1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:25,520 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Brading, Hello and welcome back to 5 00:00:25,560 --> 00:00:29,639 Speaker 1: the show. My name is Null. Our rider die Matt 6 00:00:29,760 --> 00:00:35,200 Speaker 1: Frederick is most likely playing Best Fiends while he's on vacation. 7 00:00:35,840 --> 00:00:38,479 Speaker 1: They called me Ben. We are joined as always with 8 00:00:38,560 --> 00:00:42,720 Speaker 1: our super producer Paul Mission controlled decond. Most importantly, you 9 00:00:42,760 --> 00:00:46,479 Speaker 1: are you, You are here, and that makes this stuff 10 00:00:46,640 --> 00:00:50,760 Speaker 1: they don't want you to know. This is a very 11 00:00:50,800 --> 00:00:56,480 Speaker 1: interesting episode. It's one that has um fascinated good pal 12 00:00:56,600 --> 00:01:01,080 Speaker 1: Matt for a number of years. Uh, this episode is 13 00:01:01,160 --> 00:01:04,679 Speaker 1: something that he cares deeply about. So we're gonna we're 14 00:01:04,680 --> 00:01:07,680 Speaker 1: gonna do our best to We're gonna do our best 15 00:01:07,720 --> 00:01:11,080 Speaker 1: to make him proud. Speaking of Matt, you blasted right 16 00:01:11,160 --> 00:01:14,400 Speaker 1: by this whole Best Fiends business. We got a bombshell 17 00:01:14,480 --> 00:01:17,080 Speaker 1: yesterday that Matt Frederick has reached level seven hundred and 18 00:01:17,120 --> 00:01:21,280 Speaker 1: sixty four in the mobile game Best Fiends. And I 19 00:01:21,280 --> 00:01:23,200 Speaker 1: don't know whether to be proud of him or concerned 20 00:01:23,240 --> 00:01:27,040 Speaker 1: for him. I mean, that's you know, Uh, he's nothing 21 00:01:27,080 --> 00:01:30,000 Speaker 1: if not a passionate dude, but I was. I was 22 00:01:30,280 --> 00:01:35,880 Speaker 1: likewise surprised. Now you know. No, if there's one thing 23 00:01:36,280 --> 00:01:38,880 Speaker 1: that long time listeners have learned from stuff they don't 24 00:01:38,880 --> 00:01:42,040 Speaker 1: want you to know, it's this. You can blast by 25 00:01:42,200 --> 00:01:44,400 Speaker 1: a lot of headlines, you can get a lot of 26 00:01:44,440 --> 00:01:48,480 Speaker 1: buried leads. The mainstream news is a fickle, ephemeral thing. 27 00:01:49,000 --> 00:01:53,640 Speaker 1: Some stories that seem pretty innocuous can receive international attention. 28 00:01:53,760 --> 00:01:57,240 Speaker 1: Like remember when the world was obsessed over figuring out 29 00:01:57,320 --> 00:02:01,400 Speaker 1: what color address was on Facebook? What was the determination 30 00:02:01,480 --> 00:02:05,560 Speaker 1: ultimately beij was it read? What were the choices? And 31 00:02:05,600 --> 00:02:08,000 Speaker 1: how do you even interpret this? Ben with your color deficiency? 32 00:02:08,080 --> 00:02:12,239 Speaker 1: Did you feel like that story? Now, I wouldn't have 33 00:02:12,320 --> 00:02:17,120 Speaker 1: participated even if I know what color I think it was. 34 00:02:17,240 --> 00:02:19,600 Speaker 1: It was blue or it was gold, or was black? 35 00:02:19,680 --> 00:02:22,520 Speaker 1: There was there was a whole thing. But there are 36 00:02:22,560 --> 00:02:28,200 Speaker 1: other stories, though, tremendously important stories that seemed to fade 37 00:02:28,320 --> 00:02:31,560 Speaker 1: from the spotlight, and they're only followed up on by 38 00:02:31,800 --> 00:02:38,000 Speaker 1: people in specialized internet forums or in specialized trade publications. 39 00:02:38,440 --> 00:02:43,680 Speaker 1: For example, this this is weird. You know. Today's story 40 00:02:43,960 --> 00:02:48,359 Speaker 1: comes to us from Josh P. Josh P, you emailed 41 00:02:48,480 --> 00:02:53,720 Speaker 1: us to ask about the anthrax attacks of two thousand 42 00:02:53,960 --> 00:02:57,240 Speaker 1: and one. Now, right as we say that, a lot 43 00:02:57,360 --> 00:03:00,440 Speaker 1: of us in the audience are going huh and tracks. 44 00:03:00,560 --> 00:03:04,200 Speaker 1: I I kind of remember that, right, I. I know 45 00:03:04,320 --> 00:03:07,840 Speaker 1: it's a thing, But what do you what do you mean? Well, 46 00:03:08,000 --> 00:03:10,079 Speaker 1: to answer that question, we have to first tell you 47 00:03:10,200 --> 00:03:13,519 Speaker 1: what anthrax is. So here are the facts. Yeah, So, 48 00:03:13,760 --> 00:03:15,280 Speaker 1: just to to get it out of the way. No, 49 00:03:15,600 --> 00:03:18,160 Speaker 1: not the thrash metal band from the nineties with that 50 00:03:18,320 --> 00:03:20,840 Speaker 1: ball dude with the amazing goatee that you may have 51 00:03:20,919 --> 00:03:23,480 Speaker 1: seen on episodes of Beavis and butt Head. Uh. The 52 00:03:23,639 --> 00:03:28,880 Speaker 1: c d C describes anthrax as a serious infectious disease 53 00:03:29,400 --> 00:03:34,040 Speaker 1: that's caused by something referred to as gram positive rod 54 00:03:34,200 --> 00:03:40,120 Speaker 1: shaped bacteria UM referred to as basilis and thracis um, 55 00:03:40,440 --> 00:03:45,400 Speaker 1: and it is something that can absolutely sicken people when 56 00:03:45,800 --> 00:03:49,240 Speaker 1: it's inhaled um or when they are they come into 57 00:03:49,280 --> 00:03:53,680 Speaker 1: contact with infected animals or um you know, food, food stuffs. 58 00:03:54,080 --> 00:03:55,920 Speaker 1: Another way of looking at it is that it's a 59 00:03:56,120 --> 00:04:01,160 Speaker 1: a spore forming basilis that is absolutely deadly to humans. 60 00:04:01,520 --> 00:04:05,440 Speaker 1: And there are three main forms of transmission UH. Cutaneous 61 00:04:05,720 --> 00:04:09,360 Speaker 1: which is when you um contract it through the skin, 62 00:04:10,120 --> 00:04:12,760 Speaker 1: gastro intestinal, which of course is when you would ingest 63 00:04:12,840 --> 00:04:16,240 Speaker 1: it when you know, eating a contaminated food product. And 64 00:04:16,360 --> 00:04:20,240 Speaker 1: then there is pulmonary, which is mainly what we're going 65 00:04:20,320 --> 00:04:24,240 Speaker 1: to be talking about today, which is when it is inhaled. Yeah, yeah, 66 00:04:24,520 --> 00:04:30,360 Speaker 1: that's that's correct. So so a lot of countries have 67 00:04:30,920 --> 00:04:35,160 Speaker 1: stockpiled anthrax for a long time. When you hear people 68 00:04:35,279 --> 00:04:41,160 Speaker 1: talking about bioweapon research, they're usually referring to things like 69 00:04:41,600 --> 00:04:47,320 Speaker 1: anthrax because picture antax like, um picture it like an 70 00:04:47,320 --> 00:04:50,760 Speaker 1: agricultural product. With the right know how, you can grow it, 71 00:04:51,200 --> 00:04:55,320 Speaker 1: you can groom it, and you can um change it 72 00:04:55,680 --> 00:05:00,200 Speaker 1: into various various mediums of consumption, right like you said, 73 00:05:00,279 --> 00:05:06,480 Speaker 1: with oral or pulmonary or cutaneous inhalation or ingestion. So, 74 00:05:08,440 --> 00:05:12,040 Speaker 1: behind the scenes, while everybody is worrying about what color 75 00:05:12,120 --> 00:05:16,200 Speaker 1: addresses or what the Kardashians are doing, or you know 76 00:05:16,360 --> 00:05:19,520 Speaker 1: what the newest season of your favorite television show is, 77 00:05:20,000 --> 00:05:26,159 Speaker 1: governments and private partnerships around the world are constantly experimenting 78 00:05:26,240 --> 00:05:29,720 Speaker 1: with diseases. They're refining them. You're usually going to hear 79 00:05:29,800 --> 00:05:36,000 Speaker 1: about these in terms of national defense, right like uh, like, 80 00:05:36,160 --> 00:05:38,840 Speaker 1: I'm sure you know if you went to the c 81 00:05:38,960 --> 00:05:41,800 Speaker 1: d C. They would say, we're not making bioweapons. We're 82 00:05:41,920 --> 00:05:46,400 Speaker 1: researching vaccines, right, We're trying to save people, not harm them, 83 00:05:46,760 --> 00:05:48,640 Speaker 1: That's right. And and you might hear a term like 84 00:05:48,800 --> 00:05:53,400 Speaker 1: weaponized grade you know, like weapons grade plutonium or weaponized anthrax, 85 00:05:53,440 --> 00:05:56,200 Speaker 1: and that just means it's refined to the point of 86 00:05:56,360 --> 00:06:02,159 Speaker 1: being um more easily dispersed, you know, through say air ducts, 87 00:06:02,279 --> 00:06:04,440 Speaker 1: you know in a building for example, or you know, 88 00:06:04,560 --> 00:06:06,839 Speaker 1: it's when I say refined, I literally mean made into 89 00:06:06,960 --> 00:06:11,960 Speaker 1: a fine substance that can be released and become very, 90 00:06:12,080 --> 00:06:15,520 Speaker 1: very dangerous because it is transmitted through you know, airflow 91 00:06:16,040 --> 00:06:19,560 Speaker 1: in the case of like a building or even outdoors. Yeah. Yeah. 92 00:06:19,720 --> 00:06:23,600 Speaker 1: And when we when we talk about these experts who 93 00:06:23,640 --> 00:06:27,920 Speaker 1: are working on, depending on what you believe, working on 94 00:06:28,160 --> 00:06:33,880 Speaker 1: either weaponizing diseases or on creating cures for these diseases, 95 00:06:34,320 --> 00:06:39,760 Speaker 1: they also work on plans on scenarios, right, They work 96 00:06:39,839 --> 00:06:43,919 Speaker 1: on what's called emergency preparedness plans. Yeah. And the CDC 97 00:06:44,279 --> 00:06:47,480 Speaker 1: on their website does have an emergency preparedness plan in 98 00:06:47,560 --> 00:06:52,480 Speaker 1: place for an anthrax attack. But in my opinion, and 99 00:06:52,520 --> 00:06:56,440 Speaker 1: I'm no expert, it seems pretty broad and kind of vague, 100 00:06:56,520 --> 00:06:59,840 Speaker 1: almost more of a stop, drop and roll situation than 101 00:07:00,000 --> 00:07:05,000 Speaker 1: actually some sort of larger government response plan that's that's 102 00:07:05,040 --> 00:07:08,080 Speaker 1: in place. Uh. And it's interesting and more recent times, 103 00:07:08,440 --> 00:07:12,600 Speaker 1: focus truly seems to have shifted away from you know, uh, 104 00:07:13,200 --> 00:07:18,800 Speaker 1: bio terrorism protection and more towards pandemic preparedness. Um. Though 105 00:07:19,360 --> 00:07:21,840 Speaker 1: based on our current situation, that does not seem to 106 00:07:21,920 --> 00:07:25,120 Speaker 1: have worked out quite so well. Um, so you know, 107 00:07:25,440 --> 00:07:29,000 Speaker 1: the jury is still out on that. But bio terrorism 108 00:07:29,280 --> 00:07:32,480 Speaker 1: was much more of a top of mind thing, uh 109 00:07:32,680 --> 00:07:36,480 Speaker 1: during these attacks that we're gonna talk about today, right, Yes, 110 00:07:36,720 --> 00:07:40,680 Speaker 1: fellow conspiracy realist, you may remember this story from several 111 00:07:40,800 --> 00:07:45,320 Speaker 1: years ago, almost twenty years ago now, Beginning on September 112 00:07:46,240 --> 00:07:50,560 Speaker 1: two thousand and one, just a week after literally just 113 00:07:50,680 --> 00:07:54,679 Speaker 1: a week after the infamous terrorist attacks on September eleventh, 114 00:07:54,760 --> 00:08:00,840 Speaker 1: two thousand one, someone started mailing letters laced with anthrax. 115 00:08:00,960 --> 00:08:06,000 Speaker 1: They sent the east to several places, ABC, NBC, CBS, 116 00:08:06,200 --> 00:08:10,360 Speaker 1: the New York Post. American Media. That's that's such a 117 00:08:10,560 --> 00:08:13,520 Speaker 1: that's such a benign name. American Media is probably best 118 00:08:13,600 --> 00:08:17,200 Speaker 1: known as the publisher of the National Enquirer, a quite 119 00:08:17,240 --> 00:08:20,760 Speaker 1: popular tabloid here in the US, and they also sent uh, 120 00:08:21,560 --> 00:08:26,920 Speaker 1: someone sent these sent anthrax least letters to members of Congress. 