:41,879
Speaker 1: does like every other newspaper in the world, and then

448
00:24:41,960 --> 00:24:46,480
Speaker 1: additional reporting is done Belling Cat and The New York

449
00:24:46,520 --> 00:24:49,840
Speaker 1: Times team up and they eventually like track down and

450
00:24:49,920 --> 00:24:53,000
Speaker 1: publish an article on who this guy is, an airman

451
00:24:53,240 --> 00:24:59,040
Speaker 1: named Jack Tik Sarah, And they publish an article about

452
00:24:59,040 --> 00:25:03,680
Speaker 1: that about a day before this guy gets arrested by

453
00:25:03,920 --> 00:25:07,280
Speaker 1: the FBI. And it's one of those things, one of

454
00:25:07,320 --> 00:25:09,760
Speaker 1: the if you if you look at the FBI Affid David,

455
00:25:10,840 --> 00:25:13,760
Speaker 1: it kind of makes clear how the FBI cracked this

456
00:25:13,840 --> 00:25:16,919
Speaker 1: guy down and found him because they did so, you know,

457
00:25:17,359 --> 00:25:20,679
Speaker 1: using the resources they had before the Times did online.

458
00:25:20,800 --> 00:25:23,000
Speaker 1: People have been going after The Times and Eric for

459
00:25:23,119 --> 00:25:26,520
Speaker 1: like revealing this guy to the government, which is not

460
00:25:26,640 --> 00:25:29,960
Speaker 1: the case. Basically, once it became clear what had gotten leaked,

461
00:25:30,400 --> 00:25:33,800
Speaker 1: the FBI, because they had access to you know, the

462
00:25:33,920 --> 00:25:38,640
Speaker 1: systems by which people utilize and get access to sensitive

463
00:25:38,640 --> 00:25:43,280
Speaker 1: compartmented information, found out who had most recently like on

464
00:25:43,400 --> 00:25:45,920
Speaker 1: the days that kind of corresponded to the leaks, pulled

465
00:25:46,000 --> 00:25:49,760
Speaker 1: up information about that and narrowed it down to this

466
00:25:49,840 --> 00:25:53,680
Speaker 1: guy Jack. They like it, and they were they had

467
00:25:53,720 --> 00:25:55,520
Speaker 1: access to Like one of the things they did is

468
00:25:55,560 --> 00:25:58,760
Speaker 1: they called Discord and talked to Discord, and Discord helped

469
00:25:58,800 --> 00:26:02,240
Speaker 1: them track down where the leaks were originating. From. And

470
00:26:02,280 --> 00:26:04,960
Speaker 1: then because they could see that the account that had

471
00:26:05,000 --> 00:26:08,040
Speaker 1: posted you know, the top secret data originally was a

472
00:26:08,040 --> 00:26:10,520
Speaker 1: paid account, they were able to like provide the FBI

473
00:26:10,680 --> 00:26:12,639
Speaker 1: with this guy's home address and the shit. This is

474
00:26:12,640 --> 00:26:14,240
Speaker 1: exactly what you'd expect for the f.

475
00:26:14,320 --> 00:26:16,840
Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean, the FBI has a lot of non

476
00:26:16,960 --> 00:26:20,080
Speaker 3: open source means to do this type of investigation.

477
00:26:20,400 --> 00:26:22,600
Speaker 1: Yeah, they are not doing what Eric is doing and

478
00:26:22,680 --> 00:26:25,040
Speaker 1: just kind of like clicking through shit for hours and

479
00:26:25,080 --> 00:26:27,639
Speaker 1: hours and hours until they figure out where it's come from.

480
00:26:27,680 --> 00:26:30,560
Speaker 1: Like they have they are the FBI, they have access

481
00:26:30,600 --> 00:26:32,680
Speaker 1: to other things, and.

482
00:26:32,640 --> 00:26:34,800
Speaker 2: It's what you'd expect from Discord too, right, Like they

483
00:26:35,320 --> 00:26:39,520
Speaker 2: will comply with whatever they absolutely these are top secret

484
00:26:39,560 --> 00:26:41,840
Speaker 2: that like if they don't have a legal choice here,

485
00:26:41,840 --> 00:26:44,000
Speaker 2: they're a gigantic company, they're going to comply.

486
00:26:45,560 --> 00:26:48,000
Speaker 1: So this is the kind of thing where like one

487
00:26:48,040 --> 00:26:50,880
Speaker 1: of the there's this big argument I don't even even

488
00:26:50,920 --> 00:26:53,119
Speaker 1: though it's big, but there's definitely like a weird chunk

489
00:26:53,119 --> 00:26:56,480
Speaker 1: of the left that has like leaned on because the

490
00:26:56,560 --> 00:27:01,119
Speaker 1: right has immediately started calling this guy a whistleblower. Fucking

491
00:27:01,119 --> 00:27:03,320
Speaker 1: Marjorie Taylor Green was like he's a Christian and he's

492
00:27:03,359 --> 00:27:07,000
Speaker 1: a leaker trying to expose crucial details about our government,

493
00:27:07,000 --> 00:27:09,720
Speaker 1: and no he wasn't. He was like trying to fucking

494
00:27:09,800 --> 00:27:13,840
Speaker 1: groom some teenagers and they posted it without his permission.

495
00:27:14,359 --> 00:27:16,520
Speaker 3: And a lot of a lot of the more conspiracy

496
00:27:16,520 --> 00:27:20,760
Speaker 3: type stuff is like trying to call out like you know,

497
00:27:20,800 --> 00:27:23,879
Speaker 3: it's a lot of the more conspiracy related stuff is

498
00:27:24,240 --> 00:27:27,719
Speaker 3: related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and making it

499
00:27:27,760 --> 00:27:31,679
Speaker 3: seem like the US is doing things that are wrong

500
00:27:31,800 --> 00:27:35,240
Speaker 3: and secretly helping the Ukrainians too much, and it kind

501
00:27:35,240 --> 00:27:37,679
Speaker 3: of it it plays into this weird, weird thing that

502
00:27:37,720 --> 00:27:42,520
Speaker 3: people have against the way Biden's been handling the geopolitics

503
00:27:42,520 --> 00:27:45,480
Speaker 3: around the Russian invasion, and it's like it it plays

504
00:27:45,480 --> 00:27:47,920
Speaker 3: into a whole bunch of right wing talking points we've

505
00:27:47,920 --> 00:27:50,840
Speaker 3: seen around Russia. You know, We've seen this type of

506
00:27:50,880 --> 00:27:55,200
Speaker 3: stuff get talked about by Tucker Carlson quite often. There's

507
00:27:55,200 --> 00:27:57,120
Speaker 3: there's a there's a whole bunch of like little nodes

508
00:27:57,200 --> 00:27:59,840
Speaker 3: that this that that this touches on, and we even

509
00:28:00,240 --> 00:28:02,639
Speaker 3: we even see stuff like that among like you know,

510
00:28:02,680 --> 00:28:06,520
Speaker 3: people who are authoritarian communists, right who are who are

511
00:28:06,560 --> 00:28:10,760
Speaker 3: still pro Russia despite Russia not being a communist country,

512
00:28:11,680 --> 00:28:14,719
Speaker 3: but still like being like, oh, there, you know, this

513
00:28:14,800 --> 00:28:18,680
Speaker 3: is something he's trying to expose the things that are

514
00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:21,600
Speaker 3: people are doing wrong to Russia, and it's like okay,

515
00:28:21,720 --> 00:28:22,280
Speaker 3: all right.

516
00:28:22,480 --> 00:28:25,240
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, and to me it's one of them. And

517
00:28:25,240 --> 00:28:28,920
Speaker 1: there's also you've gotten among some chunks of this attitude

518
00:28:28,960 --> 00:28:30,760
Speaker 1: that like, well, you know, I don't care why he

519
00:28:30,840 --> 00:28:33,320
Speaker 1: did it or like what he is in his personal life.

520
00:28:33,359 --> 00:28:36,919
Speaker 1: Any leak you know of the US military machine is

521
00:28:36,960 --> 00:28:39,360
Speaker 1: good and should be you know, protected. And it's like,

522
00:28:39,400 --> 00:28:42,400
Speaker 1: for one thing, this guy like nobody knew where these

523
00:28:42,440 --> 00:28:44,400
Speaker 1: things were coming from. There was a vested need in

524
00:28:44,480 --> 00:28:46,680
Speaker 1: sort of figuring out what the origin point was to

525
00:28:46,680 --> 00:28:50,200
Speaker 1: figure out if they were accurate. But for like another thing,

526
00:28:50,280 --> 00:28:52,960
Speaker 1: I don't know, man, you can argue about like what

527
00:28:53,120 --> 00:28:56,400
Speaker 1: point you know, the digging, whether or not, like the

528
00:28:57,320 --> 00:28:59,880
Speaker 1: it's ethical to dig this shit back to its source.

529
00:29:01,080 --> 00:29:03,280
Speaker 1: I would argue that like people also have a right

530
00:29:03,360 --> 00:29:06,160
Speaker 1: to know if there's some sort of fucking like like

531
00:29:06,520 --> 00:29:08,840
Speaker 1: if the documents were fake or altered in some way,

532
00:29:08,880 --> 00:29:10,680
Speaker 1: there was a reason to be trying to figure out

533
00:29:10,720 --> 00:29:12,920
Speaker 1: the providence of this shit. But more to the point,

534
00:29:12,960 --> 00:29:16,440
Speaker 1: like I think it's good to have access to like

535
00:29:16,640 --> 00:29:19,880
Speaker 1: data from inside of our military. I think that's that's

536
00:29:19,920 --> 00:29:22,840
Speaker 1: broadly positive. And when I look at these data, or

537
00:29:22,880 --> 00:29:24,680
Speaker 1: when I look at what's been leaked, I don't think

538
00:29:24,720 --> 00:29:27,680
Speaker 1: most of it's you know, one of the concerns that's

539
00:29:27,680 --> 00:29:29,680
Speaker 1: always that always exist when you're talking about a leak

540
00:29:29,680 --> 00:29:32,200
Speaker 1: of data is like, is this going to expose like

541
00:29:32,320 --> 00:29:35,600
Speaker 1: potentially innocent people to any kind of arm And there

542
00:29:35,640 --> 00:29:38,040
Speaker 1: is a potential for that with some of this, because

543
00:29:38,040 --> 00:29:41,480
Speaker 1: some of it dealt with Ukrainian military readiness for the

544
00:29:41,600 --> 00:29:45,120
Speaker 1: upcoming offensive, and like, well, like I don't really care

545
00:29:45,320 --> 00:29:49,280
Speaker 1: if some guy inside the Kremlin who's like a member

546
00:29:49,280 --> 00:29:51,200
Speaker 1: of the Russian General Staff and a double I don't

547
00:29:51,200 --> 00:29:53,240
Speaker 1: care if that guy, like something bad happens to him.

548
00:29:53,360 --> 00:29:57,480
Speaker 1: He's probably not a great dude. But but I do

549
00:29:57,600 --> 00:30:00,440
Speaker 1: care about like a bunch of random Ukrainian soldier potentially

550
00:30:00,480 --> 00:30:02,840
Speaker 1: getting harmed. Now, I will say, from what I can

551
00:30:02,840 --> 00:30:04,440
Speaker 1: tell from this, I think the odds of that are

552
00:30:04,480 --> 00:30:07,000
Speaker 1: pretty low. It looks like this has impacted kind of

553
00:30:07,040 --> 00:30:11,360
Speaker 1: the timetable for the counter offensive, but I don't know

554
00:30:11,400 --> 00:30:14,320
Speaker 1: that it's I haven't seen any evidence that it's exposed

555
00:30:14,360 --> 00:30:17,240
Speaker 1: things in a way that's like going to cause loss

556
00:30:17,240 --> 00:30:19,320
Speaker 1: of life, although it's a little bit unclear as to

557
00:30:19,360 --> 00:30:22,800
Speaker 1: whether that not that might happen. But also, while I

558
00:30:22,840 --> 00:30:25,080
Speaker 1: think it's accurate to say, I'm not saying evidence that

559
00:30:25,160 --> 00:30:28,120
Speaker 1: like a lot of people's safety have been harmed by

560
00:30:28,120 --> 00:30:31,960
Speaker 1: these leaks, it's also not you know, what we're It's

561
00:30:32,000 --> 00:30:34,480
Speaker 1: not anything like what Snowden did or what Manning did.

562
00:30:34,560 --> 00:30:39,080
Speaker 1: Right again, Manning revealed, you know, videos like the collateral

563
00:30:39,160 --> 00:30:43,920
Speaker 1: murder video, evidence of like breakdowns of order and things

564
00:30:43,920 --> 00:30:46,000
Speaker 1: that I think are accurate to call war crimes that

565
00:30:46,040 --> 00:30:49,960
Speaker 1: were being kind of hidden by our government, whereas Snowden

566
00:30:50,120 --> 00:30:53,200
Speaker 1: revealed intense details about an n Essay spying program. All

567
00:30:53,200 --> 00:30:56,480
Speaker 1: of that's extremely relevant to the average American. Most of

568
00:30:56,480 --> 00:31:00,320
Speaker 1: this is just kind of like wonky inside base fall

569
00:31:00,400 --> 00:31:04,240
Speaker 1: military stuff, which again I'm not like sad that it's

570
00:31:04,360 --> 00:31:08,480
Speaker 1: gotten out, but it's also not It really does seem

571
00:31:08,520 --> 00:31:10,880
Speaker 1: like a bunch of shit that like a guy pulled

572
00:31:10,920 --> 00:31:13,960
Speaker 1: out based on his own kind of like weird interests.

573
00:31:14,120 --> 00:31:18,000
Speaker 1: It's not there's not like a strong unifying theme around them.

574
00:31:18,040 --> 00:31:20,240
Speaker 1: And again, most of it's most of it's shit that's

575
00:31:20,240 --> 00:31:22,520
Speaker 1: not going to be interesting to the average person. One

576
00:31:22,520 --> 00:31:25,320
Speaker 1: of the documents I just read an article about, because like,

577
00:31:25,560 --> 00:31:28,080
Speaker 1: we don't entirely know everything that was leaked right now,

578
00:31:28,360 --> 00:31:30,440
Speaker 1: right there's been there's like the Post in the time

579
00:31:30,560 --> 00:31:32,880
Speaker 1: seem to have a pretty complete archive of what was leaked,

580
00:31:32,880 --> 00:31:36,040
Speaker 1: but they haven't published anything because you know, they're reading

581
00:31:36,080 --> 00:31:38,680
Speaker 1: through it and you know, actually reporting it out. One

582
00:31:38,680 --> 00:31:40,320
Speaker 1: of the articles that just came out was about the

583
00:31:40,720 --> 00:31:44,480
Speaker 1: fact that the Ukrainians made some overtures to the Kurdish

584
00:31:44,520 --> 00:31:50,920
Speaker 1: led self administration in in northern northeast Syria, to Rojava,

585
00:31:50,920 --> 00:31:54,080
Speaker 1: to the SDF in order to talk about the potential

586
00:31:54,120 --> 00:31:59,880
Speaker 1: for them attacking Russian assets in elsewhere in Syria. When

587
00:32:00,000 --> 00:32:02,760
Speaker 1: and this has kind of gotten out over like Twitter,

588
00:32:02,840 --> 00:32:05,920
Speaker 1: it's often been like described as, oh, the Ukrainians were

589
00:32:05,960 --> 00:32:07,720
Speaker 1: going to team up with the Courage to attacked Russia

590
00:32:07,800 --> 00:32:12,160
Speaker 1: in Syria, like like this was an actual, like serious plan.

591
00:32:12,600 --> 00:32:15,240
Speaker 1: Would you actually see the document? It seems a lot

592
00:32:15,360 --> 00:32:19,480
Speaker 1: less inciting than that. Basically, what happened was some folks

593
00:32:19,480 --> 00:32:23,000
Speaker 1: on the Ukrainian General staff or whatever were like looking

594
00:32:23,000 --> 00:32:25,440
Speaker 1: into the possibility, Hey, you know, is there any way

595
00:32:25,480 --> 00:32:28,120
Speaker 1: that we could kind of anything we could pay the

596
00:32:28,240 --> 00:32:30,560
Speaker 1: Kurds over in Syria to carry out an attack on

597
00:32:30,640 --> 00:32:34,200
Speaker 1: the Russians, and apparently they had access to somebody who

598
00:32:34,240 --> 00:32:36,480
Speaker 1: claimed to be in the SDF at least, and that

599
00:32:36,520 --> 00:32:38,880
Speaker 1: person was like, we might be able to do something

600
00:32:39,160 --> 00:32:41,440
Speaker 1: if you can get us some anti air defenses, right,

601
00:32:42,440 --> 00:32:45,360
Speaker 1: which I don't know how Ukraine could possibly ship meaningful

602
00:32:45,400 --> 00:32:48,960
Speaker 1: anti air defenses to northeast Syria. It's kind of bordered

603
00:32:49,000 --> 00:32:51,640
Speaker 1: on all sides. There is some stuff if you're a

604
00:32:51,640 --> 00:32:53,520
Speaker 1: walk in the region. There's some interesting stuff about this,

605
00:32:53,560 --> 00:32:56,400
Speaker 1: which is that the SDF basically responded, like we could

606
00:32:56,400 --> 00:32:59,800
Speaker 1: potentially do this, we couldn't attack Russian assets that are

607
00:32:59,840 --> 00:33:03,560
Speaker 1: within the borders of the self administration. Russians are acting

608
00:33:03,600 --> 00:33:08,200
Speaker 1: as peacekeepers there between Turkey and you know, it's kind

609
00:33:08,280 --> 00:33:12,040
Speaker 1: of desire to invade the entire region. They're not great

610
00:33:12,160 --> 00:33:14,960
Speaker 1: as peacekeepers. The Armenians will tell you that Russian soldiers

611
00:33:15,000 --> 00:33:18,360
Speaker 1: are not great, great givers. But the SDF didn't want

612
00:33:18,360 --> 00:33:20,600
Speaker 1: to like ship where they were eating, right, so there

613
00:33:20,680 --> 00:33:22,760
Speaker 1: was some like debate about where they might be able

614
00:33:22,800 --> 00:33:24,640
Speaker 1: to attack. One of the things that is really interesting

615
00:33:24,640 --> 00:33:28,400
Speaker 1: about this week is that apparently Ukraine like talk to

616
00:33:28,440 --> 00:33:31,800
Speaker 1: Turkey about this because obviously the Turks consider the core

617
00:33:31,840 --> 00:33:35,160
Speaker 1: of the SDF the YPG to be a terrorist organization.

618
00:33:36,320 --> 00:33:39,000
Speaker 1: But when Ukraine was talking to them, they're like, hey,

619
00:33:39,040 --> 00:33:42,160
Speaker 1: we might basically bribe these people to carry out an

620
00:33:42,160 --> 00:33:45,480
Speaker 1: attack on Russian assets elsewhere in Syria. Turkey was like, okay,

621
00:33:45,480 --> 00:33:47,239
Speaker 1: well don't do it here here here, because that's kind

622
00:33:47,240 --> 00:33:49,840
Speaker 1: of close to some our guys might like that. That

623
00:33:49,880 --> 00:33:53,480
Speaker 1: party is interesting. But again, none of this matters all

624
00:33:53,520 --> 00:33:56,560
Speaker 1: that much because nothing happened as far as we know.

625
00:33:56,640 --> 00:34:01,480
Speaker 1: In December, Zelenski was like, no, don't proceed with looking

626
00:34:01,520 --> 00:34:03,720
Speaker 1: into this. This is the kind of thing like the

627
00:34:03,840 --> 00:34:06,520
Speaker 1: US military has, like plans for what happens if you

628
00:34:06,520 --> 00:34:08,440
Speaker 1: have to fight Canada. This is the kind of thing

629
00:34:08,480 --> 00:34:11,200
Speaker 1: defense departments do. And as far as I can tell,

630
00:34:11,280 --> 00:34:13,400
Speaker 1: there's no evidence that went much for them, like a

631
00:34:13,520 --> 00:34:16,480
Speaker 1: series of phone calls right which, by the way, the

632
00:34:16,520 --> 00:34:19,760
Speaker 1: SDF denies ever happened. I don't know what exactly occurred.

633
00:34:19,800 --> 00:34:21,719
Speaker 1: I don't know if it's hard for me to tell.

634
00:34:21,760 --> 00:34:23,719
Speaker 1: Did the Ukrainians were they talking to someone who was

635
00:34:23,760 --> 00:34:28,200
Speaker 1: actually a representative of the sdf's like military hierarchy, or

636
00:34:28,320 --> 00:34:30,640
Speaker 1: was this like some guy that they thought was because

637
00:34:30,680 --> 00:34:33,359
Speaker 1: maybe Ukraine doesn't have great context into the air like

638
00:34:33,600 --> 00:34:35,759
Speaker 1: or did the US, And it's it's not kind of clear.

639
00:34:35,840 --> 00:34:37,960
Speaker 1: Did the US maybe like hook them up with somebody,

640
00:34:39,200 --> 00:34:40,960
Speaker 1: but it doesn't like at the at the end of

641
00:34:40,960 --> 00:34:44,120
Speaker 1: the day, you can argue, as someone who follows the region,

642
00:34:44,160 --> 00:34:49,000
Speaker 1: I find this kind of interesting. It's not exactly like groundbreaking,

643
00:34:49,320 --> 00:34:52,640
Speaker 1: you know, in its importance, because nothing happened, no one

644
00:34:52,760 --> 00:34:55,879
Speaker 1: did anything. This is like some guys in Ukraine thought

645
00:34:55,920 --> 00:34:58,919
Speaker 1: about doing a thing and then decided not to, which

646
00:34:58,960 --> 00:35:02,360
Speaker 1: is you know, potentially interesting context. But we're not talking

647
00:35:02,400 --> 00:35:04,279
Speaker 1: about the manning or the snowed in lakes here.

648
00:35:05,640 --> 00:35:08,920
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, it's yeah, it's that particular document I think

649
00:35:09,000 --> 00:35:12,160
Speaker 2: is kind of clearly they have access to people who

650
00:35:12,160 --> 00:35:15,839
Speaker 2: have formally fought in Syria with the YPG right there.

651
00:35:16,080 --> 00:35:19,200
Speaker 2: There are probably dozens of them now fighting in Ukraine

652
00:35:19,280 --> 00:35:22,120
Speaker 2: without a volunteer units. Like it's it's not hard to

653
00:35:22,120 --> 00:35:24,240
Speaker 2: see how this thought came up. But like you said,

654
00:35:24,280 --> 00:35:26,799
Speaker 2: nothing really happened. It was just some people like spitbolling.

655
00:35:27,600 --> 00:35:31,319
Speaker 1: So I don't know. There's some other like bits and

656
00:35:31,360 --> 00:35:34,080
Speaker 1: stuff in here that are kind of interesting. One of

657
00:35:34,080 --> 00:35:37,040
Speaker 1: them was there was a document in there about how

658
00:35:37,080 --> 00:35:40,680
Speaker 1: the US had kind of like interfered in peace negotiations

659
00:35:40,800 --> 00:35:45,200
Speaker 1: in Yemen due to like kind of concerns that they

660
00:35:45,280 --> 00:35:47,440
Speaker 1: had about the fact that China was kind of brokering

661
00:35:47,520 --> 00:35:50,440
Speaker 1: a degree of peace between the Houthi rebels in between

662
00:35:50,560 --> 00:35:54,760
Speaker 1: the Saudi government. There's definitely some like slightly some somewhat

663
00:35:54,800 --> 00:35:56,840
Speaker 1: shady shit from the US and there, but at the

664
00:35:56,920 --> 00:35:59,600
Speaker 1: end of the day, it didn't derail the peace negotiations.

665
00:35:59,640 --> 00:36:02,560
Speaker 1: It's just like, yeah, they were like like like and

666
00:36:02,640 --> 00:36:04,560
Speaker 1: a lot of it's like that where it's kind of

667
00:36:04,560 --> 00:36:08,080
Speaker 1: like this is useful context. I'm glad historians or journalists

668
00:36:08,160 --> 00:36:10,279
Speaker 1: reporting it out will have that. But at the end

669
00:36:10,320 --> 00:36:12,359
Speaker 1: of the day, like the fact that like, oh hey,

670
00:36:12,400 --> 00:36:15,279
Speaker 1: at one point in these peace negotiations the US was like,

671
00:36:16,120 --> 00:36:18,360
Speaker 1: you know, being being kind of a kind of a

672
00:36:18,400 --> 00:36:23,520
Speaker 1: dick isn't exactly like shocking. You know, It's not going

673
00:36:23,520 --> 00:36:27,359
Speaker 1: to like change your overall concept of what's happening over there.

674
00:36:27,440 --> 00:36:30,680
Speaker 1: It's not stuff that like is most of it's not

675
00:36:30,719 --> 00:36:34,600
Speaker 1: stuff that's like massively important important. It is really interesting

676
00:36:34,719 --> 00:36:38,800
Speaker 1: that the detail that are our defense establishment apparently has

677
00:36:39,880 --> 00:36:42,359
Speaker 1: from within the Russian government I do think it's worth

678
00:36:42,400 --> 00:36:44,759
Speaker 1: noting because we're talking like when we talk about sort

679
00:36:44,800 --> 00:36:48,880
Speaker 1: of the the provenance of these and the reliability of

680
00:36:48,920 --> 00:36:52,879
Speaker 1: these leaks. As they regard the war in Ukraine, there's

681
00:36:52,920 --> 00:36:55,000
Speaker 1: been a lot of talk about like, oh, this reveals

682
00:36:55,040 --> 00:36:57,439
Speaker 1: that like the Ukraine doesn't have the capacity to carry

683
00:36:57,440 --> 00:37:00,279
Speaker 1: out a counter offensive, or that the war has gone

684
00:37:00,360 --> 00:37:03,279
Speaker 1: much worse for them than they think. It is kind

685
00:37:03,280 --> 00:37:08,640
Speaker 1: of worth noting that, like, prior to the expanded Russian invasion,

686
00:37:08,760 --> 00:37:13,040
Speaker 1: all US military intelligence suggested that the Ukrainian government was

687
00:37:13,080 --> 00:37:16,640
Speaker 1: going to fold in a matter of days. So even

688
00:37:16,680 --> 00:37:18,640
Speaker 1: though a lot of this is top secret info, that

689
00:37:18,680 --> 00:37:21,440
Speaker 1: doesn't mean it's like one hundred percent accurate. Right Like

690
00:37:21,719 --> 00:37:24,319
Speaker 1: our guys, like think back to the Iraq War. Our

691
00:37:24,400 --> 00:37:30,400
Speaker 1: dudes get shipped right und constantly. It is. Again, this

692
00:37:30,560 --> 00:37:33,399
Speaker 1: is all really interesting, And I will say two things.

693
00:37:33,440 --> 00:37:36,760
Speaker 1: I think it's very funny that this this guy nuked

694
00:37:36,800 --> 00:37:40,239
Speaker 1: his entire life basically to impress children on a discord.

695
00:37:40,920 --> 00:37:43,759
Speaker 1: I think it's extremely funny. I have laughed many a

696
00:37:43,800 --> 00:37:47,279
Speaker 1: time at this. I also think it's like, like, as

697
00:37:47,280 --> 00:37:49,759
Speaker 1: someone who is interested in this stuff, interesting that and

698
00:37:49,920 --> 00:37:52,759
Speaker 1: good that we have this context. I don't think any

699
00:37:52,760 --> 00:37:57,200
Speaker 1: of this is like massively surprising or shocking. Like the

700
00:37:57,480 --> 00:38:01,920
Speaker 1: shit that's in that defense industry or intelligence agency analysis

701
00:38:01,960 --> 00:38:06,359
Speaker 1: of the Ukrainian position right now is like stuff that

702
00:38:06,400 --> 00:38:08,640
Speaker 1: you would know if you were paying attention to the

703
00:38:08,680 --> 00:38:11,960
Speaker 1: good ocent aggregators who have been covering the war, and

704
00:38:12,000 --> 00:38:14,239
Speaker 1: if you've been like just reading good reporting on what's

705
00:38:14,280 --> 00:38:17,000
Speaker 1: going on over there. I'll read a little bit of

706
00:38:17,000 --> 00:38:20,520
Speaker 1: a summary from an article that's kind of going over

707
00:38:20,560 --> 00:38:22,640
Speaker 1: some of the other stuff that appears to have been leaked.

708
00:38:23,239 --> 00:38:26,520
Speaker 1: One details information apparently obtained through US eavesdropping on Russia's

709
00:38:26,560 --> 00:38:29,520
Speaker 1: Foreign intelligence service and suggests that China approved the provision

710
00:38:29,520 --> 00:38:31,560
Speaker 1: of lethal aid to Russia and its war in Ukraine

711
00:38:31,560 --> 00:38:34,480
Speaker 1: early this year and planned to disguise its military equipment

712
00:38:34,520 --> 00:38:38,600
Speaker 1: as civilian items. Another includes details of a test conducted

713
00:38:38,600 --> 00:38:41,239
Speaker 1: by Beijing on one of its advanced experimental missiles, the

714
00:38:41,320 --> 00:38:44,560
Speaker 1: DF twenty seven Hypersonic light vehicle, on February twenty fifth.

715
00:38:44,719 --> 00:38:46,880
Speaker 1: It says the vehicle flew for twelve minutes across thirteen

716
00:38:46,960 --> 00:38:49,640
Speaker 1: hundred miles and that it possessed a high probability of

717
00:38:49,680 --> 00:38:54,000
Speaker 1: penetrating US ballistic missile defense systems. The documents contain new

718
00:38:54,040 --> 00:38:57,000
Speaker 1: details about a Chinese spy balloon dubbed Killeen twenty three

719
00:38:57,040 --> 00:38:59,759
Speaker 1: by US intelligence agencies, that earlier this year flew over

720
00:38:59,760 --> 00:39:03,359
Speaker 1: the UNI United States. They detail sophisticated surveillance equipment. US

721
00:39:03,440 --> 00:39:06,200
Speaker 1: intelligence agencies were aware of up to four additional Chinese

722
00:39:06,239 --> 00:39:10,200
Speaker 1: by balloons. The documents a and another previously unreported revelation,

723
00:39:11,080 --> 00:39:13,560
Speaker 1: and so let's kind of break that down. One thing

724
00:39:13,600 --> 00:39:18,360
Speaker 1: we have here is basically an argument through from the

725
00:39:18,520 --> 00:39:22,280
Speaker 1: US that based on their intercepts, they believe that China

726
00:39:22,320 --> 00:39:26,360
Speaker 1: has approved provisioning weaponry, selling weaponry to Russia and disguising

727
00:39:26,400 --> 00:39:31,040
Speaker 1: it as civilian items. That doesn't mean they have done this.

728
00:39:31,280 --> 00:39:35,400
Speaker 1: It means that, like there's sigent that someone in our

729
00:39:35,440 --> 00:39:38,440
Speaker 1: government has that says that they were. That could be

730
00:39:38,600 --> 00:39:41,360
Speaker 1: disinformation from them. It could be out of date. It

731
00:39:41,360 --> 00:39:44,040
Speaker 1: could be something like with this Ukraine and Syria thing

732
00:39:44,040 --> 00:39:47,480
Speaker 1: that they talked about doing and then didn't do. It's interesting,

733
00:39:47,880 --> 00:39:50,120
Speaker 1: I would say, if you are a defense industry reporter,

734
00:39:50,200 --> 00:39:52,920
Speaker 1: it's something that woul could should definitely spur you to

735
00:39:53,000 --> 00:39:56,960
Speaker 1: further reporting, because like that's really relevant if that's occurring.

736
00:39:57,760 --> 00:40:00,480
Speaker 1: But it's not the final word on the matter. Meanwhile,

737
00:40:00,520 --> 00:40:03,120
Speaker 1: you've got this thing on like, Yeah, this hypersonic missile

738
00:40:03,120 --> 00:40:07,919
Speaker 1: the Chinese had is good at shoot and shit. Theoretically,

739
00:40:08,840 --> 00:40:11,280
Speaker 1: this is you know, the kind of thing that's interesting

740
00:40:11,320 --> 00:40:15,359
Speaker 1: and I think is probably more accurate than you know,

741
00:40:15,920 --> 00:40:19,319
Speaker 1: talking about the China providing lethal aid because you can

742
00:40:19,400 --> 00:40:22,560
Speaker 1: kind of you know, theoretically you're looking at actual like

743
00:40:22,719 --> 00:40:25,040
Speaker 1: data on how the missile has performed. It just seems

744
00:40:25,080 --> 00:40:28,319
Speaker 1: like it's something that you've got more fidelity on. But

745
00:40:28,400 --> 00:40:30,600
Speaker 1: this is again to kind of contrast it with like

746
00:40:30,680 --> 00:40:34,399
Speaker 1: the snowed and Manning leaks. Well, what do you do

747
00:40:34,440 --> 00:40:37,000
Speaker 1: if like the NSSAY is spying on people? Well, you

748
00:40:37,040 --> 00:40:40,960
Speaker 1: could at least attempt to pass laws that restrict their

749
00:40:41,000 --> 00:40:43,600
Speaker 1: ability to do that. Right, What do you do if

750
00:40:43,600 --> 00:40:46,759
Speaker 1: there have been like war crimes committed by your military

751
00:40:46,760 --> 00:40:48,120
Speaker 1: that were then cover it up, Well, you can at

752
00:40:48,160 --> 00:40:50,400
Speaker 1: least attempt to prosecute people. What do you do if

753
00:40:50,400 --> 00:40:53,480
Speaker 1: some other countries got a better missile? Well, there's not

754
00:40:53,520 --> 00:40:55,879
Speaker 1: a whole lot for you to do sitting at home

755
00:40:55,960 --> 00:41:01,000
Speaker 1: and like New York City or you know, fucking Austin, Texas, Right, Like, like,

756
00:41:01,400 --> 00:41:04,319
Speaker 1: what are we to do about China's hyper I don't know.

757
00:41:04,560 --> 00:41:07,680
Speaker 1: My assumption, generally speaking, not that this is an interesting

758
00:41:07,680 --> 00:41:10,080
Speaker 1: but my assumption generally speaking is that when you're talking

759
00:41:10,080 --> 00:41:13,000
Speaker 1: about Russia, China, the United States, we can all murder

760
00:41:13,080 --> 00:41:15,759
Speaker 1: each other if we wanted to write, like we've all

761
00:41:15,800 --> 00:41:19,160
Speaker 1: got real nice missiles at this point. And it's this,

762
00:41:19,280 --> 00:41:22,120
Speaker 1: you know, the Chinese by balloon stuff is like interesting.

763
00:41:22,480 --> 00:41:24,680
Speaker 1: I don't think anyone's surprised by this. Like we knew

764
00:41:24,680 --> 00:41:27,560
Speaker 1: there was a spy balloon. I assumed it had sophisticated

765
00:41:27,640 --> 00:41:32,000
Speaker 1: surveillance technique. It's again, it's interesting that there were four

766
00:41:32,080 --> 00:41:34,239
Speaker 1: other spy balloons in the area. But we simply know

767
00:41:34,320 --> 00:41:36,759
Speaker 1: from older reporting that this happened like three or four

768
00:41:36,760 --> 00:41:39,359
Speaker 1: times while Trump was in office too, So like, yeah,

769
00:41:39,400 --> 00:41:41,479
Speaker 1: this is something we've known about. There's been reporting about.

770
00:41:41,600 --> 00:41:45,640
Speaker 1: This is corroboration. That's interesting. Again, none of this is

771
00:41:45,680 --> 00:41:48,759
Speaker 1: really like a sea change in our understanding of any

772
00:41:48,800 --> 00:41:51,799
Speaker 1: of these conflicts. It is interesting context. Some of it's

773
00:41:51,800 --> 00:41:55,040
Speaker 1: being blown up, you know, into stuff that it isn't.

774
00:41:55,239 --> 00:41:57,560
Speaker 1: There's reporting and like the number of US servicemen in

775
00:41:57,680 --> 00:42:00,440
Speaker 1: Ukraine that's being like spun is like we've got boots

776
00:42:00,440 --> 00:42:02,160
Speaker 1: on the ground there, and it's like, well, they're like

777
00:42:02,239 --> 00:42:05,319
Speaker 1: embassy guards and stuff. There's like twenty nine dudes that

778
00:42:05,400 --> 00:42:09,719
Speaker 1: this like confirmed. Michael, Yeah, yeah, this confirms there's not

779
00:42:09,840 --> 00:42:12,279
Speaker 1: a lot of US guys on the ground there.

780
00:42:13,120 --> 00:42:15,440
Speaker 2: You send a lot of people when we're doing wars.

781
00:42:15,480 --> 00:42:17,920
Speaker 2: But yeah, like every embassy in the world has a

782
00:42:17,920 --> 00:42:21,239
Speaker 2: contingent of marines who make sure that it doesn't just

783
00:42:21,280 --> 00:42:25,520
Speaker 2: get Yeah. I don't want to say bang ghazied, but yeah, yeah,

784
00:42:25,520 --> 00:42:29,319
Speaker 2: you know big Ghazi. Yeah, that's fine. And this is

785
00:42:29,360 --> 00:42:31,600
Speaker 2: not new news to anyone who's been paying attention. But

786
00:42:31,640 --> 00:42:34,359
Speaker 2: if you are Michael Tracy, this is brain melting shit.

787
00:42:34,800 --> 00:42:39,360
Speaker 1: Michael Tracy's a weirdo quasi left journalist who like early

788
00:42:39,440 --> 00:42:41,600
Speaker 1: on in the war he didn't want to go into

789
00:42:41,719 --> 00:42:45,000
Speaker 1: Ukraine very much, but he like hung out in Poland

790
00:42:45,040 --> 00:42:48,840
Speaker 1: and took pictures of like US soldiers and like a

791
00:42:48,920 --> 00:42:52,080
Speaker 1: facility that they were had been in for years and

792
00:42:52,239 --> 00:42:54,600
Speaker 1: was like, look, you know, this is evidence of the

793
00:42:54,640 --> 00:42:56,920
Speaker 1: secret US support. And it's like, guys, I mean, for

794
00:42:56,960 --> 00:42:59,439
Speaker 1: one thing, like look at this, Look at how much

795
00:42:59,480 --> 00:43:02,280
Speaker 1: shit just leaked out because some kid wanted to impress children.

796
00:43:02,520 --> 00:43:05,840
Speaker 1: If there were like like secret massive formations of US

797
00:43:05,880 --> 00:43:10,400
Speaker 1: troops or even large like forces of US specops guys

798
00:43:10,719 --> 00:43:13,920
Speaker 1: carrying out operations in Ukraine. How good do you think

799
00:43:14,000 --> 00:43:17,279
Speaker 1: they'd be at keeping that shit secret? Right? For one thing?

800
00:43:17,400 --> 00:43:20,600
Speaker 1: Like Special Forces guys get killed all the fucking time,

801
00:43:20,840 --> 00:43:23,879
Speaker 1: Like they get killed, they get overrun, like like's it's

802
00:43:23,920 --> 00:43:26,720
Speaker 1: a terrible risk for US to just like send Seal

803
00:43:26,800 --> 00:43:29,960
Speaker 1: Team six in to fight the Russians when spoilers, the

804
00:43:30,000 --> 00:43:33,560
Speaker 1: Ukrainians have really good Special Forces guys every bit as

805
00:43:33,600 --> 00:43:36,440
Speaker 1: good as ours actually with in a lot of cases

806
00:43:36,560 --> 00:43:39,479
Speaker 1: more experience fighting this kind of war. And we're given

807
00:43:39,480 --> 00:43:41,480
Speaker 1: And it's like, if you want to talk about US involvement,

808
00:43:41,719 --> 00:43:45,280
Speaker 1: we're giving them their weapons. Like we're involved fucking plenty.

809
00:43:45,480 --> 00:43:47,400
Speaker 1: There's just not much of a point in US like

810
00:43:47,760 --> 00:43:52,080
Speaker 1: sending the green fucking Berets into Bakamut, right, Like why

811
00:43:53,320 --> 00:43:56,400
Speaker 1: that doesn't That doesn't help us at all, That doesn't

812
00:43:56,480 --> 00:43:59,880
Speaker 1: like help our government. That's not like good for the military.

813
00:44:00,040 --> 00:44:05,359
Speaker 1: It would be stupid anyway, whatever, anything else to talk

814
00:44:05,400 --> 00:44:05,879
Speaker 1: about here?

815
00:44:06,239 --> 00:44:08,440
Speaker 2: Do we want to talk about the Israel one?

816
00:44:09,280 --> 00:44:11,280
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, no, this is one of the interest although

817
00:44:11,280 --> 00:44:14,280
Speaker 1: it's not again basically one of the things that leaked.

818
00:44:14,320 --> 00:44:16,600
Speaker 1: Is like the US is spying on all of its allies,

819
00:44:16,680 --> 00:44:19,680
Speaker 1: which this leaks every couple of years. We're always spying

820
00:44:19,719 --> 00:44:24,279
Speaker 1: on our allies, including Israel. Israel has spied on US

821
00:44:24,320 --> 00:44:27,319
Speaker 1: a bunch. That's why they have nuclear weapons. Yeah, James,

822
00:44:27,400 --> 00:44:28,120
Speaker 1: you want to talk about this.

823
00:44:28,320 --> 00:44:32,480
Speaker 2: Yeah, So this is a document that basically what it

824
00:44:32,760 --> 00:44:36,560
Speaker 2: alleges is that what has been alleged, perhaps incorrectly, is

825
00:44:36,840 --> 00:44:41,000
Speaker 2: that it was encouraging Mossad staff to attend protests against

826
00:44:41,040 --> 00:44:46,440
Speaker 2: net Yahoo when he was attempting his liketo golpe like

827
00:44:46,480 --> 00:44:49,080
Speaker 2: his coup from within, what do you want to call that? Right,

828
00:44:50,719 --> 00:44:54,080
Speaker 2: he was attempting to centralize power, right, yeah, yeah, yeah,

829
00:44:54,480 --> 00:44:58,040
Speaker 2: Now it's a LEAQD. Like you said, it's a document.

830
00:44:59,000 --> 00:45:02,560
Speaker 2: It says that I'm quoting from it, or I'm quoting

831
00:45:02,560 --> 00:45:05,120
Speaker 2: from reporting on it. At least senior leaders of the

832
00:45:05,160 --> 00:45:09,000
Speaker 2: Mossad spy Service advocated for Mossad officials and Israeli citizens

833
00:45:09,040 --> 00:45:13,040
Speaker 2: to protest the new Israeli governments, proposed judicial reforms, including

834
00:45:13,080 --> 00:45:16,160
Speaker 2: several explicit calls to action that decried the Israeli government.

835
00:45:16,239 --> 00:45:24,200
Speaker 2: According to Singet Signals Intelligence, the Infamy, So actually Netanyahu

836
00:45:24,320 --> 00:45:28,000
Speaker 2: himself has been asked about this, and it's worth he

837
00:45:28,040 --> 00:45:31,160
Speaker 2: appointed the Mossad director, a guy called David I think

838
00:45:31,160 --> 00:45:37,160
Speaker 2: it's Baynya, and he has also he's on the record

839
00:45:37,160 --> 00:45:40,640
Speaker 2: previously in news media before this saying that he had

840
00:45:40,680 --> 00:45:45,279
Speaker 2: clarified to Mosad personnel who could attend protests and who

841
00:45:45,280 --> 00:45:49,480
Speaker 2: could not attend, like because at a certain point in

842
00:45:50,000 --> 00:45:52,080
Speaker 2: any of these things, that you're not allowed to be

843
00:45:52,160 --> 00:45:56,319
Speaker 2: explicitly political, right folks, even at a very low point

844
00:45:56,360 --> 00:45:58,560
Speaker 2: in the US military, Like you're not supposed to say

845
00:45:58,560 --> 00:46:04,799
Speaker 2: and do certain things. So there was a petition that

846
00:46:04,840 --> 00:46:07,480
Speaker 2: went out earlier, and again this has already been reported.

