1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:02,840 Speaker 1: It's the moment that many fed up workers wait for, 2 00:00:03,080 --> 00:00:06,280 Speaker 1: even dream of quitting their job. That's why it's part 3 00:00:06,280 --> 00:00:09,680 Speaker 1: of so many movies like the appropriately entitled two Weeks 4 00:00:09,720 --> 00:00:14,440 Speaker 1: Notice with Sandra Bullock. I'm representing the weight organizations that 5 00:00:14,480 --> 00:00:20,320 Speaker 1: includes you not anymore, George, Sorry, you got Island Towers. 6 00:00:20,480 --> 00:00:22,640 Speaker 1: I got Coney Island. Why don't we just call it quits? Okay, 7 00:00:22,680 --> 00:00:25,640 Speaker 1: I can't take it anymore? What are you serious? Yes, 8 00:00:26,200 --> 00:00:29,280 Speaker 1: please consider this my two weeks notice. But this American 9 00:00:29,400 --> 00:00:31,920 Speaker 1: dream of leaving a bad job or just moving on 10 00:00:31,960 --> 00:00:34,480 Speaker 1: to a job in the same industry with better pay 11 00:00:34,640 --> 00:00:37,879 Speaker 1: or a better position is being crushed in some states 12 00:00:37,960 --> 00:00:41,520 Speaker 1: for workers at all levels. Idaho is known for its potatoes, 13 00:00:41,520 --> 00:00:43,360 Speaker 1: but it may become known as one of the hardest 14 00:00:43,400 --> 00:00:46,640 Speaker 1: places in the country to achieve that American dream. It 15 00:00:46,720 --> 00:00:49,760 Speaker 1: has the toughest law in the country stopping employees from 16 00:00:49,840 --> 00:00:52,720 Speaker 1: leaving their company to work for a competitor, and it 17 00:00:52,840 --> 00:00:56,760 Speaker 1: all revolves around what's known as a non compete clause. 18 00:00:57,200 --> 00:01:00,320 Speaker 1: Here to discuss the saga of the non compete laws 19 00:01:00,360 --> 00:01:03,640 Speaker 1: across the country are Michael Selm, a professor at George 20 00:01:03,640 --> 00:01:07,960 Speaker 1: Washington University Law School, and Matt Marks, a professor at 21 00:01:07,959 --> 00:01:13,080 Speaker 1: the Boston University Questroom School of Business. Michael, let's start 22 00:01:13,120 --> 00:01:16,520 Speaker 1: by talking about the non compete clause, which was once 23 00:01:16,720 --> 00:01:20,160 Speaker 1: only for senior executives, and now it's filtered down to 24 00:01:20,920 --> 00:01:24,240 Speaker 1: contracts for blue collar workers. Tell us what it is 25 00:01:24,280 --> 00:01:27,920 Speaker 1: and what it does. Yes, that's right. Uh. There has 26 00:01:27,959 --> 00:01:31,480 Speaker 1: been a proliferation of non compete agreements and all kinds 27 00:01:31,480 --> 00:01:35,560 Speaker 1: of jobs. Perhaps most famously a few years ago became 28 00:01:35,560 --> 00:01:39,040 Speaker 1: notorious that Jimmy John's required a two year non compete 29 00:01:39,040 --> 00:01:42,319 Speaker 1: clause for their sandwich makers. UM and that was has 30 00:01:42,319 --> 00:01:46,000 Speaker 1: subsequently been challenged and UH and that brought a lot 31 00:01:46,000 --> 00:01:50,040 Speaker 1: of attention to the growth of non competes. Non compete 32 00:01:50,040 --> 00:01:55,760 Speaker 1: clauses typically require UH an employee to refrain from working 33 00:01:55,840 --> 00:01:59,080 Speaker 1: for a competitor, although that can be defined in any 34 00:01:59,160 --> 00:02:02,360 Speaker 1: number of ways, UM, for some period of time after 35 00:02:02,480 --> 00:02:06,680 Speaker 1: they stopped their employment. UH. Usually the agreements are anywhere 36 00:02:06,680 --> 00:02:08,840 Speaker 1: from a year to two years. Sometimes they're longer, and 37 00:02:08,880 --> 00:02:13,519 Speaker 1: occasionally they are shorter. UH and these agreements