Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production of I Heart Radios,
Speaker 1: How Stuff Works. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff.
Speaker 1: I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with
Speaker 1: How Stuff Works and I heart Radio and I love
Speaker 1: all things tech. And today we're gonna talk about a
Speaker 1: really pretty serious issue about hacking and personal information. That
Speaker 1: this was inspired by a real world incident that happened
Speaker 1: several years ago. This particular episode actually originally published on
Speaker 1: September three, two twelve, and at the time it was
Speaker 1: extremely topical. But I would argue that the message behind
Speaker 1: the show is one that we still should heed today,
Speaker 1: even though the actual incident now is more than seven
Speaker 1: years old. But this episode was called More Data, More Problems,
Speaker 1: and I hope you enjoy now when we're recording this,
Speaker 1: it's in August, early August twelve. It's August ten, actually,
Speaker 1: and earlier this week, there was a news story that
Speaker 1: broke throughout the Twitter sphere really first and then beyond
Speaker 1: about a tech journalist named Matt Honan who has written
Speaker 1: for various UH publications including Wired, and how he had
Speaker 1: his essentially his entire digital life hacked over the course
Speaker 1: of about thirty minutes and uh, and to kind of
Speaker 1: explain what happened. First, we'll sort of talk about the
Speaker 1: way he discovered this through his personal experience, and then
Speaker 1: how the hackers did it, and then what needs to
Speaker 1: happen so that we protect ourselves against such things happening
Speaker 1: in the future. So to start, he was he was
Speaker 1: playing with his kid and he noticed that his iPhone
Speaker 1: had shut down. It was so it crashed essentially, and
Speaker 1: he thought, oh, well, that's annoying. I guess I'll have
Speaker 1: to go and uh connected to my computer over store
Speaker 1: from back up and just get this thing going again.
Speaker 1: He didn't really think much of it, because you know,
Speaker 1: technology occasionally fails. Yes, So then he goes and he
Speaker 1: goes over to his computer and tries to start that up,
Speaker 1: and that also isn't loading up properly. It's asking him
Speaker 1: for information that he doesn't have and it won't accept
Speaker 1: his password, and so he's thinking, well, that's weird, but
Speaker 1: he doesn't again panic yet. Uh. He then thinks about
Speaker 1: trying his iPad, which also isn't working, and he tries
Speaker 1: logging into his Google account using a different computer, and
Speaker 1: that also gives him a failure, and it's at that
Speaker 1: point where he's thinking something seriously wrong is happening, and
Speaker 1: eventually he starts noticing that his own Twitter handle is
Speaker 1: posting stuff uh, and he's not the one doing it,
Speaker 1: and so he can't access his Twitter account anymore either.
Speaker 1: And they are these horrible Twitter messages with various you know, uh,
Speaker 1: inappropriate tweets going out things that are racist or homophobic
Speaker 1: or having lots of foul language in it um and
Speaker 1: it's just, you know, it's it's just beyond his control.
Speaker 1: He gets on the phone with Apple trying to find
Speaker 1: out what's going on, uh, to explain that his his
Speaker 1: account has been hacked, and it takes him quite some
Speaker 1: time before they're able to sort this out. Part of
Speaker 1: the reason is that they, for a while, we're looking
Speaker 1: at the wrong account. They had his name wrong, and
Speaker 1: so they were looking at an account that had none
Speaker 1: of the issues he was explaining. And then when the
Speaker 1: Apple representative repeated his name back to him, that's when
Speaker 1: he said, wait a minute, that's not who I am.
Speaker 1: I'm Matt Honan. You've got the wrong name. And then
Speaker 1: once they switched their focus, then they started seeing oh,
Speaker 1: well before you called in, and actually I think Honan
Speaker 1: had to ask about this. They didn't. They didn't volunteer
Speaker 1: this information. But before Honan had called in, someone else
Speaker 1: had called in to regain access. They said, to regain access.
Speaker 1: Really it was to gain access for the first time.
Speaker 1: It was the hackers who had called in too, because
Speaker 1: they had claimed that they no longer had the password
Speaker 1: or security question answers, so they could not get the
Speaker 1: password normally. They were trying to get into his dot
Speaker 1: me email right and the the reason for all of
Speaker 1: this is probably the craziest part of the story, although
Speaker 1: the pathway of how the hackers got to the point
Speaker 1: where they were able to do all these things. You know,
Speaker 1: once they got access to his iCloud account, they were
Speaker 1: able to do things like wipe his devices, which is
Speaker 1: what happened. They wiped his iPhone, his Mac, and his
Speaker 1: iPad in part to prevent him from being able to
Speaker 1: head them off. While they were going down this trail
Speaker 1: of hacking his digital life. They were also able because
Speaker 1: of the way he had interconnected various accounts. They were
Speaker 1: able to do things like reset his Google password, send
Speaker 1: the message to the dot Me address, which they already
Speaker 1: had access to. Yes, because they had gained it from Apple.
Speaker 1: Once they got the password for the Google account, then
Speaker 1: they were able to get the password for Twitter because
Speaker 1: that's where he had his Twitter account attached to his
Speaker 1: Google account, So it was kind of a leap frog thing, right,
Speaker 1: he would they could do a password recovery from one system,
Speaker 1: It would send the message to one of the email
Speaker 1: addresses that was already compromised, and then they would get
Speaker 1: access to the next thing. Turns out what the hackers
Speaker 1: were interested in from the very beginning was getting hold
Speaker 1: of his Twitter account and posting these messages. That's really
Speaker 1: just for laughs. That's all they really wanted to do.
Speaker 1: They weren't really out to make a big show that
Speaker 1: you know, it should be Matt Honan that should suffer
Speaker 1: for this. Uh. They had nothing to do with Gizmodo,
Speaker 1: which Owen had written for, and his account was linked
Speaker 1: to Gizmoto's account. It never been unlinked, even though he
Speaker 1: no longer wrote for Gizmoto, so they also had access
Speaker 1: to Gizmodo's Twitter account and hijack that for a while.
Speaker 1: Um so, you you know, it turned out the only
Speaker 1: reason they wanted to get his Twitter account was because
Speaker 1: he had one of the most rare things in Twitter.