847
00:46:08,880 --> 00:46:12,680
Speaker 2: They that were sent by intelligence offices basically saying like,

848
00:46:13,120 --> 00:46:16,880
Speaker 2: we'll go on strike. And there had been again like

849
00:46:17,360 --> 00:46:21,920
Speaker 2: widely reported instances other Israeli military people saying that they

850
00:46:21,920 --> 00:46:23,720
Speaker 2: would go on strike or not shot up for work

851
00:46:24,280 --> 00:46:28,600
Speaker 2: if these judicial reforms went ahead. So I think again

852
00:46:28,680 --> 00:46:33,720
Speaker 2: it's been kind of we've really stretched. What was interesting

853
00:46:33,800 --> 00:46:36,320
Speaker 2: I thought was that it had a Feiser label on

854
00:46:38,080 --> 00:46:42,160
Speaker 2: FI series to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and if people

855
00:46:42,200 --> 00:46:49,200
Speaker 2: aren't familiar, basically it allows US intelligence to wire tap things,

856
00:46:49,280 --> 00:46:51,920
Speaker 2: which they can do it without warrant if it doesn't

857
00:46:51,960 --> 00:46:56,719
Speaker 2: include a US person. So a US person is not

858
00:46:56,920 --> 00:46:59,560
Speaker 2: just a citizen, but also maybe a permanent resident something

859
00:46:59,640 --> 00:47:02,919
Speaker 2: like that, right, like like a person who has more

860
00:47:03,000 --> 00:47:06,440
Speaker 2: rights than others in the United States. But in this

861
00:47:06,520 --> 00:47:08,320
Speaker 2: case they seem to have got a fis a warrant,

862
00:47:09,239 --> 00:47:11,879
Speaker 2: which it's very easy to get, right. It's like a

863
00:47:11,880 --> 00:47:15,160
Speaker 2: closed courtroom procedure where they go to a judge and

864
00:47:15,280 --> 00:47:19,239
Speaker 2: like it's not like an adversarial argument. Now there's no

865
00:47:19,280 --> 00:47:22,080
Speaker 2: one who argues that you should get the warrant, and

866
00:47:22,160 --> 00:47:26,160
Speaker 2: so in practice they nearly always get these warrants. But

867
00:47:26,680 --> 00:47:28,600
Speaker 2: what it showed they have to just prove it its

868
00:47:28,640 --> 00:47:31,960
Speaker 2: intelligence asset of a foreign power. And so it showed

869
00:47:31,960 --> 00:47:34,040
Speaker 2: that at some point they went for a judge and said, like, hey,

870
00:47:34,280 --> 00:47:40,000
Speaker 2: you know, we need to wiretap some kind of some

871
00:47:40,080 --> 00:47:43,480
Speaker 2: kind of communications or I'm using wiretap in the broad

872
00:47:43,520 --> 00:47:47,759
Speaker 2: sense or specific sense. But it's interesting I think that

873
00:47:47,760 --> 00:47:51,319
Speaker 2: that they have some intelligence asset in the United States

874
00:47:51,360 --> 00:47:53,640
Speaker 2: and said, hey, we know this an Israeli intelligence asset.

875
00:47:53,920 --> 00:47:56,160
Speaker 2: And to be clear that this could just be shits

876
00:47:56,200 --> 00:48:00,760
Speaker 2: going in and out of the embassy that they've decided

877
00:48:00,760 --> 00:48:03,319
Speaker 2: that they needed to wyattap that and keep an eye

878
00:48:03,360 --> 00:48:08,680
Speaker 2: on that now, given given that like it's Rael's foreign

879
00:48:08,680 --> 00:48:11,080
Speaker 2: policies has been talking terrible for decades, but net and

880
00:48:11,160 --> 00:48:14,600
Speaker 2: Yahoo is a new degree of crazy. Uh it is.

881
00:48:14,719 --> 00:48:20,640
Speaker 2: It's unsurprising that like anyone concerned with I guess international

882
00:48:20,680 --> 00:48:23,759
Speaker 2: relations would would want to know more about what is

883
00:48:23,800 --> 00:48:24,239
Speaker 2: going on.

884
00:48:24,719 --> 00:48:27,959
Speaker 1: And again like that's it's interesting context. As you noted,

885
00:48:27,960 --> 00:48:31,680
Speaker 1: a lot of this had been reported out previously, So yeah,

886
00:48:31,719 --> 00:48:38,280
Speaker 1: we're it's it's just like it's it's it's all interesting again.

887
00:48:38,320 --> 00:48:41,239
Speaker 1: I'm my, my, my, My attitude here is like I'm

888
00:48:41,239 --> 00:48:43,680
Speaker 1: glad this information is out and I don't really care

889
00:48:43,760 --> 00:48:47,080
Speaker 1: what happens to Jack tech Sierra. Like yeah, in my

890
00:48:47,280 --> 00:48:52,000
Speaker 1: in my ideal world, the policing infrastructure that's come down

891
00:48:52,040 --> 00:48:57,719
Speaker 1: on this kid would not exist. But he made this

892
00:48:57,800 --> 00:49:01,480
Speaker 1: decision knowing full well what happened when you leak top secretly,

893
00:49:01,480 --> 00:49:03,600
Speaker 1: Like it's one of those things where it's like just

894
00:49:03,600 --> 00:49:05,719
Speaker 1: just within the context of shit that's fucked up in

895
00:49:05,760 --> 00:49:08,200
Speaker 1: our country. The thing I'm going to be upset about

896
00:49:08,320 --> 00:49:12,120
Speaker 1: is not a kid leaking top secret info to win

897
00:49:12,160 --> 00:49:16,759
Speaker 1: an online argument and then having it blow up on him, right, Like,

898
00:49:17,200 --> 00:49:19,239
Speaker 1: especially not a kid who's a fucking Nazi. At the

899
00:49:19,280 --> 00:49:22,200
Speaker 1: end of the day, he did something that was obviously done.

900
00:49:22,239 --> 00:49:25,120
Speaker 1: It's like if some guy hops on Twitter under his

901
00:49:25,160 --> 00:49:28,880
Speaker 1: real name and starts posting pictures of heroin and saying, hey, guys,

902
00:49:29,440 --> 00:49:32,320
Speaker 1: this is my name and address. I'm selling hella heroin.

903
00:49:32,560 --> 00:49:36,120
Speaker 1: Here's photos of a felony quantity of heroin and guns. Well,

904
00:49:36,280 --> 00:49:39,560
Speaker 1: I think heroin should be legal, but I'm not gonna, like,

905
00:49:39,880 --> 00:49:41,839
Speaker 1: I'm not gonna like make a crusade out of that

906
00:49:41,880 --> 00:49:45,360
Speaker 1: guy's arrest because that's stupid. Like, like, you know what

907
00:49:45,480 --> 00:49:48,319
Speaker 1: happens if you post, hey, here is my at home

908
00:49:48,360 --> 00:49:51,799
Speaker 1: address and name. Here is all of the heroin I'm selling. Yeah,

909
00:49:51,840 --> 00:49:55,799
Speaker 1: you'll probably get in trouble because you have posted online

910
00:49:56,040 --> 00:49:59,279
Speaker 1: a serious crime. Obviously that could be a problem for you.

911
00:49:59,680 --> 00:50:02,600
Speaker 1: That's not my primary concern in the world when people

912
00:50:02,640 --> 00:50:05,640
Speaker 1: do really stupid shit and it blows up on them

913
00:50:06,040 --> 00:50:08,799
Speaker 1: and it's like again, leakers, you look at the way

914
00:50:09,160 --> 00:50:12,719
Speaker 1: Manning proceeded, You look at the way Snowden proceeded. They

915
00:50:12,719 --> 00:50:15,160
Speaker 1: were aware of the danger of what they were doing.

916
00:50:15,200 --> 00:50:17,680
Speaker 1: I mean, you know, Chelsea did years in fucking prison.

917
00:50:17,760 --> 00:50:23,200
Speaker 1: Snowden fled the country. That's because because they were whistleblowers,

918
00:50:23,200 --> 00:50:26,600
Speaker 1: they under they under they understood this is a serious

919
00:50:27,000 --> 00:50:29,080
Speaker 1: like this is very illegal, and I have to try

920
00:50:29,080 --> 00:50:33,040
Speaker 1: to take steps to protect myself because the government's going

921
00:50:33,120 --> 00:50:35,319
Speaker 1: to come after me. The thing about Jack is like

922
00:50:35,440 --> 00:50:38,040
Speaker 1: just the level of like arrogance that like I can

923
00:50:38,080 --> 00:50:40,680
Speaker 1: post this shit all day long and nothing will happen.

924
00:50:41,440 --> 00:50:43,960
Speaker 1: It was like, well, for one thing, this is never

925
00:50:44,040 --> 00:50:47,520
Speaker 1: going like it's information you're posting online, Like I don't care.

926
00:50:47,560 --> 00:50:50,400
Speaker 1: There's no way to keep stuff completely contained within a

927
00:50:50,480 --> 00:50:53,359
Speaker 1: thirty person discord. It's going to leak out, and when

928
00:50:53,400 --> 00:50:55,480
Speaker 1: it is, the government's gonna want to know who the

929
00:50:55,520 --> 00:50:58,520
Speaker 1: fuck is leaking this ship. And you took like took

930
00:50:58,600 --> 00:51:02,400
Speaker 1: pictures of this shit inside his home, Like it's just dumb.

931
00:51:02,480 --> 00:51:05,040
Speaker 1: I'm not gonna like I don't at the end of

932
00:51:05,080 --> 00:51:08,160
Speaker 1: the day, I have no room in my sympathy for

933
00:51:08,239 --> 00:51:12,240
Speaker 1: like a fucking fascy kid who committed the dumbest crime

934
00:51:12,280 --> 00:51:14,439
Speaker 1: possible and got in trouble, Like I don't know. There's

935
00:51:14,520 --> 00:51:17,440
Speaker 1: there's people who I don't know. For example, we're camping

936
00:51:17,440 --> 00:51:20,040
Speaker 1: in a forest and are getting charged with terrorism and

937
00:51:20,120 --> 00:51:24,600
Speaker 1: facing longer penalties, Right, Jack might do fifteen years at

938
00:51:24,640 --> 00:51:26,680
Speaker 1: the most, which is like fucked up, I guess. But

939
00:51:27,239 --> 00:51:30,400
Speaker 1: you know, there's people facing a lot worse for a

940
00:51:30,440 --> 00:51:35,120
Speaker 1: lot less, and I just, you know, whatever, I don't

941
00:51:35,160 --> 00:51:38,040
Speaker 1: care what happens to this kid. He seems like he sucks.

942
00:51:39,040 --> 00:51:42,080
Speaker 1: I think the leaks are interesting. There's nothing in here

943
00:51:42,120 --> 00:51:48,080
Speaker 1: that's like fundamentally changed my understanding of geopolitics though. Yeah,

944
00:51:48,080 --> 00:51:48,759
Speaker 1: that's where I am.

945
00:51:48,800 --> 00:51:51,200
Speaker 2: I would agree. It is a useful reminder to keep

946
00:51:51,200 --> 00:51:52,160
Speaker 2: your crime offline.

947
00:51:52,680 --> 00:51:59,560
Speaker 1: Yeah, don't continue, continue to not post crimes on the internet.

948
00:52:00,239 --> 00:52:03,279
Speaker 1: If you're selling heroin, don't post on Twitter. Here is

949
00:52:03,320 --> 00:52:05,520
Speaker 1: my name and home address. Anyone want to buy some

950
00:52:05,600 --> 00:52:09,120
Speaker 1: fucking China white, that's not a great idea.

951
00:52:09,560 --> 00:52:12,680
Speaker 3: If anyone has any top secret documents, you can find

952
00:52:12,680 --> 00:52:16,080
Speaker 3: me on the Star Wars the Old Republic forums. Just

953
00:52:16,080 --> 00:52:19,480
Speaker 3: just post, just post them there. Yeah, I am part

954
00:52:19,560 --> 00:52:23,000
Speaker 3: of the Jedi Initiative program, So just locate that and

955
00:52:23,200 --> 00:52:25,560
Speaker 3: it'll be I'm sure, I'm sure I'll see it.

956
00:52:25,880 --> 00:52:29,640
Speaker 1: Yeah, I am on the the the Nozdormo server on

957
00:52:29,760 --> 00:52:32,600
Speaker 1: World of Warcraft. You can just hit me up under

958
00:52:32,680 --> 00:52:36,239
Speaker 1: my U my given name. Just dm me and we'll

959
00:52:36,239 --> 00:52:37,880
Speaker 1: figure it out. You can send that ship to me

960
00:52:37,960 --> 00:52:41,040
Speaker 1: over AOL instant messenger. That's how I take all of

961
00:52:41,120 --> 00:52:43,600
Speaker 1: my leaks. The most secure platform.

962
00:52:44,000 --> 00:52:46,400
Speaker 2: You can find me in a Mountain Project comment section

963
00:52:46,440 --> 00:52:47,640
Speaker 2: where any good things happen.

964
00:52:47,760 --> 00:52:52,040
Speaker 1: So we're all on war Thunder too, so you can

965
00:52:52,080 --> 00:52:56,040
Speaker 1: get there too for work reasons. Yeah, I'll be shipped talking.

966
00:52:55,800 --> 00:52:59,680
Speaker 2: Your your grading on a problem, but also accepting national

967
00:52:59,680 --> 00:53:00,480
Speaker 2: security two weeks.

968
00:53:01,080 --> 00:53:04,440
Speaker 1: Yeah, we do, We do it all, all right, everybody.

969
00:53:04,480 --> 00:53:21,320
Speaker 1: That's an episode, Hello podcast Enjoys.

970
00:53:21,440 --> 00:53:26,080
Speaker 2: It's me James today and I am joined again by mo.

971
00:53:27,080 --> 00:53:31,840
Speaker 2: They are an educator, attorney, abolitionist, and they serve overlapping

972
00:53:31,840 --> 00:53:35,480
Speaker 2: communities of activists, queer people, and prisoners. And we've heard

973
00:53:35,480 --> 00:53:38,320
Speaker 2: from them before. We have from them about June eleventh,

974
00:53:38,320 --> 00:53:40,239
Speaker 2: but today we're talking about something a little different. We're

975
00:53:40,239 --> 00:53:44,879
Speaker 2: talking about redistributing power in the attorney client relationship. How

976
00:53:44,920 --> 00:53:45,160
Speaker 2: are you.

977
00:53:46,600 --> 00:53:48,400
Speaker 7: I'm doing okay. How are you, James?

978
00:53:49,560 --> 00:53:55,839
Speaker 2: I'm existing, I'm fine, I'm thriving. So, yeah, you wanted

979
00:53:55,840 --> 00:53:58,279
Speaker 2: to talk today? He reached out to talk about this.

980
00:53:58,320 --> 00:54:01,000
Speaker 2: I think it's a really interesting topic and one that,

981
00:54:01,120 --> 00:54:05,880
Speaker 2: like I've become increasingly more aware of in my coverage

982
00:54:06,000 --> 00:54:10,759
Speaker 2: of some sort of different stuff. That's various prosecutions, I

983
00:54:10,760 --> 00:54:14,120
Speaker 2: guess in the US, and so I was very interested

984
00:54:14,160 --> 00:54:17,120
Speaker 2: in this. Can you preps like start out by explaining

985
00:54:18,360 --> 00:54:20,719
Speaker 2: what it is exactly that you want you wanted to

986
00:54:20,760 --> 00:54:23,680
Speaker 2: discuss within the attorney client relationship.

987
00:54:24,160 --> 00:54:28,560
Speaker 7: Yeah, sure. I wanted to talk about building a trusting

988
00:54:28,800 --> 00:54:33,120
Speaker 7: relationship with your attorney where you feel heard and respected

989
00:54:33,719 --> 00:54:36,879
Speaker 7: and understand what you have a right to expect from

990
00:54:36,960 --> 00:54:42,080
Speaker 7: your attorney and feel empowered to push for it. And

991
00:54:42,280 --> 00:54:45,920
Speaker 7: this actually I want to address this both from the

992
00:54:46,000 --> 00:54:51,480
Speaker 7: side of the client, particularly for people who are accused

993
00:54:51,480 --> 00:54:55,360
Speaker 7: of criminal offenses, and I also want to speak a

994
00:54:55,360 --> 00:54:59,000
Speaker 7: little bit to the people who may be representing folks

995
00:54:59,120 --> 00:55:03,560
Speaker 7: who are accused criminal offenses. For people accused of criminal offenses,

996
00:55:04,120 --> 00:55:06,640
Speaker 7: I want to make sure that anyone in that position

997
00:55:07,320 --> 00:55:10,359
Speaker 7: really understands what you have a right to expect from

998
00:55:10,400 --> 00:55:13,560
Speaker 7: that relationship and to feel really confident asking for it.

999
00:55:13,880 --> 00:55:19,640
Speaker 7: For people who are representing individuals who are politically radical

1000
00:55:19,719 --> 00:55:24,439
Speaker 7: or people who are facing politically motivated prosecutions, I want

1001
00:55:24,480 --> 00:55:28,400
Speaker 7: those attorneys to feel safe and ethically empowered to practice

1002
00:55:28,440 --> 00:55:31,480
Speaker 7: criminal defense in a way that honors the goals of

1003
00:55:32,160 --> 00:55:37,520
Speaker 7: clients who may define their legal interests not with respect

1004
00:55:37,680 --> 00:55:43,279
Speaker 7: to only their own personal liability, but with respect to

1005
00:55:43,360 --> 00:55:48,120
Speaker 7: a larger set of principles or a larger community.

1006
00:55:48,239 --> 00:55:50,799
Speaker 2: Yeah, I think, yeah, that's a very it's a good

1007
00:55:50,840 --> 00:55:53,279
Speaker 2: distinction to draw, and I think a good thing for

1008
00:55:53,560 --> 00:55:57,120
Speaker 2: people to be thinking about. So why is this sort

1009
00:55:57,160 --> 00:55:59,320
Speaker 2: of a topic that's important right now?

1010
00:56:01,400 --> 00:56:05,000
Speaker 7: Well, so, I certainly don't want to say that participating

1011
00:56:05,000 --> 00:56:09,200
Speaker 7: in protests or in social movements is dangerous, or that

1012
00:56:09,280 --> 00:56:12,160
Speaker 7: it's even more dangerous than it has been in the past,

1013
00:56:13,640 --> 00:56:18,520
Speaker 7: but I am concerned that we might be seeing some

1014
00:56:18,760 --> 00:56:23,040
Speaker 7: arrests and charges that are a little more unhinged than

1015
00:56:23,080 --> 00:56:27,239
Speaker 7: we've seen in a while. So this isn't new, but

1016
00:56:27,360 --> 00:56:30,839
Speaker 7: it may be new to a newer generation of activists.

1017
00:56:32,000 --> 00:56:34,040
Speaker 7: And I think some of the community knowledge that was

1018
00:56:34,080 --> 00:56:38,560
Speaker 7: cultivated and held twenty or thirty years ago maybe outdated,

1019
00:56:38,719 --> 00:56:42,360
Speaker 7: or it might be inaccessible to folks who weren't involved

1020
00:56:42,640 --> 00:56:44,839
Speaker 7: back then, or maybe who weren't involved in things that

1021
00:56:44,920 --> 00:56:48,919
Speaker 7: were like subject to this level of state repression twenty

1022
00:56:49,040 --> 00:56:53,160
Speaker 7: or thirty years ago. So that includes activists, but it

1023
00:56:53,200 --> 00:56:58,040
Speaker 7: also includes even very experienced criminal defense attorneys who maybe

1024
00:56:58,080 --> 00:57:01,680
Speaker 7: haven't interacted with these kinds of pressingcutions, you know, for

1025
00:57:01,719 --> 00:57:04,840
Speaker 7: whatever reason, because they were doing a different area of practice,

1026
00:57:05,920 --> 00:57:10,560
Speaker 7: maybe because this what was happening to the people they

1027
00:57:10,600 --> 00:57:16,600
Speaker 7: were representing in the geographic area where they practice, or

1028
00:57:16,920 --> 00:57:19,960
Speaker 7: like it wasn't happening at the time that they were practicing.

1029
00:57:20,520 --> 00:57:22,880
Speaker 7: So I think that people on both sides of the

1030
00:57:22,880 --> 00:57:26,919
Speaker 7: attorney client relationship could benefit from considering that there are

1031
00:57:27,000 --> 00:57:32,000
Speaker 7: some maybe important and time tested methods of working to

1032
00:57:32,120 --> 00:57:36,400
Speaker 7: mount a collaborative defense in the context of a politically

1033
00:57:36,480 --> 00:57:37,480
Speaker 7: motivated prosecution.

1034
00:57:38,160 --> 00:57:41,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, I think that's just to kind of piggyback off

1035
00:57:41,120 --> 00:57:44,600
Speaker 2: what you said. I think it's incredibly valuable. Often, like

1036
00:57:44,680 --> 00:57:48,480
Speaker 2: if you've been part of social movements, protest movements, what

1037
00:57:48,520 --> 00:57:51,360
Speaker 2: if you want to call it, like for a long time.

1038
00:57:51,480 --> 00:57:55,600
Speaker 2: Often we do have to learn things like the institutional

1039
00:57:55,640 --> 00:57:58,880
Speaker 2: memory of movements can be quite short, and a lot

1040
00:57:59,000 --> 00:58:03,200
Speaker 2: of people have come to the protest movement now who

1041
00:58:03,200 --> 00:58:06,560
Speaker 2: were not, like in my own case, like involved in

1042
00:58:06,640 --> 00:58:10,320
Speaker 2: sort of the campaign against neoliberal globalization in the early

1043
00:58:10,320 --> 00:58:13,320
Speaker 2: two thousands, where we screwed up a lot and learned

1044
00:58:13,320 --> 00:58:16,200
Speaker 2: a lot, and some of us are still around, and

1045
00:58:16,760 --> 00:58:19,960
Speaker 2: some of us are not sadly yet because part of

1046
00:58:20,440 --> 00:58:24,080
Speaker 2: the screw ups that that happened, and like a lot

1047
00:58:24,080 --> 00:58:26,840
Speaker 2: of people understandably right have been radicalized by having their

1048
00:58:26,880 --> 00:58:30,880
Speaker 2: bodily autonomy attacked by seeing the cops continue to murder

1049
00:58:30,880 --> 00:58:32,440
Speaker 2: people after we all got in the streets and got

1050
00:58:32,440 --> 00:58:34,720
Speaker 2: shot with robb bullets to ask them to stop murdering people.

1051
00:58:35,080 --> 00:58:40,160
Speaker 2: Like all these things that have understandably made people realize

1052
00:58:40,160 --> 00:58:44,400
Speaker 2: that the institutional the institutions haven't really responded to their

1053
00:58:44,400 --> 00:58:48,000
Speaker 2: demands for basic human decency, and so yeah, they might

1054
00:58:48,040 --> 00:58:51,720
Speaker 2: find themselves out in the streets and government doesn't generally

1055
00:58:51,760 --> 00:58:56,280
Speaker 2: yield power willingly, and certainly government right now is doing

1056
00:58:56,320 --> 00:58:59,760
Speaker 2: everything to kind of take what little liberty and autonomy

1057
00:58:59,800 --> 00:59:04,160
Speaker 2: folk have slice into that. So it's very reasonable to

1058
00:59:04,240 --> 00:59:09,560
Speaker 2: consider these things. So if in this attorney client relationship,

1059
00:59:09,840 --> 00:59:16,480
Speaker 2: what would be some areas of friction or of maybe

1060
00:59:16,520 --> 00:59:18,920
Speaker 2: I'm phrasing that wrong, but like places where people might

1061
00:59:18,960 --> 00:59:21,120
Speaker 2: want to advocate for themselves in order to get an

1062
00:59:21,120 --> 00:59:22,720
Speaker 2: outcome that they desire.

1063
00:59:24,560 --> 00:59:30,120
Speaker 7: Right, Well, so I'll certainly get more into the specifics,

1064
00:59:30,560 --> 00:59:33,440
Speaker 7: but I guess you know, I want to talk about

1065
00:59:33,480 --> 00:59:42,080
Speaker 7: this because I am seeing disconnects between people in these relationships,

1066
00:59:42,720 --> 00:59:45,320
Speaker 7: and just from where I sit, I feel like I

1067
00:59:45,360 --> 00:59:50,680
Speaker 7: can see what's going wrong, and I think that there

1068
00:59:50,680 --> 00:59:55,440
Speaker 7: are some straightforward solutions, and I think that having compassion

1069
00:59:55,560 --> 00:59:59,160
Speaker 7: each each party having compassion for the other can be

1070
00:59:59,240 --> 01:00:02,600
Speaker 7: really useful here. So I think like one thing that's

1071
01:00:02,680 --> 01:00:05,720
Speaker 7: happening is that attorneys are very much educated to be

1072
01:00:05,920 --> 01:00:11,959
Speaker 7: confident unto the point of arrogance, and clients often either

1073
01:00:12,080 --> 01:00:15,840
Speaker 7: don't feel authorized to push back on their attorney's ideas,

1074
01:00:16,040 --> 01:00:19,959
Speaker 7: or they do and attorneys to then just maybe steamroll them.

1075
01:00:20,800 --> 01:00:27,400
Speaker 7: And this is not entirely because attorneys are assholes. I

1076
01:00:27,440 --> 01:00:30,120
Speaker 7: think it is because criminal defense attorneys are very often

1077
01:00:30,120 --> 01:00:35,600
Speaker 7: taught to minimize their clients' legal liability by any means necessary, well,

1078
01:00:35,680 --> 01:00:38,120
Speaker 7: by any lawful means. I guess that is what I

1079
01:00:38,120 --> 01:00:43,240
Speaker 7: should say. So for criminal defense attorneys who do not

1080
01:00:43,440 --> 01:00:48,080
Speaker 7: primarily work with movement aligned clients, this often means negotiating

1081
01:00:48,120 --> 01:00:52,120
Speaker 7: deals with the prosecution that involve cooperating with the state's investigation,

1082
01:00:53,800 --> 01:00:58,960
Speaker 7: handing over information on your confederates, putting the client in

1083
01:00:59,040 --> 01:01:03,120
Speaker 7: an isolated or adversarial position with their co defendants or

1084
01:01:03,120 --> 01:01:07,280
Speaker 7: co arrestees, or doing things that require a person to

1085
01:01:07,400 --> 01:01:11,040
Speaker 7: renounce or disparage the people or the communities that they've

1086
01:01:11,080 --> 01:01:15,560
Speaker 7: been involved with that they come from. And I think

1087
01:01:15,560 --> 01:01:19,360
Speaker 7: it's true that using these kinds of tactics to minimize

1088
01:01:19,440 --> 01:01:23,160
Speaker 7: your own legal risk is very often what people charged

1089
01:01:23,200 --> 01:01:29,280
Speaker 7: with criminal offenses want, But that sort of approach is

1090
01:01:29,320 --> 01:01:33,600
Speaker 7: often at odds with movement values, and it's often totally

1091
01:01:33,640 --> 01:01:38,760
Speaker 7: inconsistent with what activists want. Activists want when they are

1092
01:01:38,800 --> 01:01:46,320
Speaker 7: facing charges. So, you know, trying to minimize legal consequences is,

1093
01:01:47,200 --> 01:01:50,080
Speaker 7: you know, certainly always a part of our job, and

1094
01:01:50,120 --> 01:01:53,560
Speaker 7: it's often a totally valid thing for lawyers to be doing.

1095
01:01:53,720 --> 01:01:57,600
Speaker 7: But the idea that an attorney's job is solely to

1096
01:01:57,800 --> 01:02:04,680
Speaker 7: mitigate legal fallout is not actually entirely accurate. What lawyers

1097
01:02:04,680 --> 01:02:06,920
Speaker 7: are supposed to do is work with the client to

1098
01:02:07,000 --> 01:02:11,280
Speaker 7: help the client articulate their goals, and then the attorney

1099
01:02:11,280 --> 01:02:15,160
Speaker 7: should use their expertise and their experience to help the

1100
01:02:15,200 --> 01:02:19,560
Speaker 7: client lawfully pursue those goals. And that's what attorneys are

1101
01:02:19,600 --> 01:02:21,960
Speaker 7: supposed to do in every case. But I think it

1102
01:02:22,040 --> 01:02:28,560
Speaker 7: often becomes most salient when the client's goals are less

1103
01:02:28,640 --> 01:02:33,640
Speaker 7: focused on minimizing legal consequences and more focused on, for example,

1104
01:02:34,000 --> 01:02:37,840
Speaker 7: highlighting movement messages or acting in solidarity with other people

1105
01:02:37,840 --> 01:02:42,000
Speaker 7: who are facing similar charges. So you know, again, I'm

1106
01:02:42,040 --> 01:02:45,440
Speaker 7: talking about this right now in the context of explicitly

1107
01:02:45,560 --> 01:02:49,880
Speaker 7: politically motivated prosecution, but frankly, the goals of the client

1108
01:02:49,960 --> 01:02:51,520
Speaker 7: have to lead in all cases.

1109
01:02:52,680 --> 01:02:56,160
Speaker 2: Yeah, of course. So one thing that we've chatted, that

1110
01:02:56,280 --> 01:02:59,480
Speaker 2: little bit that I think maybe folks in some areas

1111
01:02:59,480 --> 01:03:01,640
Speaker 2: that I've looked at might not have been aware of.

1112
01:03:01,760 --> 01:03:06,280
Speaker 2: It's a concept of a joint defense. Could you explain

1113
01:03:06,440 --> 01:03:08,600
Speaker 2: for people who aren't familiar what that looks like.

1114
01:03:09,600 --> 01:03:16,040
Speaker 7: So, a joint defense is a way of approaching a

1115
01:03:16,120 --> 01:03:23,680
Speaker 7: legal case where there are multiple defendants or multiple arrestees. Typically,

1116
01:03:24,200 --> 01:03:27,400
Speaker 7: in a criminal case, if you have multiple defendants, there's

1117
01:03:27,440 --> 01:03:30,840
Speaker 7: sort of a presumption that their interests are at odds

1118
01:03:30,880 --> 01:03:36,080
Speaker 7: with each other, that you know, one of them or

1119
01:03:36,120 --> 01:03:37,920
Speaker 7: one or more of them is going to get thrown

1120
01:03:38,000 --> 01:03:43,640
Speaker 7: under the bus to reduce the punishment of one or

1121
01:03:43,640 --> 01:03:48,560
Speaker 7: more of the others. When we're talking about something like

1122
01:03:48,640 --> 01:03:52,280
Speaker 7: a mass arrest or an arrest that takes place in

1123
01:03:52,280 --> 01:03:55,920
Speaker 7: the context of a social movement where there are multiple defendants,

1124
01:03:56,120 --> 01:03:59,080
Speaker 7: very often those people do not see their interests at

1125
01:03:59,440 --> 01:04:02,600
Speaker 7: being an odds with each other. Very often they see

1126
01:04:02,640 --> 01:04:08,760
Speaker 7: their interests as being unified, and so they want to

1127
01:04:08,960 --> 01:04:11,520
Speaker 7: act in solidarity with each other. And there are a

1128
01:04:11,600 --> 01:04:17,840
Speaker 7: bunch of reasons for this that are legal, and they're

1129
01:04:17,840 --> 01:04:23,600
Speaker 7: also political and social reasons, right, just in terms of

1130
01:04:24,240 --> 01:04:30,320
Speaker 7: people you know, having carrying social relationships. They often have

1131
01:04:30,440 --> 01:04:34,360
Speaker 7: commitments to each other and to community. But politically, people

1132
01:04:34,440 --> 01:04:40,840
Speaker 7: often feel that their individual legal interests are less the

1133
01:04:41,080 --> 01:04:44,360
Speaker 7: important thing that's at stake, and that the thing that's

1134
01:04:44,400 --> 01:04:48,000
Speaker 7: at stake is actually the health and welfare of their

1135
01:04:48,040 --> 01:04:53,240
Speaker 7: social movement, right, and that if they did do something

1136
01:04:53,280 --> 01:04:56,840
Speaker 7: like cooperate with the state's investigation, they would actually be

1137
01:04:57,160 --> 01:05:02,760
Speaker 7: undermining their larger social movement goals. Legally, and this is

1138
01:05:02,800 --> 01:05:08,840
Speaker 7: really important legally, having a joint defense agreement or using

1139
01:05:08,920 --> 01:05:14,400
Speaker 7: a joint defense approach allows all of those people to

1140
01:05:14,560 --> 01:05:18,600
Speaker 7: work together in a privileged context, right because they share

1141
01:05:18,640 --> 01:05:22,400
Speaker 7: a unity of interest, and so they and their attorneys

1142
01:05:22,440 --> 01:05:25,880
Speaker 7: are able to work on legal strategy together, are able

1143
01:05:25,920 --> 01:05:30,400
Speaker 7: to do things like negotiate for non cooperating plea agreements

1144
01:05:30,720 --> 01:05:34,400
Speaker 7: as a block, are able to just have you know,

1145
01:05:35,040 --> 01:05:39,520
Speaker 7: more eyes on the problem, more people doing legal research,

1146
01:05:39,840 --> 01:05:45,400
Speaker 7: more people drafting motions, right, and so in a very

1147
01:05:45,520 --> 01:05:54,160
Speaker 7: material sense, this is often a legal strategy. Working together

1148
01:05:56,280 --> 01:06:01,120
Speaker 7: actually leads to better legal outcomes for every body involved.

1149
01:06:01,360 --> 01:06:05,680
Speaker 7: So I want to be clear that this approach, both

1150
01:06:06,880 --> 01:06:10,600
Speaker 7: you know, using joint defense agreements and using that approach,

1151
01:06:10,640 --> 01:06:14,840
Speaker 7: but also just in terms of an individual attorney client relationship,

1152
01:06:15,280 --> 01:06:19,400
Speaker 7: acting in a way that's more collaborative is not just cosmetic,

1153
01:06:19,880 --> 01:06:21,919
Speaker 7: and it's not just something that makes you feel good

1154
01:06:21,960 --> 01:06:26,040
Speaker 7: if you're someone who's committed to anti authoritarian principles. In

1155
01:06:26,080 --> 01:06:30,480
Speaker 7: a material way, approaching the attorney client relationship in a

1156
01:06:30,560 --> 01:06:34,840
Speaker 7: way that is calculated to more fully incorporate the goals

1157
01:06:35,320 --> 01:06:41,560
Speaker 7: and expertise of the client or of many clients leads

1158
01:06:41,640 --> 01:06:47,960
Speaker 7: to better legal outcomes, less punitive outcomes. It leads to

1159
01:06:48,040 --> 01:06:52,280
Speaker 7: outcomes that are more closely aligned with client values, and

1160
01:06:52,320 --> 01:06:56,160
Speaker 7: it leads to outcomes that are better understood by the client,

1161
01:06:56,280 --> 01:06:57,680
Speaker 7: even if those outcomes are.

1162
01:06:57,720 --> 01:07:01,440
Speaker 2: Bad, right, yeah, yeah, least they're part of that process.

1163
01:07:01,480 --> 01:07:03,600
Speaker 2: And I think a great example of joint defense that

1164
01:07:03,640 --> 01:07:08,880
Speaker 2: we discussed would be the J twenty case. Right, If

1165
01:07:08,920 --> 01:07:12,280
Speaker 2: I'm not mistaken, it was a group of folks who

1166
01:07:12,400 --> 01:07:16,440
Speaker 2: were tried together or who amounted to joint defense I

1167
01:07:16,440 --> 01:07:22,680
Speaker 2: guess against charges that were like fouled against some Trump's inauguration.

1168
01:07:23,280 --> 01:07:29,200
Speaker 7: It was something they were cattled in DC protesting Trump's inauguration,

1169
01:07:29,880 --> 01:07:32,800
Speaker 7: and there were more than two hundred people arrested in

1170
01:07:33,200 --> 01:07:39,080
Speaker 7: this mass arrest, and they had a very coordinated defense,

1171
01:07:39,120 --> 01:07:44,600
Speaker 7: and they all worked together, and ultimately, I'm going to say,

1172
01:07:44,600 --> 01:07:49,640
Speaker 7: in large part because they had so many eyes on

1173
01:07:49,680 --> 01:07:53,240
Speaker 7: the problem, they had so many people working on it,

1174
01:07:53,360 --> 01:07:56,520
Speaker 7: they were able to really go through discovery, go through

1175
01:07:56,560 --> 01:08:04,160
Speaker 7: the state's evidence against them, and find prosecutorial misconduct that

1176
01:08:05,160 --> 01:08:09,439
Speaker 7: led to the favorable resolution of those cases. The other

1177
01:08:09,560 --> 01:08:12,280
Speaker 7: thing that they did is that they really all refused

1178
01:08:12,600 --> 01:08:18,439
Speaker 7: to cooperate with the state's investigation, which limited the harm

1179
01:08:18,520 --> 01:08:22,880
Speaker 7: that was done to larger social movements because it meant

1180
01:08:22,920 --> 01:08:25,439
Speaker 7: that people were not just rolling over on each other

1181
01:08:25,880 --> 01:08:31,160
Speaker 7: and giving the state information to which it was not entitled, right,

1182
01:08:31,280 --> 01:08:36,360
Speaker 7: like you know, information about people's relationships or interpersonal conflicts,

1183
01:08:36,680 --> 01:08:43,240
Speaker 7: or you know, different kinds of First Amendment protected information

1184
01:08:43,320 --> 01:08:46,640
Speaker 7: that the state always wants to have about activists but

1185
01:08:47,200 --> 01:08:53,000
Speaker 7: which they actually are not entitled to, but which they

1186
01:08:53,080 --> 01:08:58,040
Speaker 7: often end up getting because people who are facing criminal charges.

1187
01:08:58,800 --> 01:09:05,160
Speaker 7: You know, sometimes will will offer that up in exchange

1188
01:09:05,320 --> 01:09:10,560
Speaker 7: for you know, what they hope will be some lenience.

1189
01:09:11,360 --> 01:09:14,519
Speaker 2: I think that was a really good explanation of of

1190
01:09:14,560 --> 01:09:17,639
Speaker 2: how these techniques, like you say, they're not just cosmetic.

1191
01:09:17,680 --> 01:09:21,800
Speaker 2: It's not posturing or an aesthetic thing. It can result

1192
01:09:21,840 --> 01:09:25,360
Speaker 2: in material benefits as well as aligning with your moral desires.

1193
01:09:26,640 --> 01:09:31,200
Speaker 2: Can you explain substantively then, how this looks in an

1194
01:09:31,200 --> 01:09:34,400
Speaker 2: attorney client relationship, either with an individual or as a group,

1195
01:09:34,479 --> 01:09:35,760
Speaker 2: Matt your joint defense.

1196
01:09:38,479 --> 01:09:42,160
Speaker 7: So, you know, like any other relationship that's predicated on

1197
01:09:42,240 --> 01:09:47,080
Speaker 7: anti authoritarian principles and shared values of mutual aid and

1198
01:09:47,120 --> 01:09:54,720
Speaker 7: self determination, it requires building trust. It requires clear expectations,

1199
01:09:54,800 --> 01:10:00,040
Speaker 7: honest communication, respect for each other's expertise and consent. And

1200
01:10:00,080 --> 01:10:04,240
Speaker 7: I think, you know, the piece that I think is

1201
01:10:04,280 --> 01:10:09,479
Speaker 7: sometimes missing is a real understanding from both parties that

1202
01:10:09,600 --> 01:10:12,839
Speaker 7: the accused is the person who has rights and liberty

1203
01:10:12,920 --> 01:10:17,160
Speaker 7: on the line. The accused is the person whose goals matter.

1204
01:10:17,640 --> 01:10:19,639
Speaker 7: The accused is the person who needs to be able

1205
01:10:19,680 --> 01:10:21,840
Speaker 7: to make decisions about things like whether or not to

1206
01:10:21,920 --> 01:10:24,439
Speaker 7: accept a plea offer, whether or not to cooperate with

1207
01:10:24,520 --> 01:10:28,120
Speaker 7: the state, whether or not to go to trial and

1208
01:10:28,160 --> 01:10:31,519
Speaker 7: whether or not to testify a trial. The attorney is

1209
01:10:31,520 --> 01:10:34,760
Speaker 7: presumably the person who has a lot of expertise with

1210
01:10:35,120 --> 01:10:37,920
Speaker 7: the law and a lot of experience with the legal system,

1211
01:10:37,960 --> 01:10:43,000
Speaker 7: and that is valuable and important. But you know it,

1212
01:10:43,080 --> 01:10:46,080
Speaker 7: really I want people who are facing criminal charges to

1213
01:10:46,200 --> 01:10:51,240
Speaker 7: understand how much power they ought to feel comfortable exercising

1214
01:10:51,280 --> 01:10:55,320
Speaker 7: in this relationship. You know, it is up to the

1215
01:10:55,439 --> 01:10:58,240
Speaker 7: accused whether they want their attorney to take part in

1216
01:10:58,240 --> 01:11:02,280
Speaker 7: a joint defense strategy. Now we are seeing some stuff.

1217
01:11:03,000 --> 01:11:08,360
Speaker 7: I have recently seen some bond conditions imposed on people

1218
01:11:08,400 --> 01:11:12,280
Speaker 7: facing criminal charges that appear to me to make it

1219
01:11:12,520 --> 01:11:18,400
Speaker 7: very difficult for attorneys to engage in a joint defense

1220
01:11:18,439 --> 01:11:22,280
Speaker 7: strategy because sometimes it looks like these co defendants are

1221
01:11:22,320 --> 01:11:28,280
Speaker 7: being forbidden from communicating with each other, and so, you know,

1222
01:11:28,880 --> 01:11:31,840
Speaker 7: that is an interesting wrinkle. But one of the things

1223
01:11:31,920 --> 01:11:34,040
Speaker 7: that can mean is that it's up to the accused

1224
01:11:34,080 --> 01:11:37,120
Speaker 7: whether they need their attorney to go and argue to

1225
01:11:37,200 --> 01:11:39,080
Speaker 7: have that bond condition removed.

1226
01:11:39,160 --> 01:11:41,639
Speaker 2: Right, Yeah, I thought of that, But there are definitely

1227
01:11:42,000 --> 01:11:45,639
Speaker 2: especially if you are being proscuted in a group it's

1228
01:11:45,640 --> 01:11:49,240
Speaker 2: alleged to you've conspired to do something illegal, then yes,

1229
01:11:49,240 --> 01:11:51,240
Speaker 2: that might be condition of your bond, and that would

1230
01:11:51,280 --> 01:11:54,000
Speaker 2: make it very hard to do a joint defense. But

1231
01:11:54,640 --> 01:11:57,640
Speaker 2: like you said, that's when you should feel empowered to

1232
01:11:57,640 --> 01:12:01,040
Speaker 2: ask your attorney to stop that from being a thing.

1233
01:12:01,160 --> 01:12:05,639
Speaker 7: Right, Right, the person who's facing charges gets to make

1234
01:12:05,680 --> 01:12:09,200
Speaker 7: these decisions, right, And I'm saying, well, it's your right

1235
01:12:09,240 --> 01:12:11,599
Speaker 7: to decide whether to be involved in a joint defense.