121 00:08:27,400 --> 00:08:31,679 Speaker 1: That's correct, to Democratic Senators Tom Dashell and Patrick Leahy. 122 00:08:32,280 --> 00:08:36,120 Speaker 1: On October two, two thousand one, um uh, the gentleman 123 00:08:36,280 --> 00:08:39,240 Speaker 1: at the American Media Building in Florida, which is again 124 00:08:39,280 --> 00:08:43,480 Speaker 1: the parent company of the National Enquirer and also the Sun. 125 00:08:44,120 --> 00:08:46,920 Speaker 1: UM a photo editor by the name of Robert Stevens 126 00:08:47,160 --> 00:08:54,599 Speaker 1: opened um an innocuously labeled envelope and was exposed to 127 00:08:55,200 --> 00:08:59,760 Speaker 1: anthrax um. There were various methods in these letters of dispersal, 128 00:08:59,840 --> 00:09:01,600 Speaker 1: but like some of them were more successful than others. 129 00:09:01,640 --> 00:09:04,000 Speaker 1: And I believe this is one where he pulled something 130 00:09:04,080 --> 00:09:06,880 Speaker 1: out of the envelope and it actually kind of ejected 131 00:09:06,960 --> 00:09:09,680 Speaker 1: powder into his face and he really took a deep 132 00:09:09,760 --> 00:09:14,640 Speaker 1: whiff of this, uh, this substance. Yep, absolutely, that's correct. 133 00:09:14,679 --> 00:09:18,840 Speaker 1: Two days later, October fourth, two thousand and one, Robert 134 00:09:18,880 --> 00:09:24,160 Speaker 1: Stevens is diagnosed with what's called inhalational anthrax, meaning it 135 00:09:24,880 --> 00:09:28,880 Speaker 1: he ingested it just the way you described NOL. Robert 136 00:09:28,920 --> 00:09:32,679 Speaker 1: Stevens dies the next day October five, two thousand and one, 137 00:09:33,040 --> 00:09:37,679 Speaker 1: and three days later, authorities in start running tests on 138 00:09:37,840 --> 00:09:40,880 Speaker 1: his office on his workspace, and they find that his 139 00:09:41,080 --> 00:09:46,000 Speaker 1: computer keyboard also tests positive for anthrax. This was only 140 00:09:46,080 --> 00:09:50,760 Speaker 1: the first confirmed death overall so far as we know today. 141 00:09:50,800 --> 00:09:55,880 Speaker 1: In the anthrax attacks of two thousand and one left 142 00:09:56,240 --> 00:10:01,920 Speaker 1: seventeen people infected and five people died. Five people died 143 00:10:02,320 --> 00:10:09,040 Speaker 1: from exposure to anthrax. This became a international story, and 144 00:10:09,559 --> 00:10:13,599 Speaker 1: the problem with some of these international stories is that 145 00:10:14,160 --> 00:10:18,640 Speaker 1: for one reason or another, copycats come into play. That's right, Um, 146 00:10:18,880 --> 00:10:23,080 Speaker 1: there was another copycat crime that occurred when someone else 147 00:10:23,240 --> 00:10:26,440 Speaker 1: mailed fake anthrax in the form of just a harmless 148 00:10:26,480 --> 00:10:29,439 Speaker 1: white powder possibly baby powder or something like that, to 149 00:10:29,559 --> 00:10:32,280 Speaker 1: the New York Times newsroom, and it was opened by 150 00:10:32,400 --> 00:10:35,960 Speaker 1: a reporter named Judith Miller. Um. And and it really 151 00:10:36,040 --> 00:10:37,800 Speaker 1: just goes to show, because of what you said, Ben, 152 00:10:38,040 --> 00:10:42,360 Speaker 1: that this truly, uh just was a massive story because 153 00:10:42,440 --> 00:10:46,320 Speaker 1: it was in the wake of nine eleven where people 154 00:10:46,400 --> 00:10:49,720 Speaker 1: were just so on edge already and just really believing 155 00:10:49,840 --> 00:10:53,559 Speaker 1: that terrorism was coming at us from all directions, and 156 00:10:53,720 --> 00:10:57,200 Speaker 1: the close proximity to that attack on on the World 157 00:10:57,240 --> 00:11:00,439 Speaker 1: Trade Center buildings really got people freaked out, and the 158 00:11:00,600 --> 00:11:04,600 Speaker 1: FBI acted accordingly, launching what they referred to as one 159 00:11:04,640 --> 00:11:08,320 Speaker 1: of the largest and most complex investigations in the history 160 00:11:08,880 --> 00:11:13,000 Speaker 1: of law enforcement and involved multiple agencies and thousands of 161 00:11:13,400 --> 00:11:18,120 Speaker 1: hours of investigative time. So what did they find. Well, 162 00:11:18,280 --> 00:11:20,920 Speaker 1: we have to remember, as you said, that this occurred 163 00:11:21,400 --> 00:11:27,480 Speaker 1: right after nine eleven. It is impossible to convey just 164 00:11:27,840 --> 00:11:35,440 Speaker 1: how um alert, how tense, how crisis ready government agencies were. 165 00:11:36,200 --> 00:11:40,199 Speaker 1: You have to remember, folks, that war was in the 166 00:11:40,320 --> 00:11:44,400 Speaker 1: air way before the anthrax. It was already floating around 167 00:11:44,559 --> 00:11:48,920 Speaker 1: it's and war is its own sort of infectious weapon, right, 168 00:11:49,040 --> 00:11:53,199 Speaker 1: its own sort of disease. The FBI scrambled and assembled 169 00:11:53,360 --> 00:11:57,559 Speaker 1: what I think is a terribly named task force, the 170 00:11:57,840 --> 00:12:01,719 Speaker 1: Amerithrax Task Force. We didn't write that. They wrote that 171 00:12:02,640 --> 00:12:04,840 Speaker 1: it just does not really roll right off the tug, 172 00:12:04,960 --> 00:12:08,319 Speaker 1: does it? But you know, name aside, it was a 173 00:12:08,520 --> 00:12:12,640 Speaker 1: serious business. Roughly twenty five to thirty full time investigators 174 00:12:13,000 --> 00:12:16,679 Speaker 1: from the FBI and the US Postal Inspection Service and 175 00:12:17,160 --> 00:12:21,320 Speaker 1: multiple other law enforcement agencies, as well as federal prosecutors 176 00:12:21,520 --> 00:12:24,000 Speaker 1: from the District of Columbia and the Justice Department Counter 177 00:12:24,160 --> 00:12:28,000 Speaker 1: Terrorism Section UM and as we said before, thousands of 178 00:12:28,080 --> 00:12:32,280 Speaker 1: investigator work hours were involved that lead to ten thousand 179 00:12:32,679 --> 00:12:38,480 Speaker 1: witness interviews on six different continents. Execution of eighty search 180 00:12:38,559 --> 00:12:41,400 Speaker 1: warrants in the recovery of more than six thousand items 181 00:12:41,600 --> 00:12:46,280 Speaker 1: of potential evidence during this investigation. And you heard that right, 182 00:12:46,960 --> 00:12:51,920 Speaker 1: six different continents. So that means that the Amerithrax Task 183 00:12:52,040 --> 00:12:58,000 Speaker 1: Force literally asked people everywhere except for Antarctica. Somehow the 184 00:12:58,120 --> 00:13:02,319 Speaker 1: folks in Antarctica slipped under the radar. This this case 185 00:13:02,840 --> 00:13:08,200 Speaker 1: also ended up issuing more than five thousand, seven hundred 186 00:13:08,240 --> 00:13:13,320 Speaker 1: and fifty subpoenas for grand juries. They collected five thousand, 187 00:13:13,440 --> 00:13:18,240 Speaker 1: seven hundred and thirty environmental samples from sixty different places 188 00:13:18,400 --> 00:13:23,559 Speaker 1: they were on the search. This this investigation, in addition 189 00:13:23,600 --> 00:13:27,440 Speaker 1: to being very expensive, was very thorough. Here's what Here's 190 00:13:27,480 --> 00:13:30,160 Speaker 1: what they found. Here's how it shakes out. So FBI 191 00:13:30,320 --> 00:13:35,439 Speaker 1: agents trace the first wave of letters to a single postmark. 192 00:13:36,040 --> 00:13:40,599 Speaker 1: It's a These letters came from Trenton, New Jersey, and 193 00:13:40,760 --> 00:13:45,079 Speaker 1: that's the first five letters. They had a theme of sorts. 194 00:13:45,320 --> 00:13:48,720 Speaker 1: You know, the letters weren't blank. When people opened the envelope, 195 00:13:48,800 --> 00:13:52,560 Speaker 1: there was something written in there. And we've got we've 196 00:13:52,559 --> 00:13:56,040 Speaker 1: got the text of these. Um let's let's maybe start 197 00:13:56,120 --> 00:13:58,520 Speaker 1: with the letters sent to New York Post in NBC 198 00:13:59,040 --> 00:14:01,040 Speaker 1: absolutely and and By the way, if you want, you 199 00:14:01,120 --> 00:14:04,160 Speaker 1: can look up images of these. They've been cataloged and 200 00:14:04,240 --> 00:14:07,120 Speaker 1: photographed and you can see them. They're all handwritten in 201 00:14:07,320 --> 00:14:11,559 Speaker 1: kind of a weird childish script. It's very Serial Killer esque, honestly, 202 00:14:11,640 --> 00:14:14,000 Speaker 1: the way the way they appear. Uh. And and the 203 00:14:14,360 --> 00:14:18,240 Speaker 1: notes really lean into that even further. Um So, the 204 00:14:18,320 --> 00:14:19,840 Speaker 1: one set to the New York Post in the NBC 205 00:14:20,000 --> 00:14:24,040 Speaker 1: News had this note nine eleven oh one. Uh, this 206 00:14:24,360 --> 00:14:30,320 Speaker 1: is next. Take penicillin now cool. Pro tip death to America, 207 00:14:30,880 --> 00:14:34,160 Speaker 1: death to Israel Allah is great. Okay, it seems to 208 00:14:34,240 --> 00:14:36,920 Speaker 1: have escalated there to a little different place. But I 209 00:14:36,960 --> 00:14:40,200 Speaker 1: appreciate the the advice about taking penicillin, and I think 210 00:14:40,240 --> 00:14:43,560 Speaker 1: that's actually really helpful. You know, they also misspelled penicillin, 211 00:14:43,640 --> 00:14:46,320 Speaker 1: by the way, it's true. But also by the way, 212 00:14:46,440 --> 00:14:49,080 Speaker 1: um you know, people think of anthrax and they think, like, 213 00:14:49,160 --> 00:14:51,240 Speaker 1: I don't know, your mind immediately goes to some sort 214 00:14:51,280 --> 00:14:55,040 Speaker 1: of face melting you know, bio terror product, and it 215 00:14:55,160 --> 00:14:57,600 Speaker 1: really just sickens you and it can make you nauseous, 216 00:14:57,640 --> 00:14:59,800 Speaker 1: and it's the respiratory thing that can obviously kill you 217 00:15:00,120 --> 00:15:01,880 Speaker 1: in the same way that COVID nineteen can. I mean, 218 00:15:02,040 --> 00:15:04,880 Speaker 1: it can escalate much more quickly. But it is treatable 219 00:15:05,240 --> 00:15:09,640 Speaker 1: with regular antibiotics. You know, it's not a death sentence 220 00:15:09,720 --> 00:15:12,120 Speaker 1: always it's caught in enough time. Um. So it's not 221 00:15:12,280 --> 00:15:14,880 Speaker 1: some kind of magical thing. It literally is just a 222 00:15:15,040 --> 00:15:18,240 Speaker 1: disease that can be treated with the antibiotics. And we 223 00:15:18,280 --> 00:15:23,800 Speaker 1: should know instantly. Uh. You know, the FBI investigators had 224 00:15:23,840 --> 00:15:27,280 Speaker 1: to had to say, well, is this a person writing 225 00:15:27,800 --> 00:15:31,440 Speaker 1: um English as a second language, you know, or the 226 00:15:31,600 --> 00:15:35,040 Speaker 1: E s L. Is that why Penicillan's misspelled? And of course, 227 00:15:35,080 --> 00:15:39,480 Speaker 1: you know, there was a lot of anti Muslim sentiment 228 00:15:39,840 --> 00:15:44,560 Speaker 1: at the time. The letters sent to Senators Dashel and 229 00:15:44,720 --> 00:15:49,800 Speaker 1: Leahy said said very similar things. They said, you cannot 230 00:15:49,880 --> 00:15:53,320 Speaker 1: stop us. We have this anthrax. You die now, are 231 00:15:53,400 --> 00:15:57,760 Speaker 1: you afraid? Death to America, death to Israel? Allah is great. 