Speaker 1: Well, as you mentioned, the party Congress is underway on
Speaker 1: the mainland and a new title for Chinese president she
Speaker 1: is raising concerns of a Mad Jung style policy cult.
Speaker 1: Joining us for a closer look is Jenny marsh Bloomberg,
Speaker 1: Greater China Editor for the Government Team. Jenny, thanks so
Speaker 1: much for being with us. The title, but I think
Speaker 1: it's fair to say any title bestowed on the head
Speaker 1: of our government conveys volumes. What are we talking about
Speaker 1: in the case of she, Well, that's right, you know,
Speaker 1: and she's deeping as someone who was famously accumulated so
Speaker 1: many titles during his presidency so far that he's been
Speaker 1: called the chairman of everything. But this one has a
Speaker 1: particular weight because it's only been used previously in relation
Speaker 1: to Mauzadong. So I think, you know, coming at this
Speaker 1: critical time where she is sort of dismantling succession norms
Speaker 1: and going for this third term in power, speaking fears
Speaker 1: that you know, in fact, he might say in power indefinitely,
Speaker 1: taking this sort of title associated with now is really
Speaker 1: worrying some some within China. You know, China is being
Speaker 1: rolled back to the era of personality cult which the
Speaker 1: party kind of vowed never to roll back to after
Speaker 1: Mail died and sort of pledged to have this system
Speaker 1: of collective leadership. So you know, there's a lot of
Speaker 1: sensitivity around this particular name. So to that point, I mean,
Speaker 1: is there a consensus here on bestowing him with this
Speaker 1: with this new title. We've seen two members of the
Speaker 1: Politbureros that's China sort of top twenty five member decision
Speaker 1: making body use it during the Congress so far um,
Speaker 1: and it was also used in a cc d I
Speaker 1: briefing at the previous weekend. So we're seeing high profile
Speaker 1: party leaders now use the term. So you know, we'll
Speaker 1: be watching out to see if we see the Standing Committee,
Speaker 1: for example, UM, this kind of the Supreme Um rulemaking
Speaker 1: body in Hong Kong, China, sorry, use that term as well.
Speaker 1: We're not expecting it to appear in an official document
Speaker 1: like the party charter, So there isn't like we're going
Speaker 1: to see this kind of like baked in to the
Speaker 1: Communist Party sort of official documents. It's much more about
Speaker 1: kind of consensus and the feeling around she so a
Speaker 1: little more subtlety, But in doing so, is there any
Speaker 1: type of risk that he is taking on when he
Speaker 1: when he chooses to embrace this, I think I think
Speaker 1: there absolutely is. I mean, last week in Beijing there
Speaker 1: was this kind of very rare protest, whether it's loan
Speaker 1: loan protus a drape to sign over a prominent bridge
Speaker 1: in Beijing, and one of the things they said was,
Speaker 1: you know, we don't want a links to you a
Speaker 1: great leader. We want um, we want elections, you know,
Speaker 1: And that kind of just spoke to some of the
Speaker 1: underlying dissatisfaction among certain parts of society in China, but
Speaker 1: also within the party. I mean, there was a statement
Speaker 1: last year from the from the party saying, you know,
Speaker 1: like upholding the current leadership doesn't mean, you know, a
Speaker 1: revert back to personality cults, which we firmly opposed. So
Speaker 1: she's trying to walk a fine line here between cumulating
Speaker 1: war power, staying in power, but also projecting the image
Speaker 1: that he isn't rolling China back to sort of some
Speaker 1: of the more controversial elements of Boos era. Yeah, I
Speaker 1: was wondering next, I mean, kind of in keeping with
Speaker 1: the point that you just made there, how people the
Speaker 1: population in China would view this. Do we have a
Speaker 1: sense of that? I mean, I would imagine that it's
Speaker 1: going to vary a little bit just generally generationally. I
Speaker 1: think it would very generationally. I mean, I think it's
Speaker 1: it's so hard to know what people in China are
Speaker 1: thinking about any of this. UM. I would say that,
Speaker 1: you know, the COVID zero policy that she has sort
Speaker 1: of um committed to earlier this year kind of generated
Speaker 1: these very unfavorable comparisons with the Cultural Revolution, particularly during
Speaker 1: the Shanghai lockdown, when you know, UM, the white suits
Speaker 1: were going into people's flats and disinfecting everything and sort
Speaker 1: of taking out the books and things like that, and
Speaker 1: there was there was some pushback on social media to
Speaker 1: sort of that decade, which they use a euphemism used
Speaker 1: to refer to the Cultural Revolution, and people are making
Speaker 1: that comparison between she UM and that sort of particular
Speaker 1: particularly termal part of Mao's rule. So I would imagined too,
Speaker 1: that if you use a lofty title, at some point
Speaker 1: you're going to have to deliver results that kind of
Speaker 1: match that, don't you think? Yeah, I guess it raises
Speaker 1: the expectation for she. I mean, I suppose the important
Speaker 1: thing to note is that UM, this is just like
Speaker 1: an informal way of him gathering more power within the party,
Speaker 1: But the important thing is obviously the fact that he
Speaker 1: is staying in power and sort of stuffing his top
Speaker 1: leadership with all the loyalists, and that's really what's gonna
Speaker 1: be consolidate his power and raise expectations that he's going
Speaker 1: to use that extra power to do something compressive and
Speaker 1: whether or not it's a liability if you don't have
Speaker 1: a diversity of opinion in that inner circle. Jenny, thank
Speaker 1: you so much. Jenny Morrish's Bloomberg's Greater China editor for
Speaker 1: the Government team, joining us here on debreak Asia