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Speaker 1: From UFOs two, Ghosts and government cover ups. History is

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Speaker 1: writtled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff that don't want you to now. Hello,

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Speaker 1: welcome back to the show. My name is Matt and

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Speaker 1: I'm then we're here with our super producer Noel Castro Brown.

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Speaker 1: Oh man, is that that's an upgrade? I'm like full

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Speaker 1: dictator right there. Well, you know who's already heading in

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Speaker 1: that direction. I think we can all see the trajectory.

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Speaker 1: Ritt large, isn't that right? Nold? That's smirk evil personified. So,

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Speaker 1: ladies and gentlemen, today we are talking about um, I

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Speaker 1: don't know, let's start with this story. How about that,

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Speaker 1: all right? Son? Or just a hypothetical situations? So like those? Okay,

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Speaker 1: So let's say super producer Noel Brown is a word

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Speaker 1: world leader, right, and she's a world leader in I

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Speaker 1: don't know, pick kind of government. Let's say let's say

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Speaker 1: it's democratic. Okay, he's a world leader in a democracy.

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Speaker 1: But things are not going too well in this democracy.

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Speaker 1: The economy's tanking, the population is impoverished, unhappy, crime is high,

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Speaker 1: they're threatening riots. Political opponents are increasingly averse to spending

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Speaker 1: especially in foreign interventions. And since you're a Western leader,

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Speaker 1: if you're Noel Brown in this situation, you can't just

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Speaker 1: make people do what you want. No, you you have

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Speaker 1: to seek guidance from your people. Right, you can't just

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Speaker 1: go out there and put an iron fist down. Right.

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Speaker 1: They are in charge of you, right, you are. You

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Speaker 1: are the person with three hundreds something million bosses exactly.

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Speaker 1: You know, theoretically, these people vote, and that is how

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Speaker 1: decisions have made. They if least if it's in the US,

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Speaker 1: the Republic of the U S. So this is not

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Speaker 1: the best comparison. Uh, then they have the right to

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Speaker 1: kick them out, if kick out their elected officials and

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Speaker 1: get some new ones. So you have to get these

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Speaker 1: people on your side. But what if circumstances change, Matt,

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Speaker 1: What if Noel Brown is the president when an attack occurs? Oh,

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Speaker 1: but all this bad stuff is happening already, it's still there.

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Speaker 1: But then an attack occur. I guess it depends on

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Speaker 1: who attacked you, right, Yeah, what if a common threat

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Speaker 1: brings a divided nation together supporting you, Noel Castro Brown. Uh.

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Speaker 1: You know, and and at the risk of being a

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Speaker 1: very cold person, this is Markavellian and and effective. You know,

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Speaker 1: it's it's a gift if this occurs. Sure, it's a

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Speaker 1: terrible thing to happen in the short term, but in

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Speaker 1: the long term for your goals. If you're that lead,

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Speaker 1: Noel Brown, then yeah, blessing in disguise, right, And you

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Speaker 1: can sit around and wait for something like this to happen,

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Speaker 1: although that would not be very wise. No, why not

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Speaker 1: just do it yourself? Hang on there, Matt, Are we

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Speaker 1: talking about false flag attacks? We're talking about false flag attacks.

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Speaker 1: That is the nature of a false flag attack. And uh,

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Speaker 1: we've got a quotation here that we'd like to open

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Speaker 1: up the show with. Why. Of course, the people don't

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Speaker 1: want war, but after all, it's the leaders of the

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Speaker 1: country who determine the policy. And it's always a simple

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Speaker 1: matter to drag the people along. Whether it's a democracy

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Speaker 1: or a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament or a communist dictatorship,

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Speaker 1: voice or no voice, the people can always be brought

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Speaker 1: to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All

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Speaker 1: you have to do is tell them they're being attacked

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Speaker 1: and denounced the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing

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Speaker 1: the country to danger. It works the same in any country.