232 00:15:58,040 --> 00:16:02,520 Speaker 1: So clearly they're coming from the same source, just based 233 00:16:02,560 --> 00:16:06,120 Speaker 1: on the language there. Uh. You know, it is very 234 00:16:06,240 --> 00:16:11,880 Speaker 1: difficult to describe the level of panic that occurs here. 235 00:16:11,920 --> 00:16:16,320 Speaker 1: We have to remember this is again a week after 236 00:16:16,680 --> 00:16:21,280 Speaker 1: the largest attack on American soil in recent US history. Yeah, so, 237 00:16:21,360 --> 00:16:24,480 Speaker 1: I mean, obviously the first go to is to investigate 238 00:16:24,560 --> 00:16:29,000 Speaker 1: al Qaeda. UM. The White House pressured then FBI Director 239 00:16:29,080 --> 00:16:32,480 Speaker 1: Robert Mueller to establish the letters were a second wave 240 00:16:32,560 --> 00:16:35,640 Speaker 1: of attacks relating to nine eleven. And it's always tough 241 00:16:36,120 --> 00:16:39,840 Speaker 1: when you know, the brass kind of tells you what 242 00:16:40,240 --> 00:16:43,200 Speaker 1: results to get, you know what I mean, because the 243 00:16:43,280 --> 00:16:44,960 Speaker 1: question is like, you know, sure we can read these 244 00:16:45,000 --> 00:16:47,400 Speaker 1: and say, okay, is it an s L situation or 245 00:16:47,600 --> 00:16:51,080 Speaker 1: is it someone trying to write in that voice as 246 00:16:51,160 --> 00:16:53,760 Speaker 1: to create that effect, you know what I mean, to 247 00:16:54,080 --> 00:16:57,960 Speaker 1: maybe cause that kind of panic. Um. So, yeah, obviously 248 00:16:58,200 --> 00:17:01,520 Speaker 1: that didn't pan out, This this notion that this was 249 00:17:01,640 --> 00:17:04,600 Speaker 1: in fact the second wave, but that was what everyone thought. 250 00:17:04,680 --> 00:17:06,440 Speaker 1: I mean, it was just the first place your mind 251 00:17:06,480 --> 00:17:09,240 Speaker 1: would go. Hence the hysteria that was just you know, 252 00:17:09,359 --> 00:17:12,200 Speaker 1: in the air in our country at that time. Yeah. Yeah, 253 00:17:12,400 --> 00:17:18,080 Speaker 1: and Muller was definitely under pressure. But you know what, 254 00:17:18,640 --> 00:17:22,840 Speaker 1: from from his estimation, the facts just weren't there. There 255 00:17:23,000 --> 00:17:27,840 Speaker 1: wasn't There was one potential link one of the nine 256 00:17:27,920 --> 00:17:32,800 Speaker 1: eleven terrorists was exposed to anthrax at some point, but 257 00:17:32,960 --> 00:17:34,800 Speaker 1: that was that was pretty much all they could find. 258 00:17:35,440 --> 00:17:40,840 Speaker 1: The initial actual suspects of the investigation ended up all 259 00:17:40,960 --> 00:17:47,439 Speaker 1: being domestic US residents. There were probably about a hundred 260 00:17:47,520 --> 00:17:50,760 Speaker 1: people or so who would have to know how, Uh, 261 00:17:51,080 --> 00:17:53,440 Speaker 1: just to know how alone, just the expertise, not even 262 00:17:53,480 --> 00:17:57,840 Speaker 1: the motivation of the opportunity. The FBI first turned to 263 00:17:58,160 --> 00:18:03,159 Speaker 1: a man named Stephen J. Hat Phil Dr. Hatfill is 264 00:18:03,400 --> 00:18:07,920 Speaker 1: alive today. He is a pathologist, he's a bioweapons expert, 265 00:18:08,240 --> 00:18:12,040 Speaker 1: and the FBI ruined his life. Yeah, for all intents 266 00:18:12,080 --> 00:18:15,840 Speaker 1: and purposes. In mid two thousand two, the FBI served 267 00:18:15,960 --> 00:18:20,040 Speaker 1: him with a search warrant of his home wearing hazmat suits, uh, 268 00:18:20,160 --> 00:18:23,560 Speaker 1: investigating whether he was, in fact this anthrax killer, as 269 00:18:23,680 --> 00:18:25,880 Speaker 1: as was dubbed in the media at the time. Um, 270 00:18:26,280 --> 00:18:30,040 Speaker 1: he was at that point considered a major person of interest. 271 00:18:30,440 --> 00:18:33,520 Speaker 1: His phone was tapped, he got fired from his job 272 00:18:33,600 --> 00:18:38,520 Speaker 1: at Science Applications International Corporation. UM. Yeah, like you said, Ben, 273 00:18:38,560 --> 00:18:40,760 Speaker 1: I mean this really, you know, in the terms of 274 00:18:40,840 --> 00:18:44,919 Speaker 1: the court of public opinion and just his other associations professionally, 275 00:18:45,000 --> 00:18:51,800 Speaker 1: this absolutely railroaded him. Um. He did ultimately get exonerated. Uh. 276 00:18:51,960 --> 00:18:56,280 Speaker 1: He was very very public exoneration. UM. There's a great 277 00:18:56,280 --> 00:18:57,840 Speaker 1: clip of him where he says, you know, now I 278 00:18:57,920 --> 00:19:01,320 Speaker 1: can look my fellow amer Kins in the eye and 279 00:19:01,440 --> 00:19:05,240 Speaker 1: say unequivocally I am not the anthrax killer, you know. 280 00:19:05,680 --> 00:19:08,359 Speaker 1: And uh, he he definitely got some money where his 281 00:19:08,480 --> 00:19:10,920 Speaker 1: mouth was, in the form of five point eight million 282 00:19:11,359 --> 00:19:14,879 Speaker 1: from the Justice Department. Uh, and in two other undisclosed 283 00:19:14,880 --> 00:19:18,479 Speaker 1: settlements from some of these other agencies that were involved. Uh. 284 00:19:18,560 --> 00:19:22,080 Speaker 1: It was very clear that they were acting on spurious 285 00:19:22,840 --> 00:19:27,000 Speaker 1: uh evidence at best, and and made really jump the 286 00:19:27,040 --> 00:19:30,000 Speaker 1: gun on nailing this guy in the way they did. Yeah, 287 00:19:30,280 --> 00:19:32,280 Speaker 1: I like they bring up the court of public opinion. 288 00:19:32,560 --> 00:19:35,800 Speaker 1: One of those groups that reached an undisclosed settlement with 289 00:19:35,960 --> 00:19:40,080 Speaker 1: him was Conde Nast. It's a huge player in the media. 290 00:19:40,200 --> 00:19:45,879 Speaker 1: They owned Reddit, for instance, so so Hafel. Luckily, if 291 00:19:45,920 --> 00:19:48,639 Speaker 1: you're listening, Dr Hatfield, we are glad that you were 292 00:19:48,720 --> 00:19:52,360 Speaker 1: able to be exonerated for a crime that you clearly 293 00:19:52,680 --> 00:19:55,800 Speaker 1: did not commit. But it's tough to recover from that 294 00:19:55,920 --> 00:19:59,720 Speaker 1: sort of stuff. And he was ultimately found innocent of 295 00:19:59,800 --> 00:20:04,800 Speaker 1: this crime. The primary conclusion of the FBI, the official story, 296 00:20:05,240 --> 00:20:11,520 Speaker 1: is this. They concluded that a scientist named Bruce Ivan's 297 00:20:12,240 --> 00:20:16,840 Speaker 1: acting alone was the source of the entirety of the 298 00:20:17,040 --> 00:20:21,280 Speaker 1: anthrax attacks, and he has if you're a if you're 299 00:20:21,280 --> 00:20:24,800 Speaker 1: a profiler, he has all of the right red flags 300 00:20:25,080 --> 00:20:28,159 Speaker 1: in all of the right places. He worked directly with 301 00:20:28,320 --> 00:20:31,680 Speaker 1: antax He was one of those people that we mentioned 302 00:20:31,720 --> 00:20:34,960 Speaker 1: at the top of the show who develops vaccines. So 303 00:20:35,160 --> 00:20:39,840 Speaker 1: he was working with anthrax um officially to develop vaccines 304 00:20:39,920 --> 00:20:44,119 Speaker 1: in case, uh, some other government had a weaponized strain 305 00:20:44,240 --> 00:20:47,680 Speaker 1: that they deployed in the US or in a battlefield. 306 00:20:47,840 --> 00:20:51,840 Speaker 1: And Ben wasn't he even involved in the investigation to 307 00:20:52,000 --> 00:20:57,240 Speaker 1: a degree? Yeah, he volunteered, right, He volunteered to test samples. 308 00:20:57,720 --> 00:21:00,359 Speaker 1: He sent samples from his own lab. He was around 309 00:21:00,400 --> 00:21:04,200 Speaker 1: fifty five years old when the anthrax attacks occurred. Uh. 310 00:21:04,480 --> 00:21:07,520 Speaker 1: He said, you know, I will help you determine the 311 00:21:07,680 --> 00:21:11,720 Speaker 1: origin of the powder. Because everybody in the scientific community, 312 00:21:11,880 --> 00:21:15,800 Speaker 1: everybody in the FBI, they knew only a few people 313 00:21:15,840 --> 00:21:22,080 Speaker 1: in the world would even understand the science evolved here. 314 00:21:22,480 --> 00:21:27,480 Speaker 1: So remember that part for later, folks. This guy volunteered 315 00:21:27,800 --> 00:21:32,159 Speaker 1: to help the FBI determine the origin of the powder. 316 00:21:32,400 --> 00:21:36,320 Speaker 1: And let's not forget how much pressure the FBI was under, 317 00:21:36,800 --> 00:21:40,200 Speaker 1: especially since this public exoneration and having that egg on 318 00:21:40,280 --> 00:21:43,600 Speaker 1: their face from wasting all those millions of dollars and 319 00:21:43,800 --> 00:21:47,480 Speaker 1: thousands of hours, you know, focusing on the wrong purp 320 00:21:48,040 --> 00:21:52,480 Speaker 1: um dr Ivan's was literally right under their noses. I 321 00:21:52,520 --> 00:21:55,800 Speaker 1: mean he was working, you know, in their labs essentially. 322 00:21:55,880 --> 00:21:58,520 Speaker 1: I mean he was an agent of the government. Um 323 00:21:58,760 --> 00:22:01,560 Speaker 1: and he you know, it was kind of a goofball. 324 00:22:01,920 --> 00:22:03,359 Speaker 1: He he was, he was he was sort of a 325 00:22:03,440 --> 00:22:06,120 Speaker 1: kook really like he was described as being a bit 326 00:22:06,320 --> 00:22:10,760 Speaker 1: arrogant um and and something of a flamboyant figure. And uh, 327 00:22:10,960 --> 00:22:12,800 Speaker 1: you know that that was a term that was thrown around. 328 00:22:12,800 --> 00:22:14,159 Speaker 1: I'm not sure if there if that's meant to be 329 00:22:14,200 --> 00:22:16,720 Speaker 1: a pejorative or just that he was kind of a 330 00:22:16,800 --> 00:22:18,399 Speaker 1: little bit of cookie. That's kind of the vibe that 331 00:22:18,440 --> 00:22:22,080 Speaker 1: I got, but not necessarily a red flag in terms 332 00:22:22,119 --> 00:22:24,080 Speaker 1: that he seemed like some kind of sociopath. He would 333 00:22:24,080 --> 00:22:27,000 Speaker 1: send these like chipper emails with bad dad jokes, which 334 00:22:27,040 --> 00:22:30,000 Speaker 1: I can get behind, um as he talked through the 335 00:22:30,160 --> 00:22:35,280 Speaker 1: dangers of of anthrax. But he was uh by some 336 00:22:35,680 --> 00:22:40,440 Speaker 1: seene as being a bit disturbed. Yes that's correct, behind 337 00:22:40,760 --> 00:22:46,720 Speaker 1: those puns, behind those cheerful exclamation marks and tangents in 338 00:22:46,880 --> 00:22:51,000 Speaker 1: his emails which the FBI obtained. Of course, he had 339 00:22:51,280 --> 00:22:54,720 Speaker 1: a lot of trauma. His therapists said that he had 340 00:22:54,800 --> 00:23:00,520 Speaker 1: a traumatic childhood and was described as disturbing, and he himself, 341 00:23:00,600 --> 00:23:04,399 Speaker 1: as an adult, seemed to be disturbed. He was a 342 00:23:04,480 --> 00:23:09,240 Speaker 1: married man, but back in nineteen seventy six he was 343 00:23:09,400 --> 00:23:12,639 Speaker 1: jilted by a fellow grad student who would go on 344 00:23:12,840 --> 00:23:17,119 Speaker 1: to be a colleague in this field, a doctor, Nancy Haywood. 345 00:23:17,960 --> 00:23:22,080 Speaker 1: And since he was jilted again back in nineteen seventy six, 346 00:23:22,400 --> 00:23:26,399 Speaker 1: he had apparently become obsessed with her old sorority Kappa 347 00:23:26,480 --> 00:23:31,200 Speaker 1: Kappa Gamma, and sororities in general. One of Yeah, yeah, 348 00:23:31,520 --> 00:23:35,879 Speaker 1: he would sit outside of sorority houses, just sit in 349 00:23:35,920 --> 00:23:39,960 Speaker 1: this car and he would, um, you know what, he 350 00:23:40,160 --> 00:23:44,840 Speaker 1: met a colleague who was affiliated with a sorority, he 351 00:23:44,920 --> 00:23:49,560 Speaker 1: would instantly start, I don't know, like pressuring them, cracking down. 352 00:23:49,680 --> 00:23:52,960 Speaker 1: He he got weird with it. Yeah, but there's also 353 00:23:53,040 --> 00:23:55,640 Speaker 1: part of me that like, is he just socially awkward 354 00:23:55,760 --> 00:23:58,200 Speaker 1: and maybe a bit on the spectrum, or is this 355 00:23:58,440 --> 00:24:03,639 Speaker 1: stalkery kind of ape behavior in saying what's your secret password? 