1236
01:12:11,640 --> 01:12:14,519
Speaker 7: It's also your right to decide not to be. You

1237
01:12:14,560 --> 01:12:19,680
Speaker 7: can absolutely exercise your right to independent counsel, meaning the

1238
01:12:19,760 --> 01:12:22,719
Speaker 7: right to have an attorney who is not representing anyone

1239
01:12:22,760 --> 01:12:25,080
Speaker 7: else who's involved in your case, like who is not

1240
01:12:25,280 --> 01:12:28,960
Speaker 7: in any way connected to a co defendant or co arrest. Now,

1241
01:12:29,080 --> 01:12:30,880
Speaker 7: this is not to say that your attorney has to

1242
01:12:30,920 --> 01:12:33,120
Speaker 7: do everything you want and they're just a yes man,

1243
01:12:33,479 --> 01:12:36,839
Speaker 7: and that if they decline to do everything you instruct

1244
01:12:36,840 --> 01:12:39,960
Speaker 7: them to do, that you should fire them. You know,

1245
01:12:40,040 --> 01:12:43,640
Speaker 7: attorneys do have to operate under certain constraints, and this

1246
01:12:44,600 --> 01:12:48,479
Speaker 7: ranges from things like, you know, some law is not

1247
01:12:48,920 --> 01:12:53,880
Speaker 7: relevant to this case. Right. I've occasionally had clients ask

1248
01:12:54,000 --> 01:12:58,320
Speaker 7: me to use the uniform commercial Code to defend their

1249
01:12:58,360 --> 01:13:04,200
Speaker 7: criminal cases, which is not a thing. And you know,

1250
01:13:04,400 --> 01:13:06,720
Speaker 7: I've also had clients ask me to like hold have

1251
01:13:06,840 --> 01:13:09,840
Speaker 7: a hearing or vile emotion at a time when like

1252
01:13:09,920 --> 01:13:14,840
Speaker 7: procedurally that's not permissible, right, So you know, you can't

1253
01:13:14,880 --> 01:13:20,000
Speaker 7: just do everything that the client says. But look, typically

1254
01:13:20,240 --> 01:13:23,840
Speaker 7: the attorney has control over legal strategy because you know,

1255
01:13:23,880 --> 01:13:26,479
Speaker 7: as I said, presumably they have expertise with the law.

1256
01:13:28,160 --> 01:13:32,600
Speaker 7: But like, even if you have decided that you're just

1257
01:13:32,680 --> 01:13:36,560
Speaker 7: going to defer to your attorney entirely in matters of strategy,

1258
01:13:37,920 --> 01:13:39,840
Speaker 7: or even if you have an attorney who's like not

1259
01:13:40,120 --> 01:13:44,160
Speaker 7: super comfortable involving you in strategy to the degree that

1260
01:13:44,280 --> 01:13:49,000
Speaker 7: like I might be, at a minimum, the attorney needs

1261
01:13:49,040 --> 01:13:51,960
Speaker 7: to be able to explain their strategy to you and

1262
01:13:52,240 --> 01:13:55,600
Speaker 7: justify it right. So you know, again there needs to

1263
01:13:55,600 --> 01:13:58,920
Speaker 7: be mutual trust and respect for each other. So expertise,

1264
01:14:00,439 --> 01:14:03,160
Speaker 7: they're not just a mouthpiece. But if you feel like

1265
01:14:03,200 --> 01:14:07,040
Speaker 7: they're genuinely not listening to your goals or not helping

1266
01:14:07,120 --> 01:14:11,599
Speaker 7: you to understand what's happening, or they're actively disrespectful, it's

1267
01:14:11,720 --> 01:14:14,920
Speaker 7: really important for you to know you can fire your attorney.

1268
01:14:15,760 --> 01:14:18,519
Speaker 2: Yeah. I think the one area of at least where

1269
01:14:18,520 --> 01:14:22,080
Speaker 2: I've become aware of this is somebody whose attorney was

1270
01:14:22,160 --> 01:14:24,800
Speaker 2: either refusing to or somehow was incapable of gendering them

1271
01:14:24,840 --> 01:14:27,120
Speaker 2: in the way that they would like to be gendered.

1272
01:14:27,640 --> 01:14:30,000
Speaker 2: And in cases like that, you have the right to

1273
01:14:30,120 --> 01:14:34,240
Speaker 2: ask your journey, you're your attorney, to use whatever pronouns

1274
01:14:34,280 --> 01:14:37,720
Speaker 2: you prefer, and to be referred to using those pronouns.

1275
01:14:37,920 --> 01:14:38,960
Speaker 2: Is that is that right?

1276
01:14:40,320 --> 01:14:45,920
Speaker 7: Absolutely? Absolutely. I've certainly heard horror stories, and not just

1277
01:14:46,680 --> 01:14:48,600
Speaker 7: and I'll speak to this in a second. I have

1278
01:14:48,640 --> 01:14:53,719
Speaker 7: heard horror stories not just about public defenders, but also

1279
01:14:53,760 --> 01:15:02,600
Speaker 7: about private counsel being you know, casually race cyst being misogynist,

1280
01:15:03,439 --> 01:15:09,880
Speaker 7: being transphobic, and you know, being ablest, being really disrespectful

1281
01:15:09,920 --> 01:15:18,479
Speaker 7: and classist, particularly around things like transportation and childcare. So

1282
01:15:18,800 --> 01:15:21,000
Speaker 7: you know, if you have an attorney who's just straight

1283
01:15:21,120 --> 01:15:25,360
Speaker 7: rude or being disrespectful or like being oppressive in some way,

1284
01:15:25,800 --> 01:15:28,519
Speaker 7: I would say, you know, the first step I suppose

1285
01:15:28,520 --> 01:15:31,719
Speaker 7: would be to bring it to their attention, and if

1286
01:15:31,800 --> 01:15:37,439
Speaker 7: they don't, if they are not responsive, you know, you

1287
01:15:37,479 --> 01:15:42,479
Speaker 7: should know that you do have a right to choose

1288
01:15:42,520 --> 01:15:46,160
Speaker 7: your own attorney. Now, I do understand that there are

1289
01:15:47,360 --> 01:15:52,000
Speaker 7: you know, financial issues with just choosing your own attorney,

1290
01:15:52,520 --> 01:15:59,440
Speaker 7: but particularly in the context of you know, movement related prosecutions.

1291
01:15:59,479 --> 01:16:06,120
Speaker 7: They're often not always, but often resources available to you

1292
01:16:06,800 --> 01:16:10,679
Speaker 7: where people will either work to find you someone who

1293
01:16:10,720 --> 01:16:16,320
Speaker 7: can represent you pro bono or you know, will raise money.

1294
01:16:16,400 --> 01:16:18,000
Speaker 7: And the other thing is that if you have a

1295
01:16:18,000 --> 01:16:25,960
Speaker 7: public defender, you can almost always have appointed counsel from

1296
01:16:26,000 --> 01:16:33,200
Speaker 7: another office if you have some kind of irretrievable conflict

1297
01:16:33,280 --> 01:16:34,040
Speaker 7: with your attorney.

1298
01:16:34,760 --> 01:16:36,600
Speaker 2: So I think we should talk about public defenders a

1299
01:16:36,600 --> 01:16:39,559
Speaker 2: bit because I think sometimes people can think that like

1300
01:16:39,640 --> 01:16:42,439
Speaker 2: that they're sort of the worst option, or like the

1301
01:16:42,479 --> 01:16:44,719
Speaker 2: bargain basement choice or what have you. Went In fact,

1302
01:16:44,800 --> 01:16:47,639
Speaker 2: there are some things you can get with a public

1303
01:16:47,680 --> 01:16:50,479
Speaker 2: defender you're very unlikely to get with private counsel and

1304
01:16:51,479 --> 01:16:53,600
Speaker 2: absolute yea, let's talk about public defenders a little bit.

1305
01:16:55,520 --> 01:17:00,360
Speaker 7: Sure, I would love to. I love public defenders actually

1306
01:17:00,560 --> 01:17:06,640
Speaker 7: in large cities that have what we would call institutional

1307
01:17:06,640 --> 01:17:11,840
Speaker 7: public defenders as opposed to you know, everyone takes a

1308
01:17:11,880 --> 01:17:14,160
Speaker 7: turn being a public defender for one week out of

1309
01:17:14,160 --> 01:17:20,080
Speaker 7: the year. You know, people who want to be public

1310
01:17:20,120 --> 01:17:26,320
Speaker 7: defenders do not go into public defense for the big bucks.

1311
01:17:26,400 --> 01:17:30,240
Speaker 7: They go into it because they care about defending people

1312
01:17:30,320 --> 01:17:36,160
Speaker 7: and keeping people out of jail, and very often, you know,

1313
01:17:37,280 --> 01:17:40,120
Speaker 7: the people who are in those positions care very much

1314
01:17:40,320 --> 01:17:44,080
Speaker 7: and are really really well trained, and they are not dummies,

1315
01:17:44,760 --> 01:17:49,479
Speaker 7: and they will work really hard for you. And I

1316
01:17:49,680 --> 01:17:53,120
Speaker 7: do want to push back against the widespread perception that

1317
01:17:53,200 --> 01:17:57,960
Speaker 7: public defenders are not good attorneys. They very often are

1318
01:17:58,080 --> 01:18:02,040
Speaker 7: the best available option are often in very very good hands. No,

1319
01:18:02,160 --> 01:18:04,760
Speaker 7: this isn't to say that you're never going to come

1320
01:18:04,800 --> 01:18:09,200
Speaker 7: across a public defender who is rude or incompetent in

1321
01:18:09,200 --> 01:18:13,599
Speaker 7: some way some way, but I would really really caution

1322
01:18:13,760 --> 01:18:19,840
Speaker 7: you against assuming that the public defender is not a

1323
01:18:20,520 --> 01:18:25,879
Speaker 7: super qualified, committed attorney. The other thing is that the

1324
01:18:25,920 --> 01:18:29,960
Speaker 7: offices of the public defender often have resources available to

1325
01:18:30,000 --> 01:18:36,080
Speaker 7: them that private counsel do not. You know, they have investigators,

1326
01:18:36,160 --> 01:18:40,640
Speaker 7: they have social workers, they have vouchers for public transportation,

1327
01:18:41,640 --> 01:18:45,679
Speaker 7: and all of those things are resources that I think

1328
01:18:45,760 --> 01:18:52,719
Speaker 7: can be very useful in supporting someone who's facing criminal charges.

1329
01:18:53,439 --> 01:18:57,960
Speaker 7: So again, you know, certainly, if you're having some kind

1330
01:18:58,000 --> 01:19:03,600
Speaker 7: of interpersonal problem with your defender or any attorney, I

1331
01:19:03,680 --> 01:19:07,160
Speaker 7: want you to feel really really empowered to address it

1332
01:19:08,439 --> 01:19:11,880
Speaker 7: and hopefully they're able to, you know, respond in a

1333
01:19:11,920 --> 01:19:15,800
Speaker 7: way that's appropriate. And explain what's going on and you

1334
01:19:15,840 --> 01:19:18,200
Speaker 7: know why things are happening in whatever way they are.

1335
01:19:18,800 --> 01:19:24,360
Speaker 7: But I think it would be a mistake to dismiss

1336
01:19:25,360 --> 01:19:27,040
Speaker 7: the public defender as a good option.

1337
01:19:27,280 --> 01:19:29,439
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, I agree. I know some public defenders, and

1338
01:19:29,479 --> 01:19:32,400
Speaker 2: some of them are really great people, very very committed,

1339
01:19:32,400 --> 01:19:34,280
Speaker 2: like you say, to keeping folks out of jail, which

1340
01:19:35,800 --> 01:19:38,200
Speaker 2: is his goal in a lot of these cases.

1341
01:19:38,560 --> 01:19:40,560
Speaker 7: Some of my best friends are public defenders.

1342
01:19:40,640 --> 01:19:44,439
Speaker 2: No, they don't, and like I, people obviously will be.

1343
01:19:45,560 --> 01:19:48,000
Speaker 2: I guess a lot of people in some who are

1344
01:19:48,040 --> 01:19:51,439
Speaker 2: anti authoritarian right are going to be like less im

1345
01:19:51,479 --> 01:19:54,880
Speaker 2: positively aligned with any sort of institutions or feel concerned

1346
01:19:54,880 --> 01:19:57,600
Speaker 2: about interacting with people who are part of these institutions.

1347
01:19:57,640 --> 01:20:00,000
Speaker 2: But like, as far as those people exist within those

1348
01:20:00,040 --> 01:20:06,000
Speaker 2: institutions to keep people out of much worse institutions like jails.

1349
01:20:06,479 --> 01:20:08,559
Speaker 7: I think a lot of people who do public defense

1350
01:20:08,640 --> 01:20:12,679
Speaker 7: really have the sense that they're you know, that their

1351
01:20:12,720 --> 01:20:17,240
Speaker 7: mission is harm reduction, right, and they're prepared to operate

1352
01:20:17,320 --> 01:20:22,680
Speaker 7: in the confines of what are sometimes sort of leviathan

1353
01:20:22,840 --> 01:20:25,920
Speaker 7: bureaucracies in order to achieve that.

1354
01:20:26,160 --> 01:20:29,599
Speaker 2: Yeah, and maybe a lot of folks would have run

1355
01:20:29,600 --> 01:20:31,400
Speaker 2: into I certainly know. I'm a lot of public twenties

1356
01:20:31,439 --> 01:20:35,639
Speaker 2: in twenty twenty in the course of covering protest, and yeah,

1357
01:20:35,680 --> 01:20:38,920
Speaker 2: it's pretty clear that those folks were largely aligned with

1358
01:20:39,160 --> 01:20:42,200
Speaker 2: good things, with stopping the state doing violence to people

1359
01:20:42,479 --> 01:20:45,920
Speaker 2: in all of the different ways that it does that. Well,

1360
01:20:46,040 --> 01:20:48,040
Speaker 2: is there anything else that you'd like us to get

1361
01:20:48,040 --> 01:20:51,080
Speaker 2: to with respect to these relationships people might have with

1362
01:20:51,200 --> 01:20:52,080
Speaker 2: their attorney?

1363
01:20:53,040 --> 01:20:57,600
Speaker 7: Yeah, I say this a lot. Attorneys have an obligation

1364
01:20:58,520 --> 01:21:03,160
Speaker 7: to give their clients their best understanding of what's going on,

1365
01:21:04,400 --> 01:21:09,800
Speaker 7: what paths are available to take, and the possible or

1366
01:21:10,000 --> 01:21:13,559
Speaker 7: likely outcomes of each of those paths. Right, an attorney

1367
01:21:13,600 --> 01:21:17,160
Speaker 7: has an obligation to give you the best possible legal

1368
01:21:17,200 --> 01:21:23,080
Speaker 7: advice based on your articulated goals, their understanding of the law,

1369
01:21:23,760 --> 01:21:29,200
Speaker 7: their experience, and their clinical judgment, and their clients have

1370
01:21:29,280 --> 01:21:36,439
Speaker 7: no corresponding obligation to follow that advice, which can be

1371
01:21:36,880 --> 01:21:43,559
Speaker 7: frustrating from where I sit, but it is nevertheless a

1372
01:21:43,720 --> 01:21:47,080
Speaker 7: critical attribute of my work that I do not get

1373
01:21:47,120 --> 01:21:52,840
Speaker 7: to make big decisions for other people. They get to

1374
01:21:52,880 --> 01:21:56,120
Speaker 7: make decisions that I would not make if I were

1375
01:21:56,160 --> 01:22:02,040
Speaker 7: allowed to make them, But I'm not. I think that

1376
01:22:03,560 --> 01:22:05,680
Speaker 7: you know, I try to be really transparent with my

1377
01:22:05,760 --> 01:22:09,280
Speaker 7: clients about what my ethical commitments are, what I will

1378
01:22:09,360 --> 01:22:13,160
Speaker 7: do for them, what I'm not allowed to do for them.

1379
01:22:13,640 --> 01:22:16,800
Speaker 7: You know, I try to have those conversations in an

1380
01:22:16,840 --> 01:22:21,360
Speaker 7: ongoing way. I don't know that that's common practice. I

1381
01:22:21,439 --> 01:22:25,000
Speaker 7: think people are really busy and that's a hard practice

1382
01:22:25,040 --> 01:22:31,000
Speaker 7: to maintain. But I want to encourage people who are

1383
01:22:31,160 --> 01:22:36,800
Speaker 7: in an attorney client relationship to initiate those conversations, right.

1384
01:22:37,400 --> 01:22:37,799
Speaker 4: I guess.

1385
01:22:37,840 --> 01:22:40,479
Speaker 7: The only other thing I would say is, you know,

1386
01:22:40,560 --> 01:22:46,880
Speaker 7: if you have concerns with your lawyer, address those concerns immediately,

1387
01:22:47,000 --> 01:22:50,559
Speaker 7: because the farther into a case you are, the harder

1388
01:22:50,600 --> 01:22:54,120
Speaker 7: it is to have that conversation, and the farther into

1389
01:22:54,120 --> 01:22:55,760
Speaker 7: a case you are, the harder it is to fire

1390
01:22:55,800 --> 01:22:59,880
Speaker 7: your lawyer. Typically, you have a right to choose your

1391
01:23:00,120 --> 01:23:05,439
Speaker 7: own attorney, but if you're, you know, one week out

1392
01:23:05,479 --> 01:23:08,800
Speaker 7: from going to trial, the judge may not allow you

1393
01:23:08,880 --> 01:23:14,839
Speaker 7: to do it. Yeah, right, So yeah, I mean, I guess,

1394
01:23:15,479 --> 01:23:22,000
Speaker 7: I just I just wanted to tell anyone who's listening

1395
01:23:22,200 --> 01:23:26,160
Speaker 7: that if you are in a situation where you have

1396
01:23:26,240 --> 01:23:31,320
Speaker 7: to have a relationship with an attorney, you know, it's

1397
01:23:31,400 --> 01:23:35,240
Speaker 7: already probably kind of a bad situation, and you should

1398
01:23:35,320 --> 01:23:37,559
Speaker 7: be in a relationship where you feel like your lawyer

1399
01:23:37,640 --> 01:23:41,599
Speaker 7: is taking all of your goals seriously, which includes not

1400
01:23:41,720 --> 01:23:46,960
Speaker 7: just your straightforward legal goals, but movement support and solidarity.

1401
01:23:48,000 --> 01:23:51,680
Speaker 7: And if your lawyer is disrespecting your goals, or disrespecting

1402
01:23:51,680 --> 01:23:56,320
Speaker 7: your identities, or disrespecting other kinds of ethical commitments you have,

1403
01:23:57,280 --> 01:24:00,280
Speaker 7: you can choose to find a different attorney and are

1404
01:24:00,400 --> 01:24:05,960
Speaker 7: resources available, and ultimately these decisions are yours. And then

1405
01:24:06,200 --> 01:24:10,400
Speaker 7: I had some resources that I wanted to be great.

1406
01:24:11,760 --> 01:24:16,080
Speaker 7: So for people who may be accused of criminal offenses,

1407
01:24:16,600 --> 01:24:19,320
Speaker 7: there's a really great book called The Tilted Guide to

1408
01:24:19,360 --> 01:24:22,840
Speaker 7: Being a Defendant, and if you google that you can

1409
01:24:22,840 --> 01:24:26,920
Speaker 7: find a free pdf of it. I would also encourage

1410
01:24:27,000 --> 01:24:32,559
Speaker 7: people to reach out to and to become non lawyer

1411
01:24:32,680 --> 01:24:36,680
Speaker 7: legal workers, So people who have, you know, experience with

1412
01:24:36,800 --> 01:24:39,800
Speaker 7: jail support, people who have experience with court support, and

1413
01:24:39,840 --> 01:24:43,320
Speaker 7: with providing sort of community support to people who are

1414
01:24:43,360 --> 01:24:50,200
Speaker 7: facing charges. If you are somebody who has an ongoing case,

1415
01:24:51,200 --> 01:24:54,960
Speaker 7: having a support committee that includes at least one legal

1416
01:24:55,000 --> 01:25:03,559
Speaker 7: worker can be just so critical in maintaining morale and

1417
01:25:03,680 --> 01:25:10,400
Speaker 7: in feeling supported and in having the wherewithal to be

1418
01:25:10,600 --> 01:25:15,280
Speaker 7: an active participant in your own defense. And we do

1419
01:25:15,439 --> 01:25:19,880
Speaker 7: know that when people are active participants in their own defense,

1420
01:25:21,479 --> 01:25:24,160
Speaker 7: they have better legal outcomes.

1421
01:25:24,240 --> 01:25:26,360
Speaker 2: Yes, I would imagine even if they don't have better

1422
01:25:26,439 --> 01:25:29,439
Speaker 2: legal outcomes, they have ones that are easier for them

1423
01:25:29,479 --> 01:25:32,559
Speaker 2: to understand the more satisfactory because of that.

1424
01:25:32,920 --> 01:25:38,680
Speaker 7: Yeah, absolutely, absolutely, there are a lot of times when

1425
01:25:38,680 --> 01:25:40,760
Speaker 7: there are no good options on the table. I don't

1426
01:25:41,760 --> 01:25:44,639
Speaker 7: I want to be very clear, being an active participant

1427
01:25:44,680 --> 01:25:47,639
Speaker 7: in your own defense or having a really great attorney

1428
01:25:47,680 --> 01:25:50,679
Speaker 7: who really listens to you and respects your goals, does

1429
01:25:50,720 --> 01:25:54,240
Speaker 7: not mean that you are not going to experience punishment

1430
01:25:54,320 --> 01:25:58,680
Speaker 7: or state repression. It means that you are going to

1431
01:25:58,680 --> 01:26:01,920
Speaker 7: have a better handle on what your options are and

1432
01:26:02,000 --> 01:26:05,080
Speaker 7: why things are happening in the way that they are. So,

1433
01:26:05,280 --> 01:26:09,000
Speaker 7: even if you end up in a situation that involves,

1434
01:26:09,320 --> 01:26:14,680
Speaker 7: you know, for example, spending time in carceroal confinement, you

1435
01:26:14,720 --> 01:26:19,000
Speaker 7: will at least understand how you got there, and you

1436
01:26:19,040 --> 01:26:25,920
Speaker 7: will understand what the other possible options were. Right, you know,

1437
01:26:27,680 --> 01:26:34,439
Speaker 7: somebody might choose to endure punishment rather than cooperate with

1438
01:26:34,520 --> 01:26:38,200
Speaker 7: the state. And even if that is not what most

1439
01:26:38,200 --> 01:26:42,960
Speaker 7: people would understand, as a better legal outcome. It is

1440
01:26:43,000 --> 01:26:50,000
Speaker 7: an outcome that at least was more intentionally pursued than

1441
01:26:50,040 --> 01:26:50,880
Speaker 7: the alternative.

1442
01:26:51,080 --> 01:26:55,760
Speaker 2: Yes, yeah, yeah, So where could people find these these

1443
01:26:55,800 --> 01:26:59,439
Speaker 2: non lower legal workers if they wanted to add one,

1444
01:26:59,520 --> 01:27:03,120
Speaker 2: or if they know if they wanted support from one.

1445
01:27:04,120 --> 01:27:08,320
Speaker 7: If people wanted to find legal workers in their own community,

1446
01:27:08,560 --> 01:27:15,680
Speaker 7: I mean typically they're they're involved with movements, they might

1447
01:27:15,680 --> 01:27:18,880
Speaker 7: be associated with your local chapter of the National Lawyers Guild,

1448
01:27:19,600 --> 01:27:22,200
Speaker 7: they might be the people who are most active in

1449
01:27:22,280 --> 01:27:27,840
Speaker 7: jail support. If you really can't find anybody, you can

1450
01:27:27,920 --> 01:27:31,760
Speaker 7: call the National Lawyer's Guild Anti Repression hotline if you

1451
01:27:31,800 --> 01:27:36,480
Speaker 7: are actively facing charges. That number is two one two

1452
01:27:36,520 --> 01:27:40,439
Speaker 7: six seven nine two eight one one, and we can

1453
01:27:40,600 --> 01:27:43,960
Speaker 7: try to connect with you with appropriate legal resources in

1454
01:27:44,000 --> 01:27:48,559
Speaker 7: your community. That is one way that I would encourage

1455
01:27:48,600 --> 01:27:53,240
Speaker 7: people to reach out if you are facing charges and

1456
01:27:53,280 --> 01:27:57,280
Speaker 7: you're having a hard time connecting with legal resources. That

1457
01:27:57,400 --> 01:28:06,320
Speaker 7: hotline is mostly for federal federal cases and for federal repression,

1458
01:28:07,960 --> 01:28:10,120
Speaker 7: but if you call it, we will do our best

1459
01:28:10,160 --> 01:28:15,400
Speaker 7: to connect you with appropriate resources wherever you are. And

1460
01:28:15,439 --> 01:28:19,479
Speaker 7: there are also some resources for lawyers that I wanted

1461
01:28:19,479 --> 01:28:23,599
Speaker 7: to hy appear, which are first of all the National

1462
01:28:23,680 --> 01:28:28,720
Speaker 7: Lawyer's Guild, which is a bar association for people who

1463
01:28:28,800 --> 01:28:31,120
Speaker 7: value human rights over property rights.

1464
01:28:31,240 --> 01:28:33,920
Speaker 2: What a dark situation that this is the subset of

1465
01:28:34,400 --> 01:28:39,400
Speaker 2: human beings. Yeah, that the nalgy are great some positive

1466
01:28:39,520 --> 01:28:40,920
Speaker 2: energy experiences.

1467
01:28:41,920 --> 01:28:45,559
Speaker 7: What a dark situation that it hadn't occurred to me.

1468
01:28:46,400 --> 01:28:50,439
Speaker 7: How telling that was about lawyers as a whole.

1469
01:28:50,600 --> 01:28:53,760
Speaker 2: Yeah, when a subset of your the subset of my

1470
01:28:53,800 --> 01:28:58,200
Speaker 2: profession is equally the dark and terrible people, we just

1471
01:28:58,240 --> 01:29:01,720
Speaker 2: have to try and be bettering. Guess.

1472
01:29:01,920 --> 01:29:05,280
Speaker 7: The other thing that is available for attorneys who are

1473
01:29:05,560 --> 01:29:09,360
Speaker 7: interested is there's a book put out by the same

1474
01:29:09,400 --> 01:29:12,040
Speaker 7: people who wrote The Tilted Guide to Being a Defendant

1475
01:29:12,960 --> 01:29:17,640
Speaker 7: for attorneys, and it's called Representing Radicals. And that is

1476
01:29:17,960 --> 01:29:20,040
Speaker 7: I think available through ak Press.

1477
01:29:20,240 --> 01:29:22,080
Speaker 2: You should buy it from Akape Press directly and not

1478
01:29:22,120 --> 01:29:23,719
Speaker 2: from Jeffrey Bezos in any way.

1479
01:29:25,720 --> 01:29:30,960
Speaker 7: Thank you. But and the other thing is there are

1480
01:29:31,000 --> 01:29:33,639
Speaker 7: a lot of attorneys around the country who are more

1481
01:29:33,680 --> 01:29:41,360
Speaker 7: than happy to consult, to act as mentors, to share motions,

1482
01:29:41,400 --> 01:29:46,040
Speaker 7: to share legal research. The people who work in movement

1483
01:29:46,080 --> 01:29:54,360
Speaker 7: spaces as lawyers, are typically always prepared to share our

1484
01:29:54,520 --> 01:29:58,040
Speaker 7: experience and resources because we have a stake in other

1485
01:29:58,080 --> 01:30:02,360
Speaker 7: people becoming really good at this. You know, you know,

1486
01:30:02,439 --> 01:30:07,200
Speaker 7: my goal is to have fewer clients. So if anyone

1487
01:30:07,280 --> 01:30:12,400
Speaker 7: is interested in helping me to achieve that goal, either

1488
01:30:12,479 --> 01:30:17,640
Speaker 7: by going to law school or by taking some of

1489
01:30:17,680 --> 01:30:20,920
Speaker 7: my clients or taking some of the people who might

1490
01:30:20,960 --> 01:30:26,280
Speaker 7: otherwise be my clients, please I would be delighted to

1491
01:30:26,360 --> 01:30:30,120
Speaker 7: shepherd you into movement defense.

1492
01:30:30,640 --> 01:30:32,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, that would be great. If we have any little

1493
01:30:32,680 --> 01:30:35,200
Speaker 2: like budding movement defenders, how would they be able to

1494
01:30:35,360 --> 01:30:35,880
Speaker 2: find you?

1495
01:30:38,960 --> 01:30:41,120
Speaker 7: Oh? Yes, if you would like to find me on

1496
01:30:41,160 --> 01:30:46,520
Speaker 7: the internet, please don't. But I do have a website

1497
01:30:47,040 --> 01:30:49,559
Speaker 7: that you can find if you google me. It is

1498
01:30:49,680 --> 01:30:55,760
Speaker 7: mo at Law and I am pretty available if you

1499
01:30:55,840 --> 01:30:58,560
Speaker 7: reach out to me by email and have questions. But

1500
01:31:00,720 --> 01:31:04,200
Speaker 7: generally when I come on these things, the only thing

1501
01:31:04,240 --> 01:31:06,599
Speaker 7: I have to plug is the concept of not talking

1502
01:31:06,600 --> 01:31:07,000
Speaker 7: to cops.

1503
01:31:07,000 --> 01:31:08,280
Speaker 2: I want to do an episode on that. Maybe we'll

1504
01:31:08,280 --> 01:31:09,639
Speaker 2: do it one day. I think we should do an

1505
01:31:09,640 --> 01:31:14,639
Speaker 2: expanded how to not talk to Cops guide the.

1506
01:31:16,320 --> 01:31:18,400
Speaker 7: I guess it's not just the concept of not talking

1507
01:31:18,400 --> 01:31:21,240
Speaker 7: to cops, it's actually the practice of not talking to cops.

1508
01:31:21,600 --> 01:31:23,840
Speaker 2: And certainly like it's somebody myself here that lives on

1509
01:31:23,880 --> 01:31:26,680
Speaker 2: the border and has to deal with all kinds of

1510
01:31:26,760 --> 01:31:29,720
Speaker 2: different jurisdictions of cops on an almost daily basis, just

1511
01:31:29,920 --> 01:31:32,519
Speaker 2: in the travel I need to do to live my life.

1512
01:31:33,720 --> 01:31:36,120
Speaker 2: It can be complicated and scary, and if you're not

1513
01:31:36,160 --> 01:31:38,600
Speaker 2: a citizen, it becomes even more complicated and scary. So,

1514
01:31:39,200 --> 01:31:41,200
Speaker 2: oh yeah, that's the thing we should discuss in detail.

1515
01:31:41,600 --> 01:31:45,880
Speaker 7: I would like to say that, apart from some very

1516
01:31:46,240 --> 01:31:53,160
Speaker 7: very specific exceptions that involve being at borders or being

1517
01:31:53,360 --> 01:31:59,800
Speaker 7: subpoenaed to a federal granchurie, you never have an obligation

1518
01:32:01,040 --> 01:32:04,760
Speaker 7: to talk to cops, to answer their questions, or to

1519
01:32:04,840 --> 01:32:07,559
Speaker 7: cooperate with their investigations. That doesn't mean you can obstruct

1520
01:32:07,600 --> 01:32:15,680
Speaker 7: their investigations, but you absolutely have no affirmative obligation to

1521
01:32:15,760 --> 01:32:18,920
Speaker 7: speak to police officers. And if they ask you, if

1522
01:32:18,920 --> 01:32:21,360
Speaker 7: they are trying to interrogate you or ask you questions,

1523
01:32:21,400 --> 01:32:23,680
Speaker 7: you can say I am going to remain silent and

1524
01:32:23,720 --> 01:32:25,840
Speaker 7: I want to speak to a lawyer. And if the

1525
01:32:25,840 --> 01:32:29,040
Speaker 7: FEDS show up at your house or call you on

1526
01:32:29,080 --> 01:32:31,639
Speaker 7: the phone, or come to your office or your place

1527
01:32:31,640 --> 01:32:34,439
Speaker 7: of work, you can say, I am represented by counsel.

1528
01:32:35,400 --> 01:32:37,639
Speaker 7: Please leave your name at number, and my lawyer will

1529
01:32:37,640 --> 01:32:37,840
Speaker 7: call you.

1530
01:32:37,920 --> 01:32:41,720
Speaker 2: Okay, Yeah, it's good to have scripts. I want to Yeah,

1531
01:32:41,800 --> 01:32:44,679
Speaker 2: I think we should. We should break down in detail

1532
01:32:44,720 --> 01:32:46,519
Speaker 2: some more socenarios. We should do it in another episode

1533
01:32:46,520 --> 01:32:49,920
Speaker 2: because it'll be maybe a bit longer. Yes, and yeah,

1534
01:32:50,000 --> 01:32:54,080
Speaker 2: I think folks, maybe I think everyone understands the concept.

1535
01:32:54,439 --> 01:32:57,840
Speaker 2: But the practice, and there's that advice you given their

1536
01:32:57,920 --> 01:32:58,200
Speaker 2: is great.

1537
01:32:58,800 --> 01:33:02,160
Speaker 7: Yeah. And if if you don't yet have an attorney

1538
01:33:02,160 --> 01:33:05,360
Speaker 7: and you feel uncomfortable saying I'm represented by counsel, you

1539
01:33:05,360 --> 01:33:07,680
Speaker 7: can just say, please leave your name and number and

1540
01:33:07,720 --> 01:33:10,400
Speaker 7: my lawyer will call you. And then you can call

1541
01:33:10,680 --> 01:33:14,599
Speaker 7: the National Lawyer's Skilled Anti Federal Repression Hotline at two

1542
01:33:14,600 --> 01:33:18,320
Speaker 7: and two six seven nine two eight point one and

1543
01:33:18,439 --> 01:33:22,600
Speaker 7: have a privileged conversation about your rights, risks and responsibilities

1544
01:33:22,880 --> 01:33:26,280
Speaker 7: and we can connect you with an attorney in your area.

1545
01:33:26,640 --> 01:33:26,840
Speaker 5: Yeah.

1546
01:33:26,960 --> 01:33:30,559
Speaker 2: That is excellent, actionable advice. Yeah, thank you so much

1547
01:33:30,560 --> 01:33:34,280
Speaker 2: for giving us so much of your time and help. Yeah,

1548
01:33:34,400 --> 01:33:37,440
Speaker 2: I really appreciate it. I'm sureveryone else does too.

1549
01:33:38,760 --> 01:33:43,000
Speaker 7: At all. It's my pleasure. I am always available to

1550
01:33:43,040 --> 01:33:48,000
Speaker 7: come and talk to you about various the various rights

1551
01:33:48,000 --> 01:33:50,960
Speaker 7: of people accused of criminal offenses. Usually I am talking

1552
01:33:51,000 --> 01:33:54,400
Speaker 7: about your rights with respect to the state. But it

1553
01:33:54,439 --> 01:33:58,719
Speaker 7: has become really evident that I needed to talk about

1554
01:34:00,080 --> 01:34:03,160
Speaker 7: people's rights with respect to their own attorneys.

1555
01:34:03,400 --> 01:34:06,080
Speaker 2: It's empowering for people to hear this, So I'm glad

1556
01:34:06,120 --> 01:34:08,439
Speaker 2: we talked about it too.

1557
01:34:23,160 --> 01:34:29,280
Speaker 1: It could happen here. It in Today's Harlance, meaning Tucker

1558
01:34:29,320 --> 01:34:34,000
Speaker 1: Carlson getting fired, because that's what we're talking about today

1559
01:34:34,080 --> 01:34:38,360
Speaker 1: is Today is one of our classic timely reaction episodes

1560
01:34:38,760 --> 01:34:43,200
Speaker 1: to the firing of Fox News fascist and popular anti

1561
01:34:43,280 --> 01:34:47,559
Speaker 1: semite Tucker Carlson. Today on the show to chat about

1562
01:34:47,600 --> 01:34:52,280
Speaker 1: all of this, I've got Garrison Davis, James Stout, Mio Wong,

1563
01:34:52,520 --> 01:34:57,920
Speaker 1: and Sophie Lichterman. Hi, everybody, Wow, where's the.

1564
01:34:57,920 --> 01:35:00,240
Speaker 5: Last time we got like the whole crew together.

1565
01:35:01,040 --> 01:35:03,439
Speaker 1: A long time? This? This is the bulk of us.

1566
01:35:03,840 --> 01:35:07,520
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, And Sophie wasn't here for the com episode.

1567
01:35:07,920 --> 01:35:11,520
Speaker 1: No, Sophie. Sophie refused to be on for the com episode,

1568
01:35:11,680 --> 01:35:17,040
Speaker 1: threatening to quit, uh sadly. Yeah.

1569
01:35:17,120 --> 01:35:17,400
Speaker 7: Yeah.

1570
01:35:17,439 --> 01:35:22,200
Speaker 1: But so you know, today is a couple of days

1571
01:35:22,280 --> 01:35:25,040
Speaker 1: since we all got the surprising news that Tucker has

1572
01:35:25,080 --> 01:35:27,400
Speaker 1: been let go at Fox. This was news that was

1573
01:35:27,439 --> 01:35:31,320
Speaker 1: surprising to Tucker There's a couple of things that are

1574
01:35:31,320 --> 01:35:36,360
Speaker 1: funny about the announcement itself, namely that he signed off

1575
01:35:36,680 --> 01:35:40,879
Speaker 1: his last episode saying, see you guys next week. Fox

1576
01:35:41,840 --> 01:35:44,120
Speaker 1: Play in the messaging they've put out was like, you know,

1577
01:35:44,200 --> 01:35:47,559
Speaker 1: we both agreed that he needed to leave the network,

1578
01:35:47,600 --> 01:35:52,000
Speaker 1: that this is an amicable split. The Brian Kilmead, who

1579
01:35:52,040 --> 01:35:56,840
Speaker 1: replaced him the next episode with Fox News tonight, was like,

1580
01:35:56,920 --> 01:35:59,400
Speaker 1: Tucker and I are still good friends. He's just decided

1581
01:36:00,320 --> 01:36:04,240
Speaker 1: mutually to take a leave from the company. This is

1582
01:36:04,520 --> 01:36:10,639
Speaker 1: definitely not true. We'll talk a little bit about all

1583
01:36:10,720 --> 01:36:12,720
Speaker 1: of this, but the gist of I think it's kind

1584
01:36:12,720 --> 01:36:16,080
Speaker 1: of worth talking about, like why this happened. As far

1585
01:36:16,120 --> 01:36:19,640
Speaker 1: as we know, there's not, you know, objective kind of

1586
01:36:19,840 --> 01:36:27,680
Speaker 1: confirmation about why specifically he got fired, but the broad speculation.

1587
01:36:28,320 --> 01:36:31,479
Speaker 1: Some articles have like quoted a Fox News insider who

1588
01:36:31,479 --> 01:36:34,800
Speaker 1: says that it was due to something either he said

1589
01:36:34,800 --> 01:36:39,040
Speaker 1: in a recorded but unaired episode of the show, or

1590
01:36:39,080 --> 01:36:41,600
Speaker 1: that it was something that was found in the emails

1591
01:36:42,160 --> 01:36:46,759
Speaker 1: that were revealed during discovery that was profoundly anti semitic.

1592
01:36:47,120 --> 01:36:51,160
Speaker 1: I've heard out like in one source at least said

1593
01:36:51,200 --> 01:36:53,240
Speaker 1: that it was anti semitic enough that it might have

1594
01:36:53,280 --> 01:36:58,640
Speaker 1: been legally actionable. That's obviously like what the fuck? I

1595
01:36:58,680 --> 01:37:03,760
Speaker 1: would love to know what that's civically means. But what

1596
01:37:03,840 --> 01:37:07,240
Speaker 1: we do know is that a former producer for The

1597
01:37:07,280 --> 01:37:10,720
Speaker 1: Tucker Carlson Show who was a booking for him, is

1598
01:37:10,800 --> 01:37:14,679
Speaker 1: currently suing the network both for a hostile work environment.

1599
01:37:14,800 --> 01:37:17,680
Speaker 1: She claims that she was exposed to intense anti Semitism

1600
01:37:17,720 --> 01:37:21,840
Speaker 1: while working there, and she alleges that she was basically

1601
01:37:22,400 --> 01:37:28,280
Speaker 1: threatened into changing her deposition. So the lawsuit came alongside

1602
01:37:28,280 --> 01:37:31,599
Speaker 1: her like issuing a correction to her deposition and saying

1603
01:37:31,640 --> 01:37:36,120
Speaker 1: that she had basically lied in order like because she

1604
01:37:36,320 --> 01:37:39,920
Speaker 1: was being threatened by people at Fox, which is like,

1605
01:37:40,800 --> 01:37:42,760
Speaker 1: so there's a lot going on here. So that's kind

1606
01:37:42,760 --> 01:37:44,880
Speaker 1: of the gist of what we know right now as

1607
01:37:44,880 --> 01:37:49,839
Speaker 1: to like why he got shit canned. Yeah, that's that's

1608
01:37:49,840 --> 01:37:51,120
Speaker 1: that's the basics.

1609
01:37:52,760 --> 01:37:54,960
Speaker 5: It's interesting too that he it's been like a day

1610
01:37:55,040 --> 01:37:58,360
Speaker 5: now and he has said nothing. There have been multiple

1611
01:37:58,360 --> 01:38:00,519
Speaker 5: people who said that he's not responding to his texts,

1612
01:38:00,600 --> 01:38:05,640
Speaker 5: which is extremely funny. He I saw one report that

1613
01:38:05,800 --> 01:38:07,200
Speaker 5: I don't I don't know how accurate is. I saw

1614
01:38:07,200 --> 01:38:09,400
Speaker 5: one report that says he found out ten minutes before

1615
01:38:09,840 --> 01:38:11,240
Speaker 5: Fox like released the statement.

1616
01:38:11,840 --> 01:38:14,800
Speaker 1: Yeah, he was in contract negotiations, so he was in

1617
01:38:14,840 --> 01:38:19,200
Speaker 1: the middle of presumably getting Fox to agree to pay

1618
01:38:19,240 --> 01:38:20,439
Speaker 1: him a shitload more money.

1619
01:38:21,560 --> 01:38:23,759
Speaker 2: Yeah, and now he has no money, which is very funny.

1620
01:38:24,160 --> 01:38:27,360
Speaker 3: Well, yeah, he'll still probably get a lot of money somehow.

1621
01:38:27,400 --> 01:38:27,559
Speaker 4: Yeah.

1622
01:38:27,720 --> 01:38:30,160
Speaker 2: Yeah, i'd be interesting to see if he like pivots

1623
01:38:30,200 --> 01:38:33,920
Speaker 2: to something like like o Ann or News Max. I

1624
01:38:33,960 --> 01:38:36,439
Speaker 2: don't know if they have the means to pay him

1625
01:38:36,479 --> 01:38:37,360
Speaker 2: what he would probably see.

1626
01:38:37,439 --> 01:38:39,439
Speaker 3: Yeah, No, I mean this is this is one of

1627
01:38:39,479 --> 01:38:42,599
Speaker 3: the questions kind of following this and how and how

1628
01:38:42,640 --> 01:38:46,240
Speaker 3: this decision is gonna affect, you know, politics going forward,

1629
01:38:46,280 --> 01:38:50,639
Speaker 3: especially with twenty twenty four. Two big questions being where

1630
01:38:50,680 --> 01:38:53,600
Speaker 3: is Tucker going to go and who is going to

1631
01:38:53,960 --> 01:38:56,519
Speaker 3: take his place? For the next few weeks, Fox is

1632
01:38:56,560 --> 01:39:00,599
Speaker 3: probably just going to be doing like a rotating selection

1633
01:39:00,880 --> 01:39:04,720
Speaker 3: of hosts until they like make a final decision. So

1634
01:39:05,200 --> 01:39:07,120
Speaker 3: you know, a lot of people could could end up

1635
01:39:07,240 --> 01:39:09,120
Speaker 3: end up with that job. But in terms of where

1636
01:39:09,160 --> 01:39:12,600
Speaker 3: he's going, there's there's a few interesting options. Now it

1637
01:39:12,680 --> 01:39:14,680
Speaker 3: kind of does come down to who's going to be

1638
01:39:14,680 --> 01:39:17,519
Speaker 3: willing to pay the probably pretty high price, or if

1639
01:39:17,520 --> 01:39:20,280
Speaker 3: he's just going to try to stay independent. But I

1640
01:39:20,280 --> 01:39:23,519
Speaker 3: think something like Newsmax isn't isn't out of the question.