Speaker 1: A three letter Twitter handle, yes, you know, because most
Speaker 1: people had to go with a longer Twitter handle because
Speaker 1: of course, once one's taken, it's gone. Yes, so people
Speaker 1: who managed to land one of those three letter accounts
Speaker 1: are rare, and so they thought, oh, this is that's
Speaker 1: that's why they targeted this particular Twitter account. Had nothing
Speaker 1: to do with him personally, had nothing to do with
Speaker 1: who he worked for, and had nothing to do with
Speaker 1: the fact that he was a tech journalist. It was
Speaker 1: just because his Twitter handle was three letters long. And
Speaker 1: that's crazy to me. First of all, that you know
Speaker 1: that that was the that they were were willing to
Speaker 1: go through, the steps that they had to go through
Speaker 1: in order to get this one Twitter account. Well, that's true,
Speaker 1: although it only took them a little less than an
Speaker 1: hour to accomplish. Once they had, once they had determined
Speaker 1: their route of attack, it was all over. So the
Speaker 1: way they did this was not through any kind of
Speaker 1: crazy sit down at the computer, type in the password
Speaker 1: three times and then you managed to get in type thing.
Speaker 1: And it certainly wasn't a Hollywood style hacker brute force
Speaker 1: attack where there was uh, you know, some group of
Speaker 1: of hackers trying everything they could to brute force their
Speaker 1: way in. Yeah, it wasn't like a computer program that
Speaker 1: was just running password after password and you see the
Speaker 1: little like digits flip up each time you hit one.
Speaker 1: That's correct, That wasn't what happened. What happened was much
Speaker 1: more simple, really in a way, because I had nothing
Speaker 1: to do with using code. It has everything to do
Speaker 1: with manipulating SISS stems, but from a person perspective, not
Speaker 1: or or a policy perspective, not from a technological one. Yeah.
Speaker 1: And it's it's also clear that although Apple's security procedures
Speaker 1: are in part to at fault, um, they are not
Speaker 1: the only ones the hackers targeted to get more information
Speaker 1: on on Honan and that um, it just so happened that, uh,
Speaker 1: the information they needed coincided across multiple companies with his accounts,
Speaker 1: and once they got some information from a couple of places,
Speaker 1: they were easily able to go in and fiddle with
Speaker 1: other stuff. There are really three parties that are I
Speaker 1: don't want to say at fault you don't blame the victim.
Speaker 1: There are three party There are three parties that made
Speaker 1: this possible for the hackers to get the access to
Speaker 1: to the accounts. One of those is Honan himself. Yeah,
Speaker 1: and he freely admits that, yes, if you he has
Speaker 1: written an incredible uh uh article that that documents this
Speaker 1: entire process and what he went through. He he blogged
Speaker 1: about it when it happened, but then he wrote up
Speaker 1: a much more comprehensive account of it for Wired and
Speaker 1: uh and it's a very interesting read. I highly recommend
Speaker 1: you read it, especially if you're concerned with your own
Speaker 1: potential security computer security. So he was at fault and
Speaker 1: not at fault. He was. He some of his choices
Speaker 1: made this possible. Uh. The Amazon, Amazon dot Com also,
Speaker 1: its policies made this possible, and Apple's policies made this possible.
Speaker 1: So those three parties together made it possible for the
Speaker 1: hackers to achieve this and uh and it's kind of
Speaker 1: interesting how how they came about it. Yeah, and and
Speaker 1: some of the irony as we get into this, is
Speaker 1: that some of the very things that made this possible
Speaker 1: are in place specifically to make it more difficult for
Speaker 1: someone to steal identities. So it actually uh, some of
Speaker 1: these some of these procedures actually worked in exactly the
Speaker 1: opposite way in which they weren't intended when they were implemented.
Speaker 1: So the way this started off was it was fairly clever.
Speaker 1: So they they first they started the hackers did a
Speaker 1: little recon work and they wanted to find out, um
Speaker 1: about how they would get uh the access to the
Speaker 1: Twitter account. And then they were able to find out
Speaker 1: Honan's uh email address because he has a website. They
Speaker 1: went to the website, they did a who is look
Speaker 1: up on Honan, which gave them two things, like two
Speaker 1: things they needed. They needed the email address and they
Speaker 1: needed his physical address. Yeah. Now, if you register a
Speaker 1: domain name, you are required to have contact information available. Um,
Speaker 1: and that information is publicly available now um some well
Speaker 1: we could talk about that too, but anyway, the the
Speaker 1: who is record for the domain had his information in it. Yeah.
Speaker 1: So once they had that information, the Google account and
Speaker 1: the just the email address didn't have access to the
Speaker 1: account yet. Um. They figured out that the Twitter account
Speaker 1: was linked to the personal website. That's what That's where
Speaker 1: they found the Gmail address, That's where they found the
Speaker 1: physical address. And then they started to look at the
Speaker 1: account recovery for a Google and without actually sending in
Speaker 1: a recovery request, they saw that the address, which was
Speaker 1: only partially obscured per Google's policy, wasn't at me dot
Speaker 1: com email address. That was the recovery address. Yeah, well
Speaker 1: that's an Apple thing, right. So that's where they said, Ah,
Speaker 1: now we know how to get at him because it's
Speaker 1: because his Google address, uh will go back if we
Speaker 1: did a password recovery, because that will go to an
Speaker 1: Apple address. And because we know how to manipulate the
Speaker 1: system so that we can get access to his Apple account.
Speaker 1: It's all over. And the way they got access to
Speaker 1: the Apple account was kind of interesting. Now, they did
Speaker 1: not have the password, they did not have the answer
Speaker 1: to security questions. So calling up Apple and getting access
Speaker 1: to this account would require that they have some other information.
Speaker 1: What Apple requires is that you have to have the
Speaker 1: building address and the last four digits of the credit
Speaker 1: card you used to establish that account. So what the
Speaker 1: hackers did was they said, well, there's a good chance
Speaker 1: that the same credit card this guy used to establish
Speaker 1: his iCloud account is the one that he uses for Amazon.
Speaker 1: And so instead of calling Apple first, they called Amazon first,
Speaker 1: and they said that they wanted to add a credit
Speaker 1: card number to the existing Amazon account. That's right, So
Speaker 1: they weren't trying to get the credit card number. They
Speaker 1: wanted to add a credit card number, right, So then
Speaker 1: they add a credit card number to the Amazon account.
