WEBVTT - How the NSA Works

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Stuff You Should Know from House Stuff Works

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<v Speaker 1>dot com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh

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<v Speaker 1>Clark and there's Charles W. Chuck Bryant and Jerry with

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<v Speaker 1>her stories she makes up and this is w should know.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh yeah, we have a Jerry story, but not for

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<v Speaker 1>this one. For the oven we're recording and spoiler coming up?

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<v Speaker 1>What's the spoiler? Like, he just gave a spoiler about

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<v Speaker 1>a spoiler that Jerry has a personal story relating to

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<v Speaker 1>the second of the two shows we're reporting today. Not

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<v Speaker 1>much of a spoiler, but people love any nugget from Jerry.

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<v Speaker 1>They're like, oh my god, what is it, right, especially

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<v Speaker 1>when she talks Yeah, um Chuck. Yes. So if we

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<v Speaker 1>weren't on any sort of watch list before, after researching

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<v Speaker 1>yesterday and today for this episode, we most decidedly are

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<v Speaker 1>some kind of red list. Yeah, if that's the highest list,

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<v Speaker 1>I would guess we're probably on it. Yeah. I don't

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<v Speaker 1>know if that's the highest, but it's a list that

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<v Speaker 1>we're probably on, or at least on the same list

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<v Speaker 1>as Glenn Greenwald, who I think is a righteous dude.

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<v Speaker 1>Did you read his book? Right? Uh huh yeah, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>Oh thanks for bringing that up. I think that we

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<v Speaker 1>should point out a few pieces of required reading slash

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<v Speaker 1>viewing for this one. If if, if this episode like

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<v Speaker 1>strikes your fancy, read Glenn Greenwald's book No Place to

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<v Speaker 1>Hide awesome, like all sorts of new revelations in there,

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<v Speaker 1>and like his take on the media and how um

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<v Speaker 1>it's just a great read. Have you read it? You should?

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<v Speaker 1>I will. Um. You should also read why Privacy Matters

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<v Speaker 1>even if you have Nothing to Hide, which is an

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<v Speaker 1>article by Daniel J. Solov in the Chronicle for Higher

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<v Speaker 1>Education that is a must read because I think that's

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of people's argument is that, well, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>if you're known to terrorists, and what do you care exactly?

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<v Speaker 1>It does matter? He dim all, it's just that argument. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>it's not an argument, um, And then argument and then

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<v Speaker 1>you should also watch parts one and two I think

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<v Speaker 1>they're both online of the United States of Secrets, which

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<v Speaker 1>is a front Line. I haven't seen that documentary. It's amazing. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>it's so good. And Frontline, which is always good. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>it's just like a great nonfiction magazine article. But for

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<v Speaker 1>your eyes come to life. Yeah, thanks man. So, um,

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<v Speaker 1>was there anything in here that you didn't really know

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<v Speaker 1>about the n S A well, yeah, I mean I

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<v Speaker 1>imagine we'll cover it in this order, which is a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit about the organization and then all the scary

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<v Speaker 1>things that they do. Um. But yeah, I mean I

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<v Speaker 1>read a lot of uh Edward Snowden's revelations, but there

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<v Speaker 1>were so many. Um, I think you have to read

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<v Speaker 1>a book. Yeah. I mean when we were researching this,

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<v Speaker 1>there were things like that I didn't know about. And

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<v Speaker 1>it's such an ongoing, like ever evolving story too, that

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<v Speaker 1>like if if I was reading an article and it

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<v Speaker 1>was from longer than a year ago, you know, it

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<v Speaker 1>was virtually useless because that was Priest Noden revelations. And

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<v Speaker 1>then even the stuff that came out in like June two,

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<v Speaker 1>it's they seem so naive. Now it's just like, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>the n S as admitted to this. Oh, and it

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<v Speaker 1>turns out that they were totally lying, but so now

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<v Speaker 1>they've admitted to this, and then you know, it just

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<v Speaker 1>kept expanding and every time like they were just just

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<v Speaker 1>admitting just the barest minimum. And then there was another

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<v Speaker 1>revelation and it just showed that whatever they admitted to

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<v Speaker 1>could be magnified times a thousand or whatever. Yeah, I

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<v Speaker 1>listen to an NPR thing on just the the policing

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<v Speaker 1>of the police essentially, or the policing of the n

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<v Speaker 1>s A, and how it's virtually impossible because their whole

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<v Speaker 1>deal is two and I guess this is the beginning

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<v Speaker 1>of what they do. It's not only do they try

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<v Speaker 1>and crack codes and intercept messages, but they're also charge

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<v Speaker 1>with safeguarding their own and a lot of the government

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<v Speaker 1>agency's own, uh important information. So the police and organization

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<v Speaker 1>like that. It's just it's an exercise and futility because

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<v Speaker 1>their job is to avoid that. Yeah, they encrypt and decrypt. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>so it's tough and there's no checks and balances. It

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<v Speaker 1>seems like it's scary. Yeah, they're supposed to be. But

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<v Speaker 1>we'll talk about that in a minute. So let's talk

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<v Speaker 1>n say, the whole thing came about in h under

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<v Speaker 1>Harry Truman that stood for nothing. Yeah, And I want

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<v Speaker 1>to go ahead and point out now I'm not gonna

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<v Speaker 1>get to opinion aated, but I don't feel that there

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<v Speaker 1>should not be something like the n s A because

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<v Speaker 1>they serve a valuable you know service. Um, But you

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<v Speaker 1>have to do in the right ways, sure, and I

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<v Speaker 1>don't think they are right. And that's the last thing

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<v Speaker 1>I'm going to say opinion life. Everything else will be

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<v Speaker 1>just fact. I just don't want this to come across

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<v Speaker 1>as like poopooing, like they should shut them down forever. Well, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I think you just overtly said you don't feel that way.

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<v Speaker 1>Harry Truman, Harry S. Truman and the st for nothing,

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<v Speaker 1>that's right. Um, he created the n s A basically two, um,

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<v Speaker 1>try to get electronic information eavesdropping on other countries and

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<v Speaker 1>do some encryption. So basically from the beginning, the NSA

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<v Speaker 1>has had the same dual mission that it has today. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>Officially that's called signets, which, um, everyone loves the acronyms

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<v Speaker 1>and these intelligence agencies and military signal intelligence. That's the

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<v Speaker 1>eaves dropping part. Yeah. And then information assurance, which is

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<v Speaker 1>you know, trying to assure them all that their information

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<v Speaker 1>is safe, so safeguarding and by encrypting it. Yeah. So

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<v Speaker 1>they've been doing that since the beginning. The thing is is,

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<v Speaker 1>since even though they've been around since nineteen fifty two,

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<v Speaker 1>they haven't been publicly acknowledged as existing until the mid seventies.

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<v Speaker 1>Thanks to the Church Committee hearings which sussed out all

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<v Speaker 1>sorts of intelligence community to abuses like the CIA experimenting

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<v Speaker 1>on unsuspecting Americans with LSD and what the n s

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<v Speaker 1>A was up tune. Until that point, it was just

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<v Speaker 1>outright denied that the n s A even existed. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>and uh, a lot of people might think the CIA

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<v Speaker 1>is the same thing, But n s A is generally

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<v Speaker 1>just intelligence, and c i A is acting on that

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<v Speaker 1>intelligence exactly out in the field. And I say, their

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<v Speaker 1>hold up in some room somewhere, and they've been keeping

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<v Speaker 1>in locks locks step over the years, well especially since

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand one. I shouldn't say over the years, but

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<v Speaker 1>really since two thousand one, they've been kind of symbiotically

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<v Speaker 1>growing with the Internet, um and as a result they

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<v Speaker 1>become incredibly more prominent as far as the seventeen agencies

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<v Speaker 1>tasked with gathering and collecting and analyzing intelligence for the

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<v Speaker 1>executive branch go um, maybe even more so than the

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<v Speaker 1>CIA these days, because their job, what they do, fits

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<v Speaker 1>so nicely into the expansion of the Internet. Like basically

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<v Speaker 1>they can do their job just by tapping into the Internet.

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<v Speaker 1>And they've spent the last decade or so figuring out

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<v Speaker 1>how to do that more efficiently. They love the Internet

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<v Speaker 1>and to gather as much stuff as possible. It's that's right.

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<v Speaker 1>It's basically like they used to have to and I'm

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<v Speaker 1>not saying it's not hard work, but now basically they said, well,

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<v Speaker 1>every all the information we need for the most part

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<v Speaker 1>is now gathered in one big corral exactly called online. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>and everybody just just tell your friend whatever you want.

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<v Speaker 1>It's secret. Uh, you know, share what you like on Facebook.

