1 00:00:00,960 --> 00:00:03,640 Speaker 1: Hey, everybody, it's me Josh, your old pal, and for 2 00:00:03,720 --> 00:00:06,880 Speaker 1: this week's s Y s K Selects, I've chosen one 3 00:00:06,920 --> 00:00:10,520 Speaker 1: of those overlook gems from way back in July of 4 00:00:10,600 --> 00:00:13,200 Speaker 1: two thousand twelve, eight years ago. Can you believe that? 5 00:00:13,640 --> 00:00:17,120 Speaker 1: It's how white collar crime works? So sit back, relax 6 00:00:17,360 --> 00:00:23,119 Speaker 1: and learn about how the other half commits crime. Welcome 7 00:00:23,160 --> 00:00:25,400 Speaker 1: to Stuff You Should Know, a production of I Heart 8 00:00:25,480 --> 00:00:34,040 Speaker 1: Radios How Stuff Works. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. 9 00:00:34,080 --> 00:00:38,320 Speaker 1: I'm Josh Clark. There's Charles W. Chuck Bryant uh stipping 10 00:00:38,360 --> 00:00:44,000 Speaker 1: on his laquais uh mineral water. And um, this isn't 11 00:00:44,040 --> 00:00:47,239 Speaker 1: even a sponsored by location and done this like two 12 00:00:47,280 --> 00:00:51,320 Speaker 1: or three times? Yeah, I agree, call us uh. And 13 00:00:51,440 --> 00:00:53,360 Speaker 1: since you put the two of us a couple of 14 00:00:53,400 --> 00:00:56,880 Speaker 1: microphones in an ice cold can of refreshing laqua mineral 15 00:00:56,920 --> 00:00:59,400 Speaker 1: water together, you have something called Stuff you Should Know. 16 00:00:59,440 --> 00:01:02,840 Speaker 1: It's a pod cast. It's a podcast. I'm looking to 17 00:01:02,880 --> 00:01:06,000 Speaker 1: see who makes this actually. Oh no, I thought I 18 00:01:06,040 --> 00:01:09,200 Speaker 1: was gonna say, like Coca Cola and smaller. No, it's 19 00:01:09,319 --> 00:01:13,320 Speaker 1: a Sundance beverage company. Oh yeah, they're huge for Minnesota. 20 00:01:13,360 --> 00:01:16,800 Speaker 1: I think that's perfect. That is a perfect sponsor for stuff. 21 00:01:16,840 --> 00:01:20,120 Speaker 1: You should know a little guy that's producing a great product. Agreed, 22 00:01:20,560 --> 00:01:25,800 Speaker 1: lax uh so chuck, Yes, I've got an intro today. Awesome, misses, 23 00:01:26,920 --> 00:01:31,920 Speaker 1: stop criticizing me. I mean, um so. Very recently, a 24 00:01:32,040 --> 00:01:39,480 Speaker 1: trio of Brits economists British economists dry, They're like walking saltines. 25 00:01:39,840 --> 00:01:42,640 Speaker 1: They're very exciting. Um. But anyway, these guys did something 26 00:01:42,680 --> 00:01:46,520 Speaker 1: pretty cool. They studied bank robberies and their study was 27 00:01:46,520 --> 00:01:50,160 Speaker 1: published in a journal called Significance. It's actually kind of 28 00:01:50,160 --> 00:01:52,440 Speaker 1: a cool journal. It takes statistics and applies it to 29 00:01:52,520 --> 00:01:56,520 Speaker 1: real world stuff, so it's an interesting statistics journal. If 30 00:01:56,560 --> 00:01:59,040 Speaker 1: there is such a thing, um, and if there is, 31 00:01:59,120 --> 00:02:02,040 Speaker 1: this is it. And what these guys found was that 32 00:02:02,200 --> 00:02:05,040 Speaker 1: bank robbery is actually a really terrible way to make 33 00:02:05,080 --> 00:02:09,840 Speaker 1: a living. Yes, I would agree with that morally, Economically 34 00:02:09,880 --> 00:02:14,120 Speaker 1: it's a terrible way to make a living too, the right. Yes, 35 00:02:14,200 --> 00:02:16,200 Speaker 1: they looked at they looked at a lot of variables, 36 00:02:16,240 --> 00:02:18,680 Speaker 1: like the number of people involved, and they found that 37 00:02:18,720 --> 00:02:22,600 Speaker 1: the bigger the gang, the more um, the bigger the hall. 38 00:02:22,639 --> 00:02:25,840 Speaker 1: I guess. But it also meant that's one extra mouth 39 00:02:25,919 --> 00:02:28,000 Speaker 1: to divide up amongst unless you're like one of those 40 00:02:28,040 --> 00:02:31,079 Speaker 1: bank robbers that just kills everybody afterward. Yeah, you don't 41 00:02:31,080 --> 00:02:32,560 Speaker 1: want to get in bed with one of those guys 42 00:02:32,600 --> 00:02:35,120 Speaker 1: like Ben Affleck or like in Heat when there are 43 00:02:35,120 --> 00:02:37,320 Speaker 1: a lot of killing afterward and heat. Yeah, and in 44 00:02:37,400 --> 00:02:40,359 Speaker 1: the town ben Affleck's a recent heist movie. Yeah, a 45 00:02:40,360 --> 00:02:41,920 Speaker 1: lot of killing going on. I was gonna let that 46 00:02:41,960 --> 00:02:44,240 Speaker 1: one walk by, but you brought it up twice. I 47 00:02:44,320 --> 00:02:48,960 Speaker 1: enjoyed it. Um. Oh really uh okay, So anyway, Um, 48 00:02:48,960 --> 00:02:51,520 Speaker 1: there's a lot of variables involved. But what they found 49 00:02:51,600 --> 00:02:54,480 Speaker 1: is no matter what, in the u K. You can 50 00:02:54,520 --> 00:02:57,560 Speaker 1: make off with about thirty one graham. That's not bad, 51 00:02:57,680 --> 00:03:01,000 Speaker 1: per yes, and on average that's what that's what the 52 00:03:01,040 --> 00:03:04,400 Speaker 1: take was. So in the UK it's not so bad. Um. 53 00:03:04,440 --> 00:03:06,360 Speaker 1: But at the same time, thirty one grand what are 54 00:03:06,360 --> 00:03:08,280 Speaker 1: you gonna do with that? Yeah, I mean, if you 55 00:03:08,320 --> 00:03:10,000 Speaker 1: want to live the highlight, you gotta rob like four 56 00:03:10,040 --> 00:03:13,040 Speaker 1: or five banks a year, easy, right or right? Okay 57 00:03:13,200 --> 00:03:16,160 Speaker 1: or um. If you're in the US, you have to 58 00:03:16,240 --> 00:03:19,600 Speaker 1: rob a lot more than that. So the UK suffers 59 00:03:19,600 --> 00:03:21,600 Speaker 1: about a hundred and six bank robbers a year. In 60 00:03:21,600 --> 00:03:25,800 Speaker 1: the US there's twelve thousand, and of those twelve thousand, 61 00:03:25,840 --> 00:03:29,760 Speaker 1: the average take is like four grand. They only have 62 00:03:29,880 --> 00:03:33,480 Speaker 1: how many a year England and six that's amazing. They 63 00:03:33,480 --> 00:03:36,720 Speaker 1: have really stiff, stiff gun laws and I think that 64 00:03:36,800 --> 00:03:39,400 Speaker 1: probably determ bank robbery because you kind of have a 65 00:03:39,440 --> 00:03:42,320 Speaker 1: gun or a note in your pocket and that says something. Well, 66 00:03:42,360 --> 00:03:44,440 Speaker 1: these guys figured out that the presence of a firearm 67 00:03:44,480 --> 00:03:49,960 Speaker 1: increased your takea Um. But anyway, so forty bucks that's 68 00:03:50,000 --> 00:03:51,800 Speaker 1: not much at all now, and about a third of 69 00:03:51,800 --> 00:03:57,000 Speaker 1: bank robberies, I guess in both countries yield nothing zero zero, 70 00:03:57,240 --> 00:03:59,600 Speaker 1: So it's a lot of hard work, a lot of risk, 71 00:03:59,720 --> 00:04:04,720 Speaker 1: for very little gain. The real money is in white 72 00:04:04,720 --> 00:04:08,880 Speaker 1: collar crime. Oh yes, you want to make some cash quick, 73 00:04:09,560 --> 00:04:12,200 Speaker 1: maybe one good heist. It's gonna set you up for 74 00:04:12,200 --> 00:04:14,480 Speaker 1: the rest of your life. And even if you're caught. 75 00:04:15,200 --> 00:04:17,800 Speaker 1: Even if you're caught, the chances are you will have 76 00:04:17,880 --> 00:04:22,200 Speaker 1: a mild, if any, penalty leviating against you. White collars 77 00:04:22,240 --> 00:04:26,320 Speaker 1: the way to go. Yeah, we're talking guys who um 78 00:04:26,600 --> 00:04:30,400 Speaker 1: tell people that they are financial investors and get friends 79 00:04:30,400 --> 00:04:33,880 Speaker 1: and family and uh parents of the little league that 80 00:04:33,960 --> 00:04:37,839 Speaker 1: they coach to give them nine grand. Um. There's other 81 00:04:37,839 --> 00:04:41,880 Speaker 1: guys who just have little penny stock companies that pump 82 00:04:42,000 --> 00:04:47,360 Speaker 1: up their um stock prospects called stock touting, and UM 83 00:04:47,520 --> 00:04:52,200 Speaker 1: dump all of their shares UM. That's investor fraud. They 84 00:04:52,240 --> 00:04:54,800 Speaker 1: make hundreds of thousands, if not millions of dollars. It's 85 00:04:54,839 --> 00:04:58,719 Speaker 1: where the real money is. And historically speaking, it has 86 00:04:58,839 --> 00:05:02,080 Speaker 1: really low risk. Yeah, even if you're caught. All right, 87 00:05:02,160 --> 00:05:04,760 Speaker 1: So we're endorsing white collar crime, we're not endorsing it. 88 00:05:05,440 --> 00:05:08,400 Speaker 1: I was being facetious. Okay, I thought you met up 89 00:05:08,400 --> 00:05:12,200 Speaker 1: with white collar crime in no. No. As a matter 90 00:05:12,200 --> 00:05:14,880 Speaker 1: of fact, it's going down. The times are definitely changing. 91 00:05:14,920 --> 00:05:17,360 Speaker 1: There's a big struggle going on right now is to 92 00:05:17,839 --> 00:05:21,520 Speaker 1: figuring out the just the right amount of punishment with 93 00:05:21,560 --> 00:05:23,920 Speaker 1: white color crime because there's a lot of factors involved. 