Speaker 1: Then they hang up. Then they call Amazon back and
Speaker 1: they say that they have lost access to their account
Speaker 1: and that they will provide the name, the billing address,
Speaker 1: which they already have from the who is look up
Speaker 1: of the website, and then the credit card number they
Speaker 1: gave at the at the call they made earlier. So
Speaker 1: there's now this credit card number that is legit because
Speaker 1: they provided it. It's not the same one that was
Speaker 1: used to establish the account in the first place. So
Speaker 1: then Amazon says, oh, all right, well we'll send you
Speaker 1: the password to the account. Here's which email addressed you
Speaker 1: wanted to go to. So they hackers give their email
Speaker 1: address or an email address that they have created for
Speaker 1: the purposes of this hack. So now Amazon sends the
Speaker 1: log in information to UH to Amazon dot Com to
Speaker 1: that account, to the email they log into the Amazon
Speaker 1: dot Com account, and then they look for the other
Speaker 1: credit card number, the one that was actually used to
Speaker 1: establish that account. So this is Honan's actual final four digits,
Speaker 1: because those are unmasked in the Amazon dot Com system. Yes,
Speaker 1: they mask the rest of it, right, Yeah, the rest
Speaker 1: of the numbers are mass So it's not that the
Speaker 1: hackers ever had access to the credit card, other than
Speaker 1: they could have bought a whole bunch of stuff on
Speaker 1: Amazon and had it sent somewhere. But that's all. That's. Yeah,
Speaker 1: that's what they could have done if they had wanted to,
Speaker 1: But they could not actually pull the credit card number
Speaker 1: itself other than the last four digits. But those last
Speaker 1: four digits are what Apple needs for account verification, right,
Speaker 1: So they take those four digits, they've got the building address,
Speaker 1: they give a call to Apple, they give that information,
Speaker 1: and because Honan used the same billing address and the
Speaker 1: same credit card for both services, Apple said, oh, well
Speaker 1: then you're clearly this guy. We will send you the
Speaker 1: account retrieval information to your email address. So then they
Speaker 1: now have the way to log into Honan's iCloud account.
Speaker 1: They do that. That's where they then disable his devices.
Speaker 1: They wipe them to help slow things down so they
Speaker 1: can continue to do this stuff. Now they have access
Speaker 1: to his Apple email, they have access to his Amazon account.
Speaker 1: That's when they go to the Google password recovery asked
Speaker 1: for the recovery information so that they can access his
Speaker 1: Google account. Well, that goes to his Apple address, which
Speaker 1: they already have access to. The information comes to the
Speaker 1: Apple address, they go into the Google account. They immediately
Speaker 1: delete the password recovery UH email out of his account
Speaker 1: so that if he has any other devices that would
Speaker 1: alert him that his password had been changed, that he
Speaker 1: would not be aware of it. So they they hide
Speaker 1: that they changed the password, so that now they've locked
Speaker 1: him out, they have access to his Google account. They
Speaker 1: then were able to go and get access to the
Speaker 1: Twitter account. Um, this is kind of scary, and again
Speaker 1: it has nothing to do with sitting down encoding stuff.
Speaker 1: It is hacking. You're hacking a system, but you're doing
Speaker 1: it more through social engineering and manipulating policies and systems.
Speaker 1: So if you guys remember we had that discussion and
Speaker 1: I think it was episode three ninety nine where we
Speaker 1: interviewed Brian Brushwood and we talked about social engineering. Now
Speaker 1: with Brushwood, his approach to social engineering is more about
Speaker 1: you know, having fun and uh, like, you're in a
Speaker 1: social situation where you you know, you never have to
Speaker 1: buy a drink because you're doing these cool things and
Speaker 1: convincing other people to buy drinks for you, or you know,
Speaker 1: you're doing something so that you can get the phone
Speaker 1: number of someone you're interested in. So you're still social
Speaker 1: engineering people. But it's not necessarily this as nefarious as
Speaker 1: as what these hackers were doing. Yeah, and it's not
Speaker 1: typically what one thinks of when one thinks of identity theft.
Speaker 1: I mean again, Um, a lot of us would look
Speaker 1: at the specifically maybe the Amazon portion of this or
Speaker 1: an online retail portion of this and say, oh, well,
Speaker 1: they got access to his credit card number, they can
Speaker 1: buy stuff well you and and in a lot of
Speaker 1: cases that maybe what a hacker might try to do.
Speaker 1: After all, we have talked about uh online systems being
Speaker 1: hacked for financial information and financial gain, but that's not
Speaker 1: the point of this. Um, the system that I was
Speaker 1: speaking of a few minutes ago, when I was saying
Speaker 1: that ironically, some of these things were turned against him
Speaker 1: tools that would be used to protect him. Um, if
Speaker 1: you're not in an Apple customer, you may not be
Speaker 1: aware there's a there's a uh an I cloud system
Speaker 1: called find my and there're a couple of them like
Speaker 1: to find my iPhone. Yeah. Um, so let's say Uh,
Speaker 1: you know, we're talking completely behind here. Let's say you
Speaker 1: have an iPhone and your kids run off with it
Speaker 1: and stuffed it somewhere in some piece of furniture or
Speaker 1: dropped it and or you left it in a cab,
Speaker 1: or you left it in a cab. Well, if you're
Speaker 1: if you're Natalie Dell Conti, well yeah, um, well, I
Speaker 1: was going to start with the the easy one. You
Speaker 1: can make it. You can make your phone make a
Speaker 1: noise so you know it's in the house, but you
Speaker 1: can't figure out where it went. I'd like to have
Speaker 1: one of these for my keys and maybe the remote.
Speaker 1: But you know you can you can make it make
Speaker 1: a noise, or if you've left it in a cab,
Speaker 1: you can have it tell you roughly where it is. Uh.
Speaker 1: This is especially useful if you can't remember if you
Speaker 1: left it in a cab, or if you at a
Speaker 1: restaurant whatever, or you know, you were at bar and
Speaker 1: you had a prototype version of the newest iPhone and
Speaker 1: it was sitting on the stool next to you when
Speaker 1: you were sitting there at the bar, but then when
Speaker 1: you turned around, it was gone, and then it ends
Speaker 1: up at some tech blog. Yeah, that could happen. Yeah,
Speaker 1: there their Twitter feed could be hacked to UM. But yeah,
Speaker 1: I mean, so you can find out where it is.