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<v Speaker 1>We can't put it together with all the other data

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<v Speaker 1>and can create a complete profile on you and know

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<v Speaker 1>you better than your mother. That's why number stations, buddy. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>it's gonna go back to the past. I wonder I

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<v Speaker 1>could see it. I mean, I'm surely bad people realize

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<v Speaker 1>that the internet is not a safe way to do

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<v Speaker 1>business anymore. Yeah, but there's such a reliance on that

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<v Speaker 1>kind of communication that it's on. I mean, have we

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<v Speaker 1>passed the point in our return where it's like it's

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<v Speaker 1>just people just don't talk on the phone about stuff

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<v Speaker 1>like that anymore. People don't talk on the phone anymore, right,

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<v Speaker 1>or they don't talk over email anymore. Yeah, you know, alright,

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<v Speaker 1>So the n s a works alongside the something called

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<v Speaker 1>the c SS, the Central Security Service, and they are

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<v Speaker 1>basically the military side that does the same thing that

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<v Speaker 1>the n s A does. Right, So, from what I understand,

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<v Speaker 1>as of two thousand thirteen, there was thirty thousand military

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<v Speaker 1>personnel as part of the n s A, So maybe

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<v Speaker 1>that's what makes up the c s S, and then

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<v Speaker 1>sixty thousand and seventy thousand contractors working for the n

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<v Speaker 1>s A. So basically there's like ninety hundred thousand people

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<v Speaker 1>who work for the n s A. Yeah, and that

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<v Speaker 1>contractor's number maybe going down because, Um, one of the

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<v Speaker 1>fears that the government now has because Edward Snowden was

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<v Speaker 1>a contractor, is that we've got way too many civilian

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<v Speaker 1>contractors working uh for us. Maybe. So the thing is

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<v Speaker 1>is Snowdon was portrayed as a low level, a Booze

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<v Speaker 1>Allen contractor. And did you watch that interview with him

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<v Speaker 1>on NBC I think a couple of months ago. It

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<v Speaker 1>was the only American interview he's given to this point.

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<v Speaker 1>Didn't he basically said, actually didn't even basically said. He said,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm a spy. I'm a highly trained spy. This whole

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<v Speaker 1>thing where they're saying like I was a low level contractor.

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<v Speaker 1>He's like, that's not true. He said, I've been working

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<v Speaker 1>undercover in a foreign country for the c I A.

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<v Speaker 1>I've worked undercover for in a foreign country for the

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<v Speaker 1>N s A. So the whole idea that just some

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<v Speaker 1>low level contractor had access to all this stuff is

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<v Speaker 1>not correct. He was like a pretty high level spy. Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>supposedly they're not interested in him anymore, although I don't

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<v Speaker 1>buy it. I don't buy that. They came out like

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<v Speaker 1>literally two days ago and said, you know what, as

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<v Speaker 1>time goes on here, his information is less and less relevant.

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<v Speaker 1>That's now, that's true, And they said, so we honestly,

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<v Speaker 1>he's because he's trying to cut it the to get

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<v Speaker 1>back to the US and now or at least it

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<v Speaker 1>may change. But now they're saying, I don't really care

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<v Speaker 1>a right, stay over there in Russia, like you're you're,

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<v Speaker 1>you're the stuff you have as old news by now, right,

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<v Speaker 1>And I mean through such a wrench in the works

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<v Speaker 1>that they may have to just go back and start

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<v Speaker 1>from scratch. I'm sure they'd just like to get their

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<v Speaker 1>hands on them, though, And even if they're not having

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<v Speaker 1>to start from scratch. It seems to be that the

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<v Speaker 1>capabilities of the n s A are evolving so quick that, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>the snapshot that he provided from what April two thirteen

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<v Speaker 1>is you know, now it's more than a year old.

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<v Speaker 1>Who knows how much it's changed. So you're right, like

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<v Speaker 1>this is getting less and less relevant as it goes on. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>what's scary is that you just referred to close to

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<v Speaker 1>two million documents as a snapshot, and that's true, that

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<v Speaker 1>is just a small portion. Yeah, what's going on if

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<v Speaker 1>you're watching the NSA though, UM and a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>people are now more than ever. Uh, they appear to

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<v Speaker 1>be continuing to expand and expand expand. Like they've got

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<v Speaker 1>this data center in UM Salt Lake City that we

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<v Speaker 1>just opened, and it, Chuckers is capable of storing data

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<v Speaker 1>in the range of zetta bytes z e t t

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<v Speaker 1>a bytes. How many terabytes is that? I don't know

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<v Speaker 1>how many terabytes it is, but it's one six tillion bytes.

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<v Speaker 1>Zeros consider this on the low end estimate, So they

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<v Speaker 1>can store at least one sex tillion bytes of data

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<v Speaker 1>in this place in Salt Lake City. There are on

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<v Speaker 1>the low end, ten sex tillion stars in the entire

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<v Speaker 1>visible universe. That's a lot of data that they just

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<v Speaker 1>build a house for out in Salt Lake City. So

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<v Speaker 1>they don't appear to be slow in the role at all. No,

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<v Speaker 1>and they in fact hired UM in two thousand eleven,

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand twelve about thirty new employees UM. And this

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<v Speaker 1>article very just sweetly points out if you want to

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<v Speaker 1>go work for the n s A, you don't even

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<v Speaker 1>have to be a computer made year. You can major

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<v Speaker 1>in music and history and still engage in cryptanalysis. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's good to know, right, because I mean, if

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<v Speaker 1>you think about it, they sometimes they use more than

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<v Speaker 1>just key codes. Like if somebody wanted decrypt your number

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<v Speaker 1>station key, they would have to be familiar with what

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<v Speaker 1>was it to Kill a mocking Bird? That was that

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<v Speaker 1>the book we use. Yeah, yeah, so you would want

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<v Speaker 1>to hire like a lip major or something like that

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<v Speaker 1>to to crack too, crypt analyze something like that. So

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<v Speaker 1>it makes sense. Yeah. Plus they train them that you're

0:12:31.480 --> 0:12:34.240
<v Speaker 1>not expected to come into the n s A as

0:12:34.280 --> 0:12:37.920
<v Speaker 1>a uh securities encryption expert. They will send you to

0:12:37.960 --> 0:12:39.960
<v Speaker 1>school and class right to teach you how to do

0:12:40.000 --> 0:12:42.720
<v Speaker 1>this stuff. That's right, And then you have to meet

0:12:42.760 --> 0:12:46.160
<v Speaker 1>certain requirements. They also have internships for students. That's right,

0:12:46.240 --> 0:12:48.680
<v Speaker 1>and that crazy. Can you imagine just interning at the

0:12:48.800 --> 0:12:51.880
<v Speaker 1>n s A for the summer, Yeah, and not being

0:12:51.960 --> 0:12:57.520
<v Speaker 1>killed afterwards. Um. Some of the victories over the years

0:12:57.559 --> 0:12:59.960
<v Speaker 1>with the n s A, like the Cuban Missile crisis,

0:13:00.080 --> 0:13:05.800
<v Speaker 1>we should note because of sigint again signals intelligence. Um,

0:13:05.840 --> 0:13:10.920
<v Speaker 1>we realized that the Russians were not just installing uh well,

0:13:10.960 --> 0:13:14.400
<v Speaker 1>we discovered they were installing nuclear warheads and they just

0:13:14.440 --> 0:13:17.720
<v Speaker 1>weren't vacationing in Cuba. And we also found out from

0:13:18.120 --> 0:13:21.480
<v Speaker 1>sigints from the n s A is that the Russians

0:13:21.480 --> 0:13:26.640
<v Speaker 1>had taken over the controls of the Cuban missile system.

0:13:26.679 --> 0:13:31.200
<v Speaker 1>So Russia installed nuclear warheads and had the key had

0:13:31.440 --> 0:13:35.760
<v Speaker 1>Yeah in Cuba pointed right here at the US. But

0:13:36.200 --> 0:13:38.480
<v Speaker 1>during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the n s A also

0:13:38.600 --> 0:13:42.199
<v Speaker 1>diffused the whole thing by eavesdropping and finding some sort

0:13:42.240 --> 0:13:46.480
<v Speaker 1>of transmission among I think the Russian Navy that showed

0:13:46.520 --> 0:13:48.920
<v Speaker 1>that Russia was not going to challenge this quarantine the

0:13:49.000 --> 0:13:51.800
<v Speaker 1>US had put around Cuba, which was kind of like

0:13:51.840 --> 0:13:55.839
<v Speaker 1>the new line in the sand that Kennedy had drawn. Yeah,

0:13:55.840 --> 0:14:00.320
<v Speaker 1>perhaps avoided nuclear war thanks to them to tell agents.

0:14:00.400 --> 0:14:02.800
<v Speaker 1>So they have delivered the goods before. They sure have.

0:14:03.160 --> 0:14:06.160
<v Speaker 1>They were under fired after nine eleven for not delivering

0:14:06.160 --> 0:14:11.000
<v Speaker 1>the goods Um, and I remember Um famously said, you know,

0:14:11.080 --> 0:14:14.240
<v Speaker 1>we had some communications that there was something big going down.

