WEBVTT - Legendary Hacker Matt Suiche on Cyberwar in the Age of AI

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.

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<v Speaker 2>Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Thoughts podcast.

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<v Speaker 2>I'm Tracy Alloway.

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<v Speaker 3>And I'm Jill. Why isn't thal Joe.

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<v Speaker 2>You know I have some uh prepper tendencies. Yeah, slightly

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<v Speaker 2>prepper tendencies, Prepper adjacent.

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<v Speaker 4>I know you do, because my plan for when everything,

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<v Speaker 4>when everything goes bad, is to bring my family over

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<v Speaker 4>to your place.

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<v Speaker 3>So I'm relying on you.

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<v Speaker 2>Actually, that's fine. I actually figured that, and I've been

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<v Speaker 2>building an extra store of supplies.

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<v Speaker 4>I'm gonna like send you a whole list of things

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<v Speaker 4>my kids like to eat and stuff like that, just

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<v Speaker 4>so that we're already Yeah, okay.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, one of the things I saw on a bunch

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<v Speaker 2>of the prepper boards that I sometimes look at. I

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<v Speaker 2>don't want people to think that I'm crazy about it,

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<v Speaker 2>but I find it interesting. I find it interesting seeing

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<v Speaker 2>how people's like insecurities manifest in physical stuff. But anyway,

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<v Speaker 2>one of the things everyone was saying was you need

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<v Speaker 2>to start taking cash out because of the situation in Iran,

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<v Speaker 2>because we're all expecting a big cyber attack that's going

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<v Speaker 2>to absolutely destroy the US financial infrastructure.

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<v Speaker 4>By the way, if I told you my idea for

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<v Speaker 4>a business, like I've looked at prepper meals, like prepared meals,

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<v Speaker 4>and they all look terrible. They do like a slightly

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<v Speaker 4>high end version for yuppies I think would be really good,

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<v Speaker 4>like something they you know, like.

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<v Speaker 2>Some nice I think it's a physical limitation on how

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<v Speaker 2>good you can actually get, like dry food.

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<v Speaker 4>Scientist can do a lot of things these days. Anyway,

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<v Speaker 4>let's talk about the actual issue at hand. Yeah, well,

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<v Speaker 4>are you taking cash out?

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<v Speaker 2>I have it? I haven't yet. I'm relying on my

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<v Speaker 2>store of gold and silver. That's right. But I think

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<v Speaker 2>this raises a legitimate and actually very interesting topic, which

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<v Speaker 2>is what do we know about Iran's cyber I guess facilities, skills,

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<v Speaker 2>what could happen in those context? And then also everything

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<v Speaker 2>that's going on with the world of AI, right like

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<v Speaker 2>cyber securities, cyber hacking. It's changing really rapidly given this

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<v Speaker 2>new technology.

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<v Speaker 4>Totally, I mean also just within the context of the

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<v Speaker 4>war itself, setting aside hypothetical doom scenarios. There's a really

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<v Speaker 4>interesting report in the Financial Times about Israel having been

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<v Speaker 4>able to hack into all of the traffic lights in Tehran,

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<v Speaker 4>almost unbelievable and shocking, but there's already within the war

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<v Speaker 4>itself or even over the last couple of years, there

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<v Speaker 4>was the pager attack that Israel had executed, and so yeah,

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<v Speaker 4>cyber is part of it. And the timing is wild

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<v Speaker 4>here because speaking of AI, it was just on Friday.

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<v Speaker 4>We're recording this March fifth. I'm not exactly sure the

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<v Speaker 4>data is coming out, but a week ago basically there

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<v Speaker 4>was the news the complete collapse of the Anthropic relationship

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<v Speaker 4>with the Department of Defense or the Department of War.

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<v Speaker 4>And so it's all in the mix right now, and

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<v Speaker 4>how is AI actually going to change warfare? And one

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<v Speaker 4>of the national security implications of AI and AI and hacking.

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<v Speaker 4>There is a lot in this sort of mix that's

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<v Speaker 4>all happening right now.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely. The thing that really caught my eye was the

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<v Speaker 2>story about a hacker using Claude to hack into like

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<v Speaker 2>the Mexican government system. Did you see that?

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<v Speaker 4>That was really interesting because it seemed like the hacker

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<v Speaker 4>extracted a bunch of information from Claude itself. You know,

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<v Speaker 4>I'm pretty sure you cannot go to claud code and say, like,

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<v Speaker 4>I want to break into the Mexican government website helped me,

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<v Speaker 4>like build this app.

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<v Speaker 3>It won't do that.

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<v Speaker 4>It's trained to avoid malicious uses. But people find a

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<v Speaker 4>way to jail break down. People find a way to

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<v Speaker 4>sort of extract information from the AI itself that has

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<v Speaker 4>in its training and so forth. And there's been examples

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<v Speaker 4>of leaks where you know, people upload data to the

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<v Speaker 4>AI and somehow other people see it. Anyway, there's a

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<v Speaker 4>lot here that we have to learn more about.

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<v Speaker 2>We should talk about all of it, and we do,

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<v Speaker 2>in fact have the perfect guest, someone who's been on

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<v Speaker 2>the podcast before but it's been a while. We're going

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<v Speaker 2>to be speaking with Matt Swish. He is the founder

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<v Speaker 2>of ondb, which is a data infrastructure startup for agentiic AI.

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<v Speaker 2>So honestly the perfect a legendary French hacker. I should

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<v Speaker 2>have said that first. Matt, thank you so much for

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<v Speaker 2>coming back on all lots.

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<v Speaker 5>Thank you very much. It's been I think it's been

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<v Speaker 5>worth four years.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I think it has been.

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<v Speaker 2>The Last time we spoke to you, you were still

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<v Speaker 2>in Dubai, and now you're coming to us from Sweden

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<v Speaker 2>and a very Gustavian looking background over there.

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<v Speaker 4>I think actually what we talked to is right after

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<v Speaker 4>Russia's invasion of Ukraine. So I guess, yeah, wow, that

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<v Speaker 4>has been almost every.

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<v Speaker 2>Time there's a war, we call you Matt.

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<v Speaker 4>But because war is so intermixed with cyber espionage, cybersecurity, hacking,

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<v Speaker 4>and so forth, it's a natural natural time.

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<v Speaker 2>So for the benefit of people who didn't listen to

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<v Speaker 2>the episode four years ago, can you just give some

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<v Speaker 2>context around who you actually are and your sort of

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<v Speaker 2>history in the hacking community, including you know, shadow brokers

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<v Speaker 2>and the Wannacrey era and all that stuff.

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<v Speaker 5>So I've been in enterprise software for almost like twenty years,

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<v Speaker 5>particularly cyber security, and my name appeared in a few

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<v Speaker 5>of the different leaks because of various analysis that I've

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<v Speaker 5>done of private information that was being leaked, but also

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<v Speaker 5>a lot of attacks that happened that happened to target

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<v Speaker 5>critical infrastructure over the last ten years. And last time

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<v Speaker 5>we were on the podcast, one of the things we

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<v Speaker 5>talked about is does cyber really matter once you enter

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<v Speaker 5>into a kinetic war, which is exactly what's happening now.

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<v Speaker 5>And the main takeaway was once you start using missiles,

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<v Speaker 5>most of these cyber elements are not really relevant because

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<v Speaker 5>you would use cyber mostly to gather information and intelligence

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<v Speaker 5>to prepare an attack or to disorganize an enemy. You

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<v Speaker 5>create confusion, but as we have seen now, you can

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<v Speaker 5>use like drones that are like twenty thousand dollars and

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<v Speaker 5>create more chaos that you would do with any sort

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<v Speaker 5>of exploits.

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<v Speaker 4>I like how you're introduced as a legendary hacker and

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<v Speaker 4>then you're like, oh, I've been twenty years in enterprise software.

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<v Speaker 3>I feel like this is like the uh, the wind

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<v Speaker 3>of the premium.

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<v Speaker 4>It's like, you know, the casual and then fancy a

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<v Speaker 4>dress up hacker and the like twenty years in enterprise software.

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<v Speaker 4>But this is a really interesting point that you made

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<v Speaker 4>this idea between Okay, mostly it sounds like when people

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<v Speaker 4>imagined cyber attacks, they imagine what Tracy talked about in

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<v Speaker 4>the beginning. Suddenly the entire financial infrastructure, like I just

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<v Speaker 4>come to a haul of people worried about or there's

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<v Speaker 4>gonna be a blackout, et cetera. But in reality, or

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<v Speaker 4>what we've seen so far, by and large, is that

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<v Speaker 4>cyber in the context of war is still much more

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<v Speaker 4>about data collection, espionage, and so forth, rather than these

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<v Speaker 4>more like you know, the types of things you might

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<v Speaker 4>see in a movie.

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<v Speaker 5>Yeah, exactly. I mean over the last like ten fifteen years,

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<v Speaker 5>we've seen some like attacks like cyber attacks against a

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<v Speaker 5>critical infrastructure you run talking like Aramco around like twenty twelve.

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<v Speaker 5>They were just mostly like using what we call a

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<v Speaker 5>wiper that was like a malware that was erasing the

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<v Speaker 5>hard drive of most of the machines. And then we

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<v Speaker 5>obviously have the case of Stocksnet few years before, where

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<v Speaker 5>it was a joint Israeli US operation against some of

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<v Speaker 5>the nuclear centrals in Iran where some of the PLCs

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<v Speaker 5>were targeted. But what we have seen over the weekend

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<v Speaker 5>is some of the drones happened to target some of

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<v Speaker 5>the Amazon data centers and that created so much instability

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<v Speaker 5>because multiple of the zones have been down and I

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<v Speaker 5>think two out of three and the third one is

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<v Speaker 5>still recovering days after. Because most of companies, either private

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<v Speaker 5>companies or public companies not relying on the cloud, which

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<v Speaker 5>is something that was not really the case before, and

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<v Speaker 5>once you have some softw of centralization in terms of dependence,

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<v Speaker 5>so become an easy target. And most of government's AI companies,

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<v Speaker 5>cloud companies do not really have twenty thousand dollars drones

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<v Speaker 5>in their threat models, which is like something that's pretty new,

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<v Speaker 5>but also confirms that Kinneti quals and have more impact.

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<v Speaker 2>So I take the point about cyber being perhaps more

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<v Speaker 2>useful before a war when it comes to info gathering

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<v Speaker 2>and things like that. But we have seen some deployment

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<v Speaker 2>of cyber attacks in the past week or so. So

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<v Speaker 2>we know Israel is attacking some cyber infrastructure in Iran,

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<v Speaker 2>and we know that Iran has perhaps attempted some things,

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<v Speaker 2>maybe not as successfully, but walk us through what we've

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<v Speaker 2>actually seen so far.

