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Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff You Should Know from House Stuff Works

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Speaker 1: dot com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh

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Speaker 1: Clark and there's Charles W. Chuck Bryant and Jerry with

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Speaker 1: her stories she makes up and this is w should know.

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Speaker 1: Uh yeah, we have a Jerry story, but not for

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Speaker 1: this one. For the oven we're recording and spoiler coming up?

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Speaker 1: What's the spoiler? Like, he just gave a spoiler about

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Speaker 1: a spoiler that Jerry has a personal story relating to

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Speaker 1: the second of the two shows we're reporting today. Not

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Speaker 1: much of a spoiler, but people love any nugget from Jerry.

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Speaker 1: They're like, oh my god, what is it, right, especially

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Speaker 1: when she talks Yeah, um Chuck. Yes. So if we

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Speaker 1: weren't on any sort of watch list before, after researching

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Speaker 1: yesterday and today for this episode, we most decidedly are

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Speaker 1: some kind of red list. Yeah, if that's the highest list,

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Speaker 1: I would guess we're probably on it. Yeah. I don't

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Speaker 1: know if that's the highest, but it's a list that

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Speaker 1: we're probably on, or at least on the same list

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Speaker 1: as Glenn Greenwald, who I think is a righteous dude.

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Speaker 1: Did you read his book? Right? Uh huh yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: Oh thanks for bringing that up. I think that we

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Speaker 1: should point out a few pieces of required reading slash

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Speaker 1: viewing for this one. If if, if this episode like

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Speaker 1: strikes your fancy, read Glenn Greenwald's book No Place to

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Speaker 1: Hide awesome, like all sorts of new revelations in there,

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Speaker 1: and like his take on the media and how um

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Speaker 1: it's just a great read. Have you read it? You should?

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Speaker 1: I will. Um. You should also read why Privacy Matters

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Speaker 1: even if you have Nothing to Hide, which is an

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Speaker 1: article by Daniel J. Solov in the Chronicle for Higher

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Speaker 1: Education that is a must read because I think that's

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Speaker 1: a lot of people's argument is that, well, you know,

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Speaker 1: if you're known to terrorists, and what do you care exactly?

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Speaker 1: It does matter? He dim all, it's just that argument. Well,

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Speaker 1: it's not an argument, um, And then argument and then

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Speaker 1: you should also watch parts one and two I think

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Speaker 1: they're both online of the United States of Secrets, which

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Speaker 1: is a front Line. I haven't seen that documentary. It's amazing. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's so good. And Frontline, which is always good. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's just like a great nonfiction magazine article. But for

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Speaker 1: your eyes come to life. Yeah, thanks man. So, um,

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Speaker 1: was there anything in here that you didn't really know

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Speaker 1: about the n S A well, yeah, I mean I

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Speaker 1: imagine we'll cover it in this order, which is a

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Speaker 1: little bit about the organization and then all the scary

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Speaker 1: things that they do. Um. But yeah, I mean I

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Speaker 1: read a lot of uh Edward Snowden's revelations, but there

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Speaker 1: were so many. Um, I think you have to read

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Speaker 1: a book. Yeah. I mean when we were researching this,

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Speaker 1: there were things like that I didn't know about. And

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Speaker 1: it's such an ongoing, like ever evolving story too, that

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Speaker 1: like if if I was reading an article and it

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Speaker 1: was from longer than a year ago, you know, it

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Speaker 1: was virtually useless because that was Priest Noden revelations. And

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Speaker 1: then even the stuff that came out in like June two,

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Speaker 1: it's they seem so naive. Now it's just like, oh,

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Speaker 1: the n S as admitted to this. Oh, and it

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Speaker 1: turns out that they were totally lying, but so now

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Speaker 1: they've admitted to this, and then you know, it just

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Speaker 1: kept expanding and every time like they were just just

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Speaker 1: admitting just the barest minimum. And then there was another

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Speaker 1: revelation and it just showed that whatever they admitted to

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Speaker 1: could be magnified times a thousand or whatever. Yeah, I

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Speaker 1: listen to an NPR thing on just the the policing

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Speaker 1: of the police essentially, or the policing of the n

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Speaker 1: s A, and how it's virtually impossible because their whole

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Speaker 1: deal is two and I guess this is the beginning

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Speaker 1: of what they do. It's not only do they try

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Speaker 1: and crack codes and intercept messages, but they're also charge

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Speaker 1: with safeguarding their own and a lot of the government

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Speaker 1: agency's own, uh important information. So the police and organization

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Speaker 1: like that. It's just it's an exercise and futility because

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Speaker 1: their job is to avoid that. Yeah, they encrypt and decrypt. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so it's tough and there's no checks and balances. It

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Speaker 1: seems like it's scary. Yeah, they're supposed to be. But

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Speaker 1: we'll talk about that in a minute. So let's talk

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Speaker 1: n say, the whole thing came about in h under

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Speaker 1: Harry Truman that stood for nothing. Yeah, And I want

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Speaker 1: to go ahead and point out now I'm not gonna

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Speaker 1: get to opinion aated, but I don't feel that there

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Speaker 1: should not be something like the n s A because

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Speaker 1: they serve a valuable you know service. Um, But you

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Speaker 1: have to do in the right ways, sure, and I

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Speaker 1: don't think they are right. And that's the last thing

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Speaker 1: I'm going to say opinion life. Everything else will be

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Speaker 1: just fact. I just don't want this to come across

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Speaker 1: as like poopooing, like they should shut them down forever. Well, yeah,

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Speaker 1: I think you just overtly said you don't feel that way.

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Speaker 1: Harry Truman, Harry S. Truman and the st for nothing,

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Speaker 1: that's right. Um, he created the n s A basically two, um,

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Speaker 1: try to get electronic information eavesdropping on other countries and

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Speaker 1: do some encryption. So basically from the beginning, the NSA

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Speaker 1: has had the same dual mission that it has today. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Officially that's called signets, which, um, everyone loves the acronyms

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Speaker 1: and these intelligence agencies and military signal intelligence. That's the

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Speaker 1: eaves dropping part. Yeah. And then information assurance, which is

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Speaker 1: you know, trying to assure them all that their information

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Speaker 1: is safe, so safeguarding and by encrypting it. Yeah. So

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Speaker 1: they've been doing that since the beginning. The thing is is,

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Speaker 1: since even though they've been around since nineteen fifty two,

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Speaker 1: they haven't been publicly acknowledged as existing until the mid seventies.

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Speaker 1: Thanks to the Church Committee hearings which sussed out all

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Speaker 1: sorts of intelligence community to abuses like the CIA experimenting

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Speaker 1: on unsuspecting Americans with LSD and what the n s

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Speaker 1: A was up tune. Until that point, it was just

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Speaker 1: outright denied that the n s A even existed. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and uh, a lot of people might think the CIA

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Speaker 1: is the same thing, But n s A is generally

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Speaker 1: just intelligence, and c i A is acting on that

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Speaker 1: intelligence exactly out in the field. And I say, their

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Speaker 1: hold up in some room somewhere, and they've been keeping

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Speaker 1: in locks locks step over the years, well especially since

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Speaker 1: two thousand one. I shouldn't say over the years, but

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Speaker 1: really since two thousand one, they've been kind of symbiotically

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Speaker 1: growing with the Internet, um and as a result they

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Speaker 1: become incredibly more prominent as far as the seventeen agencies

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Speaker 1: tasked with gathering and collecting and analyzing intelligence for the

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Speaker 1: executive branch go um, maybe even more so than the

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Speaker 1: CIA these days, because their job, what they do, fits

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Speaker 1: so nicely into the expansion of the Internet. Like basically

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Speaker 1: they can do their job just by tapping into the Internet.

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Speaker 1: And they've spent the last decade or so figuring out

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Speaker 1: how to do that more efficiently. They love the Internet

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Speaker 1: and to gather as much stuff as possible. It's that's right.

