1 00:00:02,720 --> 00:00:16,520 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News. 2 00:00:18,360 --> 00:00:21,599 Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. 3 00:00:21,640 --> 00:00:24,040 Speaker 3: I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway. 4 00:00:24,480 --> 00:00:27,720 Speaker 2: Tracy, it's January twenty eighth. I think our new mayor 5 00:00:28,320 --> 00:00:30,680 Speaker 2: here in New York City. Maybe he hasn't done much, 6 00:00:30,720 --> 00:00:34,440 Speaker 2: but the snowstorm seemed to go fairly well, not too 7 00:00:34,440 --> 00:00:35,279 Speaker 2: many big disruptions. 8 00:00:35,320 --> 00:00:37,760 Speaker 3: I wasn't here, but you were able to walk around, 9 00:00:37,880 --> 00:00:38,960 Speaker 3: get out of your apartment. 10 00:00:39,240 --> 00:00:42,720 Speaker 2: There have been several mayors who's like entire reputation failed 11 00:00:42,760 --> 00:00:45,720 Speaker 2: because they couldn't handle a snowstorm, and so he seems 12 00:00:45,720 --> 00:00:46,960 Speaker 2: to have passed the first test. 13 00:00:47,040 --> 00:00:49,920 Speaker 3: So it feels like a low bar for New York mayors. 14 00:00:49,920 --> 00:00:52,239 Speaker 2: I gotta say, my guess is, if we looked at 15 00:00:52,680 --> 00:00:54,720 Speaker 2: I agree it is a low bar. But on the 16 00:00:54,720 --> 00:00:57,000 Speaker 2: other hand, it's like, Okay, first big test of the 17 00:00:57,040 --> 00:01:00,440 Speaker 2: new administration seems to be doing well. I don't think however, 18 00:01:00,920 --> 00:01:06,679 Speaker 2: ultimately the Zarnmumdan the administration will be judged on snow removal, 19 00:01:06,760 --> 00:01:08,679 Speaker 2: like this is not going to be how history probably 20 00:01:08,720 --> 00:01:09,520 Speaker 2: remembers how well. 21 00:01:09,720 --> 00:01:12,479 Speaker 3: No, and he certainly wasn't elected on his snow removal. 22 00:01:12,560 --> 00:01:13,880 Speaker 2: No, no, this is capabilities. 23 00:01:13,920 --> 00:01:15,960 Speaker 3: Although I did see the videos of him, you know, 24 00:01:16,280 --> 00:01:17,399 Speaker 3: getting his shovel out, and. 25 00:01:17,400 --> 00:01:20,280 Speaker 2: He's so good at like retail politics like that was like, say, 26 00:01:20,400 --> 00:01:21,280 Speaker 2: he's so good at that. 27 00:01:21,400 --> 00:01:21,720 Speaker 4: Yeah. 28 00:01:21,760 --> 00:01:25,200 Speaker 3: But speaking of tests, I mean there are bigger tests 29 00:01:25,240 --> 00:01:29,760 Speaker 3: coming up, right, mostly concentrated in the economic policies heah. 30 00:01:30,000 --> 00:01:32,240 Speaker 2: Right, I think we know, like sort of and of 31 00:01:32,240 --> 00:01:35,240 Speaker 2: course we talked to him, but like the affordability question 32 00:01:35,600 --> 00:01:40,280 Speaker 2: in New York City clearly central one of the if 33 00:01:40,480 --> 00:01:44,080 Speaker 2: the most central topic in the campaign. And what I 34 00:01:44,120 --> 00:01:47,080 Speaker 2: would say is that the very most, not all of them, 35 00:01:47,120 --> 00:01:49,680 Speaker 2: but at least a handful of the ideas that he's 36 00:01:49,760 --> 00:01:53,960 Speaker 2: proposed are the types of ideas that like, economists hate them, right, So, 37 00:01:54,120 --> 00:01:58,440 Speaker 2: especially anything where the government is intervening in rent, the 38 00:01:58,520 --> 00:02:00,640 Speaker 2: idea of Like I there might not be a more 39 00:02:00,680 --> 00:02:05,000 Speaker 2: hated idea among economists than anything that smacks rent control 40 00:02:05,080 --> 00:02:05,920 Speaker 2: or anything like that. 41 00:02:06,080 --> 00:02:06,280 Speaker 4: Right. 42 00:02:06,440 --> 00:02:08,840 Speaker 3: So, I am not very knowledgeable when it comes to 43 00:02:09,160 --> 00:02:12,760 Speaker 3: actual economic theory and how it's developed over time. But 44 00:02:13,000 --> 00:02:14,920 Speaker 3: one thing I do know is that you know, the 45 00:02:14,960 --> 00:02:20,280 Speaker 3: sort of forerunner or ancestor of a lot of traditional 46 00:02:20,320 --> 00:02:24,079 Speaker 3: economic theory that we see today, like neoclassical economic theory 47 00:02:24,600 --> 00:02:28,120 Speaker 3: Adam Smith, right, talking about like the freehand of the 48 00:02:28,160 --> 00:02:32,200 Speaker 3: market and how if the market is functioning, like everything 49 00:02:32,240 --> 00:02:34,600 Speaker 3: should be fine, right, Yeah, And. 50 00:02:35,040 --> 00:02:38,079 Speaker 2: I think like economists, even like you know, almost all 51 00:02:38,120 --> 00:02:40,919 Speaker 2: but the most sort of true hardcore lais a fair 52 00:02:41,320 --> 00:02:44,720 Speaker 2: economists would say that there are areas that you know, 53 00:02:44,840 --> 00:02:47,120 Speaker 2: they call it market failure, right right, there are certain 54 00:02:47,160 --> 00:02:51,000 Speaker 2: situations in which maybe we can't expect markets to do 55 00:02:51,040 --> 00:02:53,160 Speaker 2: the job. Maybe they'd say, like, oh, it really doesn't 56 00:02:53,160 --> 00:02:56,120 Speaker 2: make sense. They have like private fire departments for example, 57 00:02:56,160 --> 00:02:59,960 Speaker 2: although some people actually do propose private fire departments. But yeah, 58 00:03:00,120 --> 00:03:03,280 Speaker 2: you know, even the most sort of like true believers, 59 00:03:03,320 --> 00:03:06,600 Speaker 2: a sort of liberal or neoclassical economics, they're like, oh, yeah, 60 00:03:06,600 --> 00:03:07,520 Speaker 2: well there are market. 61 00:03:07,240 --> 00:03:09,960 Speaker 3: Failure, is right, in which case the government should see then. 62 00:03:09,880 --> 00:03:12,440 Speaker 2: There's a role, but only in failure that unless you 63 00:03:12,880 --> 00:03:15,520 Speaker 2: like define some areas like okay, there's a reason why 64 00:03:15,560 --> 00:03:19,160 Speaker 2: markets don't work for this particular area, but that after 65 00:03:19,320 --> 00:03:23,280 Speaker 2: then sandboxing a few of those things, then it's like, okay, 66 00:03:23,280 --> 00:03:25,840 Speaker 2: as much as possible, you just want. 67 00:03:25,639 --> 00:03:28,520 Speaker 3: To you all about don't interfere. 68 00:03:28,160 --> 00:03:29,480 Speaker 2: Let the price signals do their work. 69 00:03:29,560 --> 00:03:33,799 Speaker 3: Yeah, so this has become I guess the orthodoxy, and 70 00:03:33,919 --> 00:03:38,680 Speaker 3: Mamdani is very much in the the heterodox. The heterodox. Yeah, 71 00:03:38,720 --> 00:03:41,160 Speaker 3: that's a word that always comes up when people are 72 00:03:41,200 --> 00:03:43,640 Speaker 3: talking about well, when economists start talking about policies that 73 00:03:43,640 --> 00:03:44,200 Speaker 3: they don't like. 74 00:03:44,200 --> 00:03:48,280 Speaker 2: That's that's right. It's a euphemism for policies that they 75 00:03:48,360 --> 00:03:50,480 Speaker 2: they're like, ohtho, at least a handful of people wear 76 00:03:50,520 --> 00:03:53,360 Speaker 2: that bad shortly. But like these history, how do they 77 00:03:53,400 --> 00:03:56,720 Speaker 2: become the orthodoxy, et cetera. Right, like, it's not the 78 00:03:56,800 --> 00:04:00,040 Speaker 2: law of gravity or that the Earth is round, and 79 00:04:00,520 --> 00:04:03,240 Speaker 2: which are orthodox ideas for a good reason. There are 80 00:04:03,280 --> 00:04:05,440 Speaker 2: some people who don't believe that the Earth is round, 81 00:04:05,840 --> 00:04:08,560 Speaker 2: but they're like, I think we is pretty good. We 82 00:04:08,600 --> 00:04:09,720 Speaker 2: have good reason to believe it. 83 00:04:09,920 --> 00:04:10,600 Speaker 4: And they are the. 84 00:04:10,560 --> 00:04:13,680 Speaker 2: People who don't believe that the round. They're not heterodox. 85 00:04:13,720 --> 00:04:16,600 Speaker 2: They're cranks, right, right, Like that's like they're sort of 86 00:04:16,640 --> 00:04:19,080 Speaker 2: a difference. Those are cranks. And so, but where do 87 00:04:19,200 --> 00:04:22,800 Speaker 2: these orthodoxies emerge from? How did some ideas get shunted 88 00:04:22,880 --> 00:04:25,880 Speaker 2: into the category of heterodoxy or whatever. 89 00:04:25,680 --> 00:04:26,600 Speaker 3: And how did they evolve? 90 00:04:26,640 --> 00:04:28,200 Speaker 2: I have no idea, Like, I mean, I've read a 91 00:04:28,200 --> 00:04:30,360 Speaker 2: little bit about the past, but this is not much. 92 00:04:30,680 --> 00:04:31,560 Speaker 2: I don't know much about this. 93 00:04:31,600 --> 00:04:32,400 Speaker 3: We should talk about it. 94 00:04:32,480 --> 00:04:35,920 Speaker 2: We should, especially because our new mayor may in fact 95 00:04:36,000 --> 00:04:40,039 Speaker 2: pursue some heterodox ideas about economic management. Anyway, I'm very 96 00:04:40,040 --> 00:04:42,159 Speaker 2: excited to say, we really do have the perfect guest. 97 00:04:42,160 --> 00:04:44,080 Speaker 2: We're going to be speaking with, Jommy Modude. He is 98 00:04:44,120 --> 00:04:47,400 Speaker 2: a professor of economics at Sarah Lawrence College, also a 99 00:04:47,440 --> 00:04:50,880 Speaker 2: board member of the Law and Political Economy Collective, and 100 00:04:50,920 --> 00:04:54,120 Speaker 2: he's written a lot about these topics, including sort of 101 00:04:54,160 --> 00:04:58,320 Speaker 2: the intellectual history of some of these economic ideas. So, Jommy, 102 00:04:58,440 --> 00:04:59,880 Speaker 2: thank you so much for coming on. 103 00:04:59,800 --> 00:05:02,320 Speaker 4: Ou thank you so much. Joe and Tracy, what kind 104 00:05:02,360 --> 00:05:02,960 Speaker 4: of stuff. 105 00:05:02,680 --> 00:05:05,000 Speaker 2: You're teaching the kids at Sarah Lawrence these days? 106 00:05:05,120 --> 00:05:07,919 Speaker 4: So the interesting thing is I teach Introduction to Economic 107 00:05:07,960 --> 00:05:10,680 Speaker 4: Theory and Policy, which is a year long lecture and 108 00:05:10,720 --> 00:05:14,360 Speaker 4: that actually deals with some of these central questions markets, money, 109 00:05:14,400 --> 00:05:17,960 Speaker 4: the monetary system, and so on. And I actually teach econometrics. 110 00:05:18,680 --> 00:05:21,320 Speaker 2: When you say actually, it's because like people don't expect 111 00:05:21,320 --> 00:05:25,120 Speaker 2: this sort of unorthodox thinker to like actually do the numbers, 112 00:05:25,520 --> 00:05:26,440 Speaker 2: the technical stuff. 113 00:05:26,560 --> 00:05:28,440 Speaker 4: So it's interesting that you posted it that way because 114 00:05:28,480 --> 00:05:31,040 Speaker 4: one of the things that I do teach in econometrics 115 00:05:31,120 --> 00:05:33,760 Speaker 4: is method, like you know, like when you're it's not 116 00:05:33,839 --> 00:05:35,480 Speaker 4: just about number crunching, but where do you get the 117 00:05:35,560 --> 00:05:39,359 Speaker 4: numbers from? Yeah, and so like weaving in these questions 118 00:05:39,360 --> 00:05:42,080 Speaker 4: of method as we're trying to understand social and economic 119 00:05:42,160 --> 00:05:47,719 Speaker 4: reality is it makes for a solid training in economics. 120 00:05:47,760 --> 00:05:51,760 Speaker 4: And you know, so those questions of method woven into 121 00:05:51,760 --> 00:05:54,520 Speaker 4: the construction of theory, Yeah, that kind of informs the 122 00:05:54,520 --> 00:05:58,640 Speaker 4: way I teach. And why that matters, not just as 123 00:05:58,800 --> 00:06:01,440 Speaker 4: kind of a an inn ellectual exercise, but why that 124 00:06:01,480 --> 00:06:05,400 Speaker 4: matters for practical issues like what you guys were talking about. 