94 00:05:24,040 --> 00:05:27,440 Speaker 1: It's a lot different from blue collar crime e g. 95 00:05:27,600 --> 00:05:30,960 Speaker 1: Stealing a car, robbing a bank. There's a lot of 96 00:05:31,000 --> 00:05:35,479 Speaker 1: differences that differentiated. Let's separate the two, um. And one 97 00:05:35,480 --> 00:05:39,520 Speaker 1: of those now is the the sentencing forum is probably stiffer, 98 00:05:39,960 --> 00:05:42,599 Speaker 1: which is a total reversal from how it used to 99 00:05:42,600 --> 00:05:45,039 Speaker 1: be before. And they've also closed a lot of the 100 00:05:45,040 --> 00:05:48,400 Speaker 1: club beds down that got so much press. Yes, well 101 00:05:48,440 --> 00:05:51,680 Speaker 1: they've they've changed them. They're still there. They just are 102 00:05:51,760 --> 00:05:54,800 Speaker 1: changed a lot of more shut down like period, Yeah, 103 00:05:54,960 --> 00:05:59,599 Speaker 1: just to ship them to real federal penitentiary penitentiaries, penitentiaries 104 00:05:59,600 --> 00:06:04,719 Speaker 1: and tree. Uh. That reminded me of a word that 105 00:06:04,720 --> 00:06:06,839 Speaker 1: will definitely be hearing at some point in this podcast. 106 00:06:08,080 --> 00:06:12,080 Speaker 1: It's a psi oh, yeah, because that's definitely white collar. 107 00:06:12,560 --> 00:06:14,760 Speaker 1: Part of the problem with white collar crime, Josh, as 108 00:06:14,760 --> 00:06:17,880 Speaker 1: you know from reading this, is that, um it's hard 109 00:06:17,920 --> 00:06:20,640 Speaker 1: to come up with an exact definition of what constitutes it. 110 00:06:21,080 --> 00:06:23,760 Speaker 1: So that's why they have a hard time getting great 111 00:06:23,800 --> 00:06:27,720 Speaker 1: statistics on punishment and finds levied and how many of 112 00:06:27,720 --> 00:06:32,800 Speaker 1: they're catching. But I'm gonna go with non violent crime 113 00:06:33,880 --> 00:06:36,400 Speaker 1: that typically involves and you have to say things like 114 00:06:36,440 --> 00:06:39,279 Speaker 1: typically because it's kind of all over the map, typically 115 00:06:39,320 --> 00:06:44,400 Speaker 1: involves um deceit and fraud given by perpetrator because of 116 00:06:44,440 --> 00:06:47,359 Speaker 1: their occupation. Yeah, And for that reason, a lot of 117 00:06:47,360 --> 00:06:52,120 Speaker 1: times it's called occupational UM crime. Yeah. Uh. And if 118 00:06:52,160 --> 00:06:53,800 Speaker 1: you look at it through that view, which is a 119 00:06:53,880 --> 00:06:56,560 Speaker 1: very broad view of white collar crime, it's not just 120 00:06:56,600 --> 00:06:59,480 Speaker 1: the exacts in the three thousand dollar suits who are 121 00:06:59,480 --> 00:07:04,159 Speaker 1: perpetrated eating this. It's the guy who's stealing pencils from work, yeah, 122 00:07:04,360 --> 00:07:07,080 Speaker 1: or non violent to see. Especially somebody asked him if 123 00:07:07,120 --> 00:07:09,720 Speaker 1: he did it, and he says no, And it's because 124 00:07:09,800 --> 00:07:14,040 Speaker 1: you are you're you're granted this opportunity through your occupation. Actually, 125 00:07:14,040 --> 00:07:16,640 Speaker 1: I would call that petty theft. It's but I'm saying, 126 00:07:16,680 --> 00:07:19,760 Speaker 1: like in a very very broad definition of white collar crime, 127 00:07:19,840 --> 00:07:22,040 Speaker 1: that that definitely counts. But for the most part, when 128 00:07:22,080 --> 00:07:24,000 Speaker 1: you think of white collar you think about the CEO, 129 00:07:24,120 --> 00:07:28,560 Speaker 1: as you think about investor fraud, embezzlement, that kind of 130 00:07:28,560 --> 00:07:32,400 Speaker 1: stuff exactly. Uh, feds have been after in the United States, uh, 131 00:07:32,520 --> 00:07:35,440 Speaker 1: in earnest since nineteen seventy four as far as a 132 00:07:35,440 --> 00:07:39,200 Speaker 1: a dedicated division the FBI. Yeah, and that's because the 133 00:07:39,360 --> 00:07:42,120 Speaker 1: NIX and I read and then uh, despite that about 134 00:07:42,160 --> 00:07:45,239 Speaker 1: three hundred billion dollars a year. And that's a pretty 135 00:07:45,320 --> 00:07:50,760 Speaker 1: rough estimate, that's two estimate. Yeah. So let's talk about 136 00:07:50,800 --> 00:07:52,960 Speaker 1: a few ways you can commit white color crime. Yeah, 137 00:07:53,080 --> 00:07:57,160 Speaker 1: because the definition you gave was like beautiful, it's pretty good. Um. 138 00:07:57,200 --> 00:07:59,560 Speaker 1: And there are some that just like I said, investment 139 00:07:59,600 --> 00:08:04,760 Speaker 1: frau or embezzlement, they're just prototypical. Insider trading is one 140 00:08:04,880 --> 00:08:09,520 Speaker 1: that's a big one, which falls under securities fraud. Right, Uh, Yeah, 141 00:08:09,600 --> 00:08:12,200 Speaker 1: I mean it's a type of securities fraud. So basically 142 00:08:12,240 --> 00:08:15,600 Speaker 1: insider trading. We've I swear we've done something on this, 143 00:08:15,720 --> 00:08:18,640 Speaker 1: I don't think, so it must have been in our 144 00:08:18,680 --> 00:08:22,440 Speaker 1: Fenian Freddie presentation. Then maybe we studied a lot of 145 00:08:22,480 --> 00:08:25,040 Speaker 1: this stuff. Yeah, and I thought we'd done a podcast 146 00:08:25,080 --> 00:08:28,800 Speaker 1: and I guess not. But insider trading is essentially like, um, 147 00:08:28,880 --> 00:08:31,560 Speaker 1: let's say that you and I find out that Discovery 148 00:08:31,560 --> 00:08:34,360 Speaker 1: had an awesome quarter, and so we go and buy 149 00:08:34,360 --> 00:08:37,560 Speaker 1: a bunch of Discovery stock for nothing, and then it 150 00:08:37,640 --> 00:08:40,160 Speaker 1: just shoots through the roof after the stock price comes up. 151 00:08:40,200 --> 00:08:44,760 Speaker 1: That's inside of trading. Sure, that's using private knowledge about 152 00:08:44,760 --> 00:08:47,719 Speaker 1: a publicly traded company for your own game. That's a 153 00:08:47,800 --> 00:08:51,240 Speaker 1: no note. We go to other people that would count 154 00:08:51,240 --> 00:08:54,719 Speaker 1: as well, and then like s Marcus Stewart, Yeah, that 155 00:08:54,880 --> 00:08:57,520 Speaker 1: they took part and then they would be uh insider 156 00:08:57,559 --> 00:09:00,640 Speaker 1: traders as well, exactly. And it works the opposite way 157 00:09:00,679 --> 00:09:02,280 Speaker 1: as well, Like if you find out that there's a 158 00:09:02,320 --> 00:09:05,480 Speaker 1: lot of terrible information, terrible information is going to make 159 00:09:05,480 --> 00:09:09,120 Speaker 1: your stock drop that you sell before that information becomes public, 160 00:09:09,360 --> 00:09:13,000 Speaker 1: you're in trouble, big trouble. Securities fraud, which UM in 161 00:09:13,040 --> 00:09:15,600 Speaker 1: started training is kind of like that, UM, but it 162 00:09:15,720 --> 00:09:18,760 Speaker 1: is also manipulating cooking the books. You've heard that term 163 00:09:18,800 --> 00:09:24,000 Speaker 1: of your own company. Two maybe undervalue UM a stock 164 00:09:24,120 --> 00:09:27,240 Speaker 1: before it goes public or I mean there's all different variations, 165 00:09:27,559 --> 00:09:31,360 Speaker 1: but it basically involves manipulating numbers in a dishonest way, right, 166 00:09:31,400 --> 00:09:35,360 Speaker 1: that pumping up scheme where it's stocked touting. There's that's 167 00:09:35,440 --> 00:09:40,320 Speaker 1: all securities fraud UM. And then there's any trust violations 168 00:09:40,320 --> 00:09:42,000 Speaker 1: for another good one, there's this has been kind of 169 00:09:42,040 --> 00:09:47,880 Speaker 1: big lately. So UM. Google is supposedly hogging the YouTube metadata, 170 00:09:48,200 --> 00:09:51,080 Speaker 1: which is preventing Microsoft from making a decent app for it. 171 00:09:51,840 --> 00:09:55,120 Speaker 1: Yeah and UM and Google's like, well, it's proprietary or whatever, 172 00:09:55,160 --> 00:09:57,000 Speaker 1: and I was like, no, you gotta kind of have 173 00:09:57,040 --> 00:10:00,480 Speaker 1: to share that. That's they're alleging in an antitrust violation. 174 00:10:00,920 --> 00:10:03,800 Speaker 1: Companies kind of police one another with that. And then 175 00:10:03,800 --> 00:10:05,760 Speaker 1: also price fixing is a big one, which is like 176 00:10:05,800 --> 00:10:08,880 Speaker 1: the opposite of companies policing one another. It's collusion between 177 00:10:08,920 --> 00:10:13,480 Speaker 1: companies and like Apple and book publishers, UM fixing the 178 00:10:13,520 --> 00:10:17,959 Speaker 1: prices of e books allegedly has been going on. Yeah, yeah, man, 179 00:10:18,000 --> 00:10:19,920 Speaker 1: It's going on all over the place that it's it's 180 00:10:19,920 --> 00:10:24,720 Speaker 1: a dirty, dirty, dirty world bribery one of the oldest 181 00:10:24,800 --> 00:10:28,440 Speaker 1: tricks in the book. Um, obviously that's involves some sort 182 00:10:28,480 --> 00:10:33,280 Speaker 1: of a payoff or a kickback in exchange for uh 183 00:10:33,679 --> 00:10:37,520 Speaker 1: whatever information. Um, I get the bid, my company gets 184 00:10:37,679 --> 00:10:40,160 Speaker 1: your bid for this government job, and I get a 185 00:10:40,200 --> 00:10:44,199 Speaker 1: little kickback or I give you a little kickback rather um, 186 00:10:44,240 --> 00:10:48,520 Speaker 1: any kind of maybe favorable decision that can influence your company. Yeah, 187 00:10:48,679 --> 00:10:51,720 Speaker 1: little little grease in the palm going on. Here's three 188 00:10:51,960 --> 00:10:57,640 Speaker 1: high quality frozen steaks. Please consider it, and you say 189 00:10:57,679 --> 00:11:01,360 Speaker 1: consider granted. And within each of these steaks is a 190 00:11:01,440 --> 00:11:05,080 Speaker 1: one million dollar bill. It's not even eating. That doesn't 191 00:11:05,120 --> 00:11:08,000 Speaker 1: even exist. What frozen steaks with money in them? A 192 00:11:08,000 --> 00:11:11,120 Speaker 1: million dollar bill? Okay, we know about frozen deutsch marks. 