can pose 38 00:02:13,600 --> 00:02:17,280 Speaker 1: significant restrictions on employees mobility UH and they have also 39 00:02:17,360 --> 00:02:21,880 Speaker 1: led to considerable litigation over the last few years. Matt 40 00:02:22,160 --> 00:02:26,240 Speaker 1: why did Idaho past this strict law and how strict 41 00:02:26,320 --> 00:02:32,000 Speaker 1: is it? Well? I think that existing corporations, whether they 42 00:02:32,040 --> 00:02:36,040 Speaker 1: be large or small, are interested in retaining their employees. Um. 43 00:02:36,080 --> 00:02:38,080 Speaker 1: They like to avoid the situation that you saw in 44 00:02:38,120 --> 00:02:42,000 Speaker 1: the movie where employee suddenly decides to leave, because then 45 00:02:42,000 --> 00:02:43,960 Speaker 1: they have to rehire the person and they have to 46 00:02:44,960 --> 00:02:48,919 Speaker 1: have to replace the person and so UM. In many states, 47 00:02:49,480 --> 00:02:54,840 Speaker 1: existing companies, especially large companies, lobby hard to keep existing 48 00:02:55,320 --> 00:02:58,680 Speaker 1: laws on the books, such as happened in Massachusetts, and 49 00:02:58,720 --> 00:03:01,000 Speaker 1: also to strengthen existing law. And I think that's what 50 00:03:01,080 --> 00:03:03,720 Speaker 1: you saw in Idaho, and you've seen that also in 51 00:03:03,800 --> 00:03:08,560 Speaker 1: other states. Uh. Through the years, there have been several changes, um, 52 00:03:08,680 --> 00:03:11,760 Speaker 1: where companies have said, no, we want stronger enforcement. We 53 00:03:11,800 --> 00:03:15,000 Speaker 1: want to be able to keep people from not just 54 00:03:15,080 --> 00:03:17,360 Speaker 1: from leaving, but especially want to keep them from going 55 00:03:17,440 --> 00:03:23,080 Speaker 1: and working in the same industry. Uh. Michael, With the 56 00:03:23,080 --> 00:03:27,720 Speaker 1: Idaho law, you tell me about what makes it stricter 57 00:03:27,800 --> 00:03:33,000 Speaker 1: than other laws. How it puts the burden on the worker. Yes, Um. 58 00:03:34,040 --> 00:03:40,400 Speaker 1: In when that the clauses are challenged, usually by an employee. 59 00:03:41,240 --> 00:03:44,960 Speaker 1: In most jurisdictions, the employer has the burden to establish 60 00:03:45,080 --> 00:03:47,800 Speaker 1: that the agreement is reasonable, sort of broadly defined, and 61 00:03:47,840 --> 00:03:51,600 Speaker 1: that's reasonable in the length of time, its scope, in 62 00:03:51,720 --> 00:03:56,200 Speaker 1: terms of where would apply, and also courts ensure that 63 00:03:56,280 --> 00:03:58,920 Speaker 1: it was designed to serve a legitimate business purpose. It's 64 00:03:59,640 --> 00:04:03,680 Speaker 1: tradition not a legitimate purpose to have a restrictive covenants 65 00:04:03,680 --> 00:04:06,960 Speaker 1: simply to keep an employee. The best way of keeping 66 00:04:07,000 --> 00:04:09,160 Speaker 1: good employees, obviously is to pay them work or to 67 00:04:09,200 --> 00:04:13,760 Speaker 1: treat them. What the Iowa law doesn't I will leave. 68 00:04:14,160 --> 00:04:17,440 Speaker 1: Alabama has recently done the same or similar is it 69 00:04:17,560 --> 00:04:22,800 Speaker 1: reverses the presumption. So in Idaho UH certain employees they're 70 00:04:22,800 --> 00:04:25,680 Speaker 1: defined as key employees, so wouldn't apply to all the employees, 71 00:04:26,080 --> 00:04:29,320 Speaker 1: would be required to prove that they're leading would not 72 00:04:29,440 --> 00:04:32,640 Speaker 1: hurt the employer. Um. That's an incredibly high burden for 73 00:04:32,680 --> 00:04:36,200 Speaker 1: an employee to meet, and quite different from most every 74 00:04:36,240 --> 00:04:40,880 Speaker 1: other jurisdiction in the country. Matt. Do all workers know 75 00:04:41,040 --> 00:04:44,120 Speaker 1: that they're signing this clause? Is it explained? Do they 76 00:04:44,120 --> 00:04:47,680 Speaker 1: have time to look at it? That's actually one of 77 00:04:47,720 --> 00:04:51,680 Speaker 1: the little known facets of these contracts. So I did 78 00:04:51,680 --> 00:04:55,760 Speaker 1: a survey a few years ago where i'd UH survey 79 00:04:55,839 --> 00:05:00,200 Speaker 1: thousands of workers in technology fields, engineering fields, and one 80 00:05:00,240 --> 00:05:02,440 Speaker 1: of the questions I asked them was when were you 81 00:05:02,480 --> 00:05:04,920 Speaker 1: asked to sign this noncompete? What did you know you'd 82 00:05:04,960 --> 00:05:08,719 Speaker 1: have to sign? And barely of them knew about it 83 00:05:08,760 --> 00:05:11,799 Speaker 1: at the time they were signing their job offer. For 84 00:05:11,920 --> 00:05:16,279 Speaker 1: the vast majority, it was after that, often their first 85 00:05:16,360 --> 00:05:18,600 Speaker 1: day of work, or even after they had started the job. 86 00:05:18,960 --> 00:05:21,280 Speaker 1: As one person said, I showed up the first day 87 00:05:21,279 --> 00:05:26,280 Speaker 1: and they said sign all this stuff direct deposit healthcare 88 00:05:26,480 --> 00:05:29,560 Speaker 1: noncompete and they would look at it and say, what's this. 89 00:05:30,279 --> 00:05:32,520 Speaker 1: The company would say, oh, well, that's just just sign 90 00:05:32,520 --> 00:05:35,880 Speaker 1: it and uh. And they really didn't have a chance, 91 00:05:35,920 --> 00:05:39,839 Speaker 1: and it was presented as a non negotiable uh, part 92 00:05:39,880 --> 00:05:42,719 Speaker 1: of working at the company, And so it's it's it's 93 00:05:42,760 --> 00:05:45,240 Speaker 1: not really a negotiation, it's more of an ambush in 94 00:05:45,320 --> 00:05:49,640 Speaker 1: most cases. I'm talking about noncompete clauses being on the 95 00:05:49,800 --> 00:05:52,880 Speaker 1: rise and the effect on the workforce. With Michael Selmy, 96 00:05:53,080 --> 00:05:57,240 Speaker 1: a professor at George Washington University Law School, and that Marks, 97 00:05:57,279 --> 00:06:02,440 Speaker 1: a professor at Boston University, questions of business Matt, I 98 00:06:02,480 --> 00:06:06,200 Speaker 1: can understand how these non competes are good for a company, 99 00:06:06,240 --> 00:06:10,239 Speaker 1: but what about the worker? What's the impetus then for 100 00:06:10,360 --> 00:06:14,960 Speaker 1: giving them raises, and what about the expertise the employee 101 00:06:14,960 --> 00:06:19,159 Speaker 1: has gained, is that now belong to the company. In fact, 102 00:06:19,200 --> 00:06:21,360 Speaker 1: it does. In fact the way to think about non 103 00:06:21,400 --> 00:06:24,320 Speaker 1: competes as they're kind of like a time machine because 104 00:06:25,360 --> 00:06:28,320 Speaker 1: when when you sign a noncompete, you promised not to 105 00:06:28,400 --> 00:06:31,400 Speaker 1: work in the same industry or for a competitor after leaving, 106 00:06:32,000 --> 00:06:35,080 Speaker 1: and it doesn't. And it's not just protecting anything you 107 00:06:35,160 --> 00:06:38,640 Speaker 1: learned at that company, it's protecting all the relevant skills 108 00:06:38,640 --> 00:06:42,080 Speaker 1: that you had, whether from that company, from previous jobs, 109 00:06:42,120 --> 00:06:45,159 Speaker 1: even things you learned in college. It really shuts you 110 00:06:45,240 --> 00:06:49,400 Speaker 1: off from using that expertise. And it affects especially people 111 00:06:49,440 --> 00:06:52,359 Speaker 1: who have very specialized skills, because it's very hard for 112 00:06:52,400 --> 00:06:56,719 Speaker 1: them to find another job unless it's at arrival. And 113 00:06:56,960 --> 00:06:59,120 Speaker 1: to the first part of your question, it can affect 114 00:06:59,160 --> 00:07:01,760 Speaker 1: earnings as well, because when there's less of a market, 115 00:07:02,320 --> 00:07:05,280 Speaker 1: you're not free to explore other interest in your in 116 00:07:05,320 --> 00:07:08,919 Speaker 1: your in your skills, and so you're basically tied to 117 00:07:08,960 --> 00:07:11,120 Speaker 1: the company. And when there's less of a risk of 118 00:07:11,160 --> 00:07:14,640 Speaker 1: you leaving, there's the company doesn't need to pay as much, 119 00:07:14,800 --> 00:07:17,720 Speaker 1: is not worried about you uh leaving for for somewhere 120 00:07:17,720 --> 00:07:22,360 Speaker 1: else and Michael, are lawsuits on these non competes on 121 00:07:22,440 --> 00:07:27,000 Speaker 1: the rise then? Or are they too expensive laws? Why? 122 00:07:27,080 --> 00:07:30,480 Speaker 1: Get The answer to those questions are yes to both. Actually, 123 00:07:31,000 --> 00:07:34,320 Speaker 1: lawsuits are on the rise. There's been a substantial increase 124 00:07:34,320 --> 00:07:38,840 Speaker 1: in litigation over noncompete clauses, and my impression in terms 125 00:07:38,840 --> 00:07:41,160 Speaker 1: of reading the cases is that there is a trend 126 00:07:41,600 --> 00:07:44,840 Speaker 1: towards striking them down in the courts. Courts have become 127 00:07:45,200 --> 00:07:47,840 Speaker 1: quite skeptical of the breadth of a lot of the 128 00:07:48,040 --> 00:07:51,400 Speaker 1: non compete clauses. But your second question whether they're too 129 00:07:51,400 --> 00:07:54,560 Speaker 1: expensive is also true, so that it's actually only a 130 00:07:54,640 --> 00:07:58,640 Speaker 1: limited group of employees who are able to challenge the 131 00:07:58,680 --> 00:08:03,800 Speaker 1: agreement's usually high level executives. UH and oftentimes the litigation 132 00:08:03,880 --> 00:08:07,400 Speaker 1: is funded by the potential new employer as well, so 133 00:08:07,560 --> 00:08:11,360 Speaker 1: most employees are unable to challenge them. And I always 134 00:08:11,360 --> 00:08:13,840 Speaker 1: recall when I teach employment law at the law school, 135 00:08:13,880 --> 00:08:15,680 Speaker 1: there's always somebody who comes up to me and says 136 00:08:15,720 --> 00:08:17,800 Speaker 1: that they went to law school because they had a 137 00:08:17,840 --> 00:08:21,800 Speaker 1: restrictive covenant that prevented them from moving to a different job. Um, 138 00:08:22,000 --> 00:08:23,840 Speaker 1: And I never know whether that turns out to be 139 00:08:23,880 --> 00:08:26,480 Speaker 1: a good thing for them or not, but most employees 140 00:08:27,080 --> 00:08:30,720 Speaker 1: are unable to challenge them, and they don't realize that 141 00:08:30,720 --> 00:08:35,559 Speaker 1: they could challenge them now, Matt, Matt, there are some states. 142 00:08:35,840 --> 00:08:40,479 Speaker 1: California is one where it just you cannot have any noncompetes. 143 00:08:40,600 --> 00:08:45,480 Speaker 1: Are there other other states like California? UM, North Dakota 144 00:08:45,520 --> 00:08:48,600 Speaker 1: is very much like California, And there are many states 145 00:08:48,600 --> 00:08:52,320 Speaker 1: with restrictions on non competes. Many of those have evolved. 146 00:08:52,400 --> 00:08:56,200 Speaker 1: For example, UM in two thousand eight Oregon said, Oregon 147 00:08:56,280 --> 00:08:59,400 Speaker 1: tackled this notice question, but they said, if you're going 148 00:08:59,440 --> 00:09:02,280 Speaker 1: to have a really sign a noncompete, you have to 149 00:09:02,320 --> 00:09:04,880 Speaker 1: tell them when you offer them the job. There's son 150 00:09:04,920 --> 00:09:08,120 Speaker 1: of this ambush after the fact in New Hampshire did 151 00:09:08,160 --> 00:09:12,680 Speaker 1: the same thing in So there are restrictions in different states, 152 00:09:12,920 --> 00:09:16,640 Speaker 1: but I think California is the sharpest example of the 153 00:09:16,679 --> 00:09:20,920 Speaker 1: state that just says you can't use these contracts in 154 00:09:21,280 --> 00:09:25,640 Speaker 1: challenging the law itself, Michael, would there be a challenge 155 00:09:25,720 --> 00:09:29,560 Speaker 1: to the law in in in a federal court and 156 00:09:29,600 --> 00:09:33,480 Speaker 1: then an appellate court to these very strict noncompetes that 157 00:09:33,600 --> 00:09:37,480 Speaker 1: prevent you from you know, working for years or longer 158 00:09:37,960 --> 00:09:42,040 Speaker 1: in in your field. Yes, So, the challenges UM. They 159 00:09:42,080 --> 00:09:46,040 Speaker 1: typically rise in state courts under the varied state laws 160 00:09:46,679 --> 00:09:51,040 Speaker 1: UH and UH they seek to strike down the agreements 161 00:09:51,040 --> 00:09:54,679 Speaker 1: as applied to a particular individually to typically don't UM 162 00:09:55,200 --> 00:09:58,120 Speaker 1: apply to all the individuals in a company when they 163 00:09:58,120 --> 00:10:01,199 Speaker 1: are challenged UM. And one of the things that that 164 00:10:01,520 --> 00:10:04,040 Speaker 1: works on the employer's favors in the litigation is that 165 00:10:04,080 --> 00:10:07,920 Speaker 1: the litigation can take UH some time. Oftentimes the litigation 166 00:10:07,960 --> 00:10:10,480 Speaker 1: might even take a year at the same time that 167 00:10:10,559 --> 00:10:12,520 Speaker 1: the restrict of covenant might be in place. And so 168 00:10:12,600 --> 00:10:15,800 Speaker 1: even if the agreement has struck down the simple time, 169 00:10:16,120 --> 00:10:18,720 Speaker 1: the length of time that the litigation takes conserve the 170 00:10:18,760 --> 00:10:23,400 Speaker 1: same purpose for an employer. Finally, Matt, what is there 171 00:10:23,480 --> 00:10:26,480 Speaker 1: to do if you're if you're an employee and someone 172 00:10:26,800 --> 00:10:29,160 Speaker 1: puts this in front of you, is there is there 173 00:10:29,200 --> 00:10:33,120 Speaker 1: any negotiating around this? If they want you enough? Well, 174 00:10:33,160 --> 00:10:36,920 Speaker 1: I think the thing to do is to ask before 175 00:10:37,040 --> 00:10:39,880 Speaker 1: you sign your offer letter, because once you sign the 176 00:10:40,000 --> 00:10:43,320 Speaker 1: job offer, you have lost your your leverage. You to 177 00:10:43,320 --> 00:10:45,839 Speaker 1: find out in advance is this company going to ask 178 00:10:45,880 --> 00:10:49,800 Speaker 1: me to commit not to work for arrival afterwards? And 179 00:10:49,920 --> 00:10:51,960 Speaker 1: because that's when you can negotiate, you can say well, 180 00:10:52,000 --> 00:10:55,960 Speaker 1: this other company isn't asking for a noncompete, or I 181 00:10:56,040 --> 00:10:59,439 Speaker 1: have another job offer in California and I'll just go there. 182 00:11:00,120 --> 00:11:02,680 Speaker 1: If you insist on me signing a non compete, you've 183 00:11:02,720 --> 00:11:06,080 Speaker 1: got to negotiate before you sign. Thank you both for 184 00:11:06,160 --> 00:11:09,160 Speaker 1: being on Bloomberg Law and it's it's such an incredibly 185 00:11:09,200 --> 00:11:13,199 Speaker 1: interesting topic. That's Matt Marks and Michael sell Me. Thank 186 00:11:13,240 --> 00:11:13,640 Speaker 1: you both,