WEBVTT - AOL and the Very Bad Business Deal

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<v Speaker 1>Get in touch with technology with tech Stuff from how

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<v Speaker 1>stuff Works dot com. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with

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<v Speaker 1>how Stuff Works in I heart radio and I love

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<v Speaker 1>all things tech. And in our last episode, I traced

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<v Speaker 1>a O L America Online from its birth out of

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<v Speaker 1>a company that created a service for Atari twenty hundred

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<v Speaker 1>owners in order for them to download games, up to

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<v Speaker 1>the point where this company bought up its longtime competitor,

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<v Speaker 1>Compuse Serve. Today, we're going to continue this story and

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<v Speaker 1>look at how a O L got involved in a

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<v Speaker 1>merger that is frequently listed as one of the worst

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<v Speaker 1>business deals in tech history. Sometimes it's called the worst

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<v Speaker 1>merger of all time. But that was not the Compuse

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<v Speaker 1>Serve deal. Before we get into all of that, I'm

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<v Speaker 1>going to backtrack just a touch. The company Serve deal

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<v Speaker 1>started in nineteen nine seven and it was complete by

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<v Speaker 1>early nine But another thing that happened in nineteen seven

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<v Speaker 1>was really important to A O L. And that was

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<v Speaker 1>the launch of a I m AIM or a O

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<v Speaker 1>L instant Messenger. AIM would become an incredibly popular messaging

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<v Speaker 1>app for several years, though the company would eventually sunset

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<v Speaker 1>the service in twenty seventeen. A o L had already

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<v Speaker 1>baked in a messenger feature into the A o L desktop,

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<v Speaker 1>but it was part of the overall A o L

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<v Speaker 1>user interface, who had to be in A o L

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<v Speaker 1>to use this. In May seven, the company released AIM

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<v Speaker 1>as a standalone download, at least for machines running on

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<v Speaker 1>the Windows operating system. The AIM product competed with other

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<v Speaker 1>messenger services like I c Q, which A L would

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<v Speaker 1>acquire in and then eventually sell off again in T

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<v Speaker 1>and MSN Messenger. The lead developers for AIM were Barry Appleman,

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<v Speaker 1>Eric Bosco, and Jerry Harris. But here's the thing. They

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<v Speaker 1>weren't supposed to build an instant messaging app. Aim was

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<v Speaker 1>never supposed to be. They were doing it without the

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<v Speaker 1>company's knowledge, let alone permission. Appleman and Bosco had been

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<v Speaker 1>hired as programmers who specialized in the Unix operating system.

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<v Speaker 1>Harris had joined a o L after the company had

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<v Speaker 1>acquired the web browser company that Harris was working for.

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<v Speaker 1>So Appleman had already transformed a o L a few

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<v Speaker 1>years earlier by adding the Buddy List, which is a

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<v Speaker 1>feature that just tells users if their friends happened to

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<v Speaker 1>be online the same time that they are online. Because

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<v Speaker 1>this was back in the day when you were only

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<v Speaker 1>online when you were dialing up. You didn't have this

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<v Speaker 1>sort of permanent online status. Broadband was not really a

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<v Speaker 1>thing yet before the Buddy List, you would have to

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<v Speaker 1>use a search tool with the exact screen names of

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<v Speaker 1>your friends to find out if they were online or not.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's what a lot of people were doing. They

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<v Speaker 1>would go to the search tool, they would put in

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<v Speaker 1>the handle for their friend and see if that person

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<v Speaker 1>was online. But as I mentioned in the last episode,

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<v Speaker 1>Steve Case had really positioned a o L to be

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<v Speaker 1>an online community. He was stressing that part of America

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<v Speaker 1>online business and their feature set, saying that that was

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<v Speaker 1>the most important application of a o L over all others.

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<v Speaker 1>This contrasted a o L with other services that were

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<v Speaker 1>more focused on things like online shopping, for example. So

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<v Speaker 1>people were encouraged to make communities online. They were eager

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<v Speaker 1>to see if their friends were online at the same time,

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<v Speaker 1>and so a L service was getting hit by tons

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<v Speaker 1>of search requests and that was often enough just to

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<v Speaker 1>bog down or even crash servers. Just people looking to

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<v Speaker 1>see if they're friends happen to be online at the

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<v Speaker 1>same time. So Appleman thought, what if we just made

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<v Speaker 1>a tool that would give people this information that they're

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<v Speaker 1>searching for by default. That way, they don't even have

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<v Speaker 1>to ask for it, they don't have to send requests,

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<v Speaker 1>will just tell them whether or not their friends are online.

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<v Speaker 1>This would become a very important component of AIM as well,

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<v Speaker 1>the buddy list that tells you who is online and

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<v Speaker 1>who is available to chat. We see this on lots

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<v Speaker 1>of online services today. For example, I once in a

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<v Speaker 1>blue moon get a chance to play games on Xbox

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<v Speaker 1>or on Steam, and both of those have buddy list

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<v Speaker 1>features that tell you who happens to be online at

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<v Speaker 1>that time. But this was a new thing back in

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<v Speaker 1>the early nineties. Now, the developers had determined that Aim

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<v Speaker 1>should exist as a standalone service so that it didn't

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<v Speaker 1>limit its adoption. That way, it wouldn't just be a

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<v Speaker 1>o l users that could get hold of Aim. But

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<v Speaker 1>the team quickly ran into it challenge. They had no

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<v Speaker 1>resources because again it wasn't a sanctioned project. But a

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<v Speaker 1>service has to run on hardware somewhere. It's not something

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<v Speaker 1>that can just exist in the air. So Appleman called

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<v Speaker 1>in a favor with a coworker who was getting ready

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<v Speaker 1>to ship some old servers to HP. They had bought

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<v Speaker 1>these servers. The servers were now kind of obsolete, and

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<v Speaker 1>so the a o L was going to ship the

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<v Speaker 1>servers back and get a small amount of money in return.

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<v Speaker 1>So instead of shipping back the servers, his coworker friend

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<v Speaker 1>quote unquote lost the servers and they actually went to

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<v Speaker 1>Appleman and his team, and so that team was able

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<v Speaker 1>to work on developing the messaging app. When they had

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<v Speaker 1>a finished app, they decided to show it off to

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<v Speaker 1>their bosses. They thought, well, we've got it all ready

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<v Speaker 1>to go. Now we just have to convince our bosses

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<v Speaker 1>that this was a good idea from the get go.

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<v Speaker 1>A OL management was not thrilled about this. In fact,

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<v Speaker 1>there was a real danger at first that the whole

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<v Speaker 1>team might get fired because of their work on this project.

