WEBVTT - TechStuff Classic: More Data, More Problems 0:00:04.240 --> 0:00:07.240 Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production of I Heart Radios, 0:00:07.320 --> 0:00:13.680 How Stuff Works. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. 0:00:13.720 --> 0:00:16.759 I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with 0:00:16.800 --> 0:00:18.599 How Stuff Works and I heart Radio and I love 0:00:18.680 --> 0:00:23.239 all things tech. And today we're gonna talk about a 0:00:23.320 --> 0:00:28.240 really pretty serious issue about hacking and personal information. That 0:00:28.400 --> 0:00:32.080 this was inspired by a real world incident that happened 0:00:32.200 --> 0:00:35.760 several years ago. This particular episode actually originally published on 0:00:35.800 --> 0:00:39.000 September three, two twelve, and at the time it was 0:00:39.040 --> 0:00:43.159 extremely topical. But I would argue that the message behind 0:00:43.200 --> 0:00:46.480 the show is one that we still should heed today, 0:00:46.520 --> 0:00:50.560 even though the actual incident now is more than seven 0:00:50.640 --> 0:00:54.640 years old. But this episode was called More Data, More Problems, 0:00:54.760 --> 0:00:58.160 and I hope you enjoy now when we're recording this, 0:00:58.360 --> 0:01:02.440 it's in August, early August twelve. It's August ten, actually, 0:01:03.000 --> 0:01:06.400 and earlier this week, there was a news story that 0:01:06.440 --> 0:01:09.960 broke throughout the Twitter sphere really first and then beyond 0:01:10.520 --> 0:01:15.120 about a tech journalist named Matt Honan who has written 0:01:15.240 --> 0:01:21.479 for various UH publications including Wired, and how he had 0:01:21.560 --> 0:01:25.880 his essentially his entire digital life hacked over the course 0:01:26.000 --> 0:01:30.920 of about thirty minutes and uh, and to kind of 0:01:30.959 --> 0:01:35.200 explain what happened. First, we'll sort of talk about the 0:01:35.840 --> 0:01:39.920 way he discovered this through his personal experience, and then 0:01:40.000 --> 0:01:42.560 how the hackers did it, and then what needs to 0:01:42.640 --> 0:01:46.120 happen so that we protect ourselves against such things happening 0:01:46.160 --> 0:01:50.560 in the future. So to start, he was he was 0:01:50.600 --> 0:01:53.720 playing with his kid and he noticed that his iPhone 0:01:54.000 --> 0:01:58.280 had shut down. It was so it crashed essentially, and 0:01:58.280 --> 0:01:59.960 he thought, oh, well, that's annoying. I guess I'll have 0:02:00.040 --> 0:02:03.520 to go and uh connected to my computer over store 0:02:03.560 --> 0:02:06.120 from back up and just get this thing going again. 0:02:06.200 --> 0:02:08.680 He didn't really think much of it, because you know, 0:02:08.760 --> 0:02:12.480 technology occasionally fails. Yes, So then he goes and he 0:02:12.560 --> 0:02:16.160 goes over to his computer and tries to start that up, 0:02:16.720 --> 0:02:20.280 and that also isn't loading up properly. It's asking him 0:02:20.360 --> 0:02:23.280 for information that he doesn't have and it won't accept 0:02:23.280 --> 0:02:26.440 his password, and so he's thinking, well, that's weird, but 0:02:26.520 --> 0:02:30.639 he doesn't again panic yet. Uh. He then thinks about 0:02:31.040 --> 0:02:36.280 trying his iPad, which also isn't working, and he tries 0:02:36.360 --> 0:02:41.280 logging into his Google account using a different computer, and 0:02:41.360 --> 0:02:45.800 that also gives him a failure, and it's at that 0:02:45.840 --> 0:02:49.440 point where he's thinking something seriously wrong is happening, and 0:02:49.480 --> 0:02:54.000 eventually he starts noticing that his own Twitter handle is 0:02:54.080 --> 0:02:57.320 posting stuff uh, and he's not the one doing it, 0:02:58.120 --> 0:03:01.120 and so he can't access his Twitter account anymore either. 0:03:01.320 --> 0:03:07.679 And they are these horrible Twitter messages with various you know, uh, 0:03:07.840 --> 0:03:12.440 inappropriate tweets going out things that are racist or homophobic 0:03:12.800 --> 0:03:16.359 or having lots of foul language in it um and 0:03:16.480 --> 0:03:20.680 it's just, you know, it's it's just beyond his control. 0:03:21.000 --> 0:03:22.720 He gets on the phone with Apple trying to find 0:03:22.720 --> 0:03:28.600 out what's going on, uh, to explain that his his 0:03:28.639 --> 0:03:32.640 account has been hacked, and it takes him quite some 0:03:32.720 --> 0:03:35.240 time before they're able to sort this out. Part of 0:03:35.240 --> 0:03:38.200 the reason is that they, for a while, we're looking 0:03:38.200 --> 0:03:41.360 at the wrong account. They had his name wrong, and 0:03:41.440 --> 0:03:43.520 so they were looking at an account that had none 0:03:43.520 --> 0:03:46.440 of the issues he was explaining. And then when the 0:03:46.680 --> 0:03:50.560 Apple representative repeated his name back to him, that's when 0:03:50.600 --> 0:03:52.720 he said, wait a minute, that's not who I am. 0:03:52.960 --> 0:03:55.800 I'm Matt Honan. You've got the wrong name. And then 0:03:55.840 --> 0:03:59.560 once they switched their focus, then they started seeing oh, 0:03:59.600 --> 0:04:03.400 well before you called in, and actually I think Honan 0:04:03.480 --> 0:04:07.000 had to ask about this. They didn't. They didn't volunteer 0:04:07.040 --> 0:04:09.800 this information. But before Honan had called in, someone else 0:04:09.840 --> 0:04:14.360 had called in to regain access. They said, to regain access. 0:04:14.360 --> 0:04:16.320 Really it was to gain access for the first time. 0:04:16.320 --> 0:04:18.839 It was the hackers who had called in too, because 0:04:18.839 --> 0:04:21.120 they had claimed that they no longer had the password 0:04:21.160 --> 0:04:24.720 or security question answers, so they could not get the 0:04:24.760 --> 0:04:27.720 password normally. They were trying to get into his dot 0:04:27.839 --> 0:04:33.919 me email right and the the reason for all of 0:04:33.960 --> 0:04:37.440 this is probably the craziest part of the story, although 0:04:37.839 --> 0:04:39.920 the pathway of how the hackers got to the point 0:04:39.960 --> 0:04:42.120 where they were able to do all these things. You know, 0:04:42.160 --> 0:04:44.520 once they got access to his iCloud account, they were 0:04:44.520 --> 0:04:46.599 able to do things like wipe his devices, which is 0:04:46.600 --> 0:04:49.839 what happened. They wiped his iPhone, his Mac, and his 0:04:50.000 --> 0:04:53.240 iPad in part to prevent him from being able to 0:04:53.279 --> 0:04:55.799 head them off. While they were going down this trail 0:04:56.640 --> 0:04:59.720 of hacking his digital life. They were also able because 0:05:00.040 --> 0:05:04.400 of the way he had interconnected various accounts. They were 0:05:04.400 --> 0:05:08.400 able to do things like reset his Google password, send 0:05:08.440 --> 0:05:11.520 the message to the dot Me address, which they already 0:05:11.520 --> 0:05:14.599 had access to. Yes, because they had gained it from Apple. 0:05:14.880 --> 0:05:17.080 Once they got the password for the Google account, then 0:05:17.120 --> 0:05:20.200 they were able to get the password for Twitter because 0:05:20.480 --> 0:05:23.919 that's where he had his Twitter account attached to his 0:05:23.960 --> 0:05:28.039 Google account, So it was kind of a leap frog thing, right, 0:05:28.080 --> 0:05:31.000 he would they could do a password recovery from one system, 0:05:31.000 --> 0:05:33.680 It would send the message to one of the email 0:05:33.680 --> 0:05:36.280 addresses that was already compromised, and then they would get 0:05:36.320 --> 0:05:39.200 access to the next thing. Turns out what the hackers 0:05:39.200 --> 0:05:42.479 were interested in from the very beginning was getting hold 0:05:42.600 --> 0:05:46.880 of his Twitter account and posting these messages. That's really 0:05:47.600 --> 0:05:49.920 just for laughs. That's all they really wanted to do. 0:05:49.960 --> 0:05:54.080 They weren't really out to make a big show that 0:05:54.240 --> 0:05:56.600 you know, it should be Matt Honan that should suffer 0:05:56.640 --> 0:05:59.640 for this. Uh. They had nothing to do with Gizmodo, 0:06:00.040 --> 0:06:04.799 which Owen had written for, and his account was linked 0:06:04.800 --> 0:06:07.839 to Gizmoto's account. It never been unlinked, even though he 0:06:07.880 --> 0:06:11.320 no longer wrote for Gizmoto, so they also had access 0:06:11.360 --> 0:06:13.800 to Gizmodo's Twitter account and hijack that for a while. 0:06:14.320 --> 0:06:17.680 Um so, you you know, it turned out the only 0:06:17.760 --> 0:06:21.120 reason they wanted to get his Twitter account was because 0:06:21.480 --> 0:06:24.159 he had one of the most rare things in Twitter. 