1 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:07,800 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from my Heart Radio. 2 00:00:12,080 --> 00:00:14,840 Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 3 00:00:14,920 --> 00:00:17,920 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio. 4 00:00:18,000 --> 00:00:20,720 Speaker 1: And how the tech are you. It's time for the 5 00:00:20,760 --> 00:00:25,120 Speaker 1: tech news for Thursday, February twenty four, twenty twenty two, 6 00:00:25,840 --> 00:00:30,000 Speaker 1: and probably the biggest story in the world right now 7 00:00:30,160 --> 00:00:34,639 Speaker 1: is Russia's invasion of Ukraine, something that has heightened tensions 8 00:00:34,680 --> 00:00:38,280 Speaker 1: around the globe, and of course that also spills over 9 00:00:38,440 --> 00:00:42,760 Speaker 1: into tech news. In the hours before open hostilities, Reuters 10 00:00:42,760 --> 00:00:45,640 Speaker 1: reported that the US will likely begin with holding tech 11 00:00:45,840 --> 00:00:50,600 Speaker 1: from Russia, ranging from products like computer systems to individual 12 00:00:50,600 --> 00:00:56,760 Speaker 1: components like semiconductors and aircraft parts. Interestingly, though not surprisingly, 13 00:00:57,440 --> 00:01:00,760 Speaker 1: the language is directed more at Vladimir Putin than at 14 00:01:01,000 --> 00:01:05,400 Speaker 1: Russia as a whole, and Putant's tendency toward authoritarianism arguably 15 00:01:05,520 --> 00:01:11,000 Speaker 1: justifies that wording. The US Deputy Treasury Secretary said that, quote, 16 00:01:11,080 --> 00:01:14,680 Speaker 1: We're going to cut him off from Western technology that's 17 00:01:14,680 --> 00:01:18,080 Speaker 1: critical to a dancing his military, cut him off from 18 00:01:18,120 --> 00:01:21,040 Speaker 1: Western financial resources that will be critical for feeding his 19 00:01:21,160 --> 00:01:25,319 Speaker 1: economy and also to enriching himself. Uh. The he in 20 00:01:25,360 --> 00:01:29,480 Speaker 1: this case being Putent and again this all came out 21 00:01:29,560 --> 00:01:35,080 Speaker 1: before Russia's actual invasion. But yes, we should see various 22 00:01:35,240 --> 00:01:38,080 Speaker 1: sanctions around the world. I know the UK has also 23 00:01:38,120 --> 00:01:41,480 Speaker 1: started to announce some and likely a lot of that 24 00:01:41,600 --> 00:01:44,400 Speaker 1: is going to focus not just on finances but on 25 00:01:44,560 --> 00:01:48,560 Speaker 1: tech as well. In addition to the explosions and gunfire 26 00:01:48,640 --> 00:01:52,400 Speaker 1: happening in Ukraine. By the way, any listeners out in Ukraine, 27 00:01:53,160 --> 00:01:56,200 Speaker 1: I really hope you and your loved ones are safe. 28 00:01:56,880 --> 00:02:00,680 Speaker 1: But the country has also been under a pier attack. 29 00:02:01,360 --> 00:02:04,520 Speaker 1: It appears that distributed denial of service attacks, also known 30 00:02:04,560 --> 00:02:09,520 Speaker 1: as the DOS attacks, have hampered Ukraine's internet infrastructure. In addition, 31 00:02:09,560 --> 00:02:12,400 Speaker 1: it seems as though there's been a deployment of a 32 00:02:12,480 --> 00:02:15,359 Speaker 1: type of malware designed to infect and then wipe out 33 00:02:15,480 --> 00:02:18,880 Speaker 1: data on machines, and that this has been targeting some 34 00:02:19,240 --> 00:02:24,760 Speaker 1: computer systems in Ukrainian organizations. Now, just in case you're 35 00:02:24,760 --> 00:02:28,040 Speaker 1: not familiar with the term di DOS attack, the basic 36 00:02:28,080 --> 00:02:32,000 Speaker 1: ideas that you have a distributed network of machines, so 37 00:02:32,080 --> 00:02:35,960 Speaker 1: a whole collection of computers that are distributed in an 38 00:02:36,000 --> 00:02:39,480 Speaker 1: area could be all around the world actually, and you 39 00:02:39,600 --> 00:02:43,880 Speaker 1: use these to target specific web servers and you overwhelm 40 00:02:43,960 --> 00:02:47,480 Speaker 1: those servers with traffic such as a pin request or 41 00:02:47,560 --> 00:02:50,360 Speaker 1: maybe even a pin request that goes back to an 42 00:02:50,360 --> 00:02:53,760 Speaker 1: address that doesn't exist, and the web server attempts to 43 00:02:53,840 --> 00:02:56,600 Speaker 1: respond to all those requests because that's how you know, 44 00:02:56,680 --> 00:02:59,480 Speaker 1: the Internet functions, is that if it didn't respond to 45 00:02:59,480 --> 00:03:02,680 Speaker 1: these request USTs, then the Internet wouldn't work. It has 46 00:03:02,720 --> 00:03:05,280 Speaker 1: to be able to respond to these things. So this 47 00:03:05,320 --> 00:03:08,919 Speaker 1: is kind of equivalent to bringing a doorbell and then 48 00:03:09,040 --> 00:03:12,400 Speaker 1: running away. I've used this analogy before. Imagine that you 49 00:03:12,440 --> 00:03:16,480 Speaker 1: are required to answer your door every time the doorbell rings. 50 00:03:16,760 --> 00:03:19,040 Speaker 1: And someone rings your doorbell, so you get up, you 51 00:03:19,080 --> 00:03:21,000 Speaker 1: walk to your front door, You open the door, no 52 00:03:21,080 --> 00:03:23,840 Speaker 1: one's there. You close the door. Someone rings the doorbell. 