1641
01:39:25,160 --> 01:39:28,840
Speaker 3: I think I think this that this is this is

1642
01:39:28,920 --> 01:39:31,080
Speaker 3: just like a guess, but I think there's a decent

1643
01:39:31,160 --> 01:39:32,960
Speaker 3: chance that The Daily Wire is going to go after

1644
01:39:33,040 --> 01:39:33,840
Speaker 3: him really hard.

1645
01:39:34,400 --> 01:39:36,200
Speaker 1: Yeah, he's already.

1646
01:39:35,880 --> 01:39:38,440
Speaker 3: Pretty friendly with a lot of the people there. They've

1647
01:39:38,439 --> 01:39:40,120
Speaker 3: been willing to dishout a lot of money for someone

1648
01:39:40,160 --> 01:39:43,519
Speaker 3: like Stephen Crowder. Now Tucker will be undoubtedly more, but

1649
01:39:43,560 --> 01:39:45,639
Speaker 3: also he's going to be more of a pull, and

1650
01:39:46,439 --> 01:39:49,360
Speaker 3: that that is something that's entirely possible. I mean, the

1651
01:39:49,400 --> 01:39:53,280
Speaker 3: Daily Wire already produces like usually two of the most

1652
01:39:53,320 --> 01:39:55,960
Speaker 3: popular podcasts in the world, like in the top ten.

1653
01:39:56,120 --> 01:39:57,559
Speaker 3: They already have a lot, They have a lot of

1654
01:39:57,560 --> 01:40:01,519
Speaker 3: web traffic. They don't have like cable, but they get

1655
01:40:01,560 --> 01:40:05,479
Speaker 3: a lot of like other other ways to to to

1656
01:40:06,000 --> 01:40:06,800
Speaker 3: spread their work.

1657
01:40:07,240 --> 01:40:10,719
Speaker 2: They have a paid streaming service they yes, yes, they

1658
01:40:10,800 --> 01:40:13,000
Speaker 2: also have The Daily Plus.

1659
01:40:13,400 --> 01:40:17,080
Speaker 1: Yep, they are. I think that they're probably the only

1660
01:40:17,280 --> 01:40:20,920
Speaker 1: people in the right that can offer Tucker both money

1661
01:40:20,960 --> 01:40:24,080
Speaker 1: that's broadly in line with what Fox could and an

1662
01:40:24,120 --> 01:40:29,080
Speaker 1: audience that's that's sizeable. Potentially even an audience that's larger.

1663
01:40:29,520 --> 01:40:31,320
Speaker 1: One of the things to kind of keep in mind

1664
01:40:31,400 --> 01:40:33,400
Speaker 1: is that Tucker was going to get out three and

1665
01:40:33,400 --> 01:40:36,200
Speaker 1: a half million viewers a night somewhere around there, which

1666
01:40:36,240 --> 01:40:40,759
Speaker 1: made him the most popular uh host on cable news,

1667
01:40:41,680 --> 01:40:47,200
Speaker 1: but also is minuscule based on historical number one, minuscule

1668
01:40:47,280 --> 01:40:50,280
Speaker 1: based on the kind of audiences that like you can

1669
01:40:50,360 --> 01:40:54,040
Speaker 1: get on streaming platforms today, which are much larger than

1670
01:40:54,080 --> 01:40:58,120
Speaker 1: cable audiences, And is minuscule based on like I mean,

1671
01:40:58,160 --> 01:40:59,840
Speaker 1: it was like ten years ago that three and a

1672
01:40:59,840 --> 01:41:02,320
Speaker 1: half million viewers on a night ten fifteen years ago

1673
01:41:02,360 --> 01:41:05,760
Speaker 1: would have been like an unsuccessful show on ANBC, right,

1674
01:41:06,320 --> 01:41:09,800
Speaker 1: uh for for some for some perspective, the most successful

1675
01:41:10,000 --> 01:41:12,800
Speaker 1: TV finale of all time was the Mash finale, which

1676
01:41:12,800 --> 01:41:17,360
Speaker 1: had like one hundred and five million viewers. Like cable,

1677
01:41:17,479 --> 01:41:20,400
Speaker 1: cable don't or you know, television period does not get

1678
01:41:20,400 --> 01:41:23,040
Speaker 1: the kind of viewership that it does anymore. And I

1679
01:41:23,400 --> 01:41:27,599
Speaker 1: think when you're looking at Tucker, he is the the

1680
01:41:27,640 --> 01:41:31,280
Speaker 1: main draw for him has to be the audience. He's

1681
01:41:31,280 --> 01:41:33,840
Speaker 1: not and he's the heir to the Campbell or to

1682
01:41:33,880 --> 01:41:37,640
Speaker 1: the Swanson, you know, dinner of Fortune. He cannot be

1683
01:41:37,760 --> 01:41:41,760
Speaker 1: motivated primarily by the paycheck. Right that that that there's

1684
01:41:41,840 --> 01:41:44,200
Speaker 1: he's simply like it. Just that can't be the reason

1685
01:41:44,240 --> 01:41:49,240
Speaker 1: he's doing it. It has to be the the fame,

1686
01:41:49,400 --> 01:41:53,280
Speaker 1: you know, And so Daily Wire I think is a

1687
01:41:53,479 --> 01:41:56,400
Speaker 1: likely place for him as a result of that.

1688
01:41:57,040 --> 01:41:59,599
Speaker 2: Yeah, another thing that's interesting I thought it is okay

1689
01:41:59,720 --> 01:42:02,960
Speaker 2: Man mentioned that he hasn't said anything yet and he's

1690
01:42:03,040 --> 01:42:07,519
Speaker 2: probably taking advice from his lawyer, Brian Friedman, who incidentally

1691
01:42:07,560 --> 01:42:11,200
Speaker 2: is the same dude who's representing Don Lemon who lost

1692
01:42:11,200 --> 01:42:18,560
Speaker 2: his job on the same day, which is for that guy,

1693
01:42:19,360 --> 01:42:21,400
Speaker 2: it is a good year for this guy. He like,

1694
01:42:21,640 --> 01:42:23,479
Speaker 2: this is the guy who gets a ship ton of

1695
01:42:23,479 --> 01:42:26,320
Speaker 2: money from networks when people get fired from networks, like

1696
01:42:26,360 --> 01:42:32,760
Speaker 2: he has represented like Megan Kelly before. Like, when you

1697
01:42:32,800 --> 01:42:35,040
Speaker 2: hear of a famous person getting let go by network,

1698
01:42:35,280 --> 01:42:38,360
Speaker 2: it's probably this guy who's representing them. I thought it

1699
01:42:38,400 --> 01:42:42,200
Speaker 2: was utterly hilarious that, yeah, both of them retained the

1700
01:42:42,200 --> 01:42:44,920
Speaker 2: same guy on the same day having been fired. But

1701
01:42:45,560 --> 01:42:49,040
Speaker 2: thinking about lawyering up, it made me think about like

1702
01:42:49,960 --> 01:42:55,080
Speaker 2: Sophie mentioned it that like Carlson defames people, he lies

1703
01:42:55,160 --> 01:42:57,840
Speaker 2: on an almost daily basis. Right, We recently spoke about

1704
01:42:57,840 --> 01:43:02,160
Speaker 2: how he took the statistics of Russian deaths from those

1705
01:43:02,200 --> 01:43:05,000
Speaker 2: league's documents, that he used the blatantly altered version of

1706
01:43:05,000 --> 01:43:08,320
Speaker 2: those documents long after everyone knew they'd been altered. Right,

1707
01:43:09,200 --> 01:43:13,000
Speaker 2: he needs serious legal clout to defend him from the

1708
01:43:13,040 --> 01:43:15,360
Speaker 2: fact that he lies into fames people every single day.

1709
01:43:15,400 --> 01:43:18,719
Speaker 2: So like going even though he has a sizable fortune,

1710
01:43:18,840 --> 01:43:21,479
Speaker 2: going out on his own would be costly in the

1711
01:43:21,560 --> 01:43:24,160
Speaker 2: sense of like he would almost have to be permanently

1712
01:43:24,200 --> 01:43:25,160
Speaker 2: defending himself.

1713
01:43:25,600 --> 01:43:27,200
Speaker 5: Yeah, and I think I think this is one of

1714
01:43:27,280 --> 01:43:29,960
Speaker 5: the things where, well it's not clear to me what

1715
01:43:30,000 --> 01:43:31,840
Speaker 5: the impact is of the Alex Johnes trial has been,

1716
01:43:31,840 --> 01:43:33,320
Speaker 5: but this is one of those things where I think

1717
01:43:33,720 --> 01:43:36,960
Speaker 5: the dominion people actually just nailing Fox to the wall

1718
01:43:37,120 --> 01:43:40,320
Speaker 5: is going to be a sort of big factor here

1719
01:43:40,320 --> 01:43:43,120
Speaker 5: because it makes it seem easier and more plausible on

1720
01:43:43,200 --> 01:43:45,439
Speaker 5: things that like lawyers are willing to risk getting in

1721
01:43:45,479 --> 01:43:48,720
Speaker 5: fights about for actually going after these people, for just

1722
01:43:48,880 --> 01:43:51,880
Speaker 5: like defending people. And so yeah, it'll be it'll be

1723
01:43:51,920 --> 01:43:55,800
Speaker 5: interesting to see, like how how long Tucker can last

1724
01:43:55,840 --> 01:43:57,519
Speaker 5: on his own before he gets into a giant court

1725
01:43:57,560 --> 01:44:01,439
Speaker 5: battle with someone, and whether he is I don't know,

1726
01:44:01,479 --> 01:44:03,200
Speaker 5: attempts to be slightly more careful.

1727
01:44:05,600 --> 01:44:07,840
Speaker 2: Yeah, like I yeah, exactly. I don't think if he's

1728
01:44:07,880 --> 01:44:10,040
Speaker 2: if he goes to YouTube or something, he's not going

1729
01:44:10,080 --> 01:44:13,000
Speaker 2: to be spending his his frozen dinner fortune on legal fees.

1730
01:44:13,000 --> 01:44:15,240
Speaker 2: I don't think so he and he can't do what

1731
01:44:15,320 --> 01:44:18,360
Speaker 2: he does without spouting shit, right, Like his whole thing

1732
01:44:18,560 --> 01:44:21,519
Speaker 2: is just straight up lying and doing this sort of

1733
01:44:21,600 --> 01:44:24,639
Speaker 2: credulous fool routine that he does, which which always results

1734
01:44:24,640 --> 01:44:27,400
Speaker 2: in these ridiculous conclusions that he comes to. So like,

1735
01:44:28,800 --> 01:44:30,320
Speaker 2: I don't know with that, maybe the daily why I

1736
01:44:30,320 --> 01:44:32,120
Speaker 2: can suderstain that I don't really have a good sense

1737
01:44:32,280 --> 01:44:35,840
Speaker 2: of sort of their clout if people aren't familiar. Should

1738
01:44:35,840 --> 01:44:39,040
Speaker 2: we summarize the dominion case? I know you've spoken about

1739
01:44:39,040 --> 01:44:39,240
Speaker 2: it on.

1740
01:44:39,200 --> 01:44:41,600
Speaker 1: Fast Yeah I did. I mean you can listen to

1741
01:44:41,640 --> 01:44:44,200
Speaker 1: the two parter I did with Katie and Cody on

1742
01:44:44,760 --> 01:44:47,080
Speaker 1: on the dominion lawsuit where he basically just go over

1743
01:44:47,280 --> 01:44:51,800
Speaker 1: the entire document that Dominion prepared for that. But the

1744
01:44:51,840 --> 01:44:55,559
Speaker 1: gist of it is that Tucker knowingly and knowingly. We

1745
01:44:55,680 --> 01:45:00,160
Speaker 1: know that he knew because the discovery process revealed a

1746
01:45:00,200 --> 01:45:02,840
Speaker 1: bunch of his text messages and emails where he talked

1747
01:45:02,840 --> 01:45:09,240
Speaker 1: about knowing that the election fraud conspiracy theory was bullshit,

1748
01:45:09,760 --> 01:45:13,800
Speaker 1: and he propagated it and attacks against Dominion and another company, Smartmatic,

1749
01:45:14,760 --> 01:45:18,439
Speaker 1: in order to keep his audience on board, which is

1750
01:45:18,600 --> 01:45:21,439
Speaker 1: a criminal you know, defamation or not criminal, but at

1751
01:45:21,479 --> 01:45:24,599
Speaker 1: least like legally actionable you can sue as as Dominion

1752
01:45:24,600 --> 01:45:27,320
Speaker 1: did and one like eight hundred million bucks. And I

1753
01:45:27,360 --> 01:45:31,120
Speaker 1: do think that's really worth That is kind of pertinent

1754
01:45:31,120 --> 01:45:33,679
Speaker 1: when we're talking about who's going to take him next,

1755
01:45:33,680 --> 01:45:36,920
Speaker 1: because like, obviously the Daily Wire would want a guy

1756
01:45:37,439 --> 01:45:40,719
Speaker 1: like Tucker except for the fact that he could cost

1757
01:45:40,720 --> 01:45:42,920
Speaker 1: them another eight hundred million dollars, which has to be

1758
01:45:43,000 --> 01:45:45,200
Speaker 1: has to be part of the calculus of any company

1759
01:45:45,680 --> 01:45:48,160
Speaker 1: looking at taking him on, And I think is something

1760
01:45:48,600 --> 01:45:50,599
Speaker 1: none of us, nobody really knows what's going to happen

1761
01:45:50,640 --> 01:45:52,240
Speaker 1: with this, but I think there is a good chance

1762
01:45:53,320 --> 01:45:56,840
Speaker 1: he is permanently marginalized in terms of audience just because

1763
01:45:56,840 --> 01:46:00,680
Speaker 1: of how much like eight hundred million dollars is not

1764
01:46:00,840 --> 01:46:03,040
Speaker 1: enough to sink Fox on its own, but it is

1765
01:46:03,160 --> 01:46:05,559
Speaker 1: enough to make anybody looking at bringing Tucker on board.

1766
01:46:06,000 --> 01:46:11,080
Speaker 5: The second guest, Yeah, I sawso numbers that were I

1767
01:46:11,160 --> 01:46:13,200
Speaker 5: think I think they were saying he was bringing in

1768
01:46:13,240 --> 01:46:17,040
Speaker 5: the highest like amount of revenue of any like like

1769
01:46:17,120 --> 01:46:18,599
Speaker 5: Kimble News anchor. But it was like it was like

1770
01:46:18,880 --> 01:46:21,120
Speaker 5: seventy eight million dollars a year and he lost like

1771
01:46:21,240 --> 01:46:24,479
Speaker 5: so he lost ten years of his income.

1772
01:46:25,880 --> 01:46:29,960
Speaker 1: He basically lost it, lost everything he'd made Fox during

1773
01:46:30,000 --> 01:46:32,240
Speaker 1: the time when he was the number one Get news house.

1774
01:46:32,439 --> 01:46:35,200
Speaker 5: Yeah, and that has to be that has to be

1775
01:46:35,240 --> 01:46:37,960
Speaker 5: a huge part of the coculus of like, Okay, you

1776
01:46:38,000 --> 01:46:40,519
Speaker 5: know these are these people like as as as as

1777
01:46:40,600 --> 01:46:43,320
Speaker 5: much as the right is ideological, it is also capitalist

1778
01:46:43,400 --> 01:46:46,720
Speaker 5: and the risk reward on that is terrifying.

1779
01:46:47,040 --> 01:46:49,120
Speaker 3: Yeah, and I like, especially when it comes to the

1780
01:46:49,200 --> 01:46:53,040
Speaker 3: Daily Wire, a cost like that would just probably make

1781
01:46:53,080 --> 01:46:54,560
Speaker 3: their entire company fold.

1782
01:46:54,520 --> 01:46:56,720
Speaker 5: Because they don't have Murdock behind them.

1783
01:46:56,880 --> 01:47:00,240
Speaker 3: They're not They're not that big of a company, just

1784
01:47:00,280 --> 01:47:03,439
Speaker 3: have a disproportionate amount of influence because their hosts are

1785
01:47:03,439 --> 01:47:06,280
Speaker 3: really good at like marketing and social media manipulation.

1786
01:47:06,439 --> 01:47:09,920
Speaker 2: Yeah yeah, yeah, I ad revenue. That would be a

1787
01:47:09,960 --> 01:47:12,080
Speaker 2: great time for us to pivot to and for some

1788
01:47:12,160 --> 01:47:13,479
Speaker 2: gold coins with Reagan.

1789
01:47:13,600 --> 01:47:16,240
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, yeah. You can hear the ads for the

1790
01:47:16,280 --> 01:47:19,960
Speaker 1: new podcasts that are our future. Colleague Tucker Carlson's gonna

1791
01:47:20,000 --> 01:47:20,360
Speaker 1: be doing.

1792
01:47:20,840 --> 01:47:21,600
Speaker 3: Yeah.

1793
01:47:21,680 --> 01:47:23,360
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's whay Ym and Don Lemon just.

1794
01:47:23,280 --> 01:47:26,519
Speaker 1: Have yeah, him and Don Lemon. We we're calling it.

1795
01:47:27,320 --> 01:47:29,880
Speaker 1: H I don't know, there's there's a good there's a

1796
01:47:29,920 --> 01:47:32,439
Speaker 1: good there's a good joke with their two names somewhere.

1797
01:47:32,560 --> 01:47:34,840
Speaker 1: I haven't figured it out yet though, So you do

1798
01:47:34,880 --> 01:47:39,800
Speaker 1: that for yourselves, audience. Ah, what a good what a

1799
01:47:39,840 --> 01:47:43,520
Speaker 1: good time that we're talking about here. This is just

1800
01:47:43,520 --> 01:47:48,400
Speaker 1: just just a great day, great week. Uh So, yeah,

1801
01:47:48,520 --> 01:47:50,599
Speaker 1: we're looking at you know, I think kind of when

1802
01:47:50,600 --> 01:47:55,000
Speaker 1: we're talking about what's possible here and Daily Wirey agree

1803
01:47:55,000 --> 01:47:57,080
Speaker 1: is kind of the most likely thing. If you look

1804
01:47:57,120 --> 01:48:00,000
Speaker 1: at what leaked recently during their drama with Stephen Krawt,

1805
01:48:00,240 --> 01:48:02,920
Speaker 1: the contract they were offering Crowder was somewhere around thirty

1806
01:48:02,920 --> 01:48:06,200
Speaker 1: million dollars, which, from everything people have said, is a

1807
01:48:06,200 --> 01:48:08,320
Speaker 1: big deal for them. That's one of the biggest, bigger

1808
01:48:08,360 --> 01:48:15,519
Speaker 1: offerings they're capable of doing. That is, you know, probably

1809
01:48:15,520 --> 01:48:19,160
Speaker 1: the most Tucker is realistically going to be able to get.

1810
01:48:19,200 --> 01:48:20,080
Speaker 6: But also.

1811
01:48:21,760 --> 01:48:23,479
Speaker 1: One of the things that kind of is noteworthy about

1812
01:48:23,479 --> 01:48:25,959
Speaker 1: the contract they were offering Crowder is that it included

1813
01:48:26,040 --> 01:48:31,960
Speaker 1: clauses where like Crowder's take home could be reduced significantly

1814
01:48:32,040 --> 01:48:36,040
Speaker 1: if he got kicked off of platforms and fucking Tucker

1815
01:48:36,080 --> 01:48:39,960
Speaker 1: Carlson is not going to keep it a YouTube account.

1816
01:48:41,960 --> 01:48:44,200
Speaker 3: I mean it is. It is interesting in that sense

1817
01:48:44,240 --> 01:48:48,640
Speaker 3: of like they were they all of his content was

1818
01:48:48,760 --> 01:48:51,639
Speaker 3: able to be kept up when he was under Fox.

1819
01:48:51,760 --> 01:48:53,959
Speaker 3: Like on YouTube you can find all of his segments,

1820
01:48:54,200 --> 01:48:56,360
Speaker 3: and it'd be interesting to see how the content moderation

1821
01:48:56,439 --> 01:48:59,000
Speaker 3: differs if like he starts his own channel and how

1822
01:48:59,080 --> 01:49:03,479
Speaker 3: and how comparatively what things would be would be counted

1823
01:49:03,520 --> 01:49:06,479
Speaker 3: as like community guideline strikes. But yeah, I mean just

1824
01:49:06,560 --> 01:49:10,240
Speaker 3: I think I think, like last week Matt Walsh's show

1825
01:49:10,400 --> 01:49:14,400
Speaker 3: got demonetized on YouTube, which if his contract is anything

1826
01:49:14,439 --> 01:49:17,479
Speaker 3: like Crowters, means that he is gonna be suffering up

1827
01:49:17,479 --> 01:49:18,880
Speaker 3: like a personal financial hit.

1828
01:49:19,320 --> 01:49:22,839
Speaker 1: Yeah, he's they're taking probably you know, in the millions

1829
01:49:22,960 --> 01:49:23,679
Speaker 1: that he's losing.

1830
01:49:24,360 --> 01:49:26,760
Speaker 5: Yeah, And there's something I think this is an interesting

1831
01:49:27,560 --> 01:49:30,759
Speaker 5: thing that's been happening in the last maybe like six months,

1832
01:49:31,000 --> 01:49:36,439
Speaker 5: has been there's there's been sort of increasing tension between

1833
01:49:37,520 --> 01:49:40,760
Speaker 5: sort of the far right that's basically sees control the

1834
01:49:40,760 --> 01:49:44,400
Speaker 5: Republican Party and like the money, and they keep running

1835
01:49:44,439 --> 01:49:47,200
Speaker 5: into these issues where in order to keep their base going,

1836
01:49:47,240 --> 01:49:49,880
Speaker 5: they need to say stuff that like their sort of

1837
01:49:50,080 --> 01:49:53,439
Speaker 5: like corporate backers are like, this is either losing us

1838
01:49:53,479 --> 01:49:57,200
Speaker 5: money or is so far out there that like it's

1839
01:49:57,479 --> 01:49:59,639
Speaker 5: you know, it's it's either directly losing us money from lawsuits,

1840
01:49:59,880 --> 01:50:02,760
Speaker 5: or or it's losing us elections, or it's losing us

1841
01:50:03,040 --> 01:50:06,400
Speaker 5: like business. And now I'm never gonna claim that like

1842
01:50:06,560 --> 01:50:09,880
Speaker 5: Murdoch is not the far right, because he is. But

1843
01:50:10,200 --> 01:50:14,559
Speaker 5: it's interesting that we've gotten to a point where people

1844
01:50:14,600 --> 01:50:18,559
Speaker 5: like Murdoch are getting more gun shy about what they

1845
01:50:18,560 --> 01:50:22,599
Speaker 5: can put on air because it's finally like the money

1846
01:50:22,680 --> 01:50:25,200
Speaker 5: is finally starting to see actual consequences, and they're starting

1847
01:50:25,200 --> 01:50:26,800
Speaker 5: to pull back from the stuff a little bit.

1848
01:50:27,160 --> 01:50:31,000
Speaker 1: Well, see, that's part of what I'm questioning is I'm

1849
01:50:31,080 --> 01:50:34,720
Speaker 1: sure that that is something that's entering his calculus more

1850
01:50:34,760 --> 01:50:39,160
Speaker 1: now since the settlement, but it's at least the earlier

1851
01:50:39,200 --> 01:50:42,479
Speaker 1: reporting suggests that's not really why, or at least not

1852
01:50:42,560 --> 01:50:44,720
Speaker 1: most of the reason why Tucker got shit canned. It's

1853
01:50:45,080 --> 01:50:48,320
Speaker 1: a bunch of shit like stuff that is not revealed

1854
01:50:48,400 --> 01:50:51,000
Speaker 1: yet in the deposition that he was saying an email.

1855
01:50:51,080 --> 01:50:52,519
Speaker 1: I mean, one of the things came out that woman

1856
01:50:52,560 --> 01:50:55,519
Speaker 1: who is accusing him of creating a sexist and anti

1857
01:50:55,520 --> 01:50:59,679
Speaker 1: semitic work environment. Is that he like when she got hired,

1858
01:50:59,720 --> 01:51:05,559
Speaker 1: he clustered swimsuit photos of Nancy Pelosi over her office,

1859
01:51:06,040 --> 01:51:09,000
Speaker 1: And that's what we've heard, like the ship that Like,

1860
01:51:09,560 --> 01:51:14,479
Speaker 1: I think it's possible, uh that what actually got Murdoch

1861
01:51:14,520 --> 01:51:17,960
Speaker 1: to make the call to can him is that he

1862
01:51:18,560 --> 01:51:22,360
Speaker 1: Murdoch himself found out through discovery that he was saying

1863
01:51:22,400 --> 01:51:26,680
Speaker 1: shit in emails that would sink the company, Like if

1864
01:51:26,680 --> 01:51:30,120
Speaker 1: he's saying full on Nazi shit. Yeah, and there's there's

1865
01:51:30,240 --> 01:51:34,479
Speaker 1: documentation of that, which I don't think is unlikely he

1866
01:51:34,520 --> 01:51:36,200
Speaker 1: had on it, like yeah.

1867
01:51:36,080 --> 01:51:37,960
Speaker 5: There's no there's there's there's no there's no limit at

1868
01:51:37,960 --> 01:51:38,559
Speaker 5: that point.

1869
01:51:38,400 --> 01:51:41,600
Speaker 2: Like yeah, no, the like clearly that ship aligns with

1870
01:51:41,640 --> 01:51:44,480
Speaker 2: his views, and he's made a concerted effort to mainstream

1871
01:51:44,560 --> 01:51:48,000
Speaker 2: more and more outright fascist New Genesis white supremacist talking

1872
01:51:48,040 --> 01:51:51,840
Speaker 2: points every year he's had that show, so it would know,

1873
01:51:51,960 --> 01:51:54,720
Speaker 2: especially when they got his text messages, Like he might

1874
01:51:54,800 --> 01:51:57,559
Speaker 2: be smart enough not to like maybe use his work email,

1875
01:51:58,200 --> 01:52:00,360
Speaker 2: but I think that the fact that he's there were

1876
01:52:00,360 --> 01:52:03,880
Speaker 2: some things in his text messages and yeah, that wouldn't

1877
01:52:03,880 --> 01:52:06,519
Speaker 2: surprise me. It's either that or he said something personal

1878
01:52:06,560 --> 01:52:08,559
Speaker 2: about one of the Murdochs, and.

1879
01:52:09,800 --> 01:52:14,120
Speaker 1: Well he did. He did talk shit about Fox executives,

1880
01:52:15,200 --> 01:52:19,000
Speaker 1: which some people have suggested as like part of why

1881
01:52:19,040 --> 01:52:20,960
Speaker 1: they made the decision. It can him that he actually

1882
01:52:21,000 --> 01:52:25,479
Speaker 1: just pissed off the moneymen too, and this was kind

1883
01:52:25,520 --> 01:52:30,120
Speaker 1: of an excuse to take more action. Again, like it's

1884
01:52:30,240 --> 01:52:32,720
Speaker 1: it's it's kind of unclear exactly what happened. I think

1885
01:52:32,720 --> 01:52:35,120
Speaker 1: it's probably worth talking about in the last portion of

1886
01:52:35,160 --> 01:52:39,000
Speaker 1: this what impact, because it is likely that whatever happens,

1887
01:52:40,040 --> 01:52:44,519
Speaker 1: he's he's going to have less reach and at least

1888
01:52:44,720 --> 01:52:47,280
Speaker 1: less reach in like a practical way, because if Tucker

1889
01:52:47,640 --> 01:52:50,160
Speaker 1: starts a podcast, even if the podcast has kind of

1890
01:52:50,200 --> 01:52:52,160
Speaker 1: more you know, through Daily Wire or whatever, even if

1891
01:52:52,200 --> 01:52:57,320
Speaker 1: it's got on paper more listeners than Fox, I think

1892
01:52:57,479 --> 01:53:03,600
Speaker 1: there's something about cable news where you're reaching an audience

1893
01:53:03,760 --> 01:53:07,200
Speaker 1: that's that's different with the ideas that he was When

1894
01:53:07,200 --> 01:53:09,840
Speaker 1: he was on Fox, he was hitting people who would

1895
01:53:09,840 --> 01:53:13,000
Speaker 1: never have encountered some of this like fascist shit, this

1896
01:53:13,080 --> 01:53:17,320
Speaker 1: great replacement stuff, whereas if he's saying the same thing

1897
01:53:17,560 --> 01:53:21,720
Speaker 1: on a Daily Wire podcast, he's probably talking more to

1898
01:53:21,840 --> 01:53:25,720
Speaker 1: people who are already pilled, so to speak. So I

1899
01:53:26,439 --> 01:53:30,040
Speaker 1: do think there's a good chance that overall this kind

1900
01:53:30,080 --> 01:53:31,559
Speaker 1: of tanks his ability to.

1901
01:53:32,680 --> 01:53:35,519
Speaker 3: Actually like influence culture inful way.

1902
01:53:35,640 --> 01:53:39,880
Speaker 2: Radicalized boomers like everyone listening can probably think of a

1903
01:53:39,880 --> 01:53:42,559
Speaker 2: person who they know or is in their sort of

1904
01:53:43,000 --> 01:53:45,680
Speaker 2: greatest circle of people who their friends know, who is

1905
01:53:45,720 --> 01:53:48,240
Speaker 2: an older person who is very much offline and has

1906
01:53:48,360 --> 01:53:51,439
Speaker 2: encountered these great replacement ideas through Tucker Carlson and become

1907
01:53:51,479 --> 01:53:54,120
Speaker 2: a significantly worse person because of Tucker Carlson's program.

1908
01:53:54,400 --> 01:53:57,160
Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean, and you can you can see how

1909
01:53:57,760 --> 01:54:00,680
Speaker 3: all of the Daily Wire guys like like Wall and Mike,

1910
01:54:00,680 --> 01:54:03,599
Speaker 3: Michael Noles and even someone like Andy No, they they

1911
01:54:03,680 --> 01:54:06,000
Speaker 3: suck up to Carlson so much and have been for

1912
01:54:06,040 --> 01:54:08,519
Speaker 3: the past few years because they realized that that actually

1913
01:54:08,520 --> 01:54:11,680
Speaker 3: gives them cultural access to be on his show on

1914
01:54:11,720 --> 01:54:14,720
Speaker 3: that platform in a way that they're much more like

1915
01:54:14,760 --> 01:54:18,160
Speaker 3: Peterson too, Pete Peterson. Sure, I think Peterson's broken into

1916
01:54:18,160 --> 01:54:18,599
Speaker 3: the mainstream.

1917
01:54:18,640 --> 01:54:19,439
Speaker 5: I think a bit more.

1918
01:54:19,680 --> 01:54:22,120
Speaker 3: But like all of these other guys like like Andy No,

1919
01:54:22,320 --> 01:54:27,519
Speaker 3: Walsh Knowles, they're all heavily like Internet people, and they

1920
01:54:27,560 --> 01:54:31,759
Speaker 3: influence like Internet shit, and sometimes that can start crossing over.

1921
01:54:32,160 --> 01:54:36,160
Speaker 3: But in general, the cable news platform kind of reiffies

1922
01:54:36,200 --> 01:54:39,520
Speaker 3: things into broader culture in a way that someone like

1923
01:54:39,920 --> 01:54:44,520
Speaker 3: Walsh just doesn't because he like, most people don't know

1924
01:54:44,840 --> 01:54:49,160
Speaker 3: who walshes, but most people do know who Tucker is.

1925
01:54:49,560 --> 01:54:53,400
Speaker 1: And that is my interesting is lifelong Republican voter. And

1926
01:54:53,440 --> 01:54:56,000
Speaker 1: when I talked to him complaining about shit Matt Walsh

1927
01:54:56,120 --> 01:54:57,720
Speaker 1: is doing, Like the first thing he said was like,

1928
01:54:57,760 --> 01:55:00,640
Speaker 1: I've never heard of this guy. Yeah, And it's like, yeah,

1929
01:55:00,640 --> 01:55:03,800
Speaker 1: because he's a fucking internet weirdo. And my dad doesn't

1930
01:55:03,880 --> 01:55:07,160
Speaker 1: you know, he knows Ben Shapiro because Ben breaks through

1931
01:55:07,160 --> 01:55:09,560
Speaker 1: to the mainstream, but he knows Ben Shapiro from like

1932
01:55:09,640 --> 01:55:13,440
Speaker 1: catching clips of him randomly being shared on Facebook by

1933
01:55:13,480 --> 01:55:15,960
Speaker 1: other people in his age group, as opposed to like

1934
01:55:16,920 --> 01:55:19,440
Speaker 1: seeking this shit out. And that's kind of the power

1935
01:55:19,480 --> 01:55:21,680
Speaker 1: of Tucker. And I think one of the things you've

1936
01:55:21,680 --> 01:55:24,960
Speaker 1: seen Gear that you were kind of talking at, which

1937
01:55:25,000 --> 01:55:28,840
Speaker 1: is the thing that is maybe most hopeful to me,

1938
01:55:29,320 --> 01:55:32,520
Speaker 1: is how scared people like Andy know Glenn Greenwald flipped

1939
01:55:32,560 --> 01:55:34,760
Speaker 1: the fuck out when this gun announced because they see

1940
01:55:35,960 --> 01:55:38,640
Speaker 1: this is a major threat to their reach into their

1941
01:55:38,680 --> 01:55:43,160
Speaker 1: earning potential. Yeah, Tucker can't host them anymore. That's potentially

1942
01:55:43,280 --> 01:55:46,240
Speaker 1: disastrous for them, and the fact that that's happening right

1943
01:55:46,240 --> 01:55:48,800
Speaker 1: as we're gearing up for twenty twenty four is something

1944
01:55:48,840 --> 01:55:51,120
Speaker 1: I'm hopeful about. At least I'll say.

1945
01:55:52,760 --> 01:55:57,480
Speaker 3: It is a massive like rejection of that platform to yeah,

1946
01:55:57,560 --> 01:56:00,440
Speaker 3: people like that like this type of like rhetoric Tucker

1947
01:56:00,560 --> 01:56:03,400
Speaker 3: is doing. Having this be like publicly rejected in this

1948
01:56:03,480 --> 01:56:05,440
Speaker 3: way will make all these people that are more on

1949
01:56:05,480 --> 01:56:09,000
Speaker 3: the fringes probably make it harder for them to break

1950
01:56:09,040 --> 01:56:11,560
Speaker 3: through in little ways like they used to try to

1951
01:56:11,840 --> 01:56:13,919
Speaker 3: by being on Tucker as a show.

1952
01:56:14,280 --> 01:56:21,360
Speaker 1: Speaking of reifying things into the broader culture. Buy these

1953
01:56:22,040 --> 01:56:24,600
Speaker 1: products and we're back.

1954
01:56:24,640 --> 01:56:27,360
Speaker 5: Okay. So there's one other thing that I We've could

1955
01:56:27,360 --> 01:56:28,920
Speaker 5: have been touching on it, but I think it's really

1956
01:56:28,920 --> 01:56:32,520
Speaker 5: interesting is that Tucker. Tucker basically has this sort of

1957
01:56:32,600 --> 01:56:35,480
Speaker 5: media ecosystem that revolves around him, and you know, there's

1958
01:56:35,480 --> 01:56:39,200
Speaker 5: a very established pathway for how you can become a

1959
01:56:39,240 --> 01:56:42,440
Speaker 5: sort of like a successful and profitable right wing grifter

1960
01:56:42,560 --> 01:56:44,760
Speaker 5: which goes through you know, you sort of go viral

1961
01:56:44,800 --> 01:56:47,200
Speaker 5: on Twitter, you go viral on TikTok, and then you

1962
01:56:47,240 --> 01:56:49,200
Speaker 5: go on a Tucker and you know, and like like

1963
01:56:49,240 --> 01:56:51,160
Speaker 5: people like lives a TikTok, right, Like, I think I

1964
01:56:51,160 --> 01:56:54,840
Speaker 5: think there's there's a certific kind of media campaign that

1965
01:56:55,160 --> 01:56:59,600
Speaker 5: even with whoever, like whatever absolute asshole that like Fox

1966
01:56:59,640 --> 01:57:02,920
Speaker 5: puts in that slot after Tucker's you know, when whatever

1967
01:57:02,920 --> 01:57:05,000
Speaker 5: they sort of figure out who that's going to be, Like,

1968
01:57:05,280 --> 01:57:07,040
Speaker 5: there's still I think going to be sort of a

1969
01:57:07,080 --> 01:57:09,520
Speaker 5: hole there. Yeah, where I think it gets harder to

1970
01:57:09,600 --> 01:57:12,320
Speaker 5: run the kinds the very the very very specific kinds

1971
01:57:12,320 --> 01:57:15,520
Speaker 5: of campaigns like liber tich talk, like the sort of

1972
01:57:15,520 --> 01:57:18,600
Speaker 5: mods for liberty shit that that's been just making the

1973
01:57:18,600 --> 01:57:23,320
Speaker 5: country unfathomably awful for the past few years.

1974
01:57:23,280 --> 01:57:26,080
Speaker 2: With like that. I've been kind of working on writing

1975
01:57:26,120 --> 01:57:28,800
Speaker 2: something scripted about this trans panic that happened in a

1976
01:57:28,840 --> 01:57:32,000
Speaker 2: town very near me in Santi right, which like was

1977
01:57:32,600 --> 01:57:37,280
Speaker 2: an extremely clear like like that was the goal, right,

1978
01:57:37,400 --> 01:57:41,240
Speaker 2: like like do to speech, go go viral, go on

1979
01:57:41,320 --> 01:57:44,080
Speaker 2: Tucker create, you know, then go on the speaking circuit,

1980
01:57:44,120 --> 01:57:45,840
Speaker 2: make money. Like to me, at least, it seems very

1981
01:57:45,840 --> 01:57:47,280
Speaker 2: clear that that was that was the goal.

1982
01:57:47,440 --> 01:57:50,200
Speaker 1: And I yeah, he's he's a weapons system that they

1983
01:57:50,440 --> 01:57:53,280
Speaker 1: they have learned, like has become kind of the center

1984
01:57:53,480 --> 01:57:58,160
Speaker 1: of right wing strategy really is like get on Tucker

1985
01:57:58,960 --> 01:58:02,400
Speaker 1: cause you know moral panic culture warship yep.

1986
01:58:02,440 --> 01:58:04,800
Speaker 5: Yeah, and and you know, and like obviously like other

1987
01:58:04,840 --> 01:58:07,160
Speaker 5: Fox shows do this stuff, it doesn't work anywhere anywhere

1988
01:58:07,160 --> 01:58:07,800
Speaker 5: near as well.

1989
01:58:07,880 --> 01:58:10,320
Speaker 3: And now I think it's the person the person that

1990
01:58:10,320 --> 01:58:13,280
Speaker 3: gets the closest is probably Laura Ingram, but I think

1991
01:58:13,360 --> 01:58:16,480
Speaker 3: she she kind of suffers from the glass ceiling problems.

1992
01:58:16,600 --> 01:58:21,720
Speaker 5: Yeah, she actually cannot be Yeah, I mean, but.

1993
01:58:21,880 --> 01:58:26,879
Speaker 2: I've Brad Masogy. I stand with Laura.

1994
01:58:26,880 --> 01:58:30,640
Speaker 3: Ingram rub Big specifically viewing Tucker as this thing that

1995
01:58:30,720 --> 01:58:32,800
Speaker 3: was like a targeted weapon. I think it's a really

1996
01:58:32,800 --> 01:58:35,320
Speaker 3: good way to look at this, and specifically now that

1997
01:58:35,320 --> 01:58:39,760
Speaker 3: that weapon no longer can like actually aim correctly because.

1998
01:58:40,320 --> 01:58:42,520
Speaker 1: Or at least may not be able to write. I mean,

1999
01:58:42,520 --> 01:58:46,160
Speaker 1: maybe he'll come back and we're wrong, but I I

2000
01:58:47,080 --> 01:58:50,360
Speaker 1: am optimistic. I think it all said, Yeah, it.

2001
01:58:50,600 --> 01:58:52,760
Speaker 2: Puts a spanner in the works of the hate machine

2002
01:58:52,920 --> 01:58:55,200
Speaker 2: that that he built and the folks built, and that's

2003
01:58:55,200 --> 01:58:55,640
Speaker 2: a good thing.

2004
01:58:56,120 --> 01:58:59,440
Speaker 3: But Mia, you were saying before I rudely interrupted.

2005
01:58:58,960 --> 01:59:00,920
Speaker 1: You, you asked, all you.

2006
01:59:02,400 --> 01:59:05,120
Speaker 5: Cannot remember what what I was gonna say.

2007
01:59:05,160 --> 01:59:08,960
Speaker 3: You're talking about how how how other other hosts kind

2008
01:59:09,000 --> 01:59:09,920
Speaker 3: of do the thing but.

2009
01:59:09,920 --> 01:59:11,320
Speaker 6: Not the Yeah.

2010
01:59:11,880 --> 01:59:13,680
Speaker 5: Well, I mean part of it also is just you know,

2011
01:59:13,720 --> 01:59:15,840
Speaker 5: part of the power of Tucker is just the time

2012
01:59:15,880 --> 01:59:18,880
Speaker 5: slot that he's in, Yeah, which is you know that

2013
01:59:18,880 --> 01:59:20,640
Speaker 5: that that's the one where like all of the people

2014
01:59:20,680 --> 01:59:22,840
Speaker 5: who've gotten off of work, who are like turning on

2015
01:59:22,880 --> 01:59:26,000
Speaker 5: the television at night get to But yeah, like Tuck,

2016
01:59:26,080 --> 01:59:29,520
Speaker 5: Tucker was I think was really in in the entirety

2017
01:59:29,600 --> 01:59:32,640
Speaker 5: of the sort of TV and media sphere, was uniquely

2018
01:59:32,640 --> 01:59:35,680
Speaker 5: good at that stuff and no one else, no one

2019
01:59:35,680 --> 01:59:37,160
Speaker 5: else can do it like that, and you know, like

2020
01:59:37,200 --> 01:59:39,680
Speaker 5: the like if the Fox people will create someone else,

2021
01:59:40,280 --> 01:59:42,880
Speaker 5: but until they fill that spot, A, there's a gap,

2022
01:59:42,960 --> 01:59:45,760
Speaker 5: and B it really remains to be seen whether seeing

2023
01:59:45,800 --> 01:59:49,200
Speaker 5: whether they're going to sort of pick someone who is

2024
01:59:49,560 --> 01:59:53,080
Speaker 5: as embedded in like that part of the sort of

2025
01:59:53,080 --> 01:59:55,360
Speaker 5: fascists right as Tucker is, or if they're going to

2026
01:59:55,400 --> 01:59:59,080
Speaker 5: find someone who's like, i mean still really really right

2027
01:59:59,120 --> 02:00:02,680
Speaker 5: wing and sucks but isn't like having ye on.

2028
02:00:03,320 --> 02:00:06,000
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, And it's I mean, I am kind of

2029
02:00:06,080 --> 02:00:10,560
Speaker 1: curious slash worried about who's going to follow him into

2030
02:00:10,600 --> 02:00:15,120
Speaker 1: that time slot. Folks, real old heads will know Tucker

2031
02:00:15,240 --> 02:00:18,760
Speaker 1: got his job after Bill O'Reilly, who was the Fox

2032
02:00:18,800 --> 02:00:22,560
Speaker 1: News fascist of my childhood, got shit canned for sexual

2033
02:00:22,600 --> 02:00:26,760
Speaker 1: harassment on an industrial scale. Uh, and so that's that's

2034
02:00:26,840 --> 02:00:30,560
Speaker 1: why Tucker is in. And obviously as bad as Bill was,

2035
02:00:30,600 --> 02:00:33,600
Speaker 1: Tucker was worse, and maybe the person who follows Tucker

2036
02:00:33,640 --> 02:00:36,480
Speaker 1: will be worse than Tucker. I do have trouble imagining

2037
02:00:36,600 --> 02:00:40,080
Speaker 1: what that could be, because my god, he really he went.