125 00:06:05,600 --> 00:06:08,640 Speaker 3: So truly the perfect guests. Maybe just to begin with, 126 00:06:08,760 --> 00:06:12,240 Speaker 3: we could perhaps define our terms a little bit. You know, 127 00:06:12,440 --> 00:06:16,640 Speaker 3: Joe and I gave a properly terrible summary of neoclassical 128 00:06:16,680 --> 00:06:22,239 Speaker 3: economic thought. But in your mind, what is the orthodoxy? 129 00:06:22,360 --> 00:06:28,040 Speaker 4: So the orthodoxy is neoclassical economics. It comes from an 130 00:06:28,040 --> 00:06:33,080 Speaker 4: intellectual tradition, which so if I may differ a little 131 00:06:33,080 --> 00:06:36,359 Speaker 4: bit with what you say, Smith, Adam Smith is not 132 00:06:36,440 --> 00:06:41,080 Speaker 4: the forerunner of neoclassical economics. The expression invisible hand in 133 00:06:41,080 --> 00:06:43,360 Speaker 4: but I have my students do this experiment every time 134 00:06:43,400 --> 00:06:46,000 Speaker 4: because it's an eight hundred page book The Wealth of Nations. 135 00:06:46,920 --> 00:06:50,239 Speaker 4: How many times does the expression invisible hand appear there? Once? 136 00:06:50,720 --> 00:06:55,279 Speaker 4: So the point here is that there was an older 137 00:06:55,400 --> 00:07:01,080 Speaker 4: idea of what markets and of capitalism are and that 138 00:07:01,080 --> 00:07:03,360 Speaker 4: gets revived again in the nineteen twenties and thirties, and 139 00:07:03,400 --> 00:07:06,479 Speaker 4: I'll talk about that later. But that older idea, which 140 00:07:06,480 --> 00:07:10,440 Speaker 4: is called classical political economy, did not make any assumptions 141 00:07:10,440 --> 00:07:14,520 Speaker 4: about human behavior, that human beings are inherently rational, that 142 00:07:14,880 --> 00:07:18,280 Speaker 4: markets behave in this optimal manner full employment. That would 143 00:07:18,320 --> 00:07:23,360 Speaker 4: be neoclassical economics, right, that knowledge is more or less perfect. 144 00:07:24,000 --> 00:07:26,040 Speaker 4: There was none of that you're. 145 00:07:25,880 --> 00:07:29,200 Speaker 2: Talking about in the classical economics prior to neoclassical exactly 146 00:07:29,680 --> 00:07:31,880 Speaker 2: talk what years and what thinkers are we talking about? 147 00:07:31,920 --> 00:07:34,800 Speaker 4: So we could just talk about Adam Smith, Okay, yeah, great, 148 00:07:34,920 --> 00:07:37,640 Speaker 4: to some extent, David Ricardo or Karl Marx, the physiocrats. 149 00:07:37,640 --> 00:07:40,000 Speaker 4: I mean, so you had a range of authors in 150 00:07:40,080 --> 00:07:44,160 Speaker 4: a wide range, ideologically not necessarily on the same page, 151 00:07:44,600 --> 00:07:49,320 Speaker 4: but they had a vision of capitalism, which so the 152 00:07:49,360 --> 00:07:53,640 Speaker 4: original name of economics was political economy, and that meant 153 00:07:53,720 --> 00:07:58,240 Speaker 4: that you cannot really talk about economic questions without thinking 154 00:07:58,320 --> 00:08:02,560 Speaker 4: simultaneously about and many of these folks were actually trained 155 00:08:02,600 --> 00:08:08,000 Speaker 4: in law, So the question of law's role in structuring 156 00:08:08,080 --> 00:08:11,480 Speaker 4: the economy this kind of lurks in that intellectual tradition, 157 00:08:12,000 --> 00:08:15,440 Speaker 4: and one of the implications was that the economy is 158 00:08:15,520 --> 00:08:22,400 Speaker 4: not some natural transhistorical institution or thing, but it is 159 00:08:22,560 --> 00:08:26,680 Speaker 4: profoundly a product of history. And I think that's where 160 00:08:26,840 --> 00:08:30,200 Speaker 4: the big split arises, because if you teach or if 161 00:08:30,200 --> 00:08:33,440 Speaker 4: you study neoclassical economics, it is taught in a way 162 00:08:33,559 --> 00:08:37,640 Speaker 4: by which the economy is treated as something eternal, as 163 00:08:37,679 --> 00:08:42,280 Speaker 4: something almost in naturalistic terms, and therefore, like gravity, the 164 00:08:42,360 --> 00:08:46,280 Speaker 4: economy is always there exactly. But also like the rational 165 00:08:46,320 --> 00:08:50,880 Speaker 4: individual general equilibrium theory, all of these things are supposedly 166 00:08:51,040 --> 00:08:55,079 Speaker 4: just happen. And in that sense, this idea of lesser 167 00:08:55,080 --> 00:08:58,400 Speaker 4: affair that the economy is fundamentally pre political, that it 168 00:08:58,480 --> 00:09:02,000 Speaker 4: arises before politics, rather like the kernel of a walnut, 169 00:09:02,640 --> 00:09:05,959 Speaker 4: in which the walnut, which is the shell is if 170 00:09:05,960 --> 00:09:10,280 Speaker 4: you think is constitutional law or politics or law that 171 00:09:10,720 --> 00:09:15,199 Speaker 4: emanates from politics, that would encase this thing called the economy. 172 00:09:15,679 --> 00:09:18,920 Speaker 4: And only under extreme search of this new classical economics, 173 00:09:19,240 --> 00:09:22,040 Speaker 4: if there is quote unquote market failure, then the state 174 00:09:22,080 --> 00:09:23,640 Speaker 4: can step in a little bit to do this that 175 00:09:23,760 --> 00:09:26,800 Speaker 4: or the other, but fundamentally leave the market B. And 176 00:09:26,840 --> 00:09:31,120 Speaker 4: you're familiar with this argument. This idea is not really 177 00:09:31,120 --> 00:09:34,040 Speaker 4: there in Smith. And one of the things that people 178 00:09:34,080 --> 00:09:36,400 Speaker 4: sometimes get surprised about, and I always tell this to 179 00:09:36,440 --> 00:09:40,120 Speaker 4: my students is read his chapter on wages in the 180 00:09:40,120 --> 00:09:43,360 Speaker 4: Wealth of Nations, and he says very clearly that there 181 00:09:43,559 --> 00:09:47,599 Speaker 4: is a difference in power between those who own property 182 00:09:47,840 --> 00:09:51,560 Speaker 4: and workers who don't own property. So this idea that 183 00:09:51,600 --> 00:09:54,760 Speaker 4: the market is sort of this place where equals me 184 00:09:54,960 --> 00:09:57,600 Speaker 4: to create contracts that was not in Smith. It was 185 00:09:57,640 --> 00:09:59,520 Speaker 4: not in Ricardo. And of course you know that was 186 00:09:59,559 --> 00:10:03,040 Speaker 4: not there. But people if you evoke marks, then people 187 00:10:03,080 --> 00:10:05,800 Speaker 4: often say, well, you talk about socialism, Well Smith was 188 00:10:05,840 --> 00:10:06,599 Speaker 4: not a socialist. 189 00:10:07,240 --> 00:10:11,240 Speaker 2: What is his idea? Like, what was his contribution? Or 190 00:10:11,720 --> 00:10:13,720 Speaker 2: I admit, like I'm like guilty too. It's like, oh, 191 00:10:13,760 --> 00:10:18,720 Speaker 2: Adam Smith, the visible hand, right, the butcher. But I 192 00:10:18,800 --> 00:10:20,840 Speaker 2: have been told and I have heard that the sort 193 00:10:20,880 --> 00:10:23,199 Speaker 2: of caricature that we all have of Smith is wrong. 194 00:10:23,440 --> 00:10:24,559 Speaker 2: What was his project? 195 00:10:24,880 --> 00:10:26,960 Speaker 4: So I think the way to think about it is, 196 00:10:27,120 --> 00:10:28,920 Speaker 4: you know, just to sort of get out something which 197 00:10:28,920 --> 00:10:33,000 Speaker 4: I think is kind of important which is institutions. Okay, Now, 198 00:10:33,040 --> 00:10:35,120 Speaker 4: there have been many different readings of Adam Smith, and 199 00:10:35,160 --> 00:10:36,720 Speaker 4: so I'll come to them in a little bit, but 200 00:10:37,440 --> 00:10:39,760 Speaker 4: just to get it out there. When when you talk 201 00:10:39,800 --> 00:10:44,280 Speaker 4: about institutions, you're talking about the system of implicit and 202 00:10:44,360 --> 00:10:49,600 Speaker 4: explicit social constraints within which we exist. Right. So we 203 00:10:49,720 --> 00:10:52,960 Speaker 4: are having the spontaneous conversation, but in the context of 204 00:10:53,000 --> 00:10:56,640 Speaker 4: a building which is subject to certain zoning laws and 205 00:10:56,720 --> 00:10:59,400 Speaker 4: so on, we may and you know, in current zoning 206 00:10:59,480 --> 00:11:01,520 Speaker 4: laws we cannot smoke, but. 207 00:11:01,640 --> 00:11:03,840 Speaker 3: We were certain expectations involved. 208 00:11:03,920 --> 00:11:06,120 Speaker 4: But those expectations are codified in a kind of a 209 00:11:06,200 --> 00:11:10,400 Speaker 4: legal framework. Right. So institutions, the formal institution is law, 210 00:11:11,000 --> 00:11:15,320 Speaker 4: and informal institutions are cultural norms, and notions are right 211 00:11:15,360 --> 00:11:18,600 Speaker 4: and wrong and justice and all this. So Adam Smith, 212 00:11:19,320 --> 00:11:23,360 Speaker 4: according to I think is a convincing strain of thought, 213 00:11:23,679 --> 00:11:27,480 Speaker 4: was an institutionalist. He understood that, yes, the sphere of 214 00:11:27,640 --> 00:11:34,840 Speaker 4: private behavior, private interactions, lesser affair, actually sits on a 215 00:11:35,720 --> 00:11:40,679 Speaker 4: foundation which is of human creation, the system of property 216 00:11:40,760 --> 00:11:43,679 Speaker 4: rights and the system, you know, the system of power 217 00:11:43,679 --> 00:11:47,679 Speaker 4: relations and all of that. So politics was already there. 218 00:11:48,400 --> 00:11:51,360 Speaker 4: It's not that the economy was pre political. Now those ideas. 219 00:11:51,360 --> 00:11:55,120 Speaker 4: If you read Adam Smith his Glasgow University Lectures seventeen, 220 00:11:55,120 --> 00:11:56,840 Speaker 4: you know that was before the Wealth of Nations. It's 221 00:11:57,000 --> 00:12:00,280 Speaker 4: very clear that he's writing that. But what happened, says, 222 00:12:00,320 --> 00:12:04,040 Speaker 4: the rise of neoclassical economics in the late nineteenth century 223 00:12:04,360 --> 00:12:08,840 Speaker 4: eviscerates that history and it changes the story. The political 224 00:12:08,920 --> 00:12:11,920 Speaker 4: goes out of a political economy and it becomes economics, 225 00:12:12,360 --> 00:12:16,640 Speaker 4: so the principles of economics and so then this generation 226 00:12:17,080 --> 00:12:21,320 Speaker 4: of economists are trained to think of the economy as 227 00:12:21,600 --> 00:12:28,480 Speaker 4: completely separate from politics, and that in the post war period, 228 00:12:29,360 --> 00:12:31,520 Speaker 4: so that leads to what is called the Walrasian general 229 00:12:31,559 --> 00:12:34,760 Speaker 4: equilibrium theory. And I'll be happy to explain that, Arla. 230 00:12:35,320 --> 00:12:38,119 Speaker 3: Can I just ask? I have so many questions already, 231 00:12:38,280 --> 00:12:42,000 Speaker 3: but what was the environment that actually gave rise to 232 00:12:42,040 --> 00:12:43,680 Speaker 3: the neoclassical So. 233 00:12:43,640 --> 00:12:46,680 Speaker 4: This is really interesting because we're talking about the late 234 00:12:46,760 --> 00:12:52,200 Speaker 4: nineteenth century and this is a time of enormous social turmoil. 235 00:12:52,640 --> 00:12:56,240 Speaker 4: So to think that an idealized view of markets would 236 00:12:56,280 --> 00:12:59,040 Speaker 4: arise when you know, you've got the great Depression of 237 00:12:59,040 --> 00:13:00,640 Speaker 4: the eighteen ninety. 238 00:13:00,440 --> 00:13:02,320 Speaker 3: And then it goes through World War One and World 239 00:13:02,400 --> 00:13:02,800 Speaker 3: War two. 240 00:13:02,880 --> 00:13:05,520 Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, But here's the funny thing that happens in 241 00:13:05,559 --> 00:13:10,000 Speaker 4: this tradition. So what is interesting about American economics is 242 00:13:10,000 --> 00:13:15,600 Speaker 4: that the American Economic Association is founded by institutionalists. But 243 00:13:15,720 --> 00:13:19,560 Speaker 4: institutionalists not of the neoclassical kind. They were explicit. So 244 00:13:19,600 --> 00:13:23,560 Speaker 4: they were trained, these authors like Richard T. Eli and others. 