0:06:24.640 --> 0:06:28.640 A three letter Twitter handle, yes, you know, because most 0:06:28.680 --> 0:06:31.560 people had to go with a longer Twitter handle because 0:06:31.600 --> 0:06:35.320 of course, once one's taken, it's gone. Yes, so people 0:06:35.360 --> 0:06:38.039 who managed to land one of those three letter accounts 0:06:38.080 --> 0:06:40.679 are rare, and so they thought, oh, this is that's 0:06:40.680 --> 0:06:43.320 that's why they targeted this particular Twitter account. Had nothing 0:06:43.320 --> 0:06:46.280 to do with him personally, had nothing to do with 0:06:46.320 --> 0:06:48.120 who he worked for, and had nothing to do with 0:06:48.120 --> 0:06:49.640 the fact that he was a tech journalist. It was 0:06:49.760 --> 0:06:52.960 just because his Twitter handle was three letters long. And 0:06:55.200 --> 0:06:58.240 that's crazy to me. First of all, that you know 0:06:58.320 --> 0:07:00.599 that that was the that they were were willing to 0:07:00.600 --> 0:07:02.720 go through, the steps that they had to go through 0:07:03.120 --> 0:07:06.599 in order to get this one Twitter account. Well, that's true, 0:07:06.800 --> 0:07:09.040 although it only took them a little less than an 0:07:09.040 --> 0:07:12.640 hour to accomplish. Once they had, once they had determined 0:07:12.680 --> 0:07:16.800 their route of attack, it was all over. So the 0:07:16.840 --> 0:07:20.920 way they did this was not through any kind of 0:07:21.000 --> 0:07:24.760 crazy sit down at the computer, type in the password 0:07:24.800 --> 0:07:27.400 three times and then you managed to get in type thing. 0:07:27.640 --> 0:07:32.120 And it certainly wasn't a Hollywood style hacker brute force 0:07:32.160 --> 0:07:36.240 attack where there was uh, you know, some group of 0:07:36.240 --> 0:07:38.920 of hackers trying everything they could to brute force their 0:07:38.960 --> 0:07:41.720 way in. Yeah, it wasn't like a computer program that 0:07:41.800 --> 0:07:44.160 was just running password after password and you see the 0:07:44.200 --> 0:07:48.080 little like digits flip up each time you hit one. 0:07:48.160 --> 0:07:52.000 That's correct, That wasn't what happened. What happened was much 0:07:52.080 --> 0:07:55.720 more simple, really in a way, because I had nothing 0:07:55.760 --> 0:07:59.040 to do with using code. It has everything to do 0:07:59.080 --> 0:08:02.200 with manipulating SISS stems, but from a person perspective, not 0:08:02.480 --> 0:08:07.080 or or a policy perspective, not from a technological one. Yeah. 0:08:07.320 --> 0:08:12.400 And it's it's also clear that although Apple's security procedures 0:08:12.960 --> 0:08:16.600 are in part to at fault, um, they are not 0:08:16.640 --> 0:08:20.560 the only ones the hackers targeted to get more information 0:08:20.680 --> 0:08:25.640 on on Honan and that um, it just so happened that, uh, 0:08:26.120 --> 0:08:31.440 the information they needed coincided across multiple companies with his accounts, 0:08:31.760 --> 0:08:34.800 and once they got some information from a couple of places, 0:08:34.840 --> 0:08:38.440 they were easily able to go in and fiddle with 0:08:38.480 --> 0:08:43.719 other stuff. There are really three parties that are I 0:08:43.920 --> 0:08:45.840 don't want to say at fault you don't blame the victim. 0:08:46.000 --> 0:08:47.920 There are three party There are three parties that made 0:08:47.920 --> 0:08:50.280 this possible for the hackers to get the access to 0:08:50.520 --> 0:08:53.920 to the accounts. One of those is Honan himself. Yeah, 0:08:54.240 --> 0:08:56.920 and he freely admits that, yes, if you he has 0:08:56.960 --> 0:09:03.480 written an incredible uh uh article that that documents this 0:09:03.720 --> 0:09:06.560 entire process and what he went through. He he blogged 0:09:06.559 --> 0:09:08.400 about it when it happened, but then he wrote up 0:09:08.800 --> 0:09:12.360 a much more comprehensive account of it for Wired and 0:09:12.480 --> 0:09:14.800 uh and it's a very interesting read. I highly recommend 0:09:14.840 --> 0:09:17.240 you read it, especially if you're concerned with your own 0:09:17.920 --> 0:09:23.840 potential security computer security. So he was at fault and 0:09:23.960 --> 0:09:26.840 not at fault. He was. He some of his choices 0:09:26.920 --> 0:09:32.400 made this possible. Uh. The Amazon, Amazon dot Com also, 0:09:32.840 --> 0:09:38.280 its policies made this possible, and Apple's policies made this possible. 0:09:38.320 --> 0:09:42.160 So those three parties together made it possible for the 0:09:42.200 --> 0:09:46.520 hackers to achieve this and uh and it's kind of 0:09:46.920 --> 0:09:49.960 interesting how how they came about it. Yeah, and and 0:09:50.120 --> 0:09:52.000 some of the irony as we get into this, is 0:09:52.040 --> 0:09:55.520 that some of the very things that made this possible 0:09:56.360 --> 0:10:01.920 are in place specifically to make it more difficult for 0:10:02.000 --> 0:10:06.720 someone to steal identities. So it actually uh, some of 0:10:06.760 --> 0:10:10.120 these some of these procedures actually worked in exactly the 0:10:10.120 --> 0:10:14.160 opposite way in which they weren't intended when they were implemented. 0:10:15.040 --> 0:10:20.480 So the way this started off was it was fairly clever. 0:10:20.640 --> 0:10:23.680 So they they first they started the hackers did a 0:10:23.679 --> 0:10:28.240 little recon work and they wanted to find out, um 0:10:28.280 --> 0:10:33.079 about how they would get uh the access to the 0:10:33.120 --> 0:10:36.200 Twitter account. And then they were able to find out 0:10:36.400 --> 0:10:42.200 Honan's uh email address because he has a website. They 0:10:42.240 --> 0:10:44.600 went to the website, they did a who is look 0:10:44.679 --> 0:10:47.520 up on Honan, which gave them two things, like two 0:10:47.520 --> 0:10:50.800 things they needed. They needed the email address and they 0:10:50.840 --> 0:10:54.400 needed his physical address. Yeah. Now, if you register a 0:10:54.480 --> 0:10:59.560 domain name, you are required to have contact information available. Um, 0:10:59.559 --> 0:11:04.240 and that information is publicly available now um some well 0:11:04.320 --> 0:11:06.120 we could talk about that too, but anyway, the the 0:11:06.200 --> 0:11:10.280 who is record for the domain had his information in it. Yeah. 0:11:10.440 --> 0:11:14.760 So once they had that information, the Google account and 0:11:14.800 --> 0:11:17.240 the just the email address didn't have access to the 0:11:17.320 --> 0:11:21.680 account yet. Um. They figured out that the Twitter account 0:11:21.840 --> 0:11:24.400 was linked to the personal website. That's what That's where 0:11:24.400 --> 0:11:26.240 they found the Gmail address, That's where they found the 0:11:26.800 --> 0:11:31.160 physical address. And then they started to look at the 0:11:31.200 --> 0:11:35.080 account recovery for a Google and without actually sending in 0:11:35.120 --> 0:11:39.280 a recovery request, they saw that the address, which was 0:11:39.320 --> 0:11:45.839 only partially obscured per Google's policy, wasn't at me dot 0:11:45.880 --> 0:11:50.080 com email address. That was the recovery address. Yeah, well 0:11:50.559 --> 0:11:54.960 that's an Apple thing, right. So that's where they said, Ah, 0:11:55.120 --> 0:11:58.040 now we know how to get at him because it's 0:11:58.400 --> 0:12:03.120 because his Google address, uh will go back if we 0:12:03.200 --> 0:12:05.200 did a password recovery, because that will go to an 0:12:05.240 --> 0:12:08.200 Apple address. And because we know how to manipulate the 0:12:08.200 --> 0:12:10.720 system so that we can get access to his Apple account. 0:12:11.400 --> 0:12:13.880 It's all over. And the way they got access to 0:12:13.880 --> 0:12:17.520 the Apple account was kind of interesting. Now, they did 0:12:17.600 --> 0:12:21.440 not have the password, they did not have the answer 0:12:21.480 --> 0:12:25.480 to security questions. So calling up Apple and getting access 0:12:25.520 --> 0:12:28.719 to this account would require that they have some other information. 0:12:29.080 --> 0:12:32.200 What Apple requires is that you have to have the 0:12:32.240 --> 0:12:35.199 building address and the last four digits of the credit 0:12:35.240 --> 0:12:40.840 card you used to establish that account. So what the 0:12:40.840 --> 0:12:44.360 hackers did was they said, well, there's a good chance 0:12:44.920 --> 0:12:48.959 that the same credit card this guy used to establish 0:12:49.080 --> 0:12:53.920 his iCloud account is the one that he uses for Amazon. 0:12:55.280 --> 0:12:59.520 And so instead of calling Apple first, they called Amazon first, 0:13:00.120 --> 0:13:03.480 and they said that they wanted to add a credit 0:13:03.520 --> 0:13:08.480 card number to the existing Amazon account. That's right, So 0:13:08.520 --> 0:13:10.320 they weren't trying to get the credit card number. They 0:13:10.320 --> 0:13:12.439 wanted to add a credit card number, right, So then 0:13:12.480 --> 0:13:15.440 they add a credit card number to the Amazon account. 