356 00:24:03,760 --> 00:24:07,800 Speaker 1: What's your secret handshake? Um, it seems kind of like 357 00:24:07,880 --> 00:24:11,040 Speaker 1: a goofball way of flirting, like saying, ha ha, what's 358 00:24:11,080 --> 00:24:13,280 Speaker 1: your secret handshake? You know what I mean? As opposed 359 00:24:13,320 --> 00:24:19,600 Speaker 1: to something genuinely creepy. But he was described as as 360 00:24:19,720 --> 00:24:24,480 Speaker 1: having an interest intellectually in secret things. Yeah he uh 361 00:24:25,800 --> 00:24:29,440 Speaker 1: this this recollection comes from one of his former bosses, 362 00:24:30,119 --> 00:24:34,440 Speaker 1: Dr Priscilla Weirrick. She had a she was in a 363 00:24:34,560 --> 00:24:38,200 Speaker 1: sorority in college chi Omega, and she said that he 364 00:24:38,520 --> 00:24:41,360 Speaker 1: was doing exactly what you described, nol. He was always saying, 365 00:24:41,440 --> 00:24:43,960 Speaker 1: you know, what's your what's your secret password, what's your 366 00:24:44,160 --> 00:24:48,760 Speaker 1: secret handshake? So she thought that he was just maybe, 367 00:24:48,880 --> 00:24:50,640 Speaker 1: as you said, a guy was a little bit off, 368 00:24:51,080 --> 00:24:54,120 Speaker 1: brilliant but a little bit awkward, who was really interested 369 00:24:54,240 --> 00:24:59,720 Speaker 1: in secret things. The person we mentioned earlier, Dr Nancy Haywood, 370 00:25:00,640 --> 00:25:04,159 Speaker 1: is the person who actually brought Dr Bruce Ivans to 371 00:25:04,240 --> 00:25:09,080 Speaker 1: the attention of the FBI. So what was their official conclusion. 372 00:25:09,600 --> 00:25:18,680 Speaker 1: We'll tell you after a word from our sponsor and 373 00:25:18,920 --> 00:25:24,000 Speaker 1: we're back. So so, Noel, officially, there's no reason for 374 00:25:24,440 --> 00:25:27,359 Speaker 1: us to look into this for stuff they don't want 375 00:25:27,400 --> 00:25:31,879 Speaker 1: you to know, because the FBI has an official conclusion. Right, 376 00:25:32,480 --> 00:25:36,080 Speaker 1: Nothing I trust more than an official FBI conclusion. Ben, 377 00:25:36,280 --> 00:25:38,760 Speaker 1: Let me tell you so, Yeah, it's true. Today, the 378 00:25:38,840 --> 00:25:42,680 Speaker 1: FBI's official position is that Dr Bruce Ivan's was a 379 00:25:42,840 --> 00:25:47,440 Speaker 1: lone wolf um acted without any influence outside of his 380 00:25:47,560 --> 00:25:53,400 Speaker 1: own troubled mind, and that he executed these anthrax attacks alone. 381 00:25:53,920 --> 00:25:55,840 Speaker 1: And there's some things that check out here. He had 382 00:25:55,920 --> 00:25:59,600 Speaker 1: the know how, he had the access. Uh, he had 383 00:25:59,760 --> 00:26:04,320 Speaker 1: the opportunity to do these things. But he never confessed. 384 00:26:04,480 --> 00:26:08,600 Speaker 1: And to boot he's not in prison. Uh. Dr Bruce 385 00:26:08,680 --> 00:26:12,520 Speaker 1: Ivans took his own life. He was discovered on July 386 00:26:14,080 --> 00:26:17,680 Speaker 1: unconscious in his home and taken to the hospital. He 387 00:26:17,800 --> 00:26:22,760 Speaker 1: had overdosed apparently on um thailand all three, I think 388 00:26:22,840 --> 00:26:24,639 Speaker 1: is what it's called. It's a combination of thailand all 389 00:26:24,720 --> 00:26:27,600 Speaker 1: encoding that you'd get for a toothache or a minor surgery, 390 00:26:27,720 --> 00:26:30,160 Speaker 1: but taken in large doses. Actually the tail and all 391 00:26:30,200 --> 00:26:34,200 Speaker 1: that kills you. Yeah, yep. He died at Frederick Memorial 392 00:26:34,760 --> 00:26:39,240 Speaker 1: Hospital on July twenty nine, two thousand and eight. The 393 00:26:39,520 --> 00:26:44,720 Speaker 1: FBI had found their bad guy. They would never have 394 00:26:44,960 --> 00:26:50,119 Speaker 1: to investigate further. They they established, to their you know, 395 00:26:50,320 --> 00:26:55,640 Speaker 1: to their satisfaction, the timeline. They established that he did, 396 00:26:55,760 --> 00:26:59,840 Speaker 1: as you said, have the expertise. Uh. They established that 397 00:27:00,119 --> 00:27:04,119 Speaker 1: he did have the opportunity do what A note, by 398 00:27:04,200 --> 00:27:07,680 Speaker 1: the way, there was no official autopsy, there's not one. 399 00:27:08,320 --> 00:27:11,280 Speaker 1: There's not one on the record, because again there's this 400 00:27:11,359 --> 00:27:13,760 Speaker 1: pressure we got to close the case. You know. It's 401 00:27:13,920 --> 00:27:17,119 Speaker 1: it's something that's very familiar to fans of shows like 402 00:27:17,320 --> 00:27:22,200 Speaker 1: The Wire. The FBI, UH found their guy, but their 403 00:27:22,240 --> 00:27:26,400 Speaker 1: guy didn't have a day in court. No, with Ivan's dead, 404 00:27:26,480 --> 00:27:29,040 Speaker 1: the FBI would never have to prove their case to 405 00:27:29,160 --> 00:27:31,800 Speaker 1: a jury. And we're gonna get into, you know, what 406 00:27:32,080 --> 00:27:35,400 Speaker 1: their case was as as we progress with this episode. 407 00:27:35,880 --> 00:27:40,720 Speaker 1: But what if, Ben, what if the official story kind 408 00:27:40,720 --> 00:27:44,119 Speaker 1: of peters out in oh eight? What if another story 409 00:27:44,280 --> 00:27:49,080 Speaker 1: begins UM, because the case against Bruce Ivans isn't nearly 410 00:27:49,160 --> 00:27:53,399 Speaker 1: as ironclad as the news media and the press conferences 411 00:27:53,440 --> 00:27:57,760 Speaker 1: and briefings from the FBI would have had UM viewers 412 00:27:58,359 --> 00:28:04,120 Speaker 1: and citizens of the United States believe, you see, one 413 00:28:04,240 --> 00:28:07,680 Speaker 1: thing that was missing from the FBI's case, one of 414 00:28:07,760 --> 00:28:12,399 Speaker 1: several things was a real motive. There wasn't one established. 415 00:28:12,600 --> 00:28:18,080 Speaker 1: And this means that in the almost a decade between 416 00:28:18,320 --> 00:28:23,760 Speaker 1: when these attacks occurred and when this podcast publishes, theories 417 00:28:23,800 --> 00:28:30,440 Speaker 1: have proliferated. Speculation thrives even now about what actually happened. 418 00:28:30,560 --> 00:28:34,159 Speaker 1: The big question, the big what if here is what 419 00:28:34,440 --> 00:28:38,960 Speaker 1: if after millions of dollars and thousands of hours, the 420 00:28:39,120 --> 00:28:45,600 Speaker 1: FBI nailed the wrong man. Here's where it gets crazy. No, 421 00:28:45,920 --> 00:28:49,160 Speaker 1: let's like what motivation? Right? I love that you pointed 422 00:28:49,200 --> 00:28:54,560 Speaker 1: out the flamboyant thing, but the FBI didn't ever have 423 00:28:55,040 --> 00:29:00,760 Speaker 1: like a clear discernible reason. Yeah. And another thing we 424 00:29:00,960 --> 00:29:03,960 Speaker 1: we know from like murder shows is you know, some 425 00:29:04,120 --> 00:29:06,440 Speaker 1: murders don't have to have a motive. It's not like 426 00:29:06,520 --> 00:29:09,640 Speaker 1: a requirement. But with such an analytical guy like this 427 00:29:09,800 --> 00:29:15,440 Speaker 1: and such a pointed, targeted attack, a motive. I would 428 00:29:15,520 --> 00:29:17,680 Speaker 1: like to hear a little bit more about a motive, 429 00:29:17,880 --> 00:29:19,280 Speaker 1: you know what I mean? Like, I mean, these were 430 00:29:19,440 --> 00:29:25,200 Speaker 1: very specific individuals, politicians, news outlets that these letters were 431 00:29:25,280 --> 00:29:29,560 Speaker 1: sent to um seemingly for what you know, we really 432 00:29:29,640 --> 00:29:32,320 Speaker 1: just don't have it. The guy just crack And if so, 433 00:29:32,840 --> 00:29:37,240 Speaker 1: why such a specific, targeted and pointed attack. Again, we're 434 00:29:37,280 --> 00:29:40,160 Speaker 1: not owed a motive. It's not a necessity to you know, 435 00:29:40,440 --> 00:29:44,000 Speaker 1: convict somebody of a crime. The possible motivations, like the 436 00:29:44,120 --> 00:29:46,120 Speaker 1: idea that emailed anthrax to NBC is a way of 437 00:29:46,240 --> 00:29:51,680 Speaker 1: punishing them for UH. Journalist Gary Matsumoto's work on his 438 00:29:52,280 --> 00:29:56,680 Speaker 1: lab that fell apart because Matsumoto worked at ABC not NBC. Um, 439 00:29:56,760 --> 00:29:59,560 Speaker 1: and he had written some not very flattering stories about 440 00:29:59,640 --> 00:30:03,640 Speaker 1: some of some of Ivan's research spend. Isn't that right? Yeah, yeah, 441 00:30:03,760 --> 00:30:08,000 Speaker 1: that's correct. He did. Uh, he did an investigation into 442 00:30:09,040 --> 00:30:13,560 Speaker 1: the actual lab that Dr Bruce Ivans was working at. 443 00:30:14,200 --> 00:30:18,840 Speaker 1: But again he worked for ABC not NBC, so that 444 00:30:19,640 --> 00:30:23,800 Speaker 1: that motivation doesn't add up because if Ivan's did this, 445 00:30:24,520 --> 00:30:28,080 Speaker 1: he would have at least been aware of which news 446 00:30:28,240 --> 00:30:31,959 Speaker 1: organization this journalist was working for at the time. Additionally, 447 00:30:32,120 --> 00:30:37,240 Speaker 1: Dr Ivan's passed a Lie detector test a polygraph polygraphs 448 00:30:37,480 --> 00:30:40,400 Speaker 1: we should mention here. Um, I get a brain stuff 449 00:30:40,400 --> 00:30:44,160 Speaker 1: episode about this. I think they're not scientifically sound, but 450 00:30:44,520 --> 00:30:49,160 Speaker 1: it is rare for a guilty person to pass Lie 451 00:30:49,240 --> 00:30:53,680 Speaker 1: detector test usually unless you know a few handy tricks here. 452 00:30:53,720 --> 00:30:57,960 Speaker 1: They are really quick. Not saying that you should ever 453 00:30:58,160 --> 00:31:02,080 Speaker 1: lie on a poly raff but if you want to 454 00:31:02,320 --> 00:31:05,920 Speaker 1: pass a polygraph test, again, because they are not scientifically sound, 455 00:31:06,280 --> 00:31:10,320 Speaker 1: you can employ any number of tricks, including doing some 456 00:31:10,480 --> 00:31:14,200 Speaker 1: things to mess with your own body temperature such as meditation, etcetera. 457 00:31:14,560 --> 00:31:18,680 Speaker 1: You can. Uh, this is is fairly explicit, but back 458 00:31:18,760 --> 00:31:21,120 Speaker 1: in the day people used to just really flex their 459 00:31:21,200 --> 00:31:24,760 Speaker 1: ke gold muscle for an extended amount of time. That'll 460 00:31:24,800 --> 00:31:27,280 Speaker 1: do it. You can put thumb tacks in your palm 461 00:31:27,480 --> 00:31:29,920 Speaker 1: or in your shoe, of course. Uh, there there are 462 00:31:29,920 --> 00:31:32,160 Speaker 1: a number of ways to invalidate it, because it's all 463 00:31:32,160 --> 00:31:35,920 Speaker 1: about sort of messing with that base level, that baseline, right, um, 464 00:31:36,080 --> 00:31:38,320 Speaker 1: And then you know, because what's the polygraph of not 465 00:31:38,480 --> 00:31:41,720 Speaker 1: just kind of a slightly you know, more complex like 466 00:31:41,840 --> 00:31:45,120 Speaker 1: stress tests. So if you can establish a baseline using 467 00:31:45,200 --> 00:31:48,040 Speaker 1: that thumb tack in your palm, that's you know, sort 468 00:31:48,080 --> 00:31:51,000 Speaker 1: of an elevated baseline, then everything else is going to 469 00:31:51,120 --> 00:31:54,440 Speaker 1: kind of you know, be affected by that absolutely. And 470 00:31:55,080 --> 00:32:00,680 Speaker 1: and we also know that during the investigation, even right 471 00:32:00,720 --> 00:32:03,880 Speaker 1: after the conclusion of the investigation and right after it 472 00:32:04,120 --> 00:32:08,040 Speaker 1: was re examined first in two thousand eight, then in 473 00:32:08,120 --> 00:32:12,160 Speaker 1: two thousand eleven, a lot of people, people in power, 474 00:32:12,600 --> 00:32:16,520 Speaker 1: some like victims of these attacks, did not believe the 475 00:32:16,680 --> 00:32:20,640 Speaker 1: FBI's conclusion. They thought it didn't add up. Yeah. Even 476 00:32:20,880 --> 00:32:23,880 Speaker 1: Senator Patrick Leahy, who you'll remember was the target of 477 00:32:23,960 --> 00:32:27,440 Speaker 1: one of the attacks, testify that he did not believe 478 00:32:27,560 --> 00:32:31,760 Speaker 1: that Ivan's acted alone, though Senator Dashel, who was the 479 00:32:31,840 --> 00:32:35,640 Speaker 1: other political target, did did not agree with that assessment. 