245 00:13:23,800 --> 00:13:27,040 Speaker 4: They were trained in the German historical school of economics. 246 00:13:27,320 --> 00:13:30,240 Speaker 4: And the method of the German Historical school of economics 247 00:13:30,480 --> 00:13:34,760 Speaker 4: was that theory has to be constructed in dialogue with 248 00:13:34,840 --> 00:13:41,000 Speaker 4: social reality. W. E. B. Du Bois trains at Berlin 249 00:13:41,880 --> 00:13:45,200 Speaker 4: but as a sociologist, and he brings that method to 250 00:13:45,559 --> 00:13:48,600 Speaker 4: the study of racial inequalities in this country, in which 251 00:13:48,640 --> 00:13:52,920 Speaker 4: he's constructing a theory of race and class by looking 252 00:13:53,000 --> 00:13:55,960 Speaker 4: at actually the living standards of black people in this country. 253 00:13:56,040 --> 00:13:56,240 Speaker 3: Right. 254 00:13:56,240 --> 00:14:00,120 Speaker 4: So it's a particular method that was not deductive, but 255 00:14:00,160 --> 00:14:04,800 Speaker 4: it was inductive. It was engaging with social reality. So 256 00:14:04,880 --> 00:14:09,160 Speaker 4: what happens is that when the AEA is constructed of 257 00:14:09,480 --> 00:14:13,320 Speaker 4: American Economic Association, these are institutionalists of that kind, and 258 00:14:13,400 --> 00:14:17,640 Speaker 4: they come to dominate American economics right through the nineteen thirties, 259 00:14:18,800 --> 00:14:23,760 Speaker 4: informing many of these economists lawyers who are part of 260 00:14:24,080 --> 00:14:27,080 Speaker 4: Roosevelt's brains trust. I mean, many of those folks were lawyers, 261 00:14:27,360 --> 00:14:30,200 Speaker 4: but you had these folks who were trained in a 262 00:14:30,240 --> 00:14:34,640 Speaker 4: way by which they were absolutely opposed to this idea 263 00:14:34,680 --> 00:14:39,000 Speaker 4: that the economy is pre political. What happens in the 264 00:14:39,120 --> 00:14:45,000 Speaker 4: nineteen forties is the war, and then you had the role. 265 00:14:45,120 --> 00:14:47,640 Speaker 4: And so Philip Morowski discusses this in his book Is 266 00:14:47,640 --> 00:14:51,840 Speaker 4: a Historian of Economic Thought, Machine Dreams, in which he 267 00:14:52,080 --> 00:14:58,760 Speaker 4: argues that economics eventually becomes dominated by mathematicians and engineers 268 00:14:59,080 --> 00:15:03,360 Speaker 4: who kind of eviscerates society and politics and history and 269 00:15:03,520 --> 00:15:09,360 Speaker 4: construct the economy as a machine populated by cybords right, 270 00:15:09,440 --> 00:15:14,240 Speaker 4: pre program perfectly rational, exactly all knowing, all seeing, et cetera, 271 00:15:14,320 --> 00:15:21,040 Speaker 4: et cetera, And that way of conceptualizing economics eclipses this 272 00:15:21,280 --> 00:15:24,640 Speaker 4: older tradition and in so doing becomes dominant in the 273 00:15:24,760 --> 00:15:27,880 Speaker 4: nineteen fifties and sixties. And in this way, I mean 274 00:15:28,040 --> 00:15:30,840 Speaker 4: very much a state project, in the sense that these 275 00:15:30,880 --> 00:15:35,200 Speaker 4: folks were employed at institutions that got a lot of 276 00:15:35,240 --> 00:15:39,440 Speaker 4: money from the Department of Defense. So there was a 277 00:15:39,560 --> 00:15:43,120 Speaker 4: very sort of like an intellectual framework is being constructed 278 00:15:43,680 --> 00:15:47,520 Speaker 4: about the economy in which many of these authors were 279 00:15:47,640 --> 00:15:53,560 Speaker 4: very explicitly trying to model weapons systems, input output, that 280 00:15:53,680 --> 00:15:56,440 Speaker 4: kind of thing, and that how do you optimize this 281 00:15:56,560 --> 00:15:59,280 Speaker 4: input output system that the flying plane, how to shoot 282 00:15:59,280 --> 00:16:02,880 Speaker 4: it down, et cetera. So the economy becomes this engine 283 00:16:03,400 --> 00:16:08,200 Speaker 4: and becomes increasingly more and more mathematically sophisticated, but in 284 00:16:08,280 --> 00:16:13,680 Speaker 4: so doing divorce from social reality. In nineteen eighty five 285 00:16:14,320 --> 00:16:19,560 Speaker 4: eighty six, the National Science Foundation convened a symposium on 286 00:16:19,640 --> 00:16:22,600 Speaker 4: the state of economics teaching in the top graduate schools, 287 00:16:23,440 --> 00:16:27,840 Speaker 4: and they were extremely concerned about what was being taught. 288 00:16:28,440 --> 00:16:34,000 Speaker 4: That led to the Commission on Graduate Education in Economics. 289 00:16:34,320 --> 00:16:37,360 Speaker 4: It was a survey of the top graduate programs in 290 00:16:37,400 --> 00:16:41,200 Speaker 4: economics and the article in question was published in the 291 00:16:41,240 --> 00:16:45,680 Speaker 4: Journal of Economic Literature, and it was pretty dismal because 292 00:16:45,720 --> 00:16:50,160 Speaker 4: it was saying that these students are learning math, econ, 293 00:16:50,720 --> 00:16:54,840 Speaker 4: but they cannot apply this to social reality. And the 294 00:16:54,920 --> 00:16:58,400 Speaker 4: conclusion was quite interesting. They said, the concern is that 295 00:16:58,760 --> 00:17:03,120 Speaker 4: the profession is trained idiot savants. That was an exact 296 00:17:03,240 --> 00:17:04,719 Speaker 4: term in the JEL article. 297 00:17:05,040 --> 00:17:07,400 Speaker 3: It's not the worst thing that's ever been said about economists. 298 00:17:07,440 --> 00:17:08,400 Speaker 2: Yeah, that's true. That's true. 299 00:17:08,600 --> 00:17:11,399 Speaker 4: So this issue of the way by which the discipline 300 00:17:11,440 --> 00:17:16,159 Speaker 4: itself has sort of captured the narrative in which math 301 00:17:16,320 --> 00:17:20,439 Speaker 4: becomes rigor as opposed to history and society, and so 302 00:17:20,600 --> 00:17:24,879 Speaker 4: then government intervention and non intervention become the sort of 303 00:17:25,200 --> 00:17:28,400 Speaker 4: flashpoints of the fight. But it's a false debate, I would. 304 00:17:28,240 --> 00:17:46,880 Speaker 2: Argue, can we talk a little bit more about the 305 00:17:47,119 --> 00:17:53,040 Speaker 2: post war environment coming out of the nineteen forties? My impulse, 306 00:17:53,560 --> 00:17:55,639 Speaker 2: I feel like if I were there, it's like, you know, 307 00:17:56,480 --> 00:17:59,439 Speaker 2: governments can be absolute monsters, right, and or. 308 00:17:59,440 --> 00:18:00,560 Speaker 4: You're talking about McCarthy. 309 00:18:00,960 --> 00:18:05,239 Speaker 2: No, I'm talking about the rise of militaristic dictators all 310 00:18:05,240 --> 00:18:07,560 Speaker 2: around the world. True, like true, the sort of like 311 00:18:07,800 --> 00:18:10,800 Speaker 2: monstrous creations. Of course, the first half of the twentieth 312 00:18:10,840 --> 00:18:15,560 Speaker 2: century was like characterized by the rise of like. 313 00:18:15,800 --> 00:18:18,359 Speaker 3: With strong dustrial policy. 314 00:18:18,880 --> 00:18:21,399 Speaker 2: My impulse, like, I think if I had been around 315 00:18:21,440 --> 00:18:23,359 Speaker 2: in the nineteen foury, I was like, oh, we need 316 00:18:23,400 --> 00:18:26,600 Speaker 2: to like come up with an economics that constrains the 317 00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:30,719 Speaker 2: state as much as possible, because we've just witnessed how 318 00:18:30,920 --> 00:18:33,840 Speaker 2: the state can be absolutely monstrous and destructive. And of 319 00:18:33,880 --> 00:18:37,000 Speaker 2: course right before that was the Great Depression, et cetera. Like, 320 00:18:37,440 --> 00:18:39,840 Speaker 2: I don't know I would have I just in my mind, 321 00:18:40,600 --> 00:18:42,240 Speaker 2: I would have a lot of sympathy for that view 322 00:18:42,280 --> 00:18:42,680 Speaker 2: at the time. 323 00:18:43,480 --> 00:18:45,600 Speaker 4: Here's the thing, though, so this I discussed is in 324 00:18:45,640 --> 00:18:46,840 Speaker 4: one of the chapters in my book, and I had 325 00:18:46,880 --> 00:18:49,440 Speaker 4: a lot of fun writing about this, is that if 326 00:18:49,480 --> 00:18:56,199 Speaker 4: you look at post Second World War European reconstruction, it 327 00:18:56,320 --> 00:19:02,280 Speaker 4: involved it was not less affair at all. It involved 328 00:19:02,320 --> 00:19:06,360 Speaker 4: industrial and social policies, right, the mobilization of central banks. 329 00:19:06,760 --> 00:19:09,879 Speaker 4: And actually the US Congress had two studies done on 330 00:19:10,000 --> 00:19:14,000 Speaker 4: European central Bank's role in mobilizing finance and credit to 331 00:19:14,119 --> 00:19:18,560 Speaker 4: promote industrial and social policies, you know, the reconstruction, building 332 00:19:18,560 --> 00:19:21,919 Speaker 4: of hospitals, et cetera, et cetera, and the export economies 333 00:19:21,920 --> 00:19:24,840 Speaker 4: and France and Germany and so so you did have 334 00:19:25,119 --> 00:19:30,000 Speaker 4: a pretty strong state. But these were demo social democratic states. 335 00:19:30,480 --> 00:19:32,840 Speaker 4: And this is an important point. I mean, you know, so, 336 00:19:33,480 --> 00:19:36,760 Speaker 4: for example, the Bank of France is nationalized in nineteen 337 00:19:36,800 --> 00:19:40,520 Speaker 4: forty five forty four, and the National Credit Council, which 338 00:19:40,560 --> 00:19:43,359 Speaker 4: is at the core of the BF, has in it 339 00:19:43,840 --> 00:19:50,600 Speaker 4: different constituents of French society unions, employers, farmers, and so on, 340 00:19:50,840 --> 00:19:54,199 Speaker 4: who were sort of involved in planning the allocation of 341 00:19:54,240 --> 00:19:58,399 Speaker 4: credit to different sectors of society. Across the border in 342 00:19:58,440 --> 00:20:01,360 Speaker 4: Germany you have the KfW, which is a public bank, 343 00:20:01,840 --> 00:20:06,600 Speaker 4: again with different stakeholders including unions, and they are involved 344 00:20:06,680 --> 00:20:11,560 Speaker 4: in sort of the economic and social reconstruction through credit allocation. 345 00:20:11,680 --> 00:20:14,520 Speaker 4: But these were democratic states, you know, So I hear 346 00:20:14,880 --> 00:20:17,320 Speaker 4: that in the sense that, for sure, you can have 347 00:20:17,800 --> 00:20:22,880 Speaker 4: industrial policy of a type which is consistent with authoritarianism. Yeah, 348 00:20:23,440 --> 00:20:26,199 Speaker 4: and all of us would be a post authoritarianism. But 349 00:20:26,240 --> 00:20:29,280 Speaker 4: there was an industrial policy of a social democratic kind also, 350 00:20:29,720 --> 00:20:33,040 Speaker 4: and we have plenty of examples of those just from 351 00:20:33,560 --> 00:20:34,800 Speaker 4: postwar Europe. 352 00:20:35,040 --> 00:20:37,800 Speaker 3: So just to better understand, maybe we could apply some 353 00:20:37,840 --> 00:20:41,200 Speaker 3: of the theory to current economic policies. When you look 354 00:20:41,240 --> 00:20:46,320 Speaker 3: at Mamdani's agenda, you know, things like of freeze on 355 00:20:46,440 --> 00:20:49,520 Speaker 3: rent or I think right now the hot topic is 356 00:20:49,520 --> 00:20:53,159 Speaker 3: a tax on billionaires. How does that fit into the 357 00:20:53,200 --> 00:20:57,879 Speaker 3: intellectual history of economics? And I guess how heterodox is 358 00:20:57,880 --> 00:21:00,760 Speaker 3: it versus the orthodoxy that we've been talking about. 