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Speaker 1: It's basically like they used to have to and I'm

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Speaker 1: not saying it's not hard work, but now basically they said, well,

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Speaker 1: every all the information we need for the most part

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Speaker 1: is now gathered in one big corral exactly called online. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and everybody just just tell your friend whatever you want.

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Speaker 1: It's secret. Uh, you know, share what you like on Facebook.

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Speaker 1: We can't put it together with all the other data

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Speaker 1: and can create a complete profile on you and know

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Speaker 1: you better than your mother. That's why number stations, buddy. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's gonna go back to the past. I wonder I

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Speaker 1: could see it. I mean, I'm surely bad people realize

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Speaker 1: that the internet is not a safe way to do

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Speaker 1: business anymore. Yeah, but there's such a reliance on that

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Speaker 1: kind of communication that it's on. I mean, have we

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Speaker 1: passed the point in our return where it's like it's

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Speaker 1: just people just don't talk on the phone about stuff

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Speaker 1: like that anymore. People don't talk on the phone anymore, right,

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Speaker 1: or they don't talk over email anymore. Yeah, you know, alright,

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Speaker 1: So the n s a works alongside the something called

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Speaker 1: the c SS, the Central Security Service, and they are

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Speaker 1: basically the military side that does the same thing that

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Speaker 1: the n s A does. Right, So, from what I understand,

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Speaker 1: as of two thousand thirteen, there was thirty thousand military

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Speaker 1: personnel as part of the n s A, So maybe

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Speaker 1: that's what makes up the c s S, and then

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Speaker 1: sixty thousand and seventy thousand contractors working for the n

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Speaker 1: s A. So basically there's like ninety hundred thousand people

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Speaker 1: who work for the n s A. Yeah, and that

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Speaker 1: contractor's number maybe going down because, Um, one of the

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Speaker 1: fears that the government now has because Edward Snowden was

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Speaker 1: a contractor, is that we've got way too many civilian

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Speaker 1: contractors working uh for us. Maybe. So the thing is

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Speaker 1: is Snowdon was portrayed as a low level, a Booze

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Speaker 1: Allen contractor. And did you watch that interview with him

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Speaker 1: on NBC I think a couple of months ago. It

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Speaker 1: was the only American interview he's given to this point.

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Speaker 1: Didn't he basically said, actually didn't even basically said. He said,

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Speaker 1: I'm a spy. I'm a highly trained spy. This whole

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Speaker 1: thing where they're saying like I was a low level contractor.

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Speaker 1: He's like, that's not true. He said, I've been working

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Speaker 1: undercover in a foreign country for the c I A.

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Speaker 1: I've worked undercover for in a foreign country for the

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Speaker 1: N s A. So the whole idea that just some

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Speaker 1: low level contractor had access to all this stuff is

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Speaker 1: not correct. He was like a pretty high level spy. Yes,

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Speaker 1: supposedly they're not interested in him anymore, although I don't

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Speaker 1: buy it. I don't buy that. They came out like

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Speaker 1: literally two days ago and said, you know what, as

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Speaker 1: time goes on here, his information is less and less relevant.

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Speaker 1: That's now, that's true, And they said, so we honestly,

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Speaker 1: he's because he's trying to cut it the to get

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Speaker 1: back to the US and now or at least it

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Speaker 1: may change. But now they're saying, I don't really care

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Speaker 1: a right, stay over there in Russia, like you're you're,

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Speaker 1: you're the stuff you have as old news by now, right,

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Speaker 1: And I mean through such a wrench in the works

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Speaker 1: that they may have to just go back and start

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Speaker 1: from scratch. I'm sure they'd just like to get their

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Speaker 1: hands on them, though, And even if they're not having

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Speaker 1: to start from scratch. It seems to be that the

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Speaker 1: capabilities of the n s A are evolving so quick that, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: the snapshot that he provided from what April two thirteen

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Speaker 1: is you know, now it's more than a year old.

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Speaker 1: Who knows how much it's changed. So you're right, like

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Speaker 1: this is getting less and less relevant as it goes on. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: what's scary is that you just referred to close to

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Speaker 1: two million documents as a snapshot, and that's true, that

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Speaker 1: is just a small portion. Yeah, what's going on if

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Speaker 1: you're watching the NSA though, UM and a lot of

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Speaker 1: people are now more than ever. Uh, they appear to

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Speaker 1: be continuing to expand and expand expand. Like they've got

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Speaker 1: this data center in UM Salt Lake City that we

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Speaker 1: just opened, and it, Chuckers is capable of storing data

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Speaker 1: in the range of zetta bytes z e t t

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Speaker 1: a bytes. How many terabytes is that? I don't know

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Speaker 1: how many terabytes it is, but it's one six tillion bytes.

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Speaker 1: Zeros consider this on the low end estimate, So they

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Speaker 1: can store at least one sex tillion bytes of data

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Speaker 1: in this place in Salt Lake City. There are on

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Speaker 1: the low end, ten sex tillion stars in the entire

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Speaker 1: visible universe. That's a lot of data that they just

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Speaker 1: build a house for out in Salt Lake City. So

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Speaker 1: they don't appear to be slow in the role at all. No,

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Speaker 1: and they in fact hired UM in two thousand eleven,

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Speaker 1: two thousand twelve about thirty new employees UM. And this

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Speaker 1: article very just sweetly points out if you want to

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Speaker 1: go work for the n s A, you don't even

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Speaker 1: have to be a computer made year. You can major

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Speaker 1: in music and history and still engage in cryptanalysis. Right.

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Speaker 1: So that's good to know, right, because I mean, if

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Speaker 1: you think about it, they sometimes they use more than

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Speaker 1: just key codes. Like if somebody wanted decrypt your number

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Speaker 1: station key, they would have to be familiar with what

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Speaker 1: was it to Kill a mocking Bird? That was that

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Speaker 1: the book we use. Yeah, yeah, so you would want

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Speaker 1: to hire like a lip major or something like that

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Speaker 1: to to crack too, crypt analyze something like that. So

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Speaker 1: it makes sense. Yeah. Plus they train them that you're

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Speaker 1: not expected to come into the n s A as

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Speaker 1: a uh securities encryption expert. They will send you to

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Speaker 1: school and class right to teach you how to do

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Speaker 1: this stuff. That's right, And then you have to meet

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Speaker 1: certain requirements. They also have internships for students. That's right,

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Speaker 1: and that crazy. Can you imagine just interning at the

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Speaker 1: n s A for the summer, Yeah, and not being

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Speaker 1: killed afterwards. Um. Some of the victories over the years

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Speaker 1: with the n s A, like the Cuban Missile crisis,

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Speaker 1: we should note because of sigint again signals intelligence. Um,

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Speaker 1: we realized that the Russians were not just installing uh well,

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Speaker 1: we discovered they were installing nuclear warheads and they just

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Speaker 1: weren't vacationing in Cuba. And we also found out from

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Speaker 1: sigints from the n s A is that the Russians

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Speaker 1: had taken over the controls of the Cuban missile system.

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Speaker 1: So Russia installed nuclear warheads and had the key had

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Speaker 1: Yeah in Cuba pointed right here at the US. But

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Speaker 1: during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the n s A also

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Speaker 1: diffused the whole thing by eavesdropping and finding some sort

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Speaker 1: of transmission among I think the Russian Navy that showed

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Speaker 1: that Russia was not going to challenge this quarantine the

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Speaker 1: US had put around Cuba, which was kind of like

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Speaker 1: the new line in the sand that Kennedy had drawn. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: perhaps avoided nuclear war thanks to them to tell agents.

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Speaker 1: So they have delivered the goods before. They sure have.

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Speaker 1: They were under fired after nine eleven for not delivering

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Speaker 1: the goods Um, and I remember Um famously said, you know,

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Speaker 1: we had some communications that there was something big going down.