2038
02:00:40,160 --> 02:00:41,680
Speaker 1: He went right up to the edge of putting on

2039
02:00:41,720 --> 02:00:43,160
Speaker 1: a fucking swastik arm band.

2040
02:00:43,400 --> 02:00:46,120
Speaker 5: Yeah. Yeah, I will say about the Bill Orilelly people,

2041
02:00:46,120 --> 02:00:48,040
Speaker 5: people have been like, oh, like, Tucker's going to disappear

2042
02:00:48,080 --> 02:00:49,760
Speaker 5: in the way Bill o'reiley did. I don't. I don't

2043
02:00:49,760 --> 02:00:52,000
Speaker 5: think that's I think he's going to be a bigger

2044
02:00:52,640 --> 02:00:56,320
Speaker 5: like But assuming he winds up somewhere, I think he'll

2045
02:00:56,520 --> 02:00:59,440
Speaker 5: still be a bigger influence than like Bill O'Reilly was

2046
02:00:59,440 --> 02:01:00,480
Speaker 5: after he got but.

2047
02:01:00,640 --> 02:01:04,560
Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean Bill was also a lot older, right, Yeah, yeah.

2048
02:01:04,120 --> 02:01:06,560
Speaker 3: No, I think that is that is an accurate assessment.

2049
02:01:07,400 --> 02:01:11,200
Speaker 3: Mm hmm. Well excited, excited to get my new Rumble

2050
02:01:11,240 --> 02:01:17,640
Speaker 3: subscriptions so I can watch Oh yeah, yeah.

2051
02:01:18,400 --> 02:01:21,400
Speaker 1: It's going to be uh glorious to see him finally

2052
02:01:21,960 --> 02:01:25,080
Speaker 1: pair up with Tim Poole, the two, the two of

2053
02:01:25,080 --> 02:01:28,680
Speaker 1: them carrying AK forty seven, so doing field journalism in

2054
02:01:28,720 --> 02:01:29,600
Speaker 1: twenty twenty four.

2055
02:01:29,920 --> 02:01:33,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, Tucker casting, for those are not familiar, carried

2056
02:01:33,000 --> 02:01:36,640
Speaker 2: a gun when reporting in a rock, which for many

2057
02:01:36,680 --> 02:01:38,960
Speaker 2: reasons it's a fucking terrible idea, including putting f one

2058
02:01:38,960 --> 02:01:40,280
Speaker 2: else doing your changer.

2059
02:01:41,000 --> 02:01:43,800
Speaker 1: But it is really funny. It's very I will, I

2060
02:01:43,800 --> 02:01:45,280
Speaker 1: will say that it is funny.

2061
02:01:45,600 --> 02:01:48,840
Speaker 5: I I genuine like part of me doesn't, but part

2062
02:01:48,840 --> 02:01:50,440
Speaker 5: of me does. Hope he decides to do a thing

2063
02:01:50,480 --> 02:01:52,160
Speaker 5: where he's like, I'm gonna go do field journalism in

2064
02:01:52,280 --> 02:01:52,920
Speaker 5: Ukraine and just.

2065
02:01:53,720 --> 02:01:59,080
Speaker 1: Seemed so I will, it's fucking marked by God, damn

2066
02:01:59,240 --> 02:02:02,040
Speaker 1: like happens, No, no, no, you know what happens.

2067
02:02:02,240 --> 02:02:06,760
Speaker 3: He he imbeds with the aesoff battalion. Yeah, and they

2068
02:02:06,920 --> 02:02:08,280
Speaker 3: all get taken out.

2069
02:02:11,680 --> 02:02:13,240
Speaker 2: God willing kindness.

2070
02:02:13,280 --> 02:02:15,840
Speaker 3: But I think one thing I was serfinally thinking about,

2071
02:02:16,160 --> 02:02:19,640
Speaker 3: like the past few years, less less so that this

2072
02:02:19,640 --> 02:02:22,640
Speaker 3: this like past year specifically, but for a while it

2073
02:02:22,680 --> 02:02:25,120
Speaker 3: was a quite frightening prospect to think about what if

2074
02:02:25,160 --> 02:02:28,520
Speaker 3: Tucker was going to run for president? And I don't

2075
02:02:28,880 --> 02:02:31,240
Speaker 3: think he is. He is not going to do that

2076
02:02:31,280 --> 02:02:34,040
Speaker 3: in twenty twenty four. Absolutely, that's that's that's not happening.

2077
02:02:35,440 --> 02:02:38,240
Speaker 3: But I mean it's still possible he could in the future.

2078
02:02:38,280 --> 02:02:42,080
Speaker 3: Twenty twenty eight is likely, uh if, if he wants.

2079
02:02:42,320 --> 02:02:45,160
Speaker 3: But I think the loss of this position at this

2080
02:02:45,240 --> 02:02:49,960
Speaker 3: point in time will probably affect that decision because it's

2081
02:02:49,960 --> 02:02:52,280
Speaker 3: something he's certainly been thinking about, considering he's one of

2082
02:02:52,280 --> 02:02:55,120
Speaker 3: the most influential conservative people on the Yeah, like on

2083
02:02:55,200 --> 02:02:55,720
Speaker 3: the planet.

2084
02:02:56,840 --> 02:02:59,480
Speaker 2: He determines policy or did if.

2085
02:02:59,360 --> 02:03:03,080
Speaker 3: He did, yeah, and and and now it's interesting with him,

2086
02:03:03,320 --> 02:03:07,000
Speaker 3: with him leaving his job in this way, it'll be

2087
02:03:07,000 --> 02:03:09,000
Speaker 3: interesting to see if how that how that affects any

2088
02:03:09,040 --> 02:03:12,440
Speaker 3: kind of potential of prospect for him for him, yeah,

2089
02:03:12,720 --> 02:03:13,640
Speaker 3: running for office.

2090
02:03:14,240 --> 02:03:16,640
Speaker 1: My big question around all that, and this is kind

2091
02:03:16,640 --> 02:03:20,040
Speaker 1: of unanswerable, is like, does Tucker have any appeal outside

2092
02:03:20,120 --> 02:03:22,960
Speaker 1: of the right wing base. Three and a half million

2093
02:03:23,320 --> 02:03:25,360
Speaker 1: cable news viewers is not evidence of the kind of

2094
02:03:25,400 --> 02:03:27,680
Speaker 1: broad based appeal that can draw an independence and win

2095
02:03:27,720 --> 02:03:31,120
Speaker 1: an election. And Tucker has never you know, the one

2096
02:03:31,240 --> 02:03:34,480
Speaker 1: the closest thing he's been to a political candidate is

2097
02:03:34,520 --> 02:03:36,800
Speaker 1: when he went up against John Stewart, and that didn't

2098
02:03:36,840 --> 02:03:39,520
Speaker 1: go great for him. No, he and he moved aft

2099
02:03:39,600 --> 02:03:43,200
Speaker 1: after John Stewart kind of destroyed his Crossfire career. He

2100
02:03:43,240 --> 02:03:46,840
Speaker 1: moved to a situation where he was he had unprecedented

2101
02:03:46,880 --> 02:03:50,000
Speaker 1: control over his show. It was almost entirely recorded and

2102
02:03:50,040 --> 02:03:53,320
Speaker 1: stuff out of a studio in Maine that he set up.

2103
02:03:54,520 --> 02:03:57,520
Speaker 1: He built everything he was doing around being able to

2104
02:03:57,520 --> 02:04:01,240
Speaker 1: totally control how he was seen, what was shown, what

2105
02:04:01,320 --> 02:04:04,000
Speaker 1: of his was like put out to the public. And

2106
02:04:04,040 --> 02:04:06,960
Speaker 1: you simply can't do that as a presidential candidate. You

2107
02:04:06,960 --> 02:04:10,080
Speaker 1: have to accept and be able to make work for

2108
02:04:10,160 --> 02:04:13,280
Speaker 1: you the fact that every eye is on you and

2109
02:04:13,360 --> 02:04:16,560
Speaker 1: you do not have total control over what about you

2110
02:04:16,720 --> 02:04:19,160
Speaker 1: is put out and published, among other things. You're going

2111
02:04:19,200 --> 02:04:23,000
Speaker 1: to be repeatedly questioned in situations where you can't edit

2112
02:04:23,000 --> 02:04:25,600
Speaker 1: the footage or stop things from going out afterwards. And

2113
02:04:25,720 --> 02:04:28,280
Speaker 1: I don't know that Tucker has what it takes to

2114
02:04:28,400 --> 02:04:29,959
Speaker 1: succeed in that kind of environment.

2115
02:04:32,800 --> 02:04:36,720
Speaker 5: Yeah, Enchilade, he fucking never succeeds again and we never

2116
02:04:36,760 --> 02:04:38,080
Speaker 5: have to hear about him.

2117
02:04:38,360 --> 02:04:43,200
Speaker 2: Yeah, we should shout out this lady kat Abazzale, that

2118
02:04:44,000 --> 02:04:46,640
Speaker 2: the person who had to watch Tucker Carlson for years

2119
02:04:46,640 --> 02:04:48,600
Speaker 2: and years and years and then explain it to people.

2120
02:04:49,720 --> 02:04:51,760
Speaker 2: She works at Media Matters for America. But she is

2121
02:04:51,800 --> 02:04:54,640
Speaker 2: taking the biggest victory lap that anyone has ever taken

2122
02:04:54,720 --> 02:04:56,920
Speaker 2: right now. And it's kind of glorious.

2123
02:04:56,480 --> 02:04:58,960
Speaker 3: To watch doing the lord's work. Truly.

2124
02:04:59,440 --> 02:05:04,600
Speaker 2: Yeah, taking on trauma for all of her stuff was

2125
02:05:04,640 --> 02:05:06,760
Speaker 2: quite good. Like she she did a good job explaining

2126
02:05:07,200 --> 02:05:09,160
Speaker 2: how toxic Tucker was to people who might not have

2127
02:05:09,240 --> 02:05:09,760
Speaker 2: been aware of it.

2128
02:05:11,280 --> 02:05:15,320
Speaker 1: Yeah. Anyway, in conclusion, Tucker, we would love to have

2129
02:05:15,360 --> 02:05:18,320
Speaker 1: you on at Cool Zone. Totally welcome to come host

2130
02:05:18,960 --> 02:05:20,920
Speaker 1: your own podcast. We'll bring you on to it could

2131
02:05:20,960 --> 02:05:24,640
Speaker 1: happen here. You can do a bastard's guest appearance, jam,

2132
02:05:25,040 --> 02:05:29,800
Speaker 1: he can right into the jungle.

2133
02:05:33,000 --> 02:05:33,440
Speaker 2: Directly.

2134
02:05:33,960 --> 02:05:38,240
Speaker 1: Come on, come on, Tucker. We'd love to have you anyway.

2135
02:05:38,360 --> 02:05:39,880
Speaker 1: I think that's I think that's a soode.

2136
02:05:56,360 --> 02:06:00,000
Speaker 5: It's been four months since French President Emanuel Macron effect

2137
02:06:00,280 --> 02:06:05,560
Speaker 5: declared war on French society. Euphemistically called pension reforms, Macron's

2138
02:06:05,560 --> 02:06:08,480
Speaker 5: proposal would increase the retirement age from sixty two to

2139
02:06:08,520 --> 02:06:11,920
Speaker 5: sixty four, effectively robbing the working class of two years

2140
02:06:11,960 --> 02:06:15,720
Speaker 5: of their lives. In January, French unions filled the streets

2141
02:06:15,720 --> 02:06:19,680
Speaker 5: of Paris with trash now French workers build brick and

2142
02:06:19,760 --> 02:06:22,680
Speaker 5: mortar barricades on highways and set branches on fire on

2143
02:06:22,760 --> 02:06:29,640
Speaker 5: train tracks. Welcome to it could happen here. The escalation

2144
02:06:29,720 --> 02:06:33,400
Speaker 5: from protest to uprising is in part a product of

2145
02:06:33,440 --> 02:06:36,839
Speaker 5: how Macron forced the retirement age increase through a national

2146
02:06:36,840 --> 02:06:40,480
Speaker 5: assembly he no longer controls without the ability to win

2147
02:06:40,520 --> 02:06:45,760
Speaker 5: a vote. Macron's Prime Minister, Elizabeth Bourne, suddenly invoked Article

2148
02:06:45,840 --> 02:06:49,200
Speaker 5: forty nine of the French Constitution, which allows the ruling

2149
02:06:49,240 --> 02:06:52,680
Speaker 5: government to force a bill into law without a vote.

2150
02:06:52,800 --> 02:06:56,440
Speaker 5: Macron argues that because circumventing Parliament to force legislation through

2151
02:06:56,560 --> 02:07:02,280
Speaker 5: is legal, the move is democratic across France. Disagree. We

2152
02:07:02,360 --> 02:07:06,440
Speaker 5: spoke to two French protesters, Mael, a student in Leone,

2153
02:07:06,680 --> 02:07:09,600
Speaker 5: and a Gat, a union railway worker at a state

2154
02:07:09,640 --> 02:07:13,280
Speaker 5: owned rail company, about the movement. The two met through

2155
02:07:13,280 --> 02:07:16,200
Speaker 5: a struggle committee designed to bring people from different backgrounds

2156
02:07:16,200 --> 02:07:20,120
Speaker 5: and movements together to fight against mccron's reforms and four,

2157
02:07:20,640 --> 02:07:24,600
Speaker 5: as Mael put it, victories for our class. A Gat

2158
02:07:24,640 --> 02:07:27,840
Speaker 5: had this to say about Macron's anti democratic sleight of hand.

2159
02:07:28,640 --> 02:07:34,480
Speaker 4: What they are using right now is a rhetorical trap

2160
02:07:35,160 --> 02:07:46,800
Speaker 4: which consists of confusing democracy and constitutionalism. I don't know

2161
02:07:46,840 --> 02:07:49,880
Speaker 4: if I'm using the right word, but for instance, you

2162
02:07:49,960 --> 02:07:55,280
Speaker 4: know that they maybe you know that to impose this reform,

2163
02:07:55,320 --> 02:07:59,320
Speaker 4: they have been using an article, which this article forty

2164
02:07:59,400 --> 02:08:05,040
Speaker 4: nine points three of our constitution and they say that, well,

2165
02:08:05,160 --> 02:08:10,040
Speaker 4: this article is in the constitution, we are in a democracy,

2166
02:08:10,160 --> 02:08:15,360
Speaker 4: and therefore this article is democratic, which is absolutely false.

2167
02:08:15,560 --> 02:08:21,400
Speaker 4: It's a fallacious reasoning. It is not true. It's the

2168
02:08:21,760 --> 02:08:26,320
Speaker 4: forty nine point three is an anti constitution. It is

2169
02:08:26,360 --> 02:08:32,680
Speaker 4: an anti democratic article of the constitution. And this is

2170
02:08:32,720 --> 02:08:35,680
Speaker 4: what they have been trying to do lately, to say

2171
02:08:35,880 --> 02:08:40,120
Speaker 4: to make us believe that everything that's been happening is

2172
02:08:40,360 --> 02:08:47,640
Speaker 4: absolutely normal and implies with the democratic standards of France,

2173
02:08:48,040 --> 02:08:51,200
Speaker 4: which is not true. Also, what they are trying to

2174
02:08:51,240 --> 02:08:56,920
Speaker 4: do to disqualify any opposition from the left wing is

2175
02:08:56,960 --> 02:09:01,000
Speaker 4: to say that the left wing party is actually an

2176
02:09:01,120 --> 02:09:07,680
Speaker 4: extreme left hardly, which it is not. And it's kind

2177
02:09:07,720 --> 02:09:12,720
Speaker 4: of they are trying to induce the kind of history

2178
02:09:12,880 --> 02:09:18,320
Speaker 4: in all this and to radicalize what is not. What

2179
02:09:18,360 --> 02:09:22,680
Speaker 4: we are asking for is simply for them to to

2180
02:09:22,840 --> 02:09:27,200
Speaker 4: listen to what we for once can call the people. Generally,

2181
02:09:27,240 --> 02:09:30,400
Speaker 4: when you have a protest, it's only a part of

2182
02:09:30,480 --> 02:09:35,680
Speaker 4: the population that disagrees with the policy of the government.

2183
02:09:35,720 --> 02:09:41,720
Speaker 4: But this time, honestly, uh, there are seven seven people

2184
02:09:41,760 --> 02:09:45,640
Speaker 4: out of ten who are who disagree with this and uh,

2185
02:09:45,920 --> 02:09:49,840
Speaker 4: nine workers out of ten who disagree with this reform. Honestly,

2186
02:09:50,000 --> 02:09:52,160
Speaker 4: I think we can call ourselves the people.

2187
02:09:52,920 --> 02:09:56,800
Speaker 8: And in a democracy, well what you do is listen

2188
02:09:56,840 --> 02:10:00,600
Speaker 8: to the people, not that representatives and not the members

2189
02:10:00,640 --> 02:10:03,839
Speaker 8: of the government, but the people in the fucking streets.

2190
02:10:03,960 --> 02:10:09,440
Speaker 4: I'm sorry. Uh. And and because they do not want

2191
02:10:09,520 --> 02:10:13,280
Speaker 4: to do that, they try to say that we are

2192
02:10:13,360 --> 02:10:19,040
Speaker 4: radicals and that we are supported by radical political parties.

2193
02:10:19,160 --> 02:10:20,520
Speaker 4: It's not true.

2194
02:10:20,760 --> 02:10:23,720
Speaker 6: Yeah, it's it's very radious situation.

2195
02:10:23,920 --> 02:10:26,600
Speaker 4: Yeah, this is what I wanted to say about what

2196
02:10:26,720 --> 02:10:31,040
Speaker 4: they're at their current strategy, aside from the repression of

2197
02:10:31,080 --> 02:10:33,160
Speaker 4: which we are going to talk in a few minutes,

2198
02:10:33,520 --> 02:10:35,080
Speaker 4: this is what their strategy is.

2199
02:10:35,960 --> 02:10:41,640
Speaker 6: Yeah, Like basically they confuse all of the forces on

2200
02:10:41,720 --> 02:10:45,560
Speaker 6: the left together. They say that Melanchia is funding the

2201
02:10:45,640 --> 02:10:52,120
Speaker 6: black Block, you know, so it's things like that, the

2202
02:10:52,200 --> 02:10:57,480
Speaker 6: CGTS and a fee, all of them, it's on the

2203
02:10:57,560 --> 02:11:02,400
Speaker 6: same and they all want the destruction of civilization. And

2204
02:11:03,080 --> 02:11:06,360
Speaker 6: I don't know that's the discourse on the far right.

2205
02:11:07,360 --> 02:11:12,200
Speaker 5: Yeah, babies, Yeah, that sounds like you're American, right too.

2206
02:11:14,360 --> 02:11:17,480
Speaker 6: Yeah, and this is kind of linked to police violence,

2207
02:11:18,000 --> 02:11:21,080
Speaker 6: this discourse when you were talking about how they're saying

2208
02:11:21,120 --> 02:11:24,760
Speaker 6: that the constitution is democratic and there's nothing you can

2209
02:11:24,840 --> 02:11:31,320
Speaker 6: say even though well, the point of the constitution is

2210
02:11:31,360 --> 02:11:37,680
Speaker 6: to bypass the parliament. I don't know that democratic. But yeah,

2211
02:11:37,800 --> 02:11:41,240
Speaker 6: So when it comes to police violence as a reaction

2212
02:11:41,440 --> 02:11:45,919
Speaker 6: is to say that the state holds the legitimate monopoly

2213
02:11:46,000 --> 02:11:50,600
Speaker 6: of violence, so therefore they can repress us however they want.

2214
02:11:51,560 --> 02:11:55,320
Speaker 6: That's literally what they're saying right now, which is kind

2215
02:11:55,360 --> 02:11:56,280
Speaker 6: of worrying.

2216
02:11:57,000 --> 02:12:00,000
Speaker 5: The French police have been incredibly violent in their campaign

2217
02:12:00,040 --> 02:12:03,520
Speaker 5: to suppress the protests. At an ecological action in San

2218
02:12:03,600 --> 02:12:06,800
Speaker 5: Seline on March twenty fifth, tens of thousands of activists

2219
02:12:06,840 --> 02:12:10,760
Speaker 5: were met with helicopters, armored vehicles, and six thousand grenades,

2220
02:12:11,360 --> 02:12:14,280
Speaker 5: many of which were the French police's new and incredibly

2221
02:12:14,360 --> 02:12:19,200
Speaker 5: dangerous military grade GM two l cs gas grenades. One

2222
02:12:19,240 --> 02:12:21,360
Speaker 5: protester was shot in the head with a tear gas

2223
02:12:21,400 --> 02:12:24,520
Speaker 5: grenade fired by a grenade launcher mounted on an armored vehicle.

2224
02:12:25,200 --> 02:12:27,760
Speaker 5: He remained in a coma fighting for his life for

2225
02:12:27,800 --> 02:12:31,879
Speaker 5: an entire month. Earlier today, his parents' release a statement

2226
02:12:31,960 --> 02:12:34,680
Speaker 5: saying that he has begun to wake up, but is

2227
02:12:34,720 --> 02:12:38,960
Speaker 5: not fully conscious and his life remains in danger. The

2228
02:12:39,040 --> 02:12:42,680
Speaker 5: day before, a special police motorcycle unit called Brav M,

2229
02:12:43,040 --> 02:12:46,040
Speaker 5: created in twenty nineteen to suppress the Genejean with the

2230
02:12:46,120 --> 02:12:49,440
Speaker 5: yellow vest protests, was recorded threatening a group of random

2231
02:12:49,440 --> 02:12:51,360
Speaker 5: people that had arrested for sitting in front of a

2232
02:12:51,360 --> 02:12:55,320
Speaker 5: building from The Washington Post. The cop says, quote, You're

2233
02:12:55,400 --> 02:12:57,760
Speaker 5: lucky to be sitting there, and now that we've arrested you,

2234
02:12:58,160 --> 02:13:01,360
Speaker 5: I swear I'd have broken your leg literally. I can

2235
02:13:01,400 --> 02:13:04,040
Speaker 5: tell you We've broken elbows and faces, but you I'd

2236
02:13:04,040 --> 02:13:06,440
Speaker 5: have broken your legs, one officer says. In the recording.

2237
02:13:06,560 --> 02:13:11,040
Speaker 5: Limone reported two slapping sounds can be heard, the report says,

2238
02:13:11,120 --> 02:13:14,000
Speaker 5: along with an officer saying, wipe that smile off your face.

2239
02:13:14,720 --> 02:13:17,280
Speaker 5: Later in the clip, a police officer warns the young

2240
02:13:17,320 --> 02:13:20,200
Speaker 5: people they have detained. Quote, next time we come, you

2241
02:13:20,240 --> 02:13:21,840
Speaker 5: won't be getting in the car to go to the

2242
02:13:21,840 --> 02:13:24,360
Speaker 5: police station. You'll be getting in another thing called an

2243
02:13:24,400 --> 02:13:28,760
Speaker 5: ambulance to go to the hospital. Paris Police chief Laurette

2244
02:13:28,800 --> 02:13:32,320
Speaker 5: Nuez said on Friday he was quote very shocked by

2245
02:13:32,360 --> 02:13:35,760
Speaker 5: the audio clip Mayel and a gat We're less shocked.

2246
02:13:36,360 --> 02:13:43,560
Speaker 4: This is not really a surprise, unfortunately, because well, our

2247
02:13:44,160 --> 02:13:51,200
Speaker 4: lease is not as h I don't know, it's problematic,

2248
02:13:51,240 --> 02:13:53,960
Speaker 4: but maybe not as problematic as in the US. I'm

2249
02:13:54,000 --> 02:13:58,240
Speaker 4: sorry if I'm wrong about that. But we also follow

2250
02:13:58,360 --> 02:14:02,879
Speaker 4: sometimes what happens on the other side of the ocean.

2251
02:14:03,000 --> 02:14:08,040
Speaker 4: And uh, but I must say that we we have

2252
02:14:08,280 --> 02:14:16,200
Speaker 4: had issues of police murders on the street like and

2253
02:14:16,360 --> 02:14:24,000
Speaker 4: police violence, wanting violence, and unfortunately that now it's not

2254
02:14:24,200 --> 02:14:29,760
Speaker 4: new and there is a newspaper media parts who managed

2255
02:14:29,800 --> 02:14:36,680
Speaker 4: to to find a excerpt of I think it's a

2256
02:14:36,920 --> 02:14:43,920
Speaker 4: group on WhatsApp or whatever of policemen talking about race,

2257
02:14:44,000 --> 02:14:47,360
Speaker 4: war and uh and all these kinds of things. And

2258
02:14:48,360 --> 02:14:52,680
Speaker 4: unfortunately we know that there are such people in our police.

2259
02:14:53,160 --> 02:14:57,120
Speaker 6: So so police are there's a kind of basically fascists,

2260
02:14:57,280 --> 02:15:02,360
Speaker 6: all of them. Like they have like one of their

2261
02:15:02,480 --> 02:15:07,560
Speaker 6: unions which called Alliance and for the politics for the

2262
02:15:07,680 --> 02:15:13,080
Speaker 6: presidential elections, they invited the right wing party, who are

2263
02:15:13,520 --> 02:15:18,800
Speaker 6: basically only people who talg with all about genocide. And

2264
02:15:18,840 --> 02:15:26,080
Speaker 6: then the classic marine Lapin and the more the far

2265
02:15:26,240 --> 02:15:33,400
Speaker 6: right who's openly calling for a civilizational war with Muslims.

2266
02:15:34,400 --> 02:15:39,440
Speaker 6: So that's the police unions. And for a little bit

2267
02:15:39,520 --> 02:15:44,480
Speaker 6: of history on the police, we have, for example, one

2268
02:15:44,520 --> 02:15:48,640
Speaker 6: of the very violent units that you see arresting people

2269
02:15:48,760 --> 02:15:54,240
Speaker 6: all over friends, which are called brigadotic Huminality or back

2270
02:15:54,520 --> 02:16:01,160
Speaker 6: for fort. And these people come from some sort of

2271
02:16:01,640 --> 02:16:10,480
Speaker 6: colonial units who were in Algeria during the war and

2272
02:16:10,520 --> 02:16:20,000
Speaker 6: when there was a need to repress populations who previously

2273
02:16:20,040 --> 02:16:24,560
Speaker 6: lived in colonies and then moved to France to the

2274
02:16:24,600 --> 02:16:29,440
Speaker 6: main country, they created a lot of very violent units

2275
02:16:29,640 --> 02:16:33,320
Speaker 6: and recruited through people who were in the Algerian War

2276
02:16:34,080 --> 02:16:39,160
Speaker 6: to basically break down people's house things like this, beat

2277
02:16:39,200 --> 02:16:39,680
Speaker 6: them up.

2278
02:16:40,080 --> 02:16:40,360
Speaker 4: You know.

2279
02:16:41,760 --> 02:16:46,320
Speaker 6: It was really colonial practices and all of this kind

2280
02:16:46,360 --> 02:16:54,720
Speaker 6: of state with the repression of poor and non white

2281
02:16:54,920 --> 02:16:58,840
Speaker 6: areas of town where they tried to always have a

2282
02:16:58,920 --> 02:17:03,560
Speaker 6: strong police presents and catch people. They say in the act,

2283
02:17:03,760 --> 02:17:08,320
Speaker 6: but they're really making up reasons to arrest people. Police

2284
02:17:08,400 --> 02:17:12,119
Speaker 6: violence is not new at all, And yeah, basically it's

2285
02:17:12,120 --> 02:17:16,720
Speaker 6: easier need to train all year long against poor, non

2286
02:17:16,760 --> 02:17:24,600
Speaker 6: white people, and then during protests they come against people

2287
02:17:24,720 --> 02:17:31,279
Speaker 6: who have come to protests which are generally different people,

2288
02:17:31,600 --> 02:17:34,000
Speaker 6: but not entirely different people.

2289
02:17:34,120 --> 02:17:38,560
Speaker 5: Of course, the police response to protests, again says, has

2290
02:17:38,600 --> 02:17:42,040
Speaker 5: gotten more violence as the Jiljan protests in twenty nineteen,

2291
02:17:42,760 --> 02:17:45,200
Speaker 5: but instead of clearing the streets as Macron had hoped,

2292
02:17:45,560 --> 02:17:48,640
Speaker 5: the increase in violence is just narrowing the traditional gap

2293
02:17:48,680 --> 02:17:51,600
Speaker 5: between more moderate trade union protesters and the more radical

2294
02:17:51,640 --> 02:17:53,199
Speaker 5: protesters found in black blocks.

2295
02:17:53,560 --> 02:17:54,760
Speaker 6: I've seen people.

2296
02:17:55,920 --> 02:17:58,760
Speaker 9: In America in England saying that the movement is dying

2297
02:17:58,840 --> 02:18:02,800
Speaker 9: down because the inter union protests are more and more

2298
02:18:03,560 --> 02:18:06,920
Speaker 9: away from each other. But in the actual protest people

2299
02:18:07,000 --> 02:18:11,440
Speaker 9: are much much more radical. And what happens is that

2300
02:18:11,560 --> 02:18:14,040
Speaker 9: the people who are in the front of the protests

2301
02:18:14,520 --> 02:18:18,840
Speaker 9: before the union and who may potentially fight with the

2302
02:18:18,959 --> 02:18:23,600
Speaker 9: cops that the union will never do, they're more and

2303
02:18:23,640 --> 02:18:29,880
Speaker 9: more numerous, like four times bigger than the protests months ago,

2304
02:18:30,280 --> 02:18:33,560
Speaker 9: and so the cops cannot charge us. Every time they charge,

2305
02:18:33,600 --> 02:18:36,840
Speaker 9: people get around them, and there are rocks which happen

2306
02:18:36,959 --> 02:18:37,840
Speaker 9: to hit their heads.

2307
02:18:37,879 --> 02:18:41,120
Speaker 5: I don't know how, yeah, cry. I ask about that

2308
02:18:41,160 --> 02:18:43,640
Speaker 5: a bit, specifically about the dynamic of there being a

2309
02:18:43,680 --> 02:18:47,080
Speaker 5: sort of I don't know, I kind of divide between

2310
02:18:47,600 --> 02:18:49,920
Speaker 5: the sort of more biltant people who are fighting the

2311
02:18:49,959 --> 02:18:54,400
Speaker 5: cops and the sort of more moderate like trade union

2312
02:18:55,080 --> 02:18:58,600
Speaker 5: like protesters. I wanted to ask, I guess, like how

2313
02:18:58,840 --> 02:19:02,600
Speaker 5: firm has that separation been and what I guess have

2314
02:19:02,760 --> 02:19:08,120
Speaker 5: the unions been doing here? Have they been trying to

2315
02:19:08,160 --> 02:19:10,240
Speaker 5: contain things? Have they been trying to push forward?

2316
02:19:12,160 --> 02:19:18,200
Speaker 6: Well? Yes, I think it's a very some phenomenon kind

2317
02:19:18,240 --> 02:19:22,200
Speaker 6: of especially the way it's taken from now, because it's

2318
02:19:22,240 --> 02:19:27,200
Speaker 6: basically a mix of a black block and some Dill

2319
02:19:27,360 --> 02:19:34,519
Speaker 6: June and some random already called people, yeah, yellow vests.

2320
02:19:34,879 --> 02:19:40,400
Speaker 6: But so the black block it started really in twenty sixteen.

2321
02:19:40,440 --> 02:19:43,240
Speaker 6: Before this, there was no real black block all the

2322
02:19:43,280 --> 02:19:47,280
Speaker 6: time at protests, And the attitude of the unions is

2323
02:19:47,320 --> 02:19:50,240
Speaker 6: that they hate the black block. It's pretty simple. I mean,

2324
02:19:50,280 --> 02:19:56,320
Speaker 6: not of course, as everyone who's in a union, but

2325
02:19:57,160 --> 02:20:00,760
Speaker 6: the unions who organize the protest, they don't want anyone

2326
02:20:00,800 --> 02:20:03,920
Speaker 6: in front of them. They want people to go behind

2327
02:20:04,000 --> 02:20:09,640
Speaker 6: them and follow whatever they want to do. So they've

2328
02:20:09,680 --> 02:20:14,640
Speaker 6: been really aggressive. But even if there are conflicts right now,

2329
02:20:14,760 --> 02:20:17,800
Speaker 6: I would say the fact that the people in front

2330
02:20:17,840 --> 02:20:21,879
Speaker 6: of the union are more and more numerous, I think

2331
02:20:21,920 --> 02:20:25,440
Speaker 6: there's somewhat less tensions the unions. I don't think they

2332
02:20:25,480 --> 02:20:30,760
Speaker 6: feel like they can really push against even the black

2333
02:20:30,800 --> 02:20:33,960
Speaker 6: bloc or radicals who break stuff.

2334
02:20:34,560 --> 02:20:40,760
Speaker 4: If I may add in something, Indeed, there is a

2335
02:20:40,840 --> 02:20:47,960
Speaker 4: difference between the attitude of the union directions, let's say,

2336
02:20:49,080 --> 02:20:57,520
Speaker 4: and people like me, the simple unionized workers. And what

2337
02:20:57,640 --> 02:21:03,960
Speaker 4: Miles said is absolutely true about the the hate, the Yeah,

2338
02:21:04,120 --> 02:21:08,520
Speaker 4: they really don't want any black blocks, especially in front

2339
02:21:08,560 --> 02:21:14,000
Speaker 4: of them. But what I observed in these over the

2340
02:21:14,080 --> 02:21:18,840
Speaker 4: last few demonstrations is that what we call the cortege,

2341
02:21:19,400 --> 02:21:25,720
Speaker 4: which is really the very head of the demonstration, even

2342
02:21:25,800 --> 02:21:35,960
Speaker 4: in front of the unions, the official union group, where

2343
02:21:36,040 --> 02:21:39,720
Speaker 4: there are the black blocks and the yellow vests, there

2344
02:21:39,760 --> 02:21:42,800
Speaker 4: are more and more people I was I was like,

2345
02:21:43,040 --> 02:21:44,840
Speaker 4: I was going to say, like me, but I'm a

2346
02:21:44,840 --> 02:21:48,920
Speaker 4: bit of a still a bit cowardly, and I'm still

2347
02:21:48,959 --> 02:21:54,640
Speaker 4: afraid of of getting in this kind of place. But

2348
02:21:55,480 --> 02:22:01,120
Speaker 4: there are more and more unionized workers who mingle with

2349
02:22:01,240 --> 02:22:07,080
Speaker 4: the black blogs and et cetera. And I you know,

2350
02:22:07,360 --> 02:22:12,440
Speaker 4: we also have what we call manifestations sauvage the wild

2351
02:22:12,600 --> 02:22:20,080
Speaker 4: and and not organized protests that are not organized by

2352
02:22:20,160 --> 02:22:23,280
Speaker 4: unions but are kind of spontaneous.

2353
02:22:23,200 --> 02:22:29,400
Speaker 6: They opened after Macro forced the reform through Parliament without

2354
02:22:29,400 --> 02:22:32,920
Speaker 6: a vote, and people just went in the streets without

2355
02:22:32,959 --> 02:22:38,200
Speaker 6: the union and they burned. There were images in Paris

2356
02:22:38,240 --> 02:22:41,720
Speaker 6: of everything burning. It was that day, and that's what

2357
02:22:41,800 --> 02:22:43,600
Speaker 6: we call a wild protests.

2358
02:22:44,160 --> 02:22:52,640
Speaker 4: Yeah, and for the first time I saw unionized workers

2359
02:22:52,800 --> 02:22:57,680
Speaker 4: joining in. That is crazy because they were feeling that

2360
02:22:57,879 --> 02:23:04,480
Speaker 4: what the unions were proposing within the legal and pacifists

2361
02:23:04,520 --> 02:23:11,240
Speaker 4: and nice frame was not enough because really our president

2362
02:23:11,360 --> 02:23:17,160
Speaker 4: was really just making fun of us and we couldn't

2363
02:23:17,160 --> 02:23:21,280
Speaker 4: have it, and what we usually do was not longer

2364
02:23:22,000 --> 02:23:26,160
Speaker 4: enough for us. And this is really something new.

2365
02:23:27,240 --> 02:23:29,440
Speaker 5: I asked about the appearance of the Chile Jean in

2366
02:23:29,480 --> 02:23:32,640
Speaker 5: the current protest and what you thought of them, Mael.

2367
02:23:32,879 --> 02:23:36,280
Speaker 5: The student was somewhat dismissive, but the impact that Chile

2368
02:23:36,400 --> 02:23:38,840
Speaker 5: Jean had on a GAT and the railway workers was

2369
02:23:38,959 --> 02:23:39,480
Speaker 5: very different.

2370
02:23:40,360 --> 02:23:44,320
Speaker 6: Yeah, I can say a little bit, but I don't

2371
02:23:44,360 --> 02:23:50,280
Speaker 6: know much about the yellow vests. For what I saw

2372
02:23:50,360 --> 02:23:54,360
Speaker 6: of the Yellow vests were a lot of blockages and

2373
02:23:54,480 --> 02:24:02,360
Speaker 6: people against taxes on gas, and it radicalized was towards

2374
02:24:03,560 --> 02:24:09,400
Speaker 6: some form of radical democracy, but maybe not so radical

2375
02:24:09,560 --> 02:24:15,360
Speaker 6: because they wanted the mass movement seemed to end on

2376
02:24:15,440 --> 02:24:20,600
Speaker 6: the demand for referendums. Basically, they wanted to be able

2377
02:24:20,680 --> 02:24:26,240
Speaker 6: to call their own referendums, and the demands were not

2378
02:24:26,879 --> 02:24:32,040
Speaker 6: directly linked to economics. And as I saw them many

2379
02:24:32,280 --> 02:24:37,800
Speaker 6: very often, and when we saw them in protests in Lyon,

2380
02:24:40,120 --> 02:24:45,840
Speaker 6: they were kind of weird. But I don't know them

2381
02:24:46,200 --> 02:24:50,119
Speaker 6: very well. What I saw was that the government repressed

2382
02:24:50,120 --> 02:24:54,040
Speaker 6: them really, really hard, much harder than the usual protests

2383
02:24:54,040 --> 02:24:56,199
Speaker 6: that we do, because they were really scared of them.

2384
02:24:56,840 --> 02:25:00,520
Speaker 4: Yeah, because I took part to the Yellow lest movement

2385
02:25:01,560 --> 02:25:06,000
Speaker 4: and I tend to disagree a bit with your analysis

2386
02:25:06,040 --> 02:25:10,800
Speaker 4: on this problem. No, no, no, no, it's just a I'm

2387
02:25:10,840 --> 02:25:14,199
Speaker 4: just saying and it's not an attack at all. At first,

2388
02:25:14,600 --> 02:25:19,039
Speaker 4: I must say I hated this movement because well, just

2389
02:25:19,959 --> 02:25:24,200
Speaker 4: long story short, it began in twenty eighteen, and in

2390
02:25:24,240 --> 02:25:29,800
Speaker 4: twenty eighteen there was a big movement in the SENCF

2391
02:25:29,840 --> 02:25:35,600
Speaker 4: where I work in the Railway Public Company because the

2392
02:25:36,120 --> 02:25:39,199
Speaker 4: current it's very funny because it's the current Prime Minister

2393
02:25:39,360 --> 02:25:42,720
Speaker 4: who was the Transport Minister at the time.

2394
02:25:45,280 --> 02:25:46,480
Speaker 6: They just moved them around.

2395
02:25:47,360 --> 02:25:52,800
Speaker 4: We keep seeing this. It's absolutely I can't stand that anyway.

2396
02:25:53,520 --> 02:25:59,119
Speaker 4: I have a personal vendetta with this woman, and we

2397
02:25:59,240 --> 02:26:05,560
Speaker 4: had been fed trying to fight off the well, they

2398
02:26:05,720 --> 02:26:09,160
Speaker 4: kind of started to kill off our company. It's only

2399
02:26:09,280 --> 02:26:13,240
Speaker 4: now dying of its slow death. But this is where

2400
02:26:13,280 --> 02:26:16,640
Speaker 4: it really well, this is where the end really began

2401
02:26:16,760 --> 02:26:18,640
Speaker 4: in twenty eighteen for us.

2402
02:26:18,920 --> 02:26:21,360
Speaker 6: You mean by privatization, they're killing the contents.

2403
02:26:21,480 --> 02:26:25,640
Speaker 4: Yeah, we are not private yet, but the door has

2404
02:26:25,720 --> 02:26:32,280
Speaker 4: been opened on that idea. And so it's been a

2405
02:26:32,320 --> 02:26:38,560
Speaker 4: really really hard protest for us, and we in the

2406
02:26:38,680 --> 02:26:45,200
Speaker 4: end we lost. It was really hard, and after that

2407
02:26:45,760 --> 02:26:50,480
Speaker 4: we've been I've seen these people the yellow vest stand

2408
02:26:50,640 --> 02:26:56,199
Speaker 4: up and take on our songs to make them their own.

2409
02:26:57,080 --> 02:27:01,440
Speaker 4: The famous only lap. It started with in the railway world,

2410
02:27:02,080 --> 02:27:06,320
Speaker 4: and it really started in Lyons. I was there and

2411
02:27:06,959 --> 02:27:10,640
Speaker 4: suddenly these people whom I did not see by our

2412
02:27:10,920 --> 02:27:15,680
Speaker 4: side a few months before, started to invade the streets

2413
02:27:15,720 --> 02:27:20,800
Speaker 4: and sing our songs. I was really outraged. I was furious,

2414
02:27:20,879 --> 02:27:27,199
Speaker 4: and then I fortunately I spent time with the people

2415
02:27:27,280 --> 02:27:32,520
Speaker 4: who are more intelligent than me and who said that

2416
02:27:32,640 --> 02:27:36,680
Speaker 4: it was worth going to see these people and see

2417
02:27:36,840 --> 02:27:40,000
Speaker 4: what was on their minds and what they were thinking,

2418
02:27:40,320 --> 02:27:44,600
Speaker 4: especially because there were people who had never before protested.

2419
02:27:44,760 --> 02:27:47,840
Speaker 4: They had never been on the street to demonstrate about anything,

2420
02:27:48,680 --> 02:27:53,920
Speaker 4: and they were right to do that. And it all

2421
02:27:53,959 --> 02:27:57,959
Speaker 4: started with the price of oil and of gasolina. And

2422
02:27:58,080 --> 02:28:07,040
Speaker 4: I found that really really insignificant, and in fact it

2423
02:28:07,400 --> 02:28:10,480
Speaker 4: really opened my mind about the reality of other people,

2424
02:28:10,520 --> 02:28:13,200
Speaker 4: because I do not have a car, but some people

2425
02:28:13,280 --> 02:28:16,720
Speaker 4: have a car, and they needed to live together, to

2426
02:28:16,760 --> 02:28:21,320
Speaker 4: make a live in And not only that, but the

2427
02:28:21,360 --> 02:28:25,880
Speaker 4: motives of the protest. They roaded and roaded these people.

2428
02:28:26,600 --> 02:28:33,760
Speaker 4: They got politicized at such a speed, a high speed.

2429
02:28:33,760 --> 02:28:41,760
Speaker 4: This is incredible because quite rapidly what they were demanding

2430
02:28:42,320 --> 02:28:46,039
Speaker 4: was not simply the lowering of the oil price. It

2431
02:28:46,200 --> 02:28:50,480
Speaker 4: was also more democracy, it was more social justice. It

2432
02:28:50,560 --> 02:28:58,080
Speaker 4: was against the cancelation of attacks, unfortune, of the great

2433
02:28:58,120 --> 02:29:03,000
Speaker 4: fortune of people, on break wealth, and and on climate.

2434
02:29:03,240 --> 02:29:07,679
Speaker 4: Also it merged with the with a lot of climate demonstrations,

2435
02:29:07,720 --> 02:29:11,080
Speaker 4: and it broad it really it was about really a

2436
02:29:11,080 --> 02:29:16,160
Speaker 4: social model and what world we want to live in tomorrow.