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<v Speaker 1>They had built the product without telling anyone, They had

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<v Speaker 1>allocated a server without permission, and they intended to release

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<v Speaker 1>the app for free, and that really stuck in the

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<v Speaker 1>craw of a lot of the leaders over at a

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<v Speaker 1>O L. A o L was a subscription based business plan.

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<v Speaker 1>The way all L made money in those days was

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<v Speaker 1>that they would convince customers to subscribe to A O

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<v Speaker 1>L service, and then the customers would use the A

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<v Speaker 1>o L interface to dial in and get online. That

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<v Speaker 1>was the way A O L made money Primarily. They

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<v Speaker 1>also did some advertising stuff, but that was minor compared

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<v Speaker 1>to the subscription service. So to give away stuff for

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<v Speaker 1>free seemed antithetical to A O l's business plan, But

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<v Speaker 1>ultimately the leadership at A O L was convinced to

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<v Speaker 1>give it a try halfheartedly, so they launched AIM in May.

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<v Speaker 1>Released by the way, launching in fact would be really generous.

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<v Speaker 1>What the leadership actually agreed to do was make AIM

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<v Speaker 1>available on a file Transfer Protocol or FTP service. Now

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<v Speaker 1>this FTP service wasn't actually positioned as a public facing service.

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<v Speaker 1>It wasn't meant to be something that the average person

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<v Speaker 1>would use to get access to files. But Internet geeks

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<v Speaker 1>in the know were aware of it, and in fact,

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<v Speaker 1>we're always keeping an eye on the FTP service because

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<v Speaker 1>as things would be added to the service, it gave

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<v Speaker 1>them an idea of what was coming down the road

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<v Speaker 1>for A O L in general, So it's kind of

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<v Speaker 1>a way of getting insider information but from the outside

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<v Speaker 1>so a well initially just made AIM available through this

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<v Speaker 1>and didn't promote it in any way, So AIM came

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<v Speaker 1>out with no support and no fanfare. Even so, on

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<v Speaker 1>that first evening there were nine hundred simultaneous connections on AIM. Now, people,

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<v Speaker 1>that's incredibly small when we think about the Internet. But

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<v Speaker 1>when you think about the Internet in the days when

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<v Speaker 1>folks still weren't really sure what the Internet was, most

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<v Speaker 1>people were using dial up to access it, and no

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<v Speaker 1>one was advertising the fact that this messenger service even existed,

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<v Speaker 1>it's pretty phenomenal. Now the programmers had built in some

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<v Speaker 1>clever features and AIM that made it awfully hard for

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<v Speaker 1>i T administrators to block it, and as more people

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<v Speaker 1>discovered the app, i T departments looked for ways that

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<v Speaker 1>they could block it because they were worried that employees

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<v Speaker 1>or students or or whatever would waste time chatting with

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<v Speaker 1>each other instead of doing what they're supposed to do.

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<v Speaker 1>But if they tried to block off the port the

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<v Speaker 1>Internet port through which AIM was communicating, it would automatically

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<v Speaker 1>start to scan the other ports on the machine it

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<v Speaker 1>was installed on until it found one it could communicate through.

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<v Speaker 1>So if you blocked one port. It would just say,

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<v Speaker 1>all right, well that's that doors closed. Let me look

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<v Speaker 1>and see if any other doors are open. So does

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<v Speaker 1>some ad and AIM was essentially corporate backed malware because

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<v Speaker 1>there was no easy way to shut it down, and

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<v Speaker 1>people were downloading it and using it to chat with

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<v Speaker 1>each other, and it got wildly popular. Now I might

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<v Speaker 1>as well stick with AIM for right now, before getting

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<v Speaker 1>back to a o L at large. A o L

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<v Speaker 1>would go on to buy Morabilous, which operated the I

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<v Speaker 1>c Q chat app. AIM would power Apple's first eye

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<v Speaker 1>Chat app, although that would change in later versions of

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<v Speaker 1>eye Chat, and Microsoft, in an effort to take some

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<v Speaker 1>of the steam out of a o l's engine, built

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<v Speaker 1>a version of MSN Messenger that could communicate with AIM users,

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<v Speaker 1>so you could use MSN Messenger and send chats to

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<v Speaker 1>people who are using AIM and they could talk back

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<v Speaker 1>to you. This actually made the AIM team really angry

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<v Speaker 1>because it meant that people would be able to communicate

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<v Speaker 1>with AIM users without actually downloading AIM themselves, and so

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<v Speaker 1>began a back and forth or in which ao L

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<v Speaker 1>would block Microsoft's chat app and Microsoft would engineer a

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<v Speaker 1>new version of MSN Messenger that would get around this block,

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<v Speaker 1>and that happened more than twenty times back and forth

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<v Speaker 1>until the A o L team sent a threat to Microsoft.

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<v Speaker 1>They essentially said, if you insist on making the ms

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<v Speaker 1>N messenger app compatible with AIM, we will use that

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<v Speaker 1>connection to infect your servers with malware. The threat commenced

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<v Speaker 1>Microsoft to back down. Also, yikes, that's like some sort

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<v Speaker 1>of nerd gangster stuff right there. This is a nice

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<v Speaker 1>computed database, he guy. Here'd be a real shame with

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<v Speaker 1>someone that I don't know infected it with viruses. I

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<v Speaker 1>apologize for the terrible accent. AIM always existed a little

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<v Speaker 1>outside of a o L because it was a standalone

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<v Speaker 1>app that wasn't in the walled garden of the A

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<v Speaker 1>o L experience. It was seen by A o L

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<v Speaker 1>executives as being a bit risky. Over on the A

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<v Speaker 1>o L side, the company could curate the customer experience.