53 00:03:24,200 --> 00:03:25,639 Speaker 1: You have to turn back around and go back to 54 00:03:25,680 --> 00:03:27,960 Speaker 1: the door, open it. And this just happens over and 55 00:03:28,000 --> 00:03:30,480 Speaker 1: over to the point where you can't do anything else. 56 00:03:30,960 --> 00:03:35,040 Speaker 1: That's essentially the basic version of a distributed denial of 57 00:03:35,080 --> 00:03:38,160 Speaker 1: service attacks. If you just imagine that all the neighborhood 58 00:03:38,240 --> 00:03:41,000 Speaker 1: kids in all the neighborhoods around you are all in 59 00:03:41,080 --> 00:03:43,480 Speaker 1: on this, and they're all taking turns doing it. That's 60 00:03:43,560 --> 00:03:46,360 Speaker 1: kind of what's going on on a the you know, 61 00:03:46,440 --> 00:03:52,000 Speaker 1: an analogy level well. There are companies like cloud Flare 62 00:03:52,160 --> 00:03:55,120 Speaker 1: that specialize in mitigating the dose attacks, and some of 63 00:03:55,320 --> 00:03:59,760 Speaker 1: Ukraine's most critical services, such as those connected to financial 64 00:04:00,120 --> 00:04:04,000 Speaker 1: military operations, appeared to have weathered the storm a little 65 00:04:04,000 --> 00:04:07,040 Speaker 1: bit better than you know, just about everybody else. The 66 00:04:07,320 --> 00:04:11,320 Speaker 1: malware is a different matter, the Wiper malware. This is 67 00:04:11,360 --> 00:04:15,520 Speaker 1: software that appears to have been created in late twenty one, 68 00:04:15,920 --> 00:04:19,520 Speaker 1: which could indicate that this was a planned part of 69 00:04:19,560 --> 00:04:23,440 Speaker 1: the invasion, and that the invasion itself has been something 70 00:04:23,480 --> 00:04:26,320 Speaker 1: that's been the work for at least a few months, 71 00:04:26,480 --> 00:04:30,120 Speaker 1: which honestly, I would be shocked to hear otherwise it 72 00:04:30,880 --> 00:04:33,599 Speaker 1: The narrative coming out of Russia is that this was 73 00:04:33,720 --> 00:04:38,160 Speaker 1: something that kind of happened suddenly, but all evidence seems 74 00:04:38,200 --> 00:04:43,040 Speaker 1: to contradict that. Moscow so far has denied any involvement 75 00:04:43,279 --> 00:04:46,320 Speaker 1: in the DIDOS attacks or the malware. But as we 76 00:04:46,400 --> 00:04:49,040 Speaker 1: covered in a recent tech News episode, much of the 77 00:04:49,040 --> 00:04:53,440 Speaker 1: hacking activity reported around the world, including nearly three quarters 78 00:04:53,440 --> 00:04:57,120 Speaker 1: of all ransomware attacks, appears to originate out of Russia 79 00:04:57,279 --> 00:05:01,480 Speaker 1: or Russia aligned countries. On a relay to note, researchers 80 00:05:01,480 --> 00:05:05,520 Speaker 1: in Ukraine have been sharing information, photos, and videos on Twitter. 81 00:05:06,200 --> 00:05:11,520 Speaker 1: So this includes journalists and security experts, and a lot 82 00:05:11,600 --> 00:05:14,680 Speaker 1: of them have noticed that their accounts have been hit 83 00:05:14,720 --> 00:05:19,839 Speaker 1: with suspensions. For example, Oliver Alexander, who has been fighting 84 00:05:19,839 --> 00:05:22,960 Speaker 1: misinformation during the invasion by trying to cover things on 85 00:05:23,000 --> 00:05:26,480 Speaker 1: the ground, has had his accounts suspended at least two 86 00:05:26,480 --> 00:05:29,880 Speaker 1: times in the last twenty four hours. Now, in most cases, 87 00:05:30,200 --> 00:05:33,039 Speaker 1: the researchers are told that they received a suspension for 88 00:05:33,200 --> 00:05:36,719 Speaker 1: violating a Twitter policy, but at least in a few 89 00:05:36,760 --> 00:05:40,640 Speaker 1: of those, no specific policy was cited. As of the 90 00:05:40,680 --> 00:05:44,120 Speaker 1: time of this recording. The working hypothesis is that there 91 00:05:44,279 --> 00:05:49,400 Speaker 1: was and potentially still is, an active campaign, likely originating 92 00:05:49,400 --> 00:05:54,040 Speaker 1: in Russia, that is identifying and reporting any social media 93 00:05:54,080 --> 00:05:58,039 Speaker 1: accounts attempting to cover the Ukraine invasion, and that these 94 00:05:58,080 --> 00:06:00,839 Speaker 1: reports are all made in bad face in an effort 95 00:06:00,839 --> 00:06:04,360 Speaker 1: to suppress information from being published. So in other words, 96 00:06:04,640 --> 00:06:08,120 Speaker 1: you know, it's it's people saying, hey, they're spreading misinformation 97 00:06:08,200 --> 00:06:12,640 Speaker 1: in an attempt to silence people. Now, a Twitter spokesperson 98 00:06:12,680 --> 00:06:16,440 Speaker 1: has said that quote, We've been proactively monitoring for emerging 99 00:06:16,520 --> 00:06:20,839 Speaker 1: narratives that are violative of our policies, and in this instance, 100 00:06:21,120 --> 00:06:24,640 Speaker 1: we took enforcement action on a number of accounts in error. 101 00:06:25,400 --> 00:06:30,320 Speaker 1: We're expeditiously reviewing these actions and have already proactively reinstated 102 00:06:30,360 --> 00:06:33,760 Speaker 1: access to a number of affected accounts. The claims that 103 00:06:33,839 --> 00:06:37,760 Speaker 1: the errors were a coordinated body campaign or the result 104 00:06:37,839 --> 00:06:42,159 Speaker 1: of mass reporting is inaccurate end quote. So in other words, 105 00:06:42,240 --> 00:06:46,200 Speaker 1: they're refuting that hypothesis, and hopefully that is true, because 106 00:06:46,200 --> 00:06:49,400 Speaker 1: presumably it will mean that from this point forward we'll 107 00:06:49,440 --> 00:06:54,719 Speaker 1: see fewer mistaken suspensions and that will just be a 108 00:06:54,760 --> 00:06:59,000 Speaker 1: little blip in the early days. Uh, if this actually 109 00:06:59,160 --> 00:07:01,360 Speaker 1: is part of a supper Ashan campaign, maybe that will 110 00:07:01,360 --> 00:07:04,480 Speaker 1: mean Twitter will develop better tools to detect and prevent 111 00:07:04,520 --> 00:07:07,760 Speaker 1: those from happening, which again can be a larger benefit 112 00:07:07,839 --> 00:07:13,000 Speaker 1: in the future. Switching over to North Korea, Wired has 113 00:07:13,040 --> 00:07:16,640 Speaker 1: an article titled North Korea hacked him, so he took 114 00:07:16,680 --> 00:07:20,480 Speaker 1: down its Internet and the pieces about a hacker who 115 00:07:20,560 --> 00:07:24,120 Speaker 1: goes by the handle Packs that's p the numeral four 116 00:07:24,280 --> 00:07:28,880 Speaker 1: and X, and North Korea targeted Packs because Packs does 117 00:07:29,000 --> 00:07:33,920 Speaker 1: cybersecurity work and had been involved in cybersecurity work related 118 00:07:33,960 --> 00:07:37,960 