0:14:14.440 --> 0:14:17.760
<v Speaker 1>They had like thirty of them, and to specifically mentioned

0:14:17.760 --> 0:14:20.280
<v Speaker 1>September eleven, right, but we didn't know what it was

0:14:20.360 --> 0:14:23.120
<v Speaker 1>or where it was. And Um, it's kind of hard

0:14:23.160 --> 0:14:26.400
<v Speaker 1>to throw a dragnet over the country and they didn't

0:14:26.400 --> 0:14:28.920
<v Speaker 1>even know it was going to be in the country supposedly. Yeah,

0:14:29.760 --> 0:14:32.680
<v Speaker 1>there's a guy in the UM United States of Secrets

0:14:32.760 --> 0:14:35.120
<v Speaker 1>who was one of the n s A analysts who

0:14:35.720 --> 0:14:39.840
<v Speaker 1>like missed nine eleven, like one of the guys, and

0:14:39.960 --> 0:14:43.920
<v Speaker 1>he is a wreck. Oh I'm sure he's just weeping,

0:14:44.040 --> 0:14:47.720
<v Speaker 1>like sobbing the whole interview. It's really tough to watch

0:14:48.200 --> 0:14:50.960
<v Speaker 1>because guys is gonna go to his grave like every

0:14:51.040 --> 0:14:56.680
<v Speaker 1>day just hating himself for it's really Sam that is sad. Um.

0:14:56.800 --> 0:14:59.960
<v Speaker 1>They since nine eleven, a lot of changes have taken place.

0:15:00.200 --> 0:15:03.520
<v Speaker 1>Obviously we'll get to the online aspects, but it's just

0:15:03.600 --> 0:15:06.680
<v Speaker 1>a different deal these days. The people that you're looking

0:15:06.680 --> 0:15:11.160
<v Speaker 1>for able to hide and plain sight and they're operating. Um.

0:15:11.400 --> 0:15:16.040
<v Speaker 1>Best case scenario, they're operating in a cell of you know,

0:15:16.160 --> 0:15:18.040
<v Speaker 1>a dozen people that you might be able to track.

0:15:18.160 --> 0:15:21.400
<v Speaker 1>Worst case scenario, you've got a single person just acting

0:15:21.440 --> 0:15:24.960
<v Speaker 1>on their own, which is nearly impossible to uh to

0:15:25.280 --> 0:15:27.600
<v Speaker 1>kind of root that person out. You have to wait

0:15:27.600 --> 0:15:30.120
<v Speaker 1>and catch them in the act, which was the case

0:15:30.160 --> 0:15:35.720
<v Speaker 1>in Times Square with what was his name, uh Fazl Shazad.

0:15:37.440 --> 0:15:40.720
<v Speaker 1>I think that sounds Times Square bomber or would be bomber.

0:15:41.120 --> 0:15:42.800
<v Speaker 1>He was a lone wolf. The thing is a lot

0:15:42.800 --> 0:15:46.360
<v Speaker 1>of people criticize the n SAY for even having these

0:15:46.560 --> 0:15:49.320
<v Speaker 1>cases associated with their names because these cases were made

0:15:49.400 --> 0:15:54.960
<v Speaker 1>from regular old, um warranted police work, real police Yeah.

0:15:55.200 --> 0:15:58.640
<v Speaker 1>So UM, there's a lot of criticism that the n

0:15:58.720 --> 0:16:03.960
<v Speaker 1>s A really hasn't delivered the goods for many many years,

0:16:05.040 --> 0:16:07.320
<v Speaker 1>and that um one of the problems is that it's

0:16:07.400 --> 0:16:11.000
<v Speaker 1>drowning in data, like it missed the Boston bombers. Um,

0:16:11.000 --> 0:16:13.520
<v Speaker 1>it missed the shoe bomber, the underwear bomber, like there

0:16:13.680 --> 0:16:18.560
<v Speaker 1>was these were even overseas targets. People like planning and plotting, well,

0:16:18.560 --> 0:16:21.040
<v Speaker 1>when you're tracking every cell phone call made in the

0:16:21.080 --> 0:16:25.320
<v Speaker 1>United States, you're bound to be a wash and data.

0:16:25.480 --> 0:16:28.440
<v Speaker 1>And that's that's probably the most salient criticism. Like even

0:16:28.480 --> 0:16:31.440
<v Speaker 1>Glenn Greenwald agrees with you, like that, we don't need

0:16:31.520 --> 0:16:33.440
<v Speaker 1>to do away with the n s A. But the

0:16:33.480 --> 0:16:37.920
<v Speaker 1>problem is if you are doing what General Keith Alexander

0:16:37.920 --> 0:16:42.960
<v Speaker 1>who runs the show there wants, which is collect everything, um,

0:16:43.120 --> 0:16:46.120
<v Speaker 1>then you're a washing data. It's big data with the

0:16:46.160 --> 0:16:48.680
<v Speaker 1>capital being the capital D where you have so much

0:16:48.760 --> 0:16:51.160
<v Speaker 1>data you can't make sense of anything, you can't possibly

0:16:51.240 --> 0:16:55.480
<v Speaker 1>wade through it. And um when when you're in that situation,

0:16:55.680 --> 0:16:58.280
<v Speaker 1>you can easily have something that you need and just

0:16:59.000 --> 0:17:03.360
<v Speaker 1>pass right by. Yeah. So what Greenwalt says is we

0:17:03.400 --> 0:17:06.359
<v Speaker 1>should be targeting people but more effectively, Like, yes, use

0:17:06.400 --> 0:17:09.400
<v Speaker 1>the n s A capabilities, they're awesome, but put them

0:17:09.400 --> 0:17:12.680
<v Speaker 1>to good use. Don't. Don't just cast this wide net

0:17:12.720 --> 0:17:16.360
<v Speaker 1>across the entire world that doesn't do anything. Yeah. One

0:17:16.359 --> 0:17:18.720
<v Speaker 1>of the big controversies that we're going to get into

0:17:18.840 --> 0:17:22.440
<v Speaker 1>right after these messages has to do with UH warrants

0:17:22.480 --> 0:17:24.720
<v Speaker 1>and whether or not you should have to have a

0:17:24.800 --> 0:17:28.760
<v Speaker 1>warrant to UH collect information on someone. So we'll get

0:17:28.760 --> 0:17:33.880
<v Speaker 1>to that right after this. So Chuck, We've been talking

0:17:33.880 --> 0:17:36.920
<v Speaker 1>about the n s A, and um, did we even

0:17:36.920 --> 0:17:39.879
<v Speaker 1>say what it stood for? Surely we did, didn't we?

0:17:40.240 --> 0:17:43.200
<v Speaker 1>I don't think we did. Oh, it's the National Security

0:17:43.240 --> 0:17:47.840
<v Speaker 1>Agency and for many years it had a the nickname

0:17:47.880 --> 0:17:53.800
<v Speaker 1>no such agency because they were just so secretive. Yes, um.

0:17:53.840 --> 0:17:59.159
<v Speaker 1>And under under a law that was past as the

0:17:59.680 --> 0:18:03.800
<v Speaker 1>as part of the Church Committee hearings, UM, this thing

0:18:03.880 --> 0:18:06.679
<v Speaker 1>called the FISI Court was set up. And the FISI

0:18:06.800 --> 0:18:10.000
<v Speaker 1>Court was came out of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act FISA,

0:18:10.720 --> 0:18:13.840
<v Speaker 1>and it basically said the n s A, to do

0:18:13.920 --> 0:18:19.120
<v Speaker 1>its job, can go forth and eaves drop on everybody

0:18:19.119 --> 0:18:22.440
<v Speaker 1>outside of the U S. Please do that's that's your job.

0:18:22.680 --> 0:18:25.480
<v Speaker 1>But we understand that some of those people who you

0:18:25.520 --> 0:18:27.439
<v Speaker 1>need to keep an eye on actually come into the

0:18:27.480 --> 0:18:30.600
<v Speaker 1>US while we have a line drawn there. You guys

0:18:30.600 --> 0:18:34.439
<v Speaker 1>need to get a warrant. And since night, as far

0:18:34.480 --> 0:18:39.439
<v Speaker 1>as anybody knew, until about two thousand, two thousand two, Uh,

0:18:39.520 --> 0:18:42.399
<v Speaker 1>that's how the NSA operated. If you needed if you

0:18:42.440 --> 0:18:46.160
<v Speaker 1>wanted to uh listen in on someone's phone call inside

0:18:46.200 --> 0:18:48.960
<v Speaker 1>the US, you had to go to this court and

0:18:49.000 --> 0:18:54.679
<v Speaker 1>get a warrant. Eleven members and out of thirty four

0:18:54.760 --> 0:18:59.680
<v Speaker 1>thousand warrant applications between nineteen seventy all but eleven we're

0:18:59.720 --> 0:19:05.120
<v Speaker 1>path through. Yeah, so there was a fis A court,

0:19:05.240 --> 0:19:08.560
<v Speaker 1>but they approved ninety nine of warrants, right, So it

0:19:08.600 --> 0:19:12.280
<v Speaker 1>wasn't hard you wanted to. If you wanted to target somebody,

0:19:12.520 --> 0:19:14.320
<v Speaker 1>all you have to do is ask. There was a

0:19:14.400 --> 0:19:18.520
<v Speaker 1>rubber stamp just hovering right over the desk. You know.