359 00:21:01,320 --> 00:21:04,359 Speaker 4: Well, I mean it's a it's it's a it's a 360 00:21:04,359 --> 00:21:06,600 Speaker 4: big question in the sense that I can answer it 361 00:21:06,640 --> 00:21:10,119 Speaker 4: in two ways. One is the narrative that this is 362 00:21:10,160 --> 00:21:12,160 Speaker 4: going to tank the economy. So let's just talk about 363 00:21:12,160 --> 00:21:13,840 Speaker 4: the tax Park. Let's just get that out of the way, 364 00:21:14,160 --> 00:21:17,320 Speaker 4: that this this small increase in the billionaires size is 365 00:21:17,320 --> 00:21:21,160 Speaker 4: going to tank economy. And my responses were, geez, then 366 00:21:21,200 --> 00:21:23,640 Speaker 4: capitalism would have been dead a long time ago because 367 00:21:23,640 --> 00:21:26,560 Speaker 4: the sixteenth Amendment would have killed American capitalism. 368 00:21:27,000 --> 00:21:29,840 Speaker 2: That was wait, remina, what's the is that the one 369 00:21:29,840 --> 00:21:32,000 Speaker 2: that gave the government, the federal government the ability to. 370 00:21:32,440 --> 00:21:35,959 Speaker 4: Well, that was the sixteen Amendment really legalized the progress 371 00:21:36,080 --> 00:21:38,600 Speaker 4: income taxes, right, and so if you look at across 372 00:21:38,600 --> 00:21:41,280 Speaker 4: the western world, you know, like in the US, tax 373 00:21:41,359 --> 00:21:43,679 Speaker 4: rates were actually much more progressive in that as you 374 00:21:43,680 --> 00:21:46,679 Speaker 4: know in the fifties and sixties, other countries had this 375 00:21:46,840 --> 00:21:50,640 Speaker 4: growth of more progressive taxes Britain and Franz and so on. 376 00:21:51,160 --> 00:21:53,919 Speaker 4: None of that led to the collapse of capitalism and. 377 00:21:53,920 --> 00:21:57,120 Speaker 2: The people those were the golden agers of capitalis okay. 378 00:21:57,359 --> 00:22:00,800 Speaker 4: So the question really is not the tex but what 379 00:22:00,880 --> 00:22:04,160 Speaker 4: is it being used for? And right, and so's that's 380 00:22:04,200 --> 00:22:09,840 Speaker 4: a separate conversation. But is that necessarily is that contrary 381 00:22:09,880 --> 00:22:13,440 Speaker 4: to orthodoxy? And yes, in a way it is because 382 00:22:13,480 --> 00:22:16,880 Speaker 4: it comes back to this idea that analytically, I mean, 383 00:22:16,920 --> 00:22:19,600 Speaker 4: every textbook will tell you, well, you've got this self 384 00:22:19,600 --> 00:22:24,360 Speaker 4: contained black box called the economy, which equilibrates at general equilibrium, 385 00:22:24,440 --> 00:22:28,280 Speaker 4: the production possibility, frontier per et to optimality, all these 386 00:22:28,320 --> 00:22:31,560 Speaker 4: sort of aspects of orthodoxy. So any act of state 387 00:22:32,040 --> 00:22:37,000 Speaker 4: intervention into it will automatically generate some negative outcomes. Right, 388 00:22:37,280 --> 00:22:40,480 Speaker 4: So from that standpoint, I would say that it is 389 00:22:40,520 --> 00:22:45,360 Speaker 4: profoundy opposed to the Orthodoxy this way of thinking about it. 390 00:22:45,880 --> 00:22:48,680 Speaker 4: But if you think of the Orthodoxy as a touchstone 391 00:22:49,000 --> 00:22:51,240 Speaker 4: or as a gold standard, then of course you would say, well, 392 00:22:51,280 --> 00:22:55,280 Speaker 4: these are outlandish ideas. But if you don't fall into that, 393 00:22:55,280 --> 00:22:58,119 Speaker 4: that and then you would say, well, yeah, but this 394 00:22:58,200 --> 00:23:01,600 Speaker 4: has been done. Is so weird about it? 395 00:23:02,480 --> 00:23:04,640 Speaker 2: Can we go back? I want to talk more about 396 00:23:04,800 --> 00:23:07,960 Speaker 2: the present tense, but we can't just like jump over 397 00:23:08,000 --> 00:23:09,679 Speaker 2: the war completely without ay. 398 00:23:09,880 --> 00:23:11,880 Speaker 3: You have you've talked about reconsty. 399 00:23:12,000 --> 00:23:14,160 Speaker 2: No, no, no, but sorry, I want to go back 400 00:23:14,200 --> 00:23:17,120 Speaker 2: to the war, not reconstruction. You're reading, or you did 401 00:23:17,160 --> 00:23:18,720 Speaker 2: read Wages of Destruction. 402 00:23:18,520 --> 00:23:21,880 Speaker 3: Right, which is why I mentioned German industrial policy. 403 00:23:22,080 --> 00:23:24,720 Speaker 2: But it occurs to me there's something I think is 404 00:23:24,800 --> 00:23:26,720 Speaker 2: very interesting. I think about it a lot, and i'd 405 00:23:26,760 --> 00:23:28,560 Speaker 2: love your take out of this, Like if we hear 406 00:23:28,640 --> 00:23:32,159 Speaker 2: like someone as an economist these days. Yeah, they come 407 00:23:32,240 --> 00:23:34,679 Speaker 2: up with a bunch of like big ideas, they have theories, 408 00:23:34,800 --> 00:23:39,200 Speaker 2: and they run tests and write papers and try to influence. 409 00:23:39,520 --> 00:23:42,239 Speaker 2: But when you think of like, okay, the economists in 410 00:23:42,400 --> 00:23:45,840 Speaker 2: the Department of War in whatever country was fighting at 411 00:23:45,880 --> 00:23:48,880 Speaker 2: the time, et cetera, it seemed like a more humble 412 00:23:48,960 --> 00:23:51,920 Speaker 2: profession in this sense, like a lot of the jobs 413 00:23:51,960 --> 00:23:55,880 Speaker 2: seem to just be counting, not even like advanced mathematics 414 00:23:55,920 --> 00:23:58,320 Speaker 2: per se, but the job seem to be a sort 415 00:23:58,359 --> 00:24:01,159 Speaker 2: of like very like the people who keep track of 416 00:24:01,200 --> 00:24:05,120 Speaker 2: the resources within the economy, and those are the economists, 417 00:24:05,359 --> 00:24:08,159 Speaker 2: which sounds to me very different than the picture that 418 00:24:08,160 --> 00:24:09,919 Speaker 2: we would often get in our head today. If you 419 00:24:09,960 --> 00:24:13,320 Speaker 2: hear that someone is an economist, is that fair? Is 420 00:24:13,320 --> 00:24:14,879 Speaker 2: that a fair understanding of history? 421 00:24:15,600 --> 00:24:17,080 Speaker 4: I'm not sure that I agree. 422 00:24:17,200 --> 00:24:18,640 Speaker 2: Okay, let's fine. 423 00:24:18,520 --> 00:24:21,359 Speaker 4: Because I think that, I mean, in some sense, there's 424 00:24:21,920 --> 00:24:24,000 Speaker 4: truth to what you're saying, because a lot of these 425 00:24:24,000 --> 00:24:29,000 Speaker 4: economists who were involved in war planning, that's exactly what 426 00:24:29,040 --> 00:24:30,639 Speaker 4: they were doing. I mean, you know, yeah, they were 427 00:24:30,720 --> 00:24:32,880 Speaker 4: actually but they were actually doing math modeling. I mean, 428 00:24:32,920 --> 00:24:37,760 Speaker 4: the whole mathematization of post war you know, math economy, 429 00:24:37,800 --> 00:24:41,639 Speaker 4: and all of that really came from like sophisticated mathematical models. 430 00:24:41,640 --> 00:24:45,160 Speaker 4: So it did come from that. But I think maybe 431 00:24:45,200 --> 00:24:47,679 Speaker 4: what you might be getting at over here, but you know, 432 00:24:47,800 --> 00:24:53,280 Speaker 4: just tell me what I'm hearing is that this notion 433 00:24:53,440 --> 00:24:57,359 Speaker 4: that the economy is an engine and the economist is 434 00:24:57,440 --> 00:25:00,960 Speaker 4: like this technician who is just like tinkering on with things, right, 435 00:25:01,240 --> 00:25:04,840 Speaker 4: And I think this idea and so that's how the 436 00:25:04,880 --> 00:25:08,720 Speaker 4: economist is kind of constructing this engine, as opposed to 437 00:25:08,800 --> 00:25:13,040 Speaker 4: an economist who is actually attempting to fix the engine 438 00:25:13,160 --> 00:25:16,200 Speaker 4: but also trying to see what the component parts are built. 439 00:25:16,240 --> 00:25:18,520 Speaker 4: In another words, society, this is history. 440 00:25:18,960 --> 00:25:20,919 Speaker 2: I'm going to take what you said and make it 441 00:25:20,960 --> 00:25:24,240 Speaker 2: what I meant to say, Okay, because I do. Yeah, 442 00:25:24,480 --> 00:25:26,880 Speaker 2: that's what I'm mean. Oh, that's exactly how I meant 443 00:25:26,920 --> 00:25:29,800 Speaker 2: to put it. Okay, thank you for validating perspective. 444 00:25:30,080 --> 00:25:33,280 Speaker 4: Okay. And I think those reflect two very rival methodologies. 445 00:25:33,359 --> 00:25:35,840 Speaker 4: Ok So, I think that one of the things that 446 00:25:36,320 --> 00:25:41,680 Speaker 4: so often gets missed out in the teaching of economics 447 00:25:41,720 --> 00:25:44,280 Speaker 4: and then the learning of economics is that the students 448 00:25:44,320 --> 00:25:47,320 Speaker 4: don't learn method They could say that way. I mean, 449 00:25:47,440 --> 00:25:51,160 Speaker 4: a textbook should say Okay, this is neoclassical economics. Here 450 00:25:51,240 --> 00:25:55,000 Speaker 4: is a method that is used, and here is this alternative. 451 00:25:55,200 --> 00:25:57,239 Speaker 4: Call it whatever you like to. I generally don't use 452 00:25:57,280 --> 00:26:01,520 Speaker 4: heterodox economics, I say critical political economy or you know 453 00:26:01,560 --> 00:26:05,320 Speaker 4: that kind of thing. It employs a different method. And 454 00:26:05,720 --> 00:26:08,119 Speaker 4: here's why it matters. Now, if you just do, like, 455 00:26:08,200 --> 00:26:11,760 Speaker 4: spend a few chapters on that, that already sets the 456 00:26:11,760 --> 00:26:15,159 Speaker 4: stage for an intelligent conversation. But if you don't do that, 457 00:26:15,680 --> 00:26:19,600 Speaker 4: and it's just that this is economics, then what happens 458 00:26:19,680 --> 00:26:23,679 Speaker 4: is it it kind of leaves out any possibility of 459 00:26:23,760 --> 00:26:30,480 Speaker 4: even understanding the world. Right, So Chinese, the Chinese economic miracle, 460 00:26:30,600 --> 00:26:34,800 Speaker 4: or the Japanese economic miracle, those are seen as somehow 461 00:26:35,600 --> 00:26:38,680 Speaker 4: I don't know that they were cheating, right, right, this 462 00:26:39,080 --> 00:26:42,239 Speaker 4: notion that these countries were cheating, as opposed to saying, well, 463 00:26:42,400 --> 00:26:45,000 Speaker 4: you know, they use industrial policy of a certain kind, 464 00:26:45,640 --> 00:26:49,080 Speaker 4: so did Sweden of a different kind in the post 465 00:26:49,119 --> 00:26:52,320 Speaker 4: war period, And can we learned something from that theoretically? 466 00:26:52,680 --> 00:26:54,840 Speaker 4: And what does that say about the relationship in politics 467 00:26:54,880 --> 00:26:57,040 Speaker 4: and economics, which is exactly where we started out with. 468 00:26:57,520 --> 00:26:59,600 Speaker 4: And I think that's the way the conversation should go. 469 00:27:00,840 --> 00:27:03,240 Speaker 3: Can you just remind me very quickly, but how does 470 00:27:03,400 --> 00:27:07,440 Speaker 3: neoclassical economics actually explain the fact that we do have 471 00:27:07,560 --> 00:27:10,840 Speaker 3: market failures? Right? Because in theory, if the market is 472 00:27:10,920 --> 00:27:16,959 Speaker 3: perfectly functioning and always generating an optimal outcome, always at 473 00:27:17,119 --> 00:27:21,439 Speaker 3: equilibrium between supply and demand or whatever, they shouldn't be happening, right, 474 00:27:21,480 --> 00:27:24,800 Speaker 3: And yet throughout history we have market failures all the time. 475 00:27:25,280 --> 00:27:28,040 Speaker 4: So that's the way where I would say that market 476 00:27:28,040 --> 00:27:31,880 Speaker 4: failures don't actually exist, because I mean, think about one 477 00:27:32,240 --> 00:27:37,359 Speaker 4: instance of what is often characterized as market failure. Pollution. Now, 478 00:27:37,600 --> 00:27:43,120 Speaker 4: pollution is ubiquitous. I mean any act of production involves 479 00:27:43,240 --> 00:27:46,600 Speaker 4: inputs of raw materials which are extracted from somewhere. Then 480 00:27:46,640 --> 00:27:50,800 Speaker 4: you've got a physico chemical process, outcomes and output, and 481 00:27:50,840 --> 00:27:52,800 Speaker 4: it could be an intangible output, it could be you know, 482 00:27:52,920 --> 00:27:57,240 Speaker 4: the output from your computer, right, And then there's waste, 483 00:27:58,200 --> 00:28:03,800 Speaker 4: there's pollution. So now if pollution and waste are ubiquitous, 484 00:28:04,400 --> 00:28:08,000 Speaker 4: and if market failures are ubiquitous, then they're not market 485 00:28:08,000 --> 00:28:12,920 Speaker 4: failures logically, they are the legal design of the property 486 00:28:13,000 --> 00:28:16,919 Speaker 4: rights that enabled the owner of the factory to actually 487 00:28:17,000 --> 00:28:19,480 Speaker 4: dump chemical waste or for Google to take your in 488 00:28:19,600 --> 00:28:25,440 Speaker 4: my private data, right it's a that brings you straight 489 00:28:25,520 --> 00:28:30,720 Speaker 4: back to the fact that the social cost that industry, 490 00:28:31,280 --> 00:28:35,720 Speaker 4: you know, can inflict, depends on the legal design of industry. 