Speaker 1: to North Korea, and Packs did not like getting targeted 119 00:07:38,000 --> 00:07:39,840 Speaker 1: and after a year of waiting to see what the 120 00:07:39,920 --> 00:07:43,760 Speaker 1: US would do about this, and Seeing that apparently the 121 00:07:43,800 --> 00:07:47,080 Speaker 1: answer was nothing, Packs decided to take it upon himself 122 00:07:47,120 --> 00:07:50,240 Speaker 1: to do a effectively a denial of service attack on 123 00:07:50,320 --> 00:07:54,800 Speaker 1: North Korea's Internet system. Now, you could argue that this 124 00:07:54,880 --> 00:07:58,239 Speaker 1: is not really an effective strategy because very few people 125 00:07:58,280 --> 00:08:02,920 Speaker 1: in North Korea actually have access to the Internet. A 126 00:08:02,920 --> 00:08:06,160 Speaker 1: lot of folks, or at least not a lot some 127 00:08:06,240 --> 00:08:11,320 Speaker 1: folks can access and intronet, but that has no connectivity 128 00:08:11,360 --> 00:08:14,720 Speaker 1: to the outside. Internet's fully controlled by the North Korean government. 129 00:08:15,520 --> 00:08:18,280 Speaker 1: The Internet sites in North Korea really are mostly for 130 00:08:18,400 --> 00:08:21,640 Speaker 1: propaganda purposes and are outward facing, So in other words, 131 00:08:22,120 --> 00:08:23,920 Speaker 1: it's for the rest of the world, not for the 132 00:08:23,920 --> 00:08:27,440 Speaker 1: people in North Korea. So disrupting those just means that 133 00:08:27,480 --> 00:08:32,679 Speaker 1: North Korea's propaganda campaign was somewhat hindered. In fact, a 134 00:08:32,720 --> 00:08:34,439 Speaker 1: lot of people say, like, the best this does is 135 00:08:34,520 --> 00:08:38,280 Speaker 1: kind of irritate the government and it could potentially force 136 00:08:38,400 --> 00:08:41,680 Speaker 1: them to start beefing up their Internet security, which could 137 00:08:41,679 --> 00:08:47,240 Speaker 1: in theory disrupt say more clandestine efforts that could be 138 00:08:47,280 --> 00:08:49,360 Speaker 1: going on at the same time. In other words, don't 139 00:08:49,360 --> 00:08:52,800 Speaker 1: bring attention to these vulnerabilities because someone else might be 140 00:08:52,880 --> 00:08:57,319 Speaker 1: using them to do some important work. Uh. Then again, 141 00:08:57,360 --> 00:08:59,839 Speaker 1: you know, considering the limited use of the Internet and 142 00:09:00,000 --> 00:09:03,520 Speaker 1: North Korea, you could argue that maybe there's not really 143 00:09:04,240 --> 00:09:08,480 Speaker 1: any real opportunity through that route, unless, of course, you know, 144 00:09:08,840 --> 00:09:11,400 Speaker 1: they are really bad at doing things like having air 145 00:09:11,480 --> 00:09:13,480 Speaker 1: gaps in their system. And air gap, by the way, 146 00:09:13,480 --> 00:09:15,880 Speaker 1: in case you're not familiar with that term, that's where 147 00:09:16,480 --> 00:09:20,199 Speaker 1: you make certain that a system has no connectivity to 148 00:09:20,440 --> 00:09:24,000 Speaker 1: outside networks. It is a standalone network. It's like an island. 149 00:09:24,679 --> 00:09:28,640 Speaker 1: It doesn't touch any other network. And uh, that's that's 150 00:09:28,640 --> 00:09:31,839 Speaker 1: a security measure, right if you If it doesn't interoperate 151 00:09:31,840 --> 00:09:34,199 Speaker 1: with any other networks, there's no way to get at 152 00:09:34,240 --> 00:09:37,959 Speaker 1: it from outside. You have to get access to the 153 00:09:38,040 --> 00:09:42,559 Speaker 1: actual system itself, which really cuts down on the possibility 154 00:09:42,679 --> 00:09:46,920 Speaker 1: of it being um compromised. It doesn't eliminate that possibility, 155 00:09:46,920 --> 00:09:49,960 Speaker 1: it just cuts way back on it. And um it 156 00:09:49,960 --> 00:09:53,880 Speaker 1: would be shocking to me. I guess not shocking, but 157 00:09:54,280 --> 00:09:56,559 Speaker 1: you know, if North Korea is not doing that, it's 158 00:09:56,559 --> 00:10:01,680 Speaker 1: stupid because if it's not using the Internet the way 159 00:10:01,760 --> 00:10:05,760 Speaker 1: other countries are, then there's no real reason to have 160 00:10:05,840 --> 00:10:09,000 Speaker 1: any of its you know, crucial systems hooked up to it. 161 00:10:09,520 --> 00:10:13,440 Speaker 1: But anyway, that's what's going on right now, and I 162 00:10:13,520 --> 00:10:16,319 Speaker 1: recommend the article again. It's titled North Korea hacked him 163 00:10:16,400 --> 00:10:19,560 Speaker 1: so he took down its internet. Check out that article. 164 00:10:20,559 --> 00:10:22,680 Speaker 1: We've got a few more stories to cover, but before 165 00:10:22,720 --> 00:10:32,280 Speaker 1: we get to those, let's take a quick break. We're back. 166 00:10:32,640 --> 00:10:34,559 Speaker 1: You might remember from a couple of weeks back when 167 00:10:34,559 --> 00:10:38,120 Speaker 1: I talked about how the Dutch Competition Authority was levying 168 00:10:38,160 --> 00:10:42,760 Speaker 1: fines against Apple for violating anti competitive regulations. Specifically, we're 169 00:10:42,760 --> 00:10:46,320 Speaker 1: talking about Apple's payment system in app payment system, and 170 00:10:46,360 --> 00:10:49,760 Speaker 1: how the company previously required all apps to use Apple's 171 00:10:49,800 --> 00:10:53,280 Speaker 1: own operated in payment system, and that also meant that 172 00:10:53,320 --> 00:10:55,720 Speaker 1: Apple could take a chunk out of every in app 173 00:10:55,800 --> 00:11:00,520 Speaker 1: transaction like up to well, Apple has since change things 174 00:11:00,600 --> 00:11:03,160 Speaker 1: up uh. It has announced that developers will be able 175 00:11:03,200 --> 00:11:06,000 Speaker 1: to use third party payment systems, but Apple will collect 176 00:11:06,040 --> 00:11:10,079 Speaker 1: a twenty seven percent commission on all in app purchases 177 00:11:10,640 --> 00:11:16,600 Speaker 1: that use a third party payment