480 00:32:36,160 --> 00:32:40,160 Speaker 1: So in two thousand eight, FBI Director Robert Mueller, you know, figured, Okay, 481 00:32:40,400 --> 00:32:43,480 Speaker 1: if there's doubt, you know that's being publicly stated, let's 482 00:32:43,560 --> 00:32:45,000 Speaker 1: get to the bottom of this. And he called for 483 00:32:45,000 --> 00:32:48,400 Speaker 1: an independent review of the investigation by the National Academy 484 00:32:48,480 --> 00:32:55,320 Speaker 1: of Sciences, and that review found that prosecutors had largely 485 00:32:55,600 --> 00:33:00,880 Speaker 1: overstated the case in the certainty of their findings. UM. 486 00:33:01,000 --> 00:33:04,600 Speaker 1: Members of that committee said that, uh, there were some 487 00:33:04,800 --> 00:33:09,760 Speaker 1: newly available methods for testing these these samples of of 488 00:33:09,840 --> 00:33:14,040 Speaker 1: anthrax to prove the FBI's case much more definitively UM 489 00:33:14,240 --> 00:33:19,440 Speaker 1: or lead to some other suspects. But UM, they were 490 00:33:19,520 --> 00:33:24,320 Speaker 1: not interested in exploring such such tests. UM. They relied 491 00:33:24,480 --> 00:33:28,040 Speaker 1: on some I believe it was a sort of a 492 00:33:28,120 --> 00:33:31,520 Speaker 1: fingerprint to trace it back to what they referred to 493 00:33:31,600 --> 00:33:35,840 Speaker 1: as a flask of anthrax that Ivan's had control over. 494 00:33:35,920 --> 00:33:38,640 Speaker 1: And it's it has a coded UM kind of I 495 00:33:38,800 --> 00:33:41,000 Speaker 1: d that I'm having a hard time finding right now, 496 00:33:41,040 --> 00:33:44,080 Speaker 1: but it's like two letters of dash and three numbers UM. 497 00:33:44,480 --> 00:33:51,960 Speaker 1: And the technique involved tracing these particular mutations UH that 498 00:33:52,240 --> 00:33:54,720 Speaker 1: they could you know, kind of match up with the 499 00:33:54,920 --> 00:33:58,440 Speaker 1: with the actual UH flask that were it originated. And 500 00:33:58,520 --> 00:34:01,720 Speaker 1: apparently they tested more than a thousand samples throughout this 501 00:34:01,840 --> 00:34:05,040 Speaker 1: investigation and only eight of them had tested positive for 502 00:34:05,240 --> 00:34:08,520 Speaker 1: four of these mutations found in the germs that were 503 00:34:08,600 --> 00:34:11,920 Speaker 1: sent to Congress and in the news media. So uh, 504 00:34:12,320 --> 00:34:16,160 Speaker 1: there this caused an issue. Even in the early stages 505 00:34:16,200 --> 00:34:18,839 Speaker 1: of the investigation, there was a group of scientists known 506 00:34:18,880 --> 00:34:21,759 Speaker 1: as the Red Team that said the FBI should do 507 00:34:21,960 --> 00:34:26,040 Speaker 1: more basic research into why those mutations might have arisen, 508 00:34:26,600 --> 00:34:29,480 Speaker 1: that it wasn't a foregone conclusion just because the mutations existed, 509 00:34:29,520 --> 00:34:32,920 Speaker 1: that they necessarily were uh you know, traced back to 510 00:34:33,000 --> 00:34:37,279 Speaker 1: that original flask um and that this woman named Jennifer Smith, 511 00:34:37,320 --> 00:34:40,160 Speaker 1: who is a senior manager at the FBI's lab um. 512 00:34:40,480 --> 00:34:44,680 Speaker 1: She expressed those concerns and didn't feel that the FBI 513 00:34:44,840 --> 00:34:48,160 Speaker 1: had a kind of full understanding of how these mutations 514 00:34:48,320 --> 00:34:52,879 Speaker 1: might have arisen and how this would be seen by 515 00:34:52,960 --> 00:34:56,560 Speaker 1: a judge, and how it could potentially be thrown out entirely. 516 00:34:58,560 --> 00:35:03,960 Speaker 1: The sciences vital here that specific let's say brand or 517 00:35:04,080 --> 00:35:09,960 Speaker 1: type of anthrax flask r m R ten twenty nine. Uh. 518 00:35:10,600 --> 00:35:15,800 Speaker 1: The reason we know this is because everything is should 519 00:35:15,840 --> 00:35:20,760 Speaker 1: be obsessively documented in the in the field of biohazard 520 00:35:21,000 --> 00:35:26,360 Speaker 1: research or bioweapons. Right, if you are working UM in 521 00:35:26,560 --> 00:35:29,720 Speaker 1: in the kind of lab or situation that Dr Ivans 522 00:35:30,120 --> 00:35:34,560 Speaker 1: was working in at the time, your interactions with every 523 00:35:34,719 --> 00:35:40,719 Speaker 1: single version of every single contagion has to be documented, right, 524 00:35:40,880 --> 00:35:44,239 Speaker 1: so that we know, looking at the records, we know 525 00:35:44,520 --> 00:35:47,200 Speaker 1: every time the guy was in his lab. We know 526 00:35:47,480 --> 00:35:52,719 Speaker 1: that his time in the lab on weekends and nights accelerated. Right, 527 00:35:53,000 --> 00:35:54,920 Speaker 1: He was spending a lot of time there before the 528 00:35:54,960 --> 00:35:59,720 Speaker 1: attacks occurred, and we should know everything the guy touched 529 00:36:00,000 --> 00:36:04,720 Speaker 1: it even now, even in just just like the experts 530 00:36:04,920 --> 00:36:10,160 Speaker 1: you mentioned earlier, all we find large groups of people, 531 00:36:10,320 --> 00:36:13,360 Speaker 1: including some of the doctor's colleagues and some of his 532 00:36:13,480 --> 00:36:17,800 Speaker 1: professional rivals, who are convinced that this man was innocent. 533 00:36:18,239 --> 00:36:21,200 Speaker 1: And you know, the basis for their belief is not 534 00:36:21,480 --> 00:36:24,120 Speaker 1: that they are in a Bruce Edward Ivan's fan club. 535 00:36:24,560 --> 00:36:26,520 Speaker 1: In fact, one of the reasons that a lot of 536 00:36:26,600 --> 00:36:29,400 Speaker 1: people say he's innocent is that they say the attacks 537 00:36:29,480 --> 00:36:33,880 Speaker 1: were too sophisticated for this guy to have figured out himself. 538 00:36:34,400 --> 00:36:38,359 Speaker 1: The argument is basically, yes, he had to know how 539 00:36:38,400 --> 00:36:43,359 Speaker 1: and the expertise to UM experiment with anthrax and maybe 540 00:36:43,440 --> 00:36:48,000 Speaker 1: even to grow this particular strain, but he had no 541 00:36:48,200 --> 00:36:51,799 Speaker 1: training in the delivery of bio weapons, which I think 542 00:36:51,840 --> 00:36:55,040 Speaker 1: goes right to your earlier point about how botched this 543 00:36:55,360 --> 00:36:58,800 Speaker 1: attack was. Yeah, that's true, and that that on honestly 544 00:36:59,160 --> 00:37:01,080 Speaker 1: to me in some way as makes it seem like 545 00:37:01,160 --> 00:37:04,520 Speaker 1: it could have been him, because if it were executed 546 00:37:04,560 --> 00:37:08,120 Speaker 1: by a more you know, savvy group than they maybe 547 00:37:08,160 --> 00:37:10,640 Speaker 1: would have had a better delivery method because you know, 548 00:37:11,040 --> 00:37:15,640 Speaker 1: anthrax is toxic up to the tiniest particles, and like 549 00:37:15,719 --> 00:37:17,160 Speaker 1: we said at the top of the show, you know, 550 00:37:17,239 --> 00:37:20,440 Speaker 1: if dispersed through a ducts of of an office building 551 00:37:20,719 --> 00:37:24,440 Speaker 1: could potentially infect thousands of people. Um and as we know, 552 00:37:24,719 --> 00:37:27,799 Speaker 1: the fatality count and even just the people that were 553 00:37:27,840 --> 00:37:32,440 Speaker 1: sickened by these was relatively quite low, you know, so 554 00:37:33,560 --> 00:37:36,719 Speaker 1: definitely didn't seem like it went as planned. But at 555 00:37:36,760 --> 00:37:39,720 Speaker 1: the same time, the spores of anthrax were like Walter 556 00:37:39,960 --> 00:37:44,800 Speaker 1: White breaking bad level, like strong, high quality, uh you 557 00:37:44,880 --> 00:37:47,600 Speaker 1: could you know, call them something along the lines of 558 00:37:47,800 --> 00:37:50,800 Speaker 1: weapons grade, which is you know, sort of a vague 559 00:37:50,920 --> 00:37:53,560 Speaker 1: term that doesn't necessarily mean one thing, but it's the 560 00:37:53,680 --> 00:37:57,720 Speaker 1: type basically, the you know, the finest uh anthrax grade 561 00:37:58,160 --> 00:38:01,279 Speaker 1: that can be produced for bio weapons programs in either 562 00:38:01,320 --> 00:38:03,800 Speaker 1: the US or somewhere like Russia. I want to I 563 00:38:03,840 --> 00:38:06,560 Speaker 1: want to interject here. Yeah, the reason I think Breaking 564 00:38:06,600 --> 00:38:09,320 Speaker 1: Bad is a great comparison. Uh, this is like the 565 00:38:09,440 --> 00:38:14,080 Speaker 1: blue myth level of weaponized anthrax. And there's a there's 566 00:38:14,120 --> 00:38:17,640 Speaker 1: a scary thing here that often gets ignored in this story, 567 00:38:18,239 --> 00:38:22,319 Speaker 1: which is this the sports van tax. Not to get 568 00:38:22,360 --> 00:38:24,399 Speaker 1: too far in the weeds. They were only one point 569 00:38:24,480 --> 00:38:29,520 Speaker 1: five to three micrometers wide individual spores, and it is 570 00:38:29,640 --> 00:38:33,120 Speaker 1: fine grade. You're correct, it is Walter White level. This 571 00:38:33,560 --> 00:38:40,000 Speaker 1: type of anthrax is smaller than the officially acknowledged or 572 00:38:40,040 --> 00:38:44,240 Speaker 1: even open secret level bio weapons created by the US 573 00:38:44,480 --> 00:38:48,840 Speaker 1: or by Russia. That should disturb people because that means 574 00:38:49,320 --> 00:38:55,160 Speaker 1: that someone somewhere is making something that neither world power 575 00:38:55,280 --> 00:38:58,680 Speaker 1: there acknowledges, which isn't that much of a stretch. We 576 00:38:58,800 --> 00:39:02,279 Speaker 1: know that governments hold back technology all the time, you know, 577 00:39:02,440 --> 00:39:04,880 Speaker 1: and keep it for a military use. Uh And and 578 00:39:05,000 --> 00:39:07,680 Speaker 1: they wouldn't necessarily want to broadcast that they have that. 579 00:39:07,840 --> 00:39:10,160 Speaker 1: That's not something that they just like announced, Hey we 580 00:39:10,280 --> 00:39:13,560 Speaker 1: made a scarier version of anthrax. You guys like check 581 00:39:13,600 --> 00:39:16,480 Speaker 1: it out, But no, it's it's it's true. And and 582 00:39:16,600 --> 00:39:19,279 Speaker 1: and again when we say fine grade, we literally are 583 00:39:19,360 --> 00:39:23,160 Speaker 1: talking about the particulate size, because that's what allows it 584 00:39:23,239 --> 00:39:25,960 Speaker 1: to be just dispersed, like the wind can pick it 585 00:39:26,080 --> 00:39:29,600 Speaker 1: up like a you know, dandelion down and just carry 586 00:39:29,680 --> 00:39:32,799 Speaker 1: it across the land, infecting you know, everything in its 587 00:39:32,840 --> 00:39:34,960 Speaker 1: path potentially, and obviously you have to breathe it in. 588 00:39:35,200 --> 00:39:37,320 Speaker 1: But these are you know that they could be you know, 589 00:39:37,640 --> 00:39:41,480 Speaker 1: just millions of tiny, tiny, tiny