0:19:18.680 --> 0:19:22.120
<v Speaker 1>I wonder what the deal was with those eleven They

0:19:22.160 --> 0:19:26.680
<v Speaker 1>just must have been agreedious. Um the paper boy, right,

0:19:27.560 --> 0:19:30.680
<v Speaker 1>the thing who like over charges. Yeah, like I want

0:19:30.720 --> 0:19:33.680
<v Speaker 1>to spy my paper boy in my milkman. Um. The

0:19:34.000 --> 0:19:38.440
<v Speaker 1>thing is is in two thousand two, a lot changed

0:19:38.960 --> 0:19:41.560
<v Speaker 1>as a result of nine eleven. It's part of the

0:19:41.680 --> 0:19:46.359
<v Speaker 1>USA Patriot Act and the name of that act. Um.

0:19:46.840 --> 0:19:49.440
<v Speaker 1>As part of the Patriot Act, the n s A

0:19:49.640 --> 0:19:54.920
<v Speaker 1>was given broader abilities to eavesdrop within the US. That's right.

0:19:55.560 --> 0:20:00.359
<v Speaker 1>So basically what happened was that, George Bush said, the

0:20:00.480 --> 0:20:04.479
<v Speaker 1>n s A can monitor international emails and phone calls

0:20:05.320 --> 0:20:07.800
<v Speaker 1>if they're generated within the US, as long as they're

0:20:07.840 --> 0:20:11.960
<v Speaker 1>going overseas and they're part of a targeted investigation warrant.

0:20:11.960 --> 0:20:14.800
<v Speaker 1>Without a warrant that's right. That's the key, UM, and

0:20:15.200 --> 0:20:18.120
<v Speaker 1>that happened in two thous two. The press actually knew

0:20:18.160 --> 0:20:20.879
<v Speaker 1>about this. The New York Times sat on it during

0:20:21.240 --> 0:20:25.560
<v Speaker 1>an election. Bushes re election and was roundly criticized once

0:20:25.560 --> 0:20:28.280
<v Speaker 1>they finally released it in two thousand five after he

0:20:28.320 --> 0:20:32.760
<v Speaker 1>was re elected. Um. But the point is that as

0:20:32.840 --> 0:20:35.400
<v Speaker 1>part of the Patriot Act and that this Bush Executive

0:20:35.520 --> 0:20:38.200
<v Speaker 1>Order UM, the n s A was allowed to start

0:20:38.240 --> 0:20:42.960
<v Speaker 1>paying attention to business records that the FEDS could get

0:20:43.040 --> 0:20:51.600
<v Speaker 1>from American companies, and they could eavesdrop on domestic initiated calls. Yeah,

0:20:51.640 --> 0:20:54.199
<v Speaker 1>and the business records. That was an expansion there. You

0:20:54.200 --> 0:20:57.560
<v Speaker 1>could always subpoena or get a warrant for business records,

0:20:58.000 --> 0:21:01.280
<v Speaker 1>but under the terms UM it expanded to was that

0:21:01.720 --> 0:21:05.359
<v Speaker 1>quote any tangible thing related to an investigation to obtain

0:21:05.400 --> 0:21:10.280
<v Speaker 1>foreign intelligence or protect against terrorism. So any tangible thing.

0:21:10.400 --> 0:21:13.000
<v Speaker 1>It's about as broad as it gets. You can basically

0:21:13.040 --> 0:21:17.320
<v Speaker 1>say anything, and uh, if it's not, hey, I want

0:21:17.320 --> 0:21:19.640
<v Speaker 1>to spy on my paper boy, then you can get

0:21:19.640 --> 0:21:22.160
<v Speaker 1>that warrant. But if you say I want to spy

0:21:22.160 --> 0:21:25.119
<v Speaker 1>on my paper boy and his name is Akbar, the

0:21:25.160 --> 0:21:30.720
<v Speaker 1>FISI Corpus probably be like Okay, here's two take two warrants. Well, yeah,

0:21:30.720 --> 0:21:33.040
<v Speaker 1>I got some stuff on that we'll get too later. Um. So,

0:21:33.200 --> 0:21:36.000
<v Speaker 1>as if that weren't expansive enough, I mean, having to

0:21:36.080 --> 0:21:39.200
<v Speaker 1>go get a warrant and having a nine seven percent

0:21:39.320 --> 0:21:42.359
<v Speaker 1>approval right then not having to get a warrant for

0:21:42.400 --> 0:21:44.920
<v Speaker 1>a lot more stuff. If that weren't enough. In two

0:21:44.920 --> 0:21:49.760
<v Speaker 1>thou eight, Barack Obama expanded it even further. Yeah, I

0:21:49.760 --> 0:21:52.399
<v Speaker 1>should say, reduced the obstacles between the n s A

0:21:52.520 --> 0:21:56.560
<v Speaker 1>and the information that seeks even further. He said that

0:21:56.960 --> 0:22:01.080
<v Speaker 1>he I think he signed an executive order that's that, Um,

0:22:01.119 --> 0:22:04.680
<v Speaker 1>you can monitor the communications between a U S National

0:22:05.440 --> 0:22:08.679
<v Speaker 1>and a foreign national if the foreign nationals a target

0:22:08.720 --> 0:22:11.840
<v Speaker 1>of an investigation. Before it was like, oh, there's an

0:22:11.840 --> 0:22:15.240
<v Speaker 1>American involved n SSAS out, maybe we'll tip off the

0:22:15.280 --> 0:22:17.720
<v Speaker 1>CIA or the FBI or something like that. But the

0:22:17.800 --> 0:22:20.040
<v Speaker 1>n s A is out. That was changed in two

0:22:20.080 --> 0:22:23.480
<v Speaker 1>thousand eight, yeah, and enacted for another five years through

0:22:23.680 --> 0:22:29.560
<v Speaker 1>uh this starting in December. Right. Yeah. It also did

0:22:29.600 --> 0:22:32.800
<v Speaker 1>something really really huge. The big one for the two

0:22:32.800 --> 0:22:37.000
<v Speaker 1>thousand and eight flies, the expansion, um, is that it

0:22:37.040 --> 0:22:41.800
<v Speaker 1>took away the need to get a warrant for bulk

0:22:41.880 --> 0:22:47.040
<v Speaker 1>communications collection as long as it was metadata, which meant

0:22:47.040 --> 0:22:51.320
<v Speaker 1>now that the n s A could go grab as

0:22:51.400 --> 0:22:55.880
<v Speaker 1>much data as it wanted, phone call records, email records,

0:22:55.920 --> 0:22:57.880
<v Speaker 1>all that stuff with the help of the phone companies.

0:22:58.600 --> 0:23:01.560
<v Speaker 1>As long as it didn't content the text of the

0:23:01.600 --> 0:23:04.240
<v Speaker 1>email or it wasn't a voice recording of the phone call,

0:23:04.640 --> 0:23:07.119
<v Speaker 1>they didn't need to get a warrant for everybody's stuff. Now,

0:23:07.240 --> 0:23:10.120
<v Speaker 1>they still were supposed to when they found out that

0:23:10.200 --> 0:23:13.320
<v Speaker 1>and they had an American's information, they were supposed to

0:23:13.400 --> 0:23:17.040
<v Speaker 1>destroy it unless it was related to a cyber crime,

0:23:17.600 --> 0:23:21.400
<v Speaker 1>any crime at all, conceivably was related to some sort

0:23:21.400 --> 0:23:25.480
<v Speaker 1>of security issue or there's some other reason, then they

0:23:25.600 --> 0:23:27.440
<v Speaker 1>could keep it for five years, and then that could

0:23:27.440 --> 0:23:30.840
<v Speaker 1>be extended for another five years. And again this is

0:23:30.960 --> 0:23:34.680
<v Speaker 1>really broad stuff. So if they caught an American stuff,

0:23:35.160 --> 0:23:39.400
<v Speaker 1>they can conceivably hang onto it for five years, no problem. Yeah,

0:23:39.600 --> 0:23:43.640
<v Speaker 1>the problem here is twofold is not having a warrant

0:23:43.760 --> 0:23:47.359
<v Speaker 1>is shady enough, but to have the warrants not be

0:23:47.520 --> 0:23:51.359
<v Speaker 1>what they're supposed to be, which is an effective checks

0:23:51.359 --> 0:23:53.639
<v Speaker 1>and balances system. It sounds like the warrant system was

0:23:53.680 --> 0:23:58.000
<v Speaker 1>a joke anyway. So even even if they said, well,

0:23:58.040 --> 0:24:00.720
<v Speaker 1>we gotta have warrants again, it's acted that joke of

0:24:00.760 --> 0:24:03.520
<v Speaker 1>a system exactly. So either way, it's kind of like,

0:24:04.119 --> 0:24:07.840
<v Speaker 1>you know, a joke it is in the process, Yeah,

0:24:07.880 --> 0:24:12.960
<v Speaker 1>the joke being that there are any real checks and balances. Yes.