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<v Speaker 1>The stuff that they would see before they would connect

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<v Speaker 1>to the Internet at large was completely under the control

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<v Speaker 1>of the company, so they could censor it. They could

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<v Speaker 1>make sure that there was no objectionable material showing up

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<v Speaker 1>in front of people, right they would just make sure

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<v Speaker 1>that it was all company approved content. But AIM was

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<v Speaker 1>outside of this garden, and you couldn't control what other

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<v Speaker 1>users might say or share. AIM kept in adding features

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<v Speaker 1>like file sharing, voice support, stuff like that. Many of

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<v Speaker 1>them would be copied into later tools like Skype, but

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<v Speaker 1>over time AIM began to lose influence. Other tools were

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<v Speaker 1>popping up. Some would allow users to communicate through multiple

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<v Speaker 1>chat services using a single client. Some were connected to

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<v Speaker 1>the blossoming social networking sites, and that was where allowed

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<v Speaker 1>the chat was moving to. AIM became less relevant over

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<v Speaker 1>the years, starting in two thousand two, a o L

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<v Speaker 1>began to scale back the AIM team. This happened each

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<v Speaker 1>year from two thousand two to two thousand five. Then

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<v Speaker 1>in two thousand twelve, the only team members who were

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<v Speaker 1>kept on were support staff, who just made sure that

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<v Speaker 1>the service wasn't going to collapse on itself. By then,

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<v Speaker 1>AIM had less than one per cent of the market

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<v Speaker 1>share of customers for internet messaging services. On December fifteen, seventeen,

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<v Speaker 1>A O L or rather OATH but we haven't gotten

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<v Speaker 1>to the part where ao L becomes OATH. That will

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<v Speaker 1>be in the next episode anyway, they announced that a

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<v Speaker 1>O L Instant Messenger had been discontinued. Further, there are

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<v Speaker 1>no announced plans for any sort of replacement. The messaging app,

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<v Speaker 1>which had at one time been the most dominant of

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<v Speaker 1>its kind online, just didn't have enough people using it

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<v Speaker 1>to justify the expense of maintaining it. Now, when I

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<v Speaker 1>come back, I'll switch over to A O L and

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<v Speaker 1>what was in store for the company at large. But

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<v Speaker 1>first let's take a quick break and thank our sponsor.

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<v Speaker 1>In November, A O L announced it was buying Netscape

0:13:16.320 --> 0:13:20.559
<v Speaker 1>Communications Corporation, which was the company that created the Netscape

0:13:20.679 --> 0:13:24.960
<v Speaker 1>Navigator web browser. Netscape Navigator is a fascinating story all

0:13:24.960 --> 0:13:26.800
<v Speaker 1>on its own, and I'll have to do a full

0:13:26.880 --> 0:13:30.000
<v Speaker 1>birth to death episode on it in the future, but

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<v Speaker 1>here are some high points. Mark and Dreason, who while

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<v Speaker 1>at college had worked on an early web browser called

0:13:36.679 --> 0:13:39.680
<v Speaker 1>n c s A Mosaic, saw the potential in a

0:13:39.720 --> 0:13:42.920
<v Speaker 1>web browser for the average person. He partnered with Jim

0:13:42.960 --> 0:13:46.920
<v Speaker 1>Clark of Silicon Graphics to start a new company ultimately

0:13:47.000 --> 0:13:51.640
<v Speaker 1>called Netscape Communications Corporation and bring this vision to life.

0:13:52.240 --> 0:13:55.680
<v Speaker 1>The first version of this browser was called Mosaic, but

0:13:56.000 --> 0:14:00.080
<v Speaker 1>after some threats of legal unpleasantness, they would change it

0:14:00.160 --> 0:14:05.679
<v Speaker 1>to Netscape Navigator. Now, this all started in nine by

0:14:06.120 --> 0:14:10.520
<v Speaker 1>it had become the dominant web browser, largely because there

0:14:10.559 --> 0:14:14.719
<v Speaker 1>wasn't very much competition. If I'm being totally honest. Netscape

0:14:14.760 --> 0:14:18.400
<v Speaker 1>became a publicly traded company in nineteen and had a

0:14:18.480 --> 0:14:24.360
<v Speaker 1>company valuation of almost three billion dollars, a very early

0:14:24.480 --> 0:14:30.640
<v Speaker 1>start up Unicorn. By things were different because Microsoft started

0:14:30.680 --> 0:14:33.960
<v Speaker 1>to really go after the web browser market with its

0:14:34.000 --> 0:14:37.840
<v Speaker 1>own web browser, Internet Explorer. Then there's all the different

0:14:37.920 --> 0:14:43.160
<v Speaker 1>stuff about Microsoft incorporating Internet Explorer into Windows and uh

0:14:43.200 --> 0:14:48.080
<v Speaker 1>and then also downplaying the ability to use other browsers

0:14:48.080 --> 0:14:50.560
<v Speaker 1>on Windows based machines. We won't get into all that,

0:14:50.680 --> 0:14:53.960
<v Speaker 1>but in ninety eight, Netscape announced it would release the

0:14:54.080 --> 0:14:58.600
<v Speaker 1>source code that the company had used to build Netscape Communicator,

0:14:58.960 --> 0:15:02.200
<v Speaker 1>which was a suite of programs beyond just the web browser.

0:15:02.640 --> 0:15:05.200
<v Speaker 1>This in turn would become the action that would bring

0:15:05.360 --> 0:15:09.720
<v Speaker 1>Mozilla into being, and Mozilla would eventually produce the Firefox

0:15:09.920 --> 0:15:13.360
<v Speaker 1>web browser. Well. By the time a O. L announced

0:15:13.360 --> 0:15:18.720
<v Speaker 1>intention of acquiring Netscape, Internet Explorer had already caught up

0:15:18.800 --> 0:15:21.720
<v Speaker 1>and taken the lead in the web browser market share.

0:15:22.240 --> 0:15:24.600
<v Speaker 1>But it wasn't like Netscape was down for the count

0:15:24.880 --> 0:15:27.320
<v Speaker 1>it had been the dominant player. It was now number

0:15:27.360 --> 0:15:30.040
<v Speaker 1>two there was every reason to think the company could

0:15:30.080 --> 0:15:32.320
<v Speaker 1>come back with a new version of its browser and

0:15:32.360 --> 0:15:34.240
<v Speaker 1>went back. Some folks so would go back and forth

0:15:34.280 --> 0:15:39.120
<v Speaker 1>between Netscape and Internet Explorer, so it was definitely still

0:15:39.200 --> 0:15:43.160
<v Speaker 1>an attractive company. When A o L made its proposal,

0:15:44.040 --> 0:15:48.440
<v Speaker 1>which was for four point two billion dollars, a princely

0:15:48.640 --> 0:15:51.600
<v Speaker 1>some this deal would end up being a not so

0:15:51.680 --> 0:15:55.880
<v Speaker 1>good one for either party, though it's not the very

0:15:55.960 --> 0:15:59.000
<v Speaker 1>bad deal that I referred to in the episode title.

0:15:59.240 --> 0:16:01.760
<v Speaker 1>Anyone who has been through a merger or an acquisition

0:16:02.360 --> 0:16:06.480
<v Speaker 1>knows there's always an adjustment as different departments hash things out,

0:16:07.080 --> 0:16:11.080
<v Speaker 1>cultures attempt to merge. There's some consolidation, maybe people are

0:16:11.160 --> 0:16:15.720
<v Speaker 1>let go as as redundant departments are are put together.