Speaker 1: You can have it make a noise so that if
Speaker 1: it is in the same location as you are, Uh,
Speaker 1: you know you can you can track it down. UM
Speaker 1: if you don't know where it is, Let's say you
Speaker 1: did leave it in a in a bar somewhere and
Speaker 1: uh you say, oh, well, you know it's not I
Speaker 1: don't know where that is, and you could see a
Speaker 1: location it shows you on the map where where it
Speaker 1: might be. Oh, it's no longer in my control. It's
Speaker 1: somewhere where I don't know where it is. I'm I
Speaker 1: have sensitive information on there. My my calendars on there,
Speaker 1: my contacts are on there. Um as as Honan himself said,
Speaker 1: you know he had um information from many other tech journalists. UM,
Speaker 1: so he might just let's say he was still in
Speaker 1: control of his accounts, but no longer in control of
Speaker 1: the device. He could say, wipe this device. I don't
Speaker 1: want anything on it anymore, you know, I want to
Speaker 1: wipe it clean so that nobody else gains information in
Speaker 1: my personal stuff. It's only a matter of time before
Speaker 1: they figure out my my pass code, wipe it clean.
Speaker 1: You know, you can tell it to do that and
Speaker 1: will remotely do that. Apple has added that for the
Speaker 1: Mac to find my Mac. So in that case, let's
Speaker 1: say he had corporate information. Many companies have have this
Speaker 1: policy in place. Yes, you can check your corporate email
Speaker 1: on your personal device, but if you do that, um,
Speaker 1: we retain the right to wipe the information on the device.
Speaker 1: If it should fall into somebody else's hands. Or let's
Speaker 1: say that you were to uh, you were to to
Speaker 1: either be fired or you you know, you left or whatever,
Speaker 1: they might retain that right so that they can protect
Speaker 1: themselves as a corporate entity. Yeah, so there there are
Speaker 1: positive reason uh to be able to do this in
Speaker 1: this case. Once the hackers gained information about his account
Speaker 1: and we're able to get access to his account and
Speaker 1: lock him out, um, they also chose to completely wipe
Speaker 1: his phone, his iPad, and his Mac laptop. And in
Speaker 1: doing so, they not only wiped out any you know,
Speaker 1: corporate information. He's he's a freelance writer, so any articles
Speaker 1: he might have been working on that we're on his
Speaker 1: hard drive gone. He also lost a year's worth or more,
Speaker 1: I guess the photos of personal photos personal stuff that
Speaker 1: that he had created. And yeah, Liz leads us to
Speaker 1: the the thing that we have said a billion times
Speaker 1: on this podcast that is an exaggeration, but back up
Speaker 1: your data. Yeah, and he admits he admits he was
Speaker 1: not regularly backing up his hard drive. This is not
Speaker 1: to pick on him or anything else. It's something that
Speaker 1: he wishes in retrospect he had been doing on a
Speaker 1: regular basis. Because, um, oddly enough, this is where this
Speaker 1: this is where the story takes an unusual turn. He
Speaker 1: has been in contact with his hackers and has agreed
Speaker 1: not to in return, they were telling him how they
Speaker 1: did it. Yes, and uh, I think first of all,
Speaker 1: the first thing we can agree on easily is that
Speaker 1: Amazon has to change its policy. Well, yeah, because because
Speaker 1: that's the first step that means that anyone could access
Speaker 1: anyone else's Amazon accounting. This Well, um, I wasn't going
Speaker 1: to get there quite yet. I wanted to make the
Speaker 1: point that this is where it kind of gets a
Speaker 1: little weird, because they they shared all this information with him.
Speaker 1: This is how he was able to write such a
Speaker 1: comprehensive post on onn Wired about it was. They told
Speaker 1: him what they were doing, what the point of it was, Um,
Speaker 1: they admitted, look, you know, we weren't trying to deal
Speaker 1: your your stuff. We weren't really trying to wipe out
Speaker 1: your your personal life. We have nothing against you personally.
Speaker 1: We wanted your Twitter account. Um. The guy that that
Speaker 1: that he talked to primarily UM was saying, essentially, hey,
Speaker 1: you know, my partner was the one who wiped out
Speaker 1: your computer. And now that you tell me, all your
Speaker 1: personal files, your your the pictures of your your kid
Speaker 1: were on here. I'm really sorry. I'm actually really sorry.
Speaker 1: I didn't mean to to cause you personal harm as
Speaker 1: a result of this. And and they say, now, I
Speaker 1: don't know, you know, I don't know whether their motives
Speaker 1: are are as pure as they say. You know, they
Speaker 1: say part of it was that they wanted to point
Speaker 1: out that it really is this easy to hack into
Speaker 1: your personal account. They wanted to draw attention to that. Now,
Speaker 1: I say that all the time. I suspect, based upon
Speaker 1: the messages that they posted on Twitter, that that's something
Speaker 1: they they that's covering the tracks. I think they were
Speaker 1: doing it for the kicks. Yes, exactly. Well, if you're
Speaker 1: looking at again, if you're reading the Twitter, the Twitter
Speaker 1: posts that he that were posted under his name, and
Speaker 1: there were a lot that he left there. He says,
Speaker 1: I wanted to keep a record of it. He did
Speaker 1: delete some because they were overly hurtful offensive. Yes, and
Speaker 1: he said, you know, these could actually cause people to
Speaker 1: feel badly about themselves, and I don't want that. I
Speaker 1: do want there to be a record of what had happened,
Speaker 1: but not at that, not that, not at the expense
Speaker 1: of someone else's feelings, um, other than my own obviously.
Speaker 1: So then he went out and he deleted the ones
Speaker 1: they felt were particularly offensive, and then the rest he
Speaker 1: left up. If you read those, I think it's it's
Speaker 1: pretty hard to defend yourself with. I'm just showing how
Speaker 1: the system can be hacked. It's more than that. It's
Speaker 1: also hey, you know, ha ha, we did it, you know,
Speaker 1: And and it's so it goes beyond that. And I
Speaker 1: think it's very telling the hacker he got in touch with,
Speaker 1: assuming that the what he the information he gave was
Speaker 1: accurate about himself, about the hacker himself as a young
Speaker 1: guy nineteen years old, might not quite really get be
Speaker 1: mature enough to realize, you know, what the consequences are
Speaker 1: of those actions. And what how they could affect the
Speaker 1: target beyond just oh, you know, they're thinking, we have
Speaker 1: a goal, we want to get hold of this Twitter account.