0:24:13.400 --> 0:24:17.280
<v Speaker 1>So what what came out over time over these Snowden

0:24:17.359 --> 0:24:22.240
<v Speaker 1>revelations because all this was secret, Um that that the

0:24:22.359 --> 0:24:24.440
<v Speaker 1>oversight that there was on the n s A after

0:24:24.480 --> 0:24:26.840
<v Speaker 1>two thousand and one was just peeled back more and

0:24:26.880 --> 0:24:29.040
<v Speaker 1>more and more, and there was barely any oversight to

0:24:29.040 --> 0:24:32.480
<v Speaker 1>begin with. And that at the same time they were

0:24:32.480 --> 0:24:37.000
<v Speaker 1>expanding their capabilities to And the third prong in this

0:24:37.160 --> 0:24:43.719
<v Speaker 1>trident of cloak and dagger ishness is um that they

0:24:43.840 --> 0:24:49.240
<v Speaker 1>also had the complicity of telecommunications and internet companies. Yeah,

0:24:49.320 --> 0:24:52.800
<v Speaker 1>with Operation Prism, which was another one of Snowdon's revelation.

0:24:53.200 --> 0:24:58.280
<v Speaker 1>They collect Internet information anything that you do on the Internet,

0:24:58.359 --> 0:25:01.879
<v Speaker 1>your search history, your file transfers, your emails, what you

0:25:01.920 --> 0:25:04.600
<v Speaker 1>do on Facebook. And like you said, it is with

0:25:04.640 --> 0:25:09.439
<v Speaker 1>the assistance of Apple and Facebook and Google and Yahoo. Uh.

0:25:09.520 --> 0:25:11.760
<v Speaker 1>I don't think they've admitted that though, right they have

0:25:11.920 --> 0:25:15.760
<v Speaker 1>said basically the company if the if the n s

0:25:15.840 --> 0:25:19.119
<v Speaker 1>A comes with a warrant A seven or two I

0:25:19.160 --> 0:25:22.120
<v Speaker 1>think is what it's called from a FISA court. They

0:25:22.200 --> 0:25:24.040
<v Speaker 1>hand it over. They don't like it, but they'll hand

0:25:24.080 --> 0:25:26.199
<v Speaker 1>it over. But yes, I don't think they ever have

0:25:26.359 --> 0:25:31.159
<v Speaker 1>publicly admitted and they've denied that they have allowed the

0:25:31.280 --> 0:25:34.520
<v Speaker 1>n s A free access into their servers. But what

0:25:34.560 --> 0:25:37.440
<v Speaker 1>the snowdon files have come out and said is there's

0:25:37.520 --> 0:25:42.320
<v Speaker 1>here's this process where the n s A, somebody, some

0:25:42.400 --> 0:25:45.239
<v Speaker 1>contractors somewhere, types into a computer that he wants this

0:25:45.320 --> 0:25:50.000
<v Speaker 1>guy's everything through PRISM, and then that request is routed

0:25:50.000 --> 0:25:53.040
<v Speaker 1>through the FBI. The FBI sends it out to these

0:25:53.080 --> 0:25:56.280
<v Speaker 1>companies who send back everything they've got on that person.

0:25:56.760 --> 0:25:58.600
<v Speaker 1>And then the FBI turns around and hands it back

0:25:58.640 --> 0:26:00.639
<v Speaker 1>to the n s A. And let's take between an

0:26:00.680 --> 0:26:03.520
<v Speaker 1>hour and a day, depending on who you ask, And

0:26:03.560 --> 0:26:06.960
<v Speaker 1>then you have everything on that person. You have photos,

0:26:07.320 --> 0:26:15.159
<v Speaker 1>you have their Snatchat stuff, you have their UM, dropbox stuff, Facebook, Twitter, everything,

0:26:15.320 --> 0:26:18.240
<v Speaker 1>you have all other stuff, their emails, their phone calls,

0:26:18.280 --> 0:26:22.760
<v Speaker 1>everything through PRISM. So how much the companies were complicit

0:26:22.840 --> 0:26:25.199
<v Speaker 1>or not is still at issue. Yeah, one of the

0:26:25.200 --> 0:26:28.879
<v Speaker 1>things snowden Um said to the Garden, I think The

0:26:28.880 --> 0:26:31.720
<v Speaker 1>Guardian was where he first dumped all this information. Right

0:26:32.000 --> 0:26:34.800
<v Speaker 1>the Guardian, in the Washington Post and the Post. Um

0:26:34.880 --> 0:26:37.520
<v Speaker 1>he said that I, sitting at my desk, could wire

0:26:37.560 --> 0:26:40.840
<v Speaker 1>tap anyone, uh, from you or your accountant to a

0:26:40.880 --> 0:26:43.480
<v Speaker 1>federal judge or even the president if I had their

0:26:43.520 --> 0:26:48.960
<v Speaker 1>personal email. Mike Rogers, Republican chairman of the House Intelligence Committee,

0:26:49.000 --> 0:26:52.720
<v Speaker 1>said that that's a lie and it is impossible for

0:26:52.800 --> 0:26:56.200
<v Speaker 1>him to do that. Um. But I guess we should

0:26:56.240 --> 0:27:01.440
<v Speaker 1>talk about the program x key score, which UM basically

0:27:01.480 --> 0:27:05.000
<v Speaker 1>makes it look like that's exactly what could happen like

0:27:05.359 --> 0:27:08.920
<v Speaker 1>through x key score. UM, it's supposedly the n s

0:27:09.000 --> 0:27:12.880
<v Speaker 1>as widest reaching system for collecting electronic data. You can

0:27:12.920 --> 0:27:15.399
<v Speaker 1>watch what people are doing in real time on their

0:27:15.440 --> 0:27:21.640
<v Speaker 1>Facebook page, on their Gmail account. Um. All that jazz.

0:27:22.040 --> 0:27:24.600
<v Speaker 1>And apparently, remember when we talked about in the is

0:27:24.680 --> 0:27:27.480
<v Speaker 1>My Is your Employer Spying on You? Episode? That you

0:27:27.520 --> 0:27:30.040
<v Speaker 1>could watch somebody while they were typing, even though they

0:27:30.040 --> 0:27:32.600
<v Speaker 1>hadn't saved the documentary something, and then they'd erase it

0:27:32.640 --> 0:27:35.199
<v Speaker 1>and then re type it a different way. This is

0:27:35.240 --> 0:27:37.360
<v Speaker 1>the impression I have is that that's what x key

0:27:37.359 --> 0:27:42.720
<v Speaker 1>score does. Again, um, without attaining a warrant or even

0:27:42.760 --> 0:27:46.640
<v Speaker 1>having to get your supervisor on board. Yeah, you can,

0:27:46.720 --> 0:27:50.000
<v Speaker 1>just you know, if you have the access to this program,

0:27:50.040 --> 0:27:51.800
<v Speaker 1>you can. Oh yeah, if you're the name the n

0:27:51.880 --> 0:27:55.159
<v Speaker 1>s A contractor, right, Um. And they're supposed to be

0:27:55.200 --> 0:27:58.840
<v Speaker 1>some sort of like approval process, but apparently that's not

0:27:58.960 --> 0:28:02.720
<v Speaker 1>really real either. Um. And then check. There's one other

0:28:02.720 --> 0:28:06.680
<v Speaker 1>that's kind of related to this. UM dropout JEEP is

0:28:06.800 --> 0:28:12.880
<v Speaker 1>a program where some somehow in iPhones there is a

0:28:12.920 --> 0:28:17.520
<v Speaker 1>software implant that's I don't the impression I have is

0:28:17.520 --> 0:28:21.600
<v Speaker 1>that it's in all iPhones and from anywhere in the world.

0:28:21.600 --> 0:28:24.880
<v Speaker 1>The n s A can turn your camera on, turn

0:28:24.960 --> 0:28:29.760
<v Speaker 1>your microphone on, and turn your iPhone this thing that

0:28:29.800 --> 0:28:36.639
<v Speaker 1>you interact with so intimately, um into a mole and

0:28:36.680 --> 0:28:41.400
<v Speaker 1>it eavesdrops on you. That's pretty scary. Stuff like that

0:28:41.440 --> 0:28:44.360
<v Speaker 1>makes you want not not want to like be yourself

0:28:44.400 --> 0:28:47.480
<v Speaker 1>in your own home if your phone is sitting there

0:28:47.600 --> 0:28:53.200
<v Speaker 1>like that's that's paranoia, and but it's well founded paranoia. Yeah,

0:28:53.240 --> 0:28:54.800
<v Speaker 1>all right, Well we'll get right after this mention is

0:28:54.840 --> 0:28:58.160
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna get a little bit into them. The non

0:28:58.320 --> 0:29:00.280
<v Speaker 1>argument that if you have nothing to hide, it's the

0:29:00.280 --> 0:29:13.640
<v Speaker 1>big deal. Okay, so the non argument, if you have

0:29:13.680 --> 0:29:16.920
<v Speaker 1>nothing to hide, then who cares? Um. One of the

0:29:16.960 --> 0:29:22.120
<v Speaker 1>problems is this, Uh, it depends what the n s

0:29:22.120 --> 0:29:25.760
<v Speaker 1>A considers. Well, first of all, they're just mining all

0:29:25.800 --> 0:29:30.280
<v Speaker 1>this uh like bulk material from everybody. Yeah. Can I

0:29:30.360 --> 0:29:33.720
<v Speaker 1>throw a couple of numbers out? In one month? In