0:13:15.920 --> 0:13:19.120 Then they hang up. Then they call Amazon back and 0:13:19.120 --> 0:13:22.160 they say that they have lost access to their account 0:13:23.200 --> 0:13:26.880 and that they will provide the name, the billing address, 0:13:26.920 --> 0:13:28.800 which they already have from the who is look up 0:13:28.840 --> 0:13:33.120 of the website, and then the credit card number they 0:13:33.160 --> 0:13:37.320 gave at the at the call they made earlier. So 0:13:37.440 --> 0:13:40.840 there's now this credit card number that is legit because 0:13:40.920 --> 0:13:43.760 they provided it. It's not the same one that was 0:13:43.840 --> 0:13:46.640 used to establish the account in the first place. So 0:13:46.679 --> 0:13:50.080 then Amazon says, oh, all right, well we'll send you 0:13:50.120 --> 0:13:53.320 the password to the account. Here's which email addressed you 0:13:53.760 --> 0:13:58.200 wanted to go to. So they hackers give their email 0:13:58.200 --> 0:14:00.760 address or an email address that they have created for 0:14:00.800 --> 0:14:04.480 the purposes of this hack. So now Amazon sends the 0:14:04.559 --> 0:14:09.840 log in information to UH to Amazon dot Com to 0:14:09.960 --> 0:14:15.240 that account, to the email they log into the Amazon 0:14:15.320 --> 0:14:18.199 dot Com account, and then they look for the other 0:14:18.679 --> 0:14:21.520 credit card number, the one that was actually used to 0:14:21.640 --> 0:14:25.520 establish that account. So this is Honan's actual final four digits, 0:14:25.520 --> 0:14:30.280 because those are unmasked in the Amazon dot Com system. Yes, 0:14:30.760 --> 0:14:33.000 they mask the rest of it, right, Yeah, the rest 0:14:33.040 --> 0:14:34.840 of the numbers are mass So it's not that the 0:14:34.880 --> 0:14:37.600 hackers ever had access to the credit card, other than 0:14:37.960 --> 0:14:39.800 they could have bought a whole bunch of stuff on 0:14:39.840 --> 0:14:44.080 Amazon and had it sent somewhere. But that's all. That's. Yeah, 0:14:44.120 --> 0:14:46.080 that's what they could have done if they had wanted to, 0:14:46.360 --> 0:14:49.200 But they could not actually pull the credit card number 0:14:49.200 --> 0:14:51.960 itself other than the last four digits. But those last 0:14:51.960 --> 0:14:56.080 four digits are what Apple needs for account verification, right, 0:14:56.720 --> 0:14:59.760 So they take those four digits, they've got the building address, 0:15:00.080 --> 0:15:02.560 they give a call to Apple, they give that information, 0:15:02.680 --> 0:15:06.560 and because Honan used the same billing address and the 0:15:06.600 --> 0:15:11.080 same credit card for both services, Apple said, oh, well 0:15:11.120 --> 0:15:14.160 then you're clearly this guy. We will send you the 0:15:14.200 --> 0:15:19.400 account retrieval information to your email address. So then they 0:15:19.440 --> 0:15:23.760 now have the way to log into Honan's iCloud account. 0:15:23.760 --> 0:15:27.479 They do that. That's where they then disable his devices. 0:15:27.520 --> 0:15:30.760 They wipe them to help slow things down so they 0:15:30.760 --> 0:15:34.320 can continue to do this stuff. Now they have access 0:15:34.360 --> 0:15:37.280 to his Apple email, they have access to his Amazon account. 0:15:37.720 --> 0:15:41.360 That's when they go to the Google password recovery asked 0:15:41.440 --> 0:15:45.000 for the recovery information so that they can access his 0:15:45.040 --> 0:15:48.920 Google account. Well, that goes to his Apple address, which 0:15:48.920 --> 0:15:52.400 they already have access to. The information comes to the 0:15:52.440 --> 0:15:54.960 Apple address, they go into the Google account. They immediately 0:15:55.000 --> 0:16:00.760 delete the password recovery UH email out of his account 0:16:00.840 --> 0:16:03.280 so that if he has any other devices that would 0:16:03.320 --> 0:16:08.760 alert him that his password had been changed, that he 0:16:08.800 --> 0:16:11.520 would not be aware of it. So they they hide 0:16:11.560 --> 0:16:14.280 that they changed the password, so that now they've locked 0:16:14.360 --> 0:16:17.040 him out, they have access to his Google account. They 0:16:17.040 --> 0:16:18.840 then were able to go and get access to the 0:16:18.840 --> 0:16:25.040 Twitter account. Um, this is kind of scary, and again 0:16:25.120 --> 0:16:27.920 it has nothing to do with sitting down encoding stuff. 0:16:28.080 --> 0:16:30.960 It is hacking. You're hacking a system, but you're doing 0:16:31.000 --> 0:16:36.680 it more through social engineering and manipulating policies and systems. 0:16:36.720 --> 0:16:39.440 So if you guys remember we had that discussion and 0:16:39.520 --> 0:16:41.560 I think it was episode three ninety nine where we 0:16:41.600 --> 0:16:45.080 interviewed Brian Brushwood and we talked about social engineering. Now 0:16:45.080 --> 0:16:48.560 with Brushwood, his approach to social engineering is more about 0:16:49.080 --> 0:16:52.600 you know, having fun and uh, like, you're in a 0:16:52.640 --> 0:16:55.640 social situation where you you know, you never have to 0:16:55.680 --> 0:16:58.400 buy a drink because you're doing these cool things and 0:16:58.440 --> 0:17:01.280 convincing other people to buy drinks for you, or you know, 0:17:01.320 --> 0:17:03.920 you're doing something so that you can get the phone 0:17:04.000 --> 0:17:06.919 number of someone you're interested in. So you're still social 0:17:06.920 --> 0:17:11.880 engineering people. But it's not necessarily this as nefarious as 0:17:12.040 --> 0:17:15.719 as what these hackers were doing. Yeah, and it's not 0:17:15.800 --> 0:17:19.600 typically what one thinks of when one thinks of identity theft. 0:17:19.600 --> 0:17:23.040 I mean again, Um, a lot of us would look 0:17:23.080 --> 0:17:26.240 at the specifically maybe the Amazon portion of this or 0:17:26.280 --> 0:17:28.760 an online retail portion of this and say, oh, well, 0:17:28.800 --> 0:17:30.919 they got access to his credit card number, they can 0:17:30.960 --> 0:17:32.879 buy stuff well you and and in a lot of 0:17:32.920 --> 0:17:37.199 cases that maybe what a hacker might try to do. 0:17:37.960 --> 0:17:42.600 After all, we have talked about uh online systems being 0:17:42.640 --> 0:17:46.679 hacked for financial information and financial gain, but that's not 0:17:46.960 --> 0:17:50.119 the point of this. Um, the system that I was 0:17:50.119 --> 0:17:52.200 speaking of a few minutes ago, when I was saying 0:17:52.280 --> 0:17:55.680 that ironically, some of these things were turned against him 0:17:56.280 --> 0:17:59.200 tools that would be used to protect him. Um, if 0:17:59.240 --> 0:18:03.159 you're not in an Apple customer, you may not be 0:18:03.240 --> 0:18:07.000 aware there's a there's a uh an I cloud system 0:18:07.560 --> 0:18:10.920 called find my and there're a couple of them like 0:18:11.000 --> 0:18:15.720 to find my iPhone. Yeah. Um, so let's say Uh, 0:18:15.760 --> 0:18:18.320 you know, we're talking completely behind here. Let's say you 0:18:18.359 --> 0:18:21.600 have an iPhone and your kids run off with it 0:18:21.680 --> 0:18:25.080 and stuffed it somewhere in some piece of furniture or 0:18:25.200 --> 0:18:27.520 dropped it and or you left it in a cab, 0:18:27.760 --> 0:18:29.320 or you left it in a cab. Well, if you're 0:18:29.359 --> 0:18:32.800 if you're Natalie Dell Conti, well yeah, um, well, I 0:18:33.320 --> 0:18:35.280 was going to start with the the easy one. You 0:18:35.320 --> 0:18:37.159 can make it. You can make your phone make a 0:18:37.200 --> 0:18:39.760 noise so you know it's in the house, but you 0:18:39.760 --> 0:18:41.959 can't figure out where it went. I'd like to have 0:18:41.960 --> 0:18:43.760 one of these for my keys and maybe the remote. 