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Speaker 1: Who said that that was Herman Goring. Herman Goring leader

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Speaker 1: in the National Socialist Party known by most people today

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Speaker 1: as the Nazis. This is not an unusual stance. It's

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Speaker 1: just it's just put very plainly in that quotation. But

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Speaker 1: a false flag ultimately, it's just a covert operation designed

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Speaker 1: to look as though somebody else carried it out. And

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Speaker 1: the term goes back a long time. The actual phrase,

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Speaker 1: at least the story goes is that this goes all

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Speaker 1: the way back to the days of sailing and and

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Speaker 1: uh seaborn empires. And if you're on the if you're

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Speaker 1: sailing the high season and you're flying a flag. Let's

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Speaker 1: say you're in territory that's not yours or the country

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Speaker 1: you're in, you fly flag of that country. Let's say

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Speaker 1: you're a pirate. Instead of throwing up the old black flag,

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Speaker 1: just throw up, I don't know, let's say a British

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Speaker 1: Empire flag. Right. Nobody's gonna mess with you unless they

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Speaker 1: get close enough to really like inspect your stuff, yes,

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Speaker 1: or they will let you get much closer than they should.

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Speaker 1: Uh So, this this concept can still be seen today

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Speaker 1: because ships often are required to fly flag even even

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Speaker 1: in this time, in this day and age. But uh,

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Speaker 1: it was much easier during that time to you know,

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Speaker 1: raise the Spanish flag, conductor raid leave change your flag

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Speaker 1: to you know, the Dutch flag or something. You could

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Speaker 1: be almost anonymous. Just have a whole stack of different

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Speaker 1: flags down there. And the word for studying the study

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Speaker 1: of flags is vexillology. Now that's a fun words, and

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Speaker 1: it's a weird one, isn't it. They're a real life vexillologists,

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Speaker 1: which is which is how I learned about the various

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Speaker 1: different pirate flags. It's not all skull and crossbones. It's

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Speaker 1: it's very strange. There are some elaborate ones, and there

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Speaker 1: are also a lot of poorly drawn skulls. I guess

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Speaker 1: the guys were in a hurry. But but you know,

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Speaker 1: when we're getting sidetracked. The thing is that ladies and

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Speaker 1: gentlemen listeners there at home, in your car, running whatever

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Speaker 1: you're doing, be aware that this is a real thing.

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Speaker 1: This is not some there's not some fluke that happens once.

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Speaker 1: This is not something that one guy did in you know,

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Speaker 1: ancient Rome. In fact, we have multiple examples of false

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Speaker 1: flag attacks. Yeah, just just to reiterate what you said, Ben,

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Speaker 1: It's not something that just the fringes are allowed to

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Speaker 1: talk about, right and to understand this is something a

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Speaker 1: lot of times you'll hear on the fringes of news

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Speaker 1: or media organizations. But it's something that I think we

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Speaker 1: can and probably should talk about more. Sure. Yeah, we

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Speaker 1: we're going to present some historic proven false flag attacks,

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Speaker 1: and then we're going to look at some of the

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Speaker 1: alleged false flag attacks, which that is more of the

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Speaker 1: the murky water for a lot of people. So the

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Speaker 1: first one we'd like to talk about is something we

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Speaker 1: we discussed in the video that we put out on

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Speaker 1: Wednesday of this week called the Muktin incident. And this

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Speaker 1: is when Japanese troops created an explosion on a train

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Speaker 1: track and they blamed it on China and the whole

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Speaker 1: idea of this was to justify an invasion of Manchuria

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Speaker 1: and um it's also known by the way, as the

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Speaker 1: Manurian incident. That makes sense, not to be confused with

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Speaker 1: the candidate no Um. And after a while this went

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Speaker 1: to a trial in the Tokyo International Military Tribunal UH

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Speaker 1: and essentially a lot several of the people the perpetrators

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Speaker 1: who carried out this attack admitted to what they had

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Speaker 1: done and it became public record at that point. We

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Speaker 1: also know that this kind of practice existed on both

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Speaker 1: sides of World War two Axis and allies alike. UH.