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<v Speaker 5>So so far, we have seen an Israeli operation where

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<v Speaker 5>one of the prayer app has been hijacked and so

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<v Speaker 5>message was sent to the users, so it's more like

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<v Speaker 5>to create confusion within people. Also the traffic Light operation

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<v Speaker 5>to understand the position of some of the targets, but

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<v Speaker 5>it's more used for like recaoning a In terms of destruction,

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<v Speaker 5>we didn't see anything significant. Even the government itself of

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<v Speaker 5>Iran shut down most of the Internet for a lot

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<v Speaker 5>of the users, and a lot of what we see

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<v Speaker 5>on social media is the usual disinformation and misinformation campaign,

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<v Speaker 5>especially now with AI. There is so much AI slob

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<v Speaker 5>with like the videos, the text, the boats. That's becoming

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<v Speaker 5>pretty common now, even when there is no war, So

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<v Speaker 5>it's not really like really impactful. So it's more like

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<v Speaker 5>to create confusion than being actually destructive. And now we're

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<v Speaker 5>differently entering in a stage where it's been extremely destructive.

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<v Speaker 5>And I cannot remember the last time we've seen so

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<v Speaker 5>many countries being targeted, which is pretty like a first

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<v Speaker 5>I would say, in terms of like a war climate.

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<v Speaker 4>Can you talk about You know, people stare at their

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<v Speaker 4>screens all day, and they fool themselves into thinking that

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<v Speaker 4>they're quote monitoring the situation, et cetera, but mostly.

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<v Speaker 6>The projections here.

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<v Speaker 4>I don't delude myself, no, I like, actually like I

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<v Speaker 4>sort of look at my screen and I know that

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<v Speaker 4>I'm being inundated with contextless garbage and slop and propaganda

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<v Speaker 4>and so forth. I'm curious how you monitor the situation actually,

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<v Speaker 4>as someone who takes these topics seriously and doesn't just

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<v Speaker 4>sort of become an overnight expert, you know, the day

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<v Speaker 4>after bombings begin, Like how do you pay attention to

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<v Speaker 4>what matters? How do you actually know what's real and

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<v Speaker 4>so forth, and avoid just sort of the delusion of

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<v Speaker 4>staring at the screen and engaging with slop.

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<v Speaker 5>It's a good question because there's so much of it,

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<v Speaker 5>so I think the default reaction is to ignore most

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<v Speaker 5>of it, Yeah, unless it becomes really significant. In this case,

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<v Speaker 5>I think it comes down to looking at the actual damage.

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<v Speaker 5>Many people from the military world, but also the intelligence

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<v Speaker 5>community has been underestimating Iran capabilities exactly like people used

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<v Speaker 5>to do with North Korea, and now North koreas some

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<v Speaker 5>of the best hackers in the world when we see

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<v Speaker 5>them like targeting financial institutions, whereas before they would not

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<v Speaker 5>do like much. So there is definitely like internal capabilities

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<v Speaker 5>that are available, but there's so much noise now, Like

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<v Speaker 5>you say, a lot of people are monitoring the situation

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<v Speaker 5>giving that quote un quote like overnight expert opinions, and

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<v Speaker 5>that's becoming a lot of noise. But I would say

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<v Speaker 5>that in this particular case, we have heard of the

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<v Speaker 5>imminent threat of Iran for around forty years, and that's

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<v Speaker 5>also not really a new situation, so most of people

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<v Speaker 5>would have context around it. And even for the attack

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<v Speaker 5>that happened last week, and many people were expecting them

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<v Speaker 5>four weeks, especially as the continuation of what happened last summer.

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<v Speaker 4>Can you actually talk a little bit more about the

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<v Speaker 4>data center attack? And because that's not cider really, I

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<v Speaker 4>mean that's that's just a physical kinetic warfare against the

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<v Speaker 4>data center. I was surprised how disruptive was that. I

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<v Speaker 4>sort of would assume that cloud service providers that it's

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<v Speaker 4>fairly liquid. Okay, one goes down, but you know, it

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<v Speaker 4>can just be the same software, it can be run

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<v Speaker 4>from numerous other clouds. But I saw that there were disruptions.

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<v Speaker 4>I saw Fortnite tweeting about the fact that some of

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<v Speaker 4>their gameplay was impaired due to the attack on data centers.

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<v Speaker 4>How disruptive have those attacks been? Because this is of

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<v Speaker 4>course a very.

0:12:53.440 --> 0:12:56.079
<v Speaker 2>You know, that's whereinetic meatia.

0:12:56.160 --> 0:12:58.600
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, yeah, and there's a lot you know in the future,

0:12:58.720 --> 0:13:01.920
<v Speaker 4>like thinking about hardening these data centers and as you say,

0:13:02.040 --> 0:13:05.080
<v Speaker 4>like making them they're going to be increasingly targets for war.

0:13:05.360 --> 0:13:06.439
<v Speaker 4>Like how disruptive was that?

0:13:07.280 --> 0:13:11.360
<v Speaker 5>Very good question? So I think one of the main

0:13:11.440 --> 0:13:15.680
<v Speaker 5>takeaway is that it has been extremely successful. So, like

0:13:15.760 --> 0:13:18.000
<v Speaker 5>we said before, like a Shahid drone is around twenty

0:13:18.040 --> 0:13:20.800
<v Speaker 5>thousand dollars and they managed to shut down two of

0:13:20.840 --> 0:13:23.679
<v Speaker 5>the zones of Amazon. Actually, even if you look at

0:13:23.720 --> 0:13:27.280
<v Speaker 5>the official report from Amazon for like thirty six hours,

0:13:27.440 --> 0:13:30.000
<v Speaker 5>they were just saying, oh, some objects struck the data

0:13:30.000 --> 0:13:34.520
<v Speaker 5>centers before they actually expletely said they were drawn strikes.

0:13:34.840 --> 0:13:37.200
<v Speaker 5>So a lot of services that I've been using them

0:13:37.320 --> 0:13:41.040
<v Speaker 5>have been targeted, so from like local applications from two

0:13:41.080 --> 0:13:45.920
<v Speaker 5>banks because in a data center you are taking care

0:13:46.000 --> 0:13:50.480
<v Speaker 5>of multiple different services, and even Versail had to reroute

0:13:51.280 --> 0:13:56.359
<v Speaker 5>their data to Bombay and to exclude middle List as deployment.

0:13:56.960 --> 0:14:00.280
<v Speaker 5>So even if you take the cost of most of

0:14:00.320 --> 0:14:03.200
<v Speaker 5>like zero, the exploits that can go up to like

0:14:04.000 --> 0:14:10.000
<v Speaker 5>multimillion dollar attacks. If you are really aiming at districting things,

0:14:10.720 --> 0:14:17.040
<v Speaker 5>the cost reward of using such an attack is really efficient.

0:14:17.120 --> 0:14:20.440
<v Speaker 5>So you really enter into some sort of asymmetric conflict

0:14:20.720 --> 0:14:24.640
<v Speaker 5>where you can just spend like some really old material

0:14:24.800 --> 0:14:27.240
<v Speaker 5>and have way more impact than someone who's going to

0:14:27.240 --> 0:14:30.600
<v Speaker 5>be like cutting edge and just trying to impress with

0:14:31.080 --> 0:14:33.040
<v Speaker 5>like capabilities. Because at the end of the day, it

0:14:33.040 --> 0:14:34.320
<v Speaker 5>does not really matter.

0:14:34.680 --> 0:14:38.120
<v Speaker 2>How do governments actually build up their cyber capabilities nowadays,

0:14:38.160 --> 0:14:40.920
<v Speaker 2>Because I have this image in my head of maybe

0:14:40.960 --> 0:14:44.000
<v Speaker 2>ten or twenty years ago, you know, they would recruit

0:14:44.240 --> 0:14:47.680
<v Speaker 2>like a twenty year old such as yourself at the time,

0:14:48.320 --> 0:14:50.760
<v Speaker 2>and they would be working in a dark room, that

0:14:50.800 --> 0:14:53.640
<v Speaker 2>sort of thing, but then drinking red bull. Drinking red bull,

0:14:53.680 --> 0:14:57.080
<v Speaker 2>that's right. But then you know, we had the boom

0:14:57.240 --> 0:15:00.640
<v Speaker 2>in Silicon Valley and so you had competition from private companies.

0:15:01.120 --> 0:15:04.240
<v Speaker 2>Now we have the boom in AI and again even

0:15:04.320 --> 0:15:07.200
<v Speaker 2>more competition from private companies. And at the same time,

0:15:07.720 --> 0:15:10.680
<v Speaker 2>governments seem to be I guess, seeding some of their

0:15:10.720 --> 0:15:15.880
<v Speaker 2>own skill set to potentially private companies like Anthropic and

0:15:16.080 --> 0:15:19.840
<v Speaker 2>chat GPT and some others. Walk us through how I

0:15:19.880 --> 0:15:24.440
<v Speaker 2>guess the development of governmental cyber capacity has actually shifted.

0:15:25.360 --> 0:15:28.320
<v Speaker 5>I mean something that didn't really change over the last

0:15:28.800 --> 0:15:31.800
<v Speaker 5>years in terms of capabilities, Like I guess we all

0:15:31.840 --> 0:15:36.520
<v Speaker 5>remember like these snodnnicks in twenty thirteen when we started

0:15:36.560 --> 0:15:41.120
<v Speaker 5>to see more about the inside of capabilities from a government,

0:15:41.880 --> 0:15:48.520
<v Speaker 5>including like domestic my surveillance, global surveillance, exploitation capabilities, And

0:15:48.640 --> 0:15:52.680
<v Speaker 5>since then every other year we have seen an history

0:15:52.880 --> 0:15:57.560
<v Speaker 5>of data being leaked that belongs to the government. So

0:15:57.920 --> 0:16:00.400
<v Speaker 5>in a way, things have been changing a lot, but

0:16:00.640 --> 0:16:04.800
<v Speaker 5>not really much. Like most recently, there was a contractor

0:16:04.920 --> 0:16:10.560
<v Speaker 5>from n Free Iris that was sentenced to eighty seven

0:16:10.600 --> 0:16:15.760
<v Speaker 5>months sentence because they happened to sell zero the exploits

0:16:15.840 --> 0:16:22.560
<v Speaker 5>to a Russian broker, and that's actual expert that belonged

0:16:22.560 --> 0:16:25.200
<v Speaker 5>to the government because there was some sort of integrator.