2437
02:29:16,840 --> 02:29:20,920
Speaker 4: And so this is why I say this, This movement

2438
02:29:21,080 --> 02:29:24,560
Speaker 4: was really incredible. It was also incredible because it was

2439
02:29:24,600 --> 02:29:28,359
Speaker 4: taking place without the unions. It depends on the regions.

2440
02:29:28,400 --> 02:29:32,200
Speaker 4: In France. In Lyons, for example, there there is no

2441
02:29:32,400 --> 02:29:36,520
Speaker 4: love lost between the Yellow Vest and the unions, the

2442
02:29:36,600 --> 02:29:39,840
Speaker 4: direction of the unions. But in other regions, like in

2443
02:29:39,920 --> 02:29:44,560
Speaker 4: southern France or in the north, it's very different. And

2444
02:29:44,920 --> 02:29:49,360
Speaker 4: soon they began to protest together and the Yellow Vest

2445
02:29:49,480 --> 02:29:55,200
Speaker 4: they they they gave us a new a fresh new breath.

2446
02:29:55,640 --> 02:30:00,520
Speaker 4: It was really a fresher breath of fresh air. There

2447
02:30:00,640 --> 02:30:07,720
Speaker 4: was such spontaneous, they were so spontaneous and so angry. Also,

2448
02:30:07,959 --> 02:30:11,160
Speaker 4: you know, they remind they reminded us what it was

2449
02:30:11,200 --> 02:30:13,959
Speaker 4: to be angry and to have the right to be

2450
02:30:14,080 --> 02:30:20,640
Speaker 4: angry and not to be helpless in front of an

2451
02:30:20,720 --> 02:30:28,360
Speaker 4: unjust policy. And it really changed changes. And as just

2452
02:30:28,480 --> 02:30:32,600
Speaker 4: like I said that earlier that in this very movement,

2453
02:30:33,000 --> 02:30:36,840
Speaker 4: the movement we live in now, there are there are

2454
02:30:37,160 --> 02:30:40,320
Speaker 4: unionized workers who mingle with the black dog for example,

2455
02:30:40,680 --> 02:30:43,640
Speaker 4: well there were a lot of us unionized workers in

2456
02:30:43,720 --> 02:30:51,600
Speaker 4: the Yellow vese two and so yeah, it influenced us

2457
02:30:51,680 --> 02:30:52,080
Speaker 4: a lot.

2458
02:30:52,760 --> 02:30:56,440
Speaker 6: I think we can say that if twenty sixteen and

2459
02:30:56,520 --> 02:31:00,280
Speaker 6: that's a black block to the protests. Now with the

2460
02:31:00,360 --> 02:31:03,520
Speaker 6: Yellow Vest, it changed completely the way we protest as well.

2461
02:31:04,320 --> 02:31:10,440
Speaker 6: All the blockages are like much more regular and the

2462
02:31:10,520 --> 02:31:14,640
Speaker 6: way we're people fear less, you know, to demand things

2463
02:31:14,680 --> 02:31:19,360
Speaker 6: and to organize without unions. I think we can say

2464
02:31:19,400 --> 02:31:25,920
Speaker 6: that it definitely changed things. Also personally, I think that

2465
02:31:26,360 --> 02:31:30,039
Speaker 6: if I say wrong things about the yellow vests, why

2466
02:31:30,040 --> 02:31:35,040
Speaker 6: I don't know the importug is because yes, the concerns

2467
02:31:35,040 --> 02:31:40,920
Speaker 6: about oil gas price was not what of Pine because

2468
02:31:40,920 --> 02:31:42,840
Speaker 6: I live in the city and I don't have a car,

2469
02:31:45,480 --> 02:31:51,240
Speaker 6: So I think it affected more the country, the countryside

2470
02:31:51,320 --> 02:31:55,120
Speaker 6: of friends, which is more concerned with gas prices, yeah,

2471
02:31:56,080 --> 02:32:02,680
Speaker 6: than big cities. Also because we already have have lots

2472
02:32:02,680 --> 02:32:10,560
Speaker 6: of political movements here, so like it's it's kinven different.

2473
02:32:10,879 --> 02:32:11,200
Speaker 7: I don't know.

2474
02:32:11,520 --> 02:32:14,080
Speaker 6: I don't know this sport very well, to be honest,

2475
02:32:14,480 --> 02:32:15,680
Speaker 6: maybe I should just show up.

2476
02:32:17,920 --> 02:32:20,280
Speaker 1: No, I mean, it's it's interesting to me because I

2477
02:32:20,320 --> 02:32:25,000
Speaker 1: remember when the uh the g le John's protests started up,

2478
02:32:25,440 --> 02:32:27,959
Speaker 1: there was a lot of debate outside of France and

2479
02:32:28,080 --> 02:32:32,520
Speaker 1: kind of like Westerners observing the protests to are these

2480
02:32:32,560 --> 02:32:35,560
Speaker 1: guys is this something that's like a positive movement? Are

2481
02:32:35,560 --> 02:32:40,760
Speaker 1: they all right wing? And it's interesting that the way

2482
02:32:40,800 --> 02:32:43,160
Speaker 1: in which kind of all of these different sort of

2483
02:32:43,280 --> 02:32:48,920
Speaker 1: eras of protest movements in France have melded together for

2484
02:32:48,959 --> 02:32:52,280
Speaker 1: this this most recent kind of uprising like you've got

2485
02:32:52,440 --> 02:32:55,680
Speaker 1: you know, the the the You've got these trade unions,

2486
02:32:55,720 --> 02:32:58,880
Speaker 1: you've got le Jon's, you've got the Black Bloc, all

2487
02:32:58,959 --> 02:33:05,760
Speaker 1: sort of working as different pieces of this uprising, you know,

2488
02:33:05,840 --> 02:33:08,160
Speaker 1: based on kind of the different tactics of their eras.

2489
02:33:08,160 --> 02:33:09,200
Speaker 1: That's fascinating to me.

2490
02:33:09,520 --> 02:33:14,920
Speaker 6: I was discussing and saying that it's kind of a

2491
02:33:14,959 --> 02:33:20,720
Speaker 6: feature of movements about pensions, even if they can be

2492
02:33:20,920 --> 02:33:24,000
Speaker 6: very different, that they tend to attract a lot of people.

2493
02:33:24,480 --> 02:33:27,400
Speaker 6: And at first the protests were not very radical at

2494
02:33:27,440 --> 02:33:32,400
Speaker 6: all compared to protests we could have with similar sizes.

2495
02:33:34,040 --> 02:33:38,680
Speaker 6: But gradually the movement is radicalizing a lot, it seems

2496
02:33:38,720 --> 02:33:44,080
Speaker 6: to me, the people who are in it, and the

2497
02:33:44,160 --> 02:33:47,880
Speaker 6: fact that it tends to mobilize everyone at first, even

2498
02:33:47,959 --> 02:33:51,560
Speaker 6: if it's not very radical, when it created this sort

2499
02:33:51,560 --> 02:33:55,560
Speaker 6: of mingling of everybody, the Yellow ass the Union, the

2500
02:33:55,640 --> 02:34:01,360
Speaker 6: Black Block, everybody except the political party there useless books.

2501
02:34:02,680 --> 02:34:06,200
Speaker 5: Alongside the radicalization of protesters from all walks of life

2502
02:34:06,240 --> 02:34:10,160
Speaker 5: inside France, there's been a surprisingly strong international reaction from

2503
02:34:10,200 --> 02:34:12,240
Speaker 5: other European workers and activists.

2504
02:34:12,760 --> 02:34:16,240
Speaker 1: You know, I'm wondering, you know, during the Black Lives

2505
02:34:16,280 --> 02:34:20,359
Speaker 1: Matter protests in the US and twenty twenty. International attention

2506
02:34:20,920 --> 02:34:24,480
Speaker 1: was significant, and it was to some extent useful in

2507
02:34:24,560 --> 02:34:27,199
Speaker 1: terms of helping to raise money and stuff for different

2508
02:34:27,200 --> 02:34:30,039
Speaker 1: bail funds. People from all around the world helped to

2509
02:34:30,080 --> 02:34:33,879
Speaker 1: that extent. But I'm wondering is the is the degree

2510
02:34:33,920 --> 02:34:38,240
Speaker 1: of international attention by other countries left wings, you know,

2511
02:34:38,360 --> 02:34:42,120
Speaker 1: movements on what's happening in France right now. Is it

2512
02:34:42,200 --> 02:34:45,360
Speaker 1: having an impact directly or is it just sort of

2513
02:34:45,440 --> 02:34:47,039
Speaker 1: like noise.

2514
02:34:48,240 --> 02:34:53,040
Speaker 6: Well on my port, it seems to be a lot

2515
02:34:53,080 --> 02:34:57,040
Speaker 6: of noise, yes, because a lot of people seem to

2516
02:34:57,160 --> 02:35:03,959
Speaker 6: misunderstand completely the situation. And yeah, they just give their

2517
02:35:04,000 --> 02:35:10,359
Speaker 6: opinion and that's fine, I guess. But I think there

2518
02:35:10,360 --> 02:35:16,520
Speaker 6: may be actual solidarity with some militants. I mean, I

2519
02:35:16,600 --> 02:35:20,920
Speaker 6: know among anarchists that there are an archists who come

2520
02:35:21,000 --> 02:35:27,440
Speaker 6: from Italy, Switzerland, Germany and other countries who try to

2521
02:35:27,480 --> 02:35:32,080
Speaker 6: help actions and protests. And I'm pretty sure that among

2522
02:35:32,200 --> 02:35:38,120
Speaker 6: unions there is international solidarity as well. But maybe I

2523
02:35:38,160 --> 02:35:39,840
Speaker 6: got you U should say something about this.

2524
02:35:40,520 --> 02:35:44,680
Speaker 4: Yes, there is international solidarity. Honestly, this is not something

2525
02:35:44,760 --> 02:35:50,760
Speaker 4: I was expecting. But for instance, last week in Belgium,

2526
02:35:51,080 --> 02:35:58,959
Speaker 4: there are workers from a total plant that actually blocked

2527
02:35:59,800 --> 02:36:06,800
Speaker 4: the freaking port and to prevent them from sending product

2528
02:36:07,440 --> 02:36:12,000
Speaker 4: to substitute it from to the product that was blocked

2529
02:36:12,040 --> 02:36:17,720
Speaker 4: by protesters in France. And that was this is for me,

2530
02:36:17,800 --> 02:36:23,120
Speaker 4: This is absolutely wonderful and yes, so yes, there there

2531
02:36:23,200 --> 02:36:31,080
Speaker 4: are international solidarities. We have been in our inter professional assembly,

2532
02:36:31,200 --> 02:36:35,560
Speaker 4: because we have a local inter professional assembly, and we

2533
02:36:35,680 --> 02:36:43,000
Speaker 4: have been expressing our gratitude to the people in Greece,

2534
02:36:43,200 --> 02:36:51,359
Speaker 4: in Argentina, in Spain, in Germany who expressed their support

2535
02:36:51,600 --> 02:36:57,520
Speaker 4: openly and personally. I was really surprised to see how

2536
02:36:57,640 --> 02:37:03,080
Speaker 4: many people actually were being attention to what was happening

2537
02:37:03,120 --> 02:37:08,320
Speaker 4: in our country. And it gives us, well, it gave

2538
02:37:08,480 --> 02:37:14,640
Speaker 4: strength to many people, and it also gives hope because

2539
02:37:15,040 --> 02:37:22,080
Speaker 4: I realized that, well, you know, the main leverage we

2540
02:37:22,200 --> 02:37:27,240
Speaker 4: have on our liliticians is the economical beverage. And so

2541
02:37:27,440 --> 02:37:31,520
Speaker 4: when when the bosses of big companies and investors and

2542
02:37:31,600 --> 02:37:38,760
Speaker 4: everything start to say, well, guy, your reform of pensions

2543
02:37:38,760 --> 02:37:43,080
Speaker 4: in France is starting to make a mess in Germany,

2544
02:37:43,600 --> 02:37:48,760
Speaker 4: in Spain, in Greece, please stop your madness, Well this

2545
02:37:48,879 --> 02:37:53,080
Speaker 4: is a leverage I was not expecting. We are trying

2546
02:37:53,160 --> 02:38:00,320
Speaker 4: to use the leverage of the big wealth and UH

2547
02:37:59,440 --> 02:38:03,360
Speaker 4: and the big companies in France, which is already something

2548
02:38:03,400 --> 02:38:07,960
Speaker 4: quite hard to move, and that was really an unexpected

2549
02:38:08,440 --> 02:38:14,160
Speaker 4: support and we really hope that it's going to have

2550
02:38:15,240 --> 02:38:21,760
Speaker 4: because Macaron is very He's a narcissistic guy and he

2551
02:38:21,840 --> 02:38:25,800
Speaker 4: loves his own image. So if his image is starting

2552
02:38:25,879 --> 02:38:31,200
Speaker 4: to suffer internationally, I think this is going to be

2553
02:38:31,280 --> 02:38:36,200
Speaker 4: a big problem for him, and his image at the

2554
02:38:36,320 --> 02:38:38,560
Speaker 4: time is really a catastrophe.

2555
02:38:39,240 --> 02:38:41,800
Speaker 5: Belgium, of course, is not the only place for blockades

2556
02:38:41,800 --> 02:38:44,560
Speaker 5: are happening. They've become a staple of the uprising in

2557
02:38:44,600 --> 02:38:45,400
Speaker 5: France as well.

2558
02:38:46,040 --> 02:38:51,360
Speaker 6: I'm very interesting talking about the blockages of the highways

2559
02:38:51,520 --> 02:38:59,039
Speaker 6: around the Bond because many cities are trying to do this.

2560
02:38:59,360 --> 02:39:03,240
Speaker 6: There is a which is in Brotain which manages to

2561
02:39:03,440 --> 02:39:10,400
Speaker 6: block the highways very often, and so they started in

2562
02:39:10,520 --> 02:39:14,039
Speaker 6: Lyon and we tried once a few weeks ago. It

2563
02:39:14,200 --> 02:39:19,200
Speaker 6: was a call by the unions with a few points

2564
02:39:19,200 --> 02:39:23,560
Speaker 6: to block in the morning and people then militants from

2565
02:39:24,040 --> 02:39:27,000
Speaker 6: all over join the points at like six am or

2566
02:39:27,040 --> 02:39:30,760
Speaker 6: seven am, I don't remember. But when people arrived there

2567
02:39:30,760 --> 02:39:36,119
Speaker 6: were cups everywhere and they were pushed away and circulation

2568
02:39:36,480 --> 02:39:40,879
Speaker 6: and capitalism could work normally and everything was fine. So

2569
02:39:41,200 --> 02:39:47,160
Speaker 6: we were very frustrated. So reorganized completely and through the

2570
02:39:47,200 --> 02:39:53,879
Speaker 6: Struggle Committee, we assembled people from general assemblies all over

2571
02:39:54,000 --> 02:39:59,520
Speaker 6: the city and also various groups, and we managed to

2572
02:39:59,640 --> 02:40:06,560
Speaker 6: organize is a blockade last Thursday and it worked pretty well.

2573
02:40:07,560 --> 02:40:10,959
Speaker 6: It was not exceptional, but for first trip. People were

2574
02:40:11,360 --> 02:40:16,039
Speaker 6: very happy about it, and it led to many people

2575
02:40:16,240 --> 02:40:19,920
Speaker 6: from all over in the movement working together on a

2576
02:40:20,000 --> 02:40:26,920
Speaker 6: project and meeting together in assembly and then being together

2577
02:40:27,040 --> 02:40:31,959
Speaker 6: on blockages. And I think it's moments like this which

2578
02:40:32,040 --> 02:40:37,640
Speaker 6: are very important for the movement to develop. I'm not

2579
02:40:37,640 --> 02:40:41,600
Speaker 6: sure if the blockage in itself is the most interesting

2580
02:40:41,720 --> 02:40:46,000
Speaker 6: action in terms of economic damage, especially if we don't

2581
02:40:46,040 --> 02:40:51,720
Speaker 6: stay very long, but the different social relations it can create,

2582
02:40:52,600 --> 02:40:55,200
Speaker 6: and I think it can have a lot of influence

2583
02:40:55,200 --> 02:41:04,000
Speaker 6: in the movement, especially when we're thinking about the unions

2584
02:41:04,480 --> 02:41:09,440
Speaker 6: and sort of leaders of the unions who don't want

2585
02:41:09,480 --> 02:41:13,200
Speaker 6: to mobilize too much, we don't want to go too far.

2586
02:41:14,320 --> 02:41:17,760
Speaker 6: What can we do outside of that. Well, I think

2587
02:41:17,800 --> 02:41:21,080
Speaker 6: that's part of the answer, at least.

2588
02:41:20,680 --> 02:41:21,400
Speaker 4: I agree.

2589
02:41:21,879 --> 02:41:23,680
Speaker 5: Yeah, I think I think that's something that was interesting

2590
02:41:23,720 --> 02:41:27,680
Speaker 5: to me because I think the roadblocks and barricades like

2591
02:41:27,720 --> 02:41:29,959
Speaker 5: that as a sort of social site is like a

2592
02:41:30,040 --> 02:41:34,840
Speaker 5: really it's a thing you see a lot in the past,

2593
02:41:34,959 --> 02:41:38,560
Speaker 5: like twenty twenty five years of protest movements like I.

2594
02:41:39,200 --> 02:41:42,440
Speaker 5: This was a big deal in I like Hawk in

2595
02:41:42,480 --> 02:41:44,920
Speaker 5: twosand and six. There's a lot of similar stuff in

2596
02:41:44,959 --> 02:41:48,920
Speaker 5: Tehran during the uprising there. It's interesting to see it

2597
02:41:48,959 --> 02:41:52,560
Speaker 5: sort of like re entering the repertoire of stuff.

2598
02:41:53,080 --> 02:41:58,199
Speaker 1: Yeah, the kind of the different species of social interactions

2599
02:41:58,200 --> 02:42:01,560
Speaker 1: that are made possible by these kind of zones of

2600
02:42:01,640 --> 02:42:03,119
Speaker 1: autonomy that are creating.

2601
02:42:04,120 --> 02:42:07,920
Speaker 6: And they ask a lot of new questions for militants,

2602
02:42:08,440 --> 02:42:13,840
Speaker 6: how to hold a barricade against scarps and against cars.

2603
02:42:14,520 --> 02:42:18,440
Speaker 6: It's a lot of different questions which I think they

2604
02:42:18,440 --> 02:42:23,800
Speaker 6: can radicalize people. At least two demand more things, so

2605
02:42:24,440 --> 02:42:27,760
Speaker 6: it's not clear what they want to demand for now. Yeah,

2606
02:42:27,840 --> 02:42:30,080
Speaker 6: I just wanted to say that I'm really really happy

2607
02:42:30,160 --> 02:42:34,760
Speaker 6: to see people from different parts of society really coming

2608
02:42:34,800 --> 02:42:40,560
Speaker 6: together and accepting to work together, like so many things impossible.

2609
02:42:40,680 --> 02:42:45,560
Speaker 6: Now as a student, I've met basically Lisians from all

2610
02:42:45,680 --> 02:42:49,320
Speaker 6: universities in my town. I now have free access to

2611
02:42:49,400 --> 02:42:53,240
Speaker 6: all publications in French and I'll never pay for anything

2612
02:42:55,400 --> 02:42:59,120
Speaker 6: it's really really great in terms of blockage. There is

2613
02:42:59,720 --> 02:43:05,560
Speaker 6: just south of Leon there is an oil refinery which

2614
02:43:05,600 --> 02:43:09,959
Speaker 6: is not on strike. It's among the only ones. So

2615
02:43:12,240 --> 02:43:18,199
Speaker 6: it's really important because in France there's a special system

2616
02:43:18,360 --> 02:43:21,720
Speaker 6: because they wanted to stay independent from old producers, so

2617
02:43:21,760 --> 02:43:25,000
Speaker 6: they import the oil and then they refine it in France.

2618
02:43:25,680 --> 02:43:28,360
Speaker 6: So basically, if we stop all the refinery, there is

2619
02:43:28,440 --> 02:43:32,520
Speaker 6: no more gas for cars. And right down it's becoming

2620
02:43:32,520 --> 02:43:36,879
Speaker 6: a real problem because of the strikes, and this one

2621
02:43:36,920 --> 02:43:39,520
Speaker 6: stays open, and so people have started to try and

2622
02:43:39,600 --> 02:43:44,800
Speaker 6: block the entry. So right now there's like something like

2623
02:43:44,920 --> 02:43:52,080
Speaker 6: fifty union workers and like fifty radical militants who come

2624
02:43:52,160 --> 02:43:55,920
Speaker 6: there every morning. Well not this week, but last week

2625
02:43:55,959 --> 02:44:00,160
Speaker 6: they were doing it because this week we haven't said,

2626
02:44:00,200 --> 02:44:05,000
Speaker 6: but everyone is on holiday kind of somewhat. The students

2627
02:44:05,000 --> 02:44:10,480
Speaker 6: are on holiday, so many people take their paid leave

2628
02:44:11,640 --> 02:44:15,240
Speaker 6: right now as well. It's kind of a special time.

2629
02:44:17,320 --> 02:44:20,960
Speaker 6: But next week probably the blockages are going to start again.

2630
02:44:21,200 --> 02:44:25,960
Speaker 6: And it's great to see union workers meeting with more

2631
02:44:26,040 --> 02:44:32,959
Speaker 6: radical people to try and get an action together. And

2632
02:44:33,000 --> 02:44:36,160
Speaker 6: I think when there is story diarity exists, great things

2633
02:44:36,160 --> 02:44:36,680
Speaker 6: can happen.

2634
02:44:37,440 --> 02:44:43,000
Speaker 4: If I may add something about mockages and everything. What

2635
02:44:43,280 --> 02:44:50,840
Speaker 4: works pretty well and it's quite satisfying. There are big

2636
02:44:50,959 --> 02:44:57,640
Speaker 4: days of mobilization, and what has happened several times now

2637
02:44:57,840 --> 02:45:01,680
Speaker 4: is that on the very same day, very same time,

2638
02:45:02,360 --> 02:45:09,080
Speaker 4: there are several appointments a little everywhere in the in

2639
02:45:09,120 --> 02:45:12,920
Speaker 4: the town and to block something, to block a highway,

2640
02:45:13,000 --> 02:45:17,080
Speaker 4: to block a factory, to block a school or whatever.

2641
02:45:17,680 --> 02:45:24,400
Speaker 4: And this allows, uh, it allows us to dispatch and

2642
02:45:25,040 --> 02:45:29,480
Speaker 4: stretch the forces of the police, and so they are

2643
02:45:29,560 --> 02:45:35,560
Speaker 4: never enough everywhere to to to stop us. And that

2644
02:45:35,680 --> 02:45:38,560
Speaker 4: makes that can make that can make the day a

2645
02:45:38,640 --> 02:45:42,120
Speaker 4: real success because you have a lot of things happening

2646
02:45:42,200 --> 02:45:45,320
Speaker 4: at the very same time, but there is only so

2647
02:45:45,480 --> 02:45:49,920
Speaker 4: many cops. So yeah, it works pretty well.

2648
02:45:50,760 --> 02:45:54,600
Speaker 5: This is interestingly the same analysis the US police came

2649
02:45:54,640 --> 02:45:58,000
Speaker 5: to in twenty twenty. It's easy to stop one large action,

2650
02:45:58,480 --> 02:46:01,480
Speaker 5: but several smaller actions split police forces and prevent them

2651
02:46:01,480 --> 02:46:04,800
Speaker 5: from just kettling one large block of protesters. I guess

2652
02:46:04,840 --> 02:46:06,240
Speaker 5: I think I was interested in is that I think

2653
02:46:06,320 --> 02:46:07,680
Speaker 5: one of the things that happens in the US a

2654
02:46:07,680 --> 02:46:09,400
Speaker 5: lot is you'll get a national day of action, but

2655
02:46:09,440 --> 02:46:12,840
Speaker 5: all of the actions, like there'll just be one giant

2656
02:46:12,879 --> 02:46:15,400
Speaker 5: action in a city and you don't get the kind

2657
02:46:15,400 --> 02:46:17,880
Speaker 5: of like diffusion that's been helpful with spreading out cop numbers.

2658
02:46:17,879 --> 02:46:20,040
Speaker 5: And I was wondering, like, is this something like the

2659
02:46:20,120 --> 02:46:23,120
Speaker 5: unions are specifically planning to have multiple events all over

2660
02:46:23,160 --> 02:46:26,280
Speaker 5: the place or is that something that's been happening like

2661
02:46:26,400 --> 02:46:27,160
Speaker 5: outside that.

2662
02:46:27,400 --> 02:46:32,520
Speaker 6: Or no, no, no, the unions only plan once. They

2663
02:46:32,600 --> 02:46:36,760
Speaker 6: plan for a strike and for the protests.

2664
02:46:38,320 --> 02:46:42,280
Speaker 4: There are also actions, but only one action and the

2665
02:46:42,400 --> 02:46:48,959
Speaker 4: others are organized by I mean regular people.

2666
02:46:48,959 --> 02:46:52,080
Speaker 6: Or no, but like you mean, the actions on the

2667
02:46:52,160 --> 02:46:56,520
Speaker 6: days are not organized by the national union, its local

2668
02:46:56,959 --> 02:47:02,920
Speaker 6: unions which do the actions, right, that's what you're talking about. Yes, absolutely, yeah,

2669
02:47:02,959 --> 02:47:09,320
Speaker 6: so there are local unions because in friends, unions are

2670
02:47:09,959 --> 02:47:15,000
Speaker 6: very federal somewhat this we can talk about it. It's

2671
02:47:15,360 --> 02:47:18,200
Speaker 6: a bit of a problem. But like you know, the Segete,

2672
02:47:19,000 --> 02:47:23,760
Speaker 6: it started out as an archist union, so they were

2673
02:47:23,800 --> 02:47:28,800
Speaker 6: like very into federalism and all of this. So there

2674
02:47:28,840 --> 02:47:33,760
Speaker 6: is local autonomy. And what happens is workers in very

2675
02:47:33,800 --> 02:47:39,800
Speaker 6: mobilized sectors like the railways, the energy workers, they were

2676
02:47:39,920 --> 02:47:45,560
Speaker 6: organized through their union actions on that day, for example.

2677
02:47:47,600 --> 02:47:51,200
Speaker 6: And on top of this, for example, you have students

2678
02:47:51,240 --> 02:47:54,760
Speaker 6: in a certain high school or a certain university who

2679
02:47:54,760 --> 02:48:01,440
Speaker 6: decide to block something and for example, they need support. Recently,

2680
02:48:01,520 --> 02:48:07,199
Speaker 6: there was a notably right wing campus who was blocked

2681
02:48:07,200 --> 02:48:10,200
Speaker 6: by students, and so a lot of us came to

2682
02:48:10,360 --> 02:48:14,800
Speaker 6: help them because we've had never seen this campus blocked ever.

2683
02:48:16,240 --> 02:48:20,800
Speaker 6: And of course what happened was some fascists attacked them,

2684
02:48:21,640 --> 02:48:25,320
Speaker 6: but we were much much more numerous than them, so

2685
02:48:25,440 --> 02:48:29,039
Speaker 6: it was no problem. But the next time they had

2686
02:48:29,040 --> 02:48:33,920
Speaker 6: a blockage planned at this campus, they ended up not

2687
02:48:34,000 --> 02:48:38,440
Speaker 6: having enough numbers, so they canceled, but the fascists didn't

2688
02:48:38,480 --> 02:48:40,920
Speaker 6: know that it was canceled, and so they all came

2689
02:48:41,200 --> 02:48:45,240
Speaker 6: really armed with metal bars and all of that. You know.

2690
02:48:46,480 --> 02:48:49,440
Speaker 5: Still, despite the threat of fascist streak gangs, and they're

2691
02:48:49,440 --> 02:48:52,480
Speaker 5: better armed and morey legitimate counterparts in the police, the

2692
02:48:52,520 --> 02:48:56,200
Speaker 5: protests continue. They continue to block roads, they continue to

2693
02:48:56,240 --> 02:49:00,480
Speaker 5: occupy universities, They continued to strike, they continued to fight police.

2694
02:49:01,160 --> 02:49:03,840
Speaker 5: They continue to find new forms of resistance, new forms

2695
02:49:03,840 --> 02:49:08,160
Speaker 5: of solidarity, new worlds composed of people who in ordinary

2696
02:49:08,200 --> 02:49:11,360
Speaker 5: times would never have met, and in the process they

2697
02:49:11,360 --> 02:49:15,480
Speaker 5: continue to find new ways of being free. Beneath the cobblestones,

2698
02:49:16,280 --> 02:49:20,480
Speaker 5: the beach sat another generation of French protesters in May

2699
02:49:20,520 --> 02:49:24,320
Speaker 5: of nineteen sixty eight. All you have to do is

2700
02:49:24,400 --> 02:49:44,760
Speaker 5: pick it up and throw it. Welcome to Dick It

2701
02:49:44,879 --> 02:49:47,840
Speaker 5: Happened Here a podcast about things falling apart and sometimes

2702
02:49:47,879 --> 02:49:50,760
Speaker 5: about how to put them back together again. I'm your host,

2703
02:49:50,879 --> 02:49:55,840
Speaker 5: Via Wong. This is a We are once again talking

2704
02:49:55,920 --> 02:49:59,120
Speaker 5: about Wizards of the Coast. Now this time is not

2705
02:49:59,160 --> 02:50:01,760
Speaker 5: about Dungeon Gent Daggs. It is about their other property,

2706
02:50:01,840 --> 02:50:04,680
Speaker 5: Magic the Gathering, which if you don't know, is Wizards

2707
02:50:04,680 --> 02:50:07,800
Speaker 5: of the Coasts trading card game. That's at the forefront

2708
02:50:07,840 --> 02:50:10,920
Speaker 5: of some truly wild stuff right now. Now, you could

2709
02:50:10,959 --> 02:50:14,800
Speaker 5: ask Mia, why are we even talking about this about

2710
02:50:14,840 --> 02:50:17,480
Speaker 5: Magic the Gathering on this show, And you know, there's

2711
02:50:17,520 --> 02:50:21,960
Speaker 5: multiple answers. One of them is that as industrial profit

2712
02:50:22,040 --> 02:50:24,200
Speaker 5: rates have been decreasing in the last half a century,

2713
02:50:24,520 --> 02:50:27,240
Speaker 5: capital has increasingly turned towards entertainment as a way to

2714
02:50:27,280 --> 02:50:31,039
Speaker 5: make money. Magic is now a billion dollar brand, partnering

2715
02:50:31,040 --> 02:50:33,720
Speaker 5: with everything from Fortnite to The Walking Dead to and

2716
02:50:33,920 --> 02:50:36,320
Speaker 5: this is not a joke, being in the process of

2717
02:50:36,360 --> 02:50:39,160
Speaker 5: releasing an entire set of Lord of the Rings cards.

2718
02:50:40,080 --> 02:50:42,959
Speaker 5: As capital is flooded into the entertainment industry and Magic

2719
02:50:42,959 --> 02:50:46,000
Speaker 5: in particular, our silly little hobbies are suddenly the front

2720
02:50:46,040 --> 02:50:49,760
Speaker 5: lines of class struggle. Workers at TCG Player this year,

2721
02:50:50,400 --> 02:50:52,960
Speaker 5: given the job of sorting through literally tens of thousands

2722
02:50:53,000 --> 02:50:56,360
Speaker 5: of cards that TCG player processes, finally won their second

2723
02:50:56,400 --> 02:50:59,960
Speaker 5: attempt to form a union after two devastating union busting campaigns.

2724
02:51:00,760 --> 02:51:05,480
Speaker 5: And this is where things get very very weird. Now

2725
02:51:05,640 --> 02:51:08,240
Speaker 5: bear with me here, dear listeners. We have to talk

2726
02:51:08,280 --> 02:51:11,440
Speaker 5: about a little bit of magic minutia to understand what

2727
02:51:11,480 --> 02:51:13,440
Speaker 5: has happened in this incident, and then we will get

2728
02:51:13,440 --> 02:51:15,680
Speaker 5: back to what the show is usually about, which is

2729
02:51:15,720 --> 02:51:19,879
Speaker 5: corporations killing enormous numbers of people. So a few days ago,

2730
02:51:20,200 --> 02:51:23,199
Speaker 5: Dan Cannon, a man who runs a very small Magic

2731
02:51:23,200 --> 02:51:27,160
Speaker 5: YouTube channel called Old School EMPTG, bought what he thought

2732
02:51:27,200 --> 02:51:29,680
Speaker 5: were cards in the latest Magic the Gathering set called

2733
02:51:29,680 --> 02:51:34,280
Speaker 5: March of the Machine. Now Magic releases new cards periodically

2734
02:51:34,280 --> 02:51:38,840
Speaker 5: and what are called sets. These sets have plots and characters,

2735
02:51:38,879 --> 02:51:42,000
Speaker 5: they have written stories. They are enormous sort of lower events,

2736
02:51:42,160 --> 02:51:45,440
Speaker 5: They have enormous hype behind them. And March of the

2737
02:51:45,480 --> 02:51:48,199
Speaker 5: Machine story wise, is basically the version of an Avengers

2738
02:51:48,240 --> 02:51:52,879
Speaker 5: movie giant apocalyptic threats. All the heroes crossing over people,

2739
02:51:52,920 --> 02:51:54,280
Speaker 5: hopping through, multi versus, etc.

2740
02:51:54,480 --> 02:51:54,640
Speaker 7: Etc.

2741
02:51:54,800 --> 02:51:58,680
Speaker 5: Et cetera. Now, okay, this has happened before. You know,

2742
02:51:58,879 --> 02:52:03,200
Speaker 5: Wizards does big sets. It wasn't that weird. But Wizard

2743
02:52:03,200 --> 02:52:07,039
Speaker 5: decided to do something very very weird, which is they printed,

2744
02:52:07,600 --> 02:52:10,879
Speaker 5: for the first time ever, a mini set called March

2745
02:52:10,920 --> 02:52:15,240
Speaker 5: of the Machines March of the Machine Aftermath. Now, the

2746
02:52:15,560 --> 02:52:18,160
Speaker 5: regular March of the Machine set has three hundred and

2747
02:52:18,240 --> 02:52:22,920
Speaker 5: eighty seven cards in it, Aftermath has fifty. Now, I

2748
02:52:22,920 --> 02:52:24,480
Speaker 5: don't know why they decided to do this. They've never

2749
02:52:24,959 --> 02:52:27,360
Speaker 5: done anything like this if they've never printed just a

2750
02:52:27,400 --> 02:52:30,480
Speaker 5: tiny set they release a bit after the regular set before.

2751
02:52:31,080 --> 02:52:33,440
Speaker 5: And you know, the names are very very confusing, right,

2752
02:52:33,480 --> 02:52:34,880
Speaker 5: one is called March of the Machine and the other

2753
02:52:34,879 --> 02:52:37,879
Speaker 5: one is Marching the Machine Aftermath. How is a regular

2754
02:52:37,879 --> 02:52:40,400
Speaker 5: person supposed to keep track of this? The mind boggles,

2755
02:52:41,160 --> 02:52:45,080
Speaker 5: et cetera, et cetera. Either way, So Dan Cannon tries

2756
02:52:45,160 --> 02:52:47,720
Speaker 5: to buy cards from the regular March of the Machine

2757
02:52:48,160 --> 02:52:52,120
Speaker 5: set when he gets in sent instead are by accident

2758
02:52:52,720 --> 02:52:56,959
Speaker 5: March of the Machine Aftermath cards. Now these cards are

2759
02:52:56,959 --> 02:52:59,440
Speaker 5: still secret. They have not been revealed yet. No no one,

2760
02:52:59,520 --> 02:53:01,160
Speaker 5: no one knows what they are. No one's supposed to

2761
02:53:01,200 --> 02:53:04,800
Speaker 5: know what they are before every set. There's an incredibly

2762
02:53:04,840 --> 02:53:08,960
Speaker 5: elaborate process where Wizards gives cards to influencers to you know,

2763
02:53:09,040 --> 02:53:11,160
Speaker 5: reveal them to the public. And on a certain date,

2764
02:53:11,240 --> 02:53:14,160
Speaker 5: everyone reveals, you know, your influencer reveals what their card is,

2765
02:53:14,160 --> 02:53:16,840
Speaker 5: and there's this whole hype cycle on Reddit, and everyone

2766
02:53:16,920 --> 02:53:18,520
Speaker 5: argues about how good the cards are, and i'll call

2767
02:53:18,640 --> 02:53:20,400
Speaker 5: the art is and what it means for the story.

2768
02:53:20,760 --> 02:53:23,360
Speaker 5: It's sort of it's sort of similar to the the

2769
02:53:24,120 --> 02:53:26,720
Speaker 5: sort of hype cycles that would happen around trailers from

2770
02:53:26,720 --> 02:53:29,039
Speaker 5: Marvel movies, where people would be analyzing every detail of it,

2771
02:53:29,080 --> 02:53:32,520
Speaker 5: et cetera, et cetera. And these are these spoiler seasons,

2772
02:53:32,560 --> 02:53:34,520
Speaker 5: as they're called, are a huge deal for Wizards. Date

2773
02:53:34,640 --> 02:53:39,640
Speaker 5: Wizards tries to heavily control the entire process, but sometimes

2774
02:53:39,680 --> 02:53:44,120
Speaker 5: cards leak out. Now, Dan Cannon suddenly has been handed

2775
02:53:44,200 --> 02:53:46,000
Speaker 5: a bunch of cards no one has ever seen before,

2776
02:53:46,080 --> 02:53:49,040
Speaker 5: so he does what, you know, every person who just

2777
02:53:49,080 --> 02:53:52,000
Speaker 5: suddenly has magic cards that haven't been revealed yet do

2778
02:53:53,000 --> 02:53:54,920
Speaker 5: and have been doing for years and years and years.

2779
02:53:55,000 --> 02:53:59,000
Speaker 5: He makes a video showing off the cards. Now, importantly,

2780
02:53:59,200 --> 02:54:01,960
Speaker 5: this is not a lead. I need to stress this

2781
02:54:02,040 --> 02:54:03,800
Speaker 5: because of what's going to happen, what is going to

2782
02:54:03,840 --> 02:54:09,480
Speaker 5: happen next, You know, it's it's it's very very easy

2783
02:54:09,800 --> 02:54:12,840
Speaker 5: to look at the at the sort of severity of

2784
02:54:12,879 --> 02:54:14,720
Speaker 5: what's going to happen to this guy and assume that

2785
02:54:14,760 --> 02:54:16,120
Speaker 5: he broke a law. But no, he did not. He

2786
02:54:16,360 --> 02:54:19,520
Speaker 5: did not break a law. Nothing he has done he's illegal. Literally,

2787
02:54:19,560 --> 02:54:21,400
Speaker 5: what he's done is he bought some magic cards from

2788
02:54:21,400 --> 02:54:24,000
Speaker 5: someone who screwed up and accidentally broke the street date

2789
02:54:24,040 --> 02:54:27,120
Speaker 5: for selling cards because he confused March of the Machine

2790
02:54:27,120 --> 02:54:30,760
Speaker 5: with March of the Machine. Aftermath, Wow, how can anyone

2791
02:54:30,800 --> 02:54:33,240
Speaker 5: make that mistake? Right? The genius of Wizards of the

2792
02:54:33,280 --> 02:54:36,160
Speaker 5: Coast marketing is unmatched. Everything they do is incredibly clear,

2793
02:54:36,360 --> 02:54:40,520
Speaker 5: et cetera, et cetera. Now, in the process, because of

2794
02:54:40,680 --> 02:54:43,760
Speaker 5: how many cards he bought and how small the set is,

2795
02:54:43,840 --> 02:54:46,280
Speaker 5: he reveals most of the cars that are in the set,

2796
02:54:47,600 --> 02:54:52,440
Speaker 5: and then the Pinkertons show up to his house, forced

2797
02:54:52,480 --> 02:54:55,920
Speaker 5: their way through his door, make his wife cry, threaten

2798
02:54:56,000 --> 02:54:58,120
Speaker 5: to arrest him, and threaten to put him in prison

2799
02:54:58,160 --> 02:55:00,720
Speaker 5: for ten years with two hundred thousand do finds for

2800
02:55:00,760 --> 02:55:04,360
Speaker 5: copyright infringement on the grounds of him having stolen material.

2801
02:55:05,280 --> 02:55:10,440
Speaker 5: The Pinkertons also harass his elderly neighbors. Literally, just today,

2802
02:55:10,480 --> 02:55:14,480
Speaker 5: as I'm recording this, a story broken gizmoto that revealed

2803
02:55:14,480 --> 02:55:16,760
Speaker 5: that Wizards of the Coast have used the Pinkertons before

2804
02:55:16,840 --> 02:55:21,680
Speaker 5: to go after stolen goods. Now, some of you may

2805
02:55:21,720 --> 02:55:24,480
Speaker 5: be asking who are the Pinkertons, And you know, I

2806
02:55:24,480 --> 02:55:28,200
Speaker 5: think some of you probably know in very broad outlines

2807
02:55:28,200 --> 02:55:31,520
Speaker 5: who the Pinkertons are. But in order to really get

2808
02:55:31,560 --> 02:55:35,480
Speaker 5: at the core of what this organization is and why

2809
02:55:35,520 --> 02:55:37,520
Speaker 5: they look the way they do today as compared to

2810
02:55:37,600 --> 02:55:40,080
Speaker 5: how they've looked in the past, we need to ask

2811
02:55:40,080 --> 02:55:43,480
Speaker 5: another question, which is how has the balance of military

2812
02:55:43,520 --> 02:55:47,000
Speaker 5: power between the state and corporations changed over time? And

2813
02:55:47,120 --> 02:55:51,000
Speaker 5: this seems like a very weird question, but the Pinkertons

2814
02:55:51,200 --> 02:55:55,560
Speaker 5: emerge in a very weird period of time in this balance.

2815
02:55:56,320 --> 02:55:59,440
Speaker 5: They are what fills in the gap between corporations directly

2816
02:55:59,480 --> 02:56:03,320
Speaker 5: having army East could concre nations and modern corporations who,

2817
02:56:03,360 --> 02:56:06,040
Speaker 5: instead of having their own personal armies, have intelligence, you know,

2818
02:56:06,120 --> 02:56:09,000
Speaker 5: vast intelligence agencies, but also rely on the police and

2819
02:56:09,040 --> 02:56:11,800
Speaker 5: the governments as the people who do violence for them.

2820
02:56:12,440 --> 02:56:14,800
Speaker 5: So let's go back and tell the story from the

2821
02:56:14,879 --> 02:56:17,360
Speaker 5: beginning by taking a look a brief look at the

2822
02:56:17,400 --> 02:56:20,600
Speaker 5: most infamous corporate army of them all, the army of

2823
02:56:20,640 --> 02:56:24,520
Speaker 5: the East India Trading Company. The East India Trading Company

2824
02:56:24,560 --> 02:56:27,200
Speaker 5: was formed in sixteen hundred and it was given a

2825
02:56:27,400 --> 02:56:31,920
Speaker 5: vast state monopoly over trade in what they called East India,

2826
02:56:31,920 --> 02:56:34,400
Speaker 5: which is an area we would broadly call Southeast Asia

2827
02:56:34,400 --> 02:56:37,680
Speaker 5: and the South Pacific today. And at the start, these

2828
02:56:37,720 --> 02:56:42,720
Speaker 5: guys are optimistically they are half trading group, half pirate.