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Speaker 1: During the Nuremberg trials UH former SS major who was

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Speaker 1: under orders from the chief of the Gestapo, he said

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Speaker 1: that he and some others faked attacks on UH Germans

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Speaker 1: and on resource centers so that they could blame it

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Speaker 1: on Poland and justify an invasion. And then also during

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Speaker 1: the Nuremberg trials, it was found out that this guy

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Speaker 1: friends Halder, who was a general UH. He stated that

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Speaker 1: he UH they set fire to the German parliament building

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Speaker 1: and then also blame that on somebody else, this time

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Speaker 1: on the Communists. And speaking of the Communists, did you

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Speaker 1: know that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin ordered his secret police

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Speaker 1: to execute over twenty thousand UH Polish army officers and

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Speaker 1: civilians in ninety and then blame it on the Nazis.

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Speaker 1: Jeez I remember this isn't just one side or the other.

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Speaker 1: The British government has admitted that between UM it actually

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Speaker 1: bombed ships that were attempting to take Jewish people, families

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Speaker 1: and people to who are trying to escape the Holocaust

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Speaker 1: or what was occurring at the time, civilians, refugees, yeah,

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Speaker 1: trying to take them to Palestine. And so again the

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Speaker 1: British government admitted that they bombed five ships carrying people

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Speaker 1: to safety, and they even set up a group called

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Speaker 1: Defenders of Arab Palestine, which was a pseudo group didn't

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Speaker 1: actually exist. Once they set that up, they had that

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Speaker 1: group claim responsibility for these attacks. And let's go to

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Speaker 1: Uncle Sam. The CIA openly admits it hired Iranians in

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Speaker 1: the fifties to pretend to be communists and stage bombings

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Speaker 1: in Iran in an attempt to turn the country against

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Speaker 1: its democratically elected prime minister. And of course we know

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Speaker 1: that did not work. We also know that in nineteen

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Speaker 1: fifty seven Dwight D. Eisenhower was working with the British

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Speaker 1: government to uh or at least they approved a plan.

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Speaker 1: Dwight Eisenhower approved a plan to carry out an attack

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Speaker 1: in Syria then blame it on the Syrian government as

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Speaker 1: a way to you know, like they do, try and

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Speaker 1: make regime change, which you know, that's nineteen fifty seven,

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Speaker 1: that's uh. I don't know, man. We've been learning a

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Speaker 1: lot about the U. S. Government's interactions with regime change

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Speaker 1: in the Middle East lately. Right, Yeah, not just the US.

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Speaker 1: The US is the one that is most commonly associated

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Speaker 1: with that because they've admitted to it a couple of times.

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Speaker 1: They got caught a couple of times. Maybe that's all right,

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Speaker 1: But the United States did not what the United States

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Speaker 1: was not the original regime changing power in Collies. Okay,

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Speaker 1: So we already talked about Operation Gladiol, which we did

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Speaker 1: a video about, and in Operation Gladiol, NATO, the North

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Speaker 1: Atlantic Treaty Organization had secret armies that would stay behind

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Speaker 1: and bomb stuff. Yeah, bomb stuff for various reasons, but

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Speaker 1: usually to hold back some kind of invasion from communist

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Speaker 1: or uprising. And we've seen a lot of other declassified

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Speaker 1: plans or proposals to carry out some kind of false

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Speaker 1: flag attack, Operation Northwoods being the biggest, the most famous,

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Speaker 1: the plan to attack Miami and then blame it on Cuba. Uh,

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Speaker 1: to justify war with Cuba. Right, and Uh, this this

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Speaker 1: is not the the first nor the last time these

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Speaker 1: sorts of things will be suggested. In nineteen sixty one,

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Speaker 1: the Joint chiefs of staff started talking about blowing up

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Speaker 1: a diplomatic building, an embus consulate excuse me, in the

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Speaker 1: Dominican Republic to justify an invasion. But these plans, fortunately,