491 00:28:35,760 --> 00:28:39,960 Speaker 4: So before the National Environmental Policy Actor sixty nine, industry 492 00:28:39,960 --> 00:28:43,320 Speaker 4: had far greater leeway to dump more chemical waste than 493 00:28:43,360 --> 00:28:46,520 Speaker 4: after that. So I would just say that, yeah, I 494 00:28:46,600 --> 00:28:49,600 Speaker 4: think we need to move away from this notion of 495 00:28:49,640 --> 00:28:52,840 Speaker 4: market failure. And then, you know, so that's a usual 496 00:28:52,840 --> 00:28:55,040 Speaker 4: debate that well, okay, so you got market failure, then 497 00:28:55,120 --> 00:28:58,240 Speaker 4: do we one state intervention or not? And I argue 498 00:28:58,240 --> 00:28:59,520 Speaker 4: in the book that that's a bit of a lack 499 00:28:59,560 --> 00:29:03,360 Speaker 4: of family debate between liberals and conservatives because both sides 500 00:29:03,400 --> 00:29:06,400 Speaker 4: agree that there's market failure, and then one side said, well, 501 00:29:06,400 --> 00:29:09,840 Speaker 4: we should probably not have state intervention, and the other 502 00:29:09,880 --> 00:29:12,920 Speaker 4: side says the opposite. My point is they are always 503 00:29:12,960 --> 00:29:17,240 Speaker 4: social costs, and politics, through the law, is going to 504 00:29:17,240 --> 00:29:20,600 Speaker 4: be structuring the composition and level of those costs, and 505 00:29:20,640 --> 00:29:23,400 Speaker 4: so I think that's where the conversation, I think should 506 00:29:23,400 --> 00:29:23,720 Speaker 4: go to. 507 00:29:24,120 --> 00:29:27,880 Speaker 3: So it's a political decision about which costs to minimize 508 00:29:28,000 --> 00:29:29,440 Speaker 3: or avoid versus an economy. 509 00:29:29,480 --> 00:29:31,920 Speaker 4: I mean, it's always been that, and that's where I 510 00:29:32,000 --> 00:29:34,520 Speaker 4: think in that sense. If you come back to issues 511 00:29:34,560 --> 00:29:38,120 Speaker 4: of affordability and such, I would say that if you 512 00:29:38,400 --> 00:29:41,600 Speaker 4: let housing prices be whatever they are so that people 513 00:29:41,680 --> 00:29:45,840 Speaker 4: lose their homes, that's as much a political structure ring 514 00:29:46,080 --> 00:29:51,040 Speaker 4: of real estate as otherwise. You see what I'm saying. Yeah, 515 00:29:51,240 --> 00:29:54,040 Speaker 4: So it's not any which way politics is there. The 516 00:29:54,120 --> 00:29:56,959 Speaker 4: question is who's benefiting and who's losing. This is I 517 00:29:56,960 --> 00:29:59,040 Speaker 4: think for me, this is the question. 518 00:30:14,680 --> 00:30:20,040 Speaker 2: Okay, So there are some things where markets work very well. Right, 519 00:30:20,360 --> 00:30:23,240 Speaker 2: you know, if we want to have really good bagels, 520 00:30:23,640 --> 00:30:25,800 Speaker 2: then there's a good chance that like a good way 521 00:30:25,880 --> 00:30:27,640 Speaker 2: to get there is you have a lot of bakery 522 00:30:27,840 --> 00:30:34,240 Speaker 2: entrepreneurs and they're competing on price and quality and so forth, 523 00:30:34,800 --> 00:30:38,520 Speaker 2: et cetera. But then they're gonna emmit waste. So let's 524 00:30:38,520 --> 00:30:41,080 Speaker 2: just go back to the pollution example in the process, 525 00:30:41,120 --> 00:30:43,640 Speaker 2: and we say, like, okay, the market worked really well 526 00:30:43,920 --> 00:30:46,480 Speaker 2: in the creation of the bagel, but we have this problem, 527 00:30:46,560 --> 00:30:50,120 Speaker 2: which is that they're creating they're creating waste that has 528 00:30:50,160 --> 00:30:52,240 Speaker 2: to be solved. And even if that's benign, you know, 529 00:30:52,320 --> 00:30:54,240 Speaker 2: it's like, of course anyone is good, but there's gonna 530 00:30:54,240 --> 00:30:56,800 Speaker 2: be some waste involvary and it's not the most polluting thing, 531 00:30:57,120 --> 00:30:59,920 Speaker 2: so we need some sort of like Okay, so then 532 00:31:00,000 --> 00:31:03,200 Speaker 2: and the new classical economics, Yeah, there's market failure. This 533 00:31:03,400 --> 00:31:06,560 Speaker 2: is why we have we have to have a public 534 00:31:06,640 --> 00:31:09,920 Speaker 2: the sanitation workers, right because otherwise they'd always be dumping 535 00:31:09,960 --> 00:31:12,000 Speaker 2: it out on the street. And so okay, so we 536 00:31:12,080 --> 00:31:16,080 Speaker 2: have public sanitation workers. You reframe this and you're like, no, 537 00:31:16,560 --> 00:31:18,719 Speaker 2: market failure isn't the right way to think about it. 538 00:31:18,720 --> 00:31:21,280 Speaker 2: It's endemic to production. It's part of how market works. 539 00:31:21,320 --> 00:31:23,200 Speaker 2: It's not failure. What do we then do with this 540 00:31:23,680 --> 00:31:26,760 Speaker 2: information so that we no longer conceive of these sort 541 00:31:26,800 --> 00:31:30,480 Speaker 2: of like edge cases of mostly markets work or frequently 542 00:31:30,480 --> 00:31:33,040 Speaker 2: markets can work. But then you get market failures. You 543 00:31:33,160 --> 00:31:35,280 Speaker 2: flipped this entire thing on the head and like, market 544 00:31:35,360 --> 00:31:39,640 Speaker 2: failures are not a useful thing. Okay, we accept that premise. 545 00:31:39,800 --> 00:31:41,440 Speaker 2: Then what do we do with that? Do we have 546 00:31:41,560 --> 00:31:43,080 Speaker 2: this new lens, and then what do we. 547 00:31:43,040 --> 00:31:46,720 Speaker 4: See Some of those social costs would need to be internalized. 548 00:31:46,720 --> 00:31:48,600 Speaker 4: In other words, they would as they always have been 549 00:31:48,920 --> 00:31:51,080 Speaker 4: said throughout the history of capitalism. Again, so this is 550 00:31:51,120 --> 00:31:54,000 Speaker 4: not just an obbortuary statement, but if you look at 551 00:31:54,000 --> 00:31:57,680 Speaker 4: throughout the history of capitalism, this janus faced nature of 552 00:31:58,160 --> 00:32:01,960 Speaker 4: capitalist activity, wealth creation on the one hand, and social 553 00:32:02,040 --> 00:32:05,160 Speaker 4: costs on the other hand. And then at some in 554 00:32:05,280 --> 00:32:08,440 Speaker 4: various moments in time, some of those social costs were 555 00:32:08,480 --> 00:32:11,520 Speaker 4: extremely high in terms of the rates charged on something 556 00:32:11,560 --> 00:32:15,640 Speaker 4: on the other Monvill, Illinois eighteen seventy seven landmark Supreme 557 00:32:15,680 --> 00:32:20,320 Speaker 4: Court case came out of the Interstate Commerce Act Commission, 558 00:32:20,720 --> 00:32:25,320 Speaker 4: which put caps on railroads and on grain elevators because 559 00:32:25,520 --> 00:32:29,959 Speaker 4: what was happening was that the farmers were storing, they 560 00:32:29,960 --> 00:32:33,000 Speaker 4: were charging extremely they were being charged extremely high rates 561 00:32:33,240 --> 00:32:38,600 Speaker 4: by grain storage elevators and railroads, and what was happening 562 00:32:38,640 --> 00:32:41,760 Speaker 4: was the price for food was rising. So the Illinois 563 00:32:41,800 --> 00:32:44,520 Speaker 4: state legislature put a cap on that went up to 564 00:32:44,560 --> 00:32:47,440 Speaker 4: the Supreme Court. And so there was this whole idea, 565 00:32:47,640 --> 00:32:50,840 Speaker 4: and the Supreme Court ruled in favor of price caps 566 00:32:50,880 --> 00:32:52,880 Speaker 4: on these rates charge because they said, well, this is 567 00:32:53,760 --> 00:32:56,800 Speaker 4: this is of social importance. Food should be affordable. There's 568 00:32:56,800 --> 00:33:01,320 Speaker 4: a very long history of this in American constitutional history. 569 00:33:01,800 --> 00:33:05,480 Speaker 4: That is basically exemplifying the basic point that at some 570 00:33:05,640 --> 00:33:09,560 Speaker 4: points and in various points, some of these social costs 571 00:33:09,560 --> 00:33:12,760 Speaker 4: were deemed too high, and then in some way they 572 00:33:12,760 --> 00:33:17,000 Speaker 4: would need they had to either be internalized or you know, 573 00:33:17,120 --> 00:33:20,720 Speaker 4: maybe smaller businesses could not internalize some of these costs. Okay, 574 00:33:20,880 --> 00:33:23,320 Speaker 4: give them some kind of a tax credit. You see 575 00:33:23,320 --> 00:33:26,840 Speaker 4: what I'm saying. There's intelligent ways of thinking about public policy. 576 00:33:27,120 --> 00:33:30,640 Speaker 4: So Mamdani's policies, whatever they may be, they may affect 577 00:33:31,880 --> 00:33:34,520 Speaker 4: I don't know, smaller businesses differently from a larger ones. 578 00:33:34,560 --> 00:33:37,600 Speaker 4: So the ones that have less cash flow, they can 579 00:33:37,600 --> 00:33:40,440 Speaker 4: get a tax credit as a write off, right, I mean, 580 00:33:40,480 --> 00:33:42,680 Speaker 4: you can think about all of these kinds of policies, 581 00:33:43,080 --> 00:33:44,880 Speaker 4: and at least that's whay I think about it. In 582 00:33:44,920 --> 00:33:45,720 Speaker 4: practical terms. 583 00:33:46,160 --> 00:33:48,080 Speaker 3: I'm trying to think how to frame this question, and 584 00:33:48,120 --> 00:33:50,360 Speaker 3: I probably won't get it right, but here goes. We've 585 00:33:50,360 --> 00:33:53,280 Speaker 3: been doing a lot of episodes on Venezuela recently, and 586 00:33:53,360 --> 00:33:56,440 Speaker 3: so if I think about, you know, some famous heterodox 587 00:33:56,680 --> 00:33:59,840 Speaker 3: economic policy that perhaps weren't kind of wrong, that would 588 00:33:59,840 --> 00:34:04,720 Speaker 3: be a good examples when you're thinking of designing actual 589 00:34:05,080 --> 00:34:11,759 Speaker 3: economic policy. If you're doing it prioritizing or politics, or 590 00:34:11,840 --> 00:34:15,680 Speaker 3: on a political basis, and you don't have that sort 591 00:34:15,719 --> 00:34:22,360 Speaker 3: of scientific rational framework that is so endemic in neoclassical thought, 592 00:34:23,320 --> 00:34:27,720 Speaker 3: does that help you design policy? Is that a useful 593 00:34:27,960 --> 00:34:29,040 Speaker 3: framework for you? 594 00:34:29,680 --> 00:34:33,680 Speaker 4: I guess the question is what defines science. So the way, 595 00:34:33,719 --> 00:34:38,280 Speaker 4: for example, the institutional economist that I was talking about, 596 00:34:38,360 --> 00:34:42,800 Speaker 4: the way they designed policy was on the basis of 597 00:34:42,920 --> 00:34:48,239 Speaker 4: theory that was evidence based, social reality, historical reality, court cases, 598 00:34:48,280 --> 00:34:51,279 Speaker 4: you know, this kind of thing. Neoclassical economist doesn't do 599 00:34:51,400 --> 00:34:55,000 Speaker 4: policy that way though, or theory. It's deductive, it assumed. 