193 00:11:11,280 --> 00:11:13,440 Speaker 1: Somebody sent us a dollar. By the way, I want 194 00:11:13,440 --> 00:11:15,800 Speaker 1: the dollar. We'll we'll give you fifty cents, all right, 195 00:11:16,120 --> 00:11:17,680 Speaker 1: I guess it's thirty three and a third we gotta 196 00:11:17,679 --> 00:11:21,320 Speaker 1: give Jerry or cut. Don't go there. We'll talk about 197 00:11:21,320 --> 00:11:27,080 Speaker 1: it later. Embezzlement Office Space. Everyone's seen the movie Office Space. 198 00:11:27,480 --> 00:11:29,559 Speaker 1: A little program they had to like shave a sin 199 00:11:29,679 --> 00:11:34,240 Speaker 1: or something off of transaction that's embezzlement. They were given 200 00:11:34,280 --> 00:11:39,880 Speaker 1: the opportunity through trust with books, with accounting, they basically 201 00:11:39,920 --> 00:11:43,120 Speaker 1: add access to the money and skim them off the top. 202 00:11:42,200 --> 00:11:47,439 Speaker 1: A wrong guys, money laundering, which we have done a podcast. 203 00:11:47,480 --> 00:11:55,640 Speaker 1: One schemes, yeah, on tax evasion. UM. So basically all 204 00:11:55,679 --> 00:11:58,160 Speaker 1: of the those are all the stars. There's also other 205 00:11:58,200 --> 00:12:03,400 Speaker 1: ones like UM snage, industrial espionage, corporate spelling, secrets its 206 00:12:03,440 --> 00:12:06,520 Speaker 1: white collar. UM. Remember the lady who tried to sell 207 00:12:06,520 --> 00:12:10,480 Speaker 1: Pepsi's secrets coke? Yeah, that was pretty hackney, no Coke's 208 00:12:10,480 --> 00:12:13,600 Speaker 1: secret of pepsi because she's like, wait right here, she 209 00:12:13,679 --> 00:12:15,600 Speaker 1: wasn't anyone called the cops. She didn't do a real 210 00:12:15,600 --> 00:12:20,600 Speaker 1: good job. That's she was surprised. UM. Environmental law violations 211 00:12:20,600 --> 00:12:24,640 Speaker 1: like dumping toxic waste, Yeah, covering that up like Aaron 212 00:12:24,640 --> 00:12:27,959 Speaker 1: Brockovich style. UM. One of the things they point out 213 00:12:27,960 --> 00:12:29,679 Speaker 1: in here, which is when it comes to things like 214 00:12:30,440 --> 00:12:35,800 Speaker 1: your a little office space scheme that you just touted, UM, 215 00:12:35,840 --> 00:12:38,640 Speaker 1: a lot of times it's difficult to imagine victims, Like 216 00:12:39,200 --> 00:12:41,800 Speaker 1: in the office space, they think no one's gonna min 217 00:12:42,280 --> 00:12:45,800 Speaker 1: miss a Penny is a huge company, So you commit 218 00:12:45,880 --> 00:12:49,880 Speaker 1: these crimes without realizing that someone has hurt somewhere down 219 00:12:49,920 --> 00:12:52,680 Speaker 1: the line. If you dump your stock, your company stock 220 00:12:52,760 --> 00:12:54,800 Speaker 1: that you know is about to tank. And I'm not 221 00:12:54,840 --> 00:12:58,200 Speaker 1: saying it's understandable, but if you've like worked your whole 222 00:12:58,240 --> 00:13:01,599 Speaker 1: career in sting in this company with your four O 223 00:13:01,679 --> 00:13:04,320 Speaker 1: one k you know it's about to tank, You're like, man, 224 00:13:04,440 --> 00:13:06,520 Speaker 1: I need to sell this or else I'm done for. 225 00:13:06,960 --> 00:13:09,640 Speaker 1: My family's done for. You don't think about the people 226 00:13:09,720 --> 00:13:13,840 Speaker 1: buying the stock. They're the victims. No, it's absolutely true, 227 00:13:13,880 --> 00:13:17,760 Speaker 1: And I mean like you are being pawned. You're pawning 228 00:13:17,760 --> 00:13:20,040 Speaker 1: your problem off on somebody else. But I think you 229 00:13:20,120 --> 00:13:25,400 Speaker 1: paint a really really excellent scenario. Like you can in 230 00:13:25,480 --> 00:13:29,599 Speaker 1: some cases feel bad for the white collar criminal um, 231 00:13:29,840 --> 00:13:32,360 Speaker 1: especially if it's just some average Joe who's worried about 232 00:13:32,400 --> 00:13:35,079 Speaker 1: is four oh one k um or in the case 233 00:13:35,120 --> 00:13:38,600 Speaker 1: of en Ron, you don't feel bad for the upper dudes. 234 00:13:38,840 --> 00:13:42,079 Speaker 1: You feel bad for everyone in that company that got defrauded, right, 235 00:13:42,080 --> 00:13:44,640 Speaker 1: But they were strictly victims. They didn't didn't turn around 236 00:13:44,679 --> 00:13:46,839 Speaker 1: and like try to dump the stocks. But that that's 237 00:13:46,880 --> 00:13:50,800 Speaker 1: a very visible case of like screwing over your own employees. 238 00:13:50,960 --> 00:13:52,680 Speaker 1: But you make a good point like even if the 239 00:13:52,880 --> 00:13:55,680 Speaker 1: even if the criminal is sympathetic, there still is a victim. 240 00:13:55,760 --> 00:13:59,680 Speaker 1: Even if it's just some amorphous trader, they will never meet, 241 00:13:59,720 --> 00:14:03,000 Speaker 1: even if the victim is some like hedge fund manager. Yeah, 242 00:14:03,400 --> 00:14:06,959 Speaker 1: it's really tough. There's like a really weird spectrum here. 243 00:14:07,000 --> 00:14:09,080 Speaker 1: There's like I don't know if it's a bell curve 244 00:14:09,320 --> 00:14:14,920 Speaker 1: or like, uh, the UV spectrum. Who knows. But there's 245 00:14:15,000 --> 00:14:19,440 Speaker 1: sympathies like placed in different spots, sympathies and anti antipathies 246 00:14:20,080 --> 00:14:23,680 Speaker 1: placed along this this depending on who did what and 247 00:14:23,680 --> 00:14:26,560 Speaker 1: what they gained from it and what their motives were agreed, 248 00:14:26,800 --> 00:14:29,600 Speaker 1: because you gotta also have credit card fraud and computer 249 00:14:30,360 --> 00:14:34,600 Speaker 1: and mail fraud and counterfeiting and things like that, like 250 00:14:34,720 --> 00:14:38,360 Speaker 1: you know the Nigerian email scams. That's white collar, but 251 00:14:38,760 --> 00:14:40,520 Speaker 1: and they're in the same boat as like ken Ley 252 00:14:40,520 --> 00:14:45,280 Speaker 1: and Jeff Skillings and Ron exactly same scummy crooks. Or 253 00:14:45,360 --> 00:14:47,600 Speaker 1: let's say you commit a little credit card fraud and 254 00:14:47,760 --> 00:14:50,600 Speaker 1: you or bankruptcy fraud and you're just like, does it 255 00:14:50,720 --> 00:14:52,320 Speaker 1: be easy way to get out of my debts? Or 256 00:14:52,400 --> 00:14:55,040 Speaker 1: I just say someone stole my credit card. It's very 257 00:14:55,040 --> 00:14:58,800 Speaker 1: easy there to not envision a a victim because it's 258 00:14:59,480 --> 00:15:02,800 Speaker 1: it's cha Manhattan Bank, and like they're gonna notice. But 259 00:15:02,840 --> 00:15:05,400 Speaker 1: what happens is they raise the rates on you and me, 260 00:15:06,560 --> 00:15:08,800 Speaker 1: and all of a sudden, everyone across the board is 261 00:15:08,800 --> 00:15:13,360 Speaker 1: paying more money for stuff. Yes, that is that is true. 262 00:15:15,360 --> 00:15:19,480 Speaker 1: That is very true, and that is I think everybody's probably. 263 00:15:19,520 --> 00:15:21,360 Speaker 1: I think a good companion piece that occurred to me 264 00:15:21,440 --> 00:15:24,000 Speaker 1: is to go listen to our wide corporations of the 265 00:15:24,000 --> 00:15:27,520 Speaker 1: same rights as you. One of the fundamental flaws of 266 00:15:27,760 --> 00:15:32,680 Speaker 1: UM corporate policy is that you served your shareholders first, right, 267 00:15:33,160 --> 00:15:36,040 Speaker 1: like you need to adhere to the law, but really, ultimately, 268 00:15:36,120 --> 00:15:39,480 Speaker 1: like anything you can do to serve your shareholders is 269 00:15:39,760 --> 00:15:44,240 Speaker 1: your mandate as a as a corporate governor. UM. That 270 00:15:44,280 --> 00:15:48,280 Speaker 1: includes keeping the profit margin as high as possible, which 271 00:15:48,440 --> 00:15:51,320 Speaker 1: you're not gonna go to your your shareholders and be like, hey, 272 00:15:51,440 --> 00:15:53,600 Speaker 1: we're making enough money. We took kind of a hit, 273 00:15:53,840 --> 00:15:57,000 Speaker 1: but we're still making a ton of profit, so we'll 274 00:15:57,000 --> 00:16:00,440 Speaker 1: just take a little hit this year. No, it's where 275 00:16:00,480 --> 00:16:04,000 Speaker 1: we took a hit, so we're gonna fire people. However, 276 00:16:04,040 --> 00:16:06,920 Speaker 1: you reconcile that, I mean, that's your own personal beliefs, 277 00:16:06,960 --> 00:16:09,480 Speaker 1: Like what what you feel about that but that is 278 00:16:09,880 --> 00:16:13,480 Speaker 1: reality as far as business goes, Right, there's fraud, there's 279 00:16:13,520 --> 00:16:16,720 Speaker 1: adjustments to the fraud. There absorbing the fraud, and it's 280 00:16:16,920 --> 00:16:19,880 Speaker 1: the corporation trying to get as lean as possible. Yeah, 281 00:16:19,880 --> 00:16:22,080 Speaker 1: they're not gonna take the hit for that. They're not 282 00:16:22,120 --> 00:16:25,240 Speaker 1: gonna say, oh, well, a bunch of people defaulted on 283 00:16:25,280 --> 00:16:27,040 Speaker 1: their credit cards this year. I guess we'll just have 284 00:16:27,080 --> 00:16:30,280 Speaker 1: a bad year. And I know in reality that's how 285 00:16:30,320 --> 00:16:33,320 Speaker 1: it works, but I just find it disingenuous to be like, well, 286 00:16:33,400 --> 00:16:36,680 Speaker 1: everybody suffers, you know, like people lose their jobs because 287 00:16:36,680 --> 00:16:39,320 Speaker 1: of fraud. It's like there's a there's a point b 288 00:16:39,560 --> 00:16:41,800 Speaker 1: in there that that has to be held accountable to 289 00:16:41,920 --> 00:16:46,200 Speaker 1: some degree, well, which is your own freaking ethical code 290 