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Speaker 1: They had like thirty of them, and to specifically mentioned

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Speaker 1: September eleven, right, but we didn't know what it was

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Speaker 1: or where it was. And Um, it's kind of hard

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Speaker 1: to throw a dragnet over the country and they didn't

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Speaker 1: even know it was going to be in the country supposedly. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: there's a guy in the UM United States of Secrets

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Speaker 1: who was one of the n s A analysts who

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Speaker 1: like missed nine eleven, like one of the guys, and

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Speaker 1: he is a wreck. Oh I'm sure he's just weeping,

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Speaker 1: like sobbing the whole interview. It's really tough to watch

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Speaker 1: because guys is gonna go to his grave like every

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Speaker 1: day just hating himself for it's really Sam that is sad. Um.

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Speaker 1: They since nine eleven, a lot of changes have taken place.

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Speaker 1: Obviously we'll get to the online aspects, but it's just

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Speaker 1: a different deal these days. The people that you're looking

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Speaker 1: for able to hide and plain sight and they're operating. Um.

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Speaker 1: Best case scenario, they're operating in a cell of you know,

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Speaker 1: a dozen people that you might be able to track.

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Speaker 1: Worst case scenario, you've got a single person just acting

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Speaker 1: on their own, which is nearly impossible to uh to

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Speaker 1: kind of root that person out. You have to wait

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Speaker 1: and catch them in the act, which was the case

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Speaker 1: in Times Square with what was his name, uh Fazl Shazad.

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Speaker 1: I think that sounds Times Square bomber or would be bomber.

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Speaker 1: He was a lone wolf. The thing is a lot

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Speaker 1: of people criticize the n SAY for even having these

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Speaker 1: cases associated with their names because these cases were made

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Speaker 1: from regular old, um warranted police work, real police Yeah.

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Speaker 1: So UM, there's a lot of criticism that the n

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Speaker 1: s A really hasn't delivered the goods for many many years,

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Speaker 1: and that um one of the problems is that it's

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Speaker 1: drowning in data, like it missed the Boston bombers. Um,

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Speaker 1: it missed the shoe bomber, the underwear bomber, like there

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Speaker 1: was these were even overseas targets. People like planning and plotting, well,

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Speaker 1: when you're tracking every cell phone call made in the

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Speaker 1: United States, you're bound to be a wash and data.

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Speaker 1: And that's that's probably the most salient criticism. Like even

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Speaker 1: Glenn Greenwald agrees with you, like that, we don't need

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Speaker 1: to do away with the n s A. But the

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Speaker 1: problem is if you are doing what General Keith Alexander

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Speaker 1: who runs the show there wants, which is collect everything, um,

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Speaker 1: then you're a washing data. It's big data with the

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Speaker 1: capital being the capital D where you have so much

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Speaker 1: data you can't make sense of anything, you can't possibly

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Speaker 1: wade through it. And um when when you're in that situation,

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Speaker 1: you can easily have something that you need and just

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Speaker 1: pass right by. Yeah. So what Greenwalt says is we

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Speaker 1: should be targeting people but more effectively, Like, yes, use

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Speaker 1: the n s A capabilities, they're awesome, but put them

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Speaker 1: to good use. Don't. Don't just cast this wide net

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Speaker 1: across the entire world that doesn't do anything. Yeah. One

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Speaker 1: of the big controversies that we're going to get into

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Speaker 1: right after these messages has to do with UH warrants

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Speaker 1: and whether or not you should have to have a

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Speaker 1: warrant to UH collect information on someone. So we'll get

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Speaker 1: to that right after this. So Chuck, We've been talking

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Speaker 1: about the n s A, and um, did we even

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Speaker 1: say what it stood for? Surely we did, didn't we?

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Speaker 1: I don't think we did. Oh, it's the National Security

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Speaker 1: Agency and for many years it had a the nickname

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Speaker 1: no such agency because they were just so secretive. Yes, um.

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Speaker 1: And under under a law that was past as the

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Speaker 1: as part of the Church Committee hearings, UM, this thing

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Speaker 1: called the FISI Court was set up. And the FISI

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Speaker 1: Court was came out of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act FISA,

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Speaker 1: and it basically said the n s A, to do

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Speaker 1: its job, can go forth and eaves drop on everybody

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Speaker 1: outside of the U S. Please do that's that's your job.

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Speaker 1: But we understand that some of those people who you

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Speaker 1: need to keep an eye on actually come into the

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Speaker 1: US while we have a line drawn there. You guys

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Speaker 1: need to get a warrant. And since night, as far

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Speaker 1: as anybody knew, until about two thousand, two thousand two, Uh,

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Speaker 1: that's how the NSA operated. If you needed if you

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Speaker 1: wanted to uh listen in on someone's phone call inside

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Speaker 1: the US, you had to go to this court and

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Speaker 1: get a warrant. Eleven members and out of thirty four

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Speaker 1: thousand warrant applications between nineteen seventy all but eleven we're

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Speaker 1: path through. Yeah, so there was a fis A court,

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Speaker 1: but they approved ninety nine of warrants, right, So it

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Speaker 1: wasn't hard you wanted to. If you wanted to target somebody,

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Speaker 1: all you have to do is ask. There was a

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Speaker 1: rubber stamp just hovering right over the desk. You know.

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Speaker 1: I wonder what the deal was with those eleven They

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Speaker 1: just must have been agreedious. Um the paper boy, right,

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Speaker 1: the thing who like over charges. Yeah, like I want

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Speaker 1: to spy my paper boy in my milkman. Um. The

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Speaker 1: thing is is in two thousand two, a lot changed

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Speaker 1: as a result of nine eleven. It's part of the

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Speaker 1: USA Patriot Act and the name of that act. Um.

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Speaker 1: As part of the Patriot Act, the n s A

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Speaker 1: was given broader abilities to eavesdrop within the US. That's right.

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Speaker 1: So basically what happened was that, George Bush said, the

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Speaker 1: n s A can monitor international emails and phone calls

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Speaker 1: if they're generated within the US, as long as they're

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Speaker 1: going overseas and they're part of a targeted investigation warrant.

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Speaker 1: Without a warrant that's right. That's the key, UM, and

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Speaker 1: that happened in two thous two. The press actually knew

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Speaker 1: about this. The New York Times sat on it during

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Speaker 1: an election. Bushes re election and was roundly criticized once

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Speaker 1: they finally released it in two thousand five after he

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Speaker 1: was re elected. Um. But the point is that as

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Speaker 1: part of the Patriot Act and that this Bush Executive

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Speaker 1: Order UM, the n s A was allowed to start

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Speaker 1: paying attention to business records that the FEDS could get

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Speaker 1: from American companies, and they could eavesdrop on domestic initiated calls. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and the business records. That was an expansion there. You

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Speaker 1: could always subpoena or get a warrant for business records,

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Speaker 1: but under the terms UM it expanded to was that

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Speaker 1: quote any tangible thing related to an investigation to obtain

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Speaker 1: foreign intelligence or protect against terrorism. So any tangible thing.