600 00:34:55,080 --> 00:34:59,239 Speaker 4: So it's constructing this model on the basis of no evidence, 601 00:35:00,200 --> 00:35:01,279 Speaker 4: neoclassical on. 602 00:35:01,200 --> 00:35:03,160 Speaker 3: The basis of a reality that does not in fact 603 00:35:03,160 --> 00:35:04,120 Speaker 3: exist exactly. 604 00:35:04,200 --> 00:35:06,880 Speaker 4: Thank you for putting it that way, because that already 605 00:35:06,920 --> 00:35:10,799 Speaker 4: exemplifies the problem, which is that how on earth are 606 00:35:10,840 --> 00:35:14,120 Speaker 4: you designing a policy based on a theory for which 607 00:35:14,160 --> 00:35:17,200 Speaker 4: you have which has not been subjected to any kind 608 00:35:17,360 --> 00:35:22,280 Speaker 4: of theoretical you know, any kind of intellectual engagement with reality. 609 00:35:22,680 --> 00:35:24,720 Speaker 4: In the wake of the financial crisis of two thousand 610 00:35:24,719 --> 00:35:29,120 Speaker 4: and seven two thousand and eight, when prominent neoclassical economists 611 00:35:29,160 --> 00:35:31,799 Speaker 4: were asked, wait a second, are you now going to 612 00:35:32,640 --> 00:35:36,440 Speaker 4: rethink your models because this should not have happened per 613 00:35:36,480 --> 00:35:41,319 Speaker 4: the neoclassical framework, they said, nope, And I think that's 614 00:35:41,360 --> 00:35:45,120 Speaker 4: the problem here. That policy is being designed in this 615 00:35:45,120 --> 00:35:47,240 Speaker 4: particular way on the basis of theory of this nature. 616 00:35:47,960 --> 00:35:52,680 Speaker 4: But if you bring in a more engaged way of 617 00:35:52,719 --> 00:35:57,040 Speaker 4: thinking about policy and politics, then the nature of the 618 00:35:57,040 --> 00:35:59,800 Speaker 4: politics matters. I mean, who you know, is it a 619 00:36:00,040 --> 00:36:03,600 Speaker 4: raitarian state? Is in a democratic state? So I don't 620 00:36:03,680 --> 00:36:10,120 Speaker 4: like authoritarianism, sure, so I think policy should reflect theory 621 00:36:10,840 --> 00:36:13,360 Speaker 4: on the basis of democratic principles in some in a 622 00:36:13,400 --> 00:36:13,960 Speaker 4: broad sense. 623 00:36:14,680 --> 00:36:18,120 Speaker 2: You know, going back to the contemporary debates about housing 624 00:36:18,280 --> 00:36:22,080 Speaker 2: in New York City right now, and there are others 625 00:36:22,520 --> 00:36:26,280 Speaker 2: who might buy exactly what you're saying at the conceptual lens, 626 00:36:26,880 --> 00:36:29,960 Speaker 2: and they would say, you know what, Johnny is completely 627 00:36:30,080 --> 00:36:33,920 Speaker 2: correct about everything. The problem is that existing politics have 628 00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:36,480 Speaker 2: made it too hard to build. The problem is that 629 00:36:36,680 --> 00:36:41,239 Speaker 2: existing politics have made it so that we're paying too 630 00:36:41,320 --> 00:36:44,640 Speaker 2: much for labor, et cetera. The problem is that existing 631 00:36:44,920 --> 00:36:50,080 Speaker 2: landlords control have too much influence and are constraining the 632 00:36:50,080 --> 00:36:54,040 Speaker 2: building of new that they like. It strikes me as 633 00:36:54,280 --> 00:36:58,879 Speaker 2: there are many versions of your framework that to take 634 00:36:58,880 --> 00:37:02,440 Speaker 2: it to specific policies that don't necessarily lead to and 635 00:37:02,520 --> 00:37:05,799 Speaker 2: therefore rent control is okay that you can say, look, 636 00:37:05,800 --> 00:37:10,359 Speaker 2: there's our current system is riven with politics, and that 637 00:37:10,520 --> 00:37:13,239 Speaker 2: the way to engage democratically, and the way to think 638 00:37:13,239 --> 00:37:16,560 Speaker 2: about this is we need to liberalize. The solution to 639 00:37:16,600 --> 00:37:20,879 Speaker 2: affordability is getting rid of some of these zoning laws, etc. 640 00:37:21,760 --> 00:37:24,640 Speaker 2: It seems to me like that you could agree with 641 00:37:24,760 --> 00:37:28,759 Speaker 2: sort of your conceptualization of some of these challenges and 642 00:37:28,840 --> 00:37:32,720 Speaker 2: yet and still arrive at very different outcomes in terms 643 00:37:32,719 --> 00:37:36,560 Speaker 2: of a policy response. And in fact, in fact, Zoran 644 00:37:36,680 --> 00:37:40,279 Speaker 2: himself may even agree with that, because we know that 645 00:37:40,760 --> 00:37:43,799 Speaker 2: he is more liberal than say, many on the left 646 00:37:43,840 --> 00:37:46,600 Speaker 2: when it comes to the role of private capital for 647 00:37:46,760 --> 00:37:47,720 Speaker 2: developing new houses. 648 00:37:48,000 --> 00:37:52,279 Speaker 4: Okay, so my response is that this is true. First 649 00:37:52,280 --> 00:37:53,880 Speaker 4: of all, to concede. I think in any kind of 650 00:37:53,880 --> 00:37:56,279 Speaker 4: a discussion, you concede what the other person is saying. 651 00:37:56,280 --> 00:38:00,360 Speaker 4: And this is true about the sort of impedibles of 652 00:38:00,840 --> 00:38:03,880 Speaker 4: current politics and power structures, this and the other. But 653 00:38:03,960 --> 00:38:06,640 Speaker 4: that's always been the case. It's always been the case, 654 00:38:06,760 --> 00:38:10,439 Speaker 4: and so like if we thought of that as the 655 00:38:10,480 --> 00:38:15,399 Speaker 4: supreme impediment to actually making things better, then we would 656 00:38:15,400 --> 00:38:20,120 Speaker 4: have abandoned society, would have abandoned any attempts to, let's say, 657 00:38:20,200 --> 00:38:25,280 Speaker 4: have safer cars. Sure, because the automobile industry for tooth 658 00:38:25,320 --> 00:38:30,000 Speaker 4: and nail against seatbelts for decades, making them safer, you know, 659 00:38:30,040 --> 00:38:33,560 Speaker 4: the whole design of cars. So the point here is 660 00:38:34,160 --> 00:38:39,640 Speaker 4: it's not as though that proposing a policy implies that 661 00:38:39,680 --> 00:38:42,680 Speaker 4: you wave a magic wand and it just happens. They're 662 00:38:42,719 --> 00:38:46,080 Speaker 4: going to be insuperable problems and there's going to be impediments. 663 00:38:47,360 --> 00:38:49,919 Speaker 4: But that's always been the case. That doesn't mean that, 664 00:38:50,480 --> 00:38:53,120 Speaker 4: you know, you cannot lose track of the fact that 665 00:38:53,960 --> 00:38:58,560 Speaker 4: lack of affordability in this country and elsewhere in the 666 00:38:58,560 --> 00:39:04,799 Speaker 4: world has recently eroded democracy, yeah, as we know, and 667 00:39:04,880 --> 00:39:09,719 Speaker 4: has has fuel authoritarian politics. There's a clear relationship here 668 00:39:10,040 --> 00:39:15,480 Speaker 4: between economic and security and authoritarianism undeniably. 669 00:39:16,239 --> 00:39:19,440 Speaker 2: Just to press further on this, however, so one of 670 00:39:19,440 --> 00:39:22,359 Speaker 2: the things that the housing people love to say is that, 671 00:39:22,560 --> 00:39:25,640 Speaker 2: you know, there was a rule change several years ago. 672 00:39:25,880 --> 00:39:29,960 Speaker 2: Ironically it was under the Cuomo administration. There was a 673 00:39:30,040 --> 00:39:34,440 Speaker 2: rule change that made it harder for landlords to raise 674 00:39:34,480 --> 00:39:38,600 Speaker 2: the rent of a rent stabilized building after the tenant left. 675 00:39:38,960 --> 00:39:40,799 Speaker 2: And then so then the new tenant comes in and 676 00:39:40,800 --> 00:39:43,160 Speaker 2: they like, can't move it up by much. Meanwhile, we 677 00:39:43,200 --> 00:39:45,680 Speaker 2: have inflation, and so we have this effect, at least 678 00:39:45,680 --> 00:39:49,280 Speaker 2: according to many housing people where a lot of supply 679 00:39:49,400 --> 00:39:51,800 Speaker 2: has been taken off the market because they can't raise 680 00:39:51,840 --> 00:39:54,840 Speaker 2: the rent the law prevents them from raising the rent, 681 00:39:55,280 --> 00:39:57,560 Speaker 2: and their maintenance costs have gone up, and so like 682 00:39:57,600 --> 00:39:59,920 Speaker 2: these are no longer economical to run. 683 00:40:00,440 --> 00:40:00,600 Speaker 3: Now. 684 00:40:00,680 --> 00:40:06,040 Speaker 2: Again, Like, my point is not they're right, they're wrong, whatever. 685 00:40:06,560 --> 00:40:10,280 Speaker 2: My point is that all of this could be true, 686 00:40:10,440 --> 00:40:13,400 Speaker 2: and all of this framework can be very helpful, but 687 00:40:13,520 --> 00:40:18,360 Speaker 2: it doesn't necessarily lead to the conclusion the Zoron is 688 00:40:18,520 --> 00:40:22,719 Speaker 2: right to take a stronger line on what you can 689 00:40:22,800 --> 00:40:25,239 Speaker 2: just do by FIAT in terms of price constraints. 690 00:40:26,920 --> 00:40:32,160 Speaker 4: Well, you know, yeah it does. I mean I think 691 00:40:32,200 --> 00:40:35,359 Speaker 4: I would disagree. Okay, great, because I think that if 692 00:40:35,600 --> 00:40:39,560 Speaker 4: by that logic, then we shouldn't have ever done anything anyways, right, 693 00:40:39,640 --> 00:40:42,880 Speaker 4: so we could have you know, so so for example, opposition, 694 00:40:42,960 --> 00:40:44,840 Speaker 4: I mean, so like sort of moving this sort of 695 00:40:44,840 --> 00:40:47,359 Speaker 4: the discussion a little bit away from housing. But let's 696 00:40:47,360 --> 00:40:50,440 Speaker 4: say to taxation, right, we were talking about taxation earlier on. 697 00:40:50,680 --> 00:40:53,799 Speaker 4: There was massive opposition during the Gilded Age that if 698 00:40:53,840 --> 00:40:57,040 Speaker 4: you have progressive taxation, if you even have the sixteen Amendment, 699 00:40:57,440 --> 00:41:00,759 Speaker 4: this is going to destroy the whole society. And so 700 00:41:00,840 --> 00:41:04,799 Speaker 4: the struggles in that Gilded Age period which ultimately lead 701 00:41:04,920 --> 00:41:11,080 Speaker 4: to the sixteenth Amendment, exemplifies the point that yeah, I 702 00:41:11,120 --> 00:41:13,239 Speaker 4: mean there are going to be there is going to 703 00:41:13,239 --> 00:41:13,840 Speaker 4: be opposition. 704 00:41:13,960 --> 00:41:17,719 Speaker 2: So just well, then what is the limiting principle? Or 705 00:41:17,960 --> 00:41:22,160 Speaker 2: maybe okay, there are different methods to doing economics, and 706 00:41:22,200 --> 00:41:24,560 Speaker 2: you say, the new classicals of one method and other 707 00:41:24,560 --> 00:41:27,240 Speaker 2: people of other methods, how do we know, Like, okay, 708 00:41:27,719 --> 00:41:30,719 Speaker 2: let's say we want to impose more stringent caps on 709 00:41:30,760 --> 00:41:33,000 Speaker 2: how much you can raise rent, Like we don't know, 710 00:41:33,800 --> 00:41:35,480 Speaker 2: like it could go well and it could go bad. Right, 711 00:41:35,520 --> 00:41:36,960 Speaker 2: I assume you would agree that there are ways to 712 00:41:36,960 --> 00:41:37,760 Speaker 2: do this very badly. 713 00:41:37,840 --> 00:41:38,440 Speaker 4: Yeah, of course. 714 00:41:38,560 --> 00:41:41,520 Speaker 2: So what are the methods that we could employ that 715 00:41:41,560 --> 00:41:44,520 Speaker 2: the new classicals are blind to such that we can 716 00:41:44,520 --> 00:41:45,240 Speaker 2: get this policy. 