00:16:46,200 --> 00:16:48,680 Speaker 1: of conduct, and like about not doing that because it's 291 00:16:48,680 --> 00:16:50,280 Speaker 1: the wrong thing to do. No, but I'm saying, like, 292 00:16:50,320 --> 00:16:53,360 Speaker 1: there's an institution that's absorbing the hit and then turnerund 293 00:16:53,400 --> 00:16:57,320 Speaker 1: firing this poor guy. Yeah, exactly. It's just it's tough 294 00:16:57,360 --> 00:17:01,120 Speaker 1: because I came across a word when they were describing 295 00:17:01,120 --> 00:17:04,040 Speaker 1: white collar crime giving a definition of it, and they said, 296 00:17:04,119 --> 00:17:09,399 Speaker 1: victims coling diffuse. Yeah, you don't meet the person the 297 00:17:09,400 --> 00:17:13,480 Speaker 1: the victim passes along the hit to other people. It's 298 00:17:13,520 --> 00:17:17,399 Speaker 1: a big it's nebulous. And even if they're raising rates 299 00:17:17,440 --> 00:17:20,400 Speaker 1: by like a quarter of a percentage point, or you're 300 00:17:20,440 --> 00:17:23,080 Speaker 1: paying an extra two dollars as a consumer a year, 301 00:17:23,880 --> 00:17:32,080 Speaker 1: it's like it's still not right. Yeah, you know, jo 302 00:17:42,880 --> 00:17:55,560 Speaker 1: m hm. So where did this come from? Uh? Josh, 303 00:17:55,560 --> 00:17:58,359 Speaker 1: it came. It sounds like it came from a cold, 304 00:18:00,000 --> 00:18:04,000 Speaker 1: fool delivery boy. I want to know more about this. 305 00:18:04,080 --> 00:18:05,760 Speaker 1: Was this dude just cold or did he really steal 306 00:18:05,760 --> 00:18:07,760 Speaker 1: a lot of wool? Now, so you're talking about the carriers, 307 00:18:07,760 --> 00:18:11,560 Speaker 1: the Carrier's Case of fourteen seventy three, it's the first 308 00:18:11,960 --> 00:18:16,520 Speaker 1: um white collar trial, yes, um, and and it resulted 309 00:18:16,560 --> 00:18:19,760 Speaker 1: in the first white collar law in fifteenth century England. 310 00:18:19,920 --> 00:18:23,200 Speaker 1: And this wool transporter was given a bunch of wool 311 00:18:23,240 --> 00:18:26,199 Speaker 1: and said, hey, take this wool to this person, and 312 00:18:26,240 --> 00:18:29,600 Speaker 1: it was his job, so he decided to instead just 313 00:18:29,720 --> 00:18:32,080 Speaker 1: keep the wool for himself for his own use. So 314 00:18:32,119 --> 00:18:33,959 Speaker 1: he looked into this more. Yeah, I thought he might 315 00:18:33,960 --> 00:18:36,199 Speaker 1: have been like cold on his journey and said, you know, 316 00:18:36,200 --> 00:18:38,400 Speaker 1: I'm gonna keep some of this woold. Now, he kept 317 00:18:38,480 --> 00:18:40,320 Speaker 1: some of the wool. I think he kept all of it, 318 00:18:40,840 --> 00:18:42,760 Speaker 1: but somebody gave it to him. He's like, thanks chump, 319 00:18:44,320 --> 00:18:47,080 Speaker 1: he was. But the key is, and this is something 320 00:18:47,119 --> 00:18:50,200 Speaker 1: that has has woven into the history of white collar crime. 321 00:18:51,320 --> 00:18:54,320 Speaker 1: What he did was not illegal at the time. The 322 00:18:54,400 --> 00:18:56,880 Speaker 1: law that was enacted as a result of the Carrier's 323 00:18:57,000 --> 00:19:00,639 Speaker 1: case was they were saying, Okay, this isn't oh, this 324 00:19:00,680 --> 00:19:03,960 Speaker 1: isn't illegal, but it's obviously there's a huge problem with this, 325 00:19:04,040 --> 00:19:06,760 Speaker 1: so we're going to create a law that outlaws this 326 00:19:06,840 --> 00:19:09,800 Speaker 1: act so people can't do it anymore. Good point. And 327 00:19:09,840 --> 00:19:12,320 Speaker 1: basically that's what happened. Well, that's kind of what happens 328 00:19:12,359 --> 00:19:14,240 Speaker 1: with every law. I guess, someone commits it first and 329 00:19:14,240 --> 00:19:16,840 Speaker 1: then someone says, hey, maybe we shouldn't do that. Yeah, yeah, 330 00:19:16,920 --> 00:19:20,720 Speaker 1: I guess. But in this case, especially like uh, the 331 00:19:20,760 --> 00:19:24,359 Speaker 1: Industrial Revolution in the West, obviously you started getting these 332 00:19:24,400 --> 00:19:27,280 Speaker 1: larger corporations and all of a sudden, things like monopolies 333 00:19:27,800 --> 00:19:32,240 Speaker 1: and price fixing and employee uh safety and all these 334 00:19:32,240 --> 00:19:35,720 Speaker 1: things come into effect for the first time. So that's 335 00:19:35,760 --> 00:19:38,000 Speaker 1: sort of when it was really born and when they 336 00:19:38,080 --> 00:19:41,919 Speaker 1: started saying, hey, we need to look at something called antitrust. Yeah. Again, 337 00:19:41,960 --> 00:19:45,760 Speaker 1: like monopolies were not illegal, but when a company bought 338 00:19:45,840 --> 00:19:49,119 Speaker 1: up all of its competitors and said, oh, suddenly the 339 00:19:49,160 --> 00:19:52,680 Speaker 1: price for your groceries like through the roof, where else 340 00:19:52,760 --> 00:19:56,639 Speaker 1: you gonna go? It wasn't illegal, but the the people 341 00:19:56,680 --> 00:20:00,080 Speaker 1: of the world started screaming, and governments finally responded, and 342 00:20:00,080 --> 00:20:02,800 Speaker 1: it was really the US that first had the real 343 00:20:03,359 --> 00:20:06,720 Speaker 1: first solid response in the Sherman Anti Trust Act in 344 00:20:06,760 --> 00:20:10,440 Speaker 1: like the eighteen seventies maybe I think eighteen ninety named 345 00:20:10,480 --> 00:20:15,119 Speaker 1: for John Senator John Sherman, Ohio, Republican dude, chairman of 346 00:20:15,119 --> 00:20:18,119 Speaker 1: the Senate's Finance Senate Finance Committee, which I didn't know 347 00:20:18,160 --> 00:20:21,200 Speaker 1: they even had way back then. I forgot didn't either, 348 00:20:21,280 --> 00:20:23,480 Speaker 1: but I mean, it seems like a basic committee there, 349 00:20:23,920 --> 00:20:26,600 Speaker 1: so this is interesting. And that it was voted on. 350 00:20:27,160 --> 00:20:29,119 Speaker 1: It won by a vote of in the Senate fifty 351 00:20:29,160 --> 00:20:31,600 Speaker 1: one to one, in the House by two forty two 352 00:20:31,640 --> 00:20:35,200 Speaker 1: to zero. So there was one dude that didn't vote 353 00:20:35,240 --> 00:20:38,200 Speaker 1: for it. And then I think twenty five years later 354 00:20:38,240 --> 00:20:40,240 Speaker 1: when they came up with the Clayton Anti Trust Act 355 00:20:40,280 --> 00:20:43,520 Speaker 1: to really put some punch into the Sherman Act. It 356 00:20:43,600 --> 00:20:45,840 Speaker 1: was two seventy seven to seventy four and forty six 357 00:20:45,920 --> 00:20:49,000 Speaker 1: to sixteen so in that twenty four years, it sounds 358 00:20:49,040 --> 00:20:52,880 Speaker 1: like maybe things got slightly corrupt here and there. Well 359 00:20:52,920 --> 00:20:55,560 Speaker 1: it wasn't that. It was that. Well, maybe it was, 360 00:20:56,040 --> 00:20:58,399 Speaker 1: but there was also some real problems with the Sherman 361 00:20:58,440 --> 00:21:02,320 Speaker 1: Act that was really vague. It basically said like now, 362 00:21:02,400 --> 00:21:06,960 Speaker 1: from here forth, all um anti competitive corporate measures are illegal, 363 00:21:07,560 --> 00:21:09,920 Speaker 1: and then it left it to the courts to decide 364 00:21:09,960 --> 00:21:11,879 Speaker 1: what was what, and the courts weren't really in the 365 00:21:11,880 --> 00:21:15,080 Speaker 1: mood to enforce it, so it went largely unenforced. Although 366 00:21:15,640 --> 00:21:19,200 Speaker 1: American Tobacco Company and Standard Oil, like two of the 367 00:21:19,200 --> 00:21:23,400 Speaker 1: biggest companies in the country, were dissolved under the Sherman Act, 368 00:21:23,520 --> 00:21:26,359 Speaker 1: Standard Oil big time. Imagine that Like, imagine going to 369 00:21:26,600 --> 00:21:30,520 Speaker 1: a company now and saying like, hey, Apple, it's just 370 00:21:30,560 --> 00:21:33,680 Speaker 1: too big, so we're gonna dissolve you into thirty one companies. 371 00:21:34,080 --> 00:21:36,240 Speaker 1: We have all these federal regulators here and they're gonna 372 00:21:36,240 --> 00:21:38,199 Speaker 1: come in and look at everything and the dissolve you 373 00:21:38,200 --> 00:21:43,120 Speaker 1: into different companies. Sorry, that's what they did. Okay, Even still, 374 00:21:43,160 --> 00:21:44,560 Speaker 1: it didn't have enough tea. So they came up with 375 00:21:44,600 --> 00:21:47,320 Speaker 1: the Clayton Anti Trust Act, and then that one really 376 00:21:47,359 --> 00:21:51,280 Speaker 1: spelled things out, like, um, you couldn't do price discrimination anymore, 377 00:21:51,840 --> 00:21:54,920 Speaker 1: which if you were black in America during the Jim 378 00:21:54,960 --> 00:22:00,640 Speaker 1: Crow era, price discrimination was mind boggling. You walk into 379 00:22:00,640 --> 00:22:02,679 Speaker 1: a store if you're allowed in there to begin with, 380 00:22:03,000 --> 00:22:05,800 Speaker 1: and they'll just make up whatever price they want. It's 381 00:22:05,880 --> 00:22:09,200 Speaker 1: it was really I'm reading this, um Consumerism an America book, 382 00:22:09,240 --> 00:22:12,359 Speaker 1: and it's at this point now is really just this 383 00:22:13,480 --> 00:22:17,400 Speaker 1: blemish on American history. I mean, like slavery wasn't bad enough. 