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Speaker 1: It's about as broad as it gets. You can basically

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Speaker 1: say anything, and uh, if it's not, hey, I want

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Speaker 1: to spy on my paper boy, then you can get

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Speaker 1: that warrant. But if you say I want to spy

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Speaker 1: on my paper boy and his name is Akbar, the

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Speaker 1: FISI Corpus probably be like Okay, here's two take two warrants. Well, yeah,

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Speaker 1: I got some stuff on that we'll get too later. Um. So,

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Speaker 1: as if that weren't expansive enough, I mean, having to

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Speaker 1: go get a warrant and having a nine seven percent

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Speaker 1: approval right then not having to get a warrant for

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Speaker 1: a lot more stuff. If that weren't enough. In two

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Speaker 1: thou eight, Barack Obama expanded it even further. Yeah, I

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Speaker 1: should say, reduced the obstacles between the n s A

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Speaker 1: and the information that seeks even further. He said that

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Speaker 1: he I think he signed an executive order that's that, Um,

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Speaker 1: you can monitor the communications between a U S National

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Speaker 1: and a foreign national if the foreign nationals a target

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Speaker 1: of an investigation. Before it was like, oh, there's an

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Speaker 1: American involved n SSAS out, maybe we'll tip off the

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Speaker 1: CIA or the FBI or something like that. But the

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Speaker 1: n s A is out. That was changed in two

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Speaker 1: thousand eight, yeah, and enacted for another five years through

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Speaker 1: uh this starting in December. Right. Yeah. It also did

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Speaker 1: something really really huge. The big one for the two

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Speaker 1: thousand and eight flies, the expansion, um, is that it

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Speaker 1: took away the need to get a warrant for bulk

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Speaker 1: communications collection as long as it was metadata, which meant

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Speaker 1: now that the n s A could go grab as

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Speaker 1: much data as it wanted, phone call records, email records,

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Speaker 1: all that stuff with the help of the phone companies.

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Speaker 1: As long as it didn't content the text of the

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Speaker 1: email or it wasn't a voice recording of the phone call,

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Speaker 1: they didn't need to get a warrant for everybody's stuff. Now,

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Speaker 1: they still were supposed to when they found out that

396
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Speaker 1: and they had an American's information, they were supposed to

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Speaker 1: destroy it unless it was related to a cyber crime,

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Speaker 1: any crime at all, conceivably was related to some sort

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Speaker 1: of security issue or there's some other reason, then they

400
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Speaker 1: could keep it for five years, and then that could

401
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Speaker 1: be extended for another five years. And again this is

402
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Speaker 1: really broad stuff. So if they caught an American stuff,

403
00:23:35,160 --> 00:23:39,400
Speaker 1: they can conceivably hang onto it for five years, no problem. Yeah,

404
00:23:39,600 --> 00:23:43,640
Speaker 1: the problem here is twofold is not having a warrant

405
00:23:43,760 --> 00:23:47,359
Speaker 1: is shady enough, but to have the warrants not be

406
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Speaker 1: what they're supposed to be, which is an effective checks

407
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Speaker 1: and balances system. It sounds like the warrant system was

408
00:23:53,680 --> 00:23:58,000
Speaker 1: a joke anyway. So even even if they said, well,

409
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Speaker 1: we gotta have warrants again, it's acted that joke of

410
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Speaker 1: a system exactly. So either way, it's kind of like,

411
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Speaker 1: you know, a joke it is in the process, Yeah,

412
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Speaker 1: the joke being that there are any real checks and balances. Yes.

413
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Speaker 1: So what what came out over time over these Snowden

414
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Speaker 1: revelations because all this was secret, Um that that the

415
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Speaker 1: oversight that there was on the n s A after

416
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Speaker 1: two thousand and one was just peeled back more and

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Speaker 1: more and more, and there was barely any oversight to

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Speaker 1: begin with. And that at the same time they were

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Speaker 1: expanding their capabilities to And the third prong in this

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Speaker 1: trident of cloak and dagger ishness is um that they

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Speaker 1: also had the complicity of telecommunications and internet companies. Yeah,

422
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Speaker 1: with Operation Prism, which was another one of Snowdon's revelation.

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Speaker 1: They collect Internet information anything that you do on the Internet,

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Speaker 1: your search history, your file transfers, your emails, what you

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Speaker 1: do on Facebook. And like you said, it is with

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Speaker 1: the assistance of Apple and Facebook and Google and Yahoo. Uh.

427
00:25:09,520 --> 00:25:11,760
Speaker 1: I don't think they've admitted that though, right they have

428
00:25:11,920 --> 00:25:15,760
Speaker 1: said basically the company if the if the n s

429
00:25:15,840 --> 00:25:19,119
Speaker 1: A comes with a warrant A seven or two I

430
00:25:19,160 --> 00:25:22,120
Speaker 1: think is what it's called from a FISA court. They

431
00:25:22,200 --> 00:25:24,040
Speaker 1: hand it over. They don't like it, but they'll hand

432
00:25:24,080 --> 00:25:26,199
Speaker 1: it over. But yes, I don't think they ever have

433
00:25:26,359 --> 00:25:31,159
Speaker 1: publicly admitted and they've denied that they have allowed the

434
00:25:31,280 --> 00:25:34,520
Speaker 1: n s A free access into their servers. But what

435
00:25:34,560 --> 00:25:37,440
Speaker 1: the snowdon files have come out and said is there's

436
00:25:37,520 --> 00:25:42,320
Speaker 1: here's this process where the n s A, somebody, some

437
00:25:42,400 --> 00:25:45,239
Speaker 1: contractors somewhere, types into a computer that he wants this

438
00:25:45,320 --> 00:25:50,000
Speaker 1: guy's everything through PRISM, and then that request is routed

439
00:25:50,000 --> 00:25:53,040
Speaker 1: through the FBI. The FBI sends it out to these

440
00:25:53,080 --> 00:25:56,280
Speaker 1: companies who send back everything they've got on that person.

441
00:25:56,760 --> 00:25:58,600
Speaker 1: And then the FBI turns around and hands it back

442
00:25:58,640 --> 00:26:00,639
Speaker 1: to the n s A. And let's take between an

443
00:26:00,680 --> 00:26:03,520
Speaker 1: hour and a day, depending on who you ask, And

444
00:26:03,560 --> 00:26:06,960
Speaker 1: then you have everything on that person. You have photos,

445
00:26:07,320 --> 00:26:15,159
Speaker 1: you have their Snatchat stuff, you have their UM, dropbox stuff, Facebook, Twitter, everything,

446
00:26:15,320 --> 00:26:18,240
Speaker 1: you have all other stuff, their emails, their phone calls,

447
00:26:18,280 --> 00:26:22,760
Speaker 1: everything through PRISM. So how much the companies were complicit

448
00:26:22,840 --> 00:26:25,199
Speaker 1: or not is still at issue. Yeah, one of the

449
00:26:25,200 --> 00:26:28,879
Speaker 1: things snowden Um said to the Garden, I think The

450
00:26:28,880 --> 00:26:31,720
Speaker 1: Guardian was where he first dumped all this information. Right

451
00:26:32,000 --> 00:26:34,800
Speaker 1: the Guardian, in the Washington Post and the Post. Um

452
00:26:34,880 --> 00:26:37,520
Speaker 1: he said that I, sitting at my desk, could wire

453
00:26:37,560 --> 00:26:40,840
Speaker 1: tap anyone, uh, from you or your accountant to a

454
00:26:40,880 --> 00:26:43,480
Speaker 1: federal judge or even the president if I had their

455
00:26:43,520 --> 00:26:48,960
Speaker 1: personal email. Mike Rogers, Republican chairman of the House Intelligence Committee,

456
00:26:49,000 --> 00:26:52,720
Speaker 1: said that that's a lie and it is impossible for

457
00:26:52,800 --> 00:26:56,200
Speaker 1: him to do that. Um. But I guess we should

458
00:26:56,240 --> 00:27:01,440
Speaker 1: talk about the program x key score, which UM basically

459
00:27:01,480 --> 00:27:05,000
Speaker 1: makes it look like that's exactly what could happen like

460
00:27:05,359 --> 00:27:08,920
Speaker 1: through x key score. UM, it's supposedly the n s

461
00:27:09,000 --> 00:27:12,880
Speaker 1: as widest reaching system for collecting electronic data. You can

462
00:27:12,920 --> 00:27:15,399
Speaker 1: watch what people are doing in real time on their

463
00:27:15,440 --> 00:27:21,640
Speaker 1: Facebook page, on their Gmail account. Um. All that jazz.