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Speaker 1: we're not carried out, and we you know, we see

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Speaker 1: that that's not the only plan that was proposed. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: the idea of blaming an attack on Cuba was kind

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Speaker 1: of pervasive around that time because we really wanted to

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Speaker 1: get in there and take back over. So in sixty

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Speaker 1: three there was another plan to uh stage attacks on

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Speaker 1: police like Trinidad and Tobago or Jamaica and then again

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Speaker 1: blame it on Cuba. Right, And this wasn't just really

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Speaker 1: restricted to the US and Cuba. There's the famous Gulf

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Speaker 1: of Tonkin incident, and you can go to UM government

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Speaker 1: run websites who will provide a fairly thorough narrative of

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Speaker 1: what happened. But this reason and UM this this event

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Speaker 1: in the Gulf of Tonkin was the reason that the

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Speaker 1: United States became involved fully in the Vietnam War. But

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Speaker 1: the problem is, we didn't happen. It didn't really happen,

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Speaker 1: not the way that it was stated at the time,

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Speaker 1: as in something that happened. Yeah, and then it didn't. Right.

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Speaker 1: But honestly, like there were the ideas that they were

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Speaker 1: being um, the ideas that uf U S ship was

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Speaker 1: being fired upon right by North Vietnamese boats. But again

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Speaker 1: that didn't happen. And there's a question about whether this

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Speaker 1: was just something misread in the fog of war or

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Speaker 1: whether the National Security Agency purposefully mis old the American public. Yes,

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Speaker 1: here's just one that I find really interesting, especially with

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Speaker 1: some of the videos we've done on co intel pro

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Speaker 1: in general, and on the assassination of Martin Luther King

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Speaker 1: and a couple of other things. In the ninth through

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Speaker 1: the nineteen fifties and nineteen seventies, a US Congressional committee

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Speaker 1: admitted that as part of this Coentel program that we've

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Speaker 1: talked about, they actually used provocateurs during that time nineteen

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Speaker 1: fifties to nineteen seventies to carry out violent attacks, could

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Speaker 1: be anything really small to something maybe a little larger,

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Speaker 1: and then blame those attacks on political activists to undermine

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Speaker 1: those movements. Right. Yes, and this we you know, we

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Speaker 1: see this also occurring in South Africa during apartheid, when

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Speaker 1: a group called the Civil Cooperation Bureau, which is part

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Speaker 1: of the Defense Force at the time, it's asked a

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Speaker 1: couple of experts to help them discredit the African National

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Speaker 1: Congress by bombing a cop car and trying to frame

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Speaker 1: the a n C for it. And we see that, Um,

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Speaker 1: we see that this happens much more frequently than you

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Speaker 1: might suspect. Right. But one big thing here that we

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Speaker 1: also need to point out is that often when these occur, uh,

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Speaker 1: they're created by factions within a government, not the entire government.

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Speaker 1: It's quite possible, for instance, that the um president or

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Speaker 1: prime minister of a country might not know what's going on,

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Speaker 1: and they may believe it's a legitimate attack. To absolutely

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Speaker 1: because you you'll have someone who's in a high place,

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Speaker 1: maybe in the military, that just said, look, we need

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Speaker 1: to get this done. This is hypothetical on my part,

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Speaker 1: but if you, if you believe strongly, like we said before,

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Speaker 1: enough in anything, you will do sometimes actions that are

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Speaker 1: unconscionable to most of us. Right. Yeah, And this brings

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Speaker 1: us to something that's that's a pretty sticky subject for

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Speaker 1: a lot of people, which is, um, the US going

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Speaker 1: to Iraq after the attacks on nine eleven. Right. Uh,

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Speaker 1: This this justification that the w m D or the

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Speaker 1: the relationship alleged relationship right between UM, the Saddam regime, right,

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Speaker 1: Saddam Ussein's regime and UH terrorists didn't really pan out.