2829
02:56:43,280 --> 02:56:47,680
Speaker 5: The level of piracy is really high, especially in the

2830
02:56:47,760 --> 02:56:52,120
Speaker 5: early days. They you know, trade for spices. They steal

2831
02:56:52,160 --> 02:56:54,880
Speaker 5: a lot of other people's spices from places like Java

2832
02:56:54,920 --> 02:56:56,640
Speaker 5: and they bring them back to England. They make a

2833
02:56:56,640 --> 02:57:00,520
Speaker 5: lot of money now over the course of theirs. And

2834
02:57:00,560 --> 02:57:03,360
Speaker 5: again it is worth noting that these people are kind

2835
02:57:03,360 --> 02:57:06,960
Speaker 5: of the descendants of the British privateers, people like Thomas Drake,

2836
02:57:07,040 --> 02:57:10,040
Speaker 5: who'd been you know, just pirates who have been hired

2837
02:57:10,080 --> 02:57:12,680
Speaker 5: by the government to only go after like Spanish ships

2838
02:57:12,720 --> 02:57:16,840
Speaker 5: instead of English ships. So they are you know, from

2839
02:57:16,920 --> 02:57:19,160
Speaker 5: the beginning, the East India Company has this sort of

2840
02:57:19,320 --> 02:57:23,840
Speaker 5: DNA of army in it and over the course of

2841
02:57:23,879 --> 02:57:27,640
Speaker 5: about two centuries, they are going to conquer with their

2842
02:57:27,680 --> 02:57:30,840
Speaker 5: own army most of what is now India and Pakistan,

2843
02:57:31,160 --> 02:57:34,199
Speaker 5: and that territory is either going to indirectly or directly

2844
02:57:34,280 --> 02:57:37,520
Speaker 5: come under the rule of the East India Company. And

2845
02:57:37,560 --> 02:57:40,240
Speaker 5: the East India Company is fighting wars everywhere again. They

2846
02:57:40,240 --> 02:57:42,520
Speaker 5: seize India and Pakistan by force. They are fighting wars

2847
02:57:42,520 --> 02:57:48,360
Speaker 5: in Afghanistan. They kill unfathomable numbers of people. The worst

2848
02:57:48,400 --> 02:57:51,280
Speaker 5: of these events is the Great bengalf Femin'. There's a

2849
02:57:51,320 --> 02:57:53,880
Speaker 5: Behind the Bastard's episode about this that you can listen

2850
02:57:53,920 --> 02:57:56,640
Speaker 5: to if you want a really sort of long thing

2851
02:57:56,800 --> 02:58:01,200
Speaker 5: about the East India Company and the famine. But I

2852
02:58:01,240 --> 02:58:03,279
Speaker 5: want to talk about the famine a little bit because

2853
02:58:04,480 --> 02:58:09,080
Speaker 5: so the Great Bengal Famine of seventeen seventy kills ten

2854
02:58:09,160 --> 02:58:13,640
Speaker 5: million people. And I knew this intellectually, right, I studied

2855
02:58:13,680 --> 02:58:15,879
Speaker 5: a bit in college. But what I had never actually

2856
02:58:15,920 --> 02:58:19,720
Speaker 5: looked up somehow, what I'd never seen was the percentage

2857
02:58:19,720 --> 02:58:22,120
Speaker 5: of the population of this famine kills. And this famine

2858
02:58:22,240 --> 02:58:25,280
Speaker 5: is directly the fault of the East India Company. This

2859
02:58:25,320 --> 02:58:27,680
Speaker 5: is something that all historians who have look at this

2860
02:58:27,720 --> 02:58:30,000
Speaker 5: agree is that this is directly the fault of these

2861
02:58:30,040 --> 02:58:32,800
Speaker 5: India Company and the combination of their agricultural policies and

2862
02:58:32,840 --> 02:58:36,240
Speaker 5: their tax extraction. This sort of put into perspective how

2863
02:58:36,320 --> 02:58:40,560
Speaker 5: bad this gets. The highest serious estimates for the number

2864
02:58:40,600 --> 02:58:43,000
Speaker 5: of people who die in the Great Leap Forward stands

2865
02:58:43,000 --> 02:58:46,880
Speaker 5: at about thirty million dead. This is an unfathomable atrocity.

2866
02:58:47,120 --> 02:58:49,120
Speaker 5: It is a scale of death at which the human

2867
02:58:49,160 --> 02:58:51,600
Speaker 5: mind breaks down and loses the ability to process. Some

2868
02:58:51,680 --> 02:58:54,800
Speaker 5: of my family lived through it. It is horrific in

2869
02:58:54,840 --> 02:58:57,480
Speaker 5: ways that are difficult to even begin to was to describe.

2870
02:58:59,200 --> 02:59:03,200
Speaker 5: The Great killed about five percent of China's population. The

2871
02:59:03,200 --> 02:59:07,280
Speaker 5: Great Bengal Famine killed thirty percent of the population of

2872
02:59:07,320 --> 02:59:11,360
Speaker 5: India that the East India Trading Company controlled thirty percent.

2873
02:59:12,320 --> 02:59:16,080
Speaker 5: That's not just sort of small populations statistics either. Right,

2874
02:59:16,120 --> 02:59:18,920
Speaker 5: It's not like they killed thirty percent of a country

2875
02:59:18,959 --> 02:59:21,720
Speaker 5: with thirty people in it, right, They killed ten million people.

2876
02:59:22,560 --> 02:59:24,800
Speaker 5: This isn't you know? This is an unbelievable force of

2877
02:59:24,879 --> 02:59:27,240
Speaker 5: human evil. Are they are capable of killing people in

2878
02:59:27,360 --> 02:59:33,560
Speaker 5: numbers that defy comprehension. They're able to do this because

2879
02:59:33,560 --> 02:59:35,440
Speaker 5: they have an army that is the size of a

2880
02:59:35,560 --> 02:59:39,760
Speaker 5: great power nation state. The East India Trading Company's army

2881
02:59:39,840 --> 02:59:44,320
Speaker 5: in eighteen hundred had two hundred thousand soldiers. That is

2882
02:59:44,360 --> 02:59:47,959
Speaker 5: a massive army. Today, that is like the size of

2883
02:59:48,000 --> 02:59:51,080
Speaker 5: the Act of Ukrainian Army in twenty twenty two. It

2884
02:59:51,160 --> 02:59:53,400
Speaker 5: is more than twice the size of the British army

2885
02:59:53,440 --> 02:59:56,800
Speaker 5: eighteen hundred. And you know, in eighteen hundred it's not

2886
02:59:56,840 --> 02:59:59,200
Speaker 5: like the British aren't fighting wars, right they are in

2887
02:59:59,240 --> 03:00:02,760
Speaker 5: eighteen hundred are fighting the war the Second Coalition, so.

2888
03:00:02,840 --> 03:00:03,360
Speaker 1: They are there.

2889
03:00:03,400 --> 03:00:05,960
Speaker 5: They are fighting Napoleon, right, So this isn't a sort

2890
03:00:05,959 --> 03:00:12,680
Speaker 5: of you know, completely half assed like peacetime British army.

2891
03:00:13,000 --> 03:00:14,920
Speaker 5: This is a you know, this is a serious military force.

2892
03:00:14,959 --> 03:00:17,520
Speaker 5: And even even once they like fully build up their

2893
03:00:17,640 --> 03:00:21,920
Speaker 5: army at the peak of the Napoleonic Wars thirteen years later,

2894
03:00:22,879 --> 03:00:25,040
Speaker 5: the entire size of the British army is about two

2895
03:00:25,120 --> 03:00:28,640
Speaker 5: hundred fifty thousand troops and that's not much larger than

2896
03:00:28,640 --> 03:00:31,520
Speaker 5: the East India Company's army. At the same time and

2897
03:00:31,879 --> 03:00:35,160
Speaker 5: at the height of the East India Trading Company there

2898
03:00:35,200 --> 03:00:37,760
Speaker 5: are army swells to again two hundred and fifty thousand,

2899
03:00:37,800 --> 03:00:40,360
Speaker 5: which is again the size of the regular British Army

2900
03:00:40,400 --> 03:00:43,680
Speaker 5: at in the most desperate war that the British had

2901
03:00:43,720 --> 03:00:47,240
Speaker 5: fought to that point. The trading company is a full

2902
03:00:47,320 --> 03:00:51,560
Speaker 5: on military great power. Right But and this is this

2903
03:00:51,600 --> 03:00:54,120
Speaker 5: is this is something that is going to shape an

2904
03:00:54,320 --> 03:00:59,000
Speaker 5: enormous amount of the sort of arc of the relationship

2905
03:00:59,040 --> 03:01:03,520
Speaker 5: between corporate and Billie story power. It is unbelievably expensive

2906
03:01:03,560 --> 03:01:07,640
Speaker 5: to maintain an army like this, the the the British

2907
03:01:07,720 --> 03:01:10,400
Speaker 5: Stadia Company, even though they're they you know, they are

2908
03:01:10,520 --> 03:01:15,240
Speaker 5: looting entire nations, right they have they have there there

2909
03:01:15,280 --> 03:01:17,680
Speaker 5: are entire states where they fully taken over the tax services.

2910
03:01:17,680 --> 03:01:22,400
Speaker 5: They're just walking into temples and taking stuff. But even

2911
03:01:22,480 --> 03:01:24,520
Speaker 5: with all of that profit, right they you know, they

2912
03:01:24,520 --> 03:01:26,840
Speaker 5: have the ability to mint their own coins in a

2913
03:01:26,840 --> 03:01:29,120
Speaker 5: lot of these areas, but they still lose money. And

2914
03:01:29,160 --> 03:01:32,080
Speaker 5: they still lose money again because they're maintaining this two

2915
03:01:32,160 --> 03:01:36,480
Speaker 5: hundred and fifty thousand strong army. And you know, so

2916
03:01:37,160 --> 03:01:40,000
Speaker 5: you have this problem, right, which is that you have

2917
03:01:40,040 --> 03:01:42,640
Speaker 5: this item on your balance sheet that is unfathomably expensive.

2918
03:01:42,680 --> 03:01:44,280
Speaker 5: And then you have a second problem, which is that

2919
03:01:45,120 --> 03:01:47,040
Speaker 5: if you have an army, there's always a danger. But

2920
03:01:47,120 --> 03:01:50,320
Speaker 5: the army goes into revolts, and that's what happens. In

2921
03:01:50,360 --> 03:01:53,680
Speaker 5: eighteen fifty seven, the British managed to piss off their

2922
03:01:53,680 --> 03:01:58,200
Speaker 5: own army, which is almost all composed of Indian troops,

2923
03:01:58,200 --> 03:02:00,440
Speaker 5: and they fight an incredibly bloody worn. It is either

2924
03:02:00,440 --> 03:02:04,600
Speaker 5: the boy mutiny to suppoy uprising and the British win,

2925
03:02:04,800 --> 03:02:08,400
Speaker 5: and they after victory they strap a bunch of prisoners

2926
03:02:08,480 --> 03:02:11,560
Speaker 5: bodies to canons and shoot them so they can't be

2927
03:02:11,600 --> 03:02:18,480
Speaker 5: properly buried. But the consequence of this sort of horrifying war,

2928
03:02:18,680 --> 03:02:22,920
Speaker 5: and particularly the sort of fear it invokes in the

2929
03:02:23,000 --> 03:02:26,240
Speaker 5: minds of you know, the British populace of like, oh

2930
03:02:26,280 --> 03:02:28,640
Speaker 5: my god, these non white people can actually fight us,

2931
03:02:29,560 --> 03:02:33,240
Speaker 5: is that they directly seize control of India from the

2932
03:02:33,240 --> 03:02:36,480
Speaker 5: East India Trading Company. And for all your nationalization fans

2933
03:02:36,520 --> 03:02:39,040
Speaker 5: out there, the British assuming direct control of India was

2934
03:02:39,080 --> 03:02:42,800
Speaker 5: actually a nationalization. It's not actually inherently socialist, guys. You

2935
03:02:42,840 --> 03:02:46,920
Speaker 5: have to be a bit smarter than this, But that aside, right,

2936
03:02:46,959 --> 03:02:49,640
Speaker 5: this marks an enormous shift in the sort of political

2937
03:02:49,640 --> 03:02:53,080
Speaker 5: economy of violence. What is happening here is that states

2938
03:02:53,120 --> 03:02:55,920
Speaker 5: are assuming direct military control over their colonies. Instead of

2939
03:02:55,920 --> 03:03:00,440
Speaker 5: operating through corporations. And this means that what you see

2940
03:03:00,600 --> 03:03:03,520
Speaker 5: is a shift from direct corporate armies to corporations using

2941
03:03:03,560 --> 03:03:06,720
Speaker 5: the state to do violence for them. And this doesn't

2942
03:03:06,720 --> 03:03:09,160
Speaker 5: mean that corporations don't use force directly today, and it

2943
03:03:09,320 --> 03:03:13,640
Speaker 5: also doesn't mean that the governments you know, weren't acting

2944
03:03:13,680 --> 03:03:16,000
Speaker 5: as the armies of corporations and like the eighteen hundreds,

2945
03:03:16,080 --> 03:03:22,400
Speaker 5: but what's happening here, and specifically the direct seizure of

2946
03:03:22,400 --> 03:03:25,120
Speaker 5: India from the East India, the direct seizure of India

2947
03:03:25,200 --> 03:03:29,440
Speaker 5: from the East India Company, marks a dramatic shift in

2948
03:03:29,480 --> 03:03:33,840
Speaker 5: the balance of forces away from corporations with armies doing

2949
03:03:33,920 --> 03:03:37,840
Speaker 5: violence towards states doing violence on their behalf. And this

2950
03:03:38,000 --> 03:03:40,240
Speaker 5: is one of the things, alongside sort of slave catchers

2951
03:03:40,240 --> 03:03:42,279
Speaker 5: in the US, that leads to the formation of the police.

2952
03:03:43,480 --> 03:03:45,959
Speaker 5: You see this but both both both in Britain and

2953
03:03:46,200 --> 03:03:48,560
Speaker 5: in sort of France, right, you start to get police

2954
03:03:48,560 --> 03:03:52,760
Speaker 5: agencies that are you know, largely tasked with putting down

2955
03:03:52,800 --> 03:03:55,920
Speaker 5: their own working class. And this is one of the things,

2956
03:03:56,080 --> 03:03:58,680
Speaker 5: one of the sort of inexorable marches that happens over

2957
03:03:58,720 --> 03:04:00,840
Speaker 5: the course of the twentieth century. And it's also happening

2958
03:04:00,879 --> 03:04:04,279
Speaker 5: in nineteenth century too. There is a sort of mass

2959
03:04:04,280 --> 03:04:08,480
Speaker 5: centralization of state and police power, and particularly that's an

2960
03:04:08,520 --> 03:04:11,880
Speaker 5: expansion of the bureaucracy. Right the Orican state in eighteen

2961
03:04:11,879 --> 03:04:16,640
Speaker 5: forty is barely a functional state by today's standards, right, Like,

2962
03:04:16,720 --> 03:04:19,120
Speaker 5: they have an incredibly difficult time even figuring out how

2963
03:04:19,120 --> 03:04:21,680
Speaker 5: many people there are in the country, that their provisioning

2964
03:04:21,720 --> 03:04:26,119
Speaker 5: of services as a joke, nobody has like geek cars,

2965
03:04:26,160 --> 03:04:29,280
Speaker 5: Like people don't even have birth certificates for the most part.

2966
03:04:30,160 --> 03:04:33,640
Speaker 5: And that's something, you know, and that's something that changes

2967
03:04:33,720 --> 03:04:35,720
Speaker 5: right over the course of sort of the eighteen and

2968
03:04:35,800 --> 03:04:39,360
Speaker 5: nineteen hundreds, is that you get a massive bureaucracy. The

2969
03:04:39,400 --> 03:04:41,680
Speaker 5: bureaucracy is built on the model of the police, and

2970
03:04:41,720 --> 03:04:44,520
Speaker 5: they get bigger and more powerful, and by the time

2971
03:04:44,560 --> 03:04:46,879
Speaker 5: you're you know, you're halfway through the twentieth century, get

2972
03:04:47,080 --> 03:04:50,039
Speaker 5: you get a modern standing army. And that's something that

2973
03:04:50,120 --> 03:04:52,880
Speaker 5: is very, very weird. The Founders, who you know, suck

2974
03:04:52,920 --> 03:04:56,200
Speaker 5: ass in enormous numbers of ways, are also fundamentally and

2975
03:04:56,240 --> 03:04:58,640
Speaker 5: deeply opposed to standing armies because you know, they are

2976
03:04:58,680 --> 03:05:01,880
Speaker 5: students of Roman history and they know that standing armies

2977
03:05:01,920 --> 03:05:04,840
Speaker 5: have this you know, this sort of way of seizing power,

2978
03:05:06,560 --> 03:05:08,400
Speaker 5: but we've lented in a situation where you know, they

2979
03:05:08,400 --> 03:05:09,120
Speaker 5: don't really need to.

2980
03:05:09,200 --> 03:05:09,320
Speaker 1: Right.

2981
03:05:09,480 --> 03:05:11,240
Speaker 5: The US Army is kept in check by the fact

2982
03:05:11,280 --> 03:05:13,520
Speaker 5: that it has it basically a limited budget that increases

2983
03:05:13,560 --> 03:05:15,720
Speaker 5: every year, so you can't even like talk about cutting

2984
03:05:15,760 --> 03:05:19,320
Speaker 5: it without getting accused of treason. But it didn't used

2985
03:05:19,360 --> 03:05:21,240
Speaker 5: to be like that. In the eighteen hundreds, right after

2986
03:05:21,280 --> 03:05:24,240
Speaker 5: a war would end, you know, entire parts of the

2987
03:05:24,480 --> 03:05:26,760
Speaker 5: like they like, you all the US cavalry, for example,

2988
03:05:26,760 --> 03:05:29,080
Speaker 5: sometimes which just get disbanded. Right, there'd be these massive

2989
03:05:29,120 --> 03:05:31,960
Speaker 5: reductions in troop size in between wars. And you know

2990
03:05:32,040 --> 03:05:36,280
Speaker 5: that doesn't happen anymore, right, But the product of this

2991
03:05:36,520 --> 03:05:41,200
Speaker 5: was that, you know, there weren't that many like armed

2992
03:05:41,280 --> 03:05:45,119
Speaker 5: agents of the state running around with guns. And that's

2993
03:05:45,160 --> 03:05:48,400
Speaker 5: the thing that is completely and utterly ubiquitous in modern

2994
03:05:48,400 --> 03:05:51,320
Speaker 5: American life. I mean, modern American life has reached a

2995
03:05:51,360 --> 03:05:54,480
Speaker 5: point where people literally you can't even imagine what it

2996
03:05:54,520 --> 03:05:56,959
Speaker 5: would be like if there weren't cops literally everywhere, and

2997
03:05:56,959 --> 03:05:58,920
Speaker 5: if you didn't have the ability to call the police

2998
03:05:58,959 --> 03:06:01,600
Speaker 5: about anything. And that was just the sort of the

2999
03:06:01,600 --> 03:06:03,400
Speaker 5: state of affairs for a lot of the eighteen hundreds

3000
03:06:03,400 --> 03:06:05,440
Speaker 5: in the US. Is that just you know, they're really

3001
03:06:05,600 --> 03:06:11,880
Speaker 5: weren't police. And you know, there's kind of midpoints in

3002
03:06:13,040 --> 03:06:15,360
Speaker 5: the level of sort of bureaucratic development and the level

3003
03:06:15,400 --> 03:06:18,360
Speaker 5: of sort of the bureaucracy of violence, that is the

3004
03:06:18,360 --> 03:06:27,240
Speaker 5: police happens after a bit after the Civil War, where

3005
03:06:27,959 --> 03:06:30,560
Speaker 5: there are not enough police to develop the kind of

3006
03:06:30,640 --> 03:06:33,840
Speaker 5: sort of to deploy against the kind of violence that

3007
03:06:33,840 --> 03:06:36,640
Speaker 5: companies need to stop unions informing. And you know there's

3008
03:06:36,640 --> 03:06:38,840
Speaker 5: a secondary problem, right, which is okay, so you know

3009
03:06:39,080 --> 03:06:42,640
Speaker 5: there are armed troops in a state, but the armed

3010
03:06:42,680 --> 03:06:45,640
Speaker 5: troops are the militia. And you know a lot of

3011
03:06:45,640 --> 03:06:47,800
Speaker 5: the times the militia can be relied upon to choose

3012
03:06:47,840 --> 03:06:50,280
Speaker 5: striking workers and break them, but there's always a chance

3013
03:06:50,320 --> 03:06:53,520
Speaker 5: that you ordered the militia in and the militia are

3014
03:06:53,680 --> 03:06:57,600
Speaker 5: people from the towns where you know where the striking

3015
03:06:57,640 --> 03:06:59,120
Speaker 5: workers are from. And this is a real problem with

3016
03:06:59,160 --> 03:07:02,360
Speaker 5: sheriffs too, is that in this period, you get it,

3017
03:07:02,360 --> 03:07:05,400
Speaker 5: you get a lot of sheriffs who just won't prosecute

3018
03:07:05,440 --> 03:07:08,879
Speaker 5: workers because the entire town and the sheriff are all

3019
03:07:08,879 --> 03:07:11,480
Speaker 5: pro union. And this is where we come to the

3020
03:07:11,520 --> 03:07:16,359
Speaker 5: Pinkertons but first, and this is something that the Pinkertons

3021
03:07:16,360 --> 03:07:22,000
Speaker 5: would have approved of. Some ads, and we're back. So

3022
03:07:22,360 --> 03:07:26,600
Speaker 5: who are the Pinkertons. The Pinkertons are founded by a

3023
03:07:26,640 --> 03:07:30,520
Speaker 5: guy named Alan Pinkerton. Alan Pinkerton's an interesting guy. He's

3024
03:07:31,360 --> 03:07:33,600
Speaker 5: he's kind of a radical when he's young, he's like

3025
03:07:33,680 --> 03:07:37,080
Speaker 5: he's a hardcore abolitionist who like funds John Brown. Right,

3026
03:07:38,360 --> 03:07:40,920
Speaker 5: there's a whole debate about the extent to which she

3027
03:07:41,080 --> 03:07:44,080
Speaker 5: was involved in a sort of British workers reform movement

3028
03:07:44,120 --> 03:07:49,600
Speaker 5: called the chartlists. Every source I've read disagrees about how

3029
03:07:49,640 --> 03:07:52,800
Speaker 5: much he was involved in it. It's I mean, one's

3030
03:07:52,840 --> 03:07:55,160
Speaker 5: disagreements are basically penning the radiology. I don't know if

3031
03:07:55,200 --> 03:07:56,960
Speaker 5: I ever get to get a good answer about how

3032
03:07:57,000 --> 03:08:01,520
Speaker 5: involved in it he is. But Pinkerton briefly and kind

3033
03:08:01,520 --> 03:08:03,640
Speaker 5: of by accident, becomes a bounty hunter. But he just

3034
03:08:03,680 --> 03:08:07,840
Speaker 5: like walks across it, just runs into a camp of

3035
03:08:07,879 --> 03:08:11,840
Speaker 5: people who seem to clearly be counterfeitters. And he eventually

3036
03:08:11,879 --> 03:08:15,720
Speaker 5: becomes a detective around Michigan and then in Chicago, and

3037
03:08:15,760 --> 03:08:19,920
Speaker 5: then he becomes a postal cop. And in the process

3038
03:08:19,959 --> 03:08:23,160
Speaker 5: of being a postal cop, he figures out something that

3039
03:08:23,240 --> 03:08:25,800
Speaker 5: is more lucrative. He figured out a more lucrative way

3040
03:08:25,800 --> 03:08:27,720
Speaker 5: to de detective work than just working for the state,

3041
03:08:28,120 --> 03:08:32,000
Speaker 5: which is working for the railways. So by eighteen fifty

3042
03:08:32,200 --> 03:08:34,800
Speaker 5: he has a full detective agency going that he renames

3043
03:08:34,800 --> 03:08:39,440
Speaker 5: the Pinkertons. Now, you know this is the eighteen fifties, right,

3044
03:08:39,720 --> 03:08:42,480
Speaker 5: you are rapidly coproaching the Civil War. Durating the Civil War.

3045
03:08:42,680 --> 03:08:47,320
Speaker 5: He is hired by George McClellan, just the worst union general.

3046
03:08:48,520 --> 03:08:51,720
Speaker 5: He runs a spy network in the Confederacy that absolutely sucks,

3047
03:08:51,840 --> 03:08:55,720
Speaker 5: Like all the spies get caught. His intelligence being awful.

3048
03:08:55,920 --> 03:08:58,800
Speaker 5: It's one of the things that leads McClellan to suspect,

3049
03:08:58,959 --> 03:09:01,280
Speaker 5: you know, that there's like secret way more Confederate troops

3050
03:09:01,320 --> 03:09:03,119
Speaker 5: that there actually are. So he just never does anything

3051
03:09:03,120 --> 03:09:05,160
Speaker 5: for the entire worlds Like he's like the worst union

3052
03:09:05,200 --> 03:09:08,440
Speaker 5: general until he gets replaced. Yeah, when McClellan is asked,

3053
03:09:08,520 --> 03:09:12,400
Speaker 5: Pinkerton is also out, but you know the agency is

3054
03:09:12,440 --> 03:09:16,680
Speaker 5: still around and the detectives are initially known as Sidered

3055
03:09:16,720 --> 03:09:23,200
Speaker 5: as cinder Dicks for complicated railroading reasons. I yeah, I

3056
03:09:23,240 --> 03:09:25,680
Speaker 5: don't know about that one, but it's very funny and

3057
03:09:25,920 --> 03:09:29,560
Speaker 5: what they sort of do, right is in this early phases,

3058
03:09:29,600 --> 03:09:31,840
Speaker 5: they have this massive network of sort of informants and

3059
03:09:31,879 --> 03:09:35,800
Speaker 5: spies that they sell to the highest bidder. They're not

3060
03:09:35,920 --> 03:09:38,560
Speaker 5: sort of when you know, they are detectives, right and sometimes,

3061
03:09:38,560 --> 03:09:42,720
Speaker 5: but they're not detectives in the Sherlock sense where you

3062
03:09:42,760 --> 03:09:44,600
Speaker 5: have a guy who sees a bunch of evidence and

3063
03:09:44,600 --> 03:09:49,000
Speaker 5: then uses logic and uses investigation to deduce like who

3064
03:09:49,000 --> 03:09:53,000
Speaker 5: did the crime. Pinkerton detectives are operatives. They do infiltrations.

3065
03:09:53,000 --> 03:09:54,959
Speaker 5: This is basically their one trick, right is they send

3066
03:09:54,959 --> 03:09:58,160
Speaker 5: a guy under cover and then he gets people to

3067
03:09:58,200 --> 03:10:00,000
Speaker 5: talk to him, and then they catch the guy because

3068
03:10:00,160 --> 03:10:04,199
Speaker 5: someone talked. Right now. The other thing that the Pinkertons

3069
03:10:04,240 --> 03:10:07,280
Speaker 5: are really really good at is spinning mythology around them.

3070
03:10:08,320 --> 03:10:12,280
Speaker 5: Pinkerton claims that he saved Lincoln from an assassination plot,

3071
03:10:13,840 --> 03:10:17,720
Speaker 5: and you know, he successfully convinces Lincoln to flee a

3072
03:10:17,760 --> 03:10:18,840
Speaker 5: building in a disguise.

3073
03:10:19,080 --> 03:10:19,240
Speaker 4: Right.

3074
03:10:20,280 --> 03:10:22,680
Speaker 5: The problem is that you know, as early as like

3075
03:10:22,800 --> 03:10:27,400
Speaker 5: the next day after this supposed plot happens, assassinating assassination

3076
03:10:27,440 --> 03:10:30,360
Speaker 5: plot happens, people were already claiming that there wasn't one.

3077
03:10:30,959 --> 03:10:33,000
Speaker 5: And you know, I think the evidence for their not

3078
03:10:33,120 --> 03:10:35,400
Speaker 5: being one is bolstered by the fact that no one

3079
03:10:35,520 --> 03:10:38,120
Speaker 5: was ever like, not only was no one ever tried

3080
03:10:38,160 --> 03:10:40,760
Speaker 5: for this, no one was ever even arrested for again,

3081
03:10:40,840 --> 03:10:43,240
Speaker 5: a plot to assassinate the president of the United States.

3082
03:10:43,840 --> 03:10:47,000
Speaker 5: So I am inclined to suspect that this was fake.

3083
03:10:47,200 --> 03:10:50,520
Speaker 5: So sorians disagree about this, but he's able to milk

3084
03:10:50,560 --> 03:10:53,360
Speaker 5: this for incredible pr right, He's you know, he's like,

3085
03:10:53,400 --> 03:10:55,440
Speaker 5: I'm the guy who saved the president, and he does

3086
03:10:55,440 --> 03:10:56,400
Speaker 5: this whole sort of like.

3087
03:10:56,879 --> 03:10:59,959
Speaker 10: Ah, if I had been there when if I if

3088
03:11:00,080 --> 03:11:02,959
Speaker 10: I had only been there when Lincoln was being gunned

3089
03:11:03,040 --> 03:11:06,400
Speaker 10: down by John wielks Booth, ah would have saved him.

3090
03:11:06,680 --> 03:11:10,080
Speaker 5: And you know, this makes him very famous. They also

3091
03:11:10,160 --> 03:11:14,120
Speaker 5: start doing you know, it's sort of word noting, right,

3092
03:11:14,120 --> 03:11:16,240
Speaker 5: the kind of crime that they're doing, these guys are,

3093
03:11:17,400 --> 03:11:20,200
Speaker 5: they're they're basically a corporate anti crime group.

3094
03:11:20,320 --> 03:11:20,480
Speaker 2: Right.

3095
03:11:21,160 --> 03:11:24,240
Speaker 5: They solve crimes, but the crimes that they solve are

3096
03:11:24,760 --> 03:11:28,640
Speaker 5: people stealing from corporations. So, for example, they do a

3097
03:11:28,640 --> 03:11:31,160
Speaker 5: lot of solving bank robberies. They do a lot of

3098
03:11:31,160 --> 03:11:35,039
Speaker 5: security to stop train robbers, they do counterfeitting. These are

3099
03:11:35,080 --> 03:11:40,320
Speaker 5: all kinds of crimes that affect rich people and you know,

3100
03:11:40,360 --> 03:11:43,000
Speaker 5: and so the Ppiccotians are slowly starting to gain this

3101
03:11:43,080 --> 03:11:45,760
Speaker 5: reputation to sort of like the hired hands of capital.

3102
03:11:47,120 --> 03:11:50,840
Speaker 5: Now they're also sort of doing like frontier outlaws stuff.

3103
03:11:50,879 --> 03:11:53,039
Speaker 5: There's a gang of people who there is a gang

3104
03:11:53,080 --> 03:11:55,240
Speaker 5: that sort of bandits who they very successfully break up,

3105
03:11:57,200 --> 03:12:02,200
Speaker 5: but they also go after Jesse James. Okay, we need

3106
03:12:02,240 --> 03:12:05,120
Speaker 5: to tell the story of Jesse James briefly here because

3107
03:12:05,720 --> 03:12:09,000
Speaker 5: it's it's an important thing to get an understanding of

3108
03:12:09,920 --> 03:12:12,039
Speaker 5: what the sort of conflict that's going on in the

3109
03:12:12,080 --> 03:12:14,480
Speaker 5: West is at this point. And the thing that's incredibly

3110
03:12:14,520 --> 03:12:16,840
Speaker 5: important to understand about the story of Jesse James versus

3111
03:12:16,840 --> 03:12:19,199
Speaker 5: the Pinkerton's is that there are no heroes here. Every

3112
03:12:19,200 --> 03:12:22,560
Speaker 5: single person involved in all sides is just an absolutely

3113
03:12:22,640 --> 03:12:26,359
Speaker 5: terrible person. So Jesse James is an ex Confederate terrorists

3114
03:12:26,360 --> 03:12:29,640
Speaker 5: who somehow managed to make robbing trains uncool by doing

3115
03:12:29,720 --> 03:12:33,480
Speaker 5: it dress and a KKK rope with the aim of

3116
03:12:33,560 --> 03:12:38,360
Speaker 5: like restoring the honor of the Confederacy. So this sucks.

3117
03:12:38,360 --> 03:12:39,920
Speaker 5: And this is where part of the sort of like

3118
03:12:40,280 --> 03:12:43,600
Speaker 5: rebel flag like that part of the sort of like

3119
03:12:43,760 --> 03:12:45,800
Speaker 5: lost cause myth those comes from right there are you know,

3120
03:12:45,840 --> 03:12:47,880
Speaker 5: there are these sort of frontier outlaws who are like

3121
03:12:48,720 --> 03:12:50,880
Speaker 5: ex Confederates whose thing is like, yeah, we're like against

3122
03:12:50,879 --> 03:12:52,960
Speaker 5: the man and like the maand is like you know,

3123
03:12:53,160 --> 03:12:55,920
Speaker 5: the north Right. But these people suck right. These are

3124
03:12:55,920 --> 03:12:57,360
Speaker 5: these are these are these are people who fought and

3125
03:12:57,400 --> 03:13:02,400
Speaker 5: died for slavery. I Jesse James in particular, like again,

3126
03:13:02,720 --> 03:13:06,160
Speaker 5: he's in this group of like gorillas who are fighting

3127
03:13:06,480 --> 03:13:11,080
Speaker 5: in Kansas and Missouri. They they do things that are

3128
03:13:11,640 --> 03:13:15,440
Speaker 5: genuinely unspeakable. So these people suck right. But the problem

3129
03:13:15,520 --> 03:13:17,720
Speaker 5: is the people going after them are the Pinkertons. And

3130
03:13:17,760 --> 03:13:21,000
Speaker 5: we're gonna learn a lot about the Pinkertons by what

3131
03:13:21,040 --> 03:13:24,120
Speaker 5: they managed to accomplish by going after again ex Confederate

3132
03:13:24,200 --> 03:13:26,080
Speaker 5: terrorists who are like some of the worst people who've

3133
03:13:26,080 --> 03:13:29,119
Speaker 5: ever lived. So the Pinkertons take this case in eighteen

3134
03:13:29,120 --> 03:13:31,760
Speaker 5: seventy one. He sends in a bunch of agents try

3135
03:13:31,800 --> 03:13:35,400
Speaker 5: to infiltrate the gang, and Jesse James like smokes them all. So,

3136
03:13:35,680 --> 03:13:38,480
Speaker 5: in a very sort of modern cop move, the Pinkertons

3137
03:13:38,520 --> 03:13:42,160
Speaker 5: do a raid on Jesse James's house. So they throw

3138
03:13:42,240 --> 03:13:50,000
Speaker 5: in this weird pseudo it's a very weird kind of

3139
03:13:50,040 --> 03:13:55,160
Speaker 5: explosive device thing that I don't know. They claim that

3140
03:13:55,200 --> 03:13:58,680
Speaker 5: they were just trying to scare like the family out

3141
03:13:58,680 --> 03:14:01,560
Speaker 5: of the house so they could arrest them. But the

3142
03:14:01,600 --> 03:14:03,880
Speaker 5: family sees this thing that looks like a bomb and

3143
03:14:03,920 --> 03:14:06,160
Speaker 5: they throw it into their fireplace and it blows up,

3144
03:14:07,320 --> 03:14:09,640
Speaker 5: and instead of smoking the family out, they have now

3145
03:14:09,800 --> 03:14:12,760
Speaker 5: blown up Jesse James's nine year old step brother and

3146
03:14:12,840 --> 03:14:17,200
Speaker 5: maimed a mom. So the Piggertons absolutely suck right like

3147
03:14:17,240 --> 03:14:19,600
Speaker 5: so far in there at the catch Jesse James, they

3148
03:14:19,600 --> 03:14:21,800
Speaker 5: have managed to blow up a child.

3149
03:14:21,600 --> 03:14:22,560
Speaker 1: And name a woman.

3150
03:14:23,520 --> 03:14:26,000
Speaker 5: Now you can ask the question, right, Okay, so they

3151
03:14:26,040 --> 03:14:29,720
Speaker 5: have killed a child, they have maimed a woman. Do

3152
03:14:29,920 --> 03:14:32,840
Speaker 5: they get Jesse James. No, No, they don't. They never

3153
03:14:32,879 --> 03:14:35,360
Speaker 5: get him, because that's what happens when you know, you

3154
03:14:35,360 --> 03:14:37,800
Speaker 5: have an ex Confederate in places where with a bunch

3155
03:14:37,840 --> 03:14:39,800
Speaker 5: of ex Confederates, with a bunch of people who support

3156
03:14:39,800 --> 03:14:42,960
Speaker 5: the Confederacy right, they won't turn over their own people,

3157
03:14:44,000 --> 03:14:45,520
Speaker 5: and you know, and when the people they're going up

3158
03:14:45,520 --> 03:14:48,720
Speaker 5: against are the Piggertons, who are like the hired guns

3159
03:14:48,720 --> 03:14:50,959
Speaker 5: of Northern Capital, a bunch of people, you know, what

3160
03:14:50,959 --> 03:14:52,640
Speaker 5: happens is a bunch of grand people end up dead.

3161
03:14:53,480 --> 03:14:57,879
Speaker 5: And yeah, but both sides of this are incredibly deeply evil.

3162
03:14:57,920 --> 03:15:00,000
Speaker 5: Jesse James is later shot by one of his own men,

3163
03:15:00,680 --> 03:15:05,600
Speaker 5: and yeah, that is the famous story of Jesse James

3164
03:15:06,240 --> 03:15:09,039
Speaker 5: versus the Pinkertons, which I think is useful in establishing that,

3165
03:15:09,160 --> 03:15:13,720
Speaker 5: like God, like, the South are obviously the bad guys

3166
03:15:13,800 --> 03:15:16,959
Speaker 5: in the Civil War, but a lot of the people

3167
03:15:17,040 --> 03:15:22,520
Speaker 5: in the Union are sort of genuinely awful hired gun

3168
03:15:22,720 --> 03:15:26,560
Speaker 5: for capital people. And you know that's not so much

3169
03:15:26,560 --> 03:15:28,879
Speaker 5: of a big deal dreamed the war, but after the war,

3170
03:15:29,680 --> 03:15:31,480
Speaker 5: you know, you got these battles just like, oh God,

3171
03:15:31,560 --> 03:15:35,959
Speaker 5: everyone here is like everyone here should simply die now.

3172
03:15:36,400 --> 03:15:39,320
Speaker 5: Ellen Pinkerton dies in eighteen eighty six, and he is

3173
03:15:39,400 --> 03:15:43,760
Speaker 5: replaced by his even worse sons. And at this point

3174
03:15:45,440 --> 03:15:48,280
Speaker 5: the Pinkertons cease even sort of the pretense of being

3175
03:15:48,280 --> 03:15:50,879
Speaker 5: a detective agency, and they devote themselves full time to

3176
03:15:50,920 --> 03:15:55,000
Speaker 5: being strike breakers. Now they have spies everywhere. They have

3177
03:15:55,160 --> 03:15:57,200
Speaker 5: you know, over a thousand of them at their peak,

3178
03:15:57,360 --> 03:16:00,000
Speaker 5: spread across the dozens and dozens and dozens of Union,

3179
03:16:00,120 --> 03:16:03,480
Speaker 5: and they are spying on meetings or appointed with the pinkertons.

3180
03:16:03,520 --> 03:16:05,959
Speaker 5: And this allows corporations. For example, if you know who's

3181
03:16:05,959 --> 03:16:08,720
Speaker 5: in a union meeting, right, you can just fire all

3182
03:16:08,760 --> 03:16:12,320
Speaker 5: of them. And this is especially easy. And you know

3183
03:16:12,480 --> 03:16:15,600
Speaker 5: in this sort of pre nineteen thirties period where like

3184
03:16:16,120 --> 03:16:19,160
Speaker 5: there is no protected right to strike, right, like you

3185
03:16:19,640 --> 03:16:24,360
Speaker 5: if you stop working, that is illegal. The other thing

3186
03:16:24,400 --> 03:16:28,400
Speaker 5: they do is provide quote unquote security for corporations training strikes.

3187
03:16:29,280 --> 03:16:32,080
Speaker 5: What this looks like in practice is shooting people. And

3188
03:16:32,160 --> 03:16:34,640
Speaker 5: you know, sometimes those people are striking workers, like the

3189
03:16:34,680 --> 03:16:37,360
Speaker 5: three strikers they killed in the Pennsylvania close strike of

3190
03:16:37,400 --> 03:16:41,240
Speaker 5: eighteen ninety. Sometimes they just shoot random bystanders, like the

3191
03:16:41,320 --> 03:16:45,439
Speaker 5: random guy they shot in eighteen sixty six, while providing security.

3192
03:16:45,920 --> 03:16:48,960
Speaker 5: And you know, again when you're shooting in random bysanta,

3193
03:16:49,160 --> 03:16:50,240
Speaker 5: you have to ask.

3194
03:16:50,120 --> 03:16:55,080
Speaker 1: Like security for who, like who is.

3195
03:16:55,040 --> 03:16:57,879
Speaker 5: The security you're providing for when you're just shooting random people?

3196
03:16:58,640 --> 03:17:01,200
Speaker 5: You know, anominally it's for the alo doing a dock strike.

3197
03:17:01,600 --> 03:17:05,080
Speaker 5: And sometimes, like in eighteen seventy seven, they shoot children

3198
03:17:05,560 --> 03:17:07,640
Speaker 5: where they shot and killed a fifteen year old you

3199
03:17:07,760 --> 03:17:11,800
Speaker 5: a Jersey coal wharf strike, you know, and they do

3200
03:17:11,840 --> 03:17:13,560
Speaker 5: stuff like this all the time. Right, there's a famous

3201
03:17:13,560 --> 03:17:15,680
Speaker 5: incident in Chicago where a bunch of people are yelling

3202
03:17:15,680 --> 03:17:17,360
Speaker 5: at them, because again the thinker does have a really

3203
03:17:17,400 --> 03:17:20,400
Speaker 5: bad reputation among workers at this point. And you know

3204
03:17:20,400 --> 03:17:22,320
Speaker 5: there's a point where they're they're going by on a

3205
03:17:22,400 --> 03:17:24,480
Speaker 5: train and people yelled the train and the Pinkertons just

3206
03:17:24,520 --> 03:17:26,440
Speaker 5: bomb by, taking out the rifles and shooting four people

3207
03:17:26,440 --> 03:17:32,800
Speaker 5: out the window. So you know these are good people, TM, right.

3208
03:17:33,200 --> 03:17:35,840
Speaker 5: The other thing they do is they start getting into

3209
03:17:35,879 --> 03:17:38,959
Speaker 5: breaking strikes by being a company you can hire to

3210
03:17:39,000 --> 03:17:44,400
Speaker 5: import scabs, and this culminates in the Homestead strike. Again,

3211
03:17:44,400 --> 03:17:47,080
Speaker 5: there's another thing. There's like a giant Bastard's episode on,

3212
03:17:47,200 --> 03:17:49,600
Speaker 5: but we'll do we'll do a short version of the

3213
03:17:49,600 --> 03:17:53,199
Speaker 5: Homestead strike. So the Homestet strike is this giant confrontation

3214
03:17:53,280 --> 03:17:56,520
Speaker 5: between steel workers and the forces of Andrew Carnagie and

3215
03:17:56,600 --> 03:17:59,720
Speaker 5: Henry Frick. Carnagian Frick like locked the union out of

3216
03:17:59,720 --> 03:18:02,560
Speaker 5: the factory and they call a Pinkerton army to seize

3217
03:18:02,600 --> 03:18:05,200
Speaker 5: control of the town of Homestead. This is from the

3218
03:18:05,240 --> 03:18:08,000
Speaker 5: book Inventing the Pinkertons quote. By the end of June,

3219
03:18:08,080 --> 03:18:10,640
Speaker 5: he had built around the mills of protective twelve foot

3220
03:18:10,720 --> 03:18:15,039
Speaker 5: fence that included rifle holes, waterman's capable of blasting strikers

3221
03:18:15,080 --> 03:18:18,160
Speaker 5: with boiling water, and wires attached to a generator which

3222
03:18:18,160 --> 03:18:22,720
Speaker 5: could be electrified. In response, workers dubbed the mills Fort Frick.