0:29:33.840 --> 0:29:37.000
<v Speaker 1>two thousand thirteen, the n s A gathered in one

0:29:37.080 --> 0:29:42.320
<v Speaker 1>month a hundred and twenty four billion phone calls, the

0:29:42.400 --> 0:29:46.000
<v Speaker 1>whole call, not just metadata, which by the way, supposedly

0:29:46.280 --> 0:29:48.680
<v Speaker 1>gives a clearer picture of you and your behavior than

0:29:48.720 --> 0:29:52.959
<v Speaker 1>a phone call necessarily would. Um. And if three billion

0:29:53.000 --> 0:29:56.560
<v Speaker 1>of those phone calls were from the United States, that's

0:29:56.560 --> 0:30:00.000
<v Speaker 1>a lot. And that's a single month, three billion phone calls. Yeah,

0:30:00.040 --> 0:30:01.880
<v Speaker 1>and then let me give you one more number. There's

0:30:01.920 --> 0:30:05.320
<v Speaker 1>a from the Snowdon files. Um. Some journalists analyzed them,

0:30:05.880 --> 0:30:08.520
<v Speaker 1>and they analyze a hundred and sixty thousand emails and

0:30:08.600 --> 0:30:12.560
<v Speaker 1>I AM chats that the n s A collected were

0:30:12.560 --> 0:30:19.200
<v Speaker 1>from average Americans and they contained identifying, um details, intimate

0:30:19.360 --> 0:30:22.560
<v Speaker 1>details like just the stuff like you would share to

0:30:22.600 --> 0:30:26.200
<v Speaker 1>like your closest confidant. Um. The n s A had

0:30:26.840 --> 0:30:31.800
<v Speaker 1>and of it was just average Americans. Well, uh, remember

0:30:31.840 --> 0:30:36.480
<v Speaker 1>when we talked about Tour in our Deep Web episode,

0:30:36.680 --> 0:30:41.080
<v Speaker 1>UM it's an Internet anonymizer UM that allows you to

0:30:41.200 --> 0:30:45.920
<v Speaker 1>search the Internet supposedly anonymous. The n s A revealed

0:30:46.000 --> 0:30:51.360
<v Speaker 1>recently that they consider everybody that uses tour a potential extremist.

0:30:51.840 --> 0:30:54.440
<v Speaker 1>In that two thousand and eight fives An Amendment Act,

0:30:55.320 --> 0:30:58.640
<v Speaker 1>one of the one of the exceptions for getting rid

0:30:58.680 --> 0:31:02.760
<v Speaker 1>of an Americans off is if it's encrypted. So if

0:31:02.800 --> 0:31:05.960
<v Speaker 1>you are using encryption stuff, that they can target it

0:31:06.040 --> 0:31:09.520
<v Speaker 1>and try their best to decrypt it just because it's encrypted. Yeah,

0:31:09.600 --> 0:31:13.880
<v Speaker 1>everybody that. In fact, if if you even visit tours website,

0:31:14.280 --> 0:31:15.720
<v Speaker 1>you're going to be put on the n s a's

0:31:15.760 --> 0:31:19.640
<v Speaker 1>red list supposedly just by visiting the site. And as

0:31:19.640 --> 0:31:22.400
<v Speaker 1>we pointed out in the Deep Web episode, not everyone

0:31:22.600 --> 0:31:25.520
<v Speaker 1>that uses tours on the deep Web is an extremist.

0:31:25.600 --> 0:31:29.200
<v Speaker 1>There's a lot of people that just like their privacy. Journalists, attorneys,

0:31:29.520 --> 0:31:34.240
<v Speaker 1>civil rights activists, regular schmos that don't want to be

0:31:34.440 --> 0:31:38.840
<v Speaker 1>spied on are now considered potential extremists because they don't

0:31:38.880 --> 0:31:41.320
<v Speaker 1>want to be spied on under this two thou eight

0:31:41.320 --> 0:31:45.160
<v Speaker 1>executive order by Obama. That's right, who else might be

0:31:46.120 --> 0:31:49.520
<v Speaker 1>looked at how about potential um someone you don't like

0:31:49.600 --> 0:31:53.560
<v Speaker 1>in politics. It was just released. Um. I think Greenwall

0:31:53.680 --> 0:31:59.080
<v Speaker 1>was who exposed this too, that five Americans were surveiled

0:31:59.760 --> 0:32:03.120
<v Speaker 1>under or this program without a warrant. One was a

0:32:03.280 --> 0:32:06.720
<v Speaker 1>Republican Party operative, one was a civil rights activists. A

0:32:06.720 --> 0:32:09.960
<v Speaker 1>few of them were professors. They were all Muslim. That's

0:32:10.000 --> 0:32:14.160
<v Speaker 1>no accident. Uh, just regular folks though nothing not extremists,

0:32:14.160 --> 0:32:17.680
<v Speaker 1>not terrorists. The Republican Party operative was a served in

0:32:17.680 --> 0:32:21.920
<v Speaker 1>the Navy. He's he's like a good dude and was

0:32:21.960 --> 0:32:25.440
<v Speaker 1>being spied on and um. In two thousand eleven, wire

0:32:25.520 --> 0:32:29.360
<v Speaker 1>dot Com revealed FBI training documents that said view all

0:32:29.440 --> 0:32:33.640
<v Speaker 1>Muslims as potential radicals and and say internal training document

0:32:34.200 --> 0:32:37.320
<v Speaker 1>UM as a placeholder for surveillance targets, uses the term

0:32:37.640 --> 0:32:43.320
<v Speaker 1>Mohammed raghead. And that's basically, if you're a Muslim and

0:32:43.440 --> 0:32:45.880
<v Speaker 1>you live in the United States or abroad, then you

0:32:45.920 --> 0:32:48.240
<v Speaker 1>are looked at as the enemy as far as the

0:32:48.320 --> 0:32:51.480
<v Speaker 1>NSA is concerned, or a potential enemy. Well, that was

0:32:51.520 --> 0:32:53.760
<v Speaker 1>the thing when all of this stuff started to come out,

0:32:54.040 --> 0:32:58.040
<v Speaker 1>Obama's administration was saying, like, we don't spy on Americans

0:32:58.040 --> 0:33:01.080
<v Speaker 1>were not like getting all of this inform nation on Americans.

0:33:01.120 --> 0:33:04.440
<v Speaker 1>It's not Americans, it's everybody else. And the internet companies

0:33:04.480 --> 0:33:08.520
<v Speaker 1>were like, um, like a good portion of our customer

0:33:08.560 --> 0:33:11.480
<v Speaker 1>base or overseas, and you're sitting here saying like, we

0:33:11.560 --> 0:33:15.320
<v Speaker 1>still target them, yeah, because their foreigners. It's it's so

0:33:15.480 --> 0:33:19.200
<v Speaker 1>yeah either way, it doesn't really dovetail with your point,

0:33:19.240 --> 0:33:22.160
<v Speaker 1>but you just chog my memory. What about spying on

0:33:22.200 --> 0:33:24.680
<v Speaker 1>your wife or your girlfriend. Surely no one would ever

0:33:24.760 --> 0:33:28.360
<v Speaker 1>use this capability to do something like that, right, it happens,

0:33:28.720 --> 0:33:32.400
<v Speaker 1>and they they have data that said they used a

0:33:32.480 --> 0:33:36.640
<v Speaker 1>warrantless surveillance on wives girlfriends would be girlfriends, uh and

0:33:36.720 --> 0:33:42.000
<v Speaker 1>abuse that spawned the intelligence communities term love ant instead

0:33:42.040 --> 0:33:48.040
<v Speaker 1>of sig NT. So some guy has the program open

0:33:48.320 --> 0:33:50.680
<v Speaker 1>xki stroke and he's like, Hey, I wonder if my

0:33:50.720 --> 0:33:53.640
<v Speaker 1>girlfriend's cheating on me or not even that, I just

0:33:53.680 --> 0:33:56.520
<v Speaker 1>want to spy on this person, this girl I want

0:33:56.520 --> 0:33:59.440
<v Speaker 1>to go out with. That's what And I'm not saying

0:33:59.480 --> 0:34:01.240
<v Speaker 1>that's happening all over the place, but if it happens

0:34:01.280 --> 0:34:06.480
<v Speaker 1>at all, it's an abusive power. UM. The the guy

0:34:06.560 --> 0:34:09.920
<v Speaker 1>Daniel so love and is um why Privacy Matters? Article?