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Speaker 1: It was something that UM, either the US was wrong

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Speaker 1: about or factions in the US were purposefully misleading people.

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Speaker 1: And the question here is often a question of intent.

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Speaker 1: That's what makes a false flag operation different in comparison

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Speaker 1: to just a typical operation, because people can make enormous mistakes, right,

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Speaker 1: But people can also do enormously immoral things if they

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Speaker 1: feel like they're working for a higher purpose. So we've

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Speaker 1: we've got many many more list of possible a list

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Speaker 1: of proven false flag right. And the question again being

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Speaker 1: you know, were these on purpose? Where these accidents? Were

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Speaker 1: these mistakes? Uh? But let's talk about the alleged examples. Okay, Well,

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Speaker 1: the first one that everyone would yell at us that

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Speaker 1: we didn't say it is just the September eleventh attacks

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Speaker 1: on the World Trade Center of the Pentagon and uh,

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Speaker 1: where did the plane fall down in Pennsylvania? Um? Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so we've heard this a lot. We get some flaks

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Speaker 1: sometimes for not covering the subject as much as some

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Speaker 1: people would like to. UM, it's a very sensitive subject

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Speaker 1: and it's tough for me to even go there, but

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Speaker 1: there are some fishy things that that are still there.

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Speaker 1: We've made a whole video called Thirteen Unanswered Questions about

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Speaker 1: nine eleven, and we'd love for you to check it

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Speaker 1: out if you have a chance. Uh, you know, I, Well,

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Speaker 1: here's the thing. Then, I am very skeptical when I

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Speaker 1: hear people say like, you can't talk about this thing

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Speaker 1: because of an issue of emotions, right in respect, but

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Speaker 1: I I'm very suspicious when people are treated like there

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Speaker 1: are certain questions a person is not allowed to ask.

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Speaker 1: They might be stupid questions, they might be UM easily

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Speaker 1: easily disproved or debunked, But you can't attack somebody for

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Speaker 1: asking a question. That's just that's foolish, that's a UM

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Speaker 1: it's a bullying technique of sorts. So with that, with

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Speaker 1: that in mind, UM, we would love to hear your

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Speaker 1: thoughts on whether I don't know, tell us what you

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Speaker 1: think about not just nine eleven, but the following. We

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Speaker 1: also have a vlog that came out this week about

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Speaker 1: the Oklahoma City bombing, which UM, you wanted to cover

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Speaker 1: because this is also the twenty year anniversary of that event. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that was That's one of those events that I remember

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Speaker 1: as a kid, not very well, but I remember it

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Speaker 1: happening and seeing news stories and when my father and

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Speaker 1: mother watching a lot of that stuff. But I knew

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Speaker 1: nothing about it at the time, about what was going on,

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Speaker 1: the circumstances. Over the over the years, I've learned a

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Speaker 1: little more about it, especially then in two thousand one,

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Speaker 1: right around the time when I was graduating high school.

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Speaker 1: That's when McVeigh, Timothy McVeigh was lethally injected who killed

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Speaker 1: And that's kind of when I started thinking about it.

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Speaker 1: I wonder how much you've you've thought about it around

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Speaker 1: that time or since then. H Uh, this this was

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Speaker 1: if you if you can put yourself back there, ladies

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Speaker 1: and gentlemen, if you were alive when this occurred, then

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Speaker 1: you'll know that this was until uh nine eleven, this

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Speaker 1: was a tremendous one of the biggest acts of domestics

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Speaker 1: terrorism in US history, or at least on US soil.