3223
03:18:24,160 --> 03:18:28,040
Speaker 5: Now striking steel workers and other residents of Homestead. Here

3224
03:18:28,080 --> 03:18:31,360
Speaker 5: the Pinkertons are coming and they, you know, they the

3225
03:18:31,440 --> 03:18:34,119
Speaker 5: Pinkertons are trying to land on these like invasion barges

3226
03:18:34,160 --> 03:18:37,840
Speaker 5: that they've modified, and so the homestead people go try

3227
03:18:37,840 --> 03:18:40,560
Speaker 5: to stop the barges, and the Pinkertons start shooting at them.

3228
03:18:40,600 --> 03:18:42,400
Speaker 5: And this is the thing that's very interesting about this

3229
03:18:42,400 --> 03:18:46,400
Speaker 5: whole story is that, Okay, every account at the time

3230
03:18:47,480 --> 03:18:50,120
Speaker 5: agrees that the first person the people who started shooting

3231
03:18:50,120 --> 03:18:54,959
Speaker 5: first with pinkertons. Later accounts suddenly, like mysteriously later on

3232
03:18:55,040 --> 03:18:58,039
Speaker 5: it suddenly start to claim it like, well, nobody really

3233
03:18:58,120 --> 03:19:00,480
Speaker 5: knows she started the shooting in these fights, like maybe

3234
03:19:00,560 --> 03:19:03,039
Speaker 5: it was a worker, but like again everyone at the

3235
03:19:03,080 --> 03:19:07,959
Speaker 5: time cause it was the pinkertons. So I and give,

3236
03:19:08,120 --> 03:19:10,040
Speaker 5: given what we know about the track record of pinkertons

3237
03:19:10,040 --> 03:19:12,119
Speaker 5: are shooting children and shooting random people yelling at them

3238
03:19:12,120 --> 03:19:15,360
Speaker 5: outside of a train of shooting, just literally random people

3239
03:19:15,440 --> 03:19:18,720
Speaker 5: on the streets. We can be pretty sure that Pinkertons

3240
03:19:18,760 --> 03:19:21,959
Speaker 5: started this, and but you know, the workers in Homestead

3241
03:19:21,959 --> 03:19:25,200
Speaker 5: are heavily armed, and this starts a massive gun battle.

3242
03:19:26,040 --> 03:19:29,520
Speaker 5: I'm gonna read from inventing the Pinkertons again. This serious

3243
03:19:29,520 --> 03:19:32,959
Speaker 5: battle would last the next fourteen hours. After an initial shurge,

3244
03:19:32,959 --> 03:19:36,279
Speaker 5: the Pinkertons were pinned down in their barges. After several hours,

3245
03:19:36,280 --> 03:19:38,800
Speaker 5: the crowd attempted to sink the barges by cannon fire.

3246
03:19:39,240 --> 03:19:42,160
Speaker 5: Residents borrowed the cannon that had been that the city

3247
03:19:42,240 --> 03:19:44,240
Speaker 5: used for commemorations and by the way, that that's a

3248
03:19:44,280 --> 03:19:47,480
Speaker 5: Civil war cannon that they're using it in eighteen ninety to

3249
03:19:47,520 --> 03:19:51,960
Speaker 5: try to sink these boats. The crowd also set burning

3250
03:19:52,120 --> 03:19:55,480
Speaker 5: railcars rolling towards the barges and sprayed oil lunch the

3251
03:19:55,640 --> 03:19:57,520
Speaker 5: river was they attempted a light on fire in hopes

3252
03:19:57,560 --> 03:20:01,160
Speaker 5: of burning the Pinkertons out of their barges. The lubricating

3253
03:20:01,160 --> 03:20:03,840
Speaker 5: oil thrown onto the water proved impossible to set a flame.

3254
03:20:04,520 --> 03:20:07,920
Speaker 5: So the Pickertons like try to surrender, But by this

3255
03:20:07,920 --> 03:20:10,560
Speaker 5: one people hate them so much that every they threw

3256
03:20:10,680 --> 03:20:13,480
Speaker 5: this four times, and each time someone will hold up

3257
03:20:13,480 --> 03:20:15,640
Speaker 5: a white flag and a sniper will shoot the flag

3258
03:20:15,680 --> 03:20:18,880
Speaker 5: and refuse to let them surrender. On try five, the

3259
03:20:18,920 --> 03:20:22,720
Speaker 5: Pickertons are finally allowed to surrender and the Pickersons are crushed,

3260
03:20:23,000 --> 03:20:25,240
Speaker 5: but unfortunately, the state militia is brought in to sort

3261
03:20:25,240 --> 03:20:27,480
Speaker 5: of break the strike and the union movement in Pennsylvania

3262
03:20:27,520 --> 03:20:32,400
Speaker 5: is essentially destroyed. But pr White this is terrible from

3263
03:20:32,400 --> 03:20:36,000
Speaker 5: the Pinkertons, and they start trying to do like a

3264
03:20:36,000 --> 03:20:38,600
Speaker 5: giant pr OP to sort of recover the reputation, and

3265
03:20:38,600 --> 03:20:40,400
Speaker 5: a lot of what the sort of popular image of

3266
03:20:40,440 --> 03:20:43,760
Speaker 5: the Pinkertons right comes from the pr op the agency does,

3267
03:20:43,800 --> 03:20:46,120
Speaker 5: like after the Homes District that gets reproduced by like

3268
03:20:46,200 --> 03:20:50,280
Speaker 5: TV producers later on. So fast forwarding a little bit

3269
03:20:50,320 --> 03:20:52,840
Speaker 5: to some other stuff that they were involved in. In

3270
03:20:52,920 --> 03:20:55,920
Speaker 5: late nineteen oh five, someone blew up the notoriously anti

3271
03:20:56,040 --> 03:20:58,800
Speaker 5: union governor of Idaho who'd sent troops to kill striking

3272
03:20:58,800 --> 03:21:03,279
Speaker 5: workers a few years ago. Now Idaho hires a Pinkerton

3273
03:21:03,879 --> 03:21:06,480
Speaker 5: detective to just torture a guy into confessing to the

3274
03:21:06,600 --> 03:21:10,760
Speaker 5: murder and then also claiming that like basically every instance

3275
03:21:10,760 --> 03:21:13,960
Speaker 5: of violence in the last five years in in in

3276
03:21:14,040 --> 03:21:16,160
Speaker 5: that part of the US was committed by the i

3277
03:21:16,360 --> 03:21:18,880
Speaker 5: w W, who are the WW are a very very

3278
03:21:18,959 --> 03:21:23,120
Speaker 5: radical union whose thing basically was that society should be

3279
03:21:23,160 --> 03:21:28,119
Speaker 5: run by like confederations of direct democratic unions like run

3280
03:21:28,280 --> 03:21:30,000
Speaker 5: you know, in all all of society, all the production

3281
03:21:30,080 --> 03:21:33,320
Speaker 5: should be run by workers in these in you know,

3282
03:21:33,400 --> 03:21:35,960
Speaker 5: in in in the form of like one giant direct

3283
03:21:36,000 --> 03:21:40,160
Speaker 5: democratic union. And people hate this, and by people, I

3284
03:21:40,240 --> 03:21:43,879
Speaker 5: mean like bosses absolutely hate this EW. Very IWW very

3285
03:21:43,879 --> 03:21:46,840
Speaker 5: popular with workers. Bosses are going to spend the next

3286
03:21:47,000 --> 03:21:50,240
Speaker 5: rest of theirs just murdering them, you know. But having

3287
03:21:50,360 --> 03:21:55,240
Speaker 5: having tortured this guy into saying into fingering the industrial

3288
03:21:55,280 --> 03:21:58,360
Speaker 5: workers of the world in this conspiracy, they get Big

3289
03:21:58,400 --> 03:22:00,880
Speaker 5: Bill Haywood, who is one of the most famous and

3290
03:22:00,920 --> 03:22:04,640
Speaker 5: like successful organizers of the AWW, and several other IWW

3291
03:22:04,760 --> 03:22:08,120
Speaker 5: leaders kidnapped and taken into Idaho to stand trial for murder,

3292
03:22:08,280 --> 03:22:11,600
Speaker 5: which again they had nothing to do with. Haywood is

3293
03:22:11,640 --> 03:22:15,360
Speaker 5: defended by Clarence Darrow of the infamous Scopes Monkey trial,

3294
03:22:15,920 --> 03:22:19,760
Speaker 5: and Haywood gets off, but the case the serious damage

3295
03:22:19,760 --> 03:22:21,920
Speaker 5: to the WW. If you want to learn more about

3296
03:22:21,920 --> 03:22:25,640
Speaker 5: this whole story, go listen to Cool People Who Did

3297
03:22:25,720 --> 03:22:28,000
Speaker 5: Cool Stuff there's two episodes about the IWW in this

3298
03:22:28,040 --> 03:22:31,040
Speaker 5: period called the IWW and the Hoboes. You saved free speech.

3299
03:22:31,600 --> 03:22:35,480
Speaker 5: It's good stuff, you know. I should also briefly mention, right,

3300
03:22:35,560 --> 03:22:40,040
Speaker 5: another thing that the Pinkertons do is Okay, so if

3301
03:22:40,040 --> 03:22:43,800
Speaker 5: someone someone's wanted in one state, right, instead of having

3302
03:22:43,840 --> 03:22:46,240
Speaker 5: to like make you know, the government having to like

3303
03:22:46,480 --> 03:22:48,160
Speaker 5: the state government have to making requests, have to be

3304
03:22:48,200 --> 03:22:50,600
Speaker 5: having to make request to another state in order to

3305
03:22:50,640 --> 03:22:52,600
Speaker 5: get them to extradite someone, they would just have the

3306
03:22:52,640 --> 03:22:54,960
Speaker 5: Pingertions kidnap them. This is this is one of the

3307
03:22:55,000 --> 03:22:58,480
Speaker 5: sort of big services they provide. They also seemed it's

3308
03:22:58,560 --> 03:23:01,720
Speaker 5: very unclear. I don't know, this historical record is a

3309
03:23:01,720 --> 03:23:04,880
Speaker 5: bit muddled. They seem also to have been people you

3310
03:23:04,920 --> 03:23:07,080
Speaker 5: could hire if so if like your spouse was trying

3311
03:23:07,080 --> 03:23:12,000
Speaker 5: to divorce you, which sucks. Is deeply evil.

3312
03:23:13,320 --> 03:23:16,439
Speaker 1: They do sort of lots.

3313
03:23:16,200 --> 03:23:18,480
Speaker 5: More deeply evil stuff, which we will get into after

3314
03:23:18,520 --> 03:23:22,000
Speaker 5: these ads. All right, we're back, So speaking of deeply

3315
03:23:22,040 --> 03:23:25,240
Speaker 5: evil stuff, they also send one hundred detectives to break

3316
03:23:25,240 --> 03:23:28,000
Speaker 5: a strike of the mostly black Brotherhood of Timber Workers,

3317
03:23:28,000 --> 03:23:32,039
Speaker 5: which is an IWW affiliate in Louisiana. Now they break this.

3318
03:23:32,120 --> 03:23:35,160
Speaker 5: They try to break this union by walking into a

3319
03:23:35,280 --> 03:23:39,320
Speaker 5: union meeting shooting forty four people and killing four of them.

3320
03:23:40,560 --> 03:23:44,120
Speaker 5: There are like forty more stories of a guy with

3321
03:23:44,160 --> 03:23:45,920
Speaker 5: the Pinkerton walks in and shoots a bunch of people

3322
03:23:45,920 --> 03:23:48,640
Speaker 5: that I could put here. I had to find the

3323
03:23:48,720 --> 03:23:52,520
Speaker 5: limit at some point to how many stories about Pinkerton's

3324
03:23:52,600 --> 03:23:54,680
Speaker 5: murdering people that I could I could sort of put

3325
03:23:54,760 --> 03:23:57,800
Speaker 5: But you know, there's an interesting shift that starts to

3326
03:23:57,840 --> 03:24:00,440
Speaker 5: happen in the in sort of as the nineteen hundred,

3327
03:24:00,720 --> 03:24:03,840
Speaker 5: you know, the nineteen hundreds turned into nineteen tens. The

3328
03:24:03,840 --> 03:24:06,720
Speaker 5: Pinkertons start to figure out that it's more effective to

3329
03:24:06,720 --> 03:24:09,640
Speaker 5: form mobs of vigilantes than it is to fight unions directly.

3330
03:24:09,760 --> 03:24:12,360
Speaker 5: And there's a few benefits here, right, There's less danger

3331
03:24:12,400 --> 03:24:16,280
Speaker 5: to detectives themselves. It's easier to deploy large numbers of people.

3332
03:24:17,480 --> 03:24:19,720
Speaker 5: Instead of having to sort of like pay an enormous

3333
03:24:19,720 --> 03:24:21,680
Speaker 5: amount of money for a bunch of like eight hundred

3334
03:24:21,720 --> 03:24:23,640
Speaker 5: detectives and weapons and logistics, you can just sort of

3335
03:24:23,640 --> 03:24:25,720
Speaker 5: whip up a mob and get them to do the shooting, right.

3336
03:24:26,120 --> 03:24:28,800
Speaker 5: The Pinkertons also get plausible deniability, which is very helpful.

3337
03:24:28,840 --> 03:24:32,080
Speaker 5: For their reputation, and you know, the Pinkertons are are

3338
03:24:32,200 --> 03:24:34,680
Speaker 5: very much ahead of the curve here. The government, you know,

3339
03:24:34,959 --> 03:24:36,920
Speaker 5: who is going to displace the Pinkertons is sort of

3340
03:24:36,959 --> 03:24:40,840
Speaker 5: the main force opposing the IWW in later sort of

3341
03:24:40,879 --> 03:24:44,080
Speaker 5: like cio union organizing that you know, turn into the

3342
03:24:44,120 --> 03:24:46,880
Speaker 5: two Red Scares. They're going to start taking pages from

3343
03:24:46,879 --> 03:24:49,480
Speaker 5: the Pinkerton's book, and eventually they are going to you know,

3344
03:24:49,560 --> 03:24:52,760
Speaker 5: instead of like sending the US Army to invade Nicarago,

3345
03:24:52,760 --> 03:24:54,320
Speaker 5: which is what they would have done in the eighteen hundreds,

3346
03:24:54,320 --> 03:24:55,680
Speaker 5: by you know, by the time you gets to the

3347
03:24:55,760 --> 03:25:01,560
Speaker 5: nineteen eighties, right, they are sending people to train Nicaraguan

3348
03:25:01,680 --> 03:25:06,160
Speaker 5: desk squads. And so we can track the shift here.

3349
03:25:06,280 --> 03:25:08,800
Speaker 5: Right as the nineteenth century comes to a close and

3350
03:25:08,840 --> 03:25:11,960
Speaker 5: we get to sort of the October Revolution of the

3351
03:25:12,000 --> 03:25:13,879
Speaker 5: height of the Red Scare, we're in a place where

3352
03:25:13,879 --> 03:25:17,360
Speaker 5: they're starting to be enough cops and enough federal agents

3353
03:25:17,400 --> 03:25:20,240
Speaker 5: to do the job the Pinkertons had done in previous generations.

3354
03:25:20,760 --> 03:25:24,560
Speaker 5: And you know, there's sort of robust arguments in the

3355
03:25:25,640 --> 03:25:29,320
Speaker 5: the sort of historiography about to what extent j Edgar

3356
03:25:29,400 --> 03:25:33,520
Speaker 5: Hoover and the FBI were influenced by the Pinkertons. I

3357
03:25:33,560 --> 03:25:36,320
Speaker 5: think there's decent evidence that they that they were influenced

3358
03:25:36,360 --> 03:25:40,160
Speaker 5: by them. But the FBI kind of turns into what

3359
03:25:40,200 --> 03:25:43,199
Speaker 5: the Pinkertons are. You know, they're the people who suddenly

3360
03:25:43,240 --> 03:25:45,720
Speaker 5: are like showing up and shooting people, showing up and

3361
03:25:45,800 --> 03:25:49,560
Speaker 5: arresting union organizers, deporting union organizers from the country. But

3362
03:25:49,680 --> 03:25:51,760
Speaker 5: this puts the Pinkertons in kind of a weird spot

3363
03:25:51,879 --> 03:25:55,000
Speaker 5: right there. The Pinkerton name has become synonymous with sort

3364
03:25:55,000 --> 03:25:59,520
Speaker 5: of this this kind of like they're called sort of

3365
03:25:59,520 --> 03:26:03,760
Speaker 5: like feudal retainers, right, these sort of lawless private armies

3366
03:26:03,800 --> 03:26:06,599
Speaker 5: that are you know, not supposed to exist in a democracy.

3367
03:26:07,879 --> 03:26:10,080
Speaker 5: And so you know in the nineteen thirties when the

3368
03:26:10,080 --> 03:26:12,800
Speaker 5: Wagnerak like makes strikes legal, right. I talked about the

3369
03:26:13,040 --> 03:26:14,920
Speaker 5: Wagner Acts a long time ago, an episode called The

3370
03:26:15,080 --> 03:26:19,119
Speaker 5: Eden Makes Its Strong. But after this they tried Robert

3371
03:26:19,120 --> 03:26:21,400
Speaker 5: Pinkerton the second who's the new sort of owner of

3372
03:26:21,400 --> 03:26:25,080
Speaker 5: the Pinkerton tries to do a rebrand and he has

3373
03:26:25,120 --> 03:26:29,480
Speaker 5: this great quote. That's quote he's talking about union busting.

3374
03:26:29,680 --> 03:26:31,760
Speaker 5: That is a phase of our business that we are

3375
03:26:31,800 --> 03:26:35,680
Speaker 5: not particularly delighted or proud of and we're out of it. However,

3376
03:26:36,080 --> 03:26:39,320
Speaker 5: there was nothing illegal about it at the time. Now, okay,

3377
03:26:39,400 --> 03:26:41,080
Speaker 5: you could say a lot about what was or wasn't

3378
03:26:41,120 --> 03:26:43,560
Speaker 5: illegal in a period when you know, you could order

3379
03:26:43,600 --> 03:26:46,760
Speaker 5: a drink that was cocaine mixed with wine and you know,

3380
03:26:46,800 --> 03:26:49,360
Speaker 5: you could just get like opium prescribed to your baby,

3381
03:26:49,600 --> 03:26:53,320
Speaker 5: But torturing and murdering people was still legal back then. Now,

3382
03:26:53,440 --> 03:26:55,000
Speaker 5: I guess if you're you know, if you really wanted

3383
03:26:55,000 --> 03:26:56,720
Speaker 5: to have fun, you can get into an argument that like,

3384
03:26:56,840 --> 03:26:59,600
Speaker 5: nowhere in the constitution is murdered specifically banned, but like,

3385
03:26:59,640 --> 03:27:02,760
Speaker 5: you know, how fun with that. But FDR and the

3386
03:27:02,760 --> 03:27:05,520
Speaker 5: New Dealers go after the Pinkerton's very hard. And this

3387
03:27:05,560 --> 03:27:08,720
Speaker 5: is a lot of interesting effects. What it means is,

3388
03:27:08,760 --> 03:27:10,680
Speaker 5: on the one hand, you can't have some guy with

3389
03:27:10,760 --> 03:27:13,039
Speaker 5: a detective badge who works for a corporation walked into

3390
03:27:13,080 --> 03:27:15,560
Speaker 5: a union meeting and start the killing. But it also

3391
03:27:15,600 --> 03:27:17,440
Speaker 5: means that when you need someone to smash a union

3392
03:27:17,480 --> 03:27:19,840
Speaker 5: by force, it's going to be the state doing it.

3393
03:27:20,480 --> 03:27:22,800
Speaker 5: And the aposteosis of this sort of one of the

3394
03:27:22,800 --> 03:27:25,960
Speaker 5: internal contradictions that destroys a new Deal is that it's

3395
03:27:26,040 --> 03:27:28,160
Speaker 5: reliance on the state to contain the worst exis of

3396
03:27:28,160 --> 03:27:32,760
Speaker 5: capitalism means that you know, they have in turn directly

3397
03:27:32,879 --> 03:27:36,560
Speaker 5: enormously empowered the state and the state's military capacity. And

3398
03:27:36,600 --> 03:27:39,840
Speaker 5: this means that in the nineteen eighties unions are going

3399
03:27:39,879 --> 03:27:42,640
Speaker 5: to be destroyed by the state that the New Deal

3400
03:27:42,680 --> 03:27:46,320
Speaker 5: had built. The Pickertons are replaced by Hoover and the

3401
03:27:46,360 --> 03:27:48,480
Speaker 5: g Men, and the g Men are eventually sort of

3402
03:27:49,360 --> 03:27:51,840
Speaker 5: become known as the dreaded modern fat who you know,

3403
03:27:52,040 --> 03:27:55,760
Speaker 5: lurks at every doorstep eating babies and is the terror

3404
03:27:55,800 --> 03:27:57,680
Speaker 5: of every sort of political movement in the US.

3405
03:27:59,720 --> 03:27:59,920
Speaker 4: Now.

3406
03:28:00,200 --> 03:28:03,960
Speaker 5: The Pinkertons, for for their part, right with union busting

3407
03:28:04,000 --> 03:28:07,320
Speaker 5: now technically illegal, and when I say union busting like

3408
03:28:07,400 --> 03:28:10,800
Speaker 5: I mean walking in, shooting people stop and performing a union,

3409
03:28:11,560 --> 03:28:15,360
Speaker 5: they start working basically as regular security guards. And then

3410
03:28:15,400 --> 03:28:17,840
Speaker 5: they move on to selling surveillance equipment and trainings for

3411
03:28:17,879 --> 03:28:22,560
Speaker 5: government organizations. And this reflects a kind of larger shift

3412
03:28:22,800 --> 03:28:27,240
Speaker 5: in what kinds of military operations the corporations run, which

3413
03:28:27,280 --> 03:28:32,199
Speaker 5: is that instead of directly running armies or hiring groups

3414
03:28:32,200 --> 03:28:34,640
Speaker 5: like the Pinkertons to do violence for them, now what

3415
03:28:34,640 --> 03:28:38,640
Speaker 5: they're in the business office intelligence operations. And this changes

3416
03:28:38,720 --> 03:28:42,280
Speaker 5: the way that corporations kill people enormously. You know, when

3417
03:28:42,560 --> 03:28:45,240
Speaker 5: Coca Cola now needs to kill union organizers, right, they

3418
03:28:45,240 --> 03:28:48,240
Speaker 5: have paramilitaries for this. Now, some of these guys are contractors,

3419
03:28:48,240 --> 03:28:49,480
Speaker 5: some of them are paid under the table, some of

3420
03:28:49,520 --> 03:28:51,600
Speaker 5: them are in it for ideology, some of it for money.

3421
03:28:51,640 --> 03:28:52,840
Speaker 1: But it's not you.

3422
03:28:52,800 --> 03:28:57,040
Speaker 5: Know, it's not quite like Coca Cola has its own

3423
03:28:57,080 --> 03:28:59,720
Speaker 5: military force like it would have been in the eighteen hundreds,

3424
03:28:59,720 --> 03:29:03,560
Speaker 5: and they're hundreds. It's also not there is just like

3425
03:29:03,640 --> 03:29:05,760
Speaker 5: a private but there's not like it's not they're not.

3426
03:29:05,760 --> 03:29:09,240
Speaker 5: They're not also not like hiring a specific private military contractor. Right,

3427
03:29:10,120 --> 03:29:12,160
Speaker 5: the way they do, way they do it tends to

3428
03:29:12,200 --> 03:29:17,800
Speaker 5: be they you know, sort of semi clandestinely arm paramilitary. Now,

3429
03:29:17,840 --> 03:29:20,320
Speaker 5: there are limited exceptions where sort of like oil companies

3430
03:29:20,360 --> 03:29:22,520
Speaker 5: will have private armies and places where civil wars are

3431
03:29:22,520 --> 03:29:25,400
Speaker 5: going on, but that's usually a thing that happens when

3432
03:29:25,400 --> 03:29:29,000
Speaker 5: they're in a place that doesn't have state capacity. When

3433
03:29:29,000 --> 03:29:31,240
Speaker 5: they're in a place that does have state capacity, like

3434
03:29:31,280 --> 03:29:34,879
Speaker 5: for example, Nigeria, you get a very very different story.

3435
03:29:35,240 --> 03:29:39,720
Speaker 5: So Nigeria is a major oil producer, and this has

3436
03:29:39,760 --> 03:29:42,080
Speaker 5: a number of consequences on the places where that oil

3437
03:29:42,120 --> 03:29:43,880
Speaker 5: is extracted. A huge amount of it comes from the

3438
03:29:43,959 --> 03:29:47,199
Speaker 5: Niger Delta, where the government faces an almost perennial insurgency.

3439
03:29:47,800 --> 03:29:49,959
Speaker 5: So okay, why is there an insurgency there?

3440
03:29:50,040 --> 03:29:50,200
Speaker 1: Right?

3441
03:29:50,560 --> 03:29:52,679
Speaker 5: Part of the reason is that there is an indescribable

3442
03:29:52,680 --> 03:29:55,000
Speaker 5: amount of wealth coming out of the oil and Niger Delta,

3443
03:29:55,320 --> 03:29:58,520
Speaker 5: and that money goes mostly to I mean, might I

3444
03:29:58,520 --> 03:30:01,000
Speaker 5: say mostly ninety percent of it right, go to Nigerian

3445
03:30:01,000 --> 03:30:04,959
Speaker 5: elites and corrupt for oil for in oil companies. And

3446
03:30:05,000 --> 03:30:06,640
Speaker 5: you know. Another part of the reason this turns into

3447
03:30:06,680 --> 03:30:11,000
Speaker 5: an insurgency is that people try nonviolence with disobedience in

3448
03:30:11,040 --> 03:30:14,119
Speaker 5: the Niger Delta to protest the sort of horrific environmental

3449
03:30:14,200 --> 03:30:18,320
Speaker 5: consequences of companies like Shell doing oil extraction, you know.

3450
03:30:18,400 --> 03:30:21,039
Speaker 5: And they have these marches that will draw out three

3451
03:30:21,160 --> 03:30:23,880
Speaker 5: hundred thousand people in places where this is half of

3452
03:30:23,959 --> 03:30:26,959
Speaker 5: the population, half the total population of the ethnic group

3453
03:30:27,000 --> 03:30:32,680
Speaker 5: being affected. The Nigerian government responds by publicly executing one

3454
03:30:32,680 --> 03:30:36,040
Speaker 5: of the movement's leaders, the famous activist Ken Sarrowewa, by

3455
03:30:36,080 --> 03:30:38,720
Speaker 5: hanging him and then dissolving his body and limes we

3456
03:30:38,760 --> 03:30:41,560
Speaker 5: couldn't be buried, which is a real British Empire. Shit

3457
03:30:42,440 --> 03:30:44,440
Speaker 5: And okay, so at this point you've come to the

3458
03:30:44,480 --> 03:30:47,480
Speaker 5: sort of crossroad of a nonviolent movement, right where the

3459
03:30:47,480 --> 03:30:49,800
Speaker 5: government's answer to non violence we will publicly hang you

3460
03:30:50,600 --> 03:30:52,240
Speaker 5: and you get you get to this question do you

3461
03:30:52,320 --> 03:30:53,840
Speaker 5: take up arms? And the answer is yeah, a lot

3462
03:30:53,840 --> 03:30:54,200
Speaker 5: of people do.

3463
03:30:54,400 --> 03:30:54,560
Speaker 1: Right.

3464
03:30:54,840 --> 03:30:57,199
Speaker 5: This is this is this is a very complicated insurgency

3465
03:30:57,240 --> 03:30:59,160
Speaker 5: in a lot of ways that you know, we can't

3466
03:30:59,200 --> 03:31:01,480
Speaker 5: do justice here too. But I want to read something

3467
03:31:01,520 --> 03:31:04,160
Speaker 5: from this interview from a guy for the Movement for

3468
03:31:04,280 --> 03:31:06,840
Speaker 5: the Emancipation of the Niger Delta Men, which is one

3469
03:31:06,879 --> 03:31:11,000
Speaker 5: of the many, many, many, many many like Milton groups

3470
03:31:11,000 --> 03:31:14,240
Speaker 5: that appear in the Delta over the last twenty five years. Quote,

3471
03:31:15,040 --> 03:31:17,960
Speaker 5: this is our territory. The soldiers dare not come here.

3472
03:31:18,080 --> 03:31:21,840
Speaker 5: Now they came, and we defeat them. He says. We

3473
03:31:21,920 --> 03:31:24,640
Speaker 5: are civilized people, educated people, and we do not want

3474
03:31:24,680 --> 03:31:27,039
Speaker 5: our children to be deprived as we have been deprived

3475
03:31:27,680 --> 03:31:29,760
Speaker 5: so other people can get rich from what is under

3476
03:31:29,800 --> 03:31:32,520
Speaker 5: our feet. The oil companies have had many years to

3477
03:31:32,600 --> 03:31:35,760
Speaker 5: treat us rights. They have never done that. Now we

3478
03:31:35,840 --> 03:31:39,720
Speaker 5: are making them think. Now if this is you know

3479
03:31:40,600 --> 03:31:43,600
Speaker 5: eighteen twenty right, and shell is dealing with people taking

3480
03:31:43,680 --> 03:31:45,480
Speaker 5: up arms and cutting off their ability to sort of

3481
03:31:45,520 --> 03:31:48,200
Speaker 5: like extract profits of oil. They would form an army

3482
03:31:48,280 --> 03:31:50,760
Speaker 5: of semi literate Belgian and British barbarians, arm they with

3483
03:31:50,840 --> 03:31:53,360
Speaker 5: cannons and conquer the region and place the entire area

3484
03:31:53,480 --> 03:31:56,880
Speaker 5: under direct corporate rule. You know, if this was say,

3485
03:31:57,120 --> 03:31:59,959
Speaker 5: like the eighteen nineties, right, they would hire the pinker

3486
03:32:00,080 --> 03:32:01,880
Speaker 5: Chance and the Pinkertons, nego shoot these people before them.

3487
03:32:02,440 --> 03:32:04,600
Speaker 5: But this is the nineteen nineties, in the two thousands,

3488
03:32:05,240 --> 03:32:09,879
Speaker 5: so instead, what Shell does is literally pay the salaries

3489
03:32:09,920 --> 03:32:12,880
Speaker 5: of Nigerian cops who go slaughter protesters in the streets,

3490
03:32:13,680 --> 03:32:16,480
Speaker 5: and eventually they move to spending hundreds of millions of

3491
03:32:16,520 --> 03:32:18,880
Speaker 5: dollars just just between two thousand and seven two thousand

3492
03:32:18,920 --> 03:32:24,160
Speaker 5: and nine alone directly funding equipping an army, the Nigerian Army,

3493
03:32:25,160 --> 03:32:28,360
Speaker 5: and a special like war crimes task force called the

3494
03:32:28,440 --> 03:32:32,119
Speaker 5: Joint Task Force the JFT, which is this like it's

3495
03:32:32,160 --> 03:32:34,720
Speaker 5: this sort of incredible thing where the army, the navy

3496
03:32:34,760 --> 03:32:37,320
Speaker 5: and the police do a fusion dance to massacre civilians.

3497
03:32:39,120 --> 03:32:40,920
Speaker 5: And you know, I say this hundreds of millions of dollars, right,

3498
03:32:40,920 --> 03:32:43,240
Speaker 5: that's an underestimate that's just three years. That's just what

3499
03:32:43,360 --> 03:32:45,480
Speaker 5: we know about. The actual total that they sunk into

3500
03:32:45,600 --> 03:32:50,200
Speaker 5: sort of like literally funding the Nigerian Army is enormous. Now,

3501
03:32:50,240 --> 03:32:54,480
Speaker 5: what's interesting here is that Shell does have its own

3502
03:32:54,520 --> 03:32:57,040
Speaker 5: security guards, but the ratio of what they spend in

3503
03:32:57,080 --> 03:32:59,160
Speaker 5: the Nigerian Army versus what they spend on their own

3504
03:32:59,200 --> 03:33:02,400
Speaker 5: security guards just two to one. And this goes to

3505
03:33:02,520 --> 03:33:05,039
Speaker 5: demonstrate the point that I've sort of been making this episode, right,

3506
03:33:05,120 --> 03:33:08,560
Speaker 5: which is that there's been a shift in you know,

3507
03:33:08,720 --> 03:33:13,959
Speaker 5: if you are a company like Shell, right who has

3508
03:33:14,040 --> 03:33:17,480
Speaker 5: a need, you know, who are horrifically exploiting a bunch

3509
03:33:17,480 --> 03:33:19,160
Speaker 5: of people to the point where you need to shoot

3510
03:33:19,160 --> 03:33:21,760
Speaker 5: them in order to keep them in line. Instead of

3511
03:33:21,879 --> 03:33:25,280
Speaker 5: going to like a private detective agency or having your

3512
03:33:25,320 --> 03:33:28,760
Speaker 5: own army, they are increasingly simply funding the state. And

3513
03:33:29,280 --> 03:33:31,800
Speaker 5: you know this means that right again again, instead of

3514
03:33:31,800 --> 03:33:36,840
Speaker 5: the Pinkertons, the actual trigger pullers are cops. They are

3515
03:33:36,920 --> 03:33:41,000
Speaker 5: the police, There are the military, they're weird special forces groups.

3516
03:33:41,760 --> 03:33:46,120
Speaker 5: And you know where that sort of leaves space for

3517
03:33:46,200 --> 03:33:50,520
Speaker 5: groups like the Pinkertons now is the area that's left

3518
03:33:50,560 --> 03:33:53,440
Speaker 5: for them is in corporate intelligence. And this seems to

3519
03:33:53,560 --> 03:33:56,680
Speaker 5: be most of what the Pinkertons have been up to recently.

3520
03:33:57,600 --> 03:34:00,959
Speaker 5: Amazon hired them in the last few years to work

3521
03:34:01,000 --> 03:34:03,720
Speaker 5: and to work with their intelligence division, the Global Security

3522
03:34:03,800 --> 03:34:06,760
Speaker 5: Operations Center, which they use to try to stomp out

3523
03:34:06,840 --> 03:34:10,320
Speaker 5: union organizing in their warehouses. And Amazon isn't just sort

3524
03:34:10,360 --> 03:34:12,760
Speaker 5: of spying on union organizers. 're spying on basically every

3525
03:34:12,800 --> 03:34:15,600
Speaker 5: social roupment they can get their hands on. Here's from WECE.

3526
03:34:16,160 --> 03:34:19,720
Speaker 5: In twenty nineteen, Amazon monitored the yellowfst movement known as

3527
03:34:19,760 --> 03:34:23,000
Speaker 5: the jele Jean, a grassroots uprising for economic justice spread

3528
03:34:23,040 --> 03:34:26,640
Speaker 5: across France, and solidarity movements in Vienna and protest against

3529
03:34:26,640 --> 03:34:30,760
Speaker 5: state repression in Iran. They've been deployed deployed against strikes

3530
03:34:30,800 --> 03:34:34,400
Speaker 5: of communication workers in West Virginia, Google and Facebook deploys

3531
03:34:34,440 --> 03:34:38,080
Speaker 5: them against their own employees to redout leakers. Now, this

3532
03:34:38,280 --> 03:34:40,000
Speaker 5: is all in line with the pivot of sort of

3533
03:34:40,040 --> 03:34:44,560
Speaker 5: corporate repression towards mass surveillance. Interestingly, the Pikersons have been

3534
03:34:44,600 --> 03:34:46,800
Speaker 5: planting stories in the press about going back to their

3535
03:34:46,920 --> 03:34:50,879
Speaker 5: roots as mercenaries, pitching themselves as you know, the force

3536
03:34:50,959 --> 03:34:54,960
Speaker 5: that could stop climate chaos with ex military forces. The

3537
03:34:55,040 --> 03:34:57,600
Speaker 5: company claims to have been deployed by corporations in Puerto

3538
03:34:57,680 --> 03:35:00,520
Speaker 5: Rico after the hurricane and after Hurricane ria antoin seventeen.

3539
03:35:01,360 --> 03:35:06,640
Speaker 5: I don't know if that's true. This is possible, but

3540
03:35:06,840 --> 03:35:08,680
Speaker 5: again it's something that they have to be very careful

3541
03:35:08,720 --> 03:35:12,480
Speaker 5: with the Pinkertons is that they are very, very brand obsessed,

3542
03:35:12,520 --> 03:35:14,560
Speaker 5: even though they're now owned by a different sort of

3543
03:35:14,600 --> 03:35:19,800
Speaker 5: Swedish security company, and they lie constantly, so it's very

3544
03:35:19,840 --> 03:35:21,560
Speaker 5: difficult to sort up sort of the myth from the

3545
03:35:21,680 --> 03:35:23,880
Speaker 5: fact when myth making has been such a vital part

3546
03:35:23,920 --> 03:35:27,199
Speaker 5: of their branding from the beginning. For another example, here's

3547
03:35:27,240 --> 03:35:31,160
Speaker 5: from a New York Times magazine. Among their most popular

3548
03:35:31,280 --> 03:35:35,120
Speaker 5: news services is the Pinkerton Dedicated Professional, in which agents

3549
03:35:35,280 --> 03:35:38,080
Speaker 5: join a client's company like any other new hire, allowing

3550
03:35:38,120 --> 03:35:43,840
Speaker 5: them to provide intel employees. By twenty eighteen, the agency

3551
03:35:43,879 --> 03:35:47,200
Speaker 5: said it could count among its clients about eighty percent

3552
03:35:47,320 --> 03:35:51,240
Speaker 5: of Fortune one thousand companies. Are these numbers correct? Who knows?

3553
03:35:51,320 --> 03:35:54,320
Speaker 5: They absolutely could be lying right. On the other hand,

3554
03:35:55,840 --> 03:35:59,199
Speaker 5: here's Gizmoto talking about the current reach of the Pinkertons

3555
03:35:59,280 --> 03:36:02,680
Speaker 5: in matchic together ring. There are other connections between Wizards

3556
03:36:02,720 --> 03:36:06,000
Speaker 5: of the Coast and the Pinkerton Agency. Robert M. Klemmick,

3557
03:36:06,160 --> 03:36:09,080
Speaker 5: who has been the director of Security Risk Management at Hasbro, Inc.

3558
03:36:09,120 --> 03:36:11,760
Speaker 5: Which is the parent company Wizards of the Coast for

3559
03:36:11,879 --> 03:36:15,520
Speaker 5: twelve years, was previously the director of supply chain Security

3560
03:36:15,560 --> 03:36:19,440
Speaker 5: Practice at Pinkerton Consulting in Investigations. The current manager of

3561
03:36:19,480 --> 03:36:23,560
Speaker 5: Global Investigations is also a form of Pinkerton Agents. So

3562
03:36:23,920 --> 03:36:26,680
Speaker 5: what we saw in the fact that you know, Wizards

3563
03:36:26,720 --> 03:36:29,800
Speaker 5: of the Coast said the Pinkertons after a guy who

3564
03:36:30,160 --> 03:36:33,199
Speaker 5: made a YouTube video showing some cards that he bought

3565
03:36:33,280 --> 03:36:37,160
Speaker 5: from someone else, is you know, you can see in

3566
03:36:37,400 --> 03:36:39,840
Speaker 5: that the arc of the arc of of what the

3567
03:36:39,879 --> 03:36:42,520
Speaker 5: Pinkers are trying to do. Right, You have, on the

3568
03:36:42,640 --> 03:36:46,000
Speaker 5: one hand, the Pinkertons falling back into their sort of

3569
03:36:46,080 --> 03:36:51,120
Speaker 5: intelligence role. You also have them specifically trading on their

3570
03:36:51,160 --> 03:36:53,560
Speaker 5: reputation to intimidate people. And you know, the reputation they

3571
03:36:53,600 --> 03:36:59,000
Speaker 5: acquired by killing unfathomable numbers of people between the eighteen hundreds,

3572
03:36:59,200 --> 03:37:01,960
Speaker 5: which they used the sort of intimidate people by just

3573
03:37:02,000 --> 03:37:04,440
Speaker 5: sort of the power of the reputation. You can see

3574
03:37:04,480 --> 03:37:07,520
Speaker 5: something very interesting, which is that the Pinkertons don't arrest

3575
03:37:07,680 --> 03:37:10,200
Speaker 5: Dan Cannon directly, right, they're able to leave with the

3576
03:37:10,240 --> 03:37:14,200
Speaker 5: sort of goods. But what they threatened Dan Cannon with

3577
03:37:14,720 --> 03:37:17,960
Speaker 5: is the regular police. And that is I think a

3578
03:37:18,120 --> 03:37:21,240
Speaker 5: very important aspect of what the story actually is, which

3579
03:37:21,280 --> 03:37:24,279
Speaker 5: is it's a story about the modern division of labor,

3580
03:37:25,040 --> 03:37:29,640
Speaker 5: of violence against people who corporations don't like, and that

3581
03:37:29,760 --> 03:37:33,040
Speaker 5: division of labor runs through security. You know, you have

3582
03:37:33,160 --> 03:37:36,240
Speaker 5: your major, you have a major corporation. That corporation has

3583
03:37:36,280 --> 03:37:39,480
Speaker 5: its own security division. That security division is connected to

3584
03:37:39,520 --> 03:37:42,279
Speaker 5: the Pinkertons. They use the Pinkertons as an intelligence network,

3585
03:37:42,320 --> 03:37:45,960
Speaker 5: and they have done several times now and then you know,

3586
03:37:46,040 --> 03:37:50,720
Speaker 5: when it comes time to you know, you can use

3587
03:37:50,760 --> 03:37:52,640
Speaker 5: the Pinkertons as like the people will stop you booth.

3588
03:37:52,680 --> 03:37:54,920
Speaker 5: But when it comes time to actually do violence against someone,

3589
03:37:54,959 --> 03:37:58,160
Speaker 5: when it comes time to arrest someone, that's the state's job.

3590
03:37:59,160 --> 03:38:02,120
Speaker 5: And that, I think is the thing that's that you know,

3591
03:38:02,200 --> 03:38:05,480
Speaker 5: that that's very important to understand about the way all

3592
03:38:05,520 --> 03:38:08,720
Speaker 5: of this stuff works is that the thing that is

3593
03:38:08,840 --> 03:38:12,080
Speaker 5: true now about the year twenty twenty three that was

3594
03:38:12,160 --> 03:38:16,120
Speaker 5: not true about the year like eighteen seventy three, is

3595
03:38:16,200 --> 03:38:20,959
Speaker 5: that the the sort of primary driver of corporate violence

3596
03:38:21,240 --> 03:38:26,120
Speaker 5: in you know, in in in the US and abroad

3597
03:38:27,080 --> 03:38:30,480
Speaker 5: is not necessarily private security companies. It is the state,

3598
03:38:30,560 --> 03:38:34,039
Speaker 5: and it is the police. And yeah, this has been naked.

3599
03:38:34,080 --> 03:38:38,400
Speaker 5: Happened here. The police suck acab get rid of them.

3600
03:38:42,080 --> 03:38:45,240
Speaker 1: Hey, we'll be back Monday with more episodes every week

3601
03:38:45,320 --> 03:38:47,880
Speaker 1: from now until the heat death of the Universe. It

3602
03:38:47,920 --> 03:38:50,160
Speaker 1: Could Happen Here as a production of cool Zone Media.

3603
03:38:50,400 --> 03:38:53,040
Speaker 3: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website

3604
03:38:53,120 --> 03:38:55,320
Speaker 3: cool zonemedia dot com, or check us out on the

3605
03:38:55,360 --> 03:38:58,760
Speaker 3: iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts.

3606
03:38:59,200 --> 03:39:01,320
Speaker 3: You can find sources for It Could Happen Here, updated

3607
03:39:01,360 --> 03:39:04,400
Speaker 3: monthly at coolzonemedia dot com slash sources.

3608
03:39:04,600 --> 03:39:05,400
Speaker 7: Thanks for listening.