0:16:16.200 --> 0:16:19.480
<v Speaker 1>The effect on Netscape was that it slowed down the

0:16:19.520 --> 0:16:23.640
<v Speaker 1>browser development process, and that was already running behind before

0:16:23.720 --> 0:16:26.000
<v Speaker 1>A o L purchased the company, and just a minute

0:16:26.040 --> 0:16:28.280
<v Speaker 1>took even longer for Netscape to come out with the

0:16:28.280 --> 0:16:31.760
<v Speaker 1>next version of its browser. Netscape six did not come

0:16:31.760 --> 0:16:35.680
<v Speaker 1>out until April two thousand and Netscape seven followed two

0:16:35.800 --> 0:16:39.240
<v Speaker 1>years later in two thousand two. By two thousand three,

0:16:39.560 --> 0:16:42.680
<v Speaker 1>A o L had shut down most of Netscape laying

0:16:42.680 --> 0:16:46.480
<v Speaker 1>off nearly all the employees. The decision from the top

0:16:46.680 --> 0:16:50.320
<v Speaker 1>was to shift and focus on Mozilla's Firefox code as

0:16:50.320 --> 0:16:53.600
<v Speaker 1>the base for web browsers. A o L would outsourced

0:16:53.640 --> 0:16:58.240
<v Speaker 1>Netscape browser releases to a Canadian company called Mercurial Communications.

0:16:58.800 --> 0:17:02.360
<v Speaker 1>That company produced nets eight Browser eight and Netscape Browser

0:17:02.440 --> 0:17:05.719
<v Speaker 1>eight point one in two thousand five and two thousand seven.

0:17:06.320 --> 0:17:09.200
<v Speaker 1>A o L did put together an internal development team

0:17:09.240 --> 0:17:12.680
<v Speaker 1>for one last push to make the old browser relevant

0:17:12.720 --> 0:17:15.360
<v Speaker 1>again in a world that had little interest in it,

0:17:15.760 --> 0:17:20.280
<v Speaker 1>and they released the AOL developed Netscape Navigator nine. But

0:17:20.359 --> 0:17:23.000
<v Speaker 1>that wasn't enough either, and a o L finally shut

0:17:23.040 --> 0:17:27.440
<v Speaker 1>down Navigator for good and for certain in February two eight.

0:17:28.080 --> 0:17:30.639
<v Speaker 1>So that was definitely not a great business deal. The

0:17:30.720 --> 0:17:34.280
<v Speaker 1>four point two billion dollars was not money well spent.

0:17:34.840 --> 0:17:36.440
<v Speaker 1>And I'm sure when I do a full episode on

0:17:36.520 --> 0:17:40.960
<v Speaker 1>Netscape Navigator, I'll dig much deeper into that story. Let's

0:17:40.960 --> 0:17:43.440
<v Speaker 1>get back to a O L. It made another purchase

0:17:43.480 --> 0:17:47.520
<v Speaker 1>around the same time as it bought Netscape. In A

0:17:47.640 --> 0:17:51.160
<v Speaker 1>O L bought the company movie Phone. That's the telephone

0:17:51.160 --> 0:17:53.880
<v Speaker 1>service that provides movie information to people who call in,

0:17:53.880 --> 0:17:57.199
<v Speaker 1>including information like screening times and also gives them the

0:17:57.200 --> 0:18:01.119
<v Speaker 1>opportunity to purchase tickets at certain theaters. The deal was

0:18:01.160 --> 0:18:03.520
<v Speaker 1>done in A O L stock and it was valued

0:18:03.560 --> 0:18:07.480
<v Speaker 1>at three d eight million dollars, which again princely some

0:18:08.400 --> 0:18:10.960
<v Speaker 1>A O L would hold onto movie Phone for nearly

0:18:11.080 --> 0:18:15.359
<v Speaker 1>twenty years. The company or the new company that is,

0:18:15.720 --> 0:18:18.879
<v Speaker 1>the one that holds A O L, sold movie Phone

0:18:19.160 --> 0:18:22.600
<v Speaker 1>to the beleaguered company movie Pass back in the spring

0:18:22.680 --> 0:18:26.520
<v Speaker 1>of So how much did movie Pass pay to get

0:18:26.560 --> 0:18:29.160
<v Speaker 1>this property that A O L had purchased for three

0:18:29.920 --> 0:18:33.359
<v Speaker 1>eight million dollars in stocks? Well, the agreement was for

0:18:33.440 --> 0:18:37.080
<v Speaker 1>a million dollars in cash and two point five five

0:18:37.280 --> 0:18:40.720
<v Speaker 1>million shares of the parent company for movie Pass, which

0:18:40.800 --> 0:18:45.280
<v Speaker 1>is called Helios and Matheson Analytics. Those shares were worth

0:18:45.280 --> 0:18:48.000
<v Speaker 1>about eight million dollars at the time of the announcement.

0:18:48.240 --> 0:18:50.800
<v Speaker 1>Oh and they also agreed to another two point five

0:18:50.880 --> 0:18:54.280
<v Speaker 1>five million shares at the exercise price of five dollars

0:18:54.280 --> 0:18:57.320
<v Speaker 1>fifty cents per share. That would add another fourteen million

0:18:57.359 --> 0:18:59.840
<v Speaker 1>dollars on top of the deal if the share price

0:18:59.840 --> 0:19:02.120
<v Speaker 1>were to actually reach that level, which puts the whole

0:19:02.119 --> 0:19:06.800
<v Speaker 1>deal at around twenty three million dollars, or so twenty

0:19:06.840 --> 0:19:10.920
<v Speaker 1>four million that's not great. A O L was buying

0:19:10.960 --> 0:19:14.600
<v Speaker 1>movie Phone for three and selling it for twenty four.

0:19:15.800 --> 0:19:18.000
<v Speaker 1>It might not have been the most profitable deal ever.

0:19:18.720 --> 0:19:21.520
<v Speaker 1>And movie Pass, just in case you're curious, has continued

0:19:21.560 --> 0:19:24.880
<v Speaker 1>its trend of changing pricing and services throughout the year

0:19:25.280 --> 0:19:28.640
<v Speaker 1>in an effort to win customers and become semi stable.

0:19:28.920 --> 0:19:31.520
<v Speaker 1>I'm amazed it hasn't collapsed in on itself yet. I've

0:19:31.520 --> 0:19:33.600
<v Speaker 1>already talked about movie Past this year, so I won't

0:19:33.600 --> 0:19:38.000
<v Speaker 1>go back over it. But holy cow. A O L

0:19:38.480 --> 0:19:42.640
<v Speaker 1>then invested nearly a billion dollars in Gateway PC after

0:19:42.680 --> 0:19:46.159
<v Speaker 1>announcing that the company had outperformed all of its earning projections.

0:19:46.640 --> 0:19:50.080
<v Speaker 1>Al had, that is and all made a one point

0:19:50.160 --> 0:19:53.560
<v Speaker 1>one billion dollar deal with the map Quest. Do you

0:19:53.600 --> 0:19:59.359
<v Speaker 1>remember map Quest? Al L owns it. Also in A

0:19:59.520 --> 0:20:03.720
<v Speaker 1>O L make a one point five billion dollar investment

0:20:03.760 --> 0:20:07.879
<v Speaker 1>in a company called Hughes Electronics, which is another fascinating

0:20:07.920 --> 0:20:10.920
<v Speaker 1>company and it traces its history back to the eccentric

0:20:11.040 --> 0:20:17.040
<v Speaker 1>bazillionaire Howard Hughes. Huge Electronics owned Direct TV at that time,

0:20:17.560 --> 0:20:21.520
<v Speaker 1>and as part of this agreement, the company would market

0:20:21.560 --> 0:20:25.120
<v Speaker 1>an American online product called a O L TV, which

0:20:25.200 --> 0:20:28.680
<v Speaker 1>was an interactive television service. A O LL in turn

0:20:28.800 --> 0:20:33.080
<v Speaker 1>agreed to market the Hughes Electronics services Direct TV and

0:20:33.200 --> 0:20:36.760
<v Speaker 1>Direct PC, which was a high speed satellite based internet

0:20:36.840 --> 0:20:41.560
<v Speaker 1>access service. These days, that same service is called Hugh's Net,

0:20:41.880 --> 0:20:45.199
<v Speaker 1>and the internet and TV businesses are separate entities. A

0:20:45.320 --> 0:20:48.840
<v Speaker 1>T and T now owns the direct TV business. And

0:20:48.880 --> 0:20:51.919
<v Speaker 1>now we get to the very bad business deal, the

0:20:52.000 --> 0:20:54.600
<v Speaker 1>one that so many people have held up as being

0:20:54.640 --> 0:20:58.320
<v Speaker 1>one of the worst in business history, particularly for companies

0:20:58.359 --> 0:21:02.560
<v Speaker 1>in the tech industry. In two thousand, America Online had

0:21:02.560 --> 0:21:06.160
<v Speaker 1>the opportunity to merge with Time Warner, which in itself

0:21:06.560 --> 0:21:09.200
<v Speaker 1>was the product of a merger between the company's Time

0:21:09.280 --> 0:21:13.359
<v Speaker 1>Incorporated and Warner Communications. Now, one day I'm going to

0:21:13.440 --> 0:21:15.400
<v Speaker 1>have to do a series of episodes to explain how

0:21:15.440 --> 0:21:18.200
<v Speaker 1>all of that came to pass, But here's a super

0:21:18.240 --> 0:21:23.800
<v Speaker 1>short background on both big companies. Time Incorporated was known

0:21:23.840 --> 0:21:26.640
<v Speaker 1>for being the owner and publisher of more than one

0:21:26.720 --> 0:21:30.719
<v Speaker 1>hundred different magazines, with the flagship, of course, being Time,

0:21:31.119 --> 0:21:35.879
<v Speaker 1>and others including stuff like Entertainment Weekly, Fortune, Sports Illustrated,

0:21:35.920 --> 0:21:41.520
<v Speaker 1>and Southern Living. Warner Communications was a holding company, and

0:21:41.560 --> 0:21:44.560
<v Speaker 1>they had a really super complicated history of its own.

0:21:44.840 --> 0:21:48.440
<v Speaker 1>It grew out of the Warner Brothers motion Picture Studio

0:21:48.920 --> 0:21:52.679
<v Speaker 1>and their various businesses UH that included movie theaters and

0:21:52.720 --> 0:21:56.679
<v Speaker 1>a production and distribution business in the motion picture industry. Eventually,

0:21:57.119 --> 0:22:00.840
<v Speaker 1>Jack Warner of the Warner Brothers was the only warn remaining,

0:22:01.320 --> 0:22:03.719
<v Speaker 1>and in nineteen sixty six he decided he was going

0:22:03.760 --> 0:22:05.399
<v Speaker 1>to get out of the business, so he sold his

0:22:05.480 --> 0:22:08.560
<v Speaker 1>shares of the company to another company called Seven Arts

0:22:08.560 --> 0:22:15.520
<v Speaker 1>Production Limited. That company also bought another media company, Atlantic Records.

0:22:16.320 --> 0:22:18.919
<v Speaker 1>Then you had a guy named Stephen Ross who had

0:22:18.920 --> 0:22:23.240
<v Speaker 1>built a conglomerate of businesses. He comes in, he acquires

0:22:23.320 --> 0:22:28.720
<v Speaker 1>the Warner Brothers Seven Arts conglomerate, and now the whole

0:22:28.800 --> 0:22:32.920
<v Speaker 1>mess Steven Ross's other businesses and Warner Brothers and Seven

0:22:33.000 --> 0:22:37.240
<v Speaker 1>Arts all becomes known as Kinney National Services. But then

0:22:37.280 --> 0:22:40.280
<v Speaker 1>there's a big scandal involving one of the businesses. It

0:22:40.359 --> 0:22:43.200
<v Speaker 1>was actually a parking business and it was all about

0:22:43.480 --> 0:22:47.040
<v Speaker 1>price fixing, and that led to Ross selling off most

0:22:47.080 --> 0:22:50.760
<v Speaker 1>of the companies in the conglomerate. The remaining businesses that

0:22:50.920 --> 0:22:56.359
<v Speaker 1>he kept were the media ones. It became Warner Communications.

0:22:56.400 --> 0:23:01.399
<v Speaker 1>This was in ninete Time Incorporated and Warner Munications merged

0:23:01.440 --> 0:23:04.840
<v Speaker 1>in nineteen eighty nine, and that's where we get Time Warner,

0:23:05.080 --> 0:23:08.239
<v Speaker 1>which at the time was the largest entertainment conglomerate in

0:23:08.280 --> 0:23:13.520
<v Speaker 1>the world. In this new company, Time Warner had acquired

0:23:13.680 --> 0:23:18.760
<v Speaker 1>Turner Broadcasting System for nine point six billion dollars, and

0:23:18.800 --> 0:23:22.920
<v Speaker 1>then in two thousand, America Online and Time Warner looked

0:23:22.960 --> 0:23:26.600
<v Speaker 1>to merge together. A O L was essentially buying Time

0:23:26.640 --> 0:23:31.240
<v Speaker 1>Warner for a hundred sixty five billion dollars. So that's

0:23:31.240 --> 0:23:34.680
<v Speaker 1>how the transaction would look on paper, that A O L.

0:23:34.760 --> 0:23:37.960
<v Speaker 1>The company was buying Time Warner for a hundred sixty

0:23:37.960 --> 0:23:41.520
<v Speaker 1>five billion dollars. A O L's founder, Steve Case took

0:23:41.560 --> 0:23:44.280
<v Speaker 1>the role of chairman of the board, and the new

0:23:44.320 --> 0:23:47.640
<v Speaker 1>company would be A O L. Time Warner. The association

0:23:47.720 --> 0:23:51.240
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't quite last a full decade, but it would really

0:23:51.280 --> 0:23:54.560
<v Speaker 1>make an impression in its short time in the spotlight.

0:23:55.280 --> 0:23:59.359
<v Speaker 1>I'll talk a little bit more about this troubled relationship

0:23:59.400 --> 0:24:02.200
<v Speaker 1>between A L and Time Warner, but first let's take

0:24:02.240 --> 0:24:13.359
<v Speaker 1>a quick break to thank our sponsor. In hindsight, we

0:24:13.440 --> 0:24:16.200
<v Speaker 1>can look at the messy span of time from two

0:24:16.240 --> 0:24:19.400
<v Speaker 1>thousand to two thousand nine when A O L. Time

0:24:19.440 --> 0:24:22.800
<v Speaker 1>Warner was a thing, and we can say what were

0:24:22.800 --> 0:24:26.120
<v Speaker 1>they thinking? But that's what the benefit of knowing how

0:24:26.200 --> 0:24:29.880
<v Speaker 1>things played out. Let's rewind the clock a little bit

0:24:30.280 --> 0:24:32.960
<v Speaker 1>and think about what things were like leading into this

0:24:33.200 --> 0:24:38.120
<v Speaker 1>enormous merger. First Time Warner was already a media giant.

0:24:38.520 --> 0:24:41.119
<v Speaker 1>It had its hooks set deep in the worlds of

0:24:41.160 --> 0:24:45.959
<v Speaker 1>print with Time Incorporated, and films with Warner Communications, and

0:24:46.080 --> 0:24:50.919
<v Speaker 1>television with Turner Broadcasting. America. Online was a dominant player

0:24:50.960 --> 0:24:54.119
<v Speaker 1>in the online space, yet another way for companies to

0:24:54.200 --> 0:24:57.000
<v Speaker 1>reach out to customers that would be another form of

0:24:57.160 --> 0:25:01.720
<v Speaker 1>mass media. This was before the com crash, so it

0:25:01.800 --> 0:25:05.040
<v Speaker 1>was a time when everyone was absolutely certain that the

0:25:05.080 --> 0:25:08.720
<v Speaker 1>Internet was going to be the twenty first century equivalent

0:25:09.160 --> 0:25:12.520
<v Speaker 1>of the Gold Rush in California. If you could get

0:25:12.560 --> 0:25:16.040
<v Speaker 1>on the Internet and if you could stake your claim,

0:25:16.080 --> 0:25:19.480
<v Speaker 1>whether it was an online store or some web enabled

0:25:19.520 --> 0:25:22.679
<v Speaker 1>service or something else, it was like a license to

0:25:22.760 --> 0:25:26.160
<v Speaker 1>print money. The details weren't all worked out. No one

0:25:26.280 --> 0:25:30.000
<v Speaker 1>was really sure how the money was going to roll in,

0:25:30.560 --> 0:25:33.399
<v Speaker 1>let alone how much money there would be, but it

0:25:33.480 --> 0:25:37.639
<v Speaker 1>was a foregone conclusion that the future of wealth was online.

0:25:38.000 --> 0:25:41.280
<v Speaker 1>So a o L being a huge company that was

0:25:41.320 --> 0:25:45.560
<v Speaker 1>seeing massive profits and had recently expanded by purchasing the

0:25:45.640 --> 0:25:49.679
<v Speaker 1>former leading web browser company, seemed like the perfect compliment

0:25:49.760 --> 0:25:53.840
<v Speaker 1>to the established old media represented by Time Warner. On

0:25:53.960 --> 0:25:58.200
<v Speaker 1>top of that, Time Warner had already attempted to establish

0:25:58.200 --> 0:26:01.920
<v Speaker 1>an online presence before merging with a o L. Time

0:26:01.960 --> 0:26:05.800
<v Speaker 1>Warner executives also recognized that the future would be online,

0:26:06.000 --> 0:26:09.440
<v Speaker 1>even though they weren't really sure what that future would

0:26:09.480 --> 0:26:12.120
<v Speaker 1>look like. But it seemed pretty certain that the Internet

0:26:12.160 --> 0:26:15.680
<v Speaker 1>was going to play an incredibly important part in that future.

0:26:16.280 --> 0:26:20.919
<v Speaker 1>But making something that works online isn't always easy, particularly

0:26:21.320 --> 0:26:24.400
<v Speaker 1>when you're coming from the point of view of established media.

0:26:25.000 --> 0:26:28.840
<v Speaker 1>What works for television and for film and print won't

0:26:28.840 --> 0:26:33.040
<v Speaker 1>necessarily work for online, and the preconceptions you bring to

0:26:33.080 --> 0:26:36.040
<v Speaker 1>the table could get in the way. So merging with

0:26:36.119 --> 0:26:38.800
<v Speaker 1>a O L would give Time Warner not just an

0:26:38.800 --> 0:26:42.600
<v Speaker 1>online presence, but one designed by a leader in the space.

0:26:42.680 --> 0:26:46.439
<v Speaker 1>For some people, he will meant the Internet. That was

0:26:46.600 --> 0:26:48.280
<v Speaker 1>what they thought of it. Some people called a O

0:26:48.440 --> 0:26:51.720
<v Speaker 1>L Internet for dummies, but a lot of people just thought, all,

0:26:51.840 --> 0:26:54.760
<v Speaker 1>that's how you get on the Internet. So on the surface,

0:26:54.800 --> 0:26:58.399
<v Speaker 1>all of this seemed incredibly attractive. Other companies were worried

0:26:58.440 --> 0:27:00.719
<v Speaker 1>that this merger was going to mean there was going

0:27:00.760 --> 0:27:03.199
<v Speaker 1>to be a new giant media company and soon it

0:27:03.240 --> 0:27:05.520
<v Speaker 1>was going to become a monopoly, and it would either

0:27:05.640 --> 0:27:08.280
<v Speaker 1>run you out of business or was going to gobble

0:27:08.359 --> 0:27:11.840
<v Speaker 1>you up and acquire you. That's something that a lot

0:27:11.920 --> 0:27:14.439
<v Speaker 1>of folks are saying right now about Disney, not to

0:27:14.480 --> 0:27:18.000
<v Speaker 1>mention some other pretty big companies like A T and T.

0:27:19.359 --> 0:27:23.879
<v Speaker 1>But this all came from a high level conceptual mindset.

0:27:24.440 --> 0:27:28.080
<v Speaker 1>When it came to actually bringing the two major companies together,

0:27:29.160 --> 0:27:34.160
<v Speaker 1>things fell apart pretty quickly. The corporate cultures were drastically different.

0:27:34.359 --> 0:27:39.280
<v Speaker 1>Time Warner executives saw ao L executives as being impetuous, brash,

0:27:39.359 --> 0:27:43.159
<v Speaker 1>and arrogant. A o L executives viewed their Time Warner

0:27:43.240 --> 0:27:48.119
<v Speaker 1>counterparts as being stuffy and conservative and risk averse to

0:27:48.160 --> 0:27:52.680
<v Speaker 1>the point of complacency. And this mismatch in perspectives meant

0:27:52.720 --> 0:27:56.000
<v Speaker 1>there were very few instances of people actually working together

0:27:56.359 --> 0:28:00.440
<v Speaker 1>across company lines. They were frequently feeling like they were

0:28:00.000 --> 0:28:04.120
<v Speaker 1>at cross purposes working against each other. Making things even

0:28:04.160 --> 0:28:08.000
<v Speaker 1>worse was the general economy. Now, As I said, the

0:28:08.040 --> 0:28:11.760
<v Speaker 1>deal happened before the dot com bubble burst, but then

0:28:12.200 --> 0:28:15.240
<v Speaker 1>that bubble did burst. And I've talked about the dot

0:28:15.240 --> 0:28:17.760
<v Speaker 1>com bubble so many times, and I'm sure some of

0:28:17.800 --> 0:28:21.840
<v Speaker 1>you probably could pause the podcast right now and give

0:28:21.840 --> 0:28:24.879
<v Speaker 1>an overview in my voice about the dot com bubble

0:28:24.920 --> 0:28:27.880
<v Speaker 1>bursting and be pretty much on track for what I'm

0:28:27.880 --> 0:28:31.280
<v Speaker 1>about to say. But essentially, you had an intense era

0:28:31.880 --> 0:28:35.639
<v Speaker 1>of a few years in which investors were speculating wildly

0:28:35.760 --> 0:28:40.000
<v Speaker 1>on the performance of various Internet connected businesses. Many of

0:28:40.040 --> 0:28:45.560
<v Speaker 1>those businesses, flush with cash from investors, realized that they

0:28:45.800 --> 0:28:48.040
<v Speaker 1>didn't know how to make any money. They failed to

0:28:48.080 --> 0:28:50.800
<v Speaker 1>become profitable. Some of them failed to even develop a

0:28:50.840 --> 0:28:55.760
<v Speaker 1>coherent business plan. Companies achieved a market value that didn't

0:28:55.800 --> 0:29:00.600
<v Speaker 1>reflect their real value, and eventually there were are reckoning.

0:29:00.640 --> 0:29:04.320
<v Speaker 1>The house of cards grew too heavy and it crumbled

0:29:04.360 --> 0:29:07.240
<v Speaker 1>as investors lost confidence that they would ever see long

0:29:07.360 --> 0:29:11.240
<v Speaker 1>term returns and they began to try and retrieve their

0:29:11.280 --> 0:29:13.920
<v Speaker 1>investments and pull out of the market. This led to

0:29:13.960 --> 0:29:17.320
<v Speaker 1>an overall economic recession and a o L time Warner

0:29:17.520 --> 0:29:20.719
<v Speaker 1>was hit just like everyone else. Then they lost a

0:29:20.920 --> 0:29:24.160
<v Speaker 1>whole lot of value because of it. In the wake

0:29:24.320 --> 0:29:28.400
<v Speaker 1>of that economic stumble, Al had to write off forty

0:29:28.520 --> 0:29:34.040
<v Speaker 1>five point five billion dollars in the fourth quarter of

0:29:34.120 --> 0:29:36.760
<v Speaker 1>two thousand two, and that led to the loss of

0:29:36.800 --> 0:29:41.480
<v Speaker 1>another forty four point nine billion dollars. In all, it

0:29:41.560 --> 0:29:45.040
<v Speaker 1>was a nearly nine nine billion dollar loss. When the

0:29:45.160 --> 0:29:49.000
<v Speaker 1>dust had settled, Steve Case stepped down as chairman of

0:29:49.040 --> 0:29:51.760
<v Speaker 1>the board, though he remained a member of the board

0:29:51.760 --> 0:29:57.120
<v Speaker 1>of directors. Ted Turner, who had founded Turner Broadcasting, resigned

0:29:57.160 --> 0:30:00.760
<v Speaker 1>as a vice chairman of the board. One development that

0:30:00.840 --> 0:30:04.200
<v Speaker 1>people at a O L and Time Warner perhaps should

0:30:04.320 --> 0:30:08.720
<v Speaker 1>have realized before talking about a merger was the general

0:30:08.760 --> 0:30:13.120
<v Speaker 1>trend toward broadband service. Because a O L was a

0:30:13.160 --> 0:30:17.160
<v Speaker 1>dial up service, you would connect your phone to a modem,

0:30:17.280 --> 0:30:19.800
<v Speaker 1>and your modem connected to your computer, and you would

0:30:19.800 --> 0:30:25.120
<v Speaker 1>actually dial up to connect to a L servers. Well,

0:30:25.280 --> 0:30:28.840
<v Speaker 1>broadband was slowly gaining traction, and this would allow and

0:30:29.000 --> 0:30:32.080
<v Speaker 1>always on connection. You wouldn't have to dial up. You

0:30:32.200 --> 0:30:35.280
<v Speaker 1>just would turn on your computer and then away you go.

0:30:35.960 --> 0:30:40.200
<v Speaker 1>Like most technologies, however, it was really expensive when it debuted,

0:30:40.240 --> 0:30:44.040
<v Speaker 1>in fact, prohibitively expensive for most people, and it was

0:30:44.080 --> 0:30:48.240
<v Speaker 1>also very limited in its accessibility. Not very many people

0:30:48.640 --> 0:30:52.040
<v Speaker 1>had access to it. But as years went by and

0:30:52.080 --> 0:30:57.120
<v Speaker 1>more companies invested in building out the infrastructure, the accessibility improved,

0:30:57.440 --> 0:31:00.480
<v Speaker 1>prices began to come down. The number of households in

0:31:00.520 --> 0:31:05.400
<v Speaker 1>the United States with broadband connections jumped fifty percent from

0:31:05.480 --> 0:31:10.320
<v Speaker 1>two thousand to two thousand one. That is increased by

0:31:11.040 --> 0:31:13.760
<v Speaker 1>That's great growth, but it doesn't necessarily tell you anything

0:31:13.800 --> 0:31:17.320
<v Speaker 1>about numbers, because if you have four customers in two

0:31:17.360 --> 0:31:20.880
<v Speaker 1>thousand and six customers in two thousand one, that's an

0:31:20.880 --> 0:31:24.840
<v Speaker 1>increase of fift But by two thousand three, the FCC

0:31:25.120 --> 0:31:30.400
<v Speaker 1>estimated that just under of American households were subscribed to

0:31:30.480 --> 0:31:35.560
<v Speaker 1>broadband services, and A o L's main business was quickly changing.

0:31:35.760 --> 0:31:40.320
<v Speaker 1>Its dial up service was still making money, but it

0:31:40.400 --> 0:31:44.240
<v Speaker 1>was becoming less important. It was generating less revenue year

0:31:44.280 --> 0:31:46.320
<v Speaker 1>over year, and that's typically a number you want to

0:31:46.320 --> 0:31:50.760
<v Speaker 1>see increase, not go down. In two thousand four, the

0:31:50.920 --> 0:31:53.600
<v Speaker 1>A o L unit of the company held what was

0:31:53.680 --> 0:31:58.360
<v Speaker 1>referred to as a strategic off site meeting. Now in reality,

0:31:58.480 --> 0:32:00.760
<v Speaker 1>it was a meeting to talk about why options were

0:32:00.800 --> 0:32:03.520
<v Speaker 1>open to the company as things were getting, you know,

0:32:03.560 --> 0:32:07.840
<v Speaker 1>pretty grim. The company was losing customers to broadband. Companies

0:32:07.880 --> 0:32:10.920
<v Speaker 1>like Microsoft and Yahoo were presenting challenges to A O

0:32:11.040 --> 0:32:14.360
<v Speaker 1>L's curated portal design to the Internet. There was no

0:32:14.440 --> 0:32:18.560
<v Speaker 1>consensus on the right course of action. Some people like

0:32:18.680 --> 0:32:21.480
<v Speaker 1>Ted Leonsis, who was vice chairman of a O L,

0:32:22.000 --> 0:32:24.640
<v Speaker 1>and Mike Kelly, who was the president of the Media

0:32:24.720 --> 0:32:27.520
<v Speaker 1>Networks Group, advocated that A o L should launch an

0:32:27.560 --> 0:32:31.560
<v Speaker 1>online portal similar to that of Yahoo that would entail

0:32:31.600 --> 0:32:34.840
<v Speaker 1>putting the curated A o L content as well as

0:32:34.840 --> 0:32:38.440
<v Speaker 1>the stuff created specifically for A O L up online

0:32:38.800 --> 0:32:42.920
<v Speaker 1>for free. Joe RiPP, who was another vice chairman, opposed

0:32:43.040 --> 0:32:46.440
<v Speaker 1>that idea. He said it would alienate the remaining A

0:32:46.560 --> 0:32:50.320
<v Speaker 1>o L dial up customers if they learned that other

0:32:50.360 --> 0:32:53.480
<v Speaker 1>people were just finding the exact same A o L

0:32:53.600 --> 0:32:56.880
<v Speaker 1>content online for free, whereas they were paying for it

0:32:56.960 --> 0:32:59.640
<v Speaker 1>on a month to month basis, that was going to

0:32:59.720 --> 0:33:02.920
<v Speaker 1>really upset them. Jonathan Miller, who was chief of a

0:33:03.040 --> 0:33:05.840
<v Speaker 1>O L at that point, had everyone take a lunch,

0:33:05.960 --> 0:33:08.800
<v Speaker 1>and on return he said the company was definitely going

0:33:08.840 --> 0:33:13.200
<v Speaker 1>to pursue this portal strategy. The once premium content would

0:33:13.240 --> 0:33:16.880
<v Speaker 1>now be free for users, with revenue coming from advertising.

0:33:17.720 --> 0:33:21.160
<v Speaker 1>In two thousand five, Steve Case would resign his position

0:33:21.200 --> 0:33:24.320
<v Speaker 1>as a director of Time Warner and stepped down as

0:33:24.360 --> 0:33:28.120
<v Speaker 1>a member of the board. That meant that at that point,

0:33:28.520 --> 0:33:31.680
<v Speaker 1>none of a O L's founders were still with the company,

0:33:31.880 --> 0:33:34.640
<v Speaker 1>and any real capacity they had all left at this point,

0:33:35.480 --> 0:33:37.680
<v Speaker 1>and that seems like a good stopping point for this

0:33:37.800 --> 0:33:40.440
<v Speaker 1>part of our story. In our next episode, we'll pick

0:33:40.480 --> 0:33:44.920
<v Speaker 1>back up. We'll continue talk about how that AOL Time

0:33:44.960 --> 0:33:47.800
<v Speaker 1>Warner relationship came to an end and what A O

0:33:47.960 --> 0:33:50.560
<v Speaker 1>L Has been up to in the years since. In

0:33:50.600 --> 0:33:53.560
<v Speaker 1>the meantime, if you have any suggestions for future episodes

0:33:53.600 --> 0:33:55.680
<v Speaker 1>of tech Stuff, why not let me know The email

0:33:55.680 --> 0:33:59.000
<v Speaker 1>addresses tech Stuff at how stuff works dot com. Go

0:33:59.160 --> 0:34:02.280
<v Speaker 1>to our website, it's tech Stuff podcast dot com. You're

0:34:02.280 --> 0:34:05.320
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0:34:05.320 --> 0:34:08.240
<v Speaker 1>the show. You also see a link to our merchandise

0:34:08.400 --> 0:34:11.760
<v Speaker 1>store that's over at t public dot com slash tech stuff.

0:34:12.120 --> 0:34:14.200
<v Speaker 1>There are a lot of fun items up there on sale.

0:34:14.480 --> 0:34:16.560
<v Speaker 1>You can go check those out. Every purchase you make

0:34:16.600 --> 0:34:19.200
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0:34:19.239 --> 0:34:28.160
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0:34:28.280 --> 0:34:30.760
<v Speaker 1>this and thousands of other topics. Because it how stuff

0:34:30.760 --> 0:34:41.239
<v Speaker 1>works dot com