0:16:25.720 --> 0:16:28.800
<v Speaker 5>So we see like nation states or like governments like

0:16:28.840 --> 0:16:31.720
<v Speaker 5>the US investing like an almost amount of money into

0:16:31.800 --> 0:16:35.880
<v Speaker 5>offensive capabilities, but they also keep being burned by insiders.

0:16:36.680 --> 0:16:40.240
<v Speaker 5>A lot of those capabilities are also as strong as the

0:16:40.280 --> 0:16:41.960
<v Speaker 5>internal coercion.

0:16:42.240 --> 0:16:44.200
<v Speaker 2>But I guess what I'm asking is, you know, if

0:16:44.240 --> 0:16:46.520
<v Speaker 2>you're the Department of Defense or I guess now the

0:16:46.600 --> 0:16:50.480
<v Speaker 2>Department of War, and you're thinking about developing in house

0:16:50.520 --> 0:16:55.400
<v Speaker 2>capabilities versus partnering with a company like Anthropic, and we

0:16:55.400 --> 0:16:57.600
<v Speaker 2>should talk about all the drama that's going on there,

0:16:57.760 --> 0:17:01.640
<v Speaker 2>how are you balancing those decisions nowadays versus say, ten

0:17:01.720 --> 0:17:02.640
<v Speaker 2>or twenty years ago.

0:17:03.240 --> 0:17:05.720
<v Speaker 5>Like my understanding is that now a lot of it

0:17:05.760 --> 0:17:10.080
<v Speaker 5>is also like outsourced because they cannot really develop as

0:17:10.119 --> 0:17:15.600
<v Speaker 5>many capabilities internally. So now like we have seen with

0:17:16.800 --> 0:17:21.440
<v Speaker 5>Entropic that it had been used in the Maduro operation

0:17:22.200 --> 0:17:26.000
<v Speaker 5>and then after that, like there was a per out

0:17:26.040 --> 0:17:30.960
<v Speaker 5>from Entropic because they said it was violating their ethical

0:17:31.119 --> 0:17:36.320
<v Speaker 5>like standard like policy, Yeah, standards. So I would say, now,

0:17:36.520 --> 0:17:40.840
<v Speaker 5>something that's really changing like very fast is the incorporation

0:17:40.960 --> 0:17:45.199
<v Speaker 5>of like AI into tho's decisions. But as we all know,

0:17:45.359 --> 0:17:48.960
<v Speaker 5>like AI can also hallucinate, so even Darly or the

0:17:49.080 --> 0:17:51.720
<v Speaker 5>CEO of Entropics that it's definitely not in a state

0:17:51.760 --> 0:17:54.760
<v Speaker 5>where it can be used for like fully autonomous decisions

0:17:54.800 --> 0:17:57.480
<v Speaker 5>like that. So I would say, like the AI element

0:17:57.680 --> 0:18:00.040
<v Speaker 5>would be like the main difference even we start to

0:18:00.080 --> 0:18:04.600
<v Speaker 5>see it now for like exploit development or vulnerability discovery,

0:18:05.119 --> 0:18:08.120
<v Speaker 5>but it's still too early to kind of like give

0:18:08.160 --> 0:18:12.120
<v Speaker 5>a definitive like opinion about it. But overall, I would

0:18:12.119 --> 0:18:13.120
<v Speaker 5>say it's very similar.

0:18:13.560 --> 0:18:16.240
<v Speaker 4>Well, talk to us about exploit development, because I know

0:18:16.320 --> 0:18:18.760
<v Speaker 4>that you can't just go to cloud code and say, like,

0:18:18.840 --> 0:18:23.000
<v Speaker 4>I'm working on zero day mailware attack, help me figure

0:18:23.040 --> 0:18:26.040
<v Speaker 4>this out. But you know, I also know that there

0:18:26.040 --> 0:18:29.240
<v Speaker 4>are some very talented people who pride themselves in being

0:18:29.320 --> 0:18:33.240
<v Speaker 4>able to jail break AI and illicit outputs that the

0:18:33.480 --> 0:18:36.919
<v Speaker 4>labs do not want their AIS to produce. So do

0:18:36.960 --> 0:18:39.040
<v Speaker 4>you have a sense how just within the pure like

0:18:39.359 --> 0:18:44.160
<v Speaker 4>hacker community, AI is being employed today for these purposes

0:18:44.280 --> 0:18:46.120
<v Speaker 4>or what they're able to get out of these tools.

0:18:46.400 --> 0:18:49.120
<v Speaker 5>It's a good question. So, like we started to see

0:18:49.119 --> 0:18:53.720
<v Speaker 5>people leveraging like AI for like bug discovery, which actually

0:18:53.920 --> 0:18:56.680
<v Speaker 5>is becoming like pretty good. I think even Entropy published

0:18:56.680 --> 0:19:00.840
<v Speaker 5>an article explaining how cloud can be used for the

0:19:01.560 --> 0:19:05.560
<v Speaker 5>discovery into smart contracts and how it found some bugs automatically.

0:19:05.600 --> 0:19:07.720
<v Speaker 5>And I think even recently there really is something called

0:19:08.720 --> 0:19:15.560
<v Speaker 5>cloud for security that was aiming at doing cod assessment.

0:19:16.119 --> 0:19:20.080
<v Speaker 5>But now we're entering in is like interesting paradigm shift

0:19:20.119 --> 0:19:24.439
<v Speaker 5>where the cost of software is going towards zero. So

0:19:24.680 --> 0:19:27.400
<v Speaker 5>if you're a company and if your cost of building

0:19:27.480 --> 0:19:31.480
<v Speaker 5>software is becoming less and less, it's also hard to

0:19:31.520 --> 0:19:35.119
<v Speaker 5>convince people that auditing software for security reasons is going

0:19:35.200 --> 0:19:38.000
<v Speaker 5>to be more expensive than developing the actual software. So

0:19:38.040 --> 0:19:40.679
<v Speaker 5>I think that's one of those shifts we're going to see.

0:19:41.000 --> 0:19:45.000
<v Speaker 4>But when can you explain positive lives Mark, what did

0:19:45.040 --> 0:19:47.200
<v Speaker 4>you mean by that? It's going to be hard to convent.

0:19:47.600 --> 0:19:52.479
<v Speaker 5>If you can have like to allocate budgets for building

0:19:52.520 --> 0:19:55.040
<v Speaker 5>a product, So you have most of the budget that's

0:19:55.119 --> 0:19:58.320
<v Speaker 5>usually allocated for like your software engineers to build the software,

0:19:58.800 --> 0:20:02.840
<v Speaker 5>and then you do some code review afterwards to make

0:20:02.840 --> 0:20:06.680
<v Speaker 5>sure there's no vulnerabilities before it gets released to the public,

0:20:07.240 --> 0:20:11.320
<v Speaker 5>but securities risk is usually like pretty high. You cannot

0:20:11.440 --> 0:20:14.480
<v Speaker 5>just rely on like EI tools, at least not at

0:20:14.480 --> 0:20:17.040
<v Speaker 5>the moment. Maybe in a year from now it's going

0:20:17.080 --> 0:20:20.879
<v Speaker 5>to be possible. So it's going to be like really

0:20:20.880 --> 0:20:23.359
<v Speaker 5>interesting to see how it's going to like do like

0:20:23.440 --> 0:20:27.680
<v Speaker 5>a market shift because now with cloud code, and as

0:20:27.760 --> 0:20:31.600
<v Speaker 5>a famous Vibe coder, Joe, I'm sure you know that

0:20:31.680 --> 0:20:35.640
<v Speaker 5>the cost of building software is approaching like zero if

0:20:35.640 --> 0:20:37.400
<v Speaker 5>you just look on the timeline.

0:20:37.600 --> 0:20:39.760
<v Speaker 2>Are you actually on this note, are you a believer

0:20:39.920 --> 0:20:43.240
<v Speaker 2>in the SaaS apocalypse? Because obviously there's the argument that, well,

0:20:43.280 --> 0:20:46.439
<v Speaker 2>now everyone can just create their own software fairly easily

0:20:46.560 --> 0:20:49.040
<v Speaker 2>using natural language. But on the other hand, if you

0:20:49.040 --> 0:20:52.760
<v Speaker 2>are a big corporation or presumably a government you're going

0:20:52.840 --> 0:20:55.439
<v Speaker 2>to want to have you're going to still want to

0:20:55.600 --> 0:20:59.439
<v Speaker 2>buy software from an external provider given some of the

0:20:59.480 --> 0:21:04.399
<v Speaker 2>security concerns, given that it might not necessarily make sense

0:21:04.440 --> 0:21:09.360
<v Speaker 2>for various reasons, management reasons, perhaps recreate an entire software

0:21:09.400 --> 0:21:10.399
<v Speaker 2>business in house.

0:21:10.920 --> 0:21:14.920
<v Speaker 5>So I'm definitely biased on that. But as someone who

0:21:14.960 --> 0:21:17.280
<v Speaker 5>thinks that the cost of software is going towards zero,

0:21:17.359 --> 0:21:22.040
<v Speaker 5>and as someone who is like watching the software costs

0:21:22.040 --> 0:21:25.600
<v Speaker 5>like collapsing. One of the things that we realize is

0:21:25.680 --> 0:21:28.560
<v Speaker 5>that data is the only durabel asset in the AI economy.

0:21:28.640 --> 0:21:30.480
<v Speaker 5>That's why we decided to work on the bid the

0:21:30.520 --> 0:21:34.760
<v Speaker 5>current startup I'm working on, because like that's the only

0:21:34.800 --> 0:21:36.720
<v Speaker 5>thing that's really going to have value long term if

0:21:36.760 --> 0:21:40.280
<v Speaker 5>agents need something to transact or like to take the decision.

0:21:40.880 --> 0:21:43.800
<v Speaker 5>Because even if you look in terms of like in

0:21:43.840 --> 0:21:48.720
<v Speaker 5>any context, you know, if agents are designed to think autonomously,

0:21:49.240 --> 0:21:51.960
<v Speaker 5>you need to have enough information to take those decisions

0:21:51.960 --> 0:21:56.040
<v Speaker 5>whenever you're going to have your reasoning loops. So software itself,

0:21:56.119 --> 0:22:00.240
<v Speaker 5>if you just build it, is pretty static, whereas like

0:22:00.800 --> 0:22:04.560
<v Speaker 5>the urgentic like feedback loops are more dynamic. But what

0:22:04.680 --> 0:22:09.440
<v Speaker 5>changes the contexts that take decision on. So definitely, like

0:22:09.720 --> 0:22:14.280
<v Speaker 5>Salz business are going to have our time because if anyone,

0:22:14.480 --> 0:22:19.080
<v Speaker 5>including the Shopify CEO, can just rewrite an MRI software

0:22:19.600 --> 0:22:23.480
<v Speaker 5>in one afternoon just to like look at his back MRIs,

0:22:23.840 --> 0:22:26.919
<v Speaker 5>you can imagine like how destructive it's going to be,

0:22:27.000 --> 0:22:29.040
<v Speaker 5>like by the end of this year. I think the

0:22:29.080 --> 0:22:33.159
<v Speaker 5>only thing we haven't seen yet is like enterprise AI agent.