717 00:41:45,280 --> 00:41:48,279 Speaker 4: We could, for example, provide so for for the for 718 00:41:48,320 --> 00:41:50,920 Speaker 4: the smaller landlords, the ones or the less or the 719 00:41:51,360 --> 00:41:54,200 Speaker 4: ones who are they don't have enough cash to fix 720 00:41:54,239 --> 00:41:56,839 Speaker 4: the leaks, you know, upkeep the building, that they could 721 00:41:56,880 --> 00:41:57,880 Speaker 4: be given tax credits. 722 00:41:57,960 --> 00:41:58,440 Speaker 2: Yeah. 723 00:41:58,520 --> 00:42:02,319 Speaker 4: Right, So that companies for the rent control would be 724 00:42:02,840 --> 00:42:05,120 Speaker 4: that Okay, if you're a large real estate cooperation and 725 00:42:05,120 --> 00:42:08,040 Speaker 4: you've got lots of cash flow, then clearly you do 726 00:42:08,120 --> 00:42:10,960 Speaker 4: have the cash flow to deal with the problems. But 727 00:42:11,160 --> 00:42:13,680 Speaker 4: if you're a smaller landlord, then you could be given 728 00:42:13,680 --> 00:42:15,319 Speaker 4: some kind of a tax credit, you could be given 729 00:42:15,360 --> 00:42:17,759 Speaker 4: some kind of public subsidy that could deal with that 730 00:42:17,840 --> 00:42:19,840 Speaker 4: kind of an issue, which brings you straight back to 731 00:42:19,880 --> 00:42:23,120 Speaker 4: the question of the public financing after all of this. Right, 732 00:42:23,440 --> 00:42:25,839 Speaker 4: So that's the way at least I would tentatively think 733 00:42:25,840 --> 00:42:26,799 Speaker 4: about the issue. 734 00:42:27,120 --> 00:42:31,160 Speaker 3: Since we've been talking about politics for basically this entire discussion, 735 00:42:31,280 --> 00:42:34,000 Speaker 3: I want to talk about political realities for right now, 736 00:42:34,400 --> 00:42:38,360 Speaker 3: what are the constraints that have prevented this kind of 737 00:42:38,440 --> 00:42:43,279 Speaker 3: heterodox policy from becoming the norm in a place like America. 738 00:42:43,320 --> 00:42:47,320 Speaker 4: Well, that's a great question, And I think the issue 739 00:42:47,480 --> 00:42:49,560 Speaker 4: is that these kinds of ideas are not in the 740 00:42:49,600 --> 00:42:53,879 Speaker 4: public domain. And so whenever you use the word economics, 741 00:42:53,960 --> 00:42:55,640 Speaker 4: let's say it comes up, let's say, who are the 742 00:42:55,680 --> 00:42:59,320 Speaker 4: experts who come say, let's say to CNN, They're already 743 00:42:59,400 --> 00:43:02,360 Speaker 4: coming implicitly, even if they don't say it, from this 744 00:43:02,480 --> 00:43:06,640 Speaker 4: idea that markets are sort of prime and then everything 745 00:43:06,680 --> 00:43:10,240 Speaker 4: else follows afterwards. So I mean, in order to push 746 00:43:10,239 --> 00:43:13,680 Speaker 4: back against that, you need to have more conversations about the. 747 00:43:13,600 --> 00:43:15,719 Speaker 2: Discipline thank you for that. 748 00:43:15,920 --> 00:43:19,080 Speaker 4: Thank you. I think that these kinds of conversations are 749 00:43:19,239 --> 00:43:21,880 Speaker 4: helpful because at least it opens up the space for 750 00:43:21,960 --> 00:43:24,400 Speaker 4: thinking about that well, I mean, okay, so when you're 751 00:43:24,440 --> 00:43:27,560 Speaker 4: talking about foundational questions like the market economy, what exactly 752 00:43:27,600 --> 00:43:30,799 Speaker 4: do you mean by that? And you know, so those 753 00:43:30,840 --> 00:43:32,520 Speaker 4: are the kinds of questions I think. So the come 754 00:43:32,600 --> 00:43:35,880 Speaker 4: back and coming back to your question that's an impediment 755 00:43:36,239 --> 00:43:39,239 Speaker 4: because if you're going to say that, well, I want 756 00:43:39,280 --> 00:43:43,080 Speaker 4: to make some aspect of social services I don't know, 757 00:43:43,680 --> 00:43:47,359 Speaker 4: affordable or something, then you'll always come up to this 758 00:43:47,520 --> 00:43:50,880 Speaker 4: impediment that will are you a state interventionist? Whereas this 759 00:43:50,960 --> 00:43:54,440 Speaker 4: is the free market and that's the lingua franca. And 760 00:43:55,080 --> 00:43:57,279 Speaker 4: that's the hard part of it, that to say that, 761 00:43:57,320 --> 00:44:00,560 Speaker 4: well okay, to push the conversation further, as opposed to 762 00:44:00,600 --> 00:44:03,200 Speaker 4: saying well, okay, you know, if you think of markets 763 00:44:03,200 --> 00:44:05,799 Speaker 4: in different ways, then it may be hard to make 764 00:44:05,840 --> 00:44:08,840 Speaker 4: the change. But at least the market is not pretty political. 765 00:44:09,560 --> 00:44:11,160 Speaker 4: So for me, that's the problem. 766 00:44:11,920 --> 00:44:16,200 Speaker 2: What's the basic gist of why Europe in the US 767 00:44:16,400 --> 00:44:19,680 Speaker 2: from the historian perspective sort of went different directions, and 768 00:44:19,680 --> 00:44:24,799 Speaker 2: obviously the democratic socialist, the democratic socialist tradition obviously much 769 00:44:24,800 --> 00:44:28,200 Speaker 2: more robust in Europe. I mean, it's never really you know, 770 00:44:28,560 --> 00:44:32,160 Speaker 2: it doesn't have as nearly as much history in the US, 771 00:44:32,320 --> 00:44:36,120 Speaker 2: et cetera. Union is much more robust throughout Europe. How 772 00:44:36,120 --> 00:44:39,840 Speaker 2: did that like generally speaking, except for maybe like a 773 00:44:39,880 --> 00:44:44,080 Speaker 2: couple decades, partly just there's any sort of like socialis 774 00:44:44,120 --> 00:44:45,520 Speaker 2: tradition every I took root in the US. 775 00:44:46,000 --> 00:44:47,920 Speaker 4: First of all, we do have a long history of 776 00:44:48,000 --> 00:44:51,160 Speaker 4: municipal socialism, but sewer socialism in this country. I mean, 777 00:44:51,200 --> 00:44:53,640 Speaker 4: so there's you know of so you know, in other words, 778 00:44:54,760 --> 00:44:56,600 Speaker 4: you know, there's a lot has been written actually that 779 00:44:57,040 --> 00:45:00,680 Speaker 4: what Mamdani is doing here, it's actually pretty there's a 780 00:45:00,719 --> 00:45:04,120 Speaker 4: long history behind that. Gail Radford has written about this 781 00:45:04,280 --> 00:45:09,560 Speaker 4: a historian. I think the issue is and so that's 782 00:45:09,560 --> 00:45:13,160 Speaker 4: the first point. The second point is that if you 783 00:45:13,239 --> 00:45:15,680 Speaker 4: look at and this comes back, I think tracy to 784 00:45:15,719 --> 00:45:20,000 Speaker 4: your question, which is that in the public discourse, we 785 00:45:20,120 --> 00:45:23,279 Speaker 4: don't know, there's a kind of an idea that the 786 00:45:23,360 --> 00:45:27,719 Speaker 4: New Deal was an outlier and therefore we need to 787 00:45:28,000 --> 00:45:31,960 Speaker 4: basically go back to some pre New Deal romanticized small government. 788 00:45:32,440 --> 00:45:34,800 Speaker 4: You know, Steve Bannon makes his that's why the attack 789 00:45:34,800 --> 00:45:37,800 Speaker 4: against the administrative state is premised from this. The problem 790 00:45:37,880 --> 00:45:41,360 Speaker 4: is the many legal historians and legal economic historians appointed 791 00:45:41,360 --> 00:45:43,799 Speaker 4: and this is not true that the US developed a 792 00:45:43,880 --> 00:45:49,279 Speaker 4: very robust developmental state in the reconstruction period. So there's 793 00:45:49,320 --> 00:45:52,239 Speaker 4: a really a lot of history there that is not 794 00:45:52,440 --> 00:45:57,040 Speaker 4: part of the public domain and the discourse on economics, 795 00:45:57,040 --> 00:46:01,320 Speaker 4: because the teaching of economics does not require students to 796 00:46:01,480 --> 00:46:05,719 Speaker 4: actually require not as an elective, but required them to 797 00:46:06,000 --> 00:46:10,440 Speaker 4: actually read economic history in most places in their training. 798 00:46:10,680 --> 00:46:13,399 Speaker 4: So they don't know the history, and so this new 799 00:46:13,480 --> 00:46:17,880 Speaker 4: notion of the market prevails, and then they don't know 800 00:46:17,920 --> 00:46:20,720 Speaker 4: their own history. I don't think that's any different in Europe, 801 00:46:21,120 --> 00:46:24,759 Speaker 4: and we can talk about that, but there are interesting 802 00:46:26,560 --> 00:46:30,480 Speaker 4: issues here. So for example, the American historically, the American 803 00:46:30,520 --> 00:46:34,000 Speaker 4: taxation system was much more progressive than in Europe. Yeah, right, 804 00:46:34,280 --> 00:46:36,799 Speaker 4: so there is that. But I think what happens in 805 00:46:36,840 --> 00:46:41,120 Speaker 4: the post war period, post Second World War period is 806 00:46:41,160 --> 00:46:45,560 Speaker 4: that that kind of sent a jolt for a lot 807 00:46:45,560 --> 00:46:48,040 Speaker 4: of people, and I think that kind of revived the 808 00:46:48,160 --> 00:46:52,279 Speaker 4: left in some sense because fascism and there was a 809 00:46:52,320 --> 00:46:57,719 Speaker 4: clear understanding that massive inequality was you know, one of 810 00:46:57,760 --> 00:47:00,840 Speaker 4: the one of the ingredients of the rise fascist movements 811 00:47:00,880 --> 00:47:04,360 Speaker 4: in the nineteen twenties and thirties, and so reducing inequality, 812 00:47:04,880 --> 00:47:09,000 Speaker 4: embedding social and economic rights and constitutions I'm thinking here 813 00:47:09,080 --> 00:47:13,279 Speaker 4: with the German constitution super important as a kind of 814 00:47:13,640 --> 00:47:16,640 Speaker 4: insulation at least to some extent, against a repetition of 815 00:47:16,680 --> 00:47:20,200 Speaker 4: those horrors. So this created a kind of a different 816 00:47:20,239 --> 00:47:26,200 Speaker 4: social model based on these progressive constitutions. We haven't had that. 817 00:47:26,320 --> 00:47:31,640 Speaker 4: Our constitution is a first generation constitution, and in that way, 818 00:47:31,680 --> 00:47:35,240 Speaker 4: there are no explicit commitments to economic and social rights, 819 00:47:35,680 --> 00:47:38,360 Speaker 4: human dignity, the expression I don't think appears in the 820 00:47:38,480 --> 00:47:40,920 Speaker 4: US Constitution. It does appear in a lot of these 821 00:47:40,920 --> 00:47:44,400 Speaker 4: European constitutions, and that matters. You have the rights of 822 00:47:44,480 --> 00:47:48,840 Speaker 4: personhood right the fourteen Amendment, but you know that, you 823 00:47:48,880 --> 00:47:51,000 Speaker 4: know very well that how that's been weaponized for corporate 824 00:47:51,000 --> 00:47:54,400 Speaker 4: personhood and so on. That's I think part of the 825 00:47:54,440 --> 00:47:58,400 Speaker 4: story as to why the welfare state has been somewhat 826 00:47:58,480 --> 00:48:02,000 Speaker 4: more robust, though it's all so seen fractures in Europe 827 00:48:02,480 --> 00:48:05,880 Speaker 4: than here, where that has not been the case. So 828 00:48:06,080 --> 00:48:08,960 Speaker 4: we're still stuck with this constitution, which at least in 829 00:48:08,960 --> 00:48:11,759 Speaker 4: my view, is not a very good constitution. 