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Speaker 1: And we also know that later as in you know,

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Speaker 1: like what ten years later, two thousand five, two thousand six,

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Speaker 1: maybe evidence emerged that UM federal agents were aggressively trying

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Speaker 1: to you know, break up possible terrorist attacks, and in

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Speaker 1: several cases cross the line from stopping his terrorist attack

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Speaker 1: to maybe manufacturing a terrorist yeah, to essentially entrap somebody basically, yeah, hey,

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Speaker 1: you have these views that are pretty extreme. Well, what

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Speaker 1: if you had a bomb. What if I could get

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Speaker 1: you a bomb, you know, as an undercover agent. Let's

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Speaker 1: teach you how to make it, put in your hands,

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Speaker 1: drive you to the place. And so the question that

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Speaker 1: people have about Oklahoma City is it often revolves around

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Speaker 1: something like that, was this a case where someone manufactured

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Speaker 1: to make they you know, right? Uh? And there are

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Speaker 1: interesting theories here. There isn't any conclusive proof at this point.

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Speaker 1: There there are things that Um, there are definitely some

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Speaker 1: strange things that are had and let's say questions that

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Speaker 1: have yet to be answered. Who made a video about it? Uh?

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Speaker 1: One of them that I found really interesting was the

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Speaker 1: one of the first responders to the bombing. I cannot

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Speaker 1: remember his name, Tarenceiki yek Yeki. Tarenceiki. Yeah, he he

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Speaker 1: was one of the first responders along with another officer,

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Speaker 1: and he saved I think four people, then ended up

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Speaker 1: falling and injuring himself. Um. Then I forget how many

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Speaker 1: years later, but a while down the road he ended

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Speaker 1: up killing himself and when they found his body, he

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Speaker 1: had tried to cut his wrists allegedly and then had

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Speaker 1: ultimately shot himself, but at an angle that didn't seem

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Speaker 1: to make sense for one to kill themselves. Um. People

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Speaker 1: alleged that he had information about the attack that he

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Speaker 1: wasn't telling, and that and perhaps he's threatening to tell, right,

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Speaker 1: And people on the other side of the argument that

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Speaker 1: I believe that he just commits suicide say that he

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Speaker 1: was having very difficult marital problems, and he was. And

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Speaker 1: again this is you know, as as you said, a

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Speaker 1: lot of this is allegation and speculation, but this this

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Speaker 1: exploration that we're talking about Oklahoma City. You can you

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Speaker 1: can watch our videos. You can hear much more about it, um,

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Speaker 1: with a little digging, because there are more facts that

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Speaker 1: come to light. The one person you will not hear

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Speaker 1: from is Terry Nichols because Terry Nichols is apparently not

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Speaker 1: allowed to communicate with anyone. He is currently serving a

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Speaker 1: life sentence. I think I don't know if he got

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Speaker 1: the death penalty, but he's serving a life sentence. And

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Speaker 1: his idea was that or his story side of the

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Speaker 1: stories that he was helping McVeigh make a bomb and

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Speaker 1: take it to a truck, but he didn't know what

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Speaker 1: was going to happen. And he he wants to give testimony,

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Speaker 1: but he's unable to do so currently, right And and

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Speaker 1: there's not really a question about whether McVeigh did it.

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Speaker 1: He did it. He it's conclusive that he did it.

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Speaker 1: The questions people are asking, or the questions that you

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Speaker 1: were asking, were um, the extent if any of other

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Speaker 1: parties involvement. We we also know that in a rock

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Speaker 1: there was when we talked about that a little bit,

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Speaker 1: the idea of weapons of mass destruction, which is not

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Speaker 1: not really a false flag so much as it is

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Speaker 1: either a mistake or misdirection. Sure, but we do know

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Speaker 1: that these things exist. We know that, Uh, this is

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Speaker 1: a way to learn more about what's called the deep state,

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Speaker 1: which is the unelected. The unelected officials like I think

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Speaker 1: high level military, think, high level agency people who don't

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Speaker 1: have to you know, run for a district to get

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Speaker 1: voted back in every four years or so. Instead, they

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Speaker 1: have a much longer potential ability to plan right, powerful

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Speaker 1: offices and a let's say longer further vision for what

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Speaker 1: they can achieve while they're in their office right right,

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Speaker 1: which is not which is not necessarily a bad thing,

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Speaker 1: because let's let's remember that there are unelected officials at

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Speaker 1: the Army Corps of Engineers, you know, and they are

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Speaker 1: able to leverage this this ability to plan for things

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Speaker 1: that are ten or twenty years down the road. It's

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Speaker 1: just that this, this power that an unelected position can

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Speaker 1: transfer is uh is dangerous and it goes both ways.