method. Now that that's rough, 178 00:11:16,640 --> 00:11:19,240 Speaker 1: because chances are app developers will have to pay a 179 00:11:19,320 --> 00:11:23,520 Speaker 1: cut to whatever third party payment system they're using. So 180 00:11:23,880 --> 00:11:26,400 Speaker 1: you might start to suspect that while Apple is saying 181 00:11:26,440 --> 00:11:30,160 Speaker 1: it is going to offer an alternative, the alternatives will 182 00:11:30,280 --> 00:11:33,319 Speaker 1: likely end up being more expensive to use than the 183 00:11:33,360 --> 00:11:37,360 Speaker 1: Apple provided option, and Apple still gets a cut. As such, 184 00:11:37,559 --> 00:11:41,080 Speaker 1: The Netherlands Authority for Consumers says that Apple has quote 185 00:11:41,120 --> 00:11:44,840 Speaker 1: refused to put forward any serious proposals end quote, and 186 00:11:44,920 --> 00:11:48,920 Speaker 1: that furthermore, the company appears to be fine with paying 187 00:11:49,000 --> 00:11:51,680 Speaker 1: fines even if those fines get up to fifty million 188 00:11:51,720 --> 00:11:55,240 Speaker 1: euros a week for non compliance, which tells you just 189 00:11:55,320 --> 00:11:58,200 Speaker 1: how important in app revenue is for Apple if the 190 00:11:58,200 --> 00:12:02,480 Speaker 1: company is not responding to this stuation with more speed 191 00:12:02,600 --> 00:12:06,400 Speaker 1: and seriousness. The a c M says that Apple is 192 00:12:06,400 --> 00:12:09,360 Speaker 1: purposefully putting in barriers that discouraged the use of third 193 00:12:09,360 --> 00:12:12,439 Speaker 1: party payment systems and has to come up with a 194 00:12:12,480 --> 00:12:16,400 Speaker 1: fair alternative. The BBC News investigated how the metaverse is 195 00:12:16,400 --> 00:12:19,240 Speaker 1: shaping up when a researcher posed as a thirteen year 196 00:12:19,280 --> 00:12:21,720 Speaker 1: old girl and used a meta quest a k a. 197 00:12:21,880 --> 00:12:25,760 Speaker 1: The old Oculus quest headset to visit the vr chat 198 00:12:25,880 --> 00:12:30,760 Speaker 1: virtual space. The researcher witnessed numerous things that were wildly 199 00:12:30,800 --> 00:12:35,000 Speaker 1: inappropriate for a child, including simulated sex acts. The researcher 200 00:12:35,040 --> 00:12:38,760 Speaker 1: was also approached by several adult men. Remember the researcher 201 00:12:38,840 --> 00:12:41,600 Speaker 1: was posing as a thirteen year old girl, and that 202 00:12:41,720 --> 00:12:45,280 Speaker 1: is beyond disturbing, and reportedly the researcher even received a 203 00:12:45,360 --> 00:12:48,600 Speaker 1: rape threat. On top of all that, the researcher said 204 00:12:48,640 --> 00:12:51,600 Speaker 1: she used a fake identity to create an account, and 205 00:12:51,640 --> 00:12:55,120 Speaker 1: there was no point where Meta actually verified her age, 206 00:12:55,559 --> 00:12:57,959 Speaker 1: which meant she was free to wander into virtual space. 207 00:12:58,040 --> 00:13:01,720 Speaker 1: Is very much inappropriate for children. The National Society for 208 00:13:01,800 --> 00:13:05,160 Speaker 1: the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in the UK responded 209 00:13:05,200 --> 00:13:07,720 Speaker 1: to the report by saying that there is an urgent 210 00:13:07,800 --> 00:13:11,280 Speaker 1: need to address online safety issues for children, particularly as 211 00:13:11,280 --> 00:13:14,880 Speaker 1: they're such a hard push to create the metaverse. As 212 00:13:14,920 --> 00:13:17,840 Speaker 1: it stands, the virtual environments that are sort of a 213 00:13:18,000 --> 00:13:23,040 Speaker 1: proto metaverse are very much not a safe space. Um. 214 00:13:23,120 --> 00:13:26,160 Speaker 1: They actually remind me a lot of very early Internet 215 00:13:26,280 --> 00:13:29,040 Speaker 1: chat rooms, which could range from just being silly and 216 00:13:29,120 --> 00:13:34,000 Speaker 1: harmless to outright disturbing and pornographic, depending on the chat 217 00:13:34,120 --> 00:13:37,400 Speaker 1: room and who was there at the time. The NSPCC 218 00:13:37,840 --> 00:13:40,880 Speaker 1: said that as it stands, these virtual chat rooms are 219 00:13:41,000 --> 00:13:45,520 Speaker 1: dangerous by design because of oversight and neglect. Meta's approach 220 00:13:45,559 --> 00:13:48,000 Speaker 1: so far has been kind of a weird and gross 221 00:13:48,160 --> 00:13:53,480 Speaker 1: scientific observation. Essentially, watch how people are interacting in virtual 222 00:13:53,520 --> 00:13:56,960 Speaker 1: spaces and then address problems that crop up. But that 223 00:13:57,000 --> 00:14:00,600 Speaker 1: does mean anyone who's adopting the Virtual Space protest, an 224 00:14:00,600 --> 00:14:04,400 Speaker 1: early adopter, is effectively a guinea pig, and that person's 225 00:14:04,440 --> 00:14:09,920 Speaker 1: mental health isn't really afforded very much protection. Anyway, don't 226 00:14:09,960 --> 00:14:12,680 Speaker 1: let your kids use VR chat rooms just yet. The 227 00:14:12,800 --> 00:14:16,120 Speaker 1: world can be a cruel and dangerous place, and the 228 00:14:16,160 --> 00:14:19,880 Speaker 1: online world sometimes it's a billion times more so. Earlier 229 00:14:19,920 --> 00:14:23,040 Speaker 1: this year, we talked about how Peloton, the exercise company, 230 00:14:23,240 --> 00:14:26,160 Speaker 1: is going through a really rough patch. After an initial 231 00:14:26,200 --> 00:14:28,520 Speaker 1: surge in demand at the top of the pandemic, things 232 00:14:28,600 --> 00:14:32,360 Speaker 1: quieted down and Peloton found itself with warehouses full of 233 00:14:32,400 --> 00:14:35,800 Speaker 1: product that they couldn't move. In addition, a terrible tragedy 234 00:14:35,880 --> 00:14:40,560 Speaker 1: involving a treadmill made by the company necessitated an expensive recall. 