Speaker 1: They're not thinking of what consequences are going to be
Speaker 1: felt by the target beyond just the fact that our
Speaker 1: Twitter handle has been taken over. And so some of
Speaker 1: them may just be that they were very narrowly focused
Speaker 1: on what they wanted to do and they didn't really
Speaker 1: consider what could happen or how it would feel for
Speaker 1: that sort of stuff to happen to a person. Um.
Speaker 1: So that's that's something there too, and we see that
Speaker 1: a lot. I mean, there are a lot of hackers
Speaker 1: out there who because they can do something, they'll do
Speaker 1: it and they don't realize or they don't care what
Speaker 1: the consequences of that action are going to be to
Speaker 1: the people who are also involved in that whatever that
Speaker 1: situation is. Hey, guys, Jonathan from two thousand nineteen, just
Speaker 1: interrupting this episode to say, we're going to take a
Speaker 1: quick break, but we'll be right back. So maybe maybe
Speaker 1: now this According to the article, it sounds like this
Speaker 1: guy is at least a little remorseful, and remorseful yes,
Speaker 1: that he's feeling some remorse for this, and you know,
Speaker 1: we don't know if really, like he was at all
Speaker 1: culpable in the actual deletion. He claims that it was
Speaker 1: the other guy who did it, but you know, you
Speaker 1: never know. So it's interesting to look at that. And
Speaker 1: you know, if if you kind of put yourself in
Speaker 1: the shoes of the the hacker, um, you know, especially
Speaker 1: if you're thinking of somebody who is doing it for
Speaker 1: for fun, to mess with somebody, and and the person says, hey, look,
Speaker 1: I'm not going to press charges against you, but I
Speaker 1: want to know how how you did it. He started thinking, hey,
Speaker 1: this guy is working with me. You know, the heat
Speaker 1: of the moments off, the sense of accomplishment you get
Speaker 1: from hacking in and gaining access to all this information.
Speaker 1: You know, after the fact, you've had a chance to
Speaker 1: cool down, they've had a chance to cool down. You
Speaker 1: start thinking about it like, well, you know what, this
Speaker 1: guy is not angry enough with me to to press
Speaker 1: charges with the cops. You know, we kind of damaged
Speaker 1: this guy and he's willing to talk to us about
Speaker 1: it and share the story online. You know, they kind
Speaker 1: of got something out of it too. They kind of
Speaker 1: got a little anonymity anonymous press, so they get to
Speaker 1: point to themselves and say, hey, look he's talking about us.
Speaker 1: He doesn't seem like such a bad guy. I guess
Speaker 1: we kind of you know, burned a lot of stuff
Speaker 1: of his online that kind of stay ex We were
Speaker 1: really kind of doing it for the fun of it,
Speaker 1: and now it's so much fun as a decent guy.
Speaker 1: Now you know that there's a real person on the
Speaker 1: other end of that account. That's the other thing is
Speaker 1: there's a dehumanizing effects sometimes with the whole you know,
Speaker 1: you don't really identify the fact that there's a person
Speaker 1: on the other end of these accounts. Sometimes you don't.
Speaker 1: It doesn't the concept isn't fully formed. For for a
Speaker 1: lot of us, we would have gone out and if
Speaker 1: we had found out who did it, we would have
Speaker 1: pressed charges. We would have wanted to take them. Now
Speaker 1: some of us would have re enacted the film taken
Speaker 1: but I will find you. But yeah, that that's that's
Speaker 1: what makes this story more interesting than other hacking stories,
Speaker 1: I think is that that it's got a humanizing factor
Speaker 1: to character for both parties. The person who or people
Speaker 1: who took advantage of of honing and honing himself, and
Speaker 1: it does point to security issues. Now, these are sitimate
Speaker 1: for UM. You think about your Amazon account, for example,
Speaker 1: Let's say you don't have anything else except an email
Speaker 1: account and an Amazon account. By and large, you probably
Speaker 1: wouldn't have a lot of these security issues. The security
Speaker 1: issues that Amazon would have in place would make it
Speaker 1: very difficult for them for someone else to get that
Speaker 1: information from them. But then you start sharing. You start
Speaker 1: using this UM email address with Amazon and every other
Speaker 1: company that you do business with online. That makes your
Speaker 1: email address a a key to getting information from other companies.
Speaker 1: And then you start doing business with other pieces. You've
Speaker 1: got the same credit card number across these different companies,
Speaker 1: and once you have the last four digits of your
Speaker 1: social Security number or a credit card number, that makes
Speaker 1: it possible to use that information as a key across
Speaker 1: multiple entities. And all of a sudden, if you do
Speaker 1: business with a whole bunch of places, they get something
Speaker 1: like your physical address, your name, your email address, a
Speaker 1: credit card number, any of that stuff, and they've got
Speaker 1: the keys to open lots and lots of accounts for
Speaker 1: for them to get more information. And once they've hacked one,
Speaker 1: they can get information that will let them into lots
Speaker 1: and lots of other places. Oh, they have an Amazon account.
Speaker 1: I wonder if they have a Barnes and Noble account.
Speaker 1: We could find out in about ten minutes. Yea. So
Speaker 1: Honan admits that his password was not the strongest. It
Speaker 1: was a seven seven digit alpha numeric password, but that
Speaker 1: it was one he had used for many years. But
Speaker 1: they haven't. They didn't really use it, right, So that's
Speaker 1: that's the point of this thing, is that even if
Speaker 1: he had had the strongest password in the world, it
Speaker 1: would not have mattered because they circumvented that, right. They didn't.
Speaker 1: They weren't attacking through that direction. And this this demonstrates
Speaker 1: why security is so tough, because you think about the
Speaker 1: most obvious point of entry, which would be the log
Speaker 1: in right your user name and your password. That's the
Speaker 1: most obvious point because that's the way we access our information.
Speaker 1: Hackers are looking at a system and saying, what's the
Speaker 1: best vulnerable spot to go in at And if the
Speaker 1: front door is heavily locked, you look for a window
Speaker 1: or a backdoor, You look for something else it's gonna
Speaker 1: let you get into there, and not even you just
Speaker 1: bypass the place where you've got all the security and
Speaker 1: you go in through a different entrance. So when I
Speaker 1: said that Amazon really needs to work on its policy,
Speaker 1: mainly the reason for that is that the only thing
Speaker 1: you need in order to get that that lug and
Speaker 1: recovery information was the credit card number that's associated with
Speaker 1: the account, which they did by adding in one the
Speaker 1: building address and an email address, and that's it, um uh.
Speaker 1: And in order to add the credit card number, all
Speaker 1: you need is the building address and the email address
Speaker 1: that is associated with the account. So you know, using
Speaker 1: some guesswork, thinking that okay, well he's got an Amazon account,
Speaker 1: he's probably got an Amazon account. He's probably using this
Speaker 1: address for that Amazon account. We know his address because
Speaker 1: we looked it up from his website. We can create
Speaker 1: fabricate a a a credit card using a generator that
Speaker 1: creates a realistic but not actually activated credit card number
Speaker 1: and assign that to the Amazon account and then use
Speaker 1: that to get the entry point. So obviously Amazon needs
Speaker 1: to fix that because if all you have is a
Speaker 1: person's address, and you have a good guess at what
Speaker 1: email address they use for that Amazon account, then you
Speaker 1: could do the same thing. And so that's that's a.
Speaker 1: That's number one. Number two would be the fact that
Speaker 1: Apple uses the last four digits of the credit card,
Speaker 1: the building and the building address as a security recovery method.
Speaker 1: Clearly that needs to to change in some way. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I think I think this is a uh they're there
Speaker 1: are a couple of things. Now, if you read uh,
Speaker 1: there's an account on Honan's tumbler and if you want
Speaker 1: to read some truly hurtful comments, I would suggest reading that.
Speaker 1: Um because some people blame him for owning Apple devices,
Speaker 1: which is ridiculous. In fact, that the one that that
Speaker 1: bugged me probably the most was the one that said,
Speaker 1: serves him right for owning I crap. And I'm going
Speaker 1: you know this, this really could have happened with pretty
Speaker 1: much any manufacturer or it's just I mean, Apple had
Speaker 1: policies that they were able to leverage. That's not to
Speaker 1: say that other companies don't have those same policies, and
Speaker 1: it's just that Apples were well known to them. So
Speaker 1: that's how they, once they saw the me dot com addresses,
Speaker 1: said all right, we know how to do this. Yeah.
Speaker 1: And the thing is, I would say the vast majority
Speaker 1: of online retailers or or companies that have that offer
Speaker 1: services online. UM, I mean they knew how to get
Speaker 1: into a Google account to um and and a lot
Speaker 1: of them have the same policies. So if you can
Speaker 1: get as they did, if you can get one piece,
Speaker 1: then you can apply it to other pieces and get
Speaker 1: information from them and put the whole puzzle together that way.
Speaker 1: So it's not while while I've seen people singling out
Speaker 1: Apple and Amazon and um And, they should to some
Speaker 1: degree be uh considering new stuff, it's not just their fault.
Speaker 1: The catch twenty two here is once you make an
Speaker 1: account so locked down that it's extremely hard to get into,
Speaker 1: it's also hard for you to get into when you
Speaker 1: do forget your password, when you do forget what credit
Speaker 1: card you used. Say you've got ten credit cards. UM,
Speaker 1: let's say you you shredded one of them because you
Speaker 1: don't use that card anymore. But that's the one that
Speaker 1: you set up the account with two years ago. Now
Speaker 1: you can't get back in. So and so if they
Speaker 1: lock it down this too hard, then you can't get
Speaker 1: back in either. So that's why they make a Yeah,
Speaker 1: that's why they make those those pieces available. Well, can
Speaker 1: you tell me the last four digits of your social
Speaker 1: Security number. Oh yeah, I know those. Well they got
Speaker 1: that from somebody else. So there there's a catch twenty
Speaker 1: two here. How how how secure is secure enough and
Speaker 1: not too secure to lock you out forever? So so
Speaker 1: there there is that is a challenge. UM. The part
Speaker 1: of it is to UM when we're talking about the
Speaker 1: domain name. They were able to get information from his
Speaker 1: domain name, UH, and you can. There are things you
Speaker 1: can do there too. UM. A lot of the services,
Speaker 1: the places where you can register domain names offer a
Speaker 1: secure UH service where you pay an additional fee per
Speaker 1: year or or per however often you you renew your
Speaker 1: domain name, that will lock it down so that it
Speaker 1: has a Basically the the registrar is responsible for it.
Speaker 1: So if you want to contact the owner of the
Speaker 1: domain name to say make them an offer, Hey, we
Speaker 1: want so and so dot com. You've got it, Can
Speaker 1: we offer you ten thousand dollars and buy the domain
Speaker 1: name for you? It would go through your registrar and
Speaker 1: you would get contacted for it. But your information is
Speaker 1: not the information out there, so there's a proxy between
Speaker 1: you and them. UM. That would have helped him too,
Speaker 1: If he had had something like that in place, it
Speaker 1: would have helped lock it down Google um the uh
Speaker 1: it's it's kind of interesting because what Google showed them
Speaker 1: was uh M, star star star star star star n at,
Speaker 1: you know, the Gmail name. They were pretty right in
Speaker 1: guessing that it was his first initial last name. He
Speaker 1: had that address at at several places. He points that out,
Speaker 1: and that was that was easy. Could Google fix that
Speaker 1: and make it more or obscure so that it wouldn't
Speaker 1: be so easy to guess? Maybe? Could he have picked
Speaker 1: a more difficult name to use as his backup email address? Probably?
Speaker 1: But these are there are lots of little stuff that
Speaker 1: everyone involved could have done to make it more difficult.
Speaker 1: And there's Google also has a a two step verification process.
Speaker 1: That's exactly what I was going to mention next to
Speaker 1: two part authentication is um is a useful approach it
Speaker 1: also and I've used it, Yeah, I've used it. It's
Speaker 1: so two part of authentication is kind of what it
Speaker 1: sounds like. You need. You need to have two different
Speaker 1: things in order to be able to access the account.
Speaker 1: And a typical approach is that you register a phone
Speaker 1: number with whatever the services of like a cell phone.
Speaker 1: You register that cell phone with whatever the services and
Speaker 1: then when you try to access it, you have to
Speaker 1: be able to provide not only the password, but then
Speaker 1: an authentication code is sent to your device that you
Speaker 1: have registered and you have to insert whatever that that
Speaker 1: number is, and then then you can and then and
Speaker 1: only then you can actually access whatever the account is.
Speaker 1: And that helps a lot because as long as that
Speaker 1: device remains in your possession and no one has been
Speaker 1: able to intercept it in any way, you should be
Speaker 1: fairly safe. So even if they try to reset the password,
Speaker 1: they can't get access to it because they're trying through
Speaker 1: a different device that has not been registered. Uh, And
Speaker 1: then you get that that message. And we've seen very
Speaker 1: variations of this as well, not just too part authentication,
Speaker 1: but also registering devices with services like UM Lots of
Speaker 1: them do that so that you can look at the
Speaker 1: different sessions that are logged in through a particular service
Speaker 1: and then if you if you see that there's one
Speaker 1: there that you don't recognize, someone might have access to
Speaker 1: your account. So, for example, Facebook does this where if
Speaker 1: you try and access your UM Facebook account through different devices,
Speaker 1: it may tell you, hey, I don't recognize this device.
Speaker 1: This isn't something that you've used to access this account
Speaker 1: before um, and it'll send an email to you and
Speaker 1: let you know if you are that that, hey, someone's
Speaker 1: accessing this. Is this you? Because if it's you, it's cool.
Speaker 1: But if it's not you, then you need to look
Speaker 1: into this. Johnathan, I'm two thousand nineteen. Again. Uh, well,
Speaker 1: you know, we still have some more information to give
Speaker 1: you about this particular story, but before we can dive
Speaker 1: into that, we need to take one more break. Now. Again,
Speaker 1: this is this is a good tool for people who
Speaker 1: feel like they may have been hacked. However, let's say
Speaker 1: that the person who is trying to access your Facebook account, um,
Speaker 1: you know where they're trying to hack into your Facebook
Speaker 1: account also has control of your email address. Then when
Speaker 1: they say that, hey, is this you, and they send
Speaker 1: that to your email address, well they've got that email address, yes, yes,
Speaker 1: if it's gotten to that point. It's this particular approach
Speaker 1: doesn't really help you. But other things that that you
Speaker 1: can do, because there's some things that you can't have
Speaker 1: any control over. It's it's the pole, it's the companies
Speaker 1: you work with. Well, one, you can choose which companies
Speaker 1: you you associate yourself with, but beyond that, you know
Speaker 1: you have to hope that they put in the right
Speaker 1: stuff in place to protect you. What you can do one,
Speaker 1: continue to use strong passwords and don't don't use the
Speaker 1: same ones across multiple platforms because it just makes it
Speaker 1: way easier if one if one account does get compromised,
Speaker 1: it makes it way easier for all the others to
Speaker 1: get compromised. It's the domino effect. Yeah, so you we
Speaker 1: wanna you want to start picking some pretty tough passwords
Speaker 1: and and vary them across and change the UM you
Speaker 1: know fairly regularly because the longer they stay, the more
Speaker 1: likely you're going to UM encounter a problem. Use some
Speaker 1: sort of password manager so that you can keep track
Speaker 1: of them all, because I know it is you know,
Speaker 1: the flip side of a strong password is it's really
Speaker 1: hard to remember. So if you're if you've got lots
Speaker 1: and lots of online accounts, then it's going to be
Speaker 1: really challenging to keep all those straight. So some sort
Speaker 1: of password manager is important. UM Also, think about what
Speaker 1: you share before you share it online, because some of
Speaker 1: the details you share may also serve as answers to
Speaker 1: various security questions, or they may give off other information
Speaker 1: that companies use to verify identity, So be careful about that,
Speaker 1: you know, don't don't be too free with personal information
Speaker 1: if that means that information could be used to circumvent
Speaker 1: security systems. One suggestion I've always heard is that when
Speaker 1: you create answers to security questions you create, you're essentially
Speaker 1: creating another password. You don't you don't answer the question.
Speaker 1: You and you put something else in there, and you
Speaker 1: put something something unrelated but something you will easily remember,
Speaker 1: all right, So something that doesn't have to be a
Speaker 1: strong password. In other words, it just needs to be
Speaker 1: a keyword that doesn't have anything to do with a question,
Speaker 1: but it's a keyword you are guaranteed to remember. So
Speaker 1: so for example, if you, uh, maybe I've seen something
Speaker 1: that ask for the name of your friend, model of
Speaker 1: your first car, you could say something like grapefruit, yeah, which, well,
Speaker 1: I know, if I'm asked about my car, I'm going
Speaker 1: to say grapefruit. Right. Somebody might go, oh, it's a Chevy.
Speaker 1: They might have looked on your Facebook page and you
Speaker 1: might have had a thing like this, says man, I
Speaker 1: have such great memories of my of my first car,
Speaker 1: and then you have a picture of it on there.
Speaker 1: But that's all they would need to be able to
Speaker 1: answer that question if you use the right answer, the
Speaker 1: right or the corresponding answer. So if you've done, say
Speaker 1: a thing on genealogy, and you've uh, you know, talked
Speaker 1: about your parents and say, well, you know my mother
Speaker 1: who was so and so, and it's like, what's your
Speaker 1: mother's maiden name? Oh? Well, I know it was Steven's
Speaker 1: because I saw it on the on their Facebook account.
Speaker 1: Well that's pretty easy to track down. Um. And and
Speaker 1: speaking of Facebook, uh, it occurs to me that a
Speaker 1: lot of sites these days are using Facebook connect or
Speaker 1: Google or Yahoo, and you can say, hey, would you
Speaker 1: like to sign in with your blank account? Some of
Speaker 1: them exclusively do that where you cannot access it unless
Speaker 1: you happen to have one of those are their accounts? Yes,
Speaker 1: Like I believe Pinterest you had to log in through
Speaker 1: Facebook when it was when it first started. I don't
Speaker 1: know if that's still the case. And Spotify, Uh, Spotify,
Speaker 1: you know had had switched to requiring Facebook. Um. Okay,
Speaker 1: So if they gain access to your Facebook account, all
Speaker 1: of a sudden, they've got access to every their account
Speaker 1: that you've used that log in with when they offer
Speaker 1: you an opportunity to create a separate log in. Maybe
Speaker 1: you should take that opportunity. Yeah, it's a pain. It
Speaker 1: is a pain. And the whole point about the whole
Speaker 1: Facebook connect is that it makes it much more convenient.
Speaker 1: You know, you you know, Facebook loves it because it
Speaker 1: becomes the platform for the Internet, and people love it
Speaker 1: because it means that it's one less thing they have
Speaker 1: to worry about when they want to log in. But
Speaker 1: it does mean that there is this point of vulnerability
Speaker 1: that is incredibly attractive to someone who wants to get
Speaker 1: access to your stuff, because it's going if they get
Speaker 1: access to one thing, they get access to a dozen more.
Speaker 1: And it doesn't I say Facebook, but like Chris was saying,
Speaker 1: it's not just Facebook. Google is the same way. There
Speaker 1: are lots of different services that if you have a
Speaker 1: Google account you could potentially access. UM. Another another suggestion
Speaker 1: I've seen is that there are a lot of services
Speaker 1: out there that some of us will sign up for
Speaker 1: and then stop using and then forget about um. It
Speaker 1: might not be a bad idea to if you never
Speaker 1: use those services, it might not be a bad idea
Speaker 1: to go back and check and delete those accounts because
Speaker 1: those are other points of vulnerability, especially if it's going
Speaker 1: to you know, if you do tend to use the
Speaker 1: same group of passwords over and over and hackers get
Speaker 1: access to something, particularly if it's something that isn't terribly
Speaker 1: popular anymore, and maybe as a result, the security measures
Speaker 1: aren't as up to date as they could be. It's
Speaker 1: a possibility you might want to get rid of that stuff.
Speaker 1: So you know that my Space account that you haven't
Speaker 1: checked in four years, maybe it's time to just go
Speaker 1: ahead and close that out, you know that kind of stuff. Yeah, uh,
Speaker 1: and we've already mentioned back up your data. It's also
Speaker 1: very important. So yeah, so basic basic tips that you
Speaker 1: can follow to try and protect yourself and keeping in
Speaker 1: mind that you know, a lot this also depends upon
Speaker 1: the other parties involved. Yeah, and so looking back at
Speaker 1: at at Matt hone and did he do something wrong
Speaker 1: or you know, deserving of being you know, you know,
Speaker 1: really he could have been any of us. And even
Speaker 1: though he's a known tech journalist, he you know, sort
Speaker 1: of succumbed to being human. You know, he had the
Speaker 1: same password, he didn't change it for a long time.
Speaker 1: He's probably told he didn't back up and I'm sure
Speaker 1: he's probably told people to do that a thousand times,
Speaker 1: just like we have. You know, we're all guilty of
Speaker 1: doing these little things because their pains in the neck.
Speaker 1: We don't want to do it, we don't have time
Speaker 1: to do it. I mean, he's got kids times of
Speaker 1: premium for him, just like it is for so many
Speaker 1: of us. Um, you know, is it is it Apple's
Speaker 1: fault in particular? Is it Amazon's fault in particular? The
Speaker 1: only people who are are really at fault of the hackers. Yeah,
Speaker 1: it's it's it's the combination of all of these things
Speaker 1: together that made it possible. It's the hackers that are
Speaker 1: really at fault. Yeah. And the thing is, yeah, we're
Speaker 1: all busy and none of us really wants to make
Speaker 1: up a new, you know, twenty four digit password for
Speaker 1: each thing and worry about them. No, none of us
Speaker 1: really wants to mess with that. But the truth of
Speaker 1: the matter is that all these systems worked together to
Speaker 1: make this possible, and it's true for all of us.
Speaker 1: I mean, these these vulnerabilities are vulnerable for all of us.
Speaker 1: It's I know that Amazon and Apple both have thought
Speaker 1: about this. It's still kind of fresh. Um as the recording. Yeah,
Speaker 1: as they're recording this podcast. So you know, neither of them,
Speaker 1: I don't think, have made some public proclamation about how
Speaker 1: they're going to fix this going forward quote unquote fix
Speaker 1: it again. How what do you do? It's not obvious
Speaker 1: to do this, so I think the two part authentication
Speaker 1: is probably one of the the more obvious approaches. And uh,
Speaker 1: well we might see some other elements thrown in there too.
Speaker 1: And and however, I have seen people say yeah, and
Speaker 1: I turned this on and it was the point I
Speaker 1: was making earlier. It made it so difficult that it
Speaker 1: took me two weeks to figure out how to get
Speaker 1: back into my account, and it was a real pain
Speaker 1: in the neck. I got in, but it took me
Speaker 1: a while because I kind of, uh laid myself a trap.
Speaker 1: So it's it's one of those things where I think
Speaker 1: you kind of have to work into it and think
Speaker 1: about this stuff when you set it up, and go
Speaker 1: back and look at your accounts and see how it's
Speaker 1: laid out to fix this for yourself. Yeah, this is
Speaker 1: this is why it's really important for companies to uh
Speaker 1: to hire white hat hackers who I mean, all they
Speaker 1: do is look at systems and try and find ways
Speaker 1: to to breach systems so that those systems can be
Speaker 1: improved over time. And it's important to get a third
Speaker 1: party to do it because when you design a system again,
Speaker 1: you may be thinking of the obvious points of entry,
Speaker 1: which is where you've really really put in great security,
Speaker 1: right like you know, like there's no way anyone's gonna
Speaker 1: get through this, at least not in the next five years.
Speaker 1: We require people to use non alpha numeric characters. Well,
Speaker 1: that's great if they're going to use the password in
Speaker 1: case the door. Yeah. So again, that's why you want
Speaker 1: to have a third party, because they're not thinking the
Speaker 1: way you think. They're thinking how do I get into
Speaker 1: this system? Not not how strong do I make this door?
Speaker 1: And that wraps up another classic episode. Hope you guys
Speaker 1: enjoyed this walk down memory lane and the reminder that
Speaker 1: things can get pretty dicey out there. Uh though, sometimes
Speaker 1: you can find out that the people who attacked you
Speaker 1: aren't really terrible people, but sometimes do questionable things for
Speaker 1: weird motivations. I don't know how much comfort we can
Speaker 1: take in that, but I guess it's something anyway. If
Speaker 1: you guys have any suggestions for future episodes of tech Stuff.
Speaker 1: Feel free to reach out and let me know the
Speaker 1: email addresses tech Stuff at how stuff works dot com,
Speaker 1: or pop on over to our website that's tech stuff
Speaker 1: podcast dot com. You will f links to our presence
Speaker 1: on social media. Over there, you also find links to
Speaker 1: all of the archived episodes of tech Stuff, all of
Speaker 1: the episodes that have ever published, obviously not including the
Speaker 1: legendary lost episodes of tech Stuff. And you also find
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Speaker 1: Tech Stuff is a production of I Heart Radio's How
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