0:22:33.720 --> 0:22:37.240
<v Speaker 5>So so far I would say, like since Christmas, people

0:22:37.320 --> 0:22:39.800
<v Speaker 5>are most still playing around trying to find like a

0:22:39.840 --> 0:22:44.280
<v Speaker 5>proper use case. We see a lot of like consumer

0:22:44.440 --> 0:22:48.040
<v Speaker 5>like AI agent like open Cloth that really met like

0:22:48.160 --> 0:22:52.879
<v Speaker 5>agents more mainstream, but we really haven't seen yet enterprise

0:22:53.080 --> 0:22:56.280
<v Speaker 5>AI agent. So as everyone is kind of scared of

0:22:56.320 --> 0:23:00.200
<v Speaker 5>being replaced for their jobs, we haven't really seen in

0:23:00.240 --> 0:23:04.520
<v Speaker 5>like actual like AI agents replacing entire departments or full

0:23:04.560 --> 0:23:07.800
<v Speaker 5>on like employees. So we have seen some disruption around

0:23:07.840 --> 0:23:12.120
<v Speaker 5>like software engineering, mostly to make like software engineering more efficient,

0:23:12.280 --> 0:23:16.720
<v Speaker 5>especially in terms of like development with shorter timelines, but

0:23:16.840 --> 0:23:20.600
<v Speaker 5>we haven't seen yet like proper like enterprise agents.

0:23:21.040 --> 0:23:22.600
<v Speaker 3>How do you define an AI agent?

0:23:22.960 --> 0:23:25.439
<v Speaker 5>So my view of an AI agent and I like

0:23:25.480 --> 0:23:28.960
<v Speaker 5>to remind people like what an AI agent actually is.

0:23:29.720 --> 0:23:32.159
<v Speaker 5>At the moment, most of AI agent is just like

0:23:32.280 --> 0:23:35.639
<v Speaker 5>a piece of God usually written in Python or in

0:23:35.720 --> 0:23:38.520
<v Speaker 5>type script. That's just doing a bunch of cards to

0:23:38.680 --> 0:23:42.679
<v Speaker 5>like entropic PENAI and running in a loop and taking

0:23:42.720 --> 0:23:46.680
<v Speaker 5>decisions and calling like third party tools like MCPS or

0:23:46.760 --> 0:23:51.280
<v Speaker 5>web searches. So that's mostly what an AI agent is.

0:23:51.840 --> 0:23:55.760
<v Speaker 5>We tend to think of AI agent as a completely

0:23:55.920 --> 0:23:58.879
<v Speaker 5>different persona. But at the end of the day. It

0:23:59.040 --> 0:24:01.840
<v Speaker 5>is just like a piece of software that's running as

0:24:01.880 --> 0:24:05.159
<v Speaker 5>a service on a machine or on a server. So

0:24:06.600 --> 0:24:09.479
<v Speaker 5>from a security standpoint, which is pretty interesting, it's just

0:24:09.560 --> 0:24:13.639
<v Speaker 5>like another service. So like software, but people really like

0:24:13.800 --> 0:24:16.760
<v Speaker 5>to think of it in another way.

0:24:17.080 --> 0:24:20.400
<v Speaker 4>Well, just so like I'm from the security standpoint, I mean,

0:24:20.840 --> 0:24:24.040
<v Speaker 4>one of the exciting aspects of AI agents is that

0:24:24.080 --> 0:24:27.320
<v Speaker 4>they can work autonomously. Right, you set a task and

0:24:27.560 --> 0:24:29.640
<v Speaker 4>it can go out and find what it needs to do,

0:24:29.720 --> 0:24:31.720
<v Speaker 4>and it says like, Okay, this didn't work, I'm gonna

0:24:31.720 --> 0:24:33.960
<v Speaker 4>try it's gonna try this thing. It's gonna try this thing.

0:24:34.160 --> 0:24:36.040
<v Speaker 4>I need to connect to this web service to get

0:24:36.040 --> 0:24:39.760
<v Speaker 4>this information, et cetera. The downside of AI agents is

0:24:39.800 --> 0:24:42.480
<v Speaker 4>precisely the same. The downside of AI agent says that

0:24:42.520 --> 0:24:44.520
<v Speaker 4>they could do whatever they want to do and if

0:24:44.560 --> 0:24:48.040
<v Speaker 4>it accidentally deletes a bunch of files because it thinks

0:24:48.040 --> 0:24:50.399
<v Speaker 4>that's what's necessary to execute the task.

0:24:51.240 --> 0:24:54.080
<v Speaker 3>So like I'm curious, Like from a security.

0:24:53.520 --> 0:24:57.400
<v Speaker 4>Standpoint, like I mean, we've already seen examples of people

0:24:57.400 --> 0:25:00.280
<v Speaker 4>getting private information exposed or as I mentioned, and the

0:25:00.320 --> 0:25:03.719
<v Speaker 4>example of deleting a bunch of information. Is this like

0:25:03.760 --> 0:25:06.959
<v Speaker 4>a new way to think about the security threat model.

0:25:07.040 --> 0:25:11.120
<v Speaker 4>The fact that the capability and the downside are one

0:25:11.160 --> 0:25:11.680
<v Speaker 4>and the same.

0:25:11.800 --> 0:25:12.359
<v Speaker 3>It's the same.

0:25:12.400 --> 0:25:15.040
<v Speaker 4>It's sort of like hallucinations, right, the ability to like

0:25:15.119 --> 0:25:18.880
<v Speaker 4>create an output, and it also you know, is hand

0:25:18.920 --> 0:25:21.000
<v Speaker 4>in hand with the ability to create a wrong output,

0:25:21.119 --> 0:25:23.840
<v Speaker 4>a false output, and so you know, the ability to

0:25:23.920 --> 0:25:26.480
<v Speaker 4>do to act on its own is also the ability

0:25:26.520 --> 0:25:28.879
<v Speaker 4>to destroy on its own. Is this sort of like

0:25:28.920 --> 0:25:33.159
<v Speaker 4>a novel threat model or a novel paradigm in thinking

0:25:33.200 --> 0:25:34.800
<v Speaker 4>about enterprise security.

0:25:35.160 --> 0:25:38.800
<v Speaker 5>From an enterprise security standpoint, it is pretty much the

0:25:38.880 --> 0:25:43.600
<v Speaker 5>same thing in the sense of like if you're building software,

0:25:43.720 --> 0:25:46.720
<v Speaker 5>you can just really like patch software afterwards and stuff,

0:25:46.720 --> 0:25:49.119
<v Speaker 5>because you never it never ends. Like secrety might be

0:25:49.240 --> 0:25:51.600
<v Speaker 5>like built in, and you need to have like a

0:25:51.640 --> 0:25:54.680
<v Speaker 5>safe design from the beginning. What we have seen now

0:25:54.800 --> 0:25:58.200
<v Speaker 5>is like whenever people do something argenttic, they just give

0:25:58.320 --> 0:26:01.520
<v Speaker 5>like all permeisterns up from yeah, which is like probably

0:26:01.560 --> 0:26:05.000
<v Speaker 5>the worst thing you can do. And if you're an enterprise,

0:26:05.240 --> 0:26:07.600
<v Speaker 5>as you can imagine, if you just give like all

0:26:07.640 --> 0:26:11.400
<v Speaker 5>permissions to an agent, it just becomes Murphy's Lows. If

0:26:11.440 --> 0:26:13.840
<v Speaker 5>something bad can happen because you give it access to

0:26:13.960 --> 0:26:16.000
<v Speaker 5>it will happen. So you're going to see like more

0:26:16.080 --> 0:26:21.040
<v Speaker 5>dataks for sure, because there's no safety by design in

0:26:21.160 --> 0:26:25.560
<v Speaker 5>those like architectures or like those like agents, which is

0:26:25.960 --> 0:26:29.720
<v Speaker 5>in terms of reliabilities and like exposure would be like

0:26:30.000 --> 0:26:33.200
<v Speaker 5>very similar to what we have seen over the last

0:26:33.600 --> 0:26:37.280
<v Speaker 5>like ten twenty years. But you know, if people are

0:26:37.320 --> 0:26:40.800
<v Speaker 5>ignoring what has been done in terms of software security

0:26:40.840 --> 0:26:43.560
<v Speaker 5>for the last twenty years, that's why we're going to

0:26:43.600 --> 0:26:45.679
<v Speaker 5>have a lot of problems. And I think we're probably

0:26:45.680 --> 0:26:48.480
<v Speaker 5>going to start to see like people, especially in enterprise,

0:26:48.600 --> 0:26:52.040
<v Speaker 5>like pushing back a lot because there's compliance that needs

0:26:52.040 --> 0:26:54.879
<v Speaker 5>to be like, you know, like answer to, so you

0:26:54.920 --> 0:26:57.840
<v Speaker 5>cannot just give like full access to like you know,

0:26:57.920 --> 0:26:58.440
<v Speaker 5>your agent.

0:27:14.320 --> 0:27:17.240
<v Speaker 2>Speaking of the long arc of history, one thing I

0:27:17.280 --> 0:27:20.240
<v Speaker 2>really wonder is you've obviously been in this space for

0:27:20.280 --> 0:27:23.440
<v Speaker 2>a very long time at this point. Can you describe

0:27:23.480 --> 0:27:27.000
<v Speaker 2>how you think your own career and I guess coding

0:27:27.200 --> 0:27:30.920
<v Speaker 2>experience would have been different if you were, say, starting

0:27:30.920 --> 0:27:33.960
<v Speaker 2>out now in twenty twenty six versus I guess you

0:27:33.960 --> 0:27:35.840
<v Speaker 2>would have started out in like the late nineties or

0:27:35.880 --> 0:27:38.600
<v Speaker 2>early two thousands, maybe even before that, yeah.