0:18:44.160 --> 0:18:46.239 But you know you can you can make it make 0:18:46.240 --> 0:18:48.440 a noise, or if you've left it in a cab, 0:18:49.320 --> 0:18:53.199 you can have it tell you roughly where it is. Uh. 0:18:53.320 --> 0:18:55.280 This is especially useful if you can't remember if you 0:18:55.359 --> 0:18:57.520 left it in a cab, or if you at a 0:18:57.600 --> 0:19:00.840 restaurant whatever, or you know, you were at bar and 0:19:01.160 --> 0:19:05.760 you had a prototype version of the newest iPhone and 0:19:05.800 --> 0:19:07.280 it was sitting on the stool next to you when 0:19:07.280 --> 0:19:08.639 you were sitting there at the bar, but then when 0:19:08.640 --> 0:19:11.080 you turned around, it was gone, and then it ends 0:19:11.160 --> 0:19:15.240 up at some tech blog. Yeah, that could happen. Yeah, 0:19:15.440 --> 0:19:19.080 there their Twitter feed could be hacked to UM. But yeah, 0:19:19.160 --> 0:19:20.959 I mean, so you can find out where it is. 0:19:21.040 --> 0:19:22.520 You can have it make a noise so that if 0:19:22.560 --> 0:19:25.040 it is in the same location as you are, Uh, 0:19:25.080 --> 0:19:27.360 you know you can you can track it down. UM 0:19:27.760 --> 0:19:29.359 if you don't know where it is, Let's say you 0:19:29.359 --> 0:19:31.920 did leave it in a in a bar somewhere and 0:19:32.119 --> 0:19:35.080 uh you say, oh, well, you know it's not I 0:19:35.119 --> 0:19:37.240 don't know where that is, and you could see a 0:19:37.280 --> 0:19:39.119 location it shows you on the map where where it 0:19:39.200 --> 0:19:42.160 might be. Oh, it's no longer in my control. It's 0:19:42.240 --> 0:19:44.720 somewhere where I don't know where it is. I'm I 0:19:44.760 --> 0:19:47.480 have sensitive information on there. My my calendars on there, 0:19:47.560 --> 0:19:51.080 my contacts are on there. Um as as Honan himself said, 0:19:51.119 --> 0:19:56.800 you know he had um information from many other tech journalists. UM, 0:19:57.280 --> 0:19:59.639 so he might just let's say he was still in 0:19:59.680 --> 0:20:01.879 control of his accounts, but no longer in control of 0:20:01.920 --> 0:20:05.440 the device. He could say, wipe this device. I don't 0:20:05.480 --> 0:20:09.119 want anything on it anymore, you know, I want to 0:20:09.119 --> 0:20:11.440 wipe it clean so that nobody else gains information in 0:20:11.560 --> 0:20:13.720 my personal stuff. It's only a matter of time before 0:20:13.760 --> 0:20:17.160 they figure out my my pass code, wipe it clean. 0:20:17.480 --> 0:20:18.760 You know, you can tell it to do that and 0:20:18.840 --> 0:20:22.080 will remotely do that. Apple has added that for the 0:20:22.119 --> 0:20:26.040 Mac to find my Mac. So in that case, let's 0:20:26.040 --> 0:20:32.200 say he had corporate information. Many companies have have this 0:20:32.480 --> 0:20:35.200 policy in place. Yes, you can check your corporate email 0:20:35.240 --> 0:20:38.880 on your personal device, but if you do that, um, 0:20:39.000 --> 0:20:42.280 we retain the right to wipe the information on the device. 0:20:42.440 --> 0:20:46.680 If it should fall into somebody else's hands. Or let's 0:20:46.720 --> 0:20:49.480 say that you were to uh, you were to to 0:20:50.080 --> 0:20:53.600 either be fired or you you know, you left or whatever, 0:20:53.600 --> 0:20:55.639 they might retain that right so that they can protect 0:20:55.640 --> 0:20:58.760 themselves as a corporate entity. Yeah, so there there are 0:20:59.160 --> 0:21:02.520 positive reason uh to be able to do this in 0:21:02.520 --> 0:21:07.159 this case. Once the hackers gained information about his account 0:21:07.160 --> 0:21:09.240 and we're able to get access to his account and 0:21:09.280 --> 0:21:14.480 lock him out, um, they also chose to completely wipe 0:21:14.560 --> 0:21:21.040 his phone, his iPad, and his Mac laptop. And in 0:21:21.080 --> 0:21:24.840 doing so, they not only wiped out any you know, 0:21:25.280 --> 0:21:28.760 corporate information. He's he's a freelance writer, so any articles 0:21:28.800 --> 0:21:30.040 he might have been working on that we're on his 0:21:30.160 --> 0:21:34.400 hard drive gone. He also lost a year's worth or more, 0:21:34.440 --> 0:21:38.440 I guess the photos of personal photos personal stuff that 0:21:38.440 --> 0:21:43.879 that he had created. And yeah, Liz leads us to 0:21:43.960 --> 0:21:47.520 the the thing that we have said a billion times 0:21:47.520 --> 0:21:50.439 on this podcast that is an exaggeration, but back up 0:21:50.480 --> 0:21:54.199 your data. Yeah, and he admits he admits he was 0:21:54.240 --> 0:21:57.080 not regularly backing up his hard drive. This is not 0:21:57.480 --> 0:22:00.119 to pick on him or anything else. It's something that 0:22:00.160 --> 0:22:02.879 he wishes in retrospect he had been doing on a 0:22:02.880 --> 0:22:07.520 regular basis. Because, um, oddly enough, this is where this 0:22:07.520 --> 0:22:10.840 this is where the story takes an unusual turn. He 0:22:10.880 --> 0:22:13.680 has been in contact with his hackers and has agreed 0:22:13.760 --> 0:22:18.359 not to in return, they were telling him how they 0:22:18.359 --> 0:22:21.040 did it. Yes, and uh, I think first of all, 0:22:21.080 --> 0:22:24.040 the first thing we can agree on easily is that 0:22:24.119 --> 0:22:28.600 Amazon has to change its policy. Well, yeah, because because 0:22:29.400 --> 0:22:32.360 that's the first step that means that anyone could access 0:22:32.400 --> 0:22:38.080 anyone else's Amazon accounting. This Well, um, I wasn't going 0:22:38.119 --> 0:22:40.320 to get there quite yet. I wanted to make the 0:22:40.359 --> 0:22:43.359 point that this is where it kind of gets a 0:22:43.400 --> 0:22:47.320 little weird, because they they shared all this information with him. 0:22:47.920 --> 0:22:49.639 This is how he was able to write such a 0:22:49.680 --> 0:22:54.040 comprehensive post on onn Wired about it was. They told 0:22:54.119 --> 0:22:57.000 him what they were doing, what the point of it was, Um, 0:22:57.040 --> 0:23:00.359 they admitted, look, you know, we weren't trying to deal 0:23:00.480 --> 0:23:03.120 your your stuff. We weren't really trying to wipe out 0:23:03.119 --> 0:23:06.160 your your personal life. We have nothing against you personally. 0:23:06.560 --> 0:23:10.520 We wanted your Twitter account. Um. The guy that that 0:23:10.520 --> 0:23:16.240 that he talked to primarily UM was saying, essentially, hey, 0:23:17.240 --> 0:23:19.160 you know, my partner was the one who wiped out 0:23:19.160 --> 0:23:22.200 your computer. And now that you tell me, all your 0:23:22.240 --> 0:23:25.160 personal files, your your the pictures of your your kid 0:23:25.240 --> 0:23:29.560 were on here. I'm really sorry. I'm actually really sorry. 0:23:29.600 --> 0:23:32.240 I didn't mean to to cause you personal harm as 0:23:32.240 --> 0:23:35.000 a result of this. And and they say, now, I 0:23:35.040 --> 0:23:38.760 don't know, you know, I don't know whether their motives 0:23:38.760 --> 0:23:40.959 are are as pure as they say. You know, they 0:23:40.960 --> 0:23:42.800 say part of it was that they wanted to point 0:23:42.800 --> 0:23:46.240 out that it really is this easy to hack into 0:23:46.240 --> 0:23:48.680 your personal account. They wanted to draw attention to that. Now, 0:23:50.119 --> 0:23:53.160 I say that all the time. I suspect, based upon 0:23:53.560 --> 0:23:58.160 the messages that they posted on Twitter, that that's something 0:23:58.160 --> 0:24:01.800 they they that's covering the tracks. I think they were 0:24:01.800 --> 0:24:05.280 doing it for the kicks. Yes, exactly. Well, if you're 0:24:05.280 --> 0:24:08.240 looking at again, if you're reading the Twitter, the Twitter 0:24:08.960 --> 0:24:11.240 posts that he that were posted under his name, and 0:24:11.240 --> 0:24:13.840 there were a lot that he left there. He says, 0:24:13.880 --> 0:24:15.320 I wanted to keep a record of it. He did 0:24:15.359 --> 0:24:20.680 delete some because they were overly hurtful offensive. Yes, and 0:24:20.840 --> 0:24:24.000 he said, you know, these could actually cause people to 0:24:24.080 --> 0:24:26.879 feel badly about themselves, and I don't want that. I 0:24:26.920 --> 0:24:28.959 do want there to be a record of what had happened, 0:24:28.960 --> 0:24:31.119 but not at that, not that, not at the expense 0:24:31.160 --> 0:24:34.760 of someone else's feelings, um, other than my own obviously. 0:24:35.080 --> 0:24:37.120 So then he went out and he deleted the ones 0:24:37.160 --> 0:24:39.560 they felt were particularly offensive, and then the rest he 0:24:39.680 --> 0:24:44.040 left up. If you read those, I think it's it's 0:24:44.080 --> 0:24:47.919 pretty hard to defend yourself with. I'm just showing how 0:24:48.560 --> 0:24:51.560 the system can be hacked. It's more than that. It's 0:24:51.600 --> 0:24:55.280 also hey, you know, ha ha, we did it, you know, 0:24:56.040 --> 0:24:58.240 And and it's so it goes beyond that. And I 0:24:58.280 --> 0:25:03.080 think it's very telling the hacker he got in touch with, 0:25:04.119 --> 0:25:07.639 assuming that the what he the information he gave was 0:25:07.680 --> 0:25:11.000 accurate about himself, about the hacker himself as a young 0:25:11.040 --> 0:25:15.320 guy nineteen years old, might not quite really get be 0:25:15.480 --> 0:25:20.919 mature enough to realize, you know, what the consequences are 0:25:20.960 --> 0:25:24.119 of those actions. And what how they could affect the 0:25:24.200 --> 0:25:28.280 target beyond just oh, you know, they're thinking, we have 0:25:28.359 --> 0:25:31.440 a goal, we want to get hold of this Twitter account. 