464
00:27:22,040 --> 00:27:24,600
Speaker 1: And apparently, remember when we talked about in the is

465
00:27:24,680 --> 00:27:27,480
Speaker 1: My Is your Employer Spying on You? Episode? That you

466
00:27:27,520 --> 00:27:30,040
Speaker 1: could watch somebody while they were typing, even though they

467
00:27:30,040 --> 00:27:32,600
Speaker 1: hadn't saved the documentary something, and then they'd erase it

468
00:27:32,640 --> 00:27:35,199
Speaker 1: and then re type it a different way. This is

469
00:27:35,240 --> 00:27:37,360
Speaker 1: the impression I have is that that's what x key

470
00:27:37,359 --> 00:27:42,720
Speaker 1: score does. Again, um, without attaining a warrant or even

471
00:27:42,760 --> 00:27:46,640
Speaker 1: having to get your supervisor on board. Yeah, you can,

472
00:27:46,720 --> 00:27:50,000
Speaker 1: just you know, if you have the access to this program,

473
00:27:50,040 --> 00:27:51,800
Speaker 1: you can. Oh yeah, if you're the name the n

474
00:27:51,880 --> 00:27:55,159
Speaker 1: s A contractor, right, Um. And they're supposed to be

475
00:27:55,200 --> 00:27:58,840
Speaker 1: some sort of like approval process, but apparently that's not

476
00:27:58,960 --> 00:28:02,720
Speaker 1: really real either. Um. And then check. There's one other

477
00:28:02,720 --> 00:28:06,680
Speaker 1: that's kind of related to this. UM dropout JEEP is

478
00:28:06,800 --> 00:28:12,880
Speaker 1: a program where some somehow in iPhones there is a

479
00:28:12,920 --> 00:28:17,520
Speaker 1: software implant that's I don't the impression I have is

480
00:28:17,520 --> 00:28:21,600
Speaker 1: that it's in all iPhones and from anywhere in the world.

481
00:28:21,600 --> 00:28:24,880
Speaker 1: The n s A can turn your camera on, turn

482
00:28:24,960 --> 00:28:29,760
Speaker 1: your microphone on, and turn your iPhone this thing that

483
00:28:29,800 --> 00:28:36,639
Speaker 1: you interact with so intimately, um into a mole and

484
00:28:36,680 --> 00:28:41,400
Speaker 1: it eavesdrops on you. That's pretty scary. Stuff like that

485
00:28:41,440 --> 00:28:44,360
Speaker 1: makes you want not not want to like be yourself

486
00:28:44,400 --> 00:28:47,480
Speaker 1: in your own home if your phone is sitting there

487
00:28:47,600 --> 00:28:53,200
Speaker 1: like that's that's paranoia, and but it's well founded paranoia. Yeah,

488
00:28:53,240 --> 00:28:54,800
Speaker 1: all right, Well we'll get right after this mention is

489
00:28:54,840 --> 00:28:58,160
Speaker 1: we're gonna get a little bit into them. The non

490
00:28:58,320 --> 00:29:00,280
Speaker 1: argument that if you have nothing to hide, it's the

491
00:29:00,280 --> 00:29:13,640
Speaker 1: big deal. Okay, so the non argument, if you have

492
00:29:13,680 --> 00:29:16,920
Speaker 1: nothing to hide, then who cares? Um. One of the

493
00:29:16,960 --> 00:29:22,120
Speaker 1: problems is this, Uh, it depends what the n s

494
00:29:22,120 --> 00:29:25,760
Speaker 1: A considers. Well, first of all, they're just mining all

495
00:29:25,800 --> 00:29:30,280
Speaker 1: this uh like bulk material from everybody. Yeah. Can I

496
00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:33,720
Speaker 1: throw a couple of numbers out? In one month? In

497
00:29:33,840 --> 00:29:37,000
Speaker 1: two thousand thirteen, the n s A gathered in one

498
00:29:37,080 --> 00:29:42,320
Speaker 1: month a hundred and twenty four billion phone calls, the

499
00:29:42,400 --> 00:29:46,000
Speaker 1: whole call, not just metadata, which by the way, supposedly

500
00:29:46,280 --> 00:29:48,680
Speaker 1: gives a clearer picture of you and your behavior than

501
00:29:48,720 --> 00:29:52,959
Speaker 1: a phone call necessarily would. Um. And if three billion

502
00:29:53,000 --> 00:29:56,560
Speaker 1: of those phone calls were from the United States, that's

503
00:29:56,560 --> 00:30:00,000
Speaker 1: a lot. And that's a single month, three billion phone calls. Yeah,

504
00:30:00,040 --> 00:30:01,880
Speaker 1: and then let me give you one more number. There's

505
00:30:01,920 --> 00:30:05,320
Speaker 1: a from the Snowdon files. Um. Some journalists analyzed them,

506
00:30:05,880 --> 00:30:08,520
Speaker 1: and they analyze a hundred and sixty thousand emails and

507
00:30:08,600 --> 00:30:12,560
Speaker 1: I AM chats that the n s A collected were

508
00:30:12,560 --> 00:30:19,200
Speaker 1: from average Americans and they contained identifying, um details, intimate

509
00:30:19,360 --> 00:30:22,560
Speaker 1: details like just the stuff like you would share to

510
00:30:22,600 --> 00:30:26,200
Speaker 1: like your closest confidant. Um. The n s A had

511
00:30:26,840 --> 00:30:31,800
Speaker 1: and of it was just average Americans. Well, uh, remember

512
00:30:31,840 --> 00:30:36,480
Speaker 1: when we talked about Tour in our Deep Web episode,

513
00:30:36,680 --> 00:30:41,080
Speaker 1: UM it's an Internet anonymizer UM that allows you to

514
00:30:41,200 --> 00:30:45,920
Speaker 1: search the Internet supposedly anonymous. The n s A revealed

515
00:30:46,000 --> 00:30:51,360
Speaker 1: recently that they consider everybody that uses tour a potential extremist.

516
00:30:51,840 --> 00:30:54,440
Speaker 1: In that two thousand and eight fives An Amendment Act,

517
00:30:55,320 --> 00:30:58,640
Speaker 1: one of the one of the exceptions for getting rid

518
00:30:58,680 --> 00:31:02,760
Speaker 1: of an Americans off is if it's encrypted. So if

519
00:31:02,800 --> 00:31:05,960
Speaker 1: you are using encryption stuff, that they can target it

520
00:31:06,040 --> 00:31:09,520
Speaker 1: and try their best to decrypt it just because it's encrypted. Yeah,

521
00:31:09,600 --> 00:31:13,880
Speaker 1: everybody that. In fact, if if you even visit tours website,

522
00:31:14,280 --> 00:31:15,720
Speaker 1: you're going to be put on the n s a's

523
00:31:15,760 --> 00:31:19,640
Speaker 1: red list supposedly just by visiting the site. And as

524
00:31:19,640 --> 00:31:22,400
Speaker 1: we pointed out in the Deep Web episode, not everyone

525
00:31:22,600 --> 00:31:25,520
Speaker 1: that uses tours on the deep Web is an extremist.