235 00:14:41,120 --> 00:14:45,080 Speaker 1: Shareholders began to lose confidence in Peloton, and apparently a 236 00:14:45,120 --> 00:14:48,640 Speaker 1: batch of Peloton bikes coming out of a Taiwanese manufacturing 237 00:14:48,640 --> 00:14:52,680 Speaker 1: facility had rust on them in mostly in non visible 238 00:14:52,760 --> 00:14:56,400 Speaker 1: parts of the bikes, and the company's response reportedly was 239 00:14:56,440 --> 00:15:00,520 Speaker 1: to use a chemical to conceal the corrosion. And I've 240 00:15:00,520 --> 00:15:03,200 Speaker 1: seen this referred to as Project ten Man. I'm not 241 00:15:03,240 --> 00:15:06,640 Speaker 1: actually sure if that originated from inside the company or not. 242 00:15:07,560 --> 00:15:10,760 Speaker 1: Warehouse workers were told to use the concealer, which covered 243 00:15:10,800 --> 00:15:13,920 Speaker 1: the rust with a black layer, so it wasn't removing 244 00:15:13,960 --> 00:15:16,320 Speaker 1: the corrosion, it was just covering it up. It's like 245 00:15:16,360 --> 00:15:19,880 Speaker 1: putting a rug over a dirty spot on the floor. Allegedly, 246 00:15:20,160 --> 00:15:24,040 Speaker 1: inspectors were encouraged to downplay how badly rusted a bike 247 00:15:24,120 --> 00:15:27,600 Speaker 1: actually was. Uh. And the company had adopted a policy 248 00:15:27,680 --> 00:15:31,920 Speaker 1: that would allow lightly rusted vehicles or bikes, I should say, 249 00:15:31,920 --> 00:15:34,960 Speaker 1: not really vehicles. They don't take you anywhere their stationary bikes, 250 00:15:35,480 --> 00:15:38,760 Speaker 1: but they would allow lightly rusted ones to go on 251 00:15:39,000 --> 00:15:42,560 Speaker 1: to be sold to customers and if it was deemed 252 00:15:42,760 --> 00:15:48,800 Speaker 1: unsalable then it wouldn't be And the reports suggest that 253 00:15:49,360 --> 00:15:52,640 Speaker 1: people at least felt pressured to air on the side 254 00:15:52,640 --> 00:15:55,640 Speaker 1: of selling them to customers rather than to say no, 255 00:15:55,760 --> 00:16:00,840 Speaker 1: this is unacceptable. Uh. So Platon has actually said that 256 00:16:00,880 --> 00:16:05,160 Speaker 1: if anyone pushed something that should not be sold out 257 00:16:05,280 --> 00:16:09,120 Speaker 1: to a customer, that was against corporate policy, and it 258 00:16:09,120 --> 00:16:12,000 Speaker 1: actually falls on the person in charge of that inspection, 259 00:16:12,160 --> 00:16:15,320 Speaker 1: not on Peloton. They said, no, listen, we would never 260 00:16:15,480 --> 00:16:19,080 Speaker 1: want to do that. Uh. You know, we don't know 261 00:16:19,120 --> 00:16:22,600 Speaker 1: where this came from these people are in charge of that, 262 00:16:22,640 --> 00:16:25,760 Speaker 1: they have the authority to make those decisions, and if 263 00:16:25,800 --> 00:16:29,920 Speaker 1: they chose to sell heavily rusted bikes to customers, that's 264 00:16:29,960 --> 00:16:33,200 Speaker 1: that's on them now. Apparently at least six thousand bikes 265 00:16:33,200 --> 00:16:38,000 Speaker 1: were affected by what Peloton creatively referred to as cosmetic oxidation, 266 00:16:38,880 --> 00:16:42,320 Speaker 1: which I guess is glamour rust. The company has issued 267 00:16:42,360 --> 00:16:45,440 Speaker 1: statements saying no customers have reported problems with the bikes 268 00:16:45,480 --> 00:16:47,920 Speaker 1: and that the company would be certain to make available 269 00:16:48,000 --> 00:16:51,880 Speaker 1: replacement parts should any problems pop up down the line 270 00:16:51,920 --> 00:16:55,040 Speaker 1: due to this issue. That's good, though, I think you 271 00:16:55,080 --> 00:16:57,640 Speaker 1: can make a strong argument that covering up the corrosion 272 00:16:57,640 --> 00:17:00,920 Speaker 1: and calling it cosmetic oxidation points to its Peloton really 273 00:17:00,920 --> 00:17:03,640 Speaker 1: knowing this wasn't a cool move from the get go. 274 00:17:04,359 --> 00:17:06,880 Speaker 1: Online shopping has seen a bit of a decline as 275 00:17:06,920 --> 00:17:10,520 Speaker 1: more people emerge from isolation and start to populate brick 276 00:17:10,560 --> 00:17:14,680 Speaker 1: and mortar stores once again. Amazon has adjusted its forecast 277 00:17:14,720 --> 00:17:18,160 Speaker 1: for first quarter sales, and it says that those estimates 278 00:17:18,160 --> 00:17:23,240 Speaker 1: are now slightly lower than they originally were. eBay has 279 00:17:23,280 --> 00:17:26,679 Speaker 1: had similar news. In fact, eBay's news was enough to 280 00:17:26,720 --> 00:17:30,080 Speaker 1: concern shareholders and send the stock price down nearly nine 281 00:17:30,560 --> 00:17:34,760 Speaker 1: and extended trading. Stephen Priest, the chief of finance at eBay, 282 00:17:35,040 --> 00:17:38,280 Speaker 1: told investors, quote, the second quarter should mark the low 283 00:17:38,359 --> 00:17:41,280 Speaker 1: point for margins during the year as we lap difficult 284 00:17:41,320 --> 00:17:44,399 Speaker 1: comps and ramp up our pace of investment end quote. 285 00:17:45,200 --> 00:17:46,720 Speaker 1: So it does sound like things are going to get 286 00:17:46,720 --> 00:17:51,320 Speaker 1: worse for eBay before they get better. Andy Maxwell of 287 00:17:51,400 --> 00:17:55,159 Speaker 1: torrent Freak wrote an article titled Reddit Banned two thousand, 288 00:17:55,280 --> 00:17:59,840 Speaker 1: six hundred twenty five subreddits for excessive copyright infringement into 289 00:18:00,000 --> 00:18:02,920 Speaker 1: in D twent d one, which details how Reddit is 290 00:18:02,960 --> 00:18:06,840 Speaker 1: taking d m c A takedown notices. Seriously, that's the 291 00:18:06,920 --> 00:18:11,800 Speaker 1: Digital Millennial Copyright Act. Maxwell points out that Reddit reviews 292 00:18:11,920 --> 00:18:15,040 Speaker 1: these takedown notices and only takes further steps if the 293 00:18:15,080 --> 00:18:19,119 Speaker 1: notification follows redd It's rules. So if someone sends in 294 00:18:19,160 --> 00:18:23,320 Speaker 1: a copyright notice but they don't completely or correctly