0:25:31.560 --> 0:25:34.960 They're not thinking of what consequences are going to be 0:25:35.359 --> 0:25:37.600 felt by the target beyond just the fact that our 0:25:37.600 --> 0:25:40.760 Twitter handle has been taken over. And so some of 0:25:40.800 --> 0:25:42.960 them may just be that they were very narrowly focused 0:25:42.960 --> 0:25:44.639 on what they wanted to do and they didn't really 0:25:44.640 --> 0:25:47.840 consider what could happen or how it would feel for 0:25:47.880 --> 0:25:51.600 that sort of stuff to happen to a person. Um. 0:25:51.760 --> 0:25:54.280 So that's that's something there too, and we see that 0:25:54.320 --> 0:25:55.840 a lot. I mean, there are a lot of hackers 0:25:55.840 --> 0:25:58.639 out there who because they can do something, they'll do 0:25:58.680 --> 0:26:02.240 it and they don't realize or they don't care what 0:26:02.280 --> 0:26:04.560 the consequences of that action are going to be to 0:26:04.680 --> 0:26:07.200 the people who are also involved in that whatever that 0:26:07.320 --> 0:26:10.959 situation is. Hey, guys, Jonathan from two thousand nineteen, just 0:26:11.160 --> 0:26:13.320 interrupting this episode to say, we're going to take a 0:26:13.400 --> 0:26:24.439 quick break, but we'll be right back. So maybe maybe 0:26:24.480 --> 0:26:28.919 now this According to the article, it sounds like this 0:26:28.960 --> 0:26:33.720 guy is at least a little remorseful, and remorseful yes, 0:26:33.840 --> 0:26:36.560 that he's feeling some remorse for this, and you know, 0:26:36.680 --> 0:26:42.000 we don't know if really, like he was at all 0:26:42.400 --> 0:26:46.639 culpable in the actual deletion. He claims that it was 0:26:46.680 --> 0:26:48.359 the other guy who did it, but you know, you 0:26:48.400 --> 0:26:53.000 never know. So it's interesting to look at that. And 0:26:53.760 --> 0:26:55.600 you know, if if you kind of put yourself in 0:26:55.680 --> 0:27:00.359 the shoes of the the hacker, um, you know, especially 0:27:00.400 --> 0:27:03.280 if you're thinking of somebody who is doing it for 0:27:03.280 --> 0:27:07.120 for fun, to mess with somebody, and and the person says, hey, look, 0:27:07.119 --> 0:27:08.919 I'm not going to press charges against you, but I 0:27:08.960 --> 0:27:11.720 want to know how how you did it. He started thinking, hey, 0:27:11.760 --> 0:27:13.160 this guy is working with me. You know, the heat 0:27:13.160 --> 0:27:16.360 of the moments off, the sense of accomplishment you get 0:27:16.400 --> 0:27:20.879 from hacking in and gaining access to all this information. 0:27:21.200 --> 0:27:22.960 You know, after the fact, you've had a chance to 0:27:22.960 --> 0:27:25.080 cool down, they've had a chance to cool down. You 0:27:25.119 --> 0:27:27.480 start thinking about it like, well, you know what, this 0:27:27.560 --> 0:27:30.440 guy is not angry enough with me to to press 0:27:30.520 --> 0:27:35.200 charges with the cops. You know, we kind of damaged 0:27:35.240 --> 0:27:37.120 this guy and he's willing to talk to us about 0:27:37.160 --> 0:27:40.480 it and share the story online. You know, they kind 0:27:40.480 --> 0:27:42.560 of got something out of it too. They kind of 0:27:42.560 --> 0:27:46.879 got a little anonymity anonymous press, so they get to 0:27:46.960 --> 0:27:50.200 point to themselves and say, hey, look he's talking about us. 0:27:51.200 --> 0:27:53.440 He doesn't seem like such a bad guy. I guess 0:27:53.440 --> 0:27:56.560 we kind of you know, burned a lot of stuff 0:27:56.680 --> 0:28:00.800 of his online that kind of stay ex We were 0:28:00.840 --> 0:28:02.359 really kind of doing it for the fun of it, 0:28:02.440 --> 0:28:07.880 and now it's so much fun as a decent guy. 0:28:07.960 --> 0:28:09.840 Now you know that there's a real person on the 0:28:09.840 --> 0:28:11.399 other end of that account. That's the other thing is 0:28:11.440 --> 0:28:14.679 there's a dehumanizing effects sometimes with the whole you know, 0:28:14.720 --> 0:28:17.240 you don't really identify the fact that there's a person 0:28:17.320 --> 0:28:20.440 on the other end of these accounts. Sometimes you don't. 0:28:20.720 --> 0:28:23.840 It doesn't the concept isn't fully formed. For for a 0:28:23.840 --> 0:28:26.040 lot of us, we would have gone out and if 0:28:26.040 --> 0:28:28.240 we had found out who did it, we would have 0:28:28.320 --> 0:28:30.760 pressed charges. We would have wanted to take them. Now 0:28:30.960 --> 0:28:33.600 some of us would have re enacted the film taken 0:28:35.240 --> 0:28:37.760 but I will find you. But yeah, that that's that's 0:28:37.800 --> 0:28:42.080 what makes this story more interesting than other hacking stories, 0:28:42.160 --> 0:28:46.680 I think is that that it's got a humanizing factor 0:28:46.720 --> 0:28:50.400 to character for both parties. The person who or people 0:28:50.480 --> 0:28:54.760 who took advantage of of honing and honing himself, and 0:28:55.240 --> 0:29:00.440 it does point to security issues. Now, these are sitimate 0:29:00.520 --> 0:29:05.040 for UM. You think about your Amazon account, for example, 0:29:05.160 --> 0:29:07.360 Let's say you don't have anything else except an email 0:29:07.400 --> 0:29:10.840 account and an Amazon account. By and large, you probably 0:29:10.840 --> 0:29:14.320 wouldn't have a lot of these security issues. The security 0:29:14.360 --> 0:29:17.200 issues that Amazon would have in place would make it 0:29:17.560 --> 0:29:20.080 very difficult for them for someone else to get that 0:29:20.120 --> 0:29:23.960 information from them. But then you start sharing. You start 0:29:24.080 --> 0:29:28.680 using this UM email address with Amazon and every other 0:29:28.720 --> 0:29:32.360 company that you do business with online. That makes your 0:29:32.440 --> 0:29:37.440 email address a a key to getting information from other companies. 0:29:38.360 --> 0:29:41.520 And then you start doing business with other pieces. You've 0:29:41.560 --> 0:29:46.120 got the same credit card number across these different companies, 0:29:46.560 --> 0:29:48.400 and once you have the last four digits of your 0:29:48.400 --> 0:29:52.480 social Security number or a credit card number, that makes 0:29:52.520 --> 0:29:55.520 it possible to use that information as a key across 0:29:55.720 --> 0:29:59.360 multiple entities. And all of a sudden, if you do 0:29:59.440 --> 0:30:02.400 business with a whole bunch of places, they get something 0:30:02.440 --> 0:30:07.040 like your physical address, your name, your email address, a 0:30:07.080 --> 0:30:09.560 credit card number, any of that stuff, and they've got 0:30:09.600 --> 0:30:14.640 the keys to open lots and lots of accounts for 0:30:14.640 --> 0:30:17.080 for them to get more information. And once they've hacked one, 0:30:17.680 --> 0:30:20.200 they can get information that will let them into lots 0:30:20.200 --> 0:30:22.640 and lots of other places. Oh, they have an Amazon account. 0:30:22.680 --> 0:30:24.280 I wonder if they have a Barnes and Noble account. 0:30:24.320 --> 0:30:26.400 We could find out in about ten minutes. Yea. So 0:30:26.760 --> 0:30:31.200 Honan admits that his password was not the strongest. It 0:30:31.280 --> 0:30:35.680 was a seven seven digit alpha numeric password, but that 0:30:35.800 --> 0:30:38.040 it was one he had used for many years. But 0:30:38.120 --> 0:30:42.360 they haven't. They didn't really use it, right, So that's 0:30:42.400 --> 0:30:44.320 that's the point of this thing, is that even if 0:30:44.320 --> 0:30:47.000 he had had the strongest password in the world, it 0:30:47.000 --> 0:30:50.760 would not have mattered because they circumvented that, right. They didn't. 0:30:50.880 --> 0:30:55.120 They weren't attacking through that direction. And this this demonstrates 0:30:55.160 --> 0:30:59.600 why security is so tough, because you think about the 0:30:59.640 --> 0:31:03.120 most obvious point of entry, which would be the log 0:31:03.200 --> 0:31:05.800 in right your user name and your password. That's the 0:31:05.800 --> 0:31:09.160 most obvious point because that's the way we access our information. 0:31:09.920 --> 0:31:12.520 Hackers are looking at a system and saying, what's the 0:31:12.560 --> 0:31:16.000 best vulnerable spot to go in at And if the 0:31:16.040 --> 0:31:18.840 front door is heavily locked, you look for a window 0:31:19.000 --> 0:31:21.160 or a backdoor, You look for something else it's gonna 0:31:21.240 --> 0:31:23.920 let you get into there, and not even you just 0:31:24.000 --> 0:31:27.360 bypass the place where you've got all the security and 0:31:27.400 --> 0:31:29.320 you go in through a different entrance. So when I 0:31:29.360 --> 0:31:31.680 said that Amazon really needs to work on its policy, 0:31:32.200 --> 0:31:34.080 mainly the reason for that is that the only thing 0:31:34.080 --> 0:31:38.280 you need in order to get that that lug and 0:31:38.320 --> 0:31:43.320 recovery information was the credit card number that's associated with 0:31:43.360 --> 0:31:46.840 the account, which they did by adding in one the 0:31:46.840 --> 0:31:51.880 building address and an email address, and that's it, um uh. 0:31:52.120 --> 0:31:54.680 And in order to add the credit card number, all 0:31:54.720 --> 0:31:57.760 you need is the building address and the email address 0:31:57.800 --> 0:32:02.280 that is associated with the account. So you know, using 0:32:02.360 --> 0:32:06.680 some guesswork, thinking that okay, well he's got an Amazon account, 0:32:07.240 --> 0:32:09.840 he's probably got an Amazon account. He's probably using this 0:32:09.960 --> 0:32:13.520 address for that Amazon account. We know his address because 0:32:13.520 --> 0:32:17.080 we looked it up from his website. We can create 0:32:17.240 --> 0:32:21.520 fabricate a a a credit card using a generator that 0:32:21.560 --> 0:32:26.720 creates a realistic but not actually activated credit card number 0:32:28.200 --> 0:32:30.880 and assign that to the Amazon account and then use 0:32:30.920 --> 0:32:34.280 that to get the entry point. So obviously Amazon needs 0:32:34.320 --> 0:32:37.040 to fix that because if all you have is a 0:32:37.040 --> 0:32:39.680 person's address, and you have a good guess at what 0:32:39.800 --> 0:32:43.400 email address they use for that Amazon account, then you 0:32:43.440 --> 0:32:46.840 could do the same thing. And so that's that's a. 0:32:47.360 --> 0:32:50.800 That's number one. Number two would be the fact that 0:32:51.440 --> 0:32:54.600 Apple uses the last four digits of the credit card, 0:32:55.040 --> 0:32:59.560 the building and the building address as a security recovery method. 0:33:00.800 --> 0:33:05.000 Clearly that needs to to change in some way. Yeah, 0:33:05.040 --> 0:33:07.320 I think I think this is a uh they're there 0:33:07.320 --> 0:33:09.840 are a couple of things. Now, if you read uh, 0:33:09.960 --> 0:33:13.160 there's an account on Honan's tumbler and if you want 0:33:13.200 --> 0:33:18.400 to read some truly hurtful comments, I would suggest reading that. 0:33:19.040 --> 0:33:23.240 Um because some people blame him for owning Apple devices, 0:33:23.560 --> 0:33:27.080 which is ridiculous. In fact, that the one that that 0:33:27.160 --> 0:33:29.000 bugged me probably the most was the one that said, 0:33:29.160 --> 0:33:31.920 serves him right for owning I crap. And I'm going 0:33:32.280 --> 0:33:34.800 you know this, this really could have happened with pretty 0:33:34.880 --> 0:33:39.640 much any manufacturer or it's just I mean, Apple had 0:33:39.640 --> 0:33:41.920 policies that they were able to leverage. That's not to 0:33:41.960 --> 0:33:45.440 say that other companies don't have those same policies, and 0:33:45.440 --> 0:33:47.480 it's just that Apples were well known to them. So 0:33:47.600 --> 0:33:51.360 that's how they, once they saw the me dot com addresses, 0:33:51.360 --> 0:33:53.760 said all right, we know how to do this. Yeah. 0:33:53.840 --> 0:33:57.720 And the thing is, I would say the vast majority 0:33:57.760 --> 0:34:02.760 of online retailers or or companies that have that offer 0:34:02.840 --> 0:34:05.720 services online. UM, I mean they knew how to get 0:34:05.720 --> 0:34:09.640 into a Google account to um and and a lot 0:34:09.719 --> 0:34:11.920 of them have the same policies. So if you can 0:34:11.960 --> 0:34:14.120 get as they did, if you can get one piece, 0:34:14.560 --> 0:34:17.640 then you can apply it to other pieces and get 0:34:17.719 --> 0:34:21.400 information from them and put the whole puzzle together that way. 0:34:21.480 --> 0:34:24.399 So it's not while while I've seen people singling out 0:34:24.440 --> 0:34:28.279 Apple and Amazon and um And, they should to some 0:34:28.320 --> 0:34:34.680 degree be uh considering new stuff, it's not just their fault. 0:34:34.800 --> 0:34:37.920 The catch twenty two here is once you make an 0:34:37.960 --> 0:34:43.840 account so locked down that it's extremely hard to get into, 0:34:44.120 --> 0:34:46.920 it's also hard for you to get into when you 0:34:47.040 --> 0:34:50.800 do forget your password, when you do forget what credit 0:34:50.840 --> 0:34:54.360 card you used. Say you've got ten credit cards. UM, 0:34:54.680 --> 0:34:57.160 let's say you you shredded one of them because you 0:34:57.200 --> 0:34:59.719 don't use that card anymore. But that's the one that 0:34:59.800 --> 0:35:03.040 you set up the account with two years ago. Now 0:35:03.040 --> 0:35:06.200 you can't get back in. So and so if they 0:35:06.239 --> 0:35:09.359 lock it down this too hard, then you can't get 0:35:09.400 --> 0:35:12.640 back in either. So that's why they make a Yeah, 0:35:12.640 --> 0:35:15.399 that's why they make those those pieces available. Well, can 0:35:15.440 --> 0:35:17.439 you tell me the last four digits of your social 0:35:17.480 --> 0:35:20.520 Security number. Oh yeah, I know those. Well they got 0:35:20.560 --> 0:35:24.600 that from somebody else. So there there's a catch twenty 0:35:24.640 --> 0:35:28.719 two here. How how how secure is secure enough and 0:35:28.800 --> 0:35:32.640 not too secure to lock you out forever? So so 0:35:32.719 --> 0:35:36.640 there there is that is a challenge. UM. The part 0:35:36.680 --> 0:35:39.239 of it is to UM when we're talking about the 0:35:39.280 --> 0:35:41.680 domain name. They were able to get information from his 0:35:41.800 --> 0:35:47.680 domain name, UH, and you can. There are things you 0:35:47.680 --> 0:35:50.480 can do there too. UM. A lot of the services, 0:35:50.760 --> 0:35:53.080 the places where you can register domain names offer a 0:35:53.200 --> 0:35:56.799 secure UH service where you pay an additional fee per 0:35:56.880 --> 0:36:00.879 year or or per however often you you renew your 0:36:00.920 --> 0:36:03.680 domain name, that will lock it down so that it 0:36:03.760 --> 0:36:07.000 has a Basically the the registrar is responsible for it. 0:36:07.360 --> 0:36:10.040 So if you want to contact the owner of the 0:36:10.080 --> 0:36:12.759 domain name to say make them an offer, Hey, we 0:36:12.800 --> 0:36:15.839 want so and so dot com. You've got it, Can 0:36:15.920 --> 0:36:18.640 we offer you ten thousand dollars and buy the domain 0:36:18.719 --> 0:36:20.840 name for you? It would go through your registrar and 0:36:20.840 --> 0:36:23.719 you would get contacted for it. But your information is 0:36:23.760 --> 0:36:27.240 not the information out there, so there's a proxy between 0:36:27.280 --> 0:36:29.799 you and them. UM. That would have helped him too, 0:36:29.800 --> 0:36:31.440 If he had had something like that in place, it 0:36:31.480 --> 0:36:35.759 would have helped lock it down Google um the uh 0:36:36.520 --> 0:36:38.839 it's it's kind of interesting because what Google showed them 0:36:38.960 --> 0:36:43.319 was uh M, star star star star star star n at, 0:36:44.719 --> 0:36:49.040 you know, the Gmail name. They were pretty right in 0:36:49.160 --> 0:36:52.440 guessing that it was his first initial last name. He 0:36:52.520 --> 0:36:55.680 had that address at at several places. He points that out, 0:36:55.719 --> 0:36:58.839 and that was that was easy. Could Google fix that 0:36:58.920 --> 0:37:02.120 and make it more or obscure so that it wouldn't 0:37:02.160 --> 0:37:04.960 be so easy to guess? Maybe? Could he have picked 0:37:04.960 --> 0:37:09.560 a more difficult name to use as his backup email address? Probably? 0:37:10.239 --> 0:37:12.959 But these are there are lots of little stuff that 0:37:13.160 --> 0:37:16.720 everyone involved could have done to make it more difficult. 0:37:16.880 --> 0:37:20.240 And there's Google also has a a two step verification process. 0:37:20.239 --> 0:37:22.120 That's exactly what I was going to mention next to 0:37:23.440 --> 0:37:28.320 two part authentication is um is a useful approach it 0:37:28.440 --> 0:37:31.919 also and I've used it, Yeah, I've used it. It's 0:37:32.320 --> 0:37:35.160 so two part of authentication is kind of what it 0:37:35.200 --> 0:37:38.000 sounds like. You need. You need to have two different 0:37:38.040 --> 0:37:40.640 things in order to be able to access the account. 0:37:40.760 --> 0:37:45.360 And a typical approach is that you register a phone 0:37:45.440 --> 0:37:49.000 number with whatever the services of like a cell phone. 0:37:49.280 --> 0:37:52.000 You register that cell phone with whatever the services and 0:37:52.000 --> 0:37:55.080 then when you try to access it, you have to 0:37:55.160 --> 0:37:58.000 be able to provide not only the password, but then 0:37:58.040 --> 0:38:02.040 an authentication code is sent to your device that you 0:38:02.080 --> 0:38:06.040 have registered and you have to insert whatever that that 0:38:06.320 --> 0:38:09.440 number is, and then then you can and then and 0:38:09.480 --> 0:38:12.239 only then you can actually access whatever the account is. 0:38:13.040 --> 0:38:17.640 And that helps a lot because as long as that 0:38:17.719 --> 0:38:20.799 device remains in your possession and no one has been 0:38:20.840 --> 0:38:24.080 able to intercept it in any way, you should be 0:38:24.160 --> 0:38:29.040 fairly safe. So even if they try to reset the password, 0:38:29.760 --> 0:38:32.759 they can't get access to it because they're trying through 0:38:32.800 --> 0:38:35.600 a different device that has not been registered. Uh, And 0:38:35.640 --> 0:38:39.120 then you get that that message. And we've seen very 0:38:39.640 --> 0:38:42.239 variations of this as well, not just too part authentication, 0:38:42.280 --> 0:38:48.040 but also registering devices with services like UM Lots of 0:38:48.040 --> 0:38:49.520 them do that so that you can look at the 0:38:49.560 --> 0:38:53.200 different sessions that are logged in through a particular service 0:38:53.239 --> 0:38:55.000 and then if you if you see that there's one 0:38:55.040 --> 0:38:58.600 there that you don't recognize, someone might have access to 0:38:58.680 --> 0:39:02.640 your account. So, for example, Facebook does this where if 0:39:02.680 --> 0:39:07.160 you try and access your UM Facebook account through different devices, 0:39:07.719 --> 0:39:10.240 it may tell you, hey, I don't recognize this device. 0:39:10.320 --> 0:39:12.920 This isn't something that you've used to access this account 0:39:13.000 --> 0:39:17.319 before um, and it'll send an email to you and 0:39:17.440 --> 0:39:21.680 let you know if you are that that, hey, someone's 0:39:21.680 --> 0:39:24.560 accessing this. Is this you? Because if it's you, it's cool. 0:39:24.640 --> 0:39:27.399 But if it's not you, then you need to look 0:39:27.440 --> 0:39:31.400 into this. Johnathan, I'm two thousand nineteen. Again. Uh, well, 0:39:31.480 --> 0:39:34.239 you know, we still have some more information to give 0:39:34.320 --> 0:39:37.520 you about this particular story, but before we can dive 0:39:37.520 --> 0:39:48.560 into that, we need to take one more break. Now. Again, 0:39:48.880 --> 0:39:53.439 this is this is a good tool for people who 0:39:53.719 --> 0:39:58.320 feel like they may have been hacked. However, let's say 0:39:58.360 --> 0:40:03.560 that the person who is trying to access your Facebook account, um, 0:40:03.600 --> 0:40:05.320 you know where they're trying to hack into your Facebook 0:40:05.320 --> 0:40:09.839 account also has control of your email address. Then when 0:40:09.840 --> 0:40:11.959 they say that, hey, is this you, and they send 0:40:11.960 --> 0:40:15.279 that to your email address, well they've got that email address, yes, yes, 0:40:15.640 --> 0:40:18.960 if it's gotten to that point. It's this particular approach 0:40:19.000 --> 0:40:22.880 doesn't really help you. But other things that that you 0:40:22.960 --> 0:40:25.440 can do, because there's some things that you can't have 0:40:25.480 --> 0:40:28.160 any control over. It's it's the pole, it's the companies 0:40:28.160 --> 0:40:30.480 you work with. Well, one, you can choose which companies 0:40:30.520 --> 0:40:34.200 you you associate yourself with, but beyond that, you know 0:40:34.239 --> 0:40:35.759 you have to hope that they put in the right 0:40:35.920 --> 0:40:39.120 stuff in place to protect you. What you can do one, 0:40:39.480 --> 0:40:42.279 continue to use strong passwords and don't don't use the 0:40:42.320 --> 0:40:45.560 same ones across multiple platforms because it just makes it 0:40:45.640 --> 0:40:49.239 way easier if one if one account does get compromised, 0:40:49.280 --> 0:40:50.800 it makes it way easier for all the others to 0:40:50.840 --> 0:40:53.680 get compromised. It's the domino effect. Yeah, so you we 0:40:53.760 --> 0:40:57.200 wanna you want to start picking some pretty tough passwords 0:40:57.560 --> 0:41:00.840 and and vary them across and change the UM you 0:41:00.840 --> 0:41:05.439 know fairly regularly because the longer they stay, the more 0:41:05.640 --> 0:41:10.520 likely you're going to UM encounter a problem. Use some 0:41:10.560 --> 0:41:13.080 sort of password manager so that you can keep track 0:41:13.120 --> 0:41:15.480 of them all, because I know it is you know, 0:41:16.239 --> 0:41:18.799 the flip side of a strong password is it's really 0:41:18.840 --> 0:41:22.360 hard to remember. So if you're if you've got lots 0:41:22.360 --> 0:41:25.920 and lots of online accounts, then it's going to be 0:41:25.960 --> 0:41:28.279 really challenging to keep all those straight. So some sort 0:41:28.280 --> 0:41:34.120 of password manager is important. UM Also, think about what 0:41:34.200 --> 0:41:37.360 you share before you share it online, because some of 0:41:37.400 --> 0:41:41.480 the details you share may also serve as answers to 0:41:41.560 --> 0:41:46.360 various security questions, or they may give off other information 0:41:46.400 --> 0:41:50.000 that companies use to verify identity, So be careful about that, 0:41:50.520 --> 0:41:55.160 you know, don't don't be too free with personal information 0:41:56.120 --> 0:41:59.480 if that means that information could be used to circumvent 0:41:59.600 --> 0:42:03.719 security systems. One suggestion I've always heard is that when 0:42:03.760 --> 0:42:07.960 you create answers to security questions you create, you're essentially 0:42:07.960 --> 0:42:11.000 creating another password. You don't you don't answer the question. 0:42:11.680 --> 0:42:13.440 You and you put something else in there, and you 0:42:13.520 --> 0:42:17.440 put something something unrelated but something you will easily remember, 0:42:18.040 --> 0:42:20.320 all right, So something that doesn't have to be a 0:42:20.360 --> 0:42:22.799 strong password. In other words, it just needs to be 0:42:22.840 --> 0:42:25.720 a keyword that doesn't have anything to do with a question, 0:42:25.760 --> 0:42:28.799 but it's a keyword you are guaranteed to remember. So 0:42:28.800 --> 0:42:31.759 so for example, if you, uh, maybe I've seen something 0:42:31.760 --> 0:42:34.000 that ask for the name of your friend, model of 0:42:34.000 --> 0:42:38.080 your first car, you could say something like grapefruit, yeah, which, well, 0:42:38.080 --> 0:42:39.799 I know, if I'm asked about my car, I'm going 0:42:39.840 --> 0:42:43.480 to say grapefruit. Right. Somebody might go, oh, it's a Chevy. 0:42:43.840 --> 0:42:45.719 They might have looked on your Facebook page and you 0:42:45.800 --> 0:42:48.239 might have had a thing like this, says man, I 0:42:48.239 --> 0:42:51.040 have such great memories of my of my first car, 0:42:51.239 --> 0:42:53.080 and then you have a picture of it on there. 0:42:53.440 --> 0:42:55.200 But that's all they would need to be able to 0:42:55.200 --> 0:42:57.920 answer that question if you use the right answer, the 0:42:58.080 --> 0:43:01.319 right or the corresponding answer. So if you've done, say 0:43:01.520 --> 0:43:05.600 a thing on genealogy, and you've uh, you know, talked 0:43:05.600 --> 0:43:08.200 about your parents and say, well, you know my mother 0:43:08.239 --> 0:43:10.000 who was so and so, and it's like, what's your 0:43:10.000 --> 0:43:12.440 mother's maiden name? Oh? Well, I know it was Steven's 0:43:12.480 --> 0:43:14.920 because I saw it on the on their Facebook account. 0:43:15.719 --> 0:43:19.440 Well that's pretty easy to track down. Um. And and 0:43:19.480 --> 0:43:23.319 speaking of Facebook, uh, it occurs to me that a 0:43:23.360 --> 0:43:27.600 lot of sites these days are using Facebook connect or 0:43:27.760 --> 0:43:30.560 Google or Yahoo, and you can say, hey, would you 0:43:30.600 --> 0:43:33.759 like to sign in with your blank account? Some of 0:43:33.800 --> 0:43:38.920 them exclusively do that where you cannot access it unless 0:43:38.960 --> 0:43:41.160 you happen to have one of those are their accounts? Yes, 0:43:41.320 --> 0:43:44.200 Like I believe Pinterest you had to log in through 0:43:44.239 --> 0:43:46.319 Facebook when it was when it first started. I don't 0:43:46.320 --> 0:43:49.320 know if that's still the case. And Spotify, Uh, Spotify, 0:43:50.000 --> 0:43:54.600 you know had had switched to requiring Facebook. Um. Okay, 0:43:54.600 --> 0:43:58.040 So if they gain access to your Facebook account, all 0:43:58.080 --> 0:44:00.600 of a sudden, they've got access to every their account 0:44:00.600 --> 0:44:04.359 that you've used that log in with when they offer 0:44:04.440 --> 0:44:08.200 you an opportunity to create a separate log in. Maybe 0:44:08.239 --> 0:44:10.680 you should take that opportunity. Yeah, it's a pain. It 0:44:10.800 --> 0:44:13.080 is a pain. And the whole point about the whole 0:44:13.080 --> 0:44:15.640 Facebook connect is that it makes it much more convenient. 0:44:15.760 --> 0:44:18.080 You know, you you know, Facebook loves it because it 0:44:18.160 --> 0:44:21.600 becomes the platform for the Internet, and people love it 0:44:21.600 --> 0:44:23.719 because it means that it's one less thing they have 0:44:23.800 --> 0:44:25.680 to worry about when they want to log in. But 0:44:25.800 --> 0:44:29.120 it does mean that there is this point of vulnerability 0:44:29.160 --> 0:44:31.960 that is incredibly attractive to someone who wants to get 0:44:32.000 --> 0:44:35.239 access to your stuff, because it's going if they get 0:44:35.239 --> 0:44:38.239 access to one thing, they get access to a dozen more. 0:44:38.719 --> 0:44:41.959 And it doesn't I say Facebook, but like Chris was saying, 0:44:42.000 --> 0:44:44.359 it's not just Facebook. Google is the same way. There 0:44:44.360 --> 0:44:47.480 are lots of different services that if you have a 0:44:47.560 --> 0:44:53.880 Google account you could potentially access. UM. Another another suggestion 0:44:53.920 --> 0:44:58.600 I've seen is that there are a lot of services 0:44:58.640 --> 0:45:01.000 out there that some of us will sign up for 0:45:01.760 --> 0:45:06.680 and then stop using and then forget about um. It 0:45:06.760 --> 0:45:09.359 might not be a bad idea to if you never 0:45:09.480 --> 0:45:11.160 use those services, it might not be a bad idea 0:45:11.200 --> 0:45:15.200 to go back and check and delete those accounts because 0:45:15.400 --> 0:45:18.239 those are other points of vulnerability, especially if it's going 0:45:18.280 --> 0:45:20.319 to you know, if you do tend to use the 0:45:20.320 --> 0:45:24.000 same group of passwords over and over and hackers get 0:45:24.520 --> 0:45:27.640 access to something, particularly if it's something that isn't terribly 0:45:27.680 --> 0:45:31.400 popular anymore, and maybe as a result, the security measures 0:45:31.400 --> 0:45:34.359 aren't as up to date as they could be. It's 0:45:34.360 --> 0:45:37.840 a possibility you might want to get rid of that stuff. 0:45:38.000 --> 0:45:40.520 So you know that my Space account that you haven't 0:45:40.600 --> 0:45:43.480 checked in four years, maybe it's time to just go 0:45:43.520 --> 0:45:49.080 ahead and close that out, you know that kind of stuff. Yeah, uh, 0:45:49.120 --> 0:45:52.240 and we've already mentioned back up your data. It's also 0:45:52.360 --> 0:45:56.239 very important. So yeah, so basic basic tips that you 0:45:56.280 --> 0:45:58.759 can follow to try and protect yourself and keeping in 0:45:58.800 --> 0:46:01.160 mind that you know, a lot this also depends upon 0:46:01.239 --> 0:46:05.359 the other parties involved. Yeah, and so looking back at 0:46:05.440 --> 0:46:10.320 at at Matt hone and did he do something wrong 0:46:10.880 --> 0:46:14.160 or you know, deserving of being you know, you know, 0:46:14.239 --> 0:46:16.520 really he could have been any of us. And even 0:46:16.520 --> 0:46:19.839 though he's a known tech journalist, he you know, sort 0:46:19.880 --> 0:46:22.560 of succumbed to being human. You know, he had the 0:46:22.600 --> 0:46:24.520 same password, he didn't change it for a long time. 0:46:24.560 --> 0:46:26.799 He's probably told he didn't back up and I'm sure 0:46:26.840 --> 0:46:28.959 he's probably told people to do that a thousand times, 0:46:29.000 --> 0:46:31.279 just like we have. You know, we're all guilty of 0:46:31.320 --> 0:46:33.839 doing these little things because their pains in the neck. 0:46:33.880 --> 0:46:35.120 We don't want to do it, we don't have time 0:46:35.160 --> 0:46:37.680 to do it. I mean, he's got kids times of 0:46:37.760 --> 0:46:40.200 premium for him, just like it is for so many 0:46:40.239 --> 0:46:43.720 of us. Um, you know, is it is it Apple's 0:46:43.760 --> 0:46:46.759 fault in particular? Is it Amazon's fault in particular? The 0:46:46.760 --> 0:46:49.520 only people who are are really at fault of the hackers. Yeah, 0:46:49.560 --> 0:46:52.120 it's it's it's the combination of all of these things 0:46:52.160 --> 0:46:55.239 together that made it possible. It's the hackers that are 0:46:55.280 --> 0:46:58.560 really at fault. Yeah. And the thing is, yeah, we're 0:46:58.600 --> 0:47:01.719 all busy and none of us really wants to make 0:47:01.800 --> 0:47:06.399 up a new, you know, twenty four digit password for 0:47:06.440 --> 0:47:09.680 each thing and worry about them. No, none of us 0:47:09.719 --> 0:47:12.719 really wants to mess with that. But the truth of 0:47:12.760 --> 0:47:15.799 the matter is that all these systems worked together to 0:47:15.920 --> 0:47:19.399 make this possible, and it's true for all of us. 0:47:19.440 --> 0:47:22.440 I mean, these these vulnerabilities are vulnerable for all of us. 0:47:22.680 --> 0:47:25.040 It's I know that Amazon and Apple both have thought 0:47:25.080 --> 0:47:30.759 about this. It's still kind of fresh. Um as the recording. Yeah, 0:47:31.040 --> 0:47:33.920 as they're recording this podcast. So you know, neither of them, 0:47:34.000 --> 0:47:37.439 I don't think, have made some public proclamation about how 0:47:37.960 --> 0:47:42.200 they're going to fix this going forward quote unquote fix 0:47:42.239 --> 0:47:46.440 it again. How what do you do? It's not obvious 0:47:46.480 --> 0:47:48.879 to do this, so I think the two part authentication 0:47:48.960 --> 0:47:53.359 is probably one of the the more obvious approaches. And uh, 0:47:53.440 --> 0:47:57.800 well we might see some other elements thrown in there too. 0:47:58.080 --> 0:48:00.400 And and however, I have seen people say yeah, and 0:48:00.440 --> 0:48:03.040 I turned this on and it was the point I 0:48:03.080 --> 0:48:05.920 was making earlier. It made it so difficult that it 0:48:05.920 --> 0:48:08.359 took me two weeks to figure out how to get 0:48:08.360 --> 0:48:10.719 back into my account, and it was a real pain 0:48:10.760 --> 0:48:13.000 in the neck. I got in, but it took me 0:48:13.040 --> 0:48:16.320 a while because I kind of, uh laid myself a trap. 0:48:17.080 --> 0:48:19.759 So it's it's one of those things where I think 0:48:19.800 --> 0:48:22.239 you kind of have to work into it and think 0:48:22.280 --> 0:48:24.239 about this stuff when you set it up, and go 0:48:24.320 --> 0:48:27.319 back and look at your accounts and see how it's 0:48:27.360 --> 0:48:30.319 laid out to fix this for yourself. Yeah, this is 0:48:30.360 --> 0:48:32.920 this is why it's really important for companies to uh 0:48:33.239 --> 0:48:37.680 to hire white hat hackers who I mean, all they 0:48:37.719 --> 0:48:40.120 do is look at systems and try and find ways 0:48:40.239 --> 0:48:44.000 to to breach systems so that those systems can be 0:48:44.080 --> 0:48:47.279 improved over time. And it's important to get a third 0:48:47.280 --> 0:48:50.960 party to do it because when you design a system again, 0:48:51.040 --> 0:48:53.279 you may be thinking of the obvious points of entry, 0:48:53.440 --> 0:48:57.040 which is where you've really really put in great security, 0:48:57.440 --> 0:48:59.799 right like you know, like there's no way anyone's gonna 0:48:59.840 --> 0:49:01.800 get through this, at least not in the next five years. 0:49:01.920 --> 0:49:05.239 We require people to use non alpha numeric characters. Well, 0:49:05.280 --> 0:49:07.440 that's great if they're going to use the password in 0:49:07.719 --> 0:49:10.960 case the door. Yeah. So again, that's why you want 0:49:11.000 --> 0:49:12.960 to have a third party, because they're not thinking the 0:49:13.000 --> 0:49:15.759 way you think. They're thinking how do I get into 0:49:15.800 --> 0:49:19.600 this system? Not not how strong do I make this door? 0:49:19.920 --> 0:49:22.760 And that wraps up another classic episode. Hope you guys 0:49:22.920 --> 0:49:28.600 enjoyed this walk down memory lane and the reminder that 0:49:28.760 --> 0:49:33.200 things can get pretty dicey out there. Uh though, sometimes 0:49:33.320 --> 0:49:35.319 you can find out that the people who attacked you 0:49:35.719 --> 0:49:40.520 aren't really terrible people, but sometimes do questionable things for 0:49:41.040 --> 0:49:44.120 weird motivations. I don't know how much comfort we can 0:49:44.160 --> 0:49:46.759 take in that, but I guess it's something anyway. If 0:49:46.800 --> 0:49:49.800 you guys have any suggestions for future episodes of tech Stuff. 0:49:50.080 --> 0:49:52.160 Feel free to reach out and let me know the 0:49:52.239 --> 0:49:55.399 email addresses tech Stuff at how stuff works dot com, 0:49:55.520 --> 0:49:58.000 or pop on over to our website that's tech stuff 0:49:58.000 --> 0:50:01.960 podcast dot com. You will f links to our presence 0:50:02.000 --> 0:50:04.960 on social media. Over there, you also find links to 0:50:05.160 --> 0:50:08.120 all of the archived episodes of tech Stuff, all of 0:50:08.160 --> 0:50:13.520 the episodes that have ever published, obviously not including the 0:50:13.640 --> 0:50:16.879 legendary lost episodes of tech Stuff. And you also find 0:50:16.880 --> 0:50:19.000 a link to our online store, where every purchase you 0:50:19.040 --> 0:50:21.359 make goes to help the show. 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