particles in an envelope 590 00:39:41,719 --> 00:39:44,520 Speaker 1: of full of powder, a powdered version of this stuff, right, 591 00:39:44,760 --> 00:39:47,560 Speaker 1: and and you're opening it indoors, and there are a 592 00:39:47,640 --> 00:39:50,920 Speaker 1: lot of people around, so yeah, you know, at the 593 00:39:51,000 --> 00:39:54,960 Speaker 1: risk of sounding cold, it is surprising that only seventeen 594 00:39:55,080 --> 00:40:02,799 Speaker 1: people were infected. There's another problem with this official conclusion, 595 00:40:03,320 --> 00:40:08,960 Speaker 1: and that's this, uh dr Ivan's colleagues and people familiar 596 00:40:09,000 --> 00:40:14,880 Speaker 1: with the lab can confirm that the lab equipment site 597 00:40:14,960 --> 00:40:18,040 Speaker 1: in the FBI conclusion, the lab equipment that he would 598 00:40:18,120 --> 00:40:23,880 Speaker 1: have to have used to create this stuff and to 599 00:40:24,040 --> 00:40:29,520 Speaker 1: disperse it, that lab equipment was not working. He did 600 00:40:29,640 --> 00:40:33,560 Speaker 1: not have the capability to make the spores if he 601 00:40:33,680 --> 00:40:37,360 Speaker 1: were using the equipment in that lab, full stop. It 602 00:40:37,560 --> 00:40:40,520 Speaker 1: was there. Yes, you had to know how, but that 603 00:40:40,640 --> 00:40:43,840 Speaker 1: equipment was broken down at the time, you know what 604 00:40:43,960 --> 00:40:47,399 Speaker 1: I mean, you can see how this gets messy so quickly. Yeah, 605 00:40:47,480 --> 00:40:50,000 Speaker 1: you absolutely can. And just again to to clarify, like 606 00:40:50,560 --> 00:40:53,680 Speaker 1: the we're talking about the flask that would be sort 607 00:40:53,719 --> 00:40:55,560 Speaker 1: of like the mother right, Like that's sort of the 608 00:40:55,640 --> 00:40:58,640 Speaker 1: origin material for what he would have used too then 609 00:40:58,760 --> 00:41:01,600 Speaker 1: I guess propagate them or grow them into you know, 610 00:41:01,760 --> 00:41:05,000 Speaker 1: a more usable version of of of anthrax and then 611 00:41:05,120 --> 00:41:08,399 Speaker 1: you know, make it into the powder. Um. So yeah, 612 00:41:08,760 --> 00:41:10,759 Speaker 1: that would require a lot of know how and a 613 00:41:10,800 --> 00:41:13,960 Speaker 1: lot of very exphisticated equipment. And if it wasn't working 614 00:41:14,040 --> 00:41:16,640 Speaker 1: in his lab, what did he like have a secret 615 00:41:16,800 --> 00:41:19,279 Speaker 1: lab like at his house? I mean maybe you know, 616 00:41:19,440 --> 00:41:22,320 Speaker 1: who are we to say? But it definitely was highly 617 00:41:22,400 --> 00:41:24,680 Speaker 1: unlikely that he made it with its broken down equipment 618 00:41:24,760 --> 00:41:29,160 Speaker 1: at his lab. And numerous government officials and scientists also 619 00:41:29,320 --> 00:41:32,640 Speaker 1: believe that this official story doesn't add up. And and 620 00:41:32,760 --> 00:41:37,200 Speaker 1: there are numerous theories that have kind of circulated in 621 00:41:37,320 --> 00:41:41,600 Speaker 1: the years since this, uh, this conclusion about dr ivans, 622 00:41:41,600 --> 00:41:44,640 Speaker 1: And we're gonna get into all of those after a 623 00:41:44,719 --> 00:41:55,720 Speaker 1: quick word from our sponsor, and we're back. Yes, the conspiracies, 624 00:41:55,800 --> 00:42:00,480 Speaker 1: the theories, the speculation thrives and proliferates, and to clear 625 00:42:00,680 --> 00:42:05,359 Speaker 1: the people who are proposing these alternative conclusions or these 626 00:42:05,440 --> 00:42:08,839 Speaker 1: problems with the official investigation. They're not what you would 627 00:42:08,880 --> 00:42:14,840 Speaker 1: call tinfoil hat people. They include people who were working 628 00:42:15,040 --> 00:42:18,960 Speaker 1: with the FBI and the investigation. They include uh, scientists, 629 00:42:19,040 --> 00:42:22,680 Speaker 1: they include experts and antrax uh and and they have 630 00:42:22,800 --> 00:42:27,640 Speaker 1: a lot of valid concerns here. Dr Ivan's, as I 631 00:42:27,719 --> 00:42:30,200 Speaker 1: believe we said at the top, was only one of 632 00:42:30,440 --> 00:42:32,719 Speaker 1: at least a hundred people who could have worked with 633 00:42:32,800 --> 00:42:35,960 Speaker 1: this specific brand of antrax. Of course, r M R 634 00:42:36,320 --> 00:42:40,640 Speaker 1: ten twenty nine um not the sexiest name, but it's 635 00:42:40,680 --> 00:42:46,319 Speaker 1: a technical term first superior to r M R ten. God, 636 00:42:46,400 --> 00:42:48,560 Speaker 1: I mean, really it was. It was a good year. 637 00:42:49,080 --> 00:42:52,239 Speaker 1: Don't even talk to me about ten. Are you kidding? Ten? 638 00:42:53,120 --> 00:42:57,160 Speaker 1: Come on, that's that's the connois sours choice apparently, But 639 00:42:57,360 --> 00:42:59,480 Speaker 1: he was like he was not the only person who 640 00:42:59,520 --> 00:43:03,719 Speaker 1: would have touch this. Also, the FBI did not have 641 00:43:04,480 --> 00:43:08,359 Speaker 1: a peer review of their conclusions of the scientific end 642 00:43:08,400 --> 00:43:12,520 Speaker 1: of it during their investigation. The science, in short, to 643 00:43:12,680 --> 00:43:16,280 Speaker 1: be very clear, the science was not there. Yeah, taking 644 00:43:16,280 --> 00:43:18,640 Speaker 1: it a step further, even a twenty eleven review of 645 00:43:18,680 --> 00:43:21,440 Speaker 1: the investigation was not able to rule out the possibility 646 00:43:21,520 --> 00:43:24,680 Speaker 1: that someone or some group other than Ivan's committed the crime. 647 00:43:25,320 --> 00:43:28,880 Speaker 1: The Government Accountability Office or GAL as I like to 648 00:43:28,960 --> 00:43:32,000 Speaker 1: call it because I'm an acronym junkie, UH found this 649 00:43:32,560 --> 00:43:36,320 Speaker 1: quote the FBI lacked a comprehensive approach or framework that 650 00:43:36,480 --> 00:43:40,040 Speaker 1: could have ensured standardization of the testing process. We jumped 651 00:43:40,120 --> 00:43:42,440 Speaker 1: into that a little early when we were talking about 652 00:43:42,800 --> 00:43:46,480 Speaker 1: testing for that mutation or those mutations, and how people 653 00:43:46,680 --> 00:43:51,120 Speaker 1: even within the FBI's lab kind of warned them against, 654 00:43:51,239 --> 00:43:53,880 Speaker 1: you know, jumping to conclusions about what could have caused 655 00:43:53,920 --> 00:43:56,640 Speaker 1: those mutations. They could have been something outside of what 656 00:43:56,760 --> 00:43:58,680 Speaker 1: they were using it as I kind of a foregone 657 00:43:58,680 --> 00:44:01,680 Speaker 1: conclusion and tracing it back. It's sort of like, I 658 00:44:01,719 --> 00:44:03,919 Speaker 1: don't know, maybe this is a stretch, and science people 659 00:44:04,080 --> 00:44:06,080 Speaker 1: please debunk the crap out of me, because I'm just 660 00:44:06,120 --> 00:44:07,960 Speaker 1: sort of spitballing here. But it reminds me of the 661 00:44:08,000 --> 00:44:12,120 Speaker 1: way certain ballistics technology have kind of been debunked, where 662 00:44:12,280 --> 00:44:15,880 Speaker 1: you can, you know, say the striations or whatever like 663 00:44:16,120 --> 00:44:19,040 Speaker 1: on a particular bullet could have only been generated by 664 00:44:19,080 --> 00:44:21,600 Speaker 1: this one gun. And there's a version of that technology 665 00:44:21,680 --> 00:44:23,959 Speaker 1: that was in fact debunked, and it caused some people 666 00:44:24,000 --> 00:44:27,200 Speaker 1: to be exonerated because they were convicted using that kind 667 00:44:27,239 --> 00:44:31,880 Speaker 1: of spurious um conclusion derived from, you know, something that 668 00:44:31,920 --> 00:44:35,560 Speaker 1: could have been caused by other factors. So they go 669 00:44:35,719 --> 00:44:39,080 Speaker 1: on to say the Government Accountability Office. As a result, 670 00:44:39,120 --> 00:44:42,239 Speaker 1: each of the contractors developed their tests differently, and one 671 00:44:42,320 --> 00:44:45,319 Speaker 1: contractor did not conduct verification testing, which is a key 672 00:44:45,360 --> 00:44:48,799 Speaker 1: step in determining whether a test will meet a user's requirements, 673 00:44:48,840 --> 00:44:54,919 Speaker 1: such as for sensitivity or accuracy. Broken test sounds familiar, unfortunately, 674 00:44:55,000 --> 00:44:58,600 Speaker 1: and these are days of pandemic. So if there are 675 00:44:58,840 --> 00:45:02,520 Speaker 1: problems with the f eyes official investigation, does that mean 676 00:45:02,719 --> 00:45:06,800 Speaker 1: there are problems with the FBI's official conclusion. The answer 677 00:45:06,880 --> 00:45:09,960 Speaker 1: there logically is yes. So now we have to ask 678 00:45:10,160 --> 00:45:13,239 Speaker 1: what actually happened, and that means that we have to 679 00:45:13,360 --> 00:45:18,000 Speaker 1: look at the conspiracies there. There's what you know, that's 680 00:45:18,160 --> 00:45:22,120 Speaker 1: that's pretty interesting because a lot of people don't know this. 681 00:45:22,480 --> 00:45:27,480 Speaker 1: But before Vice President Mike Pence was uh in office 682 00:45:28,080 --> 00:45:31,200 Speaker 1: in the US, he was also he had a different 683 00:45:31,280 --> 00:45:34,839 Speaker 1: career as a prominent radio host and then he moved 684 00:45:34,880 --> 00:45:39,000 Speaker 1: into politics. He had some stuff to say about this investigation. Right, yeah, 685 00:45:39,040 --> 00:45:42,480 Speaker 1: he did. He kind of just made some sort of 686 00:45:42,960 --> 00:45:47,319 Speaker 1: shot in the dark kind of claims. Um released some statements, uh, 687 00:45:47,880 --> 00:45:52,640 Speaker 1: saying some pretty interesting things about this substance. Um. He 688 00:45:53,360 --> 00:45:57,880 Speaker 1: essentially said, quote in a statement, Um, the material found 689 00:45:57,960 --> 00:46:00,840 Speaker 1: in my office and in others in Capital Hill was 690 00:46:01,000 --> 00:46:05,440 Speaker 1: finally milled weapons grade anthrax that had been this is 691 00:46:05,520 --> 00:46:10,959 Speaker 1: the key part genetically modified to increase it's virulence. Huh 692 00:46:11,520 --> 00:46:15,640 Speaker 1: what does that mean, ben, genetically modified? I mean, it's 693 00:46:15,840 --> 00:46:18,759 Speaker 1: it's the same, it's the same thing, right, He's he's 694 00:46:18,840 --> 00:46:22,600 Speaker 1: arguing that this was weaponized. And again we have to 695 00:46:22,640 --> 00:46:28,880 Speaker 1: remember that this this stuff was officially better than anything 696 00:46:29,000 --> 00:46:33,360 Speaker 1: the US or Russia or China could make. Uh, he 697 00:46:33,600 --> 00:46:36,880 Speaker 1: was I think at that point he was in a 698 00:46:37,520 --> 00:46:40,319 Speaker 1: he was a representative, right, he was a congressional representative 699 00:46:40,760 --> 00:46:44,600 Speaker 1: before he became governor of Indiana, before he became vice president. 700 00:46:45,760 --> 00:46:48,200 Speaker 1: That's right. And and you know, I mean it's he's 701 00:46:48,760 --> 00:46:51,560 Speaker 1: the notion that it was quote unquote weapons grade obviously 702 00:46:51,800 --> 00:46:55,200 Speaker 1: is is true to a degree, though the term is 703 00:46:55,480 --> 00:46:58,239 Speaker 1: a little bit dubious in terms of like how it's used. 704 00:46:58,239 --> 00:47:00,920 Speaker 1: The idea of weapons grade there isn't really a standard 705 00:47:00,960 --> 00:47:03,480 Speaker 1: as to what constitutes weapons. Great Anthrax of the l 706 00:47:03,560 --> 00:47:08,279 Speaker 1: A Times reported in an article by David Willman from 707 00:47:08,400 --> 00:47:14,960 Speaker 1: July six, UM And they spoke to UM a researcher 708 00:47:15,080 --> 00:47:18,719 Speaker 1: at Johns Hopkins University named Steven L. Salzburg, who was 709 00:47:18,719 --> 00:47:20,880 Speaker 1: actually part of the first team to check out the 710 00:47:20,960 --> 00:47:23,560 Speaker 1: material for the U. S. Government, And he said, that's 711 00:47:23,680 --> 00:47:26,520 Speaker 1: just wrong. That's simply wrong. And we knew at the 712 00:47:26,640 --> 00:47:29,239 Speaker 1: time that it was wrong. Uh. He's speaking, of course, 713 00:47:29,360 --> 00:47:34,080 Speaker 1: of of Pence's claims UM. And then Pence even kind 714 00:47:34,120 --> 00:47:39,480 Speaker 1: of doubled down further and said something to the effect of, oh, 715 00:47:39,680 --> 00:47:43,880 Speaker 1: it was coded with a chemical of some kind. Like 716 00:47:43,960 --> 00:47:47,600 Speaker 1: he definitely added some more uh fuel to this fire 717 00:47:48,000 --> 00:47:51,839 Speaker 1: in saying UM. In a two thousand two letter to Ashcroft, 718 00:47:52,120 --> 00:47:55,880 Speaker 1: the Attorney General, Um that the spores had been quote 719 00:47:55,960 --> 00:48:00,080 Speaker 1: coated with a chemical UM and that had also and 720 00:48:00,239 --> 00:48:04,319 Speaker 1: disproven by scientists at the SANDA National Laboratory in New 721 00:48:04,400 --> 00:48:08,359 Speaker 1: Mexico a few months before. He told Ashcroft that that's right, 722 00:48:08,440 --> 00:48:11,000 Speaker 1: and I'm I don't know, I'm fascinated by this idea 723 00:48:11,840 --> 00:48:15,880 Speaker 1: of it being genetically modified. UM. And it's interesting too 724 00:48:15,960 --> 00:48:20,759 Speaker 1: because Colin Powell, who is a Secretary of State. He 725 00:48:21,160 --> 00:48:25,440 Speaker 1: used this, as you know, we know was a thing, 726 00:48:25,640 --> 00:48:27,759 Speaker 1: you know, in terms of weapons of mass destruction. He 727 00:48:27,920 --> 00:48:30,360 Speaker 1: used this as another call to kind of go to 728 00:48:30,480 --> 00:48:35,560 Speaker 1: war with Iraq, um to support military action against Iraq 729 00:48:35,760 --> 00:48:38,520 Speaker 1: that you know, tying this these anthrax attacks. Uh, and 730 00:48:38,719 --> 00:48:41,000 Speaker 1: as as we did nine eleven, which we now know 731 00:48:41,719 --> 00:48:44,239 Speaker 1: really wasn't the case at all, and we used that 732 00:48:44,280 --> 00:48:46,239 Speaker 1: as an excuse to go to war with Iraq, and 733 00:48:46,320 --> 00:48:48,120 Speaker 1: that sort of got us embroiled in the Middle East 734 00:48:48,160 --> 00:48:50,840 Speaker 1: in the way that we're still kind of dealing with today. 735 00:48:51,320 --> 00:48:54,120 Speaker 1: Still friends with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Though you 736 00:48:54,200 --> 00:48:56,759 Speaker 1: want to kill some journalists you wanted to Uh, you 737 00:48:56,840 --> 00:48:59,680 Speaker 1: want to support some terrorists, that's fine. We'll see how 738 00:48:59,760 --> 00:49:04,360 Speaker 1: old prices affect that geopolitical relationship. But that's a story 739 00:49:04,480 --> 00:49:09,040 Speaker 1: for another day. You're right, Uh, you know, people immediately 740 00:49:09,160 --> 00:49:12,400 Speaker 1: tied this to terrorism. Death to America, death to Israel 741 00:49:12,920 --> 00:49:16,800 Speaker 1: is great, so on. Uh. We also have to remember 742 00:49:17,000 --> 00:49:23,160 Speaker 1: that at this time, millions of innocent Americans are being 743 00:49:23,800 --> 00:49:27,480 Speaker 1: vilified in the media for their religious beliefs. Right. It's 744 00:49:27,480 --> 00:49:31,560 Speaker 1: as dumb and disgusting as any other sort of prejudice. Um. 745 00:49:32,200 --> 00:49:35,759 Speaker 1: So when we're when we're talking about the belief of 746 00:49:35,960 --> 00:49:40,040 Speaker 1: terrorism or something, you know, the the idea that religiously 747 00:49:40,120 --> 00:49:46,120 Speaker 1: motivated terrorists might have perpetrated the anthrax attacks. We're specifically 748 00:49:46,239 --> 00:49:49,960 Speaker 1: talking about Al Qaeda. We're not talking about some general, 749 00:49:50,120 --> 00:49:55,640 Speaker 1: amorphous thing. We're talking about a real, concrete, discrete, uh, 750 00:49:56,080 --> 00:50:01,319 Speaker 1: existing organization that did have a track record, a rap 751 00:50:01,400 --> 00:50:05,040 Speaker 1: sheet of committing terroristacks. Absolutely, and let's also remember that 752 00:50:05,160 --> 00:50:09,400 Speaker 1: this was used as kind of, you know, a media device. 753 00:50:09,560 --> 00:50:12,560 Speaker 1: Powell held a press conference where he had a vial 754 00:50:12,719 --> 00:50:15,880 Speaker 1: of white powder in his hand, a small amount, and 755 00:50:16,120 --> 00:50:21,200 Speaker 1: he said that a teaspoons size quantity of anthrax um 756 00:50:21,680 --> 00:50:25,480 Speaker 1: in one of the letters had you know, driven Washington 757 00:50:25,640 --> 00:50:29,400 Speaker 1: into a state of chaos, killed and killed two postal 758 00:50:29,480 --> 00:50:35,399 Speaker 1: workers um. And he suggested very pointedly that Irraq had 759 00:50:35,480 --> 00:50:40,359 Speaker 1: stockpiled enough anthrax to quote Phil tens upon tens upon 760 00:50:40,520 --> 00:50:46,800 Speaker 1: tens of thousands of teaspoons. So, I mean, he's definitely 761 00:50:46,840 --> 00:50:49,200 Speaker 1: trying to stir up some this. It's definitely it's a 762 00:50:49,280 --> 00:50:52,080 Speaker 1: it's a fearmongering move, is what it is. And maybe 763 00:50:52,160 --> 00:50:55,360 Speaker 1: it's well intentioned, but it seems to me, like, you know, 764 00:50:55,560 --> 00:51:01,040 Speaker 1: a pretty callous maneuver. I'm just laughing because I think 765 00:51:01,080 --> 00:51:05,439 Speaker 1: that's a fantastic example of the of just how far 766 00:51:06,400 --> 00:51:10,120 Speaker 1: we in the United States will go to avoid using 767 00:51:10,200 --> 00:51:14,719 Speaker 1: the metric system. It's true, though, he's like, he's like 768 00:51:14,840 --> 00:51:17,560 Speaker 1: put it in. A number of people can understand. Tens 769 00:51:17,680 --> 00:51:23,640 Speaker 1: upon tens upon tens upon tens. If each if each 770 00:51:23,719 --> 00:51:26,200 Speaker 1: sport of anthrax was the size of an oreo, and 771 00:51:26,280 --> 00:51:28,600 Speaker 1: you stack them on top of each other, they could 772 00:51:28,640 --> 00:51:32,160 Speaker 1: reach you know whatever. Uh, as long as we don't 773 00:51:32,239 --> 00:51:34,279 Speaker 1: use the metric system. That's one of the that's one 774 00:51:34,280 --> 00:51:37,440 Speaker 1: of the big rules. But but there's another conspiracy here, 775 00:51:37,680 --> 00:51:42,960 Speaker 1: the idea that uh that the idea that the threat 776 00:51:43,160 --> 00:51:46,120 Speaker 1: came closer to home, the idea that this was a 777 00:51:46,280 --> 00:51:49,800 Speaker 1: false front, or that some faction of the U. S 778 00:51:49,880 --> 00:51:53,880 Speaker 1: Government actually planned this attack. You can imagine that for 779 00:51:54,040 --> 00:51:58,080 Speaker 1: the people who believe nine eleven itself was a false flag, 780 00:51:58,400 --> 00:52:01,840 Speaker 1: the anthrax attacks two thousand and one, we're just another 781 00:52:01,960 --> 00:52:05,760 Speaker 1: planned event or another sequence and a larger plan, another 782 00:52:05,960 --> 00:52:08,960 Speaker 1: inside job. You know. This school of thought frames those 783 00:52:09,000 --> 00:52:12,759 Speaker 1: attacks as a plan B, a backup measure just in 784 00:52:13,000 --> 00:52:17,440 Speaker 1: case nine eleven was not uh, not enough of a 785 00:52:17,560 --> 00:52:21,000 Speaker 1: push to make the public and the government move forward 786 00:52:21,120 --> 00:52:25,840 Speaker 1: with certain actions. Then this, this sort of the equivalent 787 00:52:25,880 --> 00:52:30,040 Speaker 1: of a double tap, would ensure that the public moved 788 00:52:30,080 --> 00:52:35,440 Speaker 1: in the direction that these powers, whoever they are, wanted. 789 00:52:35,920 --> 00:52:42,840 Speaker 1: You know, It's it's strange because there's something comforting this 790 00:52:43,160 --> 00:52:46,040 Speaker 1: this weird walk with me, or there's something comforting about 791 00:52:46,719 --> 00:52:50,320 Speaker 1: the idea that there is a grand design, you know 792 00:52:50,360 --> 00:52:53,680 Speaker 1: what I mean, the idea that there that the same 793 00:52:53,840 --> 00:53:00,040 Speaker 1: people who cannot get their stuff together on any of 794 00:53:00,120 --> 00:53:05,359 Speaker 1: in Tuesday are somehow also capable of this Rube Goldberg 795 00:53:05,680 --> 00:53:09,200 Speaker 1: esque control of the past, the future, and the present. 796 00:53:09,640 --> 00:53:11,680 Speaker 1: I don't know. I don't know. I I feel like 797 00:53:12,560 --> 00:53:16,200 Speaker 1: the idea that they're super villainy at work and a 798 00:53:16,280 --> 00:53:21,200 Speaker 1: grand conspiracy is much work comforting than the other side 799 00:53:21,239 --> 00:53:25,080 Speaker 1: of the coin, which is that it's just chaos, right 800 00:53:25,640 --> 00:53:28,719 Speaker 1: right that that maybe there's another conspiracy theory, is that 801 00:53:28,880 --> 00:53:34,640 Speaker 1: the FBI is covering up for governmental incompetence, Like what 802 00:53:34,880 --> 00:53:37,839 Speaker 1: what about that political pressure? Like what what if they 803 00:53:38,040 --> 00:53:40,319 Speaker 1: just you know what if they had people breathing down 804 00:53:40,360 --> 00:53:44,400 Speaker 1: their next saying clothes this case. Now, find me a 805 00:53:44,480 --> 00:53:48,560 Speaker 1: person who's the creepiest guy that we know has touched anthrax. 806 00:53:48,719 --> 00:53:52,279 Speaker 1: This is the lowest hanging fruit possibility of them all. 807 00:53:52,400 --> 00:53:54,200 Speaker 1: I mean, it makes the most sense. You know, you 808 00:53:54,280 --> 00:53:56,959 Speaker 1: want to say face. You want to get the job done, 809 00:53:57,200 --> 00:53:59,880 Speaker 1: even if it means putting away the wrong guy. You know, 810 00:54:00,280 --> 00:54:03,520 Speaker 1: maybe they even had a hand in his suicide. You know, 811 00:54:04,360 --> 00:54:07,719 Speaker 1: crazier things have been reported, you know, in terms of 812 00:54:07,800 --> 00:54:11,080 Speaker 1: the government's involvement and assassinating folks and you know, trying 813 00:54:11,120 --> 00:54:13,440 Speaker 1: to cover that up. You know. So I just I 814 00:54:13,600 --> 00:54:16,480 Speaker 1: have no problem believing this, and I find the false 815 00:54:16,520 --> 00:54:20,319 Speaker 1: flag narrative to be just such a go to kind 816 00:54:20,400 --> 00:54:22,960 Speaker 1: of loony tunes one. Like people are saying that about 817 00:54:23,000 --> 00:54:25,400 Speaker 1: the COVID situation right now, that like it's fault like 818 00:54:25,600 --> 00:54:27,520 Speaker 1: you know, some people that don't believe that it's real, 819 00:54:27,640 --> 00:54:30,239 Speaker 1: Like I equate it to like Holocaust denial or something. 820 00:54:30,320 --> 00:54:33,080 Speaker 1: It's like, dude, there's bodies piling up, they're making like 821 00:54:33,520 --> 00:54:35,480 Speaker 1: you know, ice skating rinks in New York and to 822 00:54:35,640 --> 00:54:39,359 Speaker 1: make shift morgues like it's real, you know, like move on, Yeah, 823 00:54:39,400 --> 00:54:41,960 Speaker 1: I would say, you know what to that point, the 824 00:54:43,320 --> 00:54:50,560 Speaker 1: US government is such a byzantine, complicated, maze like structure 825 00:54:50,719 --> 00:54:53,720 Speaker 1: with so many people involved in so many groups involved. 826 00:54:54,120 --> 00:54:58,959 Speaker 1: That it is completely possible for factions of the US 827 00:54:59,040 --> 00:55:02,520 Speaker 1: government to do things that the you know, the other 828 00:55:02,600 --> 00:55:05,719 Speaker 1: groups in the government don't know about or would object to. 829 00:55:05,920 --> 00:55:08,480 Speaker 1: Like the c i A is the go to example there. 830 00:55:08,600 --> 00:55:12,120 Speaker 1: They they're doing all sorts of dirty stuff, and there 831 00:55:12,160 --> 00:55:14,640 Speaker 1: are people who are supposed to have oversight of that 832 00:55:14,840 --> 00:55:17,920 Speaker 1: organization and they have no idea what's going on. You know, 833 00:55:18,120 --> 00:55:21,439 Speaker 1: they're in the dark. Uh. And the FBI has done 834 00:55:21,560 --> 00:55:25,840 Speaker 1: some some very filthy things too in the past, so 835 00:55:26,040 --> 00:55:28,920 Speaker 1: I I can see where this is coming from. At 836 00:55:29,000 --> 00:55:33,520 Speaker 1: this point, there is no conclusive proof that anyone affiliated 837 00:55:33,560 --> 00:55:38,480 Speaker 1: with the government in a law enforcement capacity conspired to 838 00:55:38,920 --> 00:55:43,239 Speaker 1: mail anthrax to people. But the problem remains. This is 839 00:55:43,360 --> 00:55:48,839 Speaker 1: the biggest problem here. The science, the science upon which 840 00:55:49,080 --> 00:55:55,160 Speaker 1: the FBI's conclusion depends is not itself sound. Regardless of 841 00:55:55,239 --> 00:55:58,279 Speaker 1: whether you think the FBI found their culprit or whether 842 00:55:58,400 --> 00:56:02,000 Speaker 1: you you know, what, if you think that some government 843 00:56:02,080 --> 00:56:06,040 Speaker 1: agents actually conducted this attack, or if you think that 844 00:56:06,160 --> 00:56:10,080 Speaker 1: political pressure rushed the investigation, there's one thing for sure, 845 00:56:10,239 --> 00:56:14,320 Speaker 1: and that is numerous experts, not just dr Ivan's colleagues, 846 00:56:15,640 --> 00:56:21,440 Speaker 1: agree the FBI has never conclusively proven dr Ivan's was 847 00:56:21,640 --> 00:56:27,080 Speaker 1: on the man behind the mail and all that lab work, 848 00:56:27,520 --> 00:56:29,759 Speaker 1: that that is what the case hinges on, and it's 849 00:56:29,800 --> 00:56:33,040 Speaker 1: not it's not solid. There's a really fantastic series on 850 00:56:33,160 --> 00:56:36,759 Speaker 1: pro Publica, one of which is was FBI science good 851 00:56:36,880 --> 00:56:40,839 Speaker 1: enough to I D Anthrax Killer? Um? And we talked 852 00:56:40,880 --> 00:56:43,600 Speaker 1: about this a little bit earlier, but just to hit 853 00:56:43,719 --> 00:56:47,800 Speaker 1: home again, UM, to quote the article, investigators had invented 854 00:56:47,800 --> 00:56:50,320 Speaker 1: a new form of genetic fingerprinting for the case, testing 855 00:56:50,360 --> 00:56:54,240 Speaker 1: anthrax collected from US and foreign labs from mutations detected 856 00:56:54,320 --> 00:56:57,440 Speaker 1: in the attack powder. Out of more than a thousand samples, 857 00:56:57,520 --> 00:57:00,920 Speaker 1: only eight tested positive for four mutations found in the 858 00:57:01,000 --> 00:57:04,040 Speaker 1: deadly germs sent to Congress in the news media. UM. 859 00:57:04,239 --> 00:57:08,520 Speaker 1: Even so, the outside scientists, quote known as the Red team, uh, 860 00:57:09,040 --> 00:57:11,120 Speaker 1: just saying this is a quote, urged the FBI to 861 00:57:11,200 --> 00:57:13,880 Speaker 1: do more basic research into how and when the mutations arose, 862 00:57:13,960 --> 00:57:17,760 Speaker 1: to make sure the tests were sound and the results unchallengeable. 863 00:57:18,280 --> 00:57:23,160 Speaker 1: And they didn't do that. So you know, Uh, this 864 00:57:23,520 --> 00:57:28,080 Speaker 1: review UM showed the FBI definitely overstated its case and 865 00:57:28,320 --> 00:57:31,520 Speaker 1: possibly would not have gotten a conviction. In fact, seems 866 00:57:31,560 --> 00:57:33,760 Speaker 1: to me quite likely would none have gotten a conviction 867 00:57:34,240 --> 00:57:38,680 Speaker 1: UM against Ivan's because they based their uh conclusions on 868 00:57:38,800 --> 00:57:42,560 Speaker 1: some pretty shaky science. And what does Dr Ivans think. 869 00:57:43,760 --> 00:57:49,280 Speaker 1: We'll never know because again, he died of an overdose 870 00:57:49,400 --> 00:57:51,800 Speaker 1: of tyler All codeine or as he said, an old 871 00:57:51,840 --> 00:57:57,160 Speaker 1: tailer all three that was ruled a probable suicide. So 872 00:57:57,240 --> 00:58:00,360 Speaker 1: he never got his day in court. Uh And technically 873 00:58:01,000 --> 00:58:04,560 Speaker 1: in this country, uh, days in court are you know, 874 00:58:04,800 --> 00:58:07,160 Speaker 1: they're a thing. They're a tradition that we like to 875 00:58:07,200 --> 00:58:11,520 Speaker 1: say we practice, but you know what I mean, it's 876 00:58:11,520 --> 00:58:14,440 Speaker 1: a formality. At times it seems really just kind of 877 00:58:14,480 --> 00:58:17,240 Speaker 1: like a smoke screen of Hey, look, justice is being 878 00:58:17,320 --> 00:58:20,480 Speaker 1: carried out, you know, but it quite often is not. 879 00:58:20,800 --> 00:58:23,720 Speaker 1: You know, there there is that court of public opinion. 880 00:58:24,320 --> 00:58:27,760 Speaker 1: Um and and this is really all Dr Ivan's truly 881 00:58:27,880 --> 00:58:30,640 Speaker 1: got tried in um and he was pilloried and he 882 00:58:31,000 --> 00:58:33,800 Speaker 1: um you know, lost his life because of it. And 883 00:58:34,160 --> 00:58:35,960 Speaker 1: you know, he may have been a weirdo and he 884 00:58:36,080 --> 00:58:38,600 Speaker 1: may have had a hand in this, but I don't 885 00:58:38,680 --> 00:58:41,480 Speaker 1: buy that he was acting alone, if he had anything 886 00:58:41,520 --> 00:58:45,720 Speaker 1: to do with it at all. Yeah, yeah, that's the issue. 887 00:58:45,800 --> 00:58:51,360 Speaker 1: Let's you know, there's one person that we should introduce 888 00:58:51,440 --> 00:58:54,000 Speaker 1: here at the towards the end of this episode, and 889 00:58:54,120 --> 00:58:58,680 Speaker 1: that is Claire Fraser Liggett. She was a pivotal member 890 00:58:59,080 --> 00:59:01,880 Speaker 1: of the amerathra X. I can't believe that's the real name, 891 00:59:01,920 --> 00:59:06,480 Speaker 1: the Amorial Trax investigation. Uh. She was a genetic consultant 892 00:59:06,720 --> 00:59:09,240 Speaker 1: working with the FBI, one of those people who helped 893 00:59:09,680 --> 00:59:14,800 Speaker 1: nail down the specific type of anthrax. Let's let's give 894 00:59:14,840 --> 00:59:18,120 Speaker 1: the last word to her again. This is an expert. 895 00:59:18,680 --> 00:59:21,800 Speaker 1: This is one of the protagonists, right, This is a 896 00:59:21,880 --> 00:59:25,760 Speaker 1: person who is attempting to solve this case. And she says, quote, 897 00:59:26,240 --> 00:59:29,320 Speaker 1: this was not an airtight case by any means. You know. 898 00:59:29,480 --> 00:59:31,640 Speaker 1: I think that for an awful lot of people, there 899 00:59:31,760 --> 00:59:34,160 Speaker 1: is a desire to really want to say that, yes, 900 00:59:34,400 --> 00:59:38,440 Speaker 1: Ivan's was the perpetrator, this case can reasonably be closed 901 00:59:38,480 --> 00:59:40,840 Speaker 1: and we can put this tragic chapter in US history 902 00:59:40,880 --> 00:59:44,480 Speaker 1: behind us. But I think part of what's driving that 903 00:59:44,760 --> 00:59:48,320 Speaker 1: is the fact that if he wasn't the perpetrator, then 904 00:59:48,400 --> 00:59:51,560 Speaker 1: it means that person is still out there. So if 905 00:59:51,640 --> 00:59:55,760 Speaker 1: not Bruce Ivans, then who That's the question we leave 906 00:59:55,800 --> 00:59:58,400 Speaker 1: you with today, Um, what what do you think? Please 907 00:59:58,920 --> 01:00:01,040 Speaker 1: let us know. You can write to us in the 908 01:00:01,160 --> 01:00:04,160 Speaker 1: usual usual places, the social media's or where some form 909 01:00:04,200 --> 01:00:08,040 Speaker 1: of conspiracy stuff or conspiracy Stuff show. You can also 910 01:00:08,200 --> 01:00:11,160 Speaker 1: find us as individuals on social media. I am on 911 01:00:11,240 --> 01:00:14,480 Speaker 1: Instagram at how Now Noel Brown, and you can find 912 01:00:14,520 --> 01:00:17,320 Speaker 1: me on Twitter at Ben Bully hs W. You can 913 01:00:17,400 --> 01:00:20,880 Speaker 1: also find me on Instagram in a burst of creativity, 914 01:00:21,000 --> 01:00:24,360 Speaker 1: calling myself at Ben Bully. Do you hate social media? 915 01:00:24,640 --> 01:00:28,280 Speaker 1: Totally get it? Why not leave us a message, give 916 01:00:28,440 --> 01:00:30,600 Speaker 1: us a call. You can reach us at one eight 917 01:00:30,800 --> 01:00:35,200 Speaker 1: three three st d w y t K. Feels weird. 918 01:00:35,240 --> 01:00:37,360 Speaker 1: We're not saying it together, and you know, I miss 919 01:00:37,400 --> 01:00:39,720 Speaker 1: when Matt says this. I hope he likes this episode. 920 01:00:39,800 --> 01:00:41,600 Speaker 1: I do too. I really hope he likes this episode. 921 01:00:41,600 --> 01:00:43,240 Speaker 1: And it's a bummer that he isn't here for it, 922 01:00:43,320 --> 01:00:45,400 Speaker 1: but I hope we didn't. Proud And speaking of Matt, 923 01:00:45,440 --> 01:00:47,919 Speaker 1: if you call that number that we just mentioned even 924 01:00:48,000 --> 01:00:51,400 Speaker 1: now while Matt's on vacation, uh you may well. He 925 01:00:51,520 --> 01:00:54,280 Speaker 1: may give you a call back. No promises, but he's 926 01:00:54,320 --> 01:00:55,880 Speaker 1: been known to do it. He's a lovely man and 927 01:00:55,920 --> 01:00:58,160 Speaker 1: would love to talk to you. Consider you know, I 928 01:00:58,200 --> 01:01:00,440 Speaker 1: wouldn't even say that's a problemise. I would say consider 929 01:01:00,480 --> 01:01:05,200 Speaker 1: it a warning. Be careful exactly exactly, so do let 930 01:01:05,280 --> 01:01:07,240 Speaker 1: us know, and while you're at it, let us know 931 01:01:08,000 --> 01:01:12,680 Speaker 1: if there are any other stories of scientists who have 932 01:01:12,880 --> 01:01:16,560 Speaker 1: died under mysterious circumstances. If there's another angle of the 933 01:01:16,640 --> 01:01:20,360 Speaker 1: anthrax attacks that you feel like your fellow listeners should 934 01:01:20,440 --> 01:01:23,480 Speaker 1: know about. Uh, you can tell us. As NL said, 935 01:01:23,920 --> 01:01:26,240 Speaker 1: on social media. You can also find us on your 936 01:01:26,720 --> 01:01:30,360 Speaker 1: your local telephone. UH. And if you say, hey, I 937 01:01:30,480 --> 01:01:33,760 Speaker 1: hate phones, Hey I hate social media, but I have 938 01:01:34,080 --> 01:01:37,200 Speaker 1: something you need to know. We are all ears, we're 939 01:01:37,280 --> 01:01:41,040 Speaker 1: all eyes. You can reach us seven any day of 940 01:01:41,080 --> 01:01:43,360 Speaker 1: the year, any time of the day at our good 941 01:01:43,360 --> 01:01:46,800 Speaker 1: old fashioned email address where we are conspiracy at iHeart 942 01:01:46,880 --> 01:02:07,520 Speaker 1: radio dot com. Yeah. Stuff they don't want you to 943 01:02:07,640 --> 01:02:10,360 Speaker 1: know is a production of I Heart Radio. For more 944 01:02:10,440 --> 01:02:13,160 Speaker 1: podcasts from my heart Radio, visit the I heart Radio app, 945 01:02:13,280 --> 01:02:16,120 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.