526
00:31:25,600 --> 00:31:29,200
Speaker 1: There's a lot of people that just like their privacy. Journalists, attorneys,

527
00:31:29,520 --> 00:31:34,240
Speaker 1: civil rights activists, regular schmos that don't want to be

528
00:31:34,440 --> 00:31:38,840
Speaker 1: spied on are now considered potential extremists because they don't

529
00:31:38,880 --> 00:31:41,320
Speaker 1: want to be spied on under this two thou eight

530
00:31:41,320 --> 00:31:45,160
Speaker 1: executive order by Obama. That's right, who else might be

531
00:31:46,120 --> 00:31:49,520
Speaker 1: looked at how about potential um someone you don't like

532
00:31:49,600 --> 00:31:53,560
Speaker 1: in politics. It was just released. Um. I think Greenwall

533
00:31:53,680 --> 00:31:59,080
Speaker 1: was who exposed this too, that five Americans were surveiled

534
00:31:59,760 --> 00:32:03,120
Speaker 1: under or this program without a warrant. One was a

535
00:32:03,280 --> 00:32:06,720
Speaker 1: Republican Party operative, one was a civil rights activists. A

536
00:32:06,720 --> 00:32:09,960
Speaker 1: few of them were professors. They were all Muslim. That's

537
00:32:10,000 --> 00:32:14,160
Speaker 1: no accident. Uh, just regular folks though nothing not extremists,

538
00:32:14,160 --> 00:32:17,680
Speaker 1: not terrorists. The Republican Party operative was a served in

539
00:32:17,680 --> 00:32:21,920
Speaker 1: the Navy. He's he's like a good dude and was

540
00:32:21,960 --> 00:32:25,440
Speaker 1: being spied on and um. In two thousand eleven, wire

541
00:32:25,520 --> 00:32:29,360
Speaker 1: dot Com revealed FBI training documents that said view all

542
00:32:29,440 --> 00:32:33,640
Speaker 1: Muslims as potential radicals and and say internal training document

543
00:32:34,200 --> 00:32:37,320
Speaker 1: UM as a placeholder for surveillance targets, uses the term

544
00:32:37,640 --> 00:32:43,320
Speaker 1: Mohammed raghead. And that's basically, if you're a Muslim and

545
00:32:43,440 --> 00:32:45,880
Speaker 1: you live in the United States or abroad, then you

546
00:32:45,920 --> 00:32:48,240
Speaker 1: are looked at as the enemy as far as the

547
00:32:48,320 --> 00:32:51,480
Speaker 1: NSA is concerned, or a potential enemy. Well, that was

548
00:32:51,520 --> 00:32:53,760
Speaker 1: the thing when all of this stuff started to come out,

549
00:32:54,040 --> 00:32:58,040
Speaker 1: Obama's administration was saying, like, we don't spy on Americans

550
00:32:58,040 --> 00:33:01,080
Speaker 1: were not like getting all of this inform nation on Americans.

551
00:33:01,120 --> 00:33:04,440
Speaker 1: It's not Americans, it's everybody else. And the internet companies

552
00:33:04,480 --> 00:33:08,520
Speaker 1: were like, um, like a good portion of our customer

553
00:33:08,560 --> 00:33:11,480
Speaker 1: base or overseas, and you're sitting here saying like, we

554
00:33:11,560 --> 00:33:15,320
Speaker 1: still target them, yeah, because their foreigners. It's it's so

555
00:33:15,480 --> 00:33:19,200
Speaker 1: yeah either way, it doesn't really dovetail with your point,

556
00:33:19,240 --> 00:33:22,160
Speaker 1: but you just chog my memory. What about spying on

557
00:33:22,200 --> 00:33:24,680
Speaker 1: your wife or your girlfriend. Surely no one would ever

558
00:33:24,760 --> 00:33:28,360
Speaker 1: use this capability to do something like that, right, it happens,

559
00:33:28,720 --> 00:33:32,400
Speaker 1: and they they have data that said they used a

560
00:33:32,480 --> 00:33:36,640
Speaker 1: warrantless surveillance on wives girlfriends would be girlfriends, uh and

561
00:33:36,720 --> 00:33:42,000
Speaker 1: abuse that spawned the intelligence communities term love ant instead

562
00:33:42,040 --> 00:33:48,040
Speaker 1: of sig NT. So some guy has the program open

563
00:33:48,320 --> 00:33:50,680
Speaker 1: xki stroke and he's like, Hey, I wonder if my

564
00:33:50,720 --> 00:33:53,640
Speaker 1: girlfriend's cheating on me or not even that, I just

565
00:33:53,680 --> 00:33:56,520
Speaker 1: want to spy on this person, this girl I want

566
00:33:56,520 --> 00:33:59,440
Speaker 1: to go out with. That's what And I'm not saying

567
00:33:59,480 --> 00:34:01,240
Speaker 1: that's happening all over the place, but if it happens

568
00:34:01,280 --> 00:34:06,480
Speaker 1: at all, it's an abusive power. UM. The the guy

569
00:34:06,560 --> 00:34:09,920
Speaker 1: Daniel so love and is um why Privacy Matters? Article?

570
00:34:10,120 --> 00:34:12,799
Speaker 1: He makes the point that even if you do have

571
00:34:12,880 --> 00:34:17,400
Speaker 1: nothing to hide or whatever, if everybody has a dossier,

572
00:34:17,600 --> 00:34:21,880
Speaker 1: if everybody has some sort of file, and if you

573
00:34:21,960 --> 00:34:25,800
Speaker 1: ever do decide to say speak out against tyranny or

574
00:34:26,239 --> 00:34:31,120
Speaker 1: or um the the E p A or whatever, they

575
00:34:31,120 --> 00:34:33,799
Speaker 1: can say, Hey, we've got this proublemaker over here, what

576
00:34:33,880 --> 00:34:36,800
Speaker 1: file do you have on them? And all of this stuff,

577
00:34:36,840 --> 00:34:39,840
Speaker 1: whether it's in context or not, can all be pieced

578
00:34:39,840 --> 00:34:42,520
Speaker 1: together to look however they want it to look. And

579
00:34:42,560 --> 00:34:47,160
Speaker 1: all of a sudden you suddenly lose your conviction, Like

580
00:34:47,280 --> 00:34:51,760
Speaker 1: that's at the n s A is at the least

581
00:34:52,840 --> 00:34:56,120
Speaker 1: in danger of having so much information that it can't

582
00:34:56,120 --> 00:34:59,799
Speaker 1: possibly keep track of everything. At worst, it's setting up

583
00:34:59,840 --> 00:35:04,680
Speaker 1: the foundation for a tyrannical government that, by its very

584
00:35:04,719 --> 00:35:08,759
Speaker 1: definition in nature and the capability that it has, can't

585
00:35:08,760 --> 00:35:11,360
Speaker 1: be anything but tyrannical. Even if it tried not to

586
00:35:11,400 --> 00:35:16,040
Speaker 1: be tyrannical, it couldn't with this capability. Yeah, and and

587
00:35:16,680 --> 00:35:20,120
Speaker 1: they literally like will install something called fiber opic optic

588
00:35:20,239 --> 00:35:26,080
Speaker 1: splitters at communications hubs. Has to be under the compliance

589
00:35:26,080 --> 00:35:29,319
Speaker 1: of of the of these companies. Like they're breaking in

590
00:35:29,360 --> 00:35:31,759
Speaker 1: there and doing it. There's no way. This is a

591
00:35:31,800 --> 00:35:34,839
Speaker 1: revelation that came up before Snowdon. There was a guy

592
00:35:35,080 --> 00:35:36,719
Speaker 1: by the last name of Klein who was an a

593
00:35:36,760 --> 00:35:40,040
Speaker 1: T and T engineer in San Francisco, and he found this.

594
00:35:40,040 --> 00:35:43,520
Speaker 1: This is in the United States of secrets. He found

595
00:35:43,960 --> 00:35:47,840
Speaker 1: this cable going up from one of the I guess

596
00:35:47,840 --> 00:35:50,399
Speaker 1: main routers of Core's that going yeah, And he went

597
00:35:50,400 --> 00:35:52,399
Speaker 1: and looked on the schematics and he's like, wait, there's

598
00:35:52,400 --> 00:35:54,759
Speaker 1: not supposed to be a room above there, but they're

599
00:35:55,040 --> 00:35:57,480
Speaker 1: a cable going to a room that's not on the

600
00:35:57,520 --> 00:36:00,239
Speaker 1: blueprints for this building. So we started looking. What he

601
00:36:00,280 --> 00:36:02,640
Speaker 1: found was the splitter that you were talking about, where

602
00:36:02,960 --> 00:36:06,239
Speaker 1: it takes the If the communication line is a beam

603
00:36:06,280 --> 00:36:09,080
Speaker 1: of light on a fiber optic cable, it uses a

604
00:36:09,080 --> 00:36:12,440
Speaker 1: mirror to make a copy of it and split it

605
00:36:12,440 --> 00:36:16,799
Speaker 1: in two, and one goes to the intended recipient, the

606
00:36:16,800 --> 00:36:19,239
Speaker 1: other goes to the n s A And that could

607
00:36:19,280 --> 00:36:23,919
Speaker 1: be your information or your life, or your phone, call,

608
00:36:24,000 --> 00:36:28,680
Speaker 1: your email, whatever. How about this. They will intercept hardware

609
00:36:28,760 --> 00:36:35,000
Speaker 1: like a router UH servers and and retrofit them to

610
00:36:35,080 --> 00:36:38,000
Speaker 1: serve their purposes, factory seal it and send it right

611
00:36:38,040 --> 00:36:41,160
Speaker 1: back to be sold. YEA. So it is pre pre

612
00:36:41,239 --> 00:36:44,680
Speaker 1: bugged for your convenience, right, they reroute it from the

613
00:36:44,719 --> 00:36:47,759
Speaker 1: distribution chain without the person who ordered it from like

614
00:36:47,880 --> 00:36:51,600
Speaker 1: Hewlett Packard or whoever, knowing that it was intercepted by

615
00:36:51,640 --> 00:36:53,560
Speaker 1: the n s A and bugged. Well. And because of

616
00:36:53,600 --> 00:36:55,759
Speaker 1: all of this stuff, there's some people that call Edward

617
00:36:55,800 --> 00:37:01,160
Speaker 1: Snowden a hero. Some people call them um Benedict Arnold

618
00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:04,360
Speaker 1: and a big fat trader that should never be allowed

619
00:37:04,360 --> 00:37:07,319
Speaker 1: back in the country. Um. If he hadn't come out

620
00:37:07,360 --> 00:37:09,120
Speaker 1: and said the stuff, it would probably all still be

621
00:37:09,160 --> 00:37:11,840
Speaker 1: going on in secret, don't you imagine for sure? I

622
00:37:11,840 --> 00:37:16,080
Speaker 1: don't think they would have self reported. No, no, they

623
00:37:16,080 --> 00:37:18,600
Speaker 1: definitely would not have. I think we're in total agreement

624
00:37:18,640 --> 00:37:23,000
Speaker 1: on that. So you know, it's up to listeners out

625
00:37:23,000 --> 00:37:25,920
Speaker 1: there to decide how you feel about what this guy did. Chuck. Um.

626
00:37:26,040 --> 00:37:28,120
Speaker 1: There's some other stuff that the n s A did,

627
00:37:28,960 --> 00:37:32,160
Speaker 1: apparently under the auspices of the FISA Court one of

628
00:37:32,200 --> 00:37:35,680
Speaker 1: the UM. So it's it's tasked with eavesdropping on like

629
00:37:36,040 --> 00:37:40,280
Speaker 1: enemies of the state. It's also cracker jack at getting

630
00:37:40,680 --> 00:37:46,200
Speaker 1: economic and diplomatic information to people like the Department of Energy,

631
00:37:46,239 --> 00:37:50,480
Speaker 1: the Department of Agriculture, the ambassadors to the U n UM,

632
00:37:50,640 --> 00:37:53,560
Speaker 1: people who deal with the EU. All of these people

633
00:37:53,600 --> 00:37:56,080
Speaker 1: are bugged by the n s A. And we've just

634
00:37:56,120 --> 00:37:58,200
Speaker 1: recently found out, and they've just recently found out and

635
00:37:58,200 --> 00:38:00,520
Speaker 1: are not very happy about it, and order to give

636
00:38:00,560 --> 00:38:05,360
Speaker 1: the US information superiority in negotiations. Yeah, that's what I

637
00:38:05,360 --> 00:38:07,960
Speaker 1: was talking about earlier, Like basically using it for political

638
00:38:08,000 --> 00:38:10,880
Speaker 1: gain has nothing to do with spying on terrorists exactly.

639
00:38:11,480 --> 00:38:14,880
Speaker 1: It's information superiority. That's the stated aim of the n

640
00:38:15,040 --> 00:38:19,440
Speaker 1: s A. There's another one too that really like before

641
00:38:19,840 --> 00:38:26,440
Speaker 1: the Internet companies were feeling um frustrated that they weren't

642
00:38:26,440 --> 00:38:30,040
Speaker 1: allowed to talk about the seven O two warrant requests,

643
00:38:30,360 --> 00:38:33,359
Speaker 1: that section seven O two that comes from and and

644
00:38:33,480 --> 00:38:37,600
Speaker 1: because in addition to having to give the government this information,

645
00:38:38,239 --> 00:38:40,480
Speaker 1: you also can't talk about it at all. There's a

646
00:38:40,480 --> 00:38:43,080
Speaker 1: gag order associated with it. So the Internet companies couldn't

647
00:38:43,080 --> 00:38:45,960
Speaker 1: say anything in their defense about this, but they were

648
00:38:46,000 --> 00:38:51,399
Speaker 1: still they were frustrated. But then they felt um like

649
00:38:51,440 --> 00:38:55,080
Speaker 1: a thief had gotten to broken into their houses because

650
00:38:55,080 --> 00:38:58,279
Speaker 1: they found out about this program called Muscular, and Muscular

651
00:38:58,520 --> 00:39:01,319
Speaker 1: went around the Internet companies and went directly to the

652
00:39:01,360 --> 00:39:04,640
Speaker 1: fiber optic line between Google servers and Yahoo servers and

653
00:39:04,680 --> 00:39:07,680
Speaker 1: just tapped in and sucked it right out of there

654
00:39:07,880 --> 00:39:12,480
Speaker 1: and apparently decrypted it fairly easily. Um, so they're getting

655
00:39:12,520 --> 00:39:15,880
Speaker 1: information with the complicity of the internet companies and behind

656
00:39:15,880 --> 00:39:19,440
Speaker 1: the Internet company's backs. That was a huge surprise. So

657
00:39:19,480 --> 00:39:23,799
Speaker 1: there's basically like, we have no allegiance whatsoever except to

658
00:39:23,800 --> 00:39:27,520
Speaker 1: our information collections. Yeah, it seems like there are no

659
00:39:27,640 --> 00:39:32,560
Speaker 1: rules and safeguards and checks and balances at all. I'm

660
00:39:32,600 --> 00:39:34,360
Speaker 1: interested to see what happens in the coming years. I

661
00:39:34,400 --> 00:39:41,359
Speaker 1: would my guess is that Snowdon's revelations will become obsolete

662
00:39:41,880 --> 00:39:44,520
Speaker 1: and unimportant and that things will kind of go back

663
00:39:44,560 --> 00:39:47,719
Speaker 1: to normal. I hope they never become unimportant. I hope

664
00:39:47,719 --> 00:39:51,520
Speaker 1: what you're saying isn't right. I know that initially feared

665
00:39:51,840 --> 00:39:54,319
Speaker 1: to him, as he said, the worst thing that could

666
00:39:54,360 --> 00:39:56,160
Speaker 1: happen is that if he did this, he took all

667
00:39:56,200 --> 00:39:59,720
Speaker 1: these risks and and exposed all this and nobody cared.

668
00:40:00,680 --> 00:40:04,000
Speaker 1: That clearly didn't happen. But you know, there's this second

669
00:40:04,800 --> 00:40:08,920
Speaker 1: potential problem, which is that eventually people just become fatigued

670
00:40:09,000 --> 00:40:13,160
Speaker 1: from all of this exposure to all all this information

671
00:40:13,200 --> 00:40:16,759
Speaker 1: that you're just like Okay, I get it. I'm my

672
00:40:16,840 --> 00:40:19,920
Speaker 1: life is not my own. I can't take worrying about

673
00:40:19,920 --> 00:40:22,399
Speaker 1: this anymore. So I'm just gonna detach and not care

674
00:40:23,200 --> 00:40:26,760
Speaker 1: that I hope doesn't happen. I think the vast majority

675
00:40:26,800 --> 00:40:31,520
Speaker 1: of people don't care. That's crazy to me. Like again, yeah,

676
00:40:31,600 --> 00:40:33,720
Speaker 1: I agree with you. You You can feel about Stone however

677
00:40:33,800 --> 00:40:39,200
Speaker 1: you feel. But the concept of being snooped on regardless

678
00:40:39,200 --> 00:40:42,000
Speaker 1: of your political affiliation or anything like that, it's not

679
00:40:42,000 --> 00:40:44,960
Speaker 1: supposed to be that way here. That transcends like anything,

680
00:40:45,040 --> 00:40:48,320
Speaker 1: like how do you not care? At least? That's crazy

681
00:40:48,360 --> 00:40:51,719
Speaker 1: to me. Uh, there's just like this would be an

682
00:40:51,719 --> 00:40:53,919
Speaker 1: eighteen hour episode if we went in all the stuff

683
00:40:53,960 --> 00:40:56,279
Speaker 1: the n s A did. So we'll say, if if

684
00:40:56,280 --> 00:41:00,359
Speaker 1: you like this, go look up the required reading um

685
00:41:00,400 --> 00:41:03,120
Speaker 1: and you'll find plenty of other stuff out there on

686
00:41:03,880 --> 00:41:05,360
Speaker 1: everything you want to know about the N s A.

687
00:41:05,440 --> 00:41:08,759
Speaker 1: These days, it's all out there about all two percent

688
00:41:08,840 --> 00:41:11,120
Speaker 1: of it. You can also learn more about the N

689
00:41:11,160 --> 00:41:13,920
Speaker 1: s A by typing N say into the search bar

690
00:41:14,040 --> 00:41:17,920
Speaker 1: how stuff works dot com, and that will bring up

691
00:41:17,960 --> 00:41:20,400
Speaker 1: this fine article. Since I said search parts time for

692
00:41:20,400 --> 00:41:25,600
Speaker 1: a listener, ma'am, I'm gonna call this a bit on

693
00:41:25,680 --> 00:41:29,360
Speaker 1: trickling down. Um, hey, guys, wanted to write in with

694
00:41:29,440 --> 00:41:33,040
Speaker 1: a clarification on the episode and trickle down economics. At

695
00:41:33,040 --> 00:41:35,160
Speaker 1: one point, you guys use an example of someone working.

696
00:41:35,400 --> 00:41:37,640
Speaker 1: Do not think it is so worth it to get

697
00:41:37,640 --> 00:41:39,799
Speaker 1: a promotion so it could put push you into a

698
00:41:39,840 --> 00:41:43,080
Speaker 1: higher tax bracket and thus you're barely bringing home any

699
00:41:43,120 --> 00:41:45,440
Speaker 1: more money. I had to write in because of someone

700
00:41:45,440 --> 00:41:49,000
Speaker 1: who loves maths. I absolutely hate to see this misperception

701
00:41:49,000 --> 00:41:51,799
Speaker 1: of how our taxes work. I've heard people I work

702
00:41:51,840 --> 00:41:54,120
Speaker 1: with claim the same thing, thinking that getting a five

703
00:41:54,640 --> 00:41:56,840
Speaker 1: bonus could push them over a line and all of

704
00:41:56,920 --> 00:41:58,960
Speaker 1: a sudden it would bring they would bring home less

705
00:41:59,000 --> 00:42:01,560
Speaker 1: money than before. I want to stay for the record,

706
00:42:01,600 --> 00:42:04,920
Speaker 1: I know this. We were just giving a different example

707
00:42:05,040 --> 00:42:08,359
Speaker 1: that wasn't fully fleshed out. Uh, this is completely wrong

708
00:42:08,360 --> 00:42:10,480
Speaker 1: based on how the tax structure works. Even if you

709
00:42:10,520 --> 00:42:13,600
Speaker 1: make one million dollars a year, the first nine thousand

710
00:42:13,680 --> 00:42:16,520
Speaker 1: will be based at ten um, the next twenty eight

711
00:42:16,600 --> 00:42:21,400
Speaker 1: thousand will be based the next at fifty two, and

712
00:42:21,440 --> 00:42:23,520
Speaker 1: so on. I think you guys know this since you

713
00:42:23,600 --> 00:42:25,920
Speaker 1: kind of allude to it in other places, but I

714
00:42:25,960 --> 00:42:28,640
Speaker 1: was hoping you can make it perfectly clear. So those

715
00:42:28,680 --> 00:42:31,040
Speaker 1: people who might be mistaken realizing that making more will

716
00:42:31,080 --> 00:42:35,279
Speaker 1: never push all of your income into a higher tax bracket. Uh,

717
00:42:35,320 --> 00:42:38,120
Speaker 1: if you make, for example, thirty six thou dollars, you

718
00:42:38,120 --> 00:42:39,880
Speaker 1: will be in that fifteen percent bracket, and if you

719
00:42:39,880 --> 00:42:43,840
Speaker 1: get a raised to forty dollars and the bracket, you

720
00:42:43,840 --> 00:42:48,959
Speaker 1: will only be paying on the above that bracket line.

721
00:42:49,719 --> 00:42:51,440
Speaker 1: The same is true of Josh's claim of the richest

722
00:42:51,440 --> 00:42:54,200
Speaker 1: people in the US used to pay. True, but they

723
00:42:54,200 --> 00:42:58,359
Speaker 1: only paid on the amount over the previous bracket. Right.

724
00:42:58,400 --> 00:43:01,280
Speaker 1: But let's say the previous bracket in half a million

725
00:43:02,040 --> 00:43:04,799
Speaker 1: and then the next million dollars or no, you made

726
00:43:04,840 --> 00:43:08,960
Speaker 1: another half a million and it was tax. That's a

727
00:43:09,000 --> 00:43:13,040
Speaker 1: disincentive to work. That's what we were saying, Like, Yeah,

728
00:43:13,200 --> 00:43:14,719
Speaker 1: I think we could have been clear on how it works,

729
00:43:14,719 --> 00:43:19,360
Speaker 1: though I'm sure we could have. UM. Anyways, thanks what

730
00:43:19,440 --> 00:43:21,319
Speaker 1: you do, and that is from charity. Thanks a lot

731
00:43:21,320 --> 00:43:25,040
Speaker 1: of charity for clarifying. I appreciate it. UM. If you

732
00:43:25,160 --> 00:43:28,239
Speaker 1: have a clarification for us for anything we want to

733
00:43:28,280 --> 00:43:30,800
Speaker 1: hear from you, you can tweet to us at s

734
00:43:30,920 --> 00:43:33,640
Speaker 1: Y s K podcast. You can join us on Facebook

735
00:43:33,680 --> 00:43:35,919
Speaker 1: dot com, slash stuff you Should Know. You can send

736
00:43:36,000 --> 00:43:39,399
Speaker 1: us an email to Stuff Podcast at Discovery dot com, and,

737
00:43:39,520 --> 00:43:41,399
Speaker 1: as always, join us at our home on the web.

738
00:43:41,600 --> 00:43:48,880
Speaker 1: Stuff you Should Know dot com For more on this

739
00:43:49,040 --> 00:43:51,560
Speaker 1: and thousands of other topics, Is it how Stuff Works

740
00:43:51,560 --> 00:43:59,440
Speaker 1: dot com