830 00:48:12,600 --> 00:48:16,200 Speaker 3: I wasn't expecting constitutional analysis to come into this conversation, 831 00:48:16,239 --> 00:48:18,400 Speaker 3: but I think it does illustrate your point about the 832 00:48:18,400 --> 00:48:22,040 Speaker 3: intertwining of politics and the economy. Can I ask one 833 00:48:22,080 --> 00:48:24,960 Speaker 3: more thing, and maybe it doesn't even make sense or 834 00:48:25,000 --> 00:48:28,320 Speaker 3: fit into this conversation, but when I think about las A, 835 00:48:28,480 --> 00:48:33,000 Speaker 3: fair markets or economics, there seems to be an emphasis 836 00:48:33,080 --> 00:48:39,080 Speaker 3: on absolute gains so positive some outcomes where it does. 837 00:48:39,239 --> 00:48:42,840 Speaker 3: You know, two countries start trading with each other guns 838 00:48:42,840 --> 00:48:46,320 Speaker 3: and butter or whatever. Both the countries are better off, 839 00:48:46,760 --> 00:48:50,400 Speaker 3: it doesn't matter how much better off they are relative 840 00:48:50,440 --> 00:48:54,120 Speaker 3: to each other. When we think about heterodox economics and 841 00:48:54,160 --> 00:48:57,320 Speaker 3: the importance of politics, are we basically saying that every 842 00:48:57,400 --> 00:49:01,320 Speaker 3: policy decision the emphasis is much more on relative gains 843 00:49:01,560 --> 00:49:02,840 Speaker 3: versus absolute gains. 844 00:49:03,640 --> 00:49:06,040 Speaker 4: I'm not aware of that tracy, That is not from 845 00:49:06,040 --> 00:49:11,319 Speaker 4: my standpoint. I do think that markets and the sort 846 00:49:11,360 --> 00:49:15,840 Speaker 4: of private initiatives in markets that does generate wealth. I 847 00:49:15,840 --> 00:49:17,400 Speaker 4: mean that you go back to Smith. He says that, 848 00:49:17,480 --> 00:49:21,439 Speaker 4: so in that sense, it's true that market activity does 849 00:49:21,520 --> 00:49:25,640 Speaker 4: generate enormous social wealth. Yes it does. But what people 850 00:49:25,719 --> 00:49:27,960 Speaker 4: tend to forget is that there's also a flip side. 851 00:49:28,000 --> 00:49:30,200 Speaker 4: To that the social costs, and so we have to 852 00:49:30,200 --> 00:49:33,600 Speaker 4: then think about, Okay, can we somehow how do we 853 00:49:33,680 --> 00:49:37,040 Speaker 4: reduce some of those social costs in terms of affordability 854 00:49:37,360 --> 00:49:41,960 Speaker 4: or pollution or climate crisis. That's I think saying that, Okay, 855 00:49:42,280 --> 00:49:45,759 Speaker 4: markets are great, but what are they sort of embedded 856 00:49:45,880 --> 00:49:49,400 Speaker 4: on that infrastructure that I was talking about that is 857 00:49:49,480 --> 00:49:54,160 Speaker 4: sort of leading to massive emissions of greenhouse gases. I mean, 858 00:49:54,200 --> 00:49:57,440 Speaker 4: that's clearly unsustainable and we all know that. So I 859 00:49:57,480 --> 00:50:00,120 Speaker 4: feel like I don't know that I would necessarily to 860 00:50:00,239 --> 00:50:04,080 Speaker 4: think about it in terms of positive and negative sum gains. 861 00:50:04,120 --> 00:50:07,560 Speaker 4: I would just say that market activity does generate enormous 862 00:50:07,800 --> 00:50:11,359 Speaker 4: social wealth, but also enormous social costs, and so then 863 00:50:11,440 --> 00:50:13,480 Speaker 4: that's where I think the conversation has to go to 864 00:50:13,680 --> 00:50:15,120 Speaker 4: how to reduce the social costs. 865 00:50:16,040 --> 00:50:17,919 Speaker 2: Jommy Modude, thank you so much. 866 00:50:17,960 --> 00:50:18,640 Speaker 4: Thank you so much. 867 00:50:19,160 --> 00:50:34,800 Speaker 2: It's really fascinating conversation. Appreciate you so much time. Okay, Tracy, 868 00:50:34,840 --> 00:50:37,840 Speaker 2: we should do more intellectual history episodes. I really like 869 00:50:37,920 --> 00:50:40,800 Speaker 2: that topic. I don't know, like I think I'm. 870 00:50:40,680 --> 00:50:44,600 Speaker 3: Still scarred from doing international relations at college, and whenever 871 00:50:44,640 --> 00:50:49,520 Speaker 3: someone talks about intellectual histories of particular theories I kind 872 00:50:49,560 --> 00:50:51,000 Speaker 3: of I get nervous. 873 00:50:52,160 --> 00:50:54,440 Speaker 2: Let's just make the whole I'd be down to make 874 00:50:54,440 --> 00:50:56,600 Speaker 2: the whole podcast A No, I do think this is 875 00:50:56,640 --> 00:50:58,480 Speaker 2: like really interesting. Look, I think this is a very 876 00:50:58,520 --> 00:51:02,120 Speaker 2: timely conversation because one thing, you know, he mentioned Bannon 877 00:51:02,360 --> 00:51:05,440 Speaker 2: there at the end. One thing that I feel is 878 00:51:05,480 --> 00:51:09,000 Speaker 2: that regardless of where many people are on the political 879 00:51:09,040 --> 00:51:14,080 Speaker 2: spectrum these days, there seems to be a deep intuition 880 00:51:14,200 --> 00:51:17,680 Speaker 2: that many people have about the corrosive effects of society 881 00:51:17,680 --> 00:51:19,520 Speaker 2: on any quality, or the corrosive effects of. 882 00:51:19,480 --> 00:51:21,760 Speaker 3: Inequality on society. 883 00:51:22,239 --> 00:51:25,080 Speaker 2: And I thought your question was really good, which is 884 00:51:25,120 --> 00:51:28,080 Speaker 2: like many people economists could say, like, look, you're better 885 00:51:28,120 --> 00:51:31,360 Speaker 2: off too it in this relationship you uber driver, Like 886 00:51:31,719 --> 00:51:35,160 Speaker 2: maybe you feel that you're maybe people find it to 887 00:51:35,200 --> 00:51:37,960 Speaker 2: not be great work, but the alternative is nothing or whatever. 888 00:51:38,239 --> 00:51:40,640 Speaker 3: You're not a billionaire, but at least your employee. 889 00:51:40,200 --> 00:51:42,400 Speaker 2: You're employed, right, And this is something and a lot 890 00:51:42,400 --> 00:51:45,959 Speaker 2: of people say, Look, everyone is on paper or maybe 891 00:51:46,000 --> 00:51:50,040 Speaker 2: even in reality, better off from this set of transactions. Right, 892 00:51:50,320 --> 00:51:52,799 Speaker 2: But then it aggregates up to something that I think 893 00:51:52,840 --> 00:51:54,800 Speaker 2: people find to be very destabilizing. 894 00:51:55,840 --> 00:51:58,840 Speaker 3: Right, So intuitively, a lot of people seem unhappy with 895 00:51:58,920 --> 00:51:59,880 Speaker 3: their current situation. 896 00:52:00,000 --> 00:52:02,600 Speaker 2: All right, so the transaction makes everyone happier in the 897 00:52:02,640 --> 00:52:05,640 Speaker 2: micro sense. But then when everyone when it all scales out, 898 00:52:06,120 --> 00:52:09,120 Speaker 2: this sort of like deep inequality. Who has the means 899 00:52:09,160 --> 00:52:12,840 Speaker 2: to create, who has the ability to like actually do something, 900 00:52:13,120 --> 00:52:16,200 Speaker 2: who is just a sort of who is not in 901 00:52:16,239 --> 00:52:19,480 Speaker 2: that position? I think it feels very again destabilizing. 902 00:52:19,640 --> 00:52:23,759 Speaker 3: Yeah, I do think. I mean, to Jommy's point, like 903 00:52:23,880 --> 00:52:26,160 Speaker 3: it does feel like so much of it just boils 904 00:52:26,200 --> 00:52:29,440 Speaker 3: down to politics, right, yeah, right, like the economy itself, 905 00:52:30,560 --> 00:52:32,960 Speaker 3: to go back to how we began. This conversation did 906 00:52:33,000 --> 00:52:37,440 Speaker 3: not spring forth from the universe. It's a human construction 907 00:52:37,760 --> 00:52:41,880 Speaker 3: and we put a lot of thought and effort into 908 00:52:42,000 --> 00:52:45,960 Speaker 3: how it actually works. And that's a political that Yeah, 909 00:52:46,400 --> 00:52:47,520 Speaker 3: that's a political reality. 910 00:52:47,760 --> 00:52:49,960 Speaker 2: Yeah. And like you know, we could talk all this 911 00:52:50,000 --> 00:52:53,960 Speaker 2: stuff and like the contrast with Chinese industrial policy I 912 00:52:54,000 --> 00:52:56,720 Speaker 2: think is very helpful for juries as one is. Okay, 913 00:52:56,760 --> 00:53:00,279 Speaker 2: you could look at various things and say, well, this 914 00:53:00,320 --> 00:53:02,040 Speaker 2: is actually very effective, and there was a role for 915 00:53:02,080 --> 00:53:05,879 Speaker 2: the public sector and so forth, but it's like we're 916 00:53:05,920 --> 00:53:08,560 Speaker 2: all at each other's throats. Yeah, right, then you're never 917 00:53:08,600 --> 00:53:12,200 Speaker 2: going to have any hope of like operationalizing these ideas, 918 00:53:12,320 --> 00:53:14,399 Speaker 2: and this why I've said this before, Like I feel 919 00:53:14,400 --> 00:53:18,800 Speaker 2: like there are certain societal problems that truly like precede economics. Yeah, 920 00:53:18,840 --> 00:53:21,920 Speaker 2: the toolkit does not entirely exist in economics to solve 921 00:53:22,000 --> 00:53:24,120 Speaker 2: problems that on payper loook economic right. 922 00:53:25,040 --> 00:53:28,279 Speaker 3: This I think is important because in the neoclassical perspective, 923 00:53:28,360 --> 00:53:32,759 Speaker 3: so everything springs from the economy and the focus is 924 00:53:32,800 --> 00:53:38,920 Speaker 3: on the economy itself. Meanwhile, as a society, you know, 925 00:53:39,000 --> 00:53:42,600 Speaker 3: you might want to prioritize different outcomes, like maybe we 926 00:53:42,600 --> 00:53:44,840 Speaker 3: should all be happy. You know, I would like to 927 00:53:44,880 --> 00:53:49,359 Speaker 3: prioritize everyone's happiness. And to your point, like if we're 928 00:53:49,400 --> 00:53:52,840 Speaker 3: all focused on relative gains, if free market capitalism is 929 00:53:52,880 --> 00:53:56,560 Speaker 3: increasing inequality, then that might not necessarily do that. 930 00:53:57,360 --> 00:54:01,840 Speaker 2: We should prioritize everyone getting off their devices and reading, 931 00:54:02,040 --> 00:54:04,000 Speaker 2: and then I think we'll have a touch grass, we'll 932 00:54:04,040 --> 00:54:04,880 Speaker 2: have better outcomes. 933 00:54:04,960 --> 00:54:09,320 Speaker 3: Yeah, we're getting dangerously close to like talking about Bhuton 934 00:54:09,480 --> 00:54:10,800 Speaker 3: and national. 935 00:54:10,840 --> 00:54:12,799 Speaker 2: You know, we got to I've read some. 936 00:54:13,239 --> 00:54:16,040 Speaker 3: Yeah, I know, I know that's why we should stop. 937 00:54:16,080 --> 00:54:16,759 Speaker 3: Shall we leave it there? 938 00:54:16,840 --> 00:54:17,640 Speaker 2: Yeah, let's leave it there? 939 00:54:17,640 --> 00:54:18,040 Speaker 4: All right. 940 00:54:18,120 --> 00:54:20,680 Speaker 3: This has been another episode of the ad Loots podcast. 941 00:54:20,800 --> 00:54:23,960 Speaker 3: I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. 942 00:54:23,680 --> 00:54:26,280 Speaker 2: And I'm Jill Wisnenthal. You can follow me at The Stalwart. 943 00:54:26,560 --> 00:54:30,120 Speaker 2: Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen armandesh Ol Bennett 944 00:54:30,120 --> 00:54:32,799 Speaker 2: at Dashbot and kill Brooks at Kilbrooks. And for more 945 00:54:32,800 --> 00:54:35,399 Speaker 2: odd Laws content, go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd 946 00:54:35,440 --> 00:54:38,040 Speaker 2: lots we're the daily newsletter and all of our episodes, 947 00:54:38,200 --> 00:54:40,040 Speaker 2: and you can shout about all of these topics twenty 948 00:54:40,080 --> 00:54:44,200 Speaker 2: four seven in our discord Discord dot gg slash odd lots. 949 00:54:44,120 --> 00:54:46,239 Speaker 3: And if you enjoy a thoughts, if you want us 950 00:54:46,280 --> 00:54:49,640 Speaker 3: to do more episodes on the intellectual history of economics, 951 00:54:49,640 --> 00:54:52,600 Speaker 3: then please leave us a positive review on your favorite 952 00:54:52,600 --> 00:54:56,359 Speaker 3: podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, 953 00:54:56,440 --> 00:54:59,520 Speaker 3: you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely add free. 954 00:55:00,040 --> 00:55:02,240 Speaker 3: All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel 955 00:55:02,280 --> 00:55:05,960 Speaker 3: on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening.