Speaker 1: Every time that we've seen a substantial weakening of the dollar,
Speaker 1: we actually see redollarization. If the dollar becomes weaker against
Speaker 1: your domestic currency, you can now borrow more dollars and
Speaker 1: that old debt that you have is easier to pay off.
Speaker 2: Did you ever think it was realistic that, of course
Speaker 2: we're going to two hundred percent tariffs against China and
Speaker 2: that was never going to come off, we'd never do
Speaker 2: traders in again, or was it always that was going
Speaker 2: to be sort of that negotiation point, the anchoring, if
Speaker 2: you will, to allow us to come back off of
Speaker 2: that into some negotiation.
Speaker 1: We've offshored our industrial base, and so if you're going
Speaker 1: to impose massive terrorists, you know that transition period could
Speaker 1: definitely cause a very severe recession. Gold and bitcoin have
Speaker 1: worked to, you know, hedge against debasement, against inflation for decades,
Speaker 1: and of course gold has been theorized to be suppressed.
Speaker 1: That's been suppressed by central banks and by bullion banks
Speaker 1: for the last twenty thirty years. But that suppression is
Speaker 1: finally coming to an end.
Speaker 2: Do you think we end twenty twenty five higher than
Speaker 2: we are now? Gold s and P five hundred and bitcoin.
Speaker 1: Yes, to all three. The reason why is because.
Speaker 2: The fact, all right, peb, you've been warning that Trump's
Speaker 2: tariffs could be the final nail in the dollar's coffin
Speaker 2: as the world reserve currency. You've talked a lot about
Speaker 2: bitcoin potentially taking its place over what time frame do
Speaker 2: you see these types of things happening?
Speaker 1: You know, that's a difficult question to answer, and a
Speaker 1: lot of people have posed that same question to me,
Speaker 1: especially when I've given talks in person, like I did
Speaker 1: just a few weeks ago in Vancouver, Canada. But it
Speaker 1: really depends on, you know, the geopolitical chess match that
Speaker 1: all these different players play, right, what are the moves
Speaker 1: that they're going to make? The fundamental issue that is
Speaker 1: that you know question here, right, is the actual structure
Speaker 1: of the global monetary system, which is basically subject to
Speaker 1: something called Triffan's dilemma. And this dilemma basically implies that
Speaker 1: the US has to export dollars in order to fund
Speaker 1: the global economy or to provide enough liquidity to the
Speaker 1: global economy to allow trade to occur and now, and
Speaker 1: for those dollars comes from many different sources, from the
Speaker 1: euro dollar market, from international trade and settlement, from foreign
Speaker 1: exchange and currency reserves for foreign central banks as well
Speaker 1: as obviously the petro dollar system. And so all this
Speaker 1: external dollar demand essentially needs to be supplied with dollar liquidity,
Speaker 1: and this means the US has to choose whether they're
Speaker 1: going to supply that supply that liquidity or not. Now,
Speaker 1: if they don't do that, then we have a global
Speaker 1: recession like you know two thousand and eight or even
Speaker 1: before in the nineteen nineties, if the US decides to
Speaker 1: not fund global liquidity enough. But if we do decide
Speaker 1: to fund that global liquidity, we print too many dollars,
Speaker 1: as Triffin said, under our gold reserve ratio, and that
Speaker 1: causes us to break the gold pig, which we obviously
Speaker 1: eventually did. So our system switched from a gold based
Speaker 1: reserve system to what I would call a treasury based
Speaker 1: reserve system. Right, the dollar is the reserve currency, but
Speaker 1: the treasury is now the reserve asset. Now, this kind
Speaker 1: of quasi balance was able to hang for as long
Speaker 1: as the treasury bond remains money good in real terms. Right,
Speaker 1: if you're earning real returns on your treasure bonds and
Speaker 1: eure a foreign central banker, it makes sense for you
Speaker 1: to hold these things. But the minute that the FED
Speaker 1: decides to hike rates in a very very rapid fashion
Speaker 1: to defeat inflation like they did in twenty twenty two,
Speaker 1: you start to see negative real returns on the treasure bonds.
Speaker 1: And not only that, like you said earlier, the teriffs
Speaker 1: that Trump has announced in the escalating wars essentially economic
Speaker 1: war that has been playing out over the month of
Speaker 1: April has basically meant that the stability and structure of
Speaker 1: this monetary system has now been called into question. And
Speaker 1: it's pretty clear if you look at global central banks
Speaker 1: on net they're funding much much less global of treasury
Speaker 1: issuers than they were in twenty eight to twenty fifteen,
Speaker 1: and if you look at even private entities, they're not
Speaker 1: buying at the same pace that they were in years prior.
Speaker 1: The marginal funder for US debt therefore has to eventually
Speaker 1: become the fat, which is what I've said before in
Speaker 1: dollar endgame, right like we'll have to do QB again
Speaker 1: on a larger scale. And so all this means that
Speaker 1: I think the tariffs and Trump's response to other countries
Speaker 1: instituting retaliated retaliatory teriffs means that the equity markets, the
Speaker 1: bond markets, everything starts to trace very very rapidly. And
Speaker 1: that's why Trump had to basically recant a lot of
Speaker 1: the insane terror phraates that he was proposing of, like
Speaker 1: two hundred and three hundred percent on China and other countries.
Speaker 2: Perfect framed it up very very well, all right. I
Speaker 2: took lots of notes, lots of places for us to
Speaker 2: dig in on that. Thank you for setting the stage
Speaker 2: for that. So let's let's dig into some of the
Speaker 2: pieces of this. So let's talk about Triffin's dilemma, which,
Speaker 2: to the point that you made ended in nineteen seventy one. Basically, right,
Speaker 2: Nixon took us off the gold standard, and now we're
Speaker 2: in this free floating Fiat era treasury system or whatever
Speaker 2: you want to call it. And you talked about the
Speaker 2: need for the US to continue to supply dollar liquidity,
Speaker 2: but you also mentioned.
Speaker 3: Like the euro dollars, So the euro dollars.
Speaker 2: Are outside of the US's control, right, so there is
Speaker 2: dollar equity being created that the FED is not doing.
Speaker 2: We also have now stable coins US dollar stable coins,
Speaker 2: which are sort of another euro dollar standard. I would
Speaker 2: say we could argue that and both of those things
Speaker 2: could provide dollar liquidity to the world without the FED
Speaker 2: necessarily having to do that upfront, right or.
Speaker 3: No, Yes and no.
Speaker 2: Right.
Speaker 1: If you study the euro dollar system, and if you've
Speaker 1: read Jeff Snyder's work, you'll come to understand that the
Speaker 1: Euro dollar system is essentially synthetic dollars, and same with right,
Speaker 1: you know, ustt stable coins, these kinds of things, because
Speaker 1: unless they show proof of reserves, unless we know for
Speaker 1: a fact that they are backed one to one by
Speaker 1: real dollars, we can, you know, basically assume that this
Speaker 1: functions similarly to the Euro dollar system, which is basically
Speaker 1: entirely synthetic dollars. Now, those synthetic euro dollars, right, they
Speaker 1: are backed by a portion of real US dollar reserves
Speaker 1: held that correspondent banks in the United States. So it's
Speaker 1: not to say that the system is complete fabrication. But
Speaker 1: if let's say twenty percent of them are held as
Speaker 1: US dollars and the system grows substantially every single year,
Speaker 1: then that obviously increases real dollar demand, which is why
Speaker 1: the US has to export dollars, i e. They have
Speaker 1: to do the opposite of the trade balance, which means
Speaker 1: import goods and create a trade deficit in order to
Speaker 1: sustain the global economy. And I've seen people on Twitter,
Speaker 1: like Parker Lewis and others who have claimed, you know,
Speaker 1: this isn't how the system works. We don't actually need
Speaker 1: to export dollars. That's all a lie. And to them,
Speaker 1: I would show them the chart of the US central
Speaker 1: bank liquidity swap lines that the FED opened post two
Speaker 1: thousand and eight and post twenty twenty in the aftermath
Speaker 1: of obviously the Great Financial Crisis and COVID nineteen. And
Speaker 1: those charts are pretty telling because you see very quickly
Speaker 1: how the FED has to offer hundreds of billions of
Speaker 1: dollars in liquidity swaps basically meaning a US dollar for
Speaker 1: their domestic currency swap to all these regional banks. And
Speaker 1: why because they need their own banks, right, all these
Speaker 1: central banks, correspondent banks, these smaller commercials need liquidity. They
Speaker 1: need real US dollars to back up the euro dollar
Speaker 1: basically like fake dollars that they've created.
Speaker 2: And just to put some numbers on that for the audience,
Speaker 2: we have the real problem is approximately three hundred trillion
Speaker 2: dollars of US dollar denominated debt and only about one
Speaker 2: hundred trillion dollars of dollars, right, and so we need
Speaker 2: more dollars to pay off the dollar denominated debt. It's
Speaker 2: going to demand the dollars to pay that off the
Speaker 2: US dollars table coins. I can understand you saying that
Speaker 2: because in order to get the stable coin you have.
Speaker 3: To have a dollar. You have to pledge a dollar
Speaker 3: to get a dollar.
Speaker 2: Back, So it's somewhat of like a one for one,
Speaker 2: if you will. The euro dollar market is not backed
Speaker 2: by anything other than the confidence in the banking system overall.
Speaker 3: But I guess that's that's a whole other.
Speaker 2: Issue that we can get into. But you did speak
Speaker 2: about the FED doing less treasury issue and how it's
Speaker 2: gone down, and so the FED has been less involved,
Speaker 2: but yet US treasuries are still being sold.
Speaker 1: Now.
Speaker 2: We do know that if you look at like central
Speaker 2: banks net purchases, that they've been going up in golden
Speaker 2: down in US treasuries, but it's almost like at the
Speaker 2: same time the demand has stayed there. So it just seems,
Speaker 2: like you said, it depends on how bad this like
Speaker 2: system degrades, if you will, right, But it seems like
Speaker 2: it's been holding pretty good.
Speaker 3: All things considered.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I would say it has been. But the main
Speaker 1: reason's been holding together, you know, so to speak, is
Speaker 1: because of actions behind the scenes that the central bankers
Speaker 1: and the monetary authorities have been doing. So just like
Speaker 1: what you described right there, right, the FED has been
Speaker 1: tapering off their treasury supply right essentially doing QT. If
Speaker 1: you actually look behind the hood or below the hood,
Speaker 1: you see that all things aren't really equal in terms
Speaker 1: of prior quantitative tightening cycles. The FED in this cycle
Speaker 1: did not sell on net anything past ten years, meaning
Speaker 1: you know, during the kiwi's run up, they bought a
Speaker 1: ton of bills, they bought a ton of notes, they
Speaker 1: bought a ton of bonds, ten year, twenty year, and
Speaker 1: thirty year bonds. And then during the taper and I
Speaker 1: have a chart for this and I can send it
Speaker 1: to you if you want to display it on the
Speaker 1: screen now, where when they started the taper everything past
Speaker 1: ten years they actually did not sell. In fact, they
Speaker 1: kept increasing their holdings of the ten year, twenty year
Speaker 1: and thirty year bonds while they decreased their holdings of
Speaker 1: bills and notes. And so this meant that on the surface,
Speaker 1: while their overall size of their balance sheet continued to decrease,
Speaker 1: the actual holdings of bonds remained high and continued to climb,
Speaker 1: and so that meant that, in my opinion, right, the
Speaker 1: Fed understood that they could not lay off this amount
Speaker 1: of bonds without causing yields to completely blow out, and
Speaker 1: so they did this intelligent you know, behind the scenes,
Speaker 1: you'd call it STEALTHI liquidity, where while they were tapering,
Speaker 1: they just ensured that they didn't sell any of the
Speaker 1: long term bonds and in fact bought more to provide
Speaker 1: support for the bond market. And the reason why this
Speaker 1: is important, of course, is because of duration risk. Right,
Speaker 1: banks can much more easily hedge against a short duration
Speaker 1: bond than a long duration bond, just because a long
Speaker 1: duration bond has much more interest rate risk than a
Speaker 1: bill for example.
Speaker 3: Right, Yeah, I definitely saw that this week. We can
Speaker 3: see some of the reports on that.
Speaker 2: Now that's the dilemma, that's sort of where we're at,
Speaker 2: and we can just frame it up with the rock
Speaker 2: of the hard place, right do we keep printing?
Speaker 3: Do we keep manipulating? If so, like how long can
Speaker 3: that last?
Speaker 2: But maybe that leads us into the next big topic,
Speaker 2: which is the tariffs that we have so far. A
Speaker 2: couple of things that you mentioned. One was that, you know,
Speaker 2: we had these insane tariffs, you know, one hundred and
Speaker 2: forty five percent against China and then two hundred and
Speaker 2: forty five percent against China and things like that, And
Speaker 2: you mentioned I forget the exact word you use, but
Speaker 2: you know, Trump backtracking or coming off of that, right.
Speaker 2: A lot of the mainstream media headlines that you would
Speaker 2: see or like he's caving or things like that. But
Speaker 2: from an analyst perspective, I mean, did you ever think
Speaker 2: it was realistic that, of course we're going to have
Speaker 2: two and fift percent tariffs against China and that was
Speaker 2: never going to come off, we'd never do trade with
Speaker 2: him again. Or was it always that was going to
Speaker 2: be sort of that negotiation point, the anchoring, if you will,
Speaker 2: to allow us to come back off of that into
Speaker 2: some negotiation.
Speaker 1: I think it was. I mean, I think it was.
Speaker 1: It was basically like a retaliatory, almost like show of force. Right.
Speaker 1: It was a chicken game, if you will have two
Speaker 1: cars racing at each other, right, And Trump thought that
Speaker 1: he held a much much stronger hand than he actually does.
Speaker 1: Because again, the issue comes when you realize the implications
Speaker 1: of Triffin's alma as well as obviously the results of it.
Speaker 1: The implication is that we need to fend out dollars
Speaker 1: on net to the global economy to fund basically global trade.
Speaker 1: But the other implication, obviously is that we've shorter industrial base,
Speaker 1: and so if you're going to impose massive terrorists in
Speaker 1: the you know, desire to move us back to an
Speaker 1: autarcic economy, basically an economy that's self sufficient, that doesn't
Speaker 1: need to have maybe much import export, that can basically
Speaker 1: provide everything that it that it needs just by itself.
Speaker 1: It's going to take a lot of time to reshore
Speaker 1: industrial bases, to retrain American workers, and then there's obviously
Speaker 1: like the cost implications for high end manufacturing iPhones, consumer electronics, cars.
Speaker 3: Et cetera.
Speaker 1: And that you know, that transition period could definitely cause
Speaker 1: a very severe recession. But even more importantly than that,
Speaker 1: obviously it would cause an unwind of a lot of
Speaker 1: these carry trade and pro liquidity effects that have taken
Speaker 1: place with regards to this Tripan's dilemma that's been playing
Speaker 1: out for the last thirty to fifty years. And so
Speaker 1: that means that equity markets and bond markets are going
Speaker 1: to fall, you know, substantially. And I don't think Trump
Speaker 1: was ready for that amount of economic pain. And I'm
Speaker 1: not saying that, you know, whether it's right or wrong
Speaker 1: that we should move back towards a more self sufficient
Speaker 1: and more reshort industrial economy, or if we should let
Speaker 1: our manufacturers move overseas and basically ship away all of
Speaker 1: our jobs. But there's always trade offs, right. This is
Speaker 1: a world of nuanced there's never anything simple, and so
Speaker 1: if you want to do that, that path you're going
Speaker 1: to cause, you know, incur a lot of economic pain.
Speaker 1: And so yeah, I think that two forty five percent
Speaker 1: was just a almost like a bloviating show move, if
Speaker 1: you will. That was just meant to scare people. But
Speaker 1: in reality that that kind of thing would not hold
Speaker 1: long term if you want to basically retain our global
Speaker 1: monetary system as it is.
Speaker 2: And I don't think that was ever the plan, right,
Speaker 2: I mean, obviously he wrote the book Art of the Deal,
Speaker 2: which is anchoring, right, you go high, you set a low,
Speaker 2: so it opens the door for negotiations.
Speaker 3: I think a couple of things in that as well
Speaker 3: that I think.
Speaker 2: About is that you know, Stephen Moran, who's his economic
Speaker 2: Trump's economic advisor, wrote a paper before Trump became president
Speaker 2: and basically coined the term mar Alago Accords. And so
Speaker 2: he sort of laid out this playbook that seems to
Speaker 2: be sort of what the Trump administration is following down now,
Speaker 2: this playbook into this mar A Lago Accords.
Speaker 3: Maybe not exactly.
Speaker 2: I think maybe he's moved more aggressively than was laid
Speaker 2: out in the paper. But I think also in that
Speaker 2: so the two hundred and forty five percent was much
Speaker 2: more aggressive. There's been a lot of talk about this
Speaker 2: potential game of chicken. I think as you called it,
Speaker 2: I would agree with that. Forming like this game of chicken,
Speaker 2: like who could go longer China or the US? Realistically,
Speaker 2: neither of us could survive without each other. I mean
Speaker 2: it'd be very rough if we did, right, And I thought, man,
Speaker 2: I mean, China welded people in their frigging houses during
Speaker 2: the pandemic, like they can go through a lot of pain,
Speaker 2: Like the US isn't going to put up with that.
Speaker 2: Right as of like yesterday and today, though, it looks
Speaker 2: like China is like caving like super fast. Right, they
Speaker 2: already switched to easing. They're like begging for a meeting.
Speaker 2: It's looking like they want to deal pretty quickly. I
Speaker 2: don't know if you've been paying attention to that.
Speaker 1: Yeah, no, and I'm not surprised that they do. You know,
Speaker 1: while the CCP can maintain basically, like you know, monetary
Speaker 1: and economic harsh conditions much longer than the US can,
Speaker 1: it does not behoove them to do that at this
Speaker 1: current juncture. Right, We've seen a Chinese economy for the
Speaker 1: last two or three years that's been in basically recession
Speaker 1: or complete contraction due to the real estate and banking
Speaker 1: sectors starting to fall from their massive shadow real estate
Speaker 1: bubble that's been imploding. We saw the you know, the
Speaker 1: bankruptcy of Country Garden and Evergrand and several other large developers,
Speaker 1: as well as defaults of major property developers all across
Speaker 1: China and their failure to pay dollar bonds as well
Speaker 1: as on shore yuan bonds, and so the Chinese economy
Speaker 1: essentially has kind of reached this I think severe inflection
Speaker 1: point where they now need to choose what they're going
Speaker 1: to go forward with a path of deflation and let
Speaker 1: their estate bubble basically burst in slow motion essentially like
Speaker 1: two thousand and eight, or are they going to reflate
Speaker 1: the bubble and print the yuan and let the UoN devalue.
Speaker 1: And that's a difficult decision to make because either way,
Speaker 1: obviously there's economic pain, but the winners and losers are
Speaker 1: different in each scenario. Right, If you choose the deflationary path,
Speaker 1: then obviously the equity holders and the bond holders are
Speaker 1: going to get wiped out, but you might be able
Speaker 1: to retain that yuan seven point three to the dollar
Speaker 1: peg for a lot longer. And then if you go
Speaker 1: the other way, obviously you're going to see a blood
Speaker 1: in your currency. But on the plus side, the exports
Speaker 1: become much more competitive, so China, and China has been
Speaker 1: trying to show this strong face, right, this poker face.
Speaker 1: But again, if you look at I mean even the
Speaker 1: data like I was looking at this yesterday. Ever since
Speaker 1: twenty twenty two, they've stopped publishing most of their economic
Speaker 1: data publicly. If you look at youth unemployment, you look
Speaker 1: at factory orders, you look at new homes and new
Speaker 1: home leases in China, all the figures just won't be
Speaker 1: reported anymore. By their version of the BLS and so
Speaker 1: that tells me that things are pretty bad there right now.
Speaker 1: They just don't want the US to know because obviously
Speaker 1: that would weaken their hand.
Speaker 3: Yeah. Yeah, but it is a game of chicken.
Speaker 2: The way I see it is back to these mariologue
Speaker 2: with chords was like obviously put pressure on China. And
Speaker 2: I think there's even in the Biden administration with sort
Speaker 2: of this stance on China trying to put them back.
Speaker 3: In their place.
Speaker 2: I think it's probably more from the intelligence community than
Speaker 2: just the Biden or Trump administration. But you know, Biden
Speaker 2: is the one that took away their ability to get
Speaker 2: microchips for example, right advanced microchips, right to limit their
Speaker 2: their technology, and then started the Chips Act to start
Speaker 2: bringing on shore and some of that back.
Speaker 3: And when you think about that, it's terrorists are really about.
Speaker 2: Like more strategic moves, right. So it's like the US
Speaker 2: doesn't need to make T shirts and sneakers here, like
Speaker 2: we gave those jobs up a long time ago. But
Speaker 2: it's like there are strategic things that we should be
Speaker 2: doing here, like you know, rare earth elements having to
Speaker 2: steal in copper so we could actually make things. So
Speaker 2: I think there's like things that are strategic. It was
Speaker 2: never about bringing all the jobs back. It's like, what
Speaker 2: are the jobs that we need here, and let's just
Speaker 2: bring those back. We don't need to grow mangoes or
Speaker 2: coconuts like we can let other people do those things
Speaker 2: as well. And that seems to be happening at a
Speaker 2: pretty breakneck speed. As a matter of fact, if you
Speaker 2: saw the latest GDP numbers that came out, right, we
Speaker 2: had a negative print, but that was adjusted for what
Speaker 2: a forty one percent increase surgeon imports. But when you
Speaker 2: look at the investments that were going on in the US,
Speaker 2: I mean, Trump announced eight trillion dollars of investments going
Speaker 2: on in the United States, it looks like we're going
Speaker 2: into some sort of like a reindustrialization that we haven't
Speaker 2: seen since like the nineteen forties.
Speaker 1: Almost, Yeah, I mean, I would hope so, right, because again,
Speaker 1: the negative effects, right, the knock on effects of the
Speaker 1: offshoring of our industrial base are is pretty substantial. It's
Speaker 1: you know, pretty sad to see as well. Like the
Speaker 1: you know, in the rost belt States, one of the
Speaker 1: leading causes for death now is opioid detention and depression
Speaker 1: and basically economic malaise is now kind of common young
Speaker 1: young men, especially in those areas. And so when you
Speaker 1: destroy the ability of especially a large section of the
Speaker 1: middle class to make money and to provide for themselves,
Speaker 1: and you offshore that to foreign countries where they just
Speaker 1: do it cheaper, and they still don't treat their workers
Speaker 1: well obviously, right in Southeast Asia, that just demoralizes the people,
Speaker 1: and it obviously impacts the local economies very very severely.
Speaker 1: And so I think reindustrialization obviously should happen. But the
Speaker 1: question is, of course, like you said, what things should
Speaker 1: we bring back? And I think high technology things that
Speaker 1: are critical to defense, you know, lithium, copper, cadmium, things
Speaker 1: that are needed for battery and ev production obviously, but
Speaker 1: like you said, agricultural products, certain consumer goods, we don't
Speaker 1: necessarily need to produce those here. So I think it's
Speaker 1: a balancing act.
Speaker 3: The problem with.
Speaker 1: The tariffs as they're constructed now is that tru you know,
Speaker 1: came out guns blazing with this tariff policy, thinking that
Speaker 1: essentially the US was invulnerable, and then very quickly saw
Speaker 1: the market start to retrace. Right. We saw the twenty
Speaker 1: year and the thirty year bond hit five percent within
Speaker 1: like a week, and credit spread start to blow out
Speaker 1: in early April, and that signaled him quickly that things
Speaker 1: were not going to go as smoothly as he had hoped,
Speaker 1: and so we started announcing basically exclusions. So he said, Okay,
Speaker 1: we're going to apply terrorifts except for iPhone you know manufacturing,
Speaker 1: and except for automotive manufacturers, and except for you know, X,
Speaker 1: Y and Z industries that need to have their cheap
Speaker 1: goods in order to produce cheap finish goods here in
Speaker 1: the US. The issue with that is that.
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Speaker 1: This excludes small businesses, right, so small businesses won't be
Speaker 1: won't be able to benefit from those exemptions that the
Speaker 1: large businesses are able to. And so that means that
Speaker 1: small businesses, if these teriffs are held in place as
Speaker 1: they're currently structured, the small businesses are going to be
Speaker 1: damaged quite significantly by the terrafs. And you know, that's
Speaker 1: where I think Trump needs to make some readjustments in
Speaker 1: his overall tariff policy to make sure that small business
Speaker 1: businesses and small business owners, especially small manufacturers and goods,
Speaker 1: don't get walloped by these things.
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Speaker 2: now part of the Marilogo Accords, and even the name
Speaker 2: sort of spells it out Accords kind of echoing rhyming
Speaker 2: the Plaza Accords of nineteen eighty five, very similar to also,
Speaker 2: you know what was done probably in nineteen forty four.
Speaker 2: So we have these periods of time, these historical moments
Speaker 2: where the global monetary system sort of gets realigned. So
Speaker 2: you know, obviously nineteen forty four Bretwood Agreement, the whole
Speaker 2: world agreed nineteen eighty five, and those moments were like
Speaker 2: really getting the world to sort of agree to peg
Speaker 2: back to the US dollar to allow the US dollar
Speaker 2: to devalue. And that appears to be the same sort
Speaker 2: of goal of this these type of cords, the Marlago
Speaker 2: coords is get in the US to sort of repeg
Speaker 2: back to the US dollar and allow the dollar to
Speaker 2: devalue as well. That's the way that it seems to
Speaker 2: be right now. Part of that is realigning trade. So
Speaker 2: if we can get about forty percent of global trade
Speaker 2: to be aligned to the US dollar, we can keep
Speaker 2: the US currency as sort of this like I think
Speaker 2: he wants to keep it about sixty percent right now,
Speaker 2: we're about fifty nine percent of global trade.
Speaker 3: Then we can allow the US to sort of have
Speaker 3: this coordinated devaluation. That's what I'm picking up. What do
Speaker 3: you think the ultimate goal of this is?
Speaker 1: No, I absolutely think that you're right on the money
Speaker 1: with that. If you look at statements from you know,
Speaker 1: a Cent even Lutnik right as well as that paper
Speaker 1: that you mentioned which I've I've read excerpts from, they
Speaker 1: do seem to be basically an agreement on weakening the
Speaker 1: dollar substantially. And the weakening dollar thing is actually a
Speaker 1: very intelligent strategy if you look at it from a
Speaker 1: geopolitical standpoint. The way that the system is structured is
Speaker 1: very counterintuitive, right, because again we most of us would
Speaker 1: think that, especially goldbugs, would go out and claim that
Speaker 1: a weaker dollar means that gold is going to rip,
Speaker 1: the dollars is going to collapse, Dixie to thirty, and
Speaker 1: Peter Shift will be vindicated in the end. Right, we
Speaker 1: can all, we can all throw a party rit with
Speaker 1: Mike Maloney and Peter Shiff in their warehouse. But if
Speaker 1: you look at the fundamental reality again of how the
Speaker 1: EU at all system works, of how the global monetary
Speaker 1: system works, that's not the case. I wrote a paper
Speaker 1: about this back in mid April. But every time that
Speaker 1: we've seen a substantial weakening of the dollar, we actually
Speaker 1: see redollarization. So that means, you know, if the dollar
Speaker 1: becomes weaker and you're a foreign let's say you know,
Speaker 1: you're a consumer goods manufacturer in Pakistan, U owe dollar
Speaker 1: debt already via the euro dollar system. Right, if the
Speaker 1: dollar becomes weaker against your domestic currency, you can now
Speaker 1: borrow more dollars and that old debt that you have
Speaker 1: is easier to pay off. So that means, on net,
Speaker 1: the whole system actually starts to increase their borrowing of
Speaker 1: US dollar and US denominated debt, and so that means
Speaker 1: obviously that the system becomes even more reliant on the
Speaker 1: dollar over time with a weaker comparatively weaker dollar, and
Speaker 1: so de dollarization is not when the dollar's falling in
Speaker 1: this case, that's redollarization, and a spike in the dollar
Speaker 1: is actually the you know rush for liquidity that all
Speaker 1: these corporate rits and countries and banks are doing in
Speaker 1: order to fund their dollar debt. So a higher Dixie
Speaker 1: is actually emblematic of a breakdown in the global monetary system,
Speaker 1: not a lower one. And so that's why we saw
Speaker 1: obviously a very high Dixie in the nineteen eighty five
Speaker 1: Plaza Cords. That's why they had to devalue, because they
Speaker 1: had to reset the global monetary system and allow enough
Speaker 1: liquidity to flow out to settle all these dollar denominated debts.
Speaker 1: And so, you know, Brent Johnson has been running about
Speaker 1: this for a long time as well. Right, this this
Speaker 1: lower dollar actually strengthens the milkshake and it extends the
Speaker 1: lifetime of the you know, dollars dominance in the global
Speaker 1: monetary system.
Speaker 2: Yeah, when you look at the dixie a dollar index
Speaker 2: compared to a basket of other top currencies, we're nowhere
Speaker 2: near the top where we were in the nineteen eighty
Speaker 2: five Plaza cords. But I was just looking at a
Speaker 2: chart of from the BIS of the US dollars relative strength.
Speaker 2: So it's like an adjusted matrix and we're like a
Speaker 2: but weal well above historical levels. So when you look
Speaker 2: at it from that perspective, But even if you look
Speaker 2: at from the Dixie, I mean, maybe a more historical
Speaker 2: number might be eighty five or ninety I mean, which
Speaker 2: if you look at it from that perspective, if you
Speaker 2: think maybe the goal is to.
Speaker 3: Devalue the dollar, would it revert to the mean? What
Speaker 3: is the mean?
Speaker 2: Is that eighty five or ninety? Is that a ten
Speaker 2: to fifteen percent drop from here? And then what does
Speaker 2: that mean? How do you think about that math or
Speaker 2: that mechanic?
Speaker 1: Sure, yeah, you're right, you know what very long term
Speaker 1: Dixie averages is eighty five, eighty seven, you know, up
Speaker 1: to ninety. So a ten to fifteen percent drop from
Speaker 1: here is basically bring us back to baseline. And like
Speaker 1: I said, that means that you know that weaker dollar
Speaker 1: will help to restabilize let's say the euro dollar market
Speaker 1: and to provide liquidity for all these banks. But more importantly, obviously,
Speaker 1: it will help these other countries who need to earn
Speaker 1: dollars into you know, essentially hold those dollars as foreign
Speaker 1: exchange reserves for future money crisis, like the like the
Speaker 1: Japanese have been doing with their interventions, or even like
Speaker 1: you know, the the BOE or the ECB may have
Speaker 1: to do in the future to defend the euro or
Speaker 1: the pound. And a higher dollar is basically restricting all
Speaker 1: of those.
Speaker 3: All of those goals.
Speaker 1: Now, a week of dollar will impact obviously tourism for Americans.
Speaker 1: They'll be harder for us to buy go a boat
Speaker 1: and buy goods and services if we're if we're going
Speaker 1: and traveling, But overall, it's a net benefit for the
Speaker 1: global monetary system as it is.
Speaker 2: So that seems to be perfectly in line with this plan,
Speaker 2: because what Trump wants is more manufacturing in the US,
Speaker 2: less exports, and so if we have a week a dollar,
Speaker 2: that's exactly what it does. It makes us more competitive
Speaker 2: on our exports, and it makes it harder for people
Speaker 2: to import into the United States exactly.
Speaker 1: And if you can switch, remember again they still need
Speaker 1: to provide dollars. So if you can switch the dollar
Speaker 1: funding line from just exports and trade for goods, which
Speaker 1: is just you know, quid pro quote transaction where I
Speaker 1: give you dollars and you give me a bunch of
Speaker 1: Chinese electronics or Taiwani semiconductors. Right, if you switch that
Speaker 1: from a you know, let's say, like trade based arrangement
Speaker 1: to a financial arrangement where instead of saying, hey, I'm
Speaker 1: going to be you know, giving a bunch of dollars
Speaker 1: for your manufactured goods, I'm going to swap a bunch
Speaker 1: of dollars for your you know, own currency reserves. That
Speaker 1: allows that the system to reindustrialize, I guess much better
Speaker 1: than it would if you were stuck on that first mode.
Speaker 1: And so what they're trying to do is this kind
Speaker 1: of game of geopolitical chess where they're trying to figure
Speaker 1: out how to manage their supposed mandate of reshowing the
Speaker 1: American industrial base and solving the problems that the populacets
Speaker 1: have basically proclaimed to be plaguing America, as well as
Speaker 1: working with the global monetary system as it works today, right,
Speaker 1: not allowing a global monetary crisis to develop under their watch.
Speaker 2: Let's just say that switching the in total entire global
Speaker 2: monetary system is not a smooth There's all types of
Speaker 2: unintended consequences that will happen throughout that it can't be
Speaker 2: a smooth process. We could certainly argue for and against
Speaker 2: the case that Trump moved too fast or was too aggressive, but.
Speaker 3: I would say, like zooming out. I don't know if
Speaker 3: maybe you retweeted.
Speaker 2: Or I saw somewhere online, but uh oh no, it
Speaker 2: wasn't you with somebody else. But they're just saying, like
Speaker 2: after Powell's announcement today that like he's a he's a legend.
Speaker 3: Like I mean, he.
Speaker 2: Seemingly might have pulled off a soft landing, which nobody
Speaker 2: thought was possible. China's coming around to negotiation looks like
Speaker 2: a deal with India's done.
Speaker 3: The dollar devalues a.
Speaker 2: Little bit, the world gets what they want, we bring
Speaker 2: some manufacturing back to the US. I mean, I kind
Speaker 2: of see a path here with unintended consequences all throughout.
Speaker 2: I'm just kind of bullish. What's your view?
Speaker 1: Yeah, I would, I would broadly, you know, agree with
Speaker 1: that statement, although I would give some right so obviously,
Speaker 1: you know, after that first kind of you know, Mayhem
Speaker 1: with Liberation Day slash liquidation Day and the credits bed
Speaker 1: flowing out and spy falling, as well as nick Ay
Speaker 1: and DAX index falling substantially in early April. They've they've
Speaker 1: been able to reshuffle their their chestboard and make the
Speaker 1: best moves that they can given the circumstances. The issue,
Speaker 1: you know, comes when you start to like visualize the
Speaker 1: long term problems that are still plaguing in the US. Right.
Speaker 1: Although we can again restructure some things within the global
Speaker 1: monetary system like resource some industrial manufacturing, or provide liquidity
Speaker 1: via dollar swap lines to these other central banks and
Speaker 1: then weaken the dollars substantially like we did in the
Speaker 1: positive courts in nineteen eighty five, the long term problems
Speaker 1: of the debt and the deficit are not solved. And
Speaker 1: even given Elon Musk Doge Project and you know, substantial
Speaker 1: pushes from Republicans and a few Democrats to reduce the
Speaker 1: deficits meaningfully, nothing has really been done. And the actual,
Speaker 1: you know, put, the actual accomplishment of that goal is
Speaker 1: much much more difficult than most people realize, right because
Speaker 1: there's so many vested interests that have basically money being
Speaker 1: that's being made from the government deficits, and so we
Speaker 1: don't solve the debt problem. Even with rates here, we
Speaker 1: don't solve the deficit problem. We don't solve the eventual
Speaker 1: need for QI or for finding some other source of funding.
Speaker 1: And even if the FED continues to do their sealth
Speaker 1: qui by you know, shifting issue INCE or the treasure,
Speaker 1: that can do the same thing, right, the treasure can
Speaker 1: shift issue INCE from the long end to the short
Speaker 1: end and essentially provide quasi self liquidity via that mechanism.
Speaker 1: Nothing fundamentally has been solved about the thirty seven trillion
Speaker 1: dollar debt and the one trillion plus of interest six
Speaker 1: months we have every single year. And so that's the
Speaker 1: issue that I still see hurting the United States.
Speaker 3: Yeah, then ain't being solved. There ain't no solution for that.
Speaker 2: I mean, there's a there's a small chance potentially through
Speaker 2: some high inflation for a couple of years, like Luke
Speaker 2: Grama talks about, maybe through super you know, double digit
Speaker 2: inflation for three four years, we can bring the ratio
Speaker 2: of debt down potentially and if you know, some miracle
Speaker 2: with efficiency gains through AI through Trump repealing, you know,
Speaker 2: twenty thirty percent of the regulations and unleashing the American economy.
Speaker 2: Maybe we can make a dent and growing out of
Speaker 2: it a little bit. I don't see us making a
Speaker 2: lot of ground on that. So that's just kind of
Speaker 2: like is what it is, is like the it's like
Speaker 2: the modern medical system, like we'll just treat the symptom.
Speaker 3: We can't really cure it.
Speaker 2: We let's just manage the sickness kind of a thing.
Speaker 2: So in that frame, which we're both sort of agreen,
Speaker 2: then really it comes down to the rate of degradation,
Speaker 2: like how how bad does it get in how fast?
Speaker 2: But the direction that we're going is pretty set, so
Speaker 2: we have to think about then how do we protect ourselves?
Speaker 3: Or I like to think abou how do we make
Speaker 3: money through this?
Speaker 2: Right?
Speaker 3: I know you like to talk about gold and bitcoin,
Speaker 3: as do I.
Speaker 2: Two assets that are sort of not only outside of
Speaker 2: that financial system, but out of outside of any country
Speaker 2: as well, maybe as lifeboats. How do you look at
Speaker 2: them in regards to the mechanics of this debt bubble
Speaker 2: that we're in.
Speaker 1: Sure, so I've written several pieces about gold and bitcoin
Speaker 1: and their correlation to global liquidity, and Michael Howells also
Speaker 1: touched on this as well. There are several other macro
Speaker 1: analysts you can check out, but essentially, what I found
Speaker 1: is that gold has been a pretty prescient front runner
Speaker 1: of global liquidity waves by about twelve to eighteen months,
Speaker 1: and bitcoin has been unfortunately the laggard, but obviously a
Speaker 1: much more extreme and you know, volatile laggard in the
Speaker 1: in the sense that if gold will go up, you know,
Speaker 1: let's say ten to twenty percent, bitcoin can go up
Speaker 1: sixty percent seventy percent, just because of the nature of
Speaker 1: its electronic means of payment as well as obviously smaller
Speaker 1: market cap. But gold and bitcoin have worked to you know,
Speaker 1: hedge against debase, against inflation for decades. And of course
Speaker 1: gold has been theorized to be suppressed, and I think
Speaker 1: that there are there's credence to that claim. That's been
Speaker 1: suppressed by central banks and by bullion banks for the
Speaker 1: last twenty thirty years. But that suppression is finally coming
Speaker 1: to an end. And the reason why it's coming to
Speaker 1: an end is something I talked about in a podcast
Speaker 1: in March as well as a written piece in February.
Speaker 1: But what I essentially was getting at was if you
Speaker 1: look at the comax and the physical orders and the
Speaker 1: physical deliveries that are now being made. It's starting to
Speaker 1: reach epic proportions, right even rivaling what we saw during
Speaker 1: twenty twenty in March during the COVID nineteen shutdown and
Speaker 1: the massive withdrawal of liquidity from the global banking system.
Speaker 1: So the question now becomes, right, who is doing this,
Speaker 1: Who's drawing this liquidity, and who's drawing this physical gold
Speaker 1: out of the system, and who is trying to front
Speaker 1: run at what they view, in my opinion as a
Speaker 1: new global liquidity wave. And I think that is mainly
Speaker 1: the Chinese and now the Americans. If you look at
Speaker 1: the physical gold orders from Shanghai, from the Shanghai Gold Exchange,
Speaker 1: they've been very very consistently showing an increased appetite for
Speaker 1: gold ever since twenty twenty two, and especially a delta
Speaker 1: in the difference between the Shanghai physical gold rate, which
Speaker 1: is their cash basically like their spot market for physical
Speaker 1: gold and the COMEX. You see like a fifty sixty
Speaker 1: to seventy dollars delta open up at sometimes, and so
Speaker 1: that allows traders to arbitrage the trade between those two nations,
Speaker 1: and so that was responsible for the first leg of
Speaker 1: gold appreciation from let's say twenty twenty two to late
Speaker 1: twenty twenty three mid twenty twenty four, and that shifted
Speaker 1: obviously once especially once Trump took office, we saw a
Speaker 1: massive amount of gold deliveries and what I believe to
Speaker 1: be a rush of physical redemptions for Fort Knox. Now,
Speaker 1: again this isn't confirmed because the government won't release this data.
Speaker 1: But according to stone X, which is one of the
Speaker 1: exchanges in the LBMA and one of the market makers
Speaker 1: that settles physical gold trades, they found that there was
Speaker 1: around you know, seven hundred tons of physical gold that
Speaker 1: was shipped from London to the United States in the
Speaker 1: two months of January and February of this year. Now,
Speaker 1: the official import numbers are for thirteen hundred tons, so
Speaker 1: that means that, you know, if we shipped in seven
Speaker 1: if they declared seven hundred tons shipped to the COMEX
Speaker 1: and then there was thirteen hundred tons total, where's that
Speaker 1: other eight hundred tons going? And a move of that size,
Speaker 1: obviously is in two months what the US would normally
Speaker 1: import in a year or two years, and so it's
Speaker 1: a huge move and the only type of gold that
Speaker 1: doesn't have to get outright claimed on our import export
Speaker 1: numbers is what's called monetary gold. So this is gold
Speaker 1: in four hundred ounce bars. And so that monetary gold
Speaker 1: would only really be going to one place, and that's
Speaker 1: Fort Knox. And so again you just use the equals
Speaker 1: be A plus equal C. Rationalization is that the US
Speaker 1: is now starting to I guess you could call it
Speaker 1: reshore or call in its gold reserves and basically called
Speaker 1: a bluff on the l B m A and on
Speaker 1: the Bank of England on their paper gold certificates that
Speaker 1: they've that they've sent out. And so that's why the
Speaker 1: lease rates in London exploded in January and February. That's
Speaker 1: why we saw massive gold backlogs, redemption backlogs at the
Speaker 1: Bank of England. And that's probably why they don't want
Speaker 1: to do the audit just yet. Even though Elon Musk
Speaker 1: and Trump have talked about auditing the gold reserves at
Speaker 1: Fort Knox. It's because they're still waiting to refill all
Speaker 1: of the empty vaults with with physical gold because right
Speaker 1: now what they have is mostly IOUs in there.
Speaker 3: It's an interesting theory. We'll see how that shakes out.
Speaker 3: I did a video talking about this number one. Obviously,
Speaker 3: that talk got.
Speaker 2: Really big about why don't we audit it? Which seems
Speaker 2: so simple, like why don't we audit it?
Speaker 3: And they're like, of course we audit it happens all
Speaker 3: the time. This is not public, so I don't know.
Speaker 3: We'll see about that.
Speaker 2: But I also talked about in a video that potentially,
Speaker 2: potentially what if we found out there was more gold
Speaker 2: than Fort Knox, then that could be equally as bad,
Speaker 2: if not even worse, because.
Speaker 1: Why did you say that?
Speaker 2: I would say it'd be worse because what if we
Speaker 2: had more gold in Fort Knox than we thought we had?
Speaker 3: So then why would the US be buying more gold?
Speaker 2: They're preparing for some sort of currency collapse that they're
Speaker 2: trying to shore up.
Speaker 3: What do they know that we don't know? Should we
Speaker 3: be shoring up our currency? Right?
Speaker 2: I would I would think it would signal a weaker standpoint.
Speaker 2: I think the US could argue why it doesn't have gold.
Speaker 2: I mean Canada has no gold, right, Like the US
Speaker 2: could argue getting rid of some of the gold, oh
Speaker 2: we have it on loan whatever, But having more gold
Speaker 2: almost seems like it could be worse. Like if the
Speaker 2: US thinks their currency is going to collapse, they're buying
Speaker 2: more gold. Maybe we should so I thought that was
Speaker 2: an interesting caveat, but yeah, we don't really know.
Speaker 3: I do. I did see last night breaking news.
Speaker 2: I haven't been able to find out if it's true
Speaker 2: or not, so I didn't want to talk about it publicly.
Speaker 2: But you probably had seen it, talk of China and
Speaker 2: Saudi opening up a gold settled oil window.
Speaker 3: I don't know if you saw that last night yesterday.
Speaker 1: No, I didn't.
Speaker 2: So that's that's big news. I haven't been able to
Speaker 2: really verify that. I've seen it from from a few
Speaker 2: people talking about it. But yeah, potentially having you know,
Speaker 2: gold and oil settled by China and Saudi Arabia could
Speaker 2: be a pretty big deal.
Speaker 3: What about the bitcoin piece?
Speaker 1: Sure, so bitcoin right has been trading as this. I
Speaker 1: guess you'd call it like levered proxy for global liquidity
Speaker 1: for the last let's say three four years, and really,
Speaker 1: you know, this is not new or just unique to
Speaker 1: just bitcoin. Again, gold trades, although at a at a
Speaker 1: different timescale, meaning like like I said, gold will front
Speaker 1: run the liquidity waves and the contractions and the sp
Speaker 1: FIE hundred and QQQ also are very very close in
Speaker 1: their correlations to global liquidity. If you stack a chart
Speaker 1: of global money supply or global central bank balance sheets
Speaker 1: minus obviously the TGA and the reverse repo window, and
Speaker 1: then you compare that to the SPY, is like a
Speaker 1: zero point eight eight correlation, which in finance, of course
Speaker 1: is extremely strong. So it's not just obviously Bitcoin that's
Speaker 1: been sensitive to global liquidity. It's literally every single financial asset,
Speaker 1: especially in the US. But Bitcoin has been trading this
Speaker 1: kind of like quasi range here and between seventy and
Speaker 1: ninety for the last few months, and I think that
Speaker 1: that's indicative of where we are in the global liquidity cycle. Right.
Speaker 1: The FED began their taper just a few years ago,
Speaker 1: and they've continued their taper, albeit at a slower rate,
Speaker 1: and then we've found out, like I said earlier, that
Speaker 1: they've been really just tapering the short bonds, not anything
Speaker 1: past ten years, which means that on net, the liquidity
Speaker 1: drain on the system isn't as bad. And now they're
Speaker 1: venture this area where they're kind of in a limbo, right,
Speaker 1: just like with other cycles, they aren't set on cutting
Speaker 1: the rates to zero yet, and they aren't set on
Speaker 1: doing Q yet, but they also aren't telegraphing that they're
Speaker 1: going to hike rates anytime soon or keep them here
Speaker 1: for the next three or four years. There is a
Speaker 1: plan to slowly reduce interest rates. So because of that,
Speaker 1: Bitcoin has been also in limbo as well. Because global
Speaker 1: liquidity is kind of in this doll drums, Bitcoin's been
Speaker 1: in these doll drums as well, and we probably won't
Speaker 1: see a breakout above one hundred and twenty K until
Speaker 1: we see major easing by at least one of the
Speaker 1: large global central banks.
Speaker 2: Well, you mentioned Michael Holley yesterday, I'm on his newsletter.
Speaker 2: Nice you mentioned how earlier yesterday on his newsletter he
Speaker 2: put out that global equity hit a new record all
Speaker 2: time high and it's been on the uptrend, and he
Speaker 2: said that he actually changed his forecast.
Speaker 3: He thought that global equity would peek out Q four.
Speaker 2: Twenty two, twenty five because it runs on these you know,
Speaker 2: five year cycles, he calls it. But now, because of
Speaker 2: what's happening with with the major central banks, he thinks
Speaker 2: it's going to go well into twenty twenty six. So
Speaker 2: we have seen global equity taking off quite a bit.
Speaker 2: Just seems like the US hasn't quite jumped on board
Speaker 2: with it.
Speaker 1: Maybe sure, but even that still you know, that still
Speaker 1: doesn't take them to count the lack right like we like,
Speaker 1: if you've seen the chart of the global M two
Speaker 1: and bitcoin three months still lags by. Yeah, it's still
Speaker 1: lags by quite a few months. And of course we
Speaker 1: said bitcoin is you know, sense of for global equidity.
Speaker 1: But there's obviously a lot of caveats, right, there's, uh,
Speaker 1: the the moment to moment reshuffling of debt, there's the
Speaker 1: the refinancing of the treasury bonds. There's the tariff wars, right,
Speaker 1: and what what banks and corporations are going to do
Speaker 1: with regards to you know, their currency reserves in the
Speaker 1: in those cases. So it's not a simple picture, right.
Speaker 1: That's why when people ask me, like, what's the fund
Speaker 1: of mental benchmark global liquidity? What is it? Like, tell
Speaker 1: me one number, it's very difficult to caulle It's not
Speaker 1: one because there's so many.
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's not one number one numbers of all.
Speaker 1: Yeah, but it's also it's like if they change the SLR,
Speaker 1: for example, and exempt treasuries from being in the leverage ratio,
Speaker 1: that would change how liquidity is flows throughout the system.
Speaker 1: But it wouldn't come up on any screen. You wouldn't
Speaker 1: see the number of Michael Howell's calculation change. That would
Speaker 1: just be a regulatory change, right. And so those kinds
Speaker 1: of like I guess, esoteric or abstract impacts are are
Speaker 1: hard to quantify and hard to parse out. So and again,
Speaker 1: remember this is a it's a strong correlation, it's not
Speaker 1: a perfect correlation. Doesn't mean that tick for tick, where
Speaker 1: global liquidity goes, bitcoin goes that single day. There's still
Speaker 1: obviously a market.
Speaker 2: For I like Michael Howell's model. I like the Bitcoin
Speaker 2: layers model. I think Real Vision has a good model.
Speaker 2: Those are the kind of the three that I look at,
Speaker 2: and they're all kind of tracking pretty similar. I want
Speaker 2: to wrap this up, and so let's just let me
Speaker 2: let me throw you an easy one here. Dig into
Speaker 2: your crystal ball, but polish that thing up and I'm
Speaker 2: gonna lay give you a layup here though, But do
Speaker 2: you think we end twenty twenty five.
Speaker 1: Higher than we are now in the bitcoin price?
Speaker 2: And let's just say markets overall.
Speaker 1: Yeahcoin, yes, all three, Yes to all three. And again
Speaker 1: the reason why is because the fundamental factors that are
Speaker 1: pushing all three higher. Haven't changed, right, We're still looking
Speaker 1: at you know, potentially, like you said, higher global liquidity.
Speaker 1: And then in the coming few years, and especially by
Speaker 1: the end of the year, we're still seeing the carry
Speaker 1: trade impacts and the dollar recycling impacts of Triffon's dilemma,
Speaker 1: pushing US dollars back into US equity markets. And you know,
Speaker 1: debasement is still inevitable given the current US debt levels
Speaker 1: and the fiscal situation. So because of those three reasons,
Speaker 1: I don't see any any strong argument as to why
Speaker 1: at least you know, or even one of those three
Speaker 1: should be lower. I think all three are going to
Speaker 1: be higher, substantially so. And I think gold, especially like
Speaker 1: I said, it's telling of more inflation coming in the
Speaker 1: future in twelve to eighteen months, just because it's been
Speaker 1: such a good predictor in the past of coming inflation waves.
Speaker 3: Yeah. Perfect, all right, I'm going to wrap it up
Speaker 3: with that. Thanks for joining.
Speaker 2: You really laid that whole whole sort of global chessboard
Speaker 2: out very well, and I agree with you on the
Speaker 2: sort of inevitability of where we're at, at least for
Speaker 2: the foreseeing future. Here, I want to link down in
Speaker 2: the show notes down below. You have your was it
Speaker 2: a dollar in game? Your newsletter that you're right, which
Speaker 2: is great yep, so linked that down below, and your
Speaker 2: Twitter handle anything else that you want to call out
Speaker 2: for everybody to go check out.
Speaker 1: I have a YouTube channel as well. I talk about markets,
Speaker 1: talk about gold, bitcoin, commodities, equities obviously, so that's just
Speaker 1: at Peruvium Bowl, so you can check that out as well.
Speaker 3: Yep, we'll link to that down below.
Speaker 1: Thanks for jumping on, Sweet, Thanks for having me