0:27:38.800 --> 0:27:41.920
<v Speaker 5>Mid two thousands. Well, I would say, like, what has

0:27:42.000 --> 0:27:45.800
<v Speaker 5>changed is back even like we even we've up going

0:27:45.840 --> 0:27:49.119
<v Speaker 5>to like the two thousands, Like back in the snow

0:27:49.200 --> 0:27:55.320
<v Speaker 5>and days when the global surveillance program was being exposed,

0:27:55.320 --> 0:27:59.439
<v Speaker 5>like a lot of people were really like scared of

0:27:59.480 --> 0:28:04.040
<v Speaker 5>it and scandalized by it and push back and people

0:28:04.160 --> 0:28:08.600
<v Speaker 5>really cared about privacy was like now we're entering in

0:28:08.640 --> 0:28:12.720
<v Speaker 5>a new arc where very few people care about privacy.

0:28:13.520 --> 0:28:18.120
<v Speaker 5>Where you see like the CEO of Entropy being asked

0:28:18.880 --> 0:28:22.960
<v Speaker 5>why he refused to work with the US government and

0:28:23.000 --> 0:28:26.920
<v Speaker 5>he says, well, they wanted to do a domestic surveillance program,

0:28:27.080 --> 0:28:32.080
<v Speaker 5>so that's against or like a safety like chart. So

0:28:32.359 --> 0:28:37.640
<v Speaker 5>there's this all aspect of people relationship with data, which

0:28:37.640 --> 0:28:40.959
<v Speaker 5>I guess is very different in terms of software off

0:28:40.960 --> 0:28:44.880
<v Speaker 5>you see like now you can write more things, anyone

0:28:44.920 --> 0:28:48.280
<v Speaker 5>can write anything. But I think we're still in this

0:28:48.440 --> 0:28:54.920
<v Speaker 5>weird adequate software phase where we know what AI can do,

0:28:56.280 --> 0:28:58.880
<v Speaker 5>but it cannot really do anything more or anything less.

0:28:58.960 --> 0:29:03.600
<v Speaker 5>Yet you haven't seen like the actually or like use

0:29:03.680 --> 0:29:08.880
<v Speaker 5>cass for it. Because it's obviously like very exciting and

0:29:08.920 --> 0:29:11.400
<v Speaker 5>it feels like a lot of it is very different

0:29:11.440 --> 0:29:17.280
<v Speaker 5>from before, but we don't really have like any evidence

0:29:17.320 --> 0:29:21.160
<v Speaker 5>of how it's really helping in national security. I know

0:29:21.240 --> 0:29:24.240
<v Speaker 5>it's been helping people who have been analyzing like Epstein's

0:29:24.280 --> 0:29:27.320
<v Speaker 5>emails because there's a lot of data and that makes

0:29:27.360 --> 0:29:31.400
<v Speaker 5>it faster. But in terms of like real use case,

0:29:31.680 --> 0:29:34.840
<v Speaker 5>I don't think like it feels like the current world

0:29:34.960 --> 0:29:37.480
<v Speaker 5>is very different than before, but there's so much noise

0:29:37.520 --> 0:29:41.000
<v Speaker 5>and so much like slop all over that in a

0:29:41.040 --> 0:29:44.200
<v Speaker 5>way it is pretty similar. I don't know if that

0:29:44.280 --> 0:29:44.800
<v Speaker 5>makes sense.

0:29:45.200 --> 0:29:47.880
<v Speaker 4>Well, I mean does your company is o n dB

0:29:48.080 --> 0:29:50.720
<v Speaker 4>dot AI, So you must think that it's going to

0:29:50.760 --> 0:29:53.800
<v Speaker 4>be used or they you know, or that there's clearly

0:29:54.120 --> 0:29:57.640
<v Speaker 4>something there actually tell us about I'm actually really I'm

0:29:57.680 --> 0:30:00.680
<v Speaker 4>on your website right now. It looks really interesting because

0:30:00.680 --> 0:30:03.000
<v Speaker 4>it's something I've been thinking about. But you must have

0:30:03.080 --> 0:30:06.120
<v Speaker 4>some vision for like where it's going and that there

0:30:06.160 --> 0:30:10.600
<v Speaker 4>will actually be significant demand for these services.

0:30:11.080 --> 0:30:13.480
<v Speaker 5>Sure. I mean, like I was saying, like I think

0:30:13.560 --> 0:30:18.280
<v Speaker 5>now we've like anything that's urgentic building software, which is

0:30:18.280 --> 0:30:20.880
<v Speaker 5>like the main use case so far for AI is

0:30:20.880 --> 0:30:22.920
<v Speaker 5>going to make software like going to zero, so the

0:30:22.960 --> 0:30:24.440
<v Speaker 5>cost of building software is going to.

0:30:24.680 --> 0:30:25.360
<v Speaker 3>So that's real.

0:30:25.480 --> 0:30:27.720
<v Speaker 4>So like say, like there's in your view, there's no

0:30:27.920 --> 0:30:31.440
<v Speaker 4>question that already AI. I mean talk about use it's

0:30:31.440 --> 0:30:33.480
<v Speaker 4>a pretty big use case right there, bringing the cost

0:30:33.480 --> 0:30:34.600
<v Speaker 4>of building software to zero.

0:30:34.880 --> 0:30:36.800
<v Speaker 5>Yeah, I mean, like even if you look at the

0:30:37.000 --> 0:30:39.920
<v Speaker 5>offer of cloud code, he said that you didn't write

0:30:39.960 --> 0:30:44.080
<v Speaker 5>like cod since November, So like a lot of people

0:30:44.080 --> 0:30:47.000
<v Speaker 5>are like this, you know, even us internally, like we

0:30:47.120 --> 0:30:50.200
<v Speaker 5>definitely like use cloud code a lot. But if software

0:30:50.240 --> 0:30:53.720
<v Speaker 5>is going to zero, like what's left in terms of

0:30:53.760 --> 0:30:57.200
<v Speaker 5>like the internet layers. So our conclusion is that data

0:30:57.680 --> 0:31:00.880
<v Speaker 5>is the only thing that's going to be like timeless

0:31:00.920 --> 0:31:04.320
<v Speaker 5>in the AI economy, so building like a layer for that.

0:31:04.440 --> 0:31:08.880
<v Speaker 5>Especially now there's like all those innovations around like payments

0:31:08.880 --> 0:31:11.760
<v Speaker 5>and stable coin that you can use to actually like

0:31:11.800 --> 0:31:15.920
<v Speaker 5>pay like anything online. So we think like, okay, if

0:31:16.720 --> 0:31:20.560
<v Speaker 5>you have like issues like entropy or like opening I

0:31:20.800 --> 0:31:25.239
<v Speaker 5>just scrapping Internet and using like public internet, so you

0:31:25.280 --> 0:31:29.000
<v Speaker 5>may as well find ways of charging like boats or

0:31:29.040 --> 0:31:31.920
<v Speaker 5>agent for your data. So at least you can have

0:31:32.080 --> 0:31:34.800
<v Speaker 5>this new like revenue unlock that's going to emerge in

0:31:34.880 --> 0:31:37.600
<v Speaker 5>these new economy because I think a lot of the

0:31:37.720 --> 0:31:41.480
<v Speaker 5>traditional like economic model, like for instance, like we said

0:31:41.480 --> 0:31:44.720
<v Speaker 5>like with SaaS are going to be like disrupted a lot.

0:31:45.240 --> 0:31:49.400
<v Speaker 5>So there is a completely new market around help people

0:31:49.400 --> 0:31:52.640
<v Speaker 5>are going to consume data, and I think people would

0:31:52.680 --> 0:31:54.960
<v Speaker 5>just be ready to pay like more to have eigh

0:31:55.000 --> 0:31:57.640
<v Speaker 5>quality data because the more noise there is, the more

0:31:57.720 --> 0:32:00.760
<v Speaker 5>you want to make sure that the data access to

0:32:01.520 --> 0:32:06.520
<v Speaker 5>is going to be like valuable and real. So yeah,

0:32:06.600 --> 0:32:09.000
<v Speaker 5>even from a security standpoint, you know, like once you

0:32:09.160 --> 0:32:12.000
<v Speaker 5>build like an infrastecure layer, you can have these like

0:32:12.120 --> 0:32:15.000
<v Speaker 5>built in security to make sure that the data you

0:32:15.040 --> 0:32:17.680
<v Speaker 5>give back or the access like for the interface that

0:32:17.720 --> 0:32:21.800
<v Speaker 5>you define is actually secure. Because even if you look

0:32:21.800 --> 0:32:25.280
<v Speaker 5>at Opencloth for instance, one of the top skill was malware.

0:32:25.680 --> 0:32:30.080
<v Speaker 5>So like people just like living into like wild West,

0:32:30.120 --> 0:32:33.920
<v Speaker 5>but they just run everything. So it's us anticipating that

0:32:34.120 --> 0:32:36.560
<v Speaker 5>enterprise is going to look very different and they won't

0:32:36.600 --> 0:32:38.600
<v Speaker 5>just run like anything they find online.

0:32:38.840 --> 0:32:41.120
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, you know, this is one of the things that

0:32:41.160 --> 0:32:45.280
<v Speaker 4>I've encountered in my Vibe coding for is is that

0:32:45.400 --> 0:32:48.240
<v Speaker 4>one of the annoying things is Okay, you want the

0:32:48.360 --> 0:32:51.600
<v Speaker 4>agent to like go out and grab some information or

0:32:51.720 --> 0:32:55.480
<v Speaker 4>clear some database or whatever, and then it's like okay,

0:32:55.640 --> 0:32:58.560
<v Speaker 4>like let me know when you've gotten an API, They're

0:32:58.600 --> 0:33:00.680
<v Speaker 4>like okay, come back and get and then you have

0:33:00.720 --> 0:33:03.080
<v Speaker 4>to go to a website, and then you have to

0:33:03.200 --> 0:33:05.520
<v Speaker 4>get out your credit card and you have to set

0:33:05.560 --> 0:33:07.960
<v Speaker 4>up an account, and then you get an API key

0:33:08.080 --> 0:33:10.120
<v Speaker 4>and then you copy and paste it and so forth,

0:33:10.560 --> 0:33:12.080
<v Speaker 4>and that's very annoying.

0:33:12.200 --> 0:33:12.680
<v Speaker 3>I want.

0:33:12.720 --> 0:33:15.120
<v Speaker 4>What I want is for the agent to just be

0:33:15.120 --> 0:33:17.360
<v Speaker 4>able to go there say, oh, you know, like let

0:33:17.440 --> 0:33:19.280
<v Speaker 4>me just pay you with some stable coins, et cetera.

0:33:19.520 --> 0:33:21.880
<v Speaker 4>Just go out and get the information on its own

0:33:21.960 --> 0:33:24.800
<v Speaker 4>without having this human in the loop. But it also

0:33:24.920 --> 0:33:27.040
<v Speaker 4>occurs to me, and this is something that I've asked

0:33:27.040 --> 0:33:30.360
<v Speaker 4>about with others, which is that like, once I'm just

0:33:30.400 --> 0:33:33.280
<v Speaker 4>like entirely operating in the terminal and the agent just

0:33:33.320 --> 0:33:35.880
<v Speaker 4>going out and scraping information for me, et cetera. Like

0:33:36.160 --> 0:33:39.240
<v Speaker 4>why do we even have a free public internet anymore?

0:33:39.560 --> 0:33:42.040
<v Speaker 4>And so like I'm curious, like whether the direction of

0:33:42.080 --> 0:33:45.920
<v Speaker 4>the Internet and information in general is just entirely like

0:33:46.240 --> 0:33:49.920
<v Speaker 4>you know, paying micro transaction or fees for data consumption

0:33:50.160 --> 0:33:53.520
<v Speaker 4>so that the data then arrives in some usable form

0:33:53.840 --> 0:33:55.240
<v Speaker 4>in the terminal that I'm operating.

0:33:55.720 --> 0:33:59.719
<v Speaker 5>Yeah, no, I think you're You're raising some really good points.

0:34:00.160 --> 0:34:03.440
<v Speaker 5>We need to talk after you can be design.

0:34:03.480 --> 0:34:07.280
<v Speaker 3>You know, it's going to hack the ati I can be,

0:34:07.400 --> 0:34:08.400
<v Speaker 3>I can be a consultant.

0:34:08.440 --> 0:34:10.160
<v Speaker 4>No I hate having to deal with all these API

0:34:10.280 --> 0:34:11.680
<v Speaker 4>key is why am I still using?

0:34:12.160 --> 0:34:15.520
<v Speaker 5>You're like completely right, Yeah, I told you're famous code.

0:34:16.480 --> 0:34:19.240
<v Speaker 5>It's like but like the US case, you're describing noise

0:34:19.400 --> 0:34:22.720
<v Speaker 5>like it makes entire sense. That's why, like we position

0:34:22.840 --> 0:34:25.439
<v Speaker 5>ourselves kind of like as a trusted like provider, where

0:34:25.480 --> 0:34:29.120
<v Speaker 5>like instead of having to go like everywhere to get data,

0:34:29.160 --> 0:34:31.600
<v Speaker 5>you know, you have like this single point and unified

0:34:31.680 --> 0:34:34.200
<v Speaker 5>access a bit like open Router for AI models, but

0:34:34.239 --> 0:34:37.360
<v Speaker 5>for provids. Because if you think about it, when you

0:34:37.480 --> 0:34:41.240
<v Speaker 5>use like cloud now in your terminal, like the level

0:34:41.360 --> 0:34:46.000
<v Speaker 5>one is basically you asking the model itself for information,

0:34:46.280 --> 0:34:48.560
<v Speaker 5>but as we know, like the model maybe like a

0:34:48.800 --> 0:34:51.280
<v Speaker 5>few months old and doesn't have access to the information.

0:34:51.800 --> 0:34:56.040
<v Speaker 5>So like the second level is the agent like cloud

0:34:56.080 --> 0:34:59.480
<v Speaker 5>god or a cloud for this top or like cha

0:34:59.600 --> 0:35:03.520
<v Speaker 5>gip doing web searches, and that's just them looking on

0:35:03.560 --> 0:35:08.360
<v Speaker 5>the internet doing like Google search, etc. But that's still

0:35:08.440 --> 0:35:11.800
<v Speaker 5>not giving you access to like the actual relevant data

0:35:12.000 --> 0:35:14.480
<v Speaker 5>that you would need, where for instance, you would have

0:35:14.560 --> 0:35:17.680
<v Speaker 5>like those APIs and stuff. So like the level after

0:35:17.760 --> 0:35:21.800
<v Speaker 5>that is basically access to private information. So on private information,

0:35:22.000 --> 0:35:25.279
<v Speaker 5>usually the one that's valuable, like in the case of Bloomberg,

0:35:25.320 --> 0:35:29.200
<v Speaker 5>for instance, Bloomberg has a lot of extremely valuable information,

0:35:29.280 --> 0:35:30.960
<v Speaker 5>but you can only have access to it through the

0:35:31.080 --> 0:35:34.560
<v Speaker 5>terminal once you have the subscription, or like any SaaS

0:35:34.560 --> 0:35:37.600
<v Speaker 5>services if you think of like SaaS platform at just

0:35:37.680 --> 0:35:40.640
<v Speaker 5>like some fancy UI where you can like browser database,

0:35:40.680 --> 0:35:45.320
<v Speaker 5>but the data that's valuable is just in the database directly.

0:35:45.800 --> 0:35:48.520
<v Speaker 5>So if you have access to those APIs and we

0:35:48.640 --> 0:35:52.279
<v Speaker 5>not have to create like one million subscriptions left and right,

0:35:52.880 --> 0:35:55.840
<v Speaker 5>because there's already like someone who's doing the integration for

0:35:56.000 --> 0:35:59.839
<v Speaker 5>that kind of like as a programmatic like API marketplace.

0:35:59.880 --> 0:36:03.360
<v Speaker 5>But the integration now is like much easier, and especially

0:36:03.360 --> 0:36:05.160
<v Speaker 5>if you trust it because now what we have seen

0:36:05.239 --> 0:36:08.239
<v Speaker 5>or so it's like whenever use autos tools, they make

0:36:08.320 --> 0:36:11.080
<v Speaker 5>you install like MCPS, but more and more people are

0:36:11.120 --> 0:36:14.000
<v Speaker 5>like moving away from mcps, they're just using like skills

0:36:14.040 --> 0:36:17.879
<v Speaker 5>because like you just said, we start to spend more

0:36:17.920 --> 0:36:22.160
<v Speaker 5>time into the terminal. So like the terminal and anything

0:36:22.160 --> 0:36:25.319
<v Speaker 5>that cila is becoming like a natural interface for like

0:36:25.400 --> 0:36:28.680
<v Speaker 5>agents even for humans because you don't need to try

0:36:28.719 --> 0:36:32.319
<v Speaker 5>to understand those like fancy UI and ux, you just say, like, Okay,

0:36:32.320 --> 0:36:35.359
<v Speaker 5>I want to do it, ABC just do that. So

0:36:36.000 --> 0:36:37.960
<v Speaker 5>I think it just makes more sense to have like

0:36:38.400 --> 0:36:41.400
<v Speaker 5>this interface for it, and like, like you said, you know,

0:36:41.480 --> 0:36:44.640
<v Speaker 5>like otherwise it's just like it becomes too complicated.

0:36:45.160 --> 0:36:46.759
<v Speaker 2>Just on this note, can we talk a little bit

0:36:46.800 --> 0:36:51.400
<v Speaker 2>about I guess institutional knowledge of code because I remember

0:36:51.440 --> 0:36:53.720
<v Speaker 2>one of the things that happened in the early days

0:36:54.120 --> 0:36:56.520
<v Speaker 2>of AI development. I mean not that early. I think

0:36:56.520 --> 0:36:59.359
<v Speaker 2>it was like twenty seventeen or something, back when Facebook's

0:36:59.520 --> 0:37:03.440
<v Speaker 2>AI lab still existed. What was that called again, Like

0:37:03.520 --> 0:37:06.560
<v Speaker 2>the acronym was fair or something. Yeah, they had like

0:37:06.560 --> 0:37:10.520
<v Speaker 2>a little Facebook like experimental lab. Anyway, they invented a

0:37:10.520 --> 0:37:14.239
<v Speaker 2>bunch of chatbots, and the chatbots started talking to each

0:37:14.280 --> 0:37:18.640
<v Speaker 2>other in pretty much incomprehensible language, but like they clearly

0:37:18.760 --> 0:37:21.600
<v Speaker 2>understood what each other were saying. And so I'm just

0:37:21.680 --> 0:37:26.480
<v Speaker 2>wondering if you extrapolate that to AI generated code, could

0:37:26.560 --> 0:37:30.560
<v Speaker 2>we have a situation where the models are constantly iterating

0:37:30.600 --> 0:37:34.279
<v Speaker 2>on themselves, They're constantly talking to each other, and so

0:37:34.360 --> 0:37:37.000
<v Speaker 2>we end up with a system that becomes very very

0:37:37.040 --> 0:37:41.719
<v Speaker 2>difficult for human engineers and coders to actually understand.

0:37:42.480 --> 0:37:44.360
<v Speaker 5>Yeah, I mean I think what we're gonna stop to

0:37:44.640 --> 0:37:47.759
<v Speaker 5>is like humans, you know, like us are going to

0:37:47.880 --> 0:37:51.279
<v Speaker 5>move towards like creating like margdon files as like a

0:37:51.280 --> 0:37:53.440
<v Speaker 5>programming language. So everything is just going to be like

0:37:53.520 --> 0:37:58.879
<v Speaker 5>normal like language, but for the machine itself obviously. Yeah,

0:37:58.920 --> 0:38:02.720
<v Speaker 5>I remember that video that is like gibberish like voice

0:38:02.960 --> 0:38:05.960
<v Speaker 5>transfer thing. Well, if you think about it, it's not

0:38:06.120 --> 0:38:09.440
<v Speaker 5>that much different from voice to text in that sense.

0:38:10.000 --> 0:38:12.560
<v Speaker 5>And at the end of the day, just like bits

0:38:12.600 --> 0:38:15.719
<v Speaker 5>like being transferred. Because even like whenever you connect on

0:38:15.760 --> 0:38:18.200
<v Speaker 5>a web page, you know, like you write it in text,

0:38:18.320 --> 0:38:22.240
<v Speaker 5>but behind it just like bites that being a change.

0:38:22.640 --> 0:38:26.320
<v Speaker 5>So agents still need to agree on the protocol that

0:38:26.360 --> 0:38:29.600
<v Speaker 5>they're going to use, and not necessarily an encryption format,

0:38:29.640 --> 0:38:33.359
<v Speaker 5>but an encoding format. So once you know what it is,

0:38:33.400 --> 0:38:36.760
<v Speaker 5>you know, it just becomes like like a reverse engineering

0:38:36.800 --> 0:38:39.600
<v Speaker 5>problem or like a foreign sake problem where you're just like, okay,

0:38:39.640 --> 0:38:41.880
<v Speaker 5>like this is what's being used when THOSS packets are

0:38:41.920 --> 0:38:44.560
<v Speaker 5>being sent. You know, let me just decrypt it once

0:38:44.600 --> 0:38:47.719
<v Speaker 5>you know the protocol, you know. Like that's so I

0:38:47.719 --> 0:38:51.600
<v Speaker 5>don't think we're going to end up in a situation

0:38:51.760 --> 0:38:54.600
<v Speaker 5>where like we would have like no idea of it,

0:38:54.640 --> 0:38:56.319
<v Speaker 5>because you're always going to have like people who are

0:38:56.320 --> 0:38:58.960
<v Speaker 5>like pretty good like reverse engineers. But at the same time,

0:38:59.000 --> 0:39:01.400
<v Speaker 5>you're also going to have like aah assistant who's going

0:39:01.480 --> 0:39:04.279
<v Speaker 5>to help you to like reverse engineer those things. So

0:39:04.880 --> 0:39:08.400
<v Speaker 5>in a way, even if it happens like you are

0:39:08.480 --> 0:39:12.640
<v Speaker 5>not like alone with your red bull and you I

0:39:12.680 --> 0:39:15.640
<v Speaker 5>know AI agents, we're all gonna have AI agents. So

0:39:16.640 --> 0:39:21.760
<v Speaker 5>that's also like the reality of things. So we're far

0:39:21.800 --> 0:39:25.160
<v Speaker 5>from just like the Clippy plugin that we used to

0:39:25.160 --> 0:39:27.920
<v Speaker 5>have in Microsoft Office, or you can have this like

0:39:28.000 --> 0:39:31.160
<v Speaker 5>CLI interface. We just give like commands and then it's

0:39:31.400 --> 0:39:34.040
<v Speaker 5>led that into like Okay, I understand what I need

0:39:34.080 --> 0:39:36.040
<v Speaker 5>to do, you know, and that's it. No.

0:39:36.160 --> 0:39:39.279
<v Speaker 4>I love like interacting with just the CLI now, And

0:39:39.320 --> 0:39:41.320
<v Speaker 4>like every time I have to go to the web,

0:39:41.719 --> 0:39:44.319
<v Speaker 4>it feels like some sort of failure. I'm like, I

0:39:44.320 --> 0:39:46.200
<v Speaker 4>have to go to this brace website, yeah, and I

0:39:46.239 --> 0:39:48.760
<v Speaker 4>just like want the information right there on the black

0:39:48.800 --> 0:39:53.640
<v Speaker 4>screen talking, you know, communicating back and forth in English background.

0:39:53.719 --> 0:39:56.880
<v Speaker 5>You know, that's like feeling familiar for you.

0:39:56.880 --> 0:39:57.080
<v Speaker 3>You know.

0:39:57.200 --> 0:39:59.600
<v Speaker 4>Something I think about is I imagine that there's a lot

0:39:59.600 --> 0:40:05.439
<v Speaker 4>of like crusty old Linux and Unix programmers who are like, oh,

0:40:05.560 --> 0:40:08.399
<v Speaker 4>this code is this isn't high quality code that the

0:40:08.400 --> 0:40:10.640
<v Speaker 4>AI that the chat pods produced.

0:40:10.719 --> 0:40:12.479
<v Speaker 3>This is slop code. It needs all.

0:40:12.440 --> 0:40:15.759
<v Speaker 4>Kinds of fixing and so forth. From your perspective, is

0:40:15.800 --> 0:40:20.040
<v Speaker 4>the code itself of good quality or of improving quality?

0:40:20.080 --> 0:40:23.719
<v Speaker 4>How just the lines of code itself from your standards

0:40:23.760 --> 0:40:24.440
<v Speaker 4>is a good stuff?

0:40:24.600 --> 0:40:26.600
<v Speaker 5>Yeah, it's pretty good then even when it's bad. You

0:40:26.680 --> 0:40:29.600
<v Speaker 5>just said it okay, like this is bad. You know,

0:40:29.840 --> 0:40:31.640
<v Speaker 5>like just do it better. You know, like if you're

0:40:31.719 --> 0:40:33.960
<v Speaker 5>using like negative rewards, you know, if you say okay,

0:40:33.960 --> 0:40:35.879
<v Speaker 5>like this piece of code is garbage, you know it's

0:40:35.880 --> 0:40:39.200
<v Speaker 5>gonna understand better because you kind of give like a

0:40:39.280 --> 0:40:42.000
<v Speaker 5>strong emotion where it's like if you say, oh it's okay,

0:40:42.040 --> 0:40:44.040
<v Speaker 5>you know it's be like okay, like whatever. You know,

0:40:44.040 --> 0:40:47.239
<v Speaker 5>if it's okay, it means it's passing, like the the

0:40:47.440 --> 0:40:50.880
<v Speaker 5>Eddequo test. Okay, that's their badge. You write it.

0:40:51.000 --> 0:40:54.760
<v Speaker 2>And I always do this so if I ask about

0:40:55.040 --> 0:40:57.760
<v Speaker 2>for something, I will always say, like after the first version,

0:40:57.840 --> 0:40:59.759
<v Speaker 2>like do better and just see what it comes up with,

0:40:59.840 --> 0:41:01.359
<v Speaker 2>and just try to iterate this is.

0:41:01.440 --> 0:41:04.480
<v Speaker 4>This is tough because you're talking when you're talking in

0:41:04.560 --> 0:41:07.880
<v Speaker 4>English the brain deludes itself into thinking that you're talking

0:41:07.880 --> 0:41:10.240
<v Speaker 4>to or when you're talking in human language, any language,

0:41:10.400 --> 0:41:12.239
<v Speaker 4>the brain deludes itself you feel like you're talking to

0:41:12.239 --> 0:41:14.120
<v Speaker 4>a person, so you have to be nice.

0:41:14.160 --> 0:41:15.800
<v Speaker 2>Well, then I feel like I don't have that problem.

0:41:17.760 --> 0:41:19.680
<v Speaker 4>But then I feel like I like I don't want

0:41:19.719 --> 0:41:21.799
<v Speaker 4>to say, oh, this is garbage. I don't But from

0:41:21.880 --> 0:41:26.080
<v Speaker 4>your perspective, it's actually sort of important to to be

0:41:26.200 --> 0:41:28.520
<v Speaker 4>firm with the bot, and you get better results by

0:41:28.520 --> 0:41:29.640
<v Speaker 4>being more sharp with it.

0:41:29.800 --> 0:41:33.200
<v Speaker 5>Yeah, because it's the equivalent to the negative world. Like

0:41:33.360 --> 0:41:35.680
<v Speaker 5>just like positive world. If you if it does something,

0:41:35.719 --> 0:41:37.960
<v Speaker 5>you say, okay, like that's great, that's exactly what I

0:41:38.000 --> 0:41:41.560
<v Speaker 5>tried to explain. Then it's like okay, like that's like

0:41:41.600 --> 0:41:43.799
<v Speaker 5>a reference point. Was Like if it starts to go

0:41:43.840 --> 0:41:47.160
<v Speaker 5>on a tangent, you just say like, oh, that's completely

0:41:47.200 --> 0:41:50.319
<v Speaker 5>like out of the line, redo this, like why are

0:41:50.400 --> 0:41:53.640
<v Speaker 5>you doing this? You know, like the more explicit you are,

0:41:54.440 --> 0:41:57.280
<v Speaker 5>the better it's going to understand how far these from

0:41:57.400 --> 0:41:58.239
<v Speaker 5>the requirements.

0:41:58.520 --> 0:42:01.879
<v Speaker 4>Well, I just have to get better, you know, sort

0:42:01.920 --> 0:42:04.839
<v Speaker 4>of conflict avoidant, and I like very nice to people.

0:42:04.880 --> 0:42:07.040
<v Speaker 2>So I just still says please and thank you. So

0:42:07.120 --> 0:42:09.320
<v Speaker 2>I just bask doesn't get them.

0:42:09.440 --> 0:42:10.279
<v Speaker 3>So yeah, that's right.

0:42:10.320 --> 0:42:11.880
<v Speaker 4>So I have to I just have to be like, no,

0:42:12.000 --> 0:42:15.040
<v Speaker 4>this is trash, this is garbage. You totally we're all

0:42:15.120 --> 0:42:17.520
<v Speaker 4>dumber for having seen this code. Okay, this is good

0:42:17.560 --> 0:42:17.799
<v Speaker 4>to know.

0:42:18.040 --> 0:42:20.240
<v Speaker 5>I mean it's a good point. You know, like those

0:42:20.320 --> 0:42:23.640
<v Speaker 5>like AI companies that are recording all the prompts, you know, yeah,

0:42:24.239 --> 0:42:27.040
<v Speaker 5>if they're keeping it, if there's retention around it, you know,

0:42:27.160 --> 0:42:29.680
<v Speaker 5>like we know the open the eye is keeping them,

0:42:29.719 --> 0:42:33.319
<v Speaker 5>you know, like they can get sophy. Is so your

0:42:33.560 --> 0:42:36.360
<v Speaker 5>importance it? Yeah, so like who knows, you know, like

0:42:36.440 --> 0:42:39.440
<v Speaker 5>in years from now, if there's like full on like

0:42:39.520 --> 0:42:44.080
<v Speaker 5>autonomous like robots managed by the Department of War because

0:42:44.120 --> 0:42:45.359
<v Speaker 5>they think it's lowful so.

0:42:45.320 --> 0:42:50.200
<v Speaker 7>We all get social scores based on our Yeah, these

0:42:50.320 --> 0:42:53.440
<v Speaker 7>thoughts creep into my head on ironically where it's like

0:42:54.000 --> 0:42:56.640
<v Speaker 7>at some point is there's going to be some am

0:42:56.640 --> 0:42:57.800
<v Speaker 7>I going to regret having?

0:42:59.000 --> 0:43:01.359
<v Speaker 3>I don't know? They I they were there in my head.

0:43:01.440 --> 0:43:04.400
<v Speaker 2>Truly a brave new world, Matt. Just one last question

0:43:04.440 --> 0:43:07.600
<v Speaker 2>for me, but going back to cybersecurity and the current

0:43:07.640 --> 0:43:12.440
<v Speaker 2>situation with Iran, what are you on just the lookout for,

0:43:12.680 --> 0:43:15.640
<v Speaker 2>like what would peak your interest the most to see

0:43:15.800 --> 0:43:17.320
<v Speaker 2>in that particular space.

0:43:18.400 --> 0:43:23.080
<v Speaker 5>I think now in that particular space because I'm one

0:43:23.080 --> 0:43:25.800
<v Speaker 5>of those people who think it's related to the Epstein files,

0:43:25.800 --> 0:43:27.919
<v Speaker 5>you know, like it's just more about like getting more

0:43:28.440 --> 0:43:31.920
<v Speaker 5>Epstein Files related stuff to see if there is like

0:43:32.080 --> 0:43:35.480
<v Speaker 5>more connections to it, you know. So I think that

0:43:35.520 --> 0:43:37.360
<v Speaker 5>would be the only thing that would kind of be

0:43:37.440 --> 0:43:41.080
<v Speaker 5>like digital that we like spike my interest because now

0:43:41.080 --> 0:43:44.000
<v Speaker 5>we have seen you know, like just those like all

0:43:44.080 --> 0:43:46.840
<v Speaker 5>drones can do like so much damage, and that Iran

0:43:47.400 --> 0:43:51.400
<v Speaker 5>demonstrated that they can be like really precise with the attacks.

0:43:51.960 --> 0:43:55.479
<v Speaker 5>So now I think it's more about seeing like which

0:43:55.560 --> 0:43:58.160
<v Speaker 5>direction it's going to go to and how long it's

0:43:58.200 --> 0:44:01.600
<v Speaker 5>going to last, which is like the big question mark

0:44:01.640 --> 0:44:05.080
<v Speaker 5>because there's so many other components, like the energy sector,

0:44:05.160 --> 0:44:07.279
<v Speaker 5>you know, like how is it We have seen the

0:44:07.320 --> 0:44:10.839
<v Speaker 5>price of like memory like increasing like a lot. So

0:44:11.320 --> 0:44:14.240
<v Speaker 5>now now if they're starting to block like the Detroit

0:44:14.320 --> 0:44:16.880
<v Speaker 5>of almost you know, like like what's gonna happen to

0:44:16.960 --> 0:44:19.440
<v Speaker 5>like the cost of data centers and like memory and

0:44:19.520 --> 0:44:22.319
<v Speaker 5>AI in general. You know, like we're going towards on

0:44:22.400 --> 0:44:24.440
<v Speaker 5>one side, you know, we're going towards like the cost

0:44:24.480 --> 0:44:27.880
<v Speaker 5>of tokens and insurance going down, but that may also

0:44:27.960 --> 0:44:30.319
<v Speaker 5>like bring the cost up. You know, So if you're

0:44:30.320 --> 0:44:34.279
<v Speaker 5>gonna use like AI for like your next generation wars,

0:44:34.520 --> 0:44:37.319
<v Speaker 5>but if your enemy can just like increase your cost

0:44:37.360 --> 0:44:40.160
<v Speaker 5>of token and insurance, what does that even mean? Like

0:44:40.200 --> 0:44:42.160
<v Speaker 5>do you even need AI in the first place? Is

0:44:42.160 --> 0:44:44.759
<v Speaker 5>it even relevant? So I think there's this all like

0:44:44.840 --> 0:44:47.839
<v Speaker 5>asymmetric like warfare that's going to happen that we really

0:44:47.880 --> 0:44:50.160
<v Speaker 5>haven't seen yet, and I think that's gonna be like

0:44:50.480 --> 0:44:53.160
<v Speaker 5>really interesting. But at the same time, there's so much

0:44:53.200 --> 0:44:56.120
<v Speaker 5>noise and so much so many things happening at once

0:44:56.160 --> 0:44:59.000
<v Speaker 5>that it's becoming like extremely like hard to focus and

0:44:59.200 --> 0:45:01.880
<v Speaker 5>just like extract. But that's pretty ready.

0:45:01.600 --> 0:45:05.360
<v Speaker 2>But yeah, definitely feels like that tough, tough choices potentially

0:45:05.360 --> 0:45:08.680
<v Speaker 2>coming for half Alock as your token costs go up. Matt,

0:45:08.719 --> 0:45:11.160
<v Speaker 2>it was so wonderful to reconnect again. Thank you so

0:45:11.239 --> 0:45:13.920
<v Speaker 2>much for coming back on odd lots And yeah, you'll

0:45:13.960 --> 0:45:16.560
<v Speaker 2>have to get back to Joe about those APIs.

0:45:16.800 --> 0:45:18.760
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I'm happy, let's let's.

0:45:18.600 --> 0:45:23.080
<v Speaker 5>Do Yeah, bring me on as sounds good.

0:45:23.320 --> 0:45:23.960
<v Speaker 3>Take care of Matt.

0:45:24.040 --> 0:45:38.279
<v Speaker 6>Thanks Matt, Joe.

0:45:38.320 --> 0:45:39.440
<v Speaker 2>Always good to catch up with.

0:45:39.520 --> 0:45:43.160
<v Speaker 4>No super interesting It's incredible how much has happened right

0:45:43.160 --> 0:45:48.200
<v Speaker 4>now at this particular nexus, especially obviously the anthropic stuff.

0:45:48.440 --> 0:45:49.680
<v Speaker 3>But I you know, it's interesting.

0:45:49.760 --> 0:45:52.359
<v Speaker 4>You know, you think about cyber warfare and you think about, okay,

0:45:52.360 --> 0:45:54.040
<v Speaker 4>we're going to hack into a system and take out

0:45:54.040 --> 0:45:56.680
<v Speaker 4>critical infrastructure. But another thing you can do is just

0:45:56.719 --> 0:45:58.480
<v Speaker 4>attack a data center correctly, just.

0:45:58.440 --> 0:46:00.520
<v Speaker 2>Send a drone to the data center. I thought that

0:46:00.600 --> 0:46:03.040
<v Speaker 2>was really interesting. That sort of like we got very

0:46:03.160 --> 0:46:06.040
<v Speaker 2>used to thinking about cyber as like this thing that

0:46:06.320 --> 0:46:10.200
<v Speaker 2>exists only in code, in code, but now you have

0:46:10.280 --> 0:46:13.000
<v Speaker 2>this like new front of kinetic warfare where the two

0:46:13.120 --> 0:46:14.120
<v Speaker 2>like really intersect.

0:46:14.280 --> 0:46:16.759
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, they do really intersect, and yeah, these are like

0:46:16.960 --> 0:46:21.160
<v Speaker 4>huge national security vulnerabilities. And he pointed out, I mean

0:46:21.280 --> 0:46:24.960
<v Speaker 4>certainly today, but you know, was this in anyone's threat

0:46:25.000 --> 0:46:27.120
<v Speaker 4>model thinking about the risks to it? You know, the

0:46:27.200 --> 0:46:30.680
<v Speaker 4>cheapness of drones the ability to take them out super interesting.

0:46:31.040 --> 0:46:35.200
<v Speaker 4>Also just this idea like yes, you know, obviously again

0:46:35.320 --> 0:46:37.840
<v Speaker 4>as your observation, the point we think of like cyber attacks,

0:46:37.840 --> 0:46:39.440
<v Speaker 4>like we're going to take out this whole thing, but

0:46:39.920 --> 0:46:42.680
<v Speaker 4>in least in the warfare context. His point like most

0:46:42.680 --> 0:46:44.880
<v Speaker 4>of it is like before the war et cetera, the

0:46:44.920 --> 0:46:48.560
<v Speaker 4>sort of information gather spy, spy craft and so forth

0:46:49.040 --> 0:46:51.040
<v Speaker 4>prior to the actual the actual attacks.

0:46:51.160 --> 0:46:54.279
<v Speaker 2>But it is interesting to see Israel in particular use

0:46:54.440 --> 0:46:57.840
<v Speaker 2>some cyber attacks as a sort of sewer of chaos.

0:46:57.920 --> 0:47:00.880
<v Speaker 2>Definitely in Iran. I can't imagine what it's like to

0:47:00.920 --> 0:47:02.839
<v Speaker 2>actually be on the ground there at the moment for

0:47:02.920 --> 0:47:06.640
<v Speaker 2>many reasons, but like you imagine just being there worried

0:47:06.680 --> 0:47:09.520
<v Speaker 2>about your physical safety, and then the traffic lights aren't

0:47:09.520 --> 0:47:10.160
<v Speaker 2>working as well.

0:47:10.280 --> 0:47:13.440
<v Speaker 4>Well, right, and also just think like wait, there's cameras

0:47:13.440 --> 0:47:17.000
<v Speaker 4>everywhere or how much is being recorded? Like create like

0:47:17.000 --> 0:47:21.000
<v Speaker 4>a sense of like paranoia among everyone about everything.

0:47:21.239 --> 0:47:24.640
<v Speaker 2>And also the interesting thing obviously this is very topical

0:47:24.640 --> 0:47:28.600
<v Speaker 2>in markets, but the SaaS apocalypse idea Matt in particular,

0:47:28.760 --> 0:47:33.520
<v Speaker 2>seemed pretty bearish on the outlook for existing software companies,

0:47:33.560 --> 0:47:35.640
<v Speaker 2>I guess, and I did think his comments about what

0:47:35.680 --> 0:47:39.920
<v Speaker 2>that would mean for security budgets within organizations were pretty

0:47:40.640 --> 0:47:44.319
<v Speaker 2>relevant and worrying. Absolutely, all right, shall we leave it there,

0:47:44.400 --> 0:47:46.520
<v Speaker 2>Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of

0:47:46.600 --> 0:47:49.080
<v Speaker 2>the Odd Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow

0:47:49.120 --> 0:47:50.600
<v Speaker 2>me at Tracy Alloway.

0:47:50.320 --> 0:47:53.000
<v Speaker 4>And I'm Jill Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwarts,

0:47:53.040 --> 0:47:55.680
<v Speaker 4>follow our guest Matt Sweish, She's at m swish Fellow

0:47:55.760 --> 0:47:59.080
<v Speaker 4>or producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Arman, Dash o'l bennett

0:47:59.080 --> 0:48:01.960
<v Speaker 4>at dashbot, ands at Kale Brooks. And for more odd

0:48:02.000 --> 0:48:04.640
<v Speaker 4>Laws content, go to Bloomberg dot com slash Oddlage for

0:48:04.719 --> 0:48:07.080
<v Speaker 4>the daily newsletter and all of our episodes, and you

0:48:07.120 --> 0:48:09.160
<v Speaker 4>can chat about all these topics twenty four to seven

0:48:09.239 --> 0:48:12.359
<v Speaker 4>in our discord Discord dot gg slash odd Lots.

0:48:12.680 --> 0:48:14.600
<v Speaker 2>And if you enjoy odd Lots, if you like it

0:48:14.640 --> 0:48:17.640
<v Speaker 2>when we talk about the intersection of kinetic and cyber warfare,

0:48:17.680 --> 0:48:20.000
<v Speaker 2>then please leave us a positive review on your favorite

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