0:34:10.120 --> 0:34:12.799
<v Speaker 1>He makes the point that even if you do have

0:34:12.880 --> 0:34:17.400
<v Speaker 1>nothing to hide or whatever, if everybody has a dossier,

0:34:17.600 --> 0:34:21.880
<v Speaker 1>if everybody has some sort of file, and if you

0:34:21.960 --> 0:34:25.800
<v Speaker 1>ever do decide to say speak out against tyranny or

0:34:26.239 --> 0:34:31.120
<v Speaker 1>or um the the E p A or whatever, they

0:34:31.120 --> 0:34:33.799
<v Speaker 1>can say, Hey, we've got this proublemaker over here, what

0:34:33.880 --> 0:34:36.800
<v Speaker 1>file do you have on them? And all of this stuff,

0:34:36.840 --> 0:34:39.840
<v Speaker 1>whether it's in context or not, can all be pieced

0:34:39.840 --> 0:34:42.520
<v Speaker 1>together to look however they want it to look. And

0:34:42.560 --> 0:34:47.160
<v Speaker 1>all of a sudden you suddenly lose your conviction, Like

0:34:47.280 --> 0:34:51.760
<v Speaker 1>that's at the n s A is at the least

0:34:52.840 --> 0:34:56.120
<v Speaker 1>in danger of having so much information that it can't

0:34:56.120 --> 0:34:59.799
<v Speaker 1>possibly keep track of everything. At worst, it's setting up

0:34:59.840 --> 0:35:04.680
<v Speaker 1>the foundation for a tyrannical government that, by its very

0:35:04.719 --> 0:35:08.759
<v Speaker 1>definition in nature and the capability that it has, can't

0:35:08.760 --> 0:35:11.360
<v Speaker 1>be anything but tyrannical. Even if it tried not to

0:35:11.400 --> 0:35:16.040
<v Speaker 1>be tyrannical, it couldn't with this capability. Yeah, and and

0:35:16.680 --> 0:35:20.120
<v Speaker 1>they literally like will install something called fiber opic optic

0:35:20.239 --> 0:35:26.080
<v Speaker 1>splitters at communications hubs. Has to be under the compliance

0:35:26.080 --> 0:35:29.319
<v Speaker 1>of of the of these companies. Like they're breaking in

0:35:29.360 --> 0:35:31.759
<v Speaker 1>there and doing it. There's no way. This is a

0:35:31.800 --> 0:35:34.839
<v Speaker 1>revelation that came up before Snowdon. There was a guy

0:35:35.080 --> 0:35:36.719
<v Speaker 1>by the last name of Klein who was an a

0:35:36.760 --> 0:35:40.040
<v Speaker 1>T and T engineer in San Francisco, and he found this.

0:35:40.040 --> 0:35:43.520
<v Speaker 1>This is in the United States of secrets. He found

0:35:43.960 --> 0:35:47.840
<v Speaker 1>this cable going up from one of the I guess

0:35:47.840 --> 0:35:50.399
<v Speaker 1>main routers of Core's that going yeah, And he went

0:35:50.400 --> 0:35:52.399
<v Speaker 1>and looked on the schematics and he's like, wait, there's

0:35:52.400 --> 0:35:54.759
<v Speaker 1>not supposed to be a room above there, but they're

0:35:55.040 --> 0:35:57.480
<v Speaker 1>a cable going to a room that's not on the

0:35:57.520 --> 0:36:00.239
<v Speaker 1>blueprints for this building. So we started looking. What he

0:36:00.280 --> 0:36:02.640
<v Speaker 1>found was the splitter that you were talking about, where

0:36:02.960 --> 0:36:06.239
<v Speaker 1>it takes the If the communication line is a beam

0:36:06.280 --> 0:36:09.080
<v Speaker 1>of light on a fiber optic cable, it uses a

0:36:09.080 --> 0:36:12.440
<v Speaker 1>mirror to make a copy of it and split it

0:36:12.440 --> 0:36:16.799
<v Speaker 1>in two, and one goes to the intended recipient, the

0:36:16.800 --> 0:36:19.239
<v Speaker 1>other goes to the n s A And that could

0:36:19.280 --> 0:36:23.919
<v Speaker 1>be your information or your life, or your phone, call,

0:36:24.000 --> 0:36:28.680
<v Speaker 1>your email, whatever. How about this. They will intercept hardware

0:36:28.760 --> 0:36:35.000
<v Speaker 1>like a router UH servers and and retrofit them to

0:36:35.080 --> 0:36:38.000
<v Speaker 1>serve their purposes, factory seal it and send it right

0:36:38.040 --> 0:36:41.160
<v Speaker 1>back to be sold. YEA. So it is pre pre

0:36:41.239 --> 0:36:44.680
<v Speaker 1>bugged for your convenience, right, they reroute it from the

0:36:44.719 --> 0:36:47.759
<v Speaker 1>distribution chain without the person who ordered it from like

0:36:47.880 --> 0:36:51.600
<v Speaker 1>Hewlett Packard or whoever, knowing that it was intercepted by

0:36:51.640 --> 0:36:53.560
<v Speaker 1>the n s A and bugged. Well. And because of

0:36:53.600 --> 0:36:55.759
<v Speaker 1>all of this stuff, there's some people that call Edward

0:36:55.800 --> 0:37:01.160
<v Speaker 1>Snowden a hero. Some people call them um Benedict Arnold

0:37:01.200 --> 0:37:04.360
<v Speaker 1>and a big fat trader that should never be allowed

0:37:04.360 --> 0:37:07.319
<v Speaker 1>back in the country. Um. If he hadn't come out

0:37:07.360 --> 0:37:09.120
<v Speaker 1>and said the stuff, it would probably all still be

0:37:09.160 --> 0:37:11.840
<v Speaker 1>going on in secret, don't you imagine for sure? I

0:37:11.840 --> 0:37:16.080
<v Speaker 1>don't think they would have self reported. No, no, they

0:37:16.080 --> 0:37:18.600
<v Speaker 1>definitely would not have. I think we're in total agreement

0:37:18.640 --> 0:37:23.000
<v Speaker 1>on that. So you know, it's up to listeners out

0:37:23.000 --> 0:37:25.920
<v Speaker 1>there to decide how you feel about what this guy did. Chuck. Um.

0:37:26.040 --> 0:37:28.120
<v Speaker 1>There's some other stuff that the n s A did,

0:37:28.960 --> 0:37:32.160
<v Speaker 1>apparently under the auspices of the FISA Court one of

0:37:32.200 --> 0:37:35.680
<v Speaker 1>the UM. So it's it's tasked with eavesdropping on like

0:37:36.040 --> 0:37:40.280
<v Speaker 1>enemies of the state. It's also cracker jack at getting

0:37:40.680 --> 0:37:46.200
<v Speaker 1>economic and diplomatic information to people like the Department of Energy,

0:37:46.239 --> 0:37:50.480
<v Speaker 1>the Department of Agriculture, the ambassadors to the U n UM,

0:37:50.640 --> 0:37:53.560
<v Speaker 1>people who deal with the EU. All of these people

0:37:53.600 --> 0:37:56.080
<v Speaker 1>are bugged by the n s A. And we've just

0:37:56.120 --> 0:37:58.200
<v Speaker 1>recently found out, and they've just recently found out and

0:37:58.200 --> 0:38:00.520
<v Speaker 1>are not very happy about it, and order to give

0:38:00.560 --> 0:38:05.360
<v Speaker 1>the US information superiority in negotiations. Yeah, that's what I

0:38:05.360 --> 0:38:07.960
<v Speaker 1>was talking about earlier, Like basically using it for political

0:38:08.000 --> 0:38:10.880
<v Speaker 1>gain has nothing to do with spying on terrorists exactly.

0:38:11.480 --> 0:38:14.880
<v Speaker 1>It's information superiority. That's the stated aim of the n

0:38:15.040 --> 0:38:19.440
<v Speaker 1>s A. There's another one too that really like before

0:38:19.840 --> 0:38:26.440
<v Speaker 1>the Internet companies were feeling um frustrated that they weren't

0:38:26.440 --> 0:38:30.040
<v Speaker 1>allowed to talk about the seven O two warrant requests,

0:38:30.360 --> 0:38:33.359
<v Speaker 1>that section seven O two that comes from and and

0:38:33.480 --> 0:38:37.600
<v Speaker 1>because in addition to having to give the government this information,

0:38:38.239 --> 0:38:40.480
<v Speaker 1>you also can't talk about it at all. There's a

0:38:40.480 --> 0:38:43.080
<v Speaker 1>gag order associated with it. So the Internet companies couldn't

0:38:43.080 --> 0:38:45.960
<v Speaker 1>say anything in their defense about this, but they were

0:38:46.000 --> 0:38:51.399
<v Speaker 1>still they were frustrated. But then they felt um like

0:38:51.440 --> 0:38:55.080
<v Speaker 1>a thief had gotten to broken into their houses because

0:38:55.080 --> 0:38:58.279
<v Speaker 1>they found out about this program called Muscular, and Muscular

0:38:58.520 --> 0:39:01.319
<v Speaker 1>went around the Internet companies and went directly to the

0:39:01.360 --> 0:39:04.640
<v Speaker 1>fiber optic line between Google servers and Yahoo servers and

0:39:04.680 --> 0:39:07.680
<v Speaker 1>just tapped in and sucked it right out of there

0:39:07.880 --> 0:39:12.480
<v Speaker 1>and apparently decrypted it fairly easily. Um, so they're getting

0:39:12.520 --> 0:39:15.880
<v Speaker 1>information with the complicity of the internet companies and behind

0:39:15.880 --> 0:39:19.440
<v Speaker 1>the Internet company's backs. That was a huge surprise. So

0:39:19.480 --> 0:39:23.799
<v Speaker 1>there's basically like, we have no allegiance whatsoever except to

0:39:23.800 --> 0:39:27.520
<v Speaker 1>our information collections. Yeah, it seems like there are no

0:39:27.640 --> 0:39:32.560
<v Speaker 1>rules and safeguards and checks and balances at all. I'm

0:39:32.600 --> 0:39:34.360
<v Speaker 1>interested to see what happens in the coming years. I

0:39:34.400 --> 0:39:41.359
<v Speaker 1>would my guess is that Snowdon's revelations will become obsolete

0:39:41.880 --> 0:39:44.520
<v Speaker 1>and unimportant and that things will kind of go back

0:39:44.560 --> 0:39:47.719
<v Speaker 1>to normal. I hope they never become unimportant. I hope

0:39:47.719 --> 0:39:51.520
<v Speaker 1>what you're saying isn't right. I know that initially feared

0:39:51.840 --> 0:39:54.319
<v Speaker 1>to him, as he said, the worst thing that could

0:39:54.360 --> 0:39:56.160
<v Speaker 1>happen is that if he did this, he took all

0:39:56.200 --> 0:39:59.720
<v Speaker 1>these risks and and exposed all this and nobody cared.