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Speaker 1: That's an excellent point. Then, hey, thank you, Matt. Uh.

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Speaker 1: We would like to hear from you what you think. Uh.

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Speaker 1: Do you believe that there are uh some false flag

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Speaker 1: attacks that we should have mentioned, and if so, what

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Speaker 1: are they? Do you think that people are exaggerating actual

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Speaker 1: events by claiming that there's a conspiracy of foot where

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Speaker 1: none exists. You can find us on Facebook and Twitter

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Speaker 1: to tell us about it, and you can also email us.

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Speaker 1: But just so you know, uh that how important listener

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Speaker 1: mail is to us, Why don't we read a couple today?

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Speaker 1: Sounds great? This is a message that comes from Katie.

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Speaker 1: She says, Hello, gents, just finished listening to your podcast

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Speaker 1: on big data, and I'm here to tell you that

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Speaker 1: there is hope. Well, yes, the big data you see

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Speaker 1: every day does generate the targeted advertising that is all

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Speaker 1: around us. One of the biggest, yet least discussed uses

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Speaker 1: is in healthcare. I work in predicative and analytics in

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Speaker 1: the healthcare field, where we use big data to help

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Speaker 1: predict and prevent catastrophic health events. Most of this is

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Speaker 1: driven by clinical data used during taken during every doctor's appointment.

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Speaker 1: And yes, your doctor is definitely selling your data, but

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Speaker 1: we're moving into the future where you're buying. Eating and

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Speaker 1: movement habits may help us even more accurately predict things

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Speaker 1: like heart attacks and stroke. We also can predict how

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Speaker 1: effective treatment is, especially in behavioral diseases such as type

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Speaker 1: two diabetes, based on the information your cell phone knows

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Speaker 1: about you. That's crazy, are accurate, It's hard to say

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Speaker 1: when the results are an event not occurring negative observation.

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Speaker 1: But if people get to live better lives, then does

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Speaker 1: it really matter. Don't get me wrong, it's creepy as beep,

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Speaker 1: but I I'd like to think that we're really helping people.

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Speaker 1: That's a cool perspective. That's a really cool perspective. Kay,

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Speaker 1: That's not something that we had thought about before. At

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Speaker 1: least that I had thought about before. I've heard of

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Speaker 1: it using uh, this information to see into your health future.

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Speaker 1: It's still is creepy, like she says, but I don't

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Speaker 1: know what do you think, Ben? I mean, if it

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Speaker 1: could save somebody's life, It could save somebody's life. And

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Speaker 1: I was really glad to read this to see more

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Speaker 1: of a positive look at big data, and we'd like

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Speaker 1: to we'd like to hear more of that too. We

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Speaker 1: have another letter and thank you for writing to a Katie.

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Speaker 1: We really did enjoy that perspective. We have another letter

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Speaker 1: from Adam at Tonbridge Wells. Adam says, first, great work

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Speaker 1: you do. Have been listening to you for under a

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Speaker 1: year now. Always look forward to your next topic. Thanks Adam.

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Speaker 1: One thing I was expecting you to discuss and forgive

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Speaker 1: me if you did on the Big Data podcast was

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Speaker 1: the police in the US who can predict where crime

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Speaker 1: is likely to be due to masses of data that

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Speaker 1: was put it that was put into this system to

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Speaker 1: set the thing up. The police on patrol are told

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Speaker 1: which areas to go at any one time. Uh, this

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Speaker 1: is a specific police department he's talking out. And I

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Speaker 1: had not I had not heard of this, But what's

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Speaker 1: exciting is that it is possible. You know, there is

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Speaker 1: enough there is enough data depending on the city, to

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00:28:10,920 --> 00:28:14,600
Speaker 1: predict where things are most likely going to go down.