384 00:22:17,480 --> 00:22:21,200 Speaker 1: I mean to like have slavery light through the Jim 385 00:22:21,240 --> 00:22:25,639 Speaker 1: Crow era, it's just disgusting. Um. Okay, So there was 386 00:22:25,680 --> 00:22:31,119 Speaker 1: no price discrimination allegedly, corporate mergers were outlawed in the 387 00:22:31,160 --> 00:22:34,840 Speaker 1: Clayton yeah. Um. And then interlocking boards where you had 388 00:22:34,880 --> 00:22:37,760 Speaker 1: like competitive companies but the same people on the board 389 00:22:37,760 --> 00:22:40,480 Speaker 1: of each Right, you can't have that. And then also 390 00:22:40,520 --> 00:22:45,240 Speaker 1: exclusive contracts where it's like hey, Home Depot, you can 391 00:22:45,280 --> 00:22:49,320 Speaker 1: sell our um weed whackers, but you can't tell anybody 392 00:22:49,320 --> 00:22:53,480 Speaker 1: else's those contracts are out right, Hey Home. They do 393 00:22:53,520 --> 00:22:57,080 Speaker 1: stuff like that now though, right, maybe not exclusively, but 394 00:22:57,119 --> 00:22:59,359 Speaker 1: they carry lives. They do not limited number of brands, 395 00:22:59,440 --> 00:23:04,159 Speaker 1: corporate mergers, interlocking boards, exclusive contracts, all that stuff one 396 00:23:04,160 --> 00:23:07,280 Speaker 1: a way. They all got chipped away. Okay, it's just 397 00:23:07,359 --> 00:23:10,560 Speaker 1: I mean this, this this act is like not in 398 00:23:10,720 --> 00:23:13,240 Speaker 1: force anymore. Basically. Well, that's one things that bugs me 399 00:23:13,280 --> 00:23:17,159 Speaker 1: about like grocery or actually the big box hardware stores. 400 00:23:17,480 --> 00:23:21,600 Speaker 1: Grocery shopping, you you only have access to what they 401 00:23:22,160 --> 00:23:24,760 Speaker 1: who they have partnered with, right, whether it's your potato 402 00:23:24,800 --> 00:23:26,800 Speaker 1: chip that you want or your weed whacker that you want. 403 00:23:26,880 --> 00:23:29,000 Speaker 1: It's true. And most of the big box stores also 404 00:23:29,400 --> 00:23:33,760 Speaker 1: have exclusive contracts the other way. It's like, yeah, we'll 405 00:23:33,800 --> 00:23:36,840 Speaker 1: sell your weed whacker, but you can't sell it. No 406 00:23:36,880 --> 00:23:39,879 Speaker 1: one else can, right, So it's like a real gamble, 407 00:23:39,920 --> 00:23:43,359 Speaker 1: I understand, Like sign on to one of these giant corporations. 408 00:23:43,560 --> 00:23:45,880 Speaker 1: Well that's one in the Walmart effect. That was one 409 00:23:45,920 --> 00:23:48,639 Speaker 1: of the things I think they used to. It's like 410 00:23:48,680 --> 00:23:52,160 Speaker 1: a tent company or an awning company, and like this 411 00:23:52,440 --> 00:23:54,320 Speaker 1: mom and pop awning company all of a sudden gets 412 00:23:54,320 --> 00:23:57,239 Speaker 1: a Walmart contract and they're like, sweet, they answered all 413 00:23:57,240 --> 00:23:59,719 Speaker 1: our prayers. They ordered like thirty thousand of these. They 414 00:23:59,800 --> 00:24:02,240 Speaker 1: order thirty thousand, They opened up like three new buildings. 415 00:24:02,560 --> 00:24:04,320 Speaker 1: Hi are all these employees, and then the next year 416 00:24:04,359 --> 00:24:06,840 Speaker 1: they come back and say, we want thirty thousand more 417 00:24:06,880 --> 00:24:10,600 Speaker 1: but we're gonna pay you about less, and you've already 418 00:24:10,600 --> 00:24:12,919 Speaker 1: bought the buildings and even you know, invested in the 419 00:24:13,040 --> 00:24:15,440 Speaker 1: in the materials and the people, and all of a 420 00:24:15,440 --> 00:24:18,600 Speaker 1: sudden you're screwed. You know, one thing that I've long 421 00:24:18,680 --> 00:24:21,280 Speaker 1: thought and I'm gonna totally take flak for this, but 422 00:24:21,320 --> 00:24:24,720 Speaker 1: I still think it's worth saying, like you here, like, well, 423 00:24:24,720 --> 00:24:30,560 Speaker 1: that's just business. I feel that any any institution where 424 00:24:30,800 --> 00:24:34,720 Speaker 1: like morally reprehensible acts can just be you know, off 425 00:24:34,800 --> 00:24:40,000 Speaker 1: handedly dismissed as a matter of course of that institution 426 00:24:40,640 --> 00:24:44,640 Speaker 1: is inherently fought. There's an inherent problem with it. Yeah, 427 00:24:44,720 --> 00:24:48,160 Speaker 1: that's not okay, Like we don't just go, well, that's 428 00:24:48,240 --> 00:24:52,639 Speaker 1: just murder, you know, or well that's just stealing, you know, 429 00:24:52,760 --> 00:24:57,639 Speaker 1: welcome to earth. Human. No, we have moral and legal 430 00:24:57,720 --> 00:25:01,080 Speaker 1: guidelines that we follow. And is this in Corporations have 431 00:25:01,280 --> 00:25:05,040 Speaker 1: so so long stood outside of these things that it's 432 00:25:05,080 --> 00:25:07,600 Speaker 1: just it always bugs me when it's just like what 433 00:25:07,640 --> 00:25:11,200 Speaker 1: are you gonna do? Yeah, I don't like that. So sorry, 434 00:25:11,240 --> 00:25:13,600 Speaker 1: I'm off my soap I agree completely, Well, I'm off 435 00:25:13,600 --> 00:25:19,160 Speaker 1: of my Tide brand soapbox. Well said, um so, things 436 00:25:19,160 --> 00:25:23,960 Speaker 1: are kicking along here in the industrial West. Corporations are 437 00:25:24,119 --> 00:25:28,160 Speaker 1: getting larger, and all of a sudden, these crimes start happening, 438 00:25:28,280 --> 00:25:31,760 Speaker 1: and something called a muck raker in the nineteenth than 439 00:25:31,960 --> 00:25:34,760 Speaker 1: early twentieth century comes about. And I didn't realize a 440 00:25:34,840 --> 00:25:38,639 Speaker 1: muck raker was exclusively a journalist. Yeah, it's thought it 441 00:25:38,680 --> 00:25:40,919 Speaker 1: was for an investigative journalist. I thought it would was 442 00:25:41,040 --> 00:25:45,440 Speaker 1: anyone raking muck. Um, But it's specifically a journalist who 443 00:25:45,880 --> 00:25:49,680 Speaker 1: basically early on said you know what, that's bad stuff 444 00:25:49,720 --> 00:25:53,720 Speaker 1: going on, see and I'm gonna expose you right one. 445 00:25:53,960 --> 00:25:56,720 Speaker 1: Oh really and he wrote the jungle changed of course. 446 00:25:56,760 --> 00:25:58,800 Speaker 1: I mean the FDA basically came about because of the 447 00:25:59,119 --> 00:26:02,320 Speaker 1: investigation that conducted. Well, muckrakers raked a lot of muck 448 00:26:02,359 --> 00:26:06,160 Speaker 1: can cost a lot of problems in these companies. And um, 449 00:26:06,240 --> 00:26:08,159 Speaker 1: one of the things that came about because of the 450 00:26:08,240 --> 00:26:12,920 Speaker 1: muckraking were, you know, things like the Clayton Net that's 451 00:26:12,960 --> 00:26:15,639 Speaker 1: exactly right, exposing all this stuff exactly and things like 452 00:26:15,680 --> 00:26:20,680 Speaker 1: that DA, Federal regulations, consumer protections. The muckrakers basically stirred 453 00:26:20,760 --> 00:26:23,679 Speaker 1: up public sentiment like hey, don't be idiots, like this 454 00:26:23,720 --> 00:26:26,400 Speaker 1: stuff's going on, and a lot of people said, well, 455 00:26:26,400 --> 00:26:29,960 Speaker 1: it's not illegal. And then unfortunately there are guys like 456 00:26:30,200 --> 00:26:34,280 Speaker 1: um E. A. Ross, who was a criminologist and a sociologist, 457 00:26:34,640 --> 00:26:37,280 Speaker 1: and he started really kind of looking into this and said, 458 00:26:37,320 --> 00:26:40,680 Speaker 1: hey man, these people might not be criminal, but let's 459 00:26:40,680 --> 00:26:43,840 Speaker 1: call them criminal OIDs. Like that was the coining the 460 00:26:43,880 --> 00:26:47,560 Speaker 1: turn might coin for people who, especially in business, carried 461 00:26:47,560 --> 00:26:51,560 Speaker 1: out these terrible acts that weren't illegal. He argued that 462 00:26:51,600 --> 00:26:54,320 Speaker 1: even though it's not illegal, they're causing ill and these 463 00:26:54,320 --> 00:26:56,440 Speaker 1: people are still responsible for him. So make a law 464 00:26:56,520 --> 00:27:00,879 Speaker 1: that outlaws at dummies. And he inspired a guy named H. Sutherland. 465 00:27:01,040 --> 00:27:03,959 Speaker 1: Okay he came before Sutherland. Yeah, he was at the UM. 466 00:27:04,119 --> 00:27:05,960 Speaker 1: Ross was working at the time of the muckrakers, and 467 00:27:05,960 --> 00:27:09,240 Speaker 1: then Sutherland came about twenty years later. Yeah. Sutherland coined 468 00:27:09,240 --> 00:27:12,760 Speaker 1: the term actually white collar crime in nine and he 469 00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:17,840 Speaker 1: was a criminologist and sociologist, and he pretty much he 470 00:27:17,880 --> 00:27:21,359 Speaker 1: had a broader definition that basically it was the high 471 00:27:21,400 --> 00:27:26,600 Speaker 1: society and not the lower class at all committing these crimes, right, 472 00:27:27,160 --> 00:27:30,560 Speaker 1: which nowadays you can't really say that because anyone can 473 00:27:30,600 --> 00:27:33,639 Speaker 1: get a stock tip commit in. You know, it happens 474 00:27:33,640 --> 00:27:36,520 Speaker 1: all the time across all spectrums of the class system. 475 00:27:36,680 --> 00:27:39,000 Speaker 1: But Sutherland's point was, and he wrote a book called 476 00:27:39,000 --> 00:27:42,240 Speaker 1: White Collar Crime, UM. His point was that there was 477 00:27:42,280 --> 00:27:45,960 Speaker 1: a huge bias in the United States UM where the 478 00:27:46,280 --> 00:27:50,040 Speaker 1: where law enforcement in the courts leaned heavily on UM, 479 00:27:50,200 --> 00:27:54,640 Speaker 1: the working class crime, and just basically ignored the crimes 480 00:27:54,640 --> 00:27:59,280 Speaker 1: of the upper class and said this is not okay, Like, um, 481 00:27:59,320 --> 00:28:02,160 Speaker 1: if a guy is gonna steal a thousand dollars from 482 00:28:02,200 --> 00:28:04,880 Speaker 1: a cash register with no gun or anything like that, 483 00:28:05,320 --> 00:28:07,760 Speaker 1: like there are other factors, but let's just say a 484 00:28:07,800 --> 00:28:10,199 Speaker 1: guy steals a thousand dollars from a cash register and 485 00:28:10,240 --> 00:28:12,679 Speaker 1: he's poor, and a guy steals a thousand dollars from 486 00:28:12,680 --> 00:28:16,240 Speaker 1: an investor and he's rich. That's they should be treated equally, 487 00:28:16,280 --> 00:28:18,760 Speaker 1: and they're not. And that's what Sutherland's point was. And 488 00:28:18,760 --> 00:28:20,440 Speaker 1: he was the first dude to really bring this to light, 489 00:28:20,520 --> 00:28:23,720 Speaker 1: wasn't he. Yeah, well, Ross kind of started to, but 490 00:28:23,800 --> 00:28:27,359 Speaker 1: Sutherland was very well received. It was well received in 491 00:28:27,440 --> 00:28:30,360 Speaker 1: certain corners. But there were also certain flaws pointed out 492 00:28:30,359 --> 00:28:34,840 Speaker 1: by people over the years. UM. One of the things 493 00:28:34,880 --> 00:28:36,880 Speaker 1: mentioned the article has said that he failed to distinguish 494 00:28:36,920 --> 00:28:42,200 Speaker 1: illegal crime from deviant mere deviant behavior, right, like apparently 495 00:28:42,320 --> 00:28:45,760 Speaker 1: his his whole premise was like you're into donkeys, you're 496 00:28:45,800 --> 00:28:49,080 Speaker 1: a white collar criminal exactly. And the other thing I 497 00:28:49,120 --> 00:28:51,040 Speaker 1: mentioned too was that he pretty much said it was 498 00:28:51,080 --> 00:28:54,440 Speaker 1: anyone like any upper class nonviolent crime, right, And that's 499 00:28:54,440 --> 00:28:57,000 Speaker 1: definitely evolved, and I think fairly sure. I think you 500 00:28:57,040 --> 00:29:00,480 Speaker 1: can be working class, you can be buss his class 501 00:29:00,760 --> 00:29:03,720 Speaker 1: if you like. That's a big, big part of white 502 00:29:03,720 --> 00:29:07,680 Speaker 1: color crimes definition is that your opportunity arises because of 503 00:29:07,680 --> 00:29:10,520 Speaker 1: the trust that's granted to you through your occupation. Yeah, 504 00:29:10,760 --> 00:29:13,480 Speaker 1: even if you're a lower level employee, you still may 505 00:29:13,520 --> 00:29:16,120 Speaker 1: have access. Like the lady who wanted to sell the 506 00:29:16,160 --> 00:29:18,480 Speaker 1: coke secret. She wasn't like a CEO, No, she was 507 00:29:18,720 --> 00:29:47,160 Speaker 1: an admin. I believe in things like job job m um. 508 00:29:47,200 --> 00:29:49,640 Speaker 1: So there's a there's one thing that that like you said, 509 00:29:49,840 --> 00:29:53,719 Speaker 1: they like to shoot a hole in uh Sutherland's theory. 510 00:29:54,160 --> 00:29:57,240 Speaker 1: That or they say his definition is too broad because 511 00:29:57,240 --> 00:30:00,400 Speaker 1: he did include behavior that's not illegal. But it's a 512 00:30:00,480 --> 00:30:03,600 Speaker 1: very legitimate point to say, you kind of have to 513 00:30:03,800 --> 00:30:06,240 Speaker 1: because if not, then we wouldn't have had the Sherman 514 00:30:06,280 --> 00:30:08,400 Speaker 1: Anti Trust Act, we wouldn't have had the Clayton Act, 515 00:30:08,440 --> 00:30:10,840 Speaker 1: we wouldn't have had um you know, the f d A, 516 00:30:10,840 --> 00:30:14,440 Speaker 1: all of these things that uh that the carrier's case, 517 00:30:14,560 --> 00:30:17,200 Speaker 1: he would have gotten off scott free. What he did 518 00:30:17,320 --> 00:30:22,800 Speaker 1: was not illegal. So it has to evolve over time. Agreed, Okay, 519 00:30:23,240 --> 00:30:27,200 Speaker 1: and it has agreed. So let's talk about, um, I 520 00:30:27,240 --> 00:30:33,080 Speaker 1: guess the impacts of today's modern white color crime. I 521 00:30:33,160 --> 00:30:36,760 Speaker 1: was like man that was suspensable all of a sudden. Thanks. Um. Yeah, 522 00:30:36,800 --> 00:30:39,360 Speaker 1: We've talked about a few of these, about seemingly not 523 00:30:39,440 --> 00:30:43,080 Speaker 1: having a victim. But what happens is, um, you rip 524 00:30:43,080 --> 00:30:45,400 Speaker 1: off a huge corporation, the al race of prices. There's 525 00:30:45,400 --> 00:30:49,160 Speaker 1: another ripple effect. You talked about cutting jobs to meet 526 00:30:49,280 --> 00:30:50,920 Speaker 1: you know, the needs of the investors. If it's a 527 00:30:50,960 --> 00:30:55,080 Speaker 1: publicly traded company. Um, when there's stock fraud committed, insider 528 00:30:55,120 --> 00:30:58,640 Speaker 1: scandals like Enron are going to ripple out throughout the 529 00:30:58,640 --> 00:31:02,800 Speaker 1: stock market cause it is, like you know, basically cause 530 00:31:02,840 --> 00:31:05,040 Speaker 1: people to be unsure and have no faith in the 531 00:31:05,040 --> 00:31:07,680 Speaker 1: stock market all of a sudden. Yeah that's dangerous. Yeah, 532 00:31:08,160 --> 00:31:11,480 Speaker 1: I think about all the people who just lost everything. 533 00:31:12,960 --> 00:31:16,440 Speaker 1: Oh my god, I get yeah. I get just as angry, 534 00:31:16,440 --> 00:31:19,239 Speaker 1: if not more angry at something like that than you know, 535 00:31:19,720 --> 00:31:23,880 Speaker 1: something like heinous crime. Yeah, i'd say equal, Yeah, they're 536 00:31:23,920 --> 00:31:31,120 Speaker 1: both scumbags. Okay. Um, so you said, like in seventy 537 00:31:31,200 --> 00:31:35,280 Speaker 1: four the FBI first started, they that's when they've created 538 00:31:35,320 --> 00:31:39,440 Speaker 1: this white color Crime division. So apparently like yes, yeah, 539 00:31:39,760 --> 00:31:43,280 Speaker 1: and it was a response like this University of Michigan 540 00:31:43,320 --> 00:31:46,640 Speaker 1: survey that they conducted between nineteen fifty eight, I think 541 00:31:46,800 --> 00:31:50,280 Speaker 1: in nineteen seventy three, they found that, um, people who 542 00:31:50,320 --> 00:31:53,719 Speaker 1: said that they trust the federal government went from seventy 543 00:31:53,760 --> 00:31:58,480 Speaker 1: three to thirty seven percent between nineteen fifty eight and 544 00:31:58,560 --> 00:32:01,680 Speaker 1: nineteen seventy three. Yeah, I flip flopped. Yeah, and that 545 00:32:01,760 --> 00:32:04,680 Speaker 1: sort of could see that over that time period the sixties. Yeah, 546 00:32:04,720 --> 00:32:07,080 Speaker 1: one of the big ones was just like fraud and 547 00:32:07,160 --> 00:32:10,120 Speaker 1: corruption at high levels, and so the FBI created this 548 00:32:10,160 --> 00:32:12,720 Speaker 1: white collar crime thing. One of the other things that 549 00:32:12,760 --> 00:32:18,280 Speaker 1: differentiates white collar crime from regular working class crime is 550 00:32:18,960 --> 00:32:24,080 Speaker 1: the police's ability to police it. You walk into a 551 00:32:24,160 --> 00:32:28,240 Speaker 1: room and there's some guy weighing out cocaine, he's a criminal. 552 00:32:29,000 --> 00:32:31,080 Speaker 1: You walk into a room and there's some guy on 553 00:32:31,120 --> 00:32:34,800 Speaker 1: a computer doing a pump and dump scheme. Who knows 554 00:32:35,640 --> 00:32:39,240 Speaker 1: that average cop isn't equipped to detect this kind of crime, 555 00:32:39,600 --> 00:32:41,440 Speaker 1: And as a matter of fact, even very very well 556 00:32:41,520 --> 00:32:45,280 Speaker 1: trained cops aren't typically equipped to detect this kind of crime. 557 00:32:45,440 --> 00:32:47,520 Speaker 1: One of the hallmarks of white collar crime is that 558 00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:50,560 Speaker 1: it's very difficult to prove. It's very difficult to uncover, 559 00:32:51,080 --> 00:32:55,280 Speaker 1: and it's also difficult to prosecute. Yeah, and there's no uh, 560 00:32:55,480 --> 00:32:57,800 Speaker 1: smoking gun, there's no paper trail, or there may be 561 00:32:57,880 --> 00:33:05,000 Speaker 1: a paper trail, but it's probably electronified. Sure, so it's 562 00:33:05,000 --> 00:33:06,960 Speaker 1: a little harder to follow. You gotta really, you know, 563 00:33:06,960 --> 00:33:08,960 Speaker 1: you gotta have people that know what they're doing. And 564 00:33:09,600 --> 00:33:12,440 Speaker 1: that's why the FBI created that division, and I guess 565 00:33:12,440 --> 00:33:15,760 Speaker 1: they're doing a good job, but it's kind of hard. Well, 566 00:33:15,760 --> 00:33:18,400 Speaker 1: the Justice Department has been going after white collar crime 567 00:33:18,680 --> 00:33:22,320 Speaker 1: lately under Obama pretty hard here there, um, and then 568 00:33:22,320 --> 00:33:26,840 Speaker 1: the Sarbanes Oxley Act definitely step things up and to 569 00:33:27,040 --> 00:33:29,800 Speaker 1: some say too much. Yeah, I mean, I've had to 570 00:33:29,880 --> 00:33:32,240 Speaker 1: comply with this at various uh when I worked in 571 00:33:32,280 --> 00:33:35,080 Speaker 1: the film as Is production companies had to, like it, 572 00:33:35,200 --> 00:33:38,160 Speaker 1: jump through way more hoops with paperwork because the Sarbanes 573 00:33:38,240 --> 00:33:41,440 Speaker 1: Oxley do you want to tell do you want to 574 00:33:41,440 --> 00:33:43,880 Speaker 1: tell them? Well, it's it was in two thousand two, 575 00:33:43,960 --> 00:33:48,120 Speaker 1: and it was to improve corporate governance, which is basically 576 00:33:48,160 --> 00:33:52,800 Speaker 1: accountability between corporation the stakeholders. What it amounted to was 577 00:33:52,920 --> 00:33:57,200 Speaker 1: a lot more paperwork, essentially, a lot more proving of 578 00:33:57,440 --> 00:34:00,959 Speaker 1: numbers and showing numbers and jumping through hoops. It was 579 00:34:01,600 --> 00:34:05,440 Speaker 1: a direct reaction from of the fallout of Enron, from 580 00:34:05,440 --> 00:34:07,680 Speaker 1: the fallout of Enron and Tycho and like all the 581 00:34:07,720 --> 00:34:11,160 Speaker 1: other companies around that time. UM. But one of the 582 00:34:11,160 --> 00:34:15,799 Speaker 1: other things that did chuckers was UM quadrupled sentences in 583 00:34:15,840 --> 00:34:18,440 Speaker 1: a lot of cases for white collar crime. So now 584 00:34:18,480 --> 00:34:20,640 Speaker 1: you have guys like Bernie made Off getting a hundred 585 00:34:20,680 --> 00:34:24,759 Speaker 1: and fifty years. There's a guy named Sholem Weiss who 586 00:34:24,920 --> 00:34:27,880 Speaker 1: was involved in like the breakup of some insurance company. 587 00:34:28,239 --> 00:34:32,000 Speaker 1: He got eight hundred and forty five years. He gets 588 00:34:32,000 --> 00:34:34,600 Speaker 1: out in twenty seven fifty four. I don't think he's 589 00:34:34,600 --> 00:34:36,239 Speaker 1: going to see that. I don't either, But I mean 590 00:34:36,360 --> 00:34:38,440 Speaker 1: a guy named rich Harkness got a hundred years for 591 00:34:38,480 --> 00:34:41,799 Speaker 1: a thirty nine million dollar ponzi scheme like these, and 592 00:34:41,880 --> 00:34:47,160 Speaker 1: all of this is like post Sarbanes Oxley, except Sholem Weiss, 593 00:34:47,440 --> 00:34:51,680 Speaker 1: which is really saying something. But but I mean, like, 594 00:34:51,760 --> 00:34:54,160 Speaker 1: so now now sentences are like quadruple. It's like, well, 595 00:34:54,200 --> 00:34:56,879 Speaker 1: wait a minute, maybe maybe this is a little too 596 00:34:56,960 --> 00:35:00,719 Speaker 1: much like just retribution on the rich. It is, and 597 00:35:01,400 --> 00:35:03,600 Speaker 1: that's kind of I think why a lot of people 598 00:35:03,640 --> 00:35:08,080 Speaker 1: are having a hard time feeling bad for ridiculously wealthy 599 00:35:08,160 --> 00:35:12,680 Speaker 1: people who were hucksters and frauds, or people who builked 600 00:35:12,719 --> 00:35:15,560 Speaker 1: people out of their retirement accounts. It's tough to feel 601 00:35:15,600 --> 00:35:17,960 Speaker 1: sorry for him. But legally speaking, it's like, well, wait 602 00:35:18,000 --> 00:35:20,319 Speaker 1: a minute, Um, you were worried about the guy who 603 00:35:20,360 --> 00:35:23,160 Speaker 1: stole a thousand dollars out of it till being treated 604 00:35:23,200 --> 00:35:25,120 Speaker 1: differently from the guy who stole a thousand dollars from 605 00:35:25,160 --> 00:35:29,000 Speaker 1: an investor. Now it's flip flopped. How is that any better? Exactly. 606 00:35:29,440 --> 00:35:32,080 Speaker 1: One of the arguments for these kind of things is 607 00:35:32,120 --> 00:35:36,800 Speaker 1: that these people are traditionally and historically have been treated 608 00:35:36,840 --> 00:35:41,680 Speaker 1: differently because they look like the judges that are sentencing them, 609 00:35:42,120 --> 00:35:45,080 Speaker 1: and so judges historically like really have taken it easy 610 00:35:45,120 --> 00:35:47,520 Speaker 1: on them. Um, let's go ahead and just call them 611 00:35:47,520 --> 00:35:52,160 Speaker 1: white dudes. Okay, but they also have been Um you 612 00:35:52,200 --> 00:35:55,000 Speaker 1: can make the case that they are usually first time offenders, 613 00:35:55,680 --> 00:35:59,480 Speaker 1: they're usually family people. Um. That's that's something that the 614 00:35:59,560 --> 00:36:01,839 Speaker 1: judges put out there like, well, this is a family man, 615 00:36:02,120 --> 00:36:04,600 Speaker 1: he's not much of a flight risk. He's probably never 616 00:36:04,600 --> 00:36:07,279 Speaker 1: going to do this again, as he had dangered a society. Yes, 617 00:36:07,320 --> 00:36:10,800 Speaker 1: he didn't use a weapon, which is a huge, huge differentiation, 618 00:36:11,160 --> 00:36:15,080 Speaker 1: and so sentences have typically typically been light. But um, 619 00:36:15,239 --> 00:36:17,400 Speaker 1: you can you can also kind of say, well, you 620 00:36:17,440 --> 00:36:19,760 Speaker 1: know where where it feels like we haven't quite felt 621 00:36:19,800 --> 00:36:23,680 Speaker 1: it out, like we've traditionally ignored white collar crime. Now 622 00:36:23,680 --> 00:36:26,560 Speaker 1: we're really sticking it to him. Well, it's that whole 623 00:36:26,640 --> 00:36:29,400 Speaker 1: argument with prison. Is it like punishment for a crime done? 624 00:36:29,520 --> 00:36:33,240 Speaker 1: Or is it rehabilitating a person who has a problem 625 00:36:33,400 --> 00:36:36,719 Speaker 1: with crime? Well, within eight hundred and forty five years sentence, 626 00:36:37,640 --> 00:36:41,359 Speaker 1: it's making an example out of that person because since 627 00:36:41,400 --> 00:36:44,360 Speaker 1: you can't police it, another way to prevent it is 628 00:36:44,760 --> 00:36:47,560 Speaker 1: to send a message through the courts like you do 629 00:36:47,600 --> 00:36:51,120 Speaker 1: this man, you're going to prison for a long time. Yeah. 630 00:36:51,160 --> 00:36:52,960 Speaker 1: I don't know if that's such a deterrent though for 631 00:36:53,040 --> 00:36:55,440 Speaker 1: some of these people. I don't know. I mean, I 632 00:36:55,480 --> 00:36:57,839 Speaker 1: think about it. Twenty years in a in a federal pen. 633 00:36:57,920 --> 00:37:01,640 Speaker 1: You say, club fed is not around any longer? Yeah, um, 634 00:37:01,680 --> 00:37:05,200 Speaker 1: And I mean this is like twenty actual years. Yeah. Um, 635 00:37:05,320 --> 00:37:09,640 Speaker 1: some guy named Thomas Petters recently got fifty years and 636 00:37:09,719 --> 00:37:12,320 Speaker 1: he will spend forty years in jail and he's fifty 637 00:37:12,320 --> 00:37:16,359 Speaker 1: two and he will probably die in prison. Now that's 638 00:37:16,360 --> 00:37:18,520 Speaker 1: a big deal with somebody who's like, well, maybe I 639 00:37:18,560 --> 00:37:21,560 Speaker 1: shouldn't do this insider train, Maybe I should let this 640 00:37:21,680 --> 00:37:24,239 Speaker 1: fifty grand just walk by because it's not really worth it. 641 00:37:24,320 --> 00:37:26,520 Speaker 1: Well something like that. I'm talking about the ones who 642 00:37:26,520 --> 00:37:29,280 Speaker 1: are getting rich by the tens of millions of dollars. 643 00:37:30,040 --> 00:37:32,759 Speaker 1: What I want to see is that these people don't 644 00:37:32,760 --> 00:37:36,320 Speaker 1: get out of prison and still have all those millions 645 00:37:36,320 --> 00:37:40,920 Speaker 1: of dollars like hidden in different foreign accounts and offshore 646 00:37:41,040 --> 00:37:45,600 Speaker 1: islands and uh like, the financial part is what really 647 00:37:45,640 --> 00:37:47,399 Speaker 1: bugs me. I meant to I didn't get a chance 648 00:37:47,440 --> 00:37:48,719 Speaker 1: that I meant to look up and see if any 649 00:37:48,719 --> 00:37:53,040 Speaker 1: of the en Ron victims and employees were ever repaid 650 00:37:53,200 --> 00:37:56,359 Speaker 1: or if they were just s O L. I'm under 651 00:37:56,400 --> 00:37:58,800 Speaker 1: the distinct impression they were s O L really, because 652 00:37:58,840 --> 00:38:01,520 Speaker 1: the company was in such bad shape that even dissolving 653 00:38:01,560 --> 00:38:05,879 Speaker 1: it and I think I think they some people did 654 00:38:05,920 --> 00:38:08,760 Speaker 1: get some money, but I don't think it was anything 655 00:38:08,800 --> 00:38:11,800 Speaker 1: approaching what they lost. Well, if whoever commits these crimes 656 00:38:11,800 --> 00:38:13,719 Speaker 1: gets out of jail and they have two pennies to 657 00:38:13,760 --> 00:38:17,279 Speaker 1: rub together. Then those two pennies more than they should have. 658 00:38:17,400 --> 00:38:19,520 Speaker 1: I think, well, that's the thing. Like, so the government 659 00:38:19,600 --> 00:38:22,600 Speaker 1: started prosecuting under the Rico Act, which is the same 660 00:38:22,640 --> 00:38:26,719 Speaker 1: thing they bust up mafia organizations with UM and they've 661 00:38:26,760 --> 00:38:28,800 Speaker 1: been fighting white collar crime with that. And one of 662 00:38:28,840 --> 00:38:32,400 Speaker 1: the things about the Rico Acts it allows states and 663 00:38:32,600 --> 00:38:35,760 Speaker 1: individuals who are harmed to sue for up to three 664 00:38:35,760 --> 00:38:38,600 Speaker 1: times the damages. Yeah, but even then, all they have 665 00:38:38,680 --> 00:38:40,319 Speaker 1: to do is say, yeah, I don't have that money. 666 00:38:40,400 --> 00:38:42,799 Speaker 1: You kid me. Well, it's true, I can't pay it. No, 667 00:38:42,960 --> 00:38:45,360 Speaker 1: it's true. But like UM, in the made off case, 668 00:38:45,440 --> 00:38:48,840 Speaker 1: the guy who's who was assigned to basically get money 669 00:38:48,880 --> 00:38:52,439 Speaker 1: back for investors has gotten I don't remember how much 670 00:38:52,520 --> 00:38:54,560 Speaker 1: made off least, but let's say it was eight billion. 671 00:38:54,960 --> 00:38:58,279 Speaker 1: The guys managed to like get like six billion back. Yeah, 672 00:38:58,280 --> 00:39:01,120 Speaker 1: he's done a really good job of getting the money back. 673 00:39:01,200 --> 00:39:03,800 Speaker 1: And that's just a that's that's an example. It's not 674 00:39:03,840 --> 00:39:07,319 Speaker 1: a figure, but it's it's something pretty significant. You're still 675 00:39:07,320 --> 00:39:11,040 Speaker 1: gonna get email. I'm looking forward to the ones where 676 00:39:11,040 --> 00:39:13,319 Speaker 1: it's like Hey man, we don't listen to you for 677 00:39:13,360 --> 00:39:18,040 Speaker 1: free to hear your opinion about class. All right, let's 678 00:39:18,080 --> 00:39:20,520 Speaker 1: move on to other countries. Um, things are different all 679 00:39:20,560 --> 00:39:24,080 Speaker 1: over the world. UM. Obviously when it comes to big 680 00:39:24,120 --> 00:39:29,400 Speaker 1: business and business dealons. Uh. Western Europe has followed right 681 00:39:29,440 --> 00:39:33,480 Speaker 1: behind the US, UH most wholeheartedly with laws to prevent corruption. 682 00:39:33,880 --> 00:39:37,160 Speaker 1: Eastern Europe it's coming on board a little slower, um. 683 00:39:37,200 --> 00:39:40,400 Speaker 1: But then you go into other countries like in Western Africa, 684 00:39:40,520 --> 00:39:44,759 Speaker 1: and it may be customary to Greece palms to get 685 00:39:44,760 --> 00:39:47,560 Speaker 1: a deal going, or in India where apparently if you're 686 00:39:47,560 --> 00:39:50,239 Speaker 1: a truck driver, you're gonna have to bribe people to 687 00:39:50,360 --> 00:39:52,440 Speaker 1: keep your rig on the road. And that's just how 688 00:39:52,440 --> 00:39:55,120 Speaker 1: it is there, right, And not only is it customary, 689 00:39:55,160 --> 00:40:00,080 Speaker 1: it's frequently legal. Yeah. Russia, Yeah, bribes all over the A. 690 00:40:00,120 --> 00:40:01,600 Speaker 1: So you want to land contract, you might have to 691 00:40:01,640 --> 00:40:05,279 Speaker 1: bribe somebody. So if you're a multinational corporation, it's tough 692 00:40:05,320 --> 00:40:09,080 Speaker 1: to do that's headquartered in America. Yeah, you have like 693 00:40:09,120 --> 00:40:11,640 Speaker 1: a real problem facing you, especially, like I said, the 694 00:40:11,760 --> 00:40:15,560 Speaker 1: UM Justice Department under Obama has been prosecuting white color 695 00:40:15,640 --> 00:40:19,759 Speaker 1: crimes and going big time after UM people. Under the 696 00:40:20,080 --> 00:40:23,520 Speaker 1: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which says, if you're an American company, 697 00:40:23,560 --> 00:40:26,120 Speaker 1: you can't engage in bribes, even if it's legal in 698 00:40:26,160 --> 00:40:30,960 Speaker 1: that country. Yeah, but what's the point, like, why hamstring 699 00:40:31,000 --> 00:40:37,800 Speaker 1: American business abroad? Exactly? Um? And to help this out, actually, 700 00:40:38,440 --> 00:40:42,280 Speaker 1: there has been a unified committee called the UM company 701 00:40:42,360 --> 00:40:46,400 Speaker 1: I'm sorry, committee called Transparency International, and they are out 702 00:40:46,480 --> 00:40:50,880 Speaker 1: to get rid of corruption and to unify business business 703 00:40:50,880 --> 00:40:53,319 Speaker 1: ethics all over the world. Right, And that's the that's 704 00:40:53,360 --> 00:40:57,480 Speaker 1: the reason that you hamstring American business because it's basically saying, hey, uh, 705 00:40:57,560 --> 00:40:59,920 Speaker 1: we can take the hit in the hopes of pressing 706 00:41:00,000 --> 00:41:01,880 Speaker 1: the rest of the world into the same clean up 707 00:41:01,880 --> 00:41:06,120 Speaker 1: their act. Competitive laws we have here in the States 708 00:41:06,320 --> 00:41:11,600 Speaker 1: that work very well, So good luck to them. Yeah 709 00:41:11,640 --> 00:41:14,240 Speaker 1: that's it, man, I got nothing else. No, we should 710 00:41:14,400 --> 00:41:17,760 Speaker 1: we should play this one out with um tucking heads 711 00:41:17,800 --> 00:41:23,040 Speaker 1: big business agreed, Okay, Um, so chuck, let's see. Uh. 712 00:41:23,239 --> 00:41:25,880 Speaker 1: If people want to learn more about white collar crime, 713 00:41:26,280 --> 00:41:29,600 Speaker 1: I would strongly advise them to go read this article 714 00:41:29,600 --> 00:41:32,520 Speaker 1: by Jaye McGrath. People with John and there's a Simpsons 715 00:41:32,560 --> 00:41:34,840 Speaker 1: reference in it. It's a way to go Jane. UM. 716 00:41:34,920 --> 00:41:37,640 Speaker 1: You can type in white collar crime in the search 717 00:41:37,680 --> 00:41:40,720 Speaker 1: bar how stuff works dot com? Which friend oh brings 718 00:41:40,800 --> 00:41:46,520 Speaker 1: up listener mail. That's right, Josh, I'm gonna call this 719 00:41:46,760 --> 00:41:50,759 Speaker 1: uh hot off the press is good cause I'm gonna 720 00:41:50,760 --> 00:41:53,520 Speaker 1: sucker with that stuff. Okay, Chuck and Josh and Jerry. 721 00:41:53,480 --> 00:41:54,800 Speaker 1: I want to say thank you for all the hours 722 00:41:54,800 --> 00:41:58,040 Speaker 1: of listening. My brother Chase and I've been listeners nearly 723 00:41:58,080 --> 00:42:00,560 Speaker 1: as long because you have been making them. There was 724 00:42:00,600 --> 00:42:03,360 Speaker 1: even one year's day where all we would do was 725 00:42:03,440 --> 00:42:07,839 Speaker 1: listen to your Hangover podcast on repeat. I don't he's 726 00:42:07,920 --> 00:42:11,279 Speaker 1: I don't know if that's good for hangover. Uh. It's 727 00:42:11,280 --> 00:42:13,680 Speaker 1: funny and informative, and I always feel like calling my 728 00:42:13,719 --> 00:42:16,520 Speaker 1: brother after listening to the latest episode. I'm writing you 729 00:42:16,560 --> 00:42:19,640 Speaker 1: because it's recently his birthday. He's the best brother in 730 00:42:19,640 --> 00:42:22,839 Speaker 1: the world and downright awesome human being. It would mean 731 00:42:22,840 --> 00:42:25,000 Speaker 1: a lot to me if you could tell the stuff 732 00:42:25,040 --> 00:42:27,880 Speaker 1: you should know listeners about his latest project. When his 733 00:42:27,920 --> 00:42:31,160 Speaker 1: friend Jim survived cancer, he told Chase that he gained 734 00:42:31,200 --> 00:42:34,839 Speaker 1: strength in the music he loved over two years, two 735 00:42:34,880 --> 00:42:40,960 Speaker 1: hundred twenty six hundred tracks, two hundred tracks. It's a 736 00:42:41,000 --> 00:42:45,719 Speaker 1: weird way to put it. What would that bed? Would 737 00:42:45,760 --> 00:42:52,799 Speaker 1: that be wait how many two D yeah would it? 738 00:42:53,239 --> 00:43:01,880 Speaker 1: Or D no plus two hundred d Nearly two hundred 739 00:43:02,000 --> 00:43:08,000 Speaker 1: artists persons insane, No, she's not over two years two 740 00:43:08,840 --> 00:43:11,960 Speaker 1: hundred tracks nearly two hundred artists from other countries all 741 00:43:11,960 --> 00:43:14,320 Speaker 1: over the world have allowed them to share that message. 742 00:43:14,960 --> 00:43:19,560 Speaker 1: They are releasing their second compilation disc Electronic Saviors colon 743 00:43:20,080 --> 00:43:24,400 Speaker 1: Industrial Music to Cure cancer. So it's these artists compilations 744 00:43:24,400 --> 00:43:29,920 Speaker 1: are putting together apparently two tracks. Uh. They are a 745 00:43:30,000 --> 00:43:34,160 Speaker 1: registered US charity and all proceeds go to cancer research. 746 00:43:34,760 --> 00:43:37,799 Speaker 1: And if you want if you're into electronic music and 747 00:43:38,360 --> 00:43:41,400 Speaker 1: if you want to support cancer research, you can go 748 00:43:41,440 --> 00:43:46,960 Speaker 1: to www dot Electronic Saviors dot com. And that is 749 00:43:47,000 --> 00:43:49,400 Speaker 1: something Chase has got going and his sister Laura Dudley 750 00:43:50,239 --> 00:43:53,280 Speaker 1: uh is a big fan of her bro He sounds 751 00:43:53,280 --> 00:43:59,279 Speaker 1: like a swell guy. I'm all for it. Cancer. Had 752 00:43:59,280 --> 00:44:02,319 Speaker 1: to promoted your cause, chuckers. We try to do that. 753 00:44:02,400 --> 00:44:05,960 Speaker 1: You did good. Um. Yeah, we always want to hear 754 00:44:05,960 --> 00:44:09,560 Speaker 1: about good causes, so you can get in touch with us, 755 00:44:09,800 --> 00:44:11,800 Speaker 1: let us know about yours. We'll try our best to 756 00:44:11,880 --> 00:44:13,960 Speaker 1: let everybody else know about it, especially if people can 757 00:44:14,000 --> 00:44:17,720 Speaker 1: support it. Agreed. Um, let's see also enjoy a little 758 00:44:17,760 --> 00:44:21,480 Speaker 1: Talking Heads Big Business from the live album Stop Making 759 00:44:21,560 --> 00:44:26,200 Speaker 1: Sense released. We're sure it's up on iTunes, Amazon and elsewhere. Um. 760 00:44:26,400 --> 00:44:28,279 Speaker 1: You can get in touch with us at s y 761 00:44:28,400 --> 00:44:31,200 Speaker 1: s K podcast on Twitter, uh, you can go to 762 00:44:31,239 --> 00:44:34,440 Speaker 1: Facebook dot com slash Stuff you Should Know, and you 763 00:44:34,480 --> 00:44:38,280 Speaker 1: can send us a regular old email to stuff podcast 764 00:44:38,320 --> 00:44:41,520 Speaker 1: at how stuff Works dot com and as always, join 765 00:44:41,640 --> 00:44:43,880 Speaker 1: us at our home on the web Stuff you Should 766 00:44:43,880 --> 00:44:48,880 Speaker 1: Know dot com. Stuff you Should Know is a production 767 00:44:48,920 --> 00:44:51,640 Speaker 1: of iHeart Radio's How Stuff Works. For more podcasts for 768 00:44:51,680 --> 00:44:54,440 Speaker 1: my heart Radio is at the iHeart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, 769 00:44:54,560 --> 00:45:00,279 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows. Zero