0:40:00.680 --> 0:40:04.000
<v Speaker 1>That clearly didn't happen. But you know, there's this second

0:40:04.800 --> 0:40:08.920
<v Speaker 1>potential problem, which is that eventually people just become fatigued

0:40:09.000 --> 0:40:13.160
<v Speaker 1>from all of this exposure to all all this information

0:40:13.200 --> 0:40:16.759
<v Speaker 1>that you're just like Okay, I get it. I'm my

0:40:16.840 --> 0:40:19.920
<v Speaker 1>life is not my own. I can't take worrying about

0:40:19.920 --> 0:40:22.399
<v Speaker 1>this anymore. So I'm just gonna detach and not care

0:40:23.200 --> 0:40:26.760
<v Speaker 1>that I hope doesn't happen. I think the vast majority

0:40:26.800 --> 0:40:31.520
<v Speaker 1>of people don't care. That's crazy to me. Like again, yeah,

0:40:31.600 --> 0:40:33.720
<v Speaker 1>I agree with you. You You can feel about Stone however

0:40:33.800 --> 0:40:39.200
<v Speaker 1>you feel. But the concept of being snooped on regardless

0:40:39.200 --> 0:40:42.000
<v Speaker 1>of your political affiliation or anything like that, it's not

0:40:42.000 --> 0:40:44.960
<v Speaker 1>supposed to be that way here. That transcends like anything,

0:40:45.040 --> 0:40:48.320
<v Speaker 1>like how do you not care? At least? That's crazy

0:40:48.360 --> 0:40:51.719
<v Speaker 1>to me. Uh, there's just like this would be an

0:40:51.719 --> 0:40:53.919
<v Speaker 1>eighteen hour episode if we went in all the stuff

0:40:53.960 --> 0:40:56.279
<v Speaker 1>the n s A did. So we'll say, if if

0:40:56.280 --> 0:41:00.359
<v Speaker 1>you like this, go look up the required reading um

0:41:00.400 --> 0:41:03.120
<v Speaker 1>and you'll find plenty of other stuff out there on

0:41:03.880 --> 0:41:05.360
<v Speaker 1>everything you want to know about the N s A.

0:41:05.440 --> 0:41:08.759
<v Speaker 1>These days, it's all out there about all two percent

0:41:08.840 --> 0:41:11.120
<v Speaker 1>of it. You can also learn more about the N

0:41:11.160 --> 0:41:13.920
<v Speaker 1>s A by typing N say into the search bar

0:41:14.040 --> 0:41:17.920
<v Speaker 1>how stuff works dot com, and that will bring up

0:41:17.960 --> 0:41:20.400
<v Speaker 1>this fine article. Since I said search parts time for

0:41:20.400 --> 0:41:25.600
<v Speaker 1>a listener, ma'am, I'm gonna call this a bit on

0:41:25.680 --> 0:41:29.360
<v Speaker 1>trickling down. Um, hey, guys, wanted to write in with

0:41:29.440 --> 0:41:33.040
<v Speaker 1>a clarification on the episode and trickle down economics. At

0:41:33.040 --> 0:41:35.160
<v Speaker 1>one point, you guys use an example of someone working.

0:41:35.400 --> 0:41:37.640
<v Speaker 1>Do not think it is so worth it to get

0:41:37.640 --> 0:41:39.799
<v Speaker 1>a promotion so it could put push you into a

0:41:39.840 --> 0:41:43.080
<v Speaker 1>higher tax bracket and thus you're barely bringing home any

0:41:43.120 --> 0:41:45.440
<v Speaker 1>more money. I had to write in because of someone

0:41:45.440 --> 0:41:49.000
<v Speaker 1>who loves maths. I absolutely hate to see this misperception

0:41:49.000 --> 0:41:51.799
<v Speaker 1>of how our taxes work. I've heard people I work

0:41:51.840 --> 0:41:54.120
<v Speaker 1>with claim the same thing, thinking that getting a five

0:41:54.640 --> 0:41:56.840
<v Speaker 1>bonus could push them over a line and all of

0:41:56.920 --> 0:41:58.960
<v Speaker 1>a sudden it would bring they would bring home less

0:41:59.000 --> 0:42:01.560
<v Speaker 1>money than before. I want to stay for the record,

0:42:01.600 --> 0:42:04.920
<v Speaker 1>I know this. We were just giving a different example

0:42:05.040 --> 0:42:08.359
<v Speaker 1>that wasn't fully fleshed out. Uh, this is completely wrong

0:42:08.360 --> 0:42:10.480
<v Speaker 1>based on how the tax structure works. Even if you

0:42:10.520 --> 0:42:13.600
<v Speaker 1>make one million dollars a year, the first nine thousand

0:42:13.680 --> 0:42:16.520
<v Speaker 1>will be based at ten um, the next twenty eight

0:42:16.600 --> 0:42:21.400
<v Speaker 1>thousand will be based the next at fifty two, and

0:42:21.440 --> 0:42:23.520
<v Speaker 1>so on. I think you guys know this since you

0:42:23.600 --> 0:42:25.920
<v Speaker 1>kind of allude to it in other places, but I

0:42:25.960 --> 0:42:28.640
<v Speaker 1>was hoping you can make it perfectly clear. So those

0:42:28.680 --> 0:42:31.040
<v Speaker 1>people who might be mistaken realizing that making more will

0:42:31.080 --> 0:42:35.279
<v Speaker 1>never push all of your income into a higher tax bracket. Uh,

0:42:35.320 --> 0:42:38.120
<v Speaker 1>if you make, for example, thirty six thou dollars, you

0:42:38.120 --> 0:42:39.880
<v Speaker 1>will be in that fifteen percent bracket, and if you

0:42:39.880 --> 0:42:43.840
<v Speaker 1>get a raised to forty dollars and the bracket, you

0:42:43.840 --> 0:42:48.959
<v Speaker 1>will only be paying on the above that bracket line.

0:42:49.719 --> 0:42:51.440
<v Speaker 1>The same is true of Josh's claim of the richest

0:42:51.440 --> 0:42:54.200
<v Speaker 1>people in the US used to pay. True, but they

0:42:54.200 --> 0:42:58.359
<v Speaker 1>only paid on the amount over the previous bracket. Right.

0:42:58.400 --> 0:43:01.280
<v Speaker 1>But let's say the previous bracket in half a million

0:43:02.040 --> 0:43:04.799
<v Speaker 1>and then the next million dollars or no, you made

0:43:04.840 --> 0:43:08.960
<v Speaker 1>another half a million and it was tax. That's a

0:43:09.000 --> 0:43:13.040
<v Speaker 1>disincentive to work. That's what we were saying, Like, Yeah,

0:43:13.200 --> 0:43:14.719
<v Speaker 1>I think we could have been clear on how it works,

0:43:14.719 --> 0:43:19.360
<v Speaker 1>though I'm sure we could have. UM. Anyways, thanks what

0:43:19.440 --> 0:43:21.319
<v Speaker 1>you do, and that is from charity. Thanks a lot

0:43:21.320 --> 0:43:25.040
<v Speaker 1>of charity for clarifying. I appreciate it. UM. If you

0:43:25.160 --> 0:43:28.239
<v Speaker 1>have a clarification for us for anything we want to

0:43:28.280 --> 0:43:30.800
<v Speaker 1>hear from you, you can tweet to us at s

0:43:30.920 --> 0:43:33.640
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0:43:36.000 --> 0:43:39.399
<v Speaker 1>us an email to Stuff Podcast at Discovery dot com, and,

0:43:39.520 --> 0:43:41.399
<v Speaker 1>as always, join us at our home on the web.

0:43:41.600 --> 0:43:48.880
<v Speaker 1>Stuff you Should Know dot com For more on this

0:43:49.040 --> 0:43:51.560
<v Speaker 1>and thousands of other topics, Is it how Stuff Works

0:43:51.560 --> 0:43:59.440
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