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00:28:14,680 --> 00:28:17,200
Speaker 1: You know, it's interesting the time of day, what type

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00:28:17,200 --> 00:28:21,480
Speaker 1: of crime right the neighborhood, like, where do break INDs occur?

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00:28:21,640 --> 00:28:24,119
Speaker 1: When do they occur? Uh So we're gonna dig in

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00:28:24,200 --> 00:28:26,679
Speaker 1: a little bit deeper and look at that as well

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00:28:26,720 --> 00:28:28,840
Speaker 1: at them. Thanks so much for writing, Katie, Thanks so

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00:28:28,880 --> 00:28:31,320
Speaker 1: much for writing. Adam. We hope that you, as well

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00:28:31,359 --> 00:28:35,280
Speaker 1: as the rest of the listeners enjoyed our episode here

436
00:28:35,359 --> 00:28:38,400
Speaker 1: on False Flags, and we would like to hear from

437
00:28:38,400 --> 00:28:41,440
Speaker 1: you if you are into this whole podcast thing. And

438
00:28:41,440 --> 00:28:43,360
Speaker 1: then buddy, do we have news for you. You You can

439
00:28:43,440 --> 00:28:45,200
Speaker 1: visit stuff they don't want you to know dot com

440
00:28:45,200 --> 00:28:48,640
Speaker 1: where you can see here uh so much stuff that

441
00:28:48,680 --> 00:28:51,480
Speaker 1: we've done. Yeah, it's all there, and you can go

442
00:28:51,600 --> 00:28:54,440
Speaker 1: check out our videos there. If we do a blog,

443
00:28:54,480 --> 00:28:58,400
Speaker 1: you can check that out too. And oh man, you

444
00:28:58,520 --> 00:29:00,200
Speaker 1: there are all these other sites that we have all

445
00:29:00,200 --> 00:29:03,200
Speaker 1: our friends who work here with us. Yeah, you can

446
00:29:03,200 --> 00:29:05,280
Speaker 1: go to cars though I we never do this, I'm

447
00:29:05,280 --> 00:29:07,200
Speaker 1: saying it. You can go to car stuff if you're

448
00:29:07,200 --> 00:29:09,720
Speaker 1: into cars, car stuff show dot com, Yeah, we have

449
00:29:09,840 --> 00:29:12,800
Speaker 1: a we have a car show as well. If you

450
00:29:12,880 --> 00:29:16,000
Speaker 1: like our podcast, you'll probably also enjoy h stuff to

451
00:29:16,040 --> 00:29:18,840
Speaker 1: blow your mind. Yes, definitely. They get weird with it,

452
00:29:18,880 --> 00:29:21,200
Speaker 1: just like we like to write. So if you're into

453
00:29:21,200 --> 00:29:24,200
Speaker 1: any of that stuff, go to Twitter. We are conspiracy

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00:29:24,200 --> 00:29:27,480
Speaker 1: Stuff there. You can also find us on Facebook, same thing.

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00:29:28,040 --> 00:29:30,320
Speaker 1: And uh, you know, if you don't like doing any

456
00:29:30,320 --> 00:29:33,000
Speaker 1: of that stuff and you're like, man, leave me alone,

457
00:29:33,520 --> 00:29:37,520
Speaker 1: but you're still interested in and want to talk to us, uh,

458
00:29:37,720 --> 00:29:40,600
Speaker 1: you can always write us an email. We are conspiracy

459
00:29:40,680 --> 00:29:47,840
Speaker 1: at how stuff works dot com. From one on this

460
00:29:47,920 --> 00:29:53,800
Speaker 1: topic another unexplained phenomenon, visit YouTube dot com slash conspiracy stuff.

461
00:29:53,840 --> 00:29:55,920
Speaker 1: You can also get in touch on Twitter at the

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00:29:55,960 --> 00:30:05,160
Speaker 1: handle at conspiracy Stuff to me