fill 295 00:18:23,359 --> 00:18:27,720 Speaker 1: out Reddit's forms, then that notice doesn't count. Reddit will 296 00:18:27,720 --> 00:18:29,639 Speaker 1: take no action on it because the person did not 297 00:18:29,760 --> 00:18:32,879 Speaker 1: bother to actually properly fill out the notice in the 298 00:18:32,880 --> 00:18:36,840 Speaker 1: first place. Then if the notice is filled up properly, 299 00:18:36,880 --> 00:18:40,480 Speaker 1: Reddit examines the case to see if perhaps it's an 300 00:18:40,480 --> 00:18:43,680 Speaker 1: example of fair use. So as a reminder, fair use 301 00:18:44,240 --> 00:18:49,600 Speaker 1: covers exceptions to copyright exclusivity. Now, fair use is usually 302 00:18:49,600 --> 00:18:52,440 Speaker 1: a matter that gets decided within a court of law. 303 00:18:53,080 --> 00:18:56,680 Speaker 1: Arguing fair use on the outset isn't really a force 304 00:18:56,720 --> 00:19:00,399 Speaker 1: field against d m C A action, But in limited cases, 305 00:19:00,520 --> 00:19:03,840 Speaker 1: someone can use part of a copyrighted work without getting 306 00:19:03,840 --> 00:19:08,480 Speaker 1: permission to do so. Anyway, Maxwell mentions that in one 307 00:19:08,520 --> 00:19:12,600 Speaker 1: read it received copyright notices regarding more than nine twenty 308 00:19:12,840 --> 00:19:17,680 Speaker 1: thousand pieces of content. Read It subsequently removed around six 309 00:19:18,160 --> 00:19:22,320 Speaker 1: sixty five thousand of those pieces, So again, it's not 310 00:19:22,400 --> 00:19:25,639 Speaker 1: a guarantee that once read It gets a copyright notice 311 00:19:25,680 --> 00:19:29,240 Speaker 1: that it will strike content. It did so more frequently 312 00:19:29,240 --> 00:19:32,639 Speaker 1: than it didn't, but like a third of almost a 313 00:19:32,680 --> 00:19:38,920 Speaker 1: third of the complaints were dismissed. But Maxwell points out 314 00:19:38,960 --> 00:19:41,840 Speaker 1: that folks really do need to take copyright more seriously 315 00:19:41,960 --> 00:19:45,360 Speaker 1: on the platform because repeated violations can result not just 316 00:19:45,480 --> 00:19:49,480 Speaker 1: in user bands, but even bands of entire sub credits. 317 00:19:49,920 --> 00:19:53,119 Speaker 1: And imagine being part of a community that gets shut 318 00:19:53,200 --> 00:19:56,080 Speaker 1: down because too many other folks in that community we're 319 00:19:56,119 --> 00:20:00,919 Speaker 1: posting copyrighted material without permission. That would stink. Anyway, The 320 00:20:01,000 --> 00:20:03,480 Speaker 1: article is a good read. I recommend checking it out again. 321 00:20:03,520 --> 00:20:07,040 Speaker 1: It is titled Reddit banned two thousand, six d twenty 322 00:20:07,080 --> 00:20:11,680 Speaker 1: five subreddits for excessive copyright infringement in one and it's 323 00:20:11,720 --> 00:20:16,639 Speaker 1: on torrent Freak. Okay, we've got a few more stories 324 00:20:16,680 --> 00:20:19,879 Speaker 1: before we close out today, but first let's take another 325 00:20:19,960 --> 00:20:30,840 Speaker 1: quick break. Meta, the company that was formerly known as Facebook, 326 00:20:30,960 --> 00:20:34,560 Speaker 1: has announced that it is developing AI tools dedicated to 327 00:20:34,720 --> 00:20:40,240 Speaker 1: translating languages in real time any language to any other language. 328 00:20:40,720 --> 00:20:43,240 Speaker 1: And right now, we do have tools that can cater 329 00:20:43,359 --> 00:20:47,520 Speaker 1: to some of the major languages in the world, like Mandarin, English, 330 00:20:47,600 --> 00:20:51,359 Speaker 1: and Spanish, but a lot of other languages have little 331 00:20:51,440 --> 00:20:54,960 Speaker 1: to no support in those tools, and Meta says that 332 00:20:55,000 --> 00:20:58,959 Speaker 1: the company wishes to build out a universal translator like programs, 333 00:20:59,040 --> 00:21:02,040 Speaker 1: something that could let any two people from any two 334 00:21:02,119 --> 00:21:05,520 Speaker 1: places in the world have a conversation in real time 335 00:21:05,560 --> 00:21:09,000 Speaker 1: with each other, no matter what languages each person was speaking. 336 00:21:09,480 --> 00:21:13,000 Speaker 1: So if you had one person speaking Portuguese and another 337 00:21:13,119 --> 00:21:16,960 Speaker 1: speaking Hindi, they could communicate easily with one another through 338 00:21:17,000 --> 00:21:20,680 Speaker 1: this AI application. And you can immediately understand how this 339 00:21:20,720 --> 00:21:24,760 Speaker 1: would be a really important component in Meta's vision of 340 00:21:24,840 --> 00:21:29,280 Speaker 1: its own future, primarily the metaverse. If there is to 341 00:21:29,320 --> 00:21:34,000 Speaker 1: be a persistent global virtual world. It would be beneficial 342 00:21:34,080 --> 00:21:38,320 Speaker 1: if there were no communication barriers between people visiting that world. 343 00:21:39,000 --> 00:21:42,280 Speaker 1: I should add, however, that while Meta's goal is pretty 344 00:21:42,320 --> 00:21:45,840 Speaker 1: easy to understand, like we we see what they're aiming for, 345 00:21:46,920 --> 00:21:49,719 Speaker 1: Meta has not yet shared any information on how it 346 00:21:49,760 --> 00:21:52,280 Speaker 1: plans to get to that goal, like how long is 347 00:21:52,320 --> 00:21:56,080 Speaker 1: it going to take, what are the milestones to achieving 348 00:21:56,160 --> 00:21:58,919 Speaker 1: that goal? None of that has been shared publicly. At 349 00:21:59,000 --> 00:22:02,560 Speaker 1: least if I replacing a BET, I would aima oult 350 00:22:02,600 --> 00:22:05,760 Speaker 1: several years, maybe as many as ten to get a 351 00:22:05,800 --> 00:22:08,919 Speaker 1: really good handle on this. The tools we have today 352 00:22:08,960 --> 00:22:13,680 Speaker 1: are pretty amazing, um, at least for the limited contexts 353 00:22:13,680 --> 00:22:16,040 Speaker 1: in which they work. But they still have a lot 354 00:22:16,040 --> 00:22:19,800 Speaker 1: of flaws and shortcomings. They're far from perfect. There's a 355 00:22:19,840 --> 00:22:21,720 Speaker 1: lot of bias in there. There's still a lot of 356 00:22:21,880 --> 00:22:24,639 Speaker 1: error in there um And a lot of this is 357 00:22:24,680 --> 00:22:29,320 Speaker 1: because translation is hard. Interpretation is part of translation, and 358 00:22:29,359 --> 00:22:31,800 Speaker 1: that is hard. So it's gonna take some time to 359 00:22:31,840 --> 00:22:34,440 Speaker 1: develop something that can work with low latency and high 360 00:22:34,440 --> 00:22:40,240 Speaker 1: reliability across all languages. The Center for Countering Digital Hate 361 00:22:40,359 --> 00:22:43,720 Speaker 1: released research saying that Facebook is falling well short of 362 00:22:43,720 --> 00:22:48,439 Speaker 1: its responsibility to flag climate misinformation. UH, it's supposed to 363 00:22:48,600 --> 00:22:53,160 Speaker 1: it's supposed to tag UH posts that contain our links 364 00:22:53,160 --> 00:22:56,399 Speaker 1: to articles that are are deemed to be misinformation. But 365 00:22:56,720 --> 00:23:00,360 Speaker 1: the research states that ten publishers nicknamed the Toxic Ten, 366 00:23:00,480 --> 00:23:04,720 Speaker 1: are responsible for nearly sevent of all climate change denial 367 00:23:04,880 --> 00:23:08,359 Speaker 1: posts on Facebook, and that Facebook had only tagged about 368 00:23:08,440 --> 00:23:13,080 Speaker 1: half of those as containing misinformation. The research sites examples 369 00:23:13,119 --> 00:23:17,520 Speaker 1: of posts that clearly contained misinformation in the headlines alone, 370 00:23:17,640 --> 00:23:21,040 Speaker 1: let alone inside the articles themselves, and yet did not 371 00:23:21,280 --> 00:23:26,000 Speaker 1: get that climate denial misinformation tag on them. But a 372 00:23:26,080 --> 00:23:29,040 Speaker 1: Facebook rep addressed the findings and said that part of 373 00:23:29,040 --> 00:23:30,919 Speaker 1: the problem was that the company was actually in the 374 00:23:30,920 --> 00:23:35,520 Speaker 1: process of rolling out its labeling platform when this research 375 00:23:35,600 --> 00:23:38,679 Speaker 1: came out and when it was conducted, suggesting that it 376 00:23:38,760 --> 00:23:40,840 Speaker 1: was just a matter of timing that the company was 377 00:23:40,880 --> 00:23:45,520 Speaker 1: failing to tag of misinformation incidents. The c C d 378 00:23:45,680 --> 00:23:49,720 Speaker 1: H report included several examples of posts that were made 379 00:23:49,800 --> 00:23:52,920 Speaker 1: after September of last year, which is when Meta announced 380 00:23:52,920 --> 00:23:57,440 Speaker 1: it was labeling climate change misinformation posts. So I guess 381 00:23:57,600 --> 00:24:00,760 Speaker 1: it all just depends on which party you believe. Hopefully 382 00:24:00,800 --> 00:24:03,360 Speaker 1: it will mean that we will see more accurate tagging 383 00:24:03,400 --> 00:24:09,840 Speaker 1: in the future and potentially less bultification of misinformation across 384 00:24:09,880 --> 00:24:14,920 Speaker 1: Facebook's platform. I know a guy can dream. U S 385 00:24:15,040 --> 00:24:19,200 Speaker 1: Senator Tammy Baldwin sent a message to Activision Blizzards CEO 386 00:24:19,480 --> 00:24:22,800 Speaker 1: at least for now, Bobby Codeck, and in that message, 387 00:24:22,880 --> 00:24:26,800 Speaker 1: Baldwin told Codeck he should quote negotiate in good faith 388 00:24:26,880 --> 00:24:30,160 Speaker 1: with the workers and suspend any efforts to undermine your 389 00:24:30,200 --> 00:24:34,200 Speaker 1: employees legal rights to form a union and collectively bargain 390 00:24:34,400 --> 00:24:39,000 Speaker 1: end quote. Among the many issues plaguing the company, one 391 00:24:39,520 --> 00:24:43,440 Speaker 1: is that quality assurance testers working at Raven Software, which 392 00:24:43,520 --> 00:24:48,080 Speaker 1: is owned by Activision Blizzard, have been attempting to unionize. 393 00:24:48,520 --> 00:24:52,600 Speaker 1: And you know, we've seen several tech companies face unionization 394 00:24:52,640 --> 00:24:56,280 Speaker 1: efforts in what I think we can generously refer to 395 00:24:56,400 --> 00:25:01,840 Speaker 1: as an adversarial response. Of course, Microsoft is on track 396 00:25:01,880 --> 00:25:04,680 Speaker 1: to acquire Activision Blizzard and a deal that will not 397 00:25:04,800 --> 00:25:10,400 Speaker 1: finalize until the by the end of fiscal year three, 398 00:25:11,200 --> 00:25:17,439 Speaker 1: which doesn't start until this July UM, so that is 399 00:25:17,520 --> 00:25:20,480 Speaker 1: probably going to complicate matters. However, it does mean that 400 00:25:20,560 --> 00:25:25,440 Speaker 1: Baldwin decided to copy Microsoft's CEO Satya Nadela on this 401 00:25:25,560 --> 00:25:28,840 Speaker 1: letter as well, so you know she saw to it 402 00:25:28,920 --> 00:25:32,560 Speaker 1: that that Nadela also got this notification to say, hey, 403 00:25:32,720 --> 00:25:35,480 Speaker 1: we're directing this at CODEC, but we really mean that 404 00:25:36,720 --> 00:25:40,159 Speaker 1: you should allow your employees to unionize if they want to. 405 00:25:41,480 --> 00:25:46,080 Speaker 1: Activision Blizzard refused to voluntarily recognize the union, which means 406 00:25:46,440 --> 00:25:49,879 Speaker 1: that now there are necessary further steps that must be taken, 407 00:25:50,000 --> 00:25:55,240 Speaker 1: including a formal vote. UH side note I Heart Media, 408 00:25:55,600 --> 00:26:01,440 Speaker 1: our our parent company, voluntarily recognize the Heart podcast union, 409 00:26:01,880 --> 00:26:06,560 Speaker 1: so there are cases where companies will voluntarily recognize unions, 410 00:26:06,720 --> 00:26:12,000 Speaker 1: but Activision Blizzard did not go that route. So assuming 411 00:26:12,040 --> 00:26:15,560 Speaker 1: that the QA testers hold such a vote and the 412 00:26:15,640 --> 00:26:19,119 Speaker 1: vote passes, then the National Labor Relations Board or in 413 00:26:19,440 --> 00:26:23,200 Speaker 1: l r B would step in an Activision Blizzard would 414 00:26:23,280 --> 00:26:26,639 Speaker 1: really have no choice but to recognize the union. Microsoft, 415 00:26:26,640 --> 00:26:29,160 Speaker 1: i should add, is another company that is not particularly 416 00:26:29,240 --> 00:26:31,960 Speaker 1: known to be super gung ho on unions. In fact, 417 00:26:32,440 --> 00:26:36,480 Speaker 1: the acquisition agreement includes a clause that prevents Activision Blizzard 418 00:26:36,480 --> 00:26:42,359 Speaker 1: from voluntarily recognizing unions without first consulting with Microsoft executives, so, 419 00:26:42,400 --> 00:26:44,439 Speaker 1: in other words, they have to ask their parents for 420 00:26:44,480 --> 00:26:48,480 Speaker 1: permission first. There are also reports that Activision Blizzard was 421 00:26:48,560 --> 00:26:52,080 Speaker 1: looking to redistribute the QA testers throughout the rest of 422 00:26:52,119 --> 00:26:55,560 Speaker 1: activision Blizzard perhaps in an effort to head off this 423 00:26:55,880 --> 00:26:59,879 Speaker 1: unionization effort, if they were incorporate into other teams, than 424 00:27:00,000 --> 00:27:03,120 Speaker 1: you can make the argument, well, you don't have a 425 00:27:03,200 --> 00:27:07,119 Speaker 1: high enough concentration of people who are trying to unionize 426 00:27:07,200 --> 00:27:09,600 Speaker 1: because you have to read a reach a certain threshold 427 00:27:10,080 --> 00:27:13,320 Speaker 1: in order to start this process. And if you dilute 428 00:27:13,320 --> 00:27:17,280 Speaker 1: that by spreading out the employees into other divisions, that 429 00:27:17,320 --> 00:27:20,760 Speaker 1: could be a way to try and avoid, uh, the 430 00:27:20,800 --> 00:27:25,359 Speaker 1: whole issue. It's not common for U S. Senators to 431 00:27:25,560 --> 00:27:28,160 Speaker 1: wait into matters like these, and they don't actually hold 432 00:27:28,160 --> 00:27:31,439 Speaker 1: any legal authority to change the course of matters, but 433 00:27:31,520 --> 00:27:34,800 Speaker 1: it could certainly help shape public opinion on the subject. 434 00:27:35,160 --> 00:27:38,879 Speaker 1: And finally, on a related activision Blizzard note, Bloomberg reports 435 00:27:38,920 --> 00:27:41,280 Speaker 1: that the company will delay what was to be the 436 00:27:41,400 --> 00:27:44,600 Speaker 1: twenty twenty three release in the Call of Duty franchise 437 00:27:45,080 --> 00:27:49,360 Speaker 1: see activision. Blizzard has put out a new main title 438 00:27:49,560 --> 00:27:54,000 Speaker 1: in that franchise every year since two thousand five, but 439 00:27:54,080 --> 00:27:57,600 Speaker 1: now it sounds like the twenty twenty three release will 440 00:27:57,640 --> 00:28:00,320 Speaker 1: take a little bit longer before players get a chance 441 00:28:00,359 --> 00:28:03,400 Speaker 1: to play it. It will not come out in and 442 00:28:03,520 --> 00:28:06,359 Speaker 1: it seems like part of this reason is that the 443 00:28:06,400 --> 00:28:11,359 Speaker 1: most recent release, Call of Duty Vanguard, didn't meet company expectations, 444 00:28:11,800 --> 00:28:14,560 Speaker 1: and that executives were blaming the fact that players were 445 00:28:14,560 --> 00:28:18,800 Speaker 1: still playing earlier Call of Duty releases and that perhaps 446 00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:21,760 Speaker 1: they were coming out a little too close together and 447 00:28:21,920 --> 00:28:26,679 Speaker 1: not offering enough to players to necessitate them moving to 448 00:28:26,840 --> 00:28:29,760 Speaker 1: the latest title, and so they want to take a 449 00:28:29,760 --> 00:28:35,480 Speaker 1: little more time both to develop stronger games as well 450 00:28:35,520 --> 00:28:39,280 Speaker 1: as to give the market a little time to create demand. So, 451 00:28:39,320 --> 00:28:41,200 Speaker 1: in other words, you can have too much of a 452 00:28:41,240 --> 00:28:45,000 Speaker 1: good thing. Of course, some players would argue that good 453 00:28:45,080 --> 00:28:47,200 Speaker 1: is not the word they would use for certain Call 454 00:28:47,240 --> 00:28:52,240 Speaker 1: of Duty releases, not all of them have received universal acclaim. Also, 455 00:28:52,360 --> 00:28:55,800 Speaker 1: there will still be plenty of cod content out there 456 00:28:55,840 --> 00:28:59,600 Speaker 1: to play before the next major release, because they'll be 457 00:28:59,680 --> 00:29:03,480 Speaker 1: various expansions. There's the free to play war Zone game mode. 458 00:29:03,560 --> 00:29:05,840 Speaker 1: There's war Zone two that's supposed to be coming out 459 00:29:06,400 --> 00:29:09,680 Speaker 1: in the future. So there just won't be another major 460 00:29:09,800 --> 00:29:13,640 Speaker 1: release in the franchise in three but that doesn't mean 461 00:29:13,640 --> 00:29:15,720 Speaker 1: there won't be any Call of Duty content out there. 462 00:29:16,200 --> 00:29:19,240 Speaker 1: All right. That wraps up this Tech News episode. If 463 00:29:19,280 --> 00:29:21,680 Speaker 1: you have suggestions for topics I should cover in future 464 00:29:21,680 --> 00:29:24,320 Speaker 1: episodes of tech Stuff, Please reach out to me. The 465 00:29:24,360 --> 00:29:27,080 Speaker 1: best way to do that is on Twitter. The handle 466 00:29:27,080 --> 00:29:30,480 Speaker 1: for the show is tech Stuff hs W and I'll 467 00:29:30,480 --> 00:29:39,280 Speaker 1: talk to you again, really Sion. Tech Stuff is an 468 00:29:39,280 --> 00:29:42,960 Speaker 1: I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from my Heart Radio, 469 00:29:43,320 --> 00:29:46,479 Speaker 1: visit the i Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever 470 00:29:46,560 --> 00:29:48,040 Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows.