WEBVTT - The Dangers of Public WiFi

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production of I Heart Radios

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<v Speaker 1>How Stuff Works. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. Forgot my own name for

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<v Speaker 1>a second. I'm an executive producer at iHeart Radio and

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<v Speaker 1>I love all things tech. And you know, uh, there's

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<v Speaker 1>a there's a topic that I really wanted to cover

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<v Speaker 1>because as I record this, we're in the holiday season.

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<v Speaker 1>A lot of people are traveling, They're going through airports,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe you're visiting family, and occasionally you need to find

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<v Speaker 1>a place to be elsewhere, like maybe a coffee shop

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<v Speaker 1>or something. That typically means we're carrying our devices with us,

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<v Speaker 1>and then we want to connect to different networks, but

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<v Speaker 1>that might not always be a great idea, And so

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<v Speaker 1>I decided I was going to do an episode all

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<v Speaker 1>about the best ways to browse the Internet with privacy

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<v Speaker 1>and safety in mind, going from the least private and

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<v Speaker 1>the least secure to perhaps the most private and most

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<v Speaker 1>secure here. And then I thought, hey, you dumb, dumb.

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<v Speaker 1>You know people who are extremely well versed in this topic,

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<v Speaker 1>and that's why I invited my good friend, the phenomenal

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<v Speaker 1>Shannon Morris to join this episode. To come back so

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<v Speaker 1>welcome back to Tech Stuff, Shannon. Thank you so much. Jonathan.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm so excited to be back on the show. How

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<v Speaker 1>are you doing. I'm tired. But it's at the end

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<v Speaker 1>of the year, so that always happens, right, like, And

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<v Speaker 1>here's the thing, you know, Shannon can tell you. In fact,

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<v Speaker 1>we were just talking about it before we went on

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<v Speaker 1>to the record, that the tech journalists life does not

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<v Speaker 1>get easier at the end of the year because you

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<v Speaker 1>immediately turned around and head off to Vegas for c

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<v Speaker 1>E S. And that's where you're gonna be in early January,

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<v Speaker 1>as I understand it, right, Shannon, Yes, I will. I'll

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<v Speaker 1>be there all week covering everything over on my channel,

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<v Speaker 1>So make sure to link everybody to my channel later, absolutely,

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<v Speaker 1>because I ain't going folks. So Shannon's your your destination

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<v Speaker 1>for finding all the really cool stuff. And uh, Shannon,

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<v Speaker 1>I can say from experience because I've watched her work

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<v Speaker 1>does amazing work, not just at CES but everywhere, but

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<v Speaker 1>particularly like under a high stress situation like CES, certain

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<v Speaker 1>people can light up under the camera. And uh, I'm

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<v Speaker 1>frankly envious of your ability to do so. So um

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<v Speaker 1>that's me being nice. Yeah, well, I mean, I could

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<v Speaker 1>be more caddy about it, but I'm gonna be nice.

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<v Speaker 1>The caddy would be like, how dare she? How dare

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<v Speaker 1>she show me up? But no, we're gonna talk about

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<v Speaker 1>browsing safely. So the first thing I wanted to do

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<v Speaker 1>before we get into the spectrum of browsing the Internet,

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<v Speaker 1>because you could argue that there's like the least safe, secure,

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<v Speaker 1>naive way to do it to what is perhaps the

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<v Speaker 1>most secure but not perfect. There's no perfect solution spoiler alert.

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<v Speaker 1>Before we get into any of that, I wanted to

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<v Speaker 1>talk about some stats, and these come from a few

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<v Speaker 1>different sources. Uh. One was a survey that was conducted

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<v Speaker 1>by one World Identity back in eighteen about public WiFi.

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<v Speaker 1>So this was just asking people about their perception and

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<v Speaker 1>their use of public WiFi. And Shannon, I kind of

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<v Speaker 1>wanted to get your reaction to this because being someone

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<v Speaker 1>who has been so entrenched in data security, in the

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<v Speaker 1>hacker culture, in you know, everything from how do we

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<v Speaker 1>make these systems more secure? To the white hat approach

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<v Speaker 1>of how do we find any vulnerability so that they

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<v Speaker 1>can be patched, to even the black hat culture where

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<v Speaker 1>people are exploiting this for their own gain. I wanted

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<v Speaker 1>to see what you thought about these stats. So the

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<v Speaker 1>first one was they asked a question to people in

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<v Speaker 1>the United States, in Germany, and in France, and the

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<v Speaker 1>question they asked was, do you ever use unsecured public

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<v Speaker 1>WiFi networks? In the United States? Forty percent, so nearly

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<v Speaker 1>half said, you know, if there's no other option, sure,

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<v Speaker 1>I'll do it. Thirty two percent actually said I prefer

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<v Speaker 1>using public WiFi to using my cellular plan, presumably because

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<v Speaker 1>they would not be billed for data usage right because

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<v Speaker 1>they're using WiFi instead of their cell data only said

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<v Speaker 1>they never did it. One percent said they do it,

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<v Speaker 1>but only with a VPN. But we'll cover VPNs a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit later. So, Shannon, you've you've talked with hackers.

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<v Speaker 1>What do you think their reaction initially would be hearing

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<v Speaker 1>that nearly fifty of people in the United States said yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, if there's no other connection, I'll I'll connect

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<v Speaker 1>to public WiFi, and another thirty two percent and I said, oh, heck, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>sign me up. Well, I'm definitely in the one percent

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<v Speaker 1>of only with a VPN, and and that's assuming that

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<v Speaker 1>I have absolutely no other option. So I'm kind of

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<v Speaker 1>a mix of the and the one percent, but only

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<v Speaker 1>only if I have a VP n UM. I would

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<v Speaker 1>say from my experience, all of my friends would probably

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<v Speaker 1>not be surprised by the that prefer public WiFi over

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<v Speaker 1>their cellular plants, specifically because of what you said. They'll

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<v Speaker 1>be able to save money, especially if they don't have

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<v Speaker 1>an unlimited plan through their mobile carrier. So in that way,

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<v Speaker 1>it makes sense, uh that say yes, if there's no

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<v Speaker 1>other option, there's always another option. Come on, folks, what

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<v Speaker 1>are you doing? Where are you at? I mean, we

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<v Speaker 1>we have such good cellular coverage now there's always another option,

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<v Speaker 1>even if you just have three G like that's manageable

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<v Speaker 1>from most tasks. So what what are they doing? I'm

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<v Speaker 1>just my draw My job kind of dropped a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit when I heard that number. I just thought it

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<v Speaker 1>was I thought that I'm doing a much better job

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<v Speaker 1>of educating people about the importance of not using public WiFi,

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<v Speaker 1>and apparently I'm not doing my job as well as

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<v Speaker 1>I should have been, or or the people who are

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<v Speaker 1>already kind of hip to it are the ones watching you, going, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>she gets it, she knows, and the people who need

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<v Speaker 1>to see it are like, what's on the masked Singer

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<v Speaker 1>today or whatever, you know, like, so, yeah, I I

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<v Speaker 1>look at this and I think, man if I were

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<v Speaker 1>a black hat, I would just be doing the Mr

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<v Speaker 1>Burns excellent gesture over and over again, just drooling at

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<v Speaker 1>that opportunity, because you know, public WiFi is definitely the

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<v Speaker 1>most dangerous option you can pick when you're talking about

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<v Speaker 1>protecting your own privacy and security, especially if you're not

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<v Speaker 1>doing something like using a VPN uh spoiler alert will

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<v Speaker 1>talk more about that in a second. And so knowing

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<v Speaker 1>that you're your opportunity for targets is so vast has

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<v Speaker 1>got to be incredibly encouraging to someone who is ready

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<v Speaker 1>to exploit that. And that's really, you know, that's what

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<v Speaker 1>we're trying to protect everyone against, is you know, it's

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<v Speaker 1>the likelihood of you running into these situations is not

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<v Speaker 1>necessarily hot on a day to day basis, but the

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<v Speaker 1>opportunity is so huge that you need to take it

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<v Speaker 1>into account no matter where you happen to be. So

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<v Speaker 1>you you want to make yourself the hard target. You

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<v Speaker 1>want to be the person that makes people work really

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<v Speaker 1>hard to get access to your data. You don't want

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<v Speaker 1>to be the easy target, because the easier target you are,

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<v Speaker 1>the more often you're going to be targeted. You don't

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<v Speaker 1>want that. No, No, And I was actually talking to

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<v Speaker 1>a co worker today and I said, honestly, when you

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<v Speaker 1>look at data security, even when you're talking like, you

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<v Speaker 1>always get naysayers who will say, oh, sure you can

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<v Speaker 1>use this, but it doesn't protect you against everything. And

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<v Speaker 1>they may technically be right, but my answer is the

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<v Speaker 1>harder you make it effectively, what that means is you're

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<v Speaker 1>making it more expensive for someone to successfully target you.

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<v Speaker 1>So if you price yourself out where it would cost

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<v Speaker 1>them more to break your security, then they would get

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<v Speaker 1>from whatever they took from you. You win, because no

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<v Speaker 1>one's going to lose money on that. Uh exactly. It's

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<v Speaker 1>when you've made it so convenient that it's like it's

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<v Speaker 1>like it's like when someone says about a sale, I

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<v Speaker 1>would lose money if I didn't buy that. That's when

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<v Speaker 1>you're in trouble. Yes, exactly. It's they're looking for the

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<v Speaker 1>bargain deal. And a lot of times when a black

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<v Speaker 1>hat is looking at public WiFi as a way to

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<v Speaker 1>access information, they're in tending to profit off of that information,

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<v Speaker 1>whether by stealing an idea, identity or reselling that data

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<v Speaker 1>on the black market, like on the dark web. So

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<v Speaker 1>making yourself the hard target is absolutely crucial to helping

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<v Speaker 1>to protect you. Yeah, and and just so that you

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<v Speaker 1>guys out there, no, I mean I mentioned the United

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<v Speaker 1>States numbers. It's not like Germany and France were shining

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<v Speaker 1>examples of data privacy and security among the public. In Germany,

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<v Speaker 1>in fact of respondent said they'd used unsecured, unsecured public

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<v Speaker 1>WiFi over their cellular data. So it was even a

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<v Speaker 1>larger centers than the United States and the United United States,

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<v Speaker 1>it was that thirty two percent it said, oh yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>if I've got a choice, I'll use public over my

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<v Speaker 1>cellular data. In Germany it was forty six percent um

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<v Speaker 1>and percent said they would use it if they could

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<v Speaker 1>not get a cellular option. And then in France it

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<v Speaker 1>was closer to what the United States said, said they

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<v Speaker 1>preferred using public WiFi to using their cellular data and

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<v Speaker 1>forty percent said they'd used it if they couldn't get

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<v Speaker 1>any other option. So again that mirrored very closely what

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<v Speaker 1>the folks in the United States said. So this is

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<v Speaker 1>a trend that goes beyond the US. I know that

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<v Speaker 1>because I'm centered in the US. I often get very

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<v Speaker 1>US centric, and I also tend to harp on how

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<v Speaker 1>American citizens in particular seemed to come across to me

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<v Speaker 1>as being security illiterate. For in a in large part,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, I just see it all the time, but

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know if it's not exactly reassuring to see

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<v Speaker 1>that's that way in other parts of the world. That

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't film me with confidence. I think a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>times people either don't know where to look for the information,

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<v Speaker 1>for accessible information that's that that's explained in a way

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<v Speaker 1>that isn't scary, or doesn't you know, create create emotions

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<v Speaker 1>of paranoia, or just close people down so that they

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<v Speaker 1>just get lose interest insecurity. Uh. And you also have

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of folks out there that just don't care.

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<v Speaker 1>But I think a lot of people do care, they

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<v Speaker 1>just don't know where to look for this kind of information.

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<v Speaker 1>So I'm glad that you, Jonathan, as well as myself

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<v Speaker 1>on my channel, we're putting that information out there in

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<v Speaker 1>a way that's easy to understand, and I'm hoping that

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<v Speaker 1>even if it just helps one person understand a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit better security and privacy, hopefully we change that percentage

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<v Speaker 1>over time. Absolutely, I agree. I think, uh, it can

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<v Speaker 1>be one of those situations where you get overwhelmed by

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<v Speaker 1>the scope of something. And when you get overwhelmed, it's

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<v Speaker 1>almost like there's a defense mechanism them in your brain, right,

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<v Speaker 1>it's like this is too hard, so I can't worry

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<v Speaker 1>about it. And I have seen this in action when

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<v Speaker 1>trying to tell people about like password managers, for example,

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<v Speaker 1>and they just shut down. They have no interest, They

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<v Speaker 1>get glassy eyed, and they just say, well, I don't

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<v Speaker 1>see what the point is. And I try to explain

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<v Speaker 1>the point, but as after that point, it's just it's

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<v Speaker 1>just like talking through talking through the air. They just

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<v Speaker 1>don't want anything to do with it. And and as

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<v Speaker 1>someone who relies heavily on a password manager like it is,

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<v Speaker 1>it's it's fundamentally one of the most important tools in

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<v Speaker 1>my toolbox to make certain that I don't do rookie

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<v Speaker 1>mistakes like using the same password for multiple accounts. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>Because as as we'll discuss as we get into this

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<v Speaker 1>discussion about safely browsing the Internet, one of the big

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<v Speaker 1>dangers is that if you through accident or or your

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<v Speaker 1>tricked or whatever, if you somehow share your log in

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<v Speaker 1>information for one service. Let's say that you have one

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<v Speaker 1>service that isn't using uh secure encryption for some reason.

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<v Speaker 1>First of all, don't do that. But if you are,

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<v Speaker 1>if you're using that same password anywhere else, it's like

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<v Speaker 1>you just handed a skeleton key to somebody, because now

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<v Speaker 1>they can access everything you've used that password with. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>this is this is blatantly obvious. So that's why it's

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<v Speaker 1>so important to have unique, strong passwords for all the

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<v Speaker 1>different services you use. That way, if one, if worst

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<v Speaker 1>case scenario one gets compromised, it doesn't compromise everything else. Yes, absolutely,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm glad you mentioned that because the more different things

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<v Speaker 1>that you use that help your security and privacy, every

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<v Speaker 1>single step you take absolutely helps. And that's just one

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<v Speaker 1>of the many steps that you can take. Every single

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<v Speaker 1>consumer in the world does not have to take all

0:12:50.600 --> 0:12:53.000
<v Speaker 1>of these steps all at once, because that would be

0:12:53.120 --> 0:12:57.400
<v Speaker 1>quite mind boggling. But if you do take steps towards

0:12:57.440 --> 0:13:01.680
<v Speaker 1>these over time, you can increase were privacy and security

0:13:01.679 --> 0:13:05.600
<v Speaker 1>two fold. Yeah, it's fantastic. Yeah, I mean and and

0:13:05.600 --> 0:13:08.360
<v Speaker 1>and to be fair, like like I'm gonna be upfront guys,

0:13:08.400 --> 0:13:10.160
<v Speaker 1>like I used to be the dude who had like

0:13:10.320 --> 0:13:14.560
<v Speaker 1>three passwords and for everything. Yeah, I was like that

0:13:14.640 --> 0:13:18.480
<v Speaker 1>for years until until I finally like woke up to

0:13:18.800 --> 0:13:21.600
<v Speaker 1>how dangerous that was. I was fortunate in that I

0:13:21.640 --> 0:13:28.360
<v Speaker 1>was never knowingly anyway targeted for a specific like intrusion. Uh,

0:13:28.640 --> 0:13:30.439
<v Speaker 1>as far as I know, I never None of my

0:13:30.480 --> 0:13:33.679
<v Speaker 1>stuff ever got compromised because of that. Stuff has been

0:13:33.679 --> 0:13:36.320
<v Speaker 1>compromised because of data breaches that are beyond our control.

0:13:36.840 --> 0:13:39.000
<v Speaker 1>But we're really focusing on the stuff that we as

0:13:39.120 --> 0:13:41.640
<v Speaker 1>end users can do to improve our security as best

0:13:41.679 --> 0:13:43.480
<v Speaker 1>we can, knowing that we live in a world where

0:13:43.840 --> 0:13:47.040
<v Speaker 1>that's just one point of vulnerability. That's one point of attack,

0:13:47.400 --> 0:13:51.480
<v Speaker 1>but it's it's one that we have some control over another.

0:13:51.640 --> 0:13:55.320
<v Speaker 1>Another scary statistic, or at least I thought it was scary,

0:13:55.640 --> 0:13:59.439
<v Speaker 1>is that Kaspersky did a UH survey back in seventeen

0:14:00.080 --> 0:14:03.400
<v Speaker 1>and are They did an analysis of thirty two million

0:14:03.559 --> 0:14:07.400
<v Speaker 1>hot spots. Hot spots being points of contact where your

0:14:07.400 --> 0:14:10.800
<v Speaker 1>device connects over to the Internet at large, and a

0:14:10.800 --> 0:14:13.880
<v Speaker 1>hot spot can be everything from the router in a

0:14:14.280 --> 0:14:17.559
<v Speaker 1>like a coffee shop to your own cell phone. You

0:14:17.640 --> 0:14:20.400
<v Speaker 1>might be using that as a portable hot spot. Out

0:14:20.440 --> 0:14:22.960
<v Speaker 1>of the thirty two million hot spots they examined, twenty

0:14:23.840 --> 0:14:27.320
<v Speaker 1>one quarter of them had no encryption in use at all,

0:14:27.360 --> 0:14:30.920
<v Speaker 1>meaning everything is being sent in plain text, which means

0:14:30.960 --> 0:14:35.960
<v Speaker 1>that if anyone has any method of eavesdropping on those communications,

0:14:36.480 --> 0:14:40.480
<v Speaker 1>they see it all, which again blows my mind that

0:14:40.520 --> 0:14:44.520
<v Speaker 1>there would be that many networks that have no encryption

0:14:44.560 --> 0:14:50.080
<v Speaker 1>in place at all, not even bad encryption. Yeah, that's

0:14:50.120 --> 0:14:53.960
<v Speaker 1>a very scary number. That's extremely high and is a

0:14:54.000 --> 0:14:56.920
<v Speaker 1>lot higher than what I thought it would be. Uh.

0:14:57.000 --> 0:14:59.880
<v Speaker 1>If if they're not using any sort of encryption whatso

0:15:00.040 --> 0:15:03.040
<v Speaker 1>ever for a hot spot, that means that anybody within

0:15:03.120 --> 0:15:06.680
<v Speaker 1>that vicinity, within range of that device would be able

0:15:06.720 --> 0:15:11.520
<v Speaker 1>to see everything you're doing. It's very very mind boggling. Yeah,

0:15:11.600 --> 0:15:13.400
<v Speaker 1>and this is one of the reasons why I wanted

0:15:13.400 --> 0:15:17.320
<v Speaker 1>to have you on the show, because we say these things, right,

0:15:17.320 --> 0:15:20.600
<v Speaker 1>We say that when you use public WiFi, you're using it.

0:15:20.680 --> 0:15:24.680
<v Speaker 1>If you're using an unsecured public WiFi hot spot, especially

0:15:24.680 --> 0:15:28.320
<v Speaker 1>one that is unencrypted, that you are in danger of

0:15:28.360 --> 0:15:31.400
<v Speaker 1>this And a lot of people say, all right, but

0:15:31.520 --> 0:15:33.960
<v Speaker 1>exactly what's going on? Right? How are they doing this?

0:15:34.320 --> 0:15:37.280
<v Speaker 1>And it's that there are various pieces of software out

0:15:37.320 --> 0:15:40.800
<v Speaker 1>there that allow people who are who get onto a

0:15:40.880 --> 0:15:45.320
<v Speaker 1>network to monitor traffic that's going across that network. I

0:15:45.320 --> 0:15:50.440
<v Speaker 1>mean their entire groups out there that make different software

0:15:50.440 --> 0:15:56.120
<v Speaker 1>and hardware, uh solutions to do just this, right, Yeah,

0:15:56.240 --> 0:15:59.560
<v Speaker 1>not gonna lie. Um. I used to solder and sell

0:16:00.080 --> 0:16:02.240
<v Speaker 1>some of these products at a company that I used

0:16:02.240 --> 0:16:04.920
<v Speaker 1>to work with called hack five, So I'll definitely share

0:16:05.120 --> 0:16:07.560
<v Speaker 1>some of that information once we get closer to those

0:16:07.600 --> 0:16:11.640
<v Speaker 1>those topics with today's discussion. But yeah, those products exist,

0:16:11.800 --> 0:16:15.440
<v Speaker 1>They're very inexpensive, and some of the software is free,

0:16:15.840 --> 0:16:19.640
<v Speaker 1>and there's tutorials made by yours truly on YouTube that

0:16:19.720 --> 0:16:23.360
<v Speaker 1>show you how to use these things. So it's definitely

0:16:23.480 --> 0:16:26.520
<v Speaker 1>a thing that pretty much anybody can introduce themselves too,

0:16:26.800 --> 0:16:28.760
<v Speaker 1>and then they will be able to see what's going

0:16:28.800 --> 0:16:32.280
<v Speaker 1>on on a network. And there are different reasons to

0:16:32.400 --> 0:16:35.480
<v Speaker 1>even do this. There's obviously there's the nefarious ones that

0:16:35.520 --> 0:16:38.000
<v Speaker 1>we're concerned about, but there's also like if you're a

0:16:38.000 --> 0:16:41.400
<v Speaker 1>network administrator being able to do things like monitor network

0:16:41.440 --> 0:16:46.080
<v Speaker 1>traffic and see points of co education as well. Yeah,

0:16:46.120 --> 0:16:49.120
<v Speaker 1>there's like there's there are legit reasons to use that

0:16:49.160 --> 0:16:52.600
<v Speaker 1>sort of technology that don't that don't immediately point you

0:16:52.680 --> 0:16:55.640
<v Speaker 1>to the to the road of I'm here to steal

0:16:55.680 --> 0:16:59.080
<v Speaker 1>all your infos. It's like there's stuff that where this

0:16:59.200 --> 0:17:02.320
<v Speaker 1>is used in quote unquote legitimate purposes. I mean like

0:17:02.360 --> 0:17:07.600
<v Speaker 1>packet sniffers. That's something that sounds like it's underhanded and shady,

0:17:07.640 --> 0:17:11.200
<v Speaker 1>but they were invented not to try and sniff out

0:17:11.240 --> 0:17:13.439
<v Speaker 1>what someone else was doing, but literally to help network

0:17:13.480 --> 0:17:18.000
<v Speaker 1>administrators see how network how network traffic was moving across,

0:17:18.480 --> 0:17:21.360
<v Speaker 1>so they could make sure that everything was working properly.

0:17:21.840 --> 0:17:24.879
<v Speaker 1>So but it doesn't mean that you can't a tool.

0:17:25.280 --> 0:17:27.080
<v Speaker 1>A tool is either a tool or a weapon, depending

0:17:27.119 --> 0:17:29.879
<v Speaker 1>upon how you want to use it, And so the

0:17:29.920 --> 0:17:32.040
<v Speaker 1>same stuff that was used to help networks is also

0:17:32.160 --> 0:17:35.199
<v Speaker 1>used to exploit them. Um exactly, you could say the

0:17:35.200 --> 0:17:38.119
<v Speaker 1>same thing about a kitchen knife. I mean kitchen knives

0:17:38.160 --> 0:17:41.560
<v Speaker 1>to to you know, cut up fruits and veggies. Some

0:17:41.680 --> 0:17:45.600
<v Speaker 1>nefarious people might use one to murder somebody part of me.

0:17:45.760 --> 0:17:49.600
<v Speaker 1>But the thing I used the exact same sort of analogy,

0:17:49.600 --> 0:17:51.720
<v Speaker 1>except when I was talking to someone earlier today, but

0:17:51.760 --> 0:17:53.879
<v Speaker 1>it was a hammer, But same thing, Like a hammer

0:17:54.440 --> 0:17:56.720
<v Speaker 1>is either something that you're using to to build stuff

0:17:56.760 --> 0:17:59.240
<v Speaker 1>with or it could be used to bludgeon somebody, And

0:17:59.560 --> 0:18:01.920
<v Speaker 1>it all comes down to it's not that the tool

0:18:02.000 --> 0:18:05.399
<v Speaker 1>itself is bad, it's the intent and use of the

0:18:05.440 --> 0:18:10.040
<v Speaker 1>person wielding that tool. And the same is true of technology.

0:18:10.160 --> 0:18:12.800
<v Speaker 1>Uh So, one other stat that I wanted to mention

0:18:12.840 --> 0:18:16.399
<v Speaker 1>that's pretty alarming. Norton found out this was in so

0:18:16.440 --> 0:18:20.880
<v Speaker 1>it's a few years ago, but Americans had had their

0:18:20.920 --> 0:18:24.680
<v Speaker 1>email hacked at some point, and that twelve percent had

0:18:24.720 --> 0:18:28.280
<v Speaker 1>their financial data stolen while they were shopping online, and

0:18:28.359 --> 0:18:34.960
<v Speaker 1>that in million people globally had been a victim of

0:18:35.040 --> 0:18:38.240
<v Speaker 1>some sort of cyber crime. And that kind of shows

0:18:38.280 --> 0:18:41.840
<v Speaker 1>us the scale of why this is an important topic.

0:18:41.880 --> 0:18:44.960
<v Speaker 1>It's not just because the opportunity is there. It's because

0:18:45.000 --> 0:18:49.320
<v Speaker 1>people are actually actively taking advantage of those opportunities, and

0:18:49.400 --> 0:18:53.119
<v Speaker 1>you could be the victim of one of those actions

0:18:53.280 --> 0:18:58.000
<v Speaker 1>if you're not careful. And we love you absolutely, we too,

0:18:58.080 --> 0:19:01.720
<v Speaker 1>love you very much. I'm kind of I'm kind of

0:19:01.760 --> 0:19:05.119
<v Speaker 1>thinking that all of those numbers have probably increased given

0:19:05.119 --> 0:19:08.760
<v Speaker 1>that it's been about four years since they were they

0:19:08.800 --> 0:19:13.040
<v Speaker 1>analyzed the data and had those those statistics available, because

0:19:13.200 --> 0:19:16.760
<v Speaker 1>in the past couple of years we've seen hacks go

0:19:16.920 --> 0:19:20.520
<v Speaker 1>from a few hundred million people to almost a billion

0:19:20.600 --> 0:19:25.000
<v Speaker 1>people get hacked online. So it's entirely possible that those

0:19:25.119 --> 0:19:29.159
<v Speaker 1>numbers have increased quite a bit since, especially in the

0:19:29.240 --> 0:19:33.480
<v Speaker 1>realm of the mobile app becoming king right, because there's

0:19:33.760 --> 0:19:37.480
<v Speaker 1>there's such a proliferation of apps out there that either

0:19:37.960 --> 0:19:43.439
<v Speaker 1>through a conscious effort, are creating vulnerabilities or because of

0:19:43.480 --> 0:19:47.679
<v Speaker 1>poor design, create vulnerabilities that can later be exploited. You know,

0:19:47.720 --> 0:19:51.280
<v Speaker 1>we've seen so many examples of that where an a

0:19:51.440 --> 0:19:54.960
<v Speaker 1>p I didn't take everything into account and then someone

0:19:55.040 --> 0:19:58.280
<v Speaker 1>was able to exploit it. Famous one being Facebook and

0:19:58.320 --> 0:20:02.439
<v Speaker 1>Cambridge Analytica, where where you had an app that if

0:20:02.480 --> 0:20:05.439
<v Speaker 1>you installed the app like you would voluntarily install it

0:20:05.520 --> 0:20:08.240
<v Speaker 1>within your Facebook and you're voluntary a lee sharing your

0:20:08.240 --> 0:20:12.000
<v Speaker 1>own information. All of that is fine, right if you've

0:20:12.000 --> 0:20:15.320
<v Speaker 1>agreed to do it such a god not a good idea,

0:20:15.440 --> 0:20:18.840
<v Speaker 1>such a good example. Good example. Yeah, good example, not

0:20:18.920 --> 0:20:20.760
<v Speaker 1>a good idea to do. But it's fine if you

0:20:20.840 --> 0:20:22.760
<v Speaker 1>if you are knowingly doing that, that's fine. But the

0:20:22.800 --> 0:20:26.199
<v Speaker 1>problem that the Cambrage Analytica story brought to bears that

0:20:26.200 --> 0:20:29.879
<v Speaker 1>they took advantage of a loophole in Facebook's API and

0:20:29.920 --> 0:20:32.480
<v Speaker 1>they were able to to phish out a ton of

0:20:32.520 --> 0:20:35.840
<v Speaker 1>information about all the contacts of the people who had

0:20:35.840 --> 0:20:39.520
<v Speaker 1>installed the app. These are people who did not, uh,

0:20:39.560 --> 0:20:42.840
<v Speaker 1>you know, give permission to share their information, but the

0:20:42.920 --> 0:20:48.239
<v Speaker 1>app collected all that information regardless. And that's where we see, like,

0:20:48.280 --> 0:20:53.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, there were countless victims of this app because

0:20:53.280 --> 0:20:55.960
<v Speaker 1>none of them opted in to share that information. It

0:20:56.000 --> 0:20:59.640
<v Speaker 1>was just taken from them. And uh, that's just one

0:20:59.680 --> 0:21:02.879
<v Speaker 1>little example of the world we live in where you know,

0:21:03.040 --> 0:21:06.800
<v Speaker 1>even when you are being careful, there are there are

0:21:06.840 --> 0:21:10.320
<v Speaker 1>these opportunities for your information to get out there, which

0:21:10.320 --> 0:21:12.320
<v Speaker 1>is why we're like, this is why you need to

0:21:12.359 --> 0:21:16.080
<v Speaker 1>take the steps necessary to protect yourself as best you can,

0:21:16.359 --> 0:21:19.560
<v Speaker 1>because we live in a world where there are numerous

0:21:20.040 --> 0:21:24.199
<v Speaker 1>attack vectors that point back to us. All right, I

0:21:24.200 --> 0:21:28.399
<v Speaker 1>mean just mid December, the New York Times discussed location

0:21:28.440 --> 0:21:32.080
<v Speaker 1>tracking on phones and how ping pings to local towers

0:21:32.119 --> 0:21:35.240
<v Speaker 1>can basically give you a map of a certain phone

0:21:35.280 --> 0:21:37.480
<v Speaker 1>I D and you can track that and figure out

0:21:37.520 --> 0:21:40.560
<v Speaker 1>who that phone belongs to based on what residents and

0:21:40.560 --> 0:21:43.960
<v Speaker 1>what office they go to every day. It's extremely scary,

0:21:44.040 --> 0:21:47.399
<v Speaker 1>and the more information we have about it as consumers,

0:21:47.440 --> 0:21:50.640
<v Speaker 1>the better we can protect ourselves. Yeah, and again like, uh,

0:21:51.240 --> 0:21:54.680
<v Speaker 1>back to what you were just saying, Shannon. Facebook send

0:21:54.720 --> 0:21:56.920
<v Speaker 1>a letter to Congress just a couple of days before

0:21:56.920 --> 0:22:01.360
<v Speaker 1>we record this episode where they said, Um, even if

0:22:01.400 --> 0:22:05.240
<v Speaker 1>you opted out of location tracking, we actually know where

0:22:05.240 --> 0:22:09.760
<v Speaker 1>you are, partly because of the information people are voluntarily sharing.

0:22:09.880 --> 0:22:13.400
<v Speaker 1>Like if I tag if I take a photo while

0:22:13.440 --> 0:22:16.159
<v Speaker 1>I'm at a party and I tagged the location and

0:22:16.200 --> 0:22:19.000
<v Speaker 1>I tag people are in the photo, well, I'm voluntarily

0:22:19.080 --> 0:22:21.480
<v Speaker 1>sharing a lot of information. Maybe those people haven't given

0:22:21.480 --> 0:22:24.400
<v Speaker 1>me permission to do that, but I'm sharing that information.

0:22:24.480 --> 0:22:27.320
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, of course Facebook knows where I am when

0:22:27.359 --> 0:22:29.600
<v Speaker 1>I when I'm there, and who I'm with because I

0:22:29.680 --> 0:22:33.200
<v Speaker 1>shared the information. But they also admitted yeah, we also

0:22:33.840 --> 0:22:36.040
<v Speaker 1>use a lot of other methods where we can suss

0:22:36.040 --> 0:22:38.800
<v Speaker 1>out where you were and who you were with at

0:22:38.840 --> 0:22:43.680
<v Speaker 1>what time that aren't as obvious and aren't examples of

0:22:43.840 --> 0:22:49.080
<v Speaker 1>the user voluntarily handing over information. So yeah, scary stuff. Um.

0:22:49.920 --> 0:22:51.840
<v Speaker 1>One of the things I wanted to mention is sort

0:22:51.840 --> 0:22:55.639
<v Speaker 1>of the bird's eye view of the process of what

0:22:55.760 --> 0:22:58.400
<v Speaker 1>it's like just connecting to WiFi, so we can kind

0:22:58.400 --> 0:23:01.560
<v Speaker 1>of understand, uh, you know, what's going on, because I

0:23:01.600 --> 0:23:04.600
<v Speaker 1>think a lot of people if they think that if

0:23:04.640 --> 0:23:06.800
<v Speaker 1>they see that, for example, that there's a Wi Fi

0:23:06.920 --> 0:23:10.080
<v Speaker 1>hot spot that requires a password, they immediately think that

0:23:10.080 --> 0:23:13.600
<v Speaker 1>that is inherently more secure than a public WiFi spot

0:23:13.600 --> 0:23:18.240
<v Speaker 1>that has no password, which is not necessarily true. Um,

0:23:18.280 --> 0:23:20.399
<v Speaker 1>So connecting to WiFi is really you can think of

0:23:20.440 --> 0:23:24.200
<v Speaker 1>it as a series of handshakes between whatever device you're

0:23:24.320 --> 0:23:27.199
<v Speaker 1>using and the hot spot, whether it's a router or

0:23:27.240 --> 0:23:31.080
<v Speaker 1>something else. And this series of handshakes is not meant

0:23:31.200 --> 0:23:33.720
<v Speaker 1>to secure the data. It's not meant to encrypt a

0:23:33.840 --> 0:23:37.480
<v Speaker 1>channel necessarily, it's not meant to protect it. What's meant

0:23:37.480 --> 0:23:40.840
<v Speaker 1>to do is to identify the device and the hot

0:23:40.920 --> 0:23:45.439
<v Speaker 1>spot so that they know where the data needs to go. Right. Otherwise,

0:23:45.800 --> 0:23:48.440
<v Speaker 1>if if we all connected to a public WiFi hot

0:23:48.440 --> 0:23:53.480
<v Speaker 1>spot and there wasn't this handshake thing going on, it

0:23:53.520 --> 0:23:55.080
<v Speaker 1>would be as if we were all listening to an

0:23:55.119 --> 0:23:57.359
<v Speaker 1>open broadcast of everything all at once, and it would

0:23:57.359 --> 0:24:00.159
<v Speaker 1>just be meaningless garbage, and we would just get just

0:24:00.200 --> 0:24:03.000
<v Speaker 1>get everyone's data simultaneously, and we're like, I don't even

0:24:03.240 --> 0:24:06.760
<v Speaker 1>I don't know what we could I don't think it

0:24:06.760 --> 0:24:10.680
<v Speaker 1>would go well. But so this was this was literally

0:24:11.000 --> 0:24:12.960
<v Speaker 1>the solution to that problem. Like you know, if you're

0:24:13.000 --> 0:24:15.920
<v Speaker 1>using wired connections, that's one thing, right, you can wire

0:24:16.000 --> 0:24:19.520
<v Speaker 1>things to specific ports. You have physical hardware. When you

0:24:19.560 --> 0:24:22.919
<v Speaker 1>go wireless, you have to create a virtual version of that.

0:24:22.920 --> 0:24:26.840
<v Speaker 1>That's sort of what the handshake processes for. It's saying, hey,

0:24:26.880 --> 0:24:28.840
<v Speaker 1>there's this device that wants to connect to the network.

0:24:28.880 --> 0:24:31.280
<v Speaker 1>The network says, okay, I'm giving you permission. The device

0:24:31.359 --> 0:24:33.560
<v Speaker 1>is okay. This is who I am, and the network

0:24:33.600 --> 0:24:36.280
<v Speaker 1>devices all right, I see who you are, and now

0:24:36.400 --> 0:24:38.840
<v Speaker 1>we can send information back and forth. You can send

0:24:38.960 --> 0:24:40.920
<v Speaker 1>a requests out to the internet. I'll go out and

0:24:40.960 --> 0:24:43.119
<v Speaker 1>grab whatever it is you wanted, and I'll return it

0:24:43.200 --> 0:24:46.600
<v Speaker 1>just to you. That's the idea. That's actually a great

0:24:46.640 --> 0:24:50.520
<v Speaker 1>explanation without using any of the terminology. So I thank

0:24:50.560 --> 0:24:52.920
<v Speaker 1>you for the doing that. Yeah, I tried. I tried.

0:24:52.920 --> 0:24:55.679
<v Speaker 1>At one point, I had a spoiler alert or we'll

0:24:55.720 --> 0:24:58.560
<v Speaker 1>not even spoiler. Look behind the curtain, folks. I had

0:24:58.600 --> 0:25:01.760
<v Speaker 1>originally started to episode as a solo show, and that's

0:25:01.840 --> 0:25:04.040
<v Speaker 1>when it struck me that it would be way easier

0:25:04.080 --> 0:25:06.080
<v Speaker 1>if I brought Shannon on because she's much smarter than

0:25:06.119 --> 0:25:08.800
<v Speaker 1>I am. And so as I was doing it, I

0:25:08.840 --> 0:25:12.000
<v Speaker 1>was trying to describe this process, And I think I

0:25:12.040 --> 0:25:13.800
<v Speaker 1>went through two or three drafts when I said, you

0:25:13.800 --> 0:25:16.120
<v Speaker 1>know what, I can just step back and not get

0:25:16.160 --> 0:25:19.800
<v Speaker 1>so technical because the technical parts aren't really what's important.

0:25:19.920 --> 0:25:22.919
<v Speaker 1>What's important is just sort of understanding the concept of

0:25:22.960 --> 0:25:26.480
<v Speaker 1>the process and why it is not inherently tied to

0:25:26.880 --> 0:25:31.120
<v Speaker 1>security and privacy. It's inherently tied to just what does

0:25:31.160 --> 0:25:33.760
<v Speaker 1>it take so that you can have these two devices

0:25:33.800 --> 0:25:36.880
<v Speaker 1>communicate with one another and not have them confused with

0:25:36.960 --> 0:25:39.760
<v Speaker 1>all the other devices that hook into the same network.

0:25:40.240 --> 0:25:41.920
<v Speaker 1>And once I figured that, I was like, I'm gonna

0:25:41.960 --> 0:25:44.639
<v Speaker 1>go with that because I'm tired of trying to figure

0:25:44.640 --> 0:25:48.600
<v Speaker 1>out how to explain this handshake process. Um, it totally works.

0:25:48.760 --> 0:25:52.320
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I like the handshake terminology because it is

0:25:52.400 --> 0:25:55.720
<v Speaker 1>kind of like that, like in person, whenever you meet somebody,

0:25:56.040 --> 0:25:59.359
<v Speaker 1>you acknowledge each other, you shake each other's hands, you

0:25:59.440 --> 0:26:02.280
<v Speaker 1>kind of enticate each other by name and by face.

0:26:02.880 --> 0:26:06.400
<v Speaker 1>And that's very similar to what a router does with

0:26:06.520 --> 0:26:09.920
<v Speaker 1>a device like your smartphone or a laptop. It's basically

0:26:09.920 --> 0:26:13.040
<v Speaker 1>doing the same thing where you're you're looking for somebody

0:26:13.040 --> 0:26:17.600
<v Speaker 1>to introduce yourself to. You go in, you acknowledge each other,

0:26:17.720 --> 0:26:20.680
<v Speaker 1>you shake hands with each other, you kind of authenticate

0:26:20.800 --> 0:26:24.080
<v Speaker 1>each other by name, and then you have that connection. Yeah,

0:26:24.119 --> 0:26:27.120
<v Speaker 1>and you have that connection forever until you break it off. Yes,

0:26:27.359 --> 0:26:30.920
<v Speaker 1>And if if you're at CES, it probably also requires

0:26:30.960 --> 0:26:33.840
<v Speaker 1>you to hand over a business card because that's like, yeah,

0:26:33.960 --> 0:26:36.040
<v Speaker 1>most likely that's that's the current I guess that would

0:26:36.040 --> 0:26:39.800
<v Speaker 1>be your password, right, yeah, I guess so yeah. All right, Well,

0:26:39.800 --> 0:26:42.919
<v Speaker 1>when we come back, we're going to talk about the

0:26:43.640 --> 0:26:46.080
<v Speaker 1>how how information is sent through packets, just so that

0:26:46.119 --> 0:26:49.120
<v Speaker 1>we can understand why did that packet sniffing thing mean earlier?

0:26:49.680 --> 0:26:54.600
<v Speaker 1>But first, let's take a quick break to thank our sponsor. Recently,

0:26:54.720 --> 0:26:58.280
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0:27:23.080 --> 0:27:27.160
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0:27:27.200 --> 0:27:30.600
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0:27:38.480 --> 0:27:42.240
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0:28:01.440 --> 0:28:05.119
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0:28:08.720 --> 0:28:12.560
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0:28:12.680 --> 0:28:16.359
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0:28:28.359 --> 0:28:34.160
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0:28:38.240 --> 0:28:41.360
<v Speaker 1>All right, then we're back. So I promised that we

0:28:41.360 --> 0:28:44.960
<v Speaker 1>were going to talk about packets. Packets is pretty simple concept.

0:28:45.240 --> 0:28:49.040
<v Speaker 1>So a packet switching network. You've probably heard that term before. Uh,

0:28:49.120 --> 0:28:51.840
<v Speaker 1>the Internet. When the pioneers of the Internet, we're sort

0:28:51.840 --> 0:28:55.560
<v Speaker 1>of designing this thing. They thought, well, how do we

0:28:56.040 --> 0:28:58.520
<v Speaker 1>make it so that information can be sent from one

0:28:58.520 --> 0:29:02.200
<v Speaker 1>computer to another in such a way that if something happens,

0:29:02.840 --> 0:29:05.400
<v Speaker 1>the information can continue to make its way to its

0:29:05.440 --> 0:29:08.920
<v Speaker 1>destination even if there's some sort of interruption. And if

0:29:08.920 --> 0:29:11.920
<v Speaker 1>it were just an uninterrupted string of data and there

0:29:11.960 --> 0:29:14.120
<v Speaker 1>was an interruption, then you would have a corrupt file

0:29:14.440 --> 0:29:17.200
<v Speaker 1>or you know, things would not work right, you wouldn't

0:29:17.200 --> 0:29:19.680
<v Speaker 1>get what you were wanting. So they said, what if

0:29:19.720 --> 0:29:25.240
<v Speaker 1>we bundled data into uh, certain sizes, We'll call it packets.

0:29:26.120 --> 0:29:28.840
<v Speaker 1>The packets will have information on them that will tell

0:29:29.000 --> 0:29:31.640
<v Speaker 1>the data where it needs to go, where it came from,

0:29:31.680 --> 0:29:34.640
<v Speaker 1>and how it fits within all the other packets to

0:29:34.720 --> 0:29:37.680
<v Speaker 1>make whatever the thing is. And since we're talking about

0:29:37.680 --> 0:29:40.080
<v Speaker 1>the Internet, let's be honest, chances are it's a picture

0:29:40.120 --> 0:29:43.120
<v Speaker 1>of a cat. So that cat picture is going to

0:29:43.160 --> 0:29:45.000
<v Speaker 1>be a lot of different data packets and they have

0:29:45.080 --> 0:29:46.840
<v Speaker 1>to put the packets together kind of like a puzzle

0:29:46.920 --> 0:29:49.720
<v Speaker 1>in order to recreate that image of a cat. So

0:29:49.840 --> 0:29:52.120
<v Speaker 1>that's that's what a packet is. Well, the packet because

0:29:52.160 --> 0:29:55.000
<v Speaker 1>it has that information on it about where it's going

0:29:55.040 --> 0:29:57.920
<v Speaker 1>and where it's from. That's what we would call metadata, right,

0:29:57.960 --> 0:30:01.400
<v Speaker 1>that's the data about the data, or it's data that

0:30:01.480 --> 0:30:05.120
<v Speaker 1>somehow describes the data that's inside and um and I

0:30:05.160 --> 0:30:07.080
<v Speaker 1>always always try and say that the packets on the

0:30:07.120 --> 0:30:10.240
<v Speaker 1>other side get reassembled Willy Wonka style like Mike TV

0:30:10.520 --> 0:30:14.040
<v Speaker 1>when he goes across the camera. UM like that. Yeah,

0:30:14.440 --> 0:30:16.560
<v Speaker 1>I mean it's a it's a nice way of putting it,

0:30:16.760 --> 0:30:18.800
<v Speaker 1>especially since I mean that's one of my favorite films

0:30:18.800 --> 0:30:21.200
<v Speaker 1>of all time, the Gene Wilder version of the not

0:30:21.280 --> 0:30:24.800
<v Speaker 1>the Johnny not the Johnny Den version yet. So that's

0:30:24.880 --> 0:30:28.920
<v Speaker 1>where we get the words for packets. So, a packet sniffer,

0:30:28.920 --> 0:30:32.440
<v Speaker 1>as we mentioned earlier, can be software, it can be hardware,

0:30:32.520 --> 0:30:34.760
<v Speaker 1>it can be a combination of the two. That is

0:30:34.800 --> 0:30:38.400
<v Speaker 1>meant to sort of check out the packets that are

0:30:38.440 --> 0:30:42.320
<v Speaker 1>being sent across a network, uh and get an idea

0:30:42.440 --> 0:30:45.480
<v Speaker 1>of what's going on there. And one of the things

0:30:46.040 --> 0:30:48.520
<v Speaker 1>someone can do if they have a packet sniffer and

0:30:48.520 --> 0:30:51.000
<v Speaker 1>they know how to do it, is they can look

0:30:51.240 --> 0:30:55.080
<v Speaker 1>for packets that represent essentially an unencrypted cookie or a

0:30:55.120 --> 0:30:59.520
<v Speaker 1>session key. And this is essentially where a user has

0:30:59.560 --> 0:31:02.240
<v Speaker 1>sent a request to log into a service of some

0:31:02.280 --> 0:31:06.280
<v Speaker 1>sort uh, and if the hacker is able to sniff

0:31:06.280 --> 0:31:09.400
<v Speaker 1>out that cookie, they might be able to step in

0:31:09.600 --> 0:31:14.360
<v Speaker 1>and pose as that user and thus get access to

0:31:14.400 --> 0:31:18.760
<v Speaker 1>the user's account or services. Um and this is sometimes

0:31:18.800 --> 0:31:23.320
<v Speaker 1>referred to as side jacking. I learned a lot of

0:31:23.440 --> 0:31:26.960
<v Speaker 1>hacker slang while I was doing the research. This. I'm

0:31:27.040 --> 0:31:29.200
<v Speaker 1>so proud of you. I'm not good at using it,

0:31:29.240 --> 0:31:31.920
<v Speaker 1>but I learned it. It's okay. You could go to

0:31:31.960 --> 0:31:34.480
<v Speaker 1>def Con next year and totally fitting. Yeah, except I

0:31:34.520 --> 0:31:36.120
<v Speaker 1>will be like, all right, well, I'm gonna leave all

0:31:36.160 --> 0:31:41.600
<v Speaker 1>of my devices at home. Another great idea def Con

0:31:41.680 --> 0:31:44.880
<v Speaker 1>for those who do not know is a information security

0:31:44.880 --> 0:31:49.040
<v Speaker 1>and hacking convention where if you aren't careful, they will

0:31:49.120 --> 0:31:52.800
<v Speaker 1>let you know about it. Oh yeah they do. Usually

0:31:52.800 --> 0:31:54.640
<v Speaker 1>they're nice about it, and you just end up on

0:31:55.040 --> 0:31:59.120
<v Speaker 1>this thing called the wall of shame. But luckily generally

0:31:59.160 --> 0:32:02.680
<v Speaker 1>people don't nefariously hack each other there. It's just kind

0:32:02.760 --> 0:32:05.240
<v Speaker 1>of to pop your name up on a wall of

0:32:05.280 --> 0:32:08.960
<v Speaker 1>shame and that's about it. Yeah. Essentially, essentially they're saying, hey,

0:32:09.200 --> 0:32:11.320
<v Speaker 1>you need to have a heads up, like whatever you're

0:32:11.360 --> 0:32:14.360
<v Speaker 1>doing is not sufficient. Yeah, it's it's really more like

0:32:14.920 --> 0:32:18.600
<v Speaker 1>it's really more like saying like, listen, we want you

0:32:18.680 --> 0:32:21.720
<v Speaker 1>to be safe, and right now you're not being safe.

0:32:22.240 --> 0:32:25.840
<v Speaker 1>So but but yeah, but still there's also the shame factor.

0:32:26.120 --> 0:32:28.800
<v Speaker 1>And the more the more known you are in the sphere,

0:32:28.840 --> 0:32:31.080
<v Speaker 1>I imagine, the greater the shame would be to appear

0:32:31.080 --> 0:32:35.280
<v Speaker 1>on that wall. Oh yeah, definitely. So this was I've

0:32:35.280 --> 0:32:36.640
<v Speaker 1>never been on the wall of shame, and I hope

0:32:36.680 --> 0:32:39.360
<v Speaker 1>I never congratulations. Yeah, I've never been on the wall

0:32:39.360 --> 0:32:42.000
<v Speaker 1>of shame either, But that's because I haven't gone. I

0:32:42.080 --> 0:32:44.880
<v Speaker 1>am certain I would end up doing something bone headed

0:32:44.920 --> 0:32:47.400
<v Speaker 1>and mess up. So you were talking earlier about how

0:32:47.440 --> 0:32:51.400
<v Speaker 1>you have actually actively worked on technologies that do this

0:32:51.480 --> 0:32:56.560
<v Speaker 1>this packet sniffing uh approach. Yes, yes, I have. I

0:32:56.640 --> 0:32:58.880
<v Speaker 1>used to work at a company called hack five. I

0:32:58.960 --> 0:33:02.640
<v Speaker 1>still do show on that channel, j K five, And

0:33:03.040 --> 0:33:06.479
<v Speaker 1>our our premise for that channel is educating people who

0:33:06.560 --> 0:33:09.840
<v Speaker 1>are interested in security and privacy and might want to

0:33:09.880 --> 0:33:15.920
<v Speaker 1>go into information technology or penetration testing or infosec info

0:33:15.960 --> 0:33:21.280
<v Speaker 1>security as a profession. So we teach young hackers how

0:33:21.320 --> 0:33:25.560
<v Speaker 1>to legally use their talents to actually get a job

0:33:25.800 --> 0:33:29.360
<v Speaker 1>that will help them spur the economy, help them protect

0:33:29.360 --> 0:33:34.880
<v Speaker 1>companies h and help them really get involved with their passion. Um. So,

0:33:35.040 --> 0:33:38.160
<v Speaker 1>one of the products that we created is something called

0:33:38.200 --> 0:33:41.520
<v Speaker 1>called the WiFi Pineapple. It's a little hardware device. It's

0:33:41.560 --> 0:33:45.400
<v Speaker 1>basically a router, but the software that's built into the

0:33:45.440 --> 0:33:50.680
<v Speaker 1>WiFi Pineapple allows us to do things like get people

0:33:50.760 --> 0:33:53.680
<v Speaker 1>to connect to a WiFi Pineapple as opposed to a

0:33:53.720 --> 0:33:57.560
<v Speaker 1>regular router and allow us to sniff packets just like

0:33:57.600 --> 0:34:02.040
<v Speaker 1>you were saying, um it. The product has been around

0:34:02.040 --> 0:34:04.760
<v Speaker 1>for half a decade at this point. No, actually it's

0:34:04.760 --> 0:34:07.000
<v Speaker 1>been almost a decade. Wow, I can't believe it's been

0:34:07.040 --> 0:34:10.239
<v Speaker 1>so long. But we've gone through various revisions of it,

0:34:10.400 --> 0:34:14.839
<v Speaker 1>and as security has gotten stronger, there's always been new

0:34:14.920 --> 0:34:19.600
<v Speaker 1>vulnerabilities available in wireless network technology, so we've always been

0:34:19.640 --> 0:34:23.240
<v Speaker 1>able to update the WiFi Pineapple to continue to educate

0:34:23.280 --> 0:34:27.400
<v Speaker 1>people why it's still a good idea to not connect

0:34:27.480 --> 0:34:33.200
<v Speaker 1>to public WiFi or open hotspots. And uh, it's been

0:34:33.239 --> 0:34:37.279
<v Speaker 1>a wonderful education tool since we can use it as

0:34:37.320 --> 0:34:40.200
<v Speaker 1>this kind of man in the middle attack for for

0:34:40.400 --> 0:34:43.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, helping people understand. Yeah, and I mean, like

0:34:43.719 --> 0:34:47.839
<v Speaker 1>the thing that I see people sometimes and I know

0:34:47.960 --> 0:34:50.799
<v Speaker 1>you've seen it sometimes protests that like why are you

0:34:50.880 --> 0:34:53.919
<v Speaker 1>making this thing? And the argument I would make to them,

0:34:53.960 --> 0:34:55.680
<v Speaker 1>and I'm sure it's an argument that you guys have

0:34:55.760 --> 0:34:59.040
<v Speaker 1>made numerous times, is you know that people who have

0:34:59.120 --> 0:35:03.080
<v Speaker 1>bad intentions are making stuff like this already. They're they're

0:35:03.200 --> 0:35:06.359
<v Speaker 1>they're doing it all the time. They're doing and they're

0:35:06.400 --> 0:35:09.280
<v Speaker 1>not talking about it. They're not upfront about it because

0:35:09.320 --> 0:35:12.239
<v Speaker 1>they want to take advantage of it. The reason why

0:35:12.320 --> 0:35:15.920
<v Speaker 1>you guys do it is to raise awareness, to teach

0:35:15.960 --> 0:35:19.799
<v Speaker 1>people how it works, and presumably they can then take

0:35:19.800 --> 0:35:23.440
<v Speaker 1>that knowledge and better protect whatever their future clients might

0:35:23.480 --> 0:35:25.560
<v Speaker 1>be if they end up working as a white hat hacker.

0:35:26.239 --> 0:35:29.160
<v Speaker 1>And yeah, straight up, people have made their own WiFi

0:35:29.200 --> 0:35:32.840
<v Speaker 1>pineapples using you know, different types of hardware and different

0:35:32.920 --> 0:35:36.160
<v Speaker 1>kind of software that they've made their own. But our

0:35:36.239 --> 0:35:39.520
<v Speaker 1>our products are well. Hack fives products are listed in MIST,

0:35:39.600 --> 0:35:44.080
<v Speaker 1>which is the National Institute of Standards and Technologies as

0:35:44.120 --> 0:35:48.600
<v Speaker 1>a wireless penetration testing device. So a lot of companies

0:35:48.640 --> 0:35:52.120
<v Speaker 1>see it as a professional tool and they get their

0:35:52.160 --> 0:35:55.719
<v Speaker 1>employees to purchase these items to use and make sure

0:35:55.760 --> 0:35:58.200
<v Speaker 1>that their networks are protected. Because as much as you

0:35:58.239 --> 0:36:01.560
<v Speaker 1>could use a WiFi Pineapple to hack somebody, you can

0:36:01.600 --> 0:36:04.239
<v Speaker 1>also use it to protect yourself because you're still doing

0:36:04.320 --> 0:36:08.239
<v Speaker 1>the same kind of tracking on your known network. So

0:36:08.320 --> 0:36:11.040
<v Speaker 1>if I had a WiFi Pineapple on a company's network

0:36:11.120 --> 0:36:15.680
<v Speaker 1>that I'm legally have access to as since that's my profession,

0:36:15.719 --> 0:36:19.600
<v Speaker 1>for example, hypothetically, uh, then I could see what employees

0:36:19.600 --> 0:36:22.040
<v Speaker 1>are doing on that network. So if somebody is visiting

0:36:22.040 --> 0:36:24.080
<v Speaker 1>Facebook when they shouldn't be, I could see that, and

0:36:24.080 --> 0:36:25.880
<v Speaker 1>I could tell them, hey, you need to you know,

0:36:26.040 --> 0:36:27.839
<v Speaker 1>cut that off or you're going to get written up.

0:36:28.440 --> 0:36:31.400
<v Speaker 1>Or if there was an attacker trying to gain access

0:36:31.440 --> 0:36:33.759
<v Speaker 1>to a wireless network, I would be able to see

0:36:33.800 --> 0:36:36.640
<v Speaker 1>those packets because they would not be what I normally see,

0:36:36.960 --> 0:36:39.040
<v Speaker 1>and I would be able to protect my network because

0:36:39.040 --> 0:36:42.440
<v Speaker 1>I could blacklist them then. So there's so many different

0:36:42.440 --> 0:36:45.239
<v Speaker 1>ways that you can use these tools, not just nefariously

0:36:45.360 --> 0:36:49.480
<v Speaker 1>like you had mentioned, but in like these amazing ways

0:36:49.560 --> 0:36:52.600
<v Speaker 1>that help protect so much more than just companies, but

0:36:52.640 --> 0:36:55.640
<v Speaker 1>also the employees that are working there as well. Yeah,

0:36:55.640 --> 0:36:58.120
<v Speaker 1>and that, and I've always been the type to say,

0:36:58.200 --> 0:37:02.200
<v Speaker 1>if if someone's outwardly talking about what their technology can do,

0:37:02.920 --> 0:37:05.920
<v Speaker 1>then those are the people you should trust. It's the

0:37:05.920 --> 0:37:09.200
<v Speaker 1>ones who aren't talking that you have to worry about.

0:37:09.760 --> 0:37:12.040
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, it's the same thing for me when people

0:37:12.080 --> 0:37:15.040
<v Speaker 1>are talking about security vulnerabilities that they found in systems,

0:37:15.080 --> 0:37:17.600
<v Speaker 1>where they might come forward and say, yeah, I reported

0:37:17.640 --> 0:37:20.319
<v Speaker 1>this like three months ago, the company still hasn't done

0:37:20.320 --> 0:37:22.600
<v Speaker 1>anything about it. The only reason I'm coming forward is

0:37:22.640 --> 0:37:25.360
<v Speaker 1>because that puts the pressure on the company to definitely

0:37:25.400 --> 0:37:29.000
<v Speaker 1>make a change, because that vulnerability exists, whether they talk

0:37:29.040 --> 0:37:31.560
<v Speaker 1>about it or not. Now they have to do something

0:37:31.560 --> 0:37:34.560
<v Speaker 1>because the public knows about it, and and they're you know,

0:37:34.680 --> 0:37:36.520
<v Speaker 1>I'm I'm fully on board with that too. I mean,

0:37:36.560 --> 0:37:39.960
<v Speaker 1>I think that you always give the entity the chance

0:37:40.080 --> 0:37:44.080
<v Speaker 1>to address it, but if they haven't shown any movement

0:37:44.160 --> 0:37:47.080
<v Speaker 1>towards that, I think it's the responsibility of someone who's

0:37:47.080 --> 0:37:50.560
<v Speaker 1>found a vulnerability to come forward with it because otherwise

0:37:51.280 --> 0:37:53.560
<v Speaker 1>it's just it's just a ticking time bomb. Someone's going

0:37:53.600 --> 0:37:56.200
<v Speaker 1>to take advantage of it, and then it becomes a

0:37:56.239 --> 0:37:59.480
<v Speaker 1>problem far bigger than coming forward and saying, hey, guys,

0:37:59.480 --> 0:38:02.399
<v Speaker 1>need to fix your stuff. And it's it's not just

0:38:02.800 --> 0:38:05.799
<v Speaker 1>you know, devices like the WiFi Pineapple, but as we

0:38:05.840 --> 0:38:08.920
<v Speaker 1>had mentioned, it's also software that's involved too that can

0:38:08.960 --> 0:38:13.640
<v Speaker 1>do very similar type of tracking on networks. There's a

0:38:13.719 --> 0:38:17.040
<v Speaker 1>technology called wire Shark, which I'll bring up not just

0:38:17.080 --> 0:38:22.040
<v Speaker 1>because you know, I have no financial responsibility via hack five.

0:38:22.160 --> 0:38:25.720
<v Speaker 1>So like if if you know, somebody purchases a WiFi

0:38:25.719 --> 0:38:28.160
<v Speaker 1>Pineapple when they hear this talk, I don't get anything

0:38:28.200 --> 0:38:30.640
<v Speaker 1>from that, no compensation whatsoever. I just do a show

0:38:30.640 --> 0:38:32.719
<v Speaker 1>on that channel, So don't worry. I'm not. I don't

0:38:32.719 --> 0:38:36.520
<v Speaker 1>get referrals or anything. But there's also software like wire shark,

0:38:36.960 --> 0:38:40.200
<v Speaker 1>which is a free service online that anybody can download

0:38:40.280 --> 0:38:44.160
<v Speaker 1>and that allows you to do packet sniffing. I've used

0:38:44.200 --> 0:38:47.120
<v Speaker 1>it to test my own home network and make sure

0:38:47.200 --> 0:38:51.239
<v Speaker 1>that my smart coot devices are secure and they're encrypted,

0:38:51.680 --> 0:38:55.160
<v Speaker 1>and that has luckily, luckily, all of my devices are,

0:38:55.520 --> 0:38:58.680
<v Speaker 1>you know, totally secure, which is wonderful. But back in

0:38:58.719 --> 0:39:00.840
<v Speaker 1>the day when I first started using wire Shark, I

0:39:00.920 --> 0:39:04.800
<v Speaker 1>discovered that when I was using Instagram on my phone,

0:39:05.280 --> 0:39:07.880
<v Speaker 1>I could see links to the pictures that I was

0:39:08.000 --> 0:39:11.399
<v Speaker 1>liking as I liked them, so as I gave them

0:39:11.400 --> 0:39:14.719
<v Speaker 1>the little hearts, it would pull up a little HTTP

0:39:14.880 --> 0:39:17.120
<v Speaker 1>link and I could click on that through wire Shark,

0:39:17.160 --> 0:39:19.920
<v Speaker 1>and I could see exactly which pictures I was liking,

0:39:20.000 --> 0:39:24.239
<v Speaker 1>which was so creepy. I mean, definitely something that you

0:39:24.280 --> 0:39:27.200
<v Speaker 1>should be aware of is what kind of data is

0:39:27.239 --> 0:39:30.759
<v Speaker 1>being passed through with no encryption whatsoever, and what kind

0:39:30.760 --> 0:39:35.000
<v Speaker 1>of data is being encrypted too. Yeah, totally and you

0:39:35.040 --> 0:39:37.280
<v Speaker 1>means crazy. You mentioned the man in the middle attack.

0:39:37.600 --> 0:39:41.839
<v Speaker 1>That's that's kind of another step up, where you have

0:39:42.080 --> 0:39:46.680
<v Speaker 1>a hacker that sets their machine in between a user

0:39:46.880 --> 0:39:50.319
<v Speaker 1>and some other computer that might be a router. So

0:39:50.400 --> 0:39:51.640
<v Speaker 1>you might actually have a man in the middle of

0:39:51.640 --> 0:39:53.960
<v Speaker 1>attack where someone say at the coffee shop, and they

0:39:53.960 --> 0:39:57.000
<v Speaker 1>set up uh their computer so that it appears to

0:39:57.040 --> 0:40:00.880
<v Speaker 1>be the coffee shops network. There's actually ways where you

0:40:00.920 --> 0:40:04.160
<v Speaker 1>can force a reboot of a system and then pose

0:40:04.239 --> 0:40:07.520
<v Speaker 1>as that system so that when it does reboot, you

0:40:07.560 --> 0:40:12.880
<v Speaker 1>are effectively a middleman in that relationship, and meanwhile you

0:40:12.880 --> 0:40:14.799
<v Speaker 1>see all the stuff that goes across that because your

0:40:14.880 --> 0:40:18.960
<v Speaker 1>computer is acting as the network spot for where where

0:40:18.960 --> 0:40:22.000
<v Speaker 1>everybody's connecting through UH. So that's that's one way, but

0:40:22.080 --> 0:40:24.040
<v Speaker 1>there's also ways of began doing a man in the

0:40:24.040 --> 0:40:28.799
<v Speaker 1>middle of attack between a like a client and an

0:40:28.840 --> 0:40:32.800
<v Speaker 1>actual service, like you know, directing people to fake bank

0:40:33.080 --> 0:40:35.799
<v Speaker 1>log in pages and things. Of that nature. Um, So

0:40:35.840 --> 0:40:37.359
<v Speaker 1>those are things you also have to be aware of,

0:40:37.680 --> 0:40:41.239
<v Speaker 1>although that can happen pretty much in every scenario we're

0:40:41.239 --> 0:40:43.879
<v Speaker 1>going to talk about. That requires you to pay close

0:40:43.920 --> 0:40:47.840
<v Speaker 1>attention to what you are doing as you're browsing. UM.

0:40:47.880 --> 0:40:50.279
<v Speaker 1>And I mentioned earlier about the idea that if you

0:40:50.440 --> 0:40:53.640
<v Speaker 1>are using public WiFi that is password protected. Let's say

0:40:53.640 --> 0:40:56.359
<v Speaker 1>you're at us coffee shop where yeah, you can log

0:40:56.400 --> 0:40:59.120
<v Speaker 1>into their their WiFi, but you have to first go

0:40:59.200 --> 0:41:01.279
<v Speaker 1>up to the cash regis her and find out what

0:41:01.320 --> 0:41:03.040
<v Speaker 1>the password is, and then you find that out and

0:41:03.080 --> 0:41:05.640
<v Speaker 1>you log in. Some people feel like that gives them

0:41:05.640 --> 0:41:10.000
<v Speaker 1>that extra area of security. Honestly, that doesn't, because there's

0:41:10.040 --> 0:41:12.719
<v Speaker 1>nothing stopping a hacker going into that same coffee shop

0:41:12.760 --> 0:41:16.120
<v Speaker 1>getting that same password and like that. It doesn't add

0:41:16.160 --> 0:41:19.080
<v Speaker 1>any like by itself, it doesn't add any extra security.

0:41:19.080 --> 0:41:23.080
<v Speaker 1>It just as one extra little step. Yeah, it's true.

0:41:23.280 --> 0:41:26.959
<v Speaker 1>Uh yeah, anybody even in the vicinity, if they've ever

0:41:27.040 --> 0:41:32.359
<v Speaker 1>had access to that wireless password and the coffee shop,

0:41:32.400 --> 0:41:34.719
<v Speaker 1>for example, has never changed the password, Like they could

0:41:34.760 --> 0:41:38.680
<v Speaker 1>easily get access again with a long range antenna on

0:41:38.719 --> 0:41:40.600
<v Speaker 1>the other side of a parking lot and be able

0:41:40.640 --> 0:41:43.439
<v Speaker 1>to sniff what everybody in that coffee shop is doing.

0:41:43.960 --> 0:41:47.279
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, I don't even use coffee shop WiFi or

0:41:47.360 --> 0:41:51.080
<v Speaker 1>airport WiFi if we want to use that example. Those

0:41:51.120 --> 0:41:54.560
<v Speaker 1>aren't even trustworthy exactly, and I think that those are

0:41:54.760 --> 0:41:57.680
<v Speaker 1>perfect examples, especially as people are traveling a lot for

0:41:57.680 --> 0:42:01.560
<v Speaker 1>the holidays. Like I that's why I think of seeing

0:42:01.560 --> 0:42:03.880
<v Speaker 1>people whipping out their computers the most is airports and

0:42:03.880 --> 0:42:08.480
<v Speaker 1>coffee shops. That's it, um. But yeah, if you have

0:42:08.760 --> 0:42:14.920
<v Speaker 1>an encrypted network, that's better. It's again like this is

0:42:14.960 --> 0:42:19.200
<v Speaker 1>another step where we're getting into uh more secure area,

0:42:19.280 --> 0:42:21.960
<v Speaker 1>and we'll talk about different types of encryption in a second,

0:42:22.400 --> 0:42:26.360
<v Speaker 1>but before we get to that, there's actually also a

0:42:26.400 --> 0:42:30.040
<v Speaker 1>difference in the types of browsers, right. Different browsers offer

0:42:30.160 --> 0:42:36.080
<v Speaker 1>different levels of features that either uh enable security and

0:42:36.120 --> 0:42:40.360
<v Speaker 1>privacy or they make it really difficult to protect. So

0:42:40.640 --> 0:42:43.760
<v Speaker 1>on the bad end of the scale. As the Internet

0:42:43.760 --> 0:42:49.800
<v Speaker 1>Explorer for multiple reasons, it was never the best browser

0:42:49.840 --> 0:42:53.080
<v Speaker 1>when it comes to security and privacy. But it's really

0:42:53.120 --> 0:42:57.120
<v Speaker 1>not great now because Microsoft no longer actively supports it. UM.

0:42:57.160 --> 0:43:00.799
<v Speaker 1>They will push out a security update on occasion, but

0:43:00.920 --> 0:43:04.640
<v Speaker 1>it's not frequent, which means that there are a lot

0:43:04.680 --> 0:43:10.120
<v Speaker 1>more opportunities for people to discover and exploit vulnerabilities and

0:43:10.120 --> 0:43:14.200
<v Speaker 1>and be fairly sure that those vulnerabilities will stick around

0:43:14.239 --> 0:43:17.280
<v Speaker 1>for a while. So it's not even like a rush

0:43:17.520 --> 0:43:22.320
<v Speaker 1>because Microsoft isn't updating it that frequently with security patches,

0:43:22.520 --> 0:43:27.360
<v Speaker 1>So that's a bad one. Don't use it. Microsoft. Microsoft

0:43:27.440 --> 0:43:33.279
<v Speaker 1>Edge only slightly better than the completely unsupported Internet Explorer. Um,

0:43:33.320 --> 0:43:37.279
<v Speaker 1>at least as far as privacy is concerned. Uh, I

0:43:37.360 --> 0:43:40.080
<v Speaker 1>use Google Chrome a lot, but admittedly Google Chrome not

0:43:40.160 --> 0:43:42.600
<v Speaker 1>great either. It's kind of on the bottom half of

0:43:42.640 --> 0:43:47.040
<v Speaker 1>the middle of the pack. So, uh, they're better about security,

0:43:47.080 --> 0:43:49.800
<v Speaker 1>but they are the pets when it comes to privacy.

0:43:49.920 --> 0:43:54.839
<v Speaker 1>Also not a big surprise, because I mean, what's Google's business, right,

0:43:54.920 --> 0:43:59.080
<v Speaker 1>Google owns you? Yeah, your data is Google's That's what

0:43:59.239 --> 0:44:04.480
<v Speaker 1>Google buys and sells. It's your information, that's that's Google's currency.

0:44:04.560 --> 0:44:10.320
<v Speaker 1>So clearly it does not behoove Google too lockdown privacy

0:44:10.440 --> 0:44:13.200
<v Speaker 1>super tight. They want to know all the information about

0:44:13.200 --> 0:44:16.520
<v Speaker 1>you they make that's how they make their money. Um. So,

0:44:17.080 --> 0:44:19.680
<v Speaker 1>of all the common browsers, like the ones that are

0:44:19.680 --> 0:44:23.279
<v Speaker 1>frequently used out there, the one that that tends to

0:44:23.360 --> 0:44:27.320
<v Speaker 1>rank the highest is Firefox, higher than Opera higher than Chrome,

0:44:27.480 --> 0:44:32.280
<v Speaker 1>higher than safari Um. So it does really well, especially

0:44:32.360 --> 0:44:35.359
<v Speaker 1>for security and privacy. It can support a lot of

0:44:35.719 --> 0:44:39.280
<v Speaker 1>features that protect you when you're when you're surfing stuff

0:44:39.280 --> 0:44:41.880
<v Speaker 1>that will end up cutting down on things like targeted

0:44:41.880 --> 0:44:45.799
<v Speaker 1>advertising because you can really limit the information that's being

0:44:45.880 --> 0:44:50.560
<v Speaker 1>shared by the sites that you're visiting. UM and you

0:44:50.600 --> 0:44:54.120
<v Speaker 1>can also enhance it with various add ons that you

0:44:54.160 --> 0:44:58.000
<v Speaker 1>can find, although obviously anytime you're going to be adding

0:44:58.040 --> 0:45:02.080
<v Speaker 1>anything to UH an ext a sting program, it pays

0:45:02.120 --> 0:45:03.960
<v Speaker 1>to do your research to make sure that it is

0:45:05.280 --> 0:45:12.440
<v Speaker 1>offered by a reputable and dependable app developer. Yeah, Firefox

0:45:12.520 --> 0:45:16.120
<v Speaker 1>is an excellent choice UH and two fold. If you

0:45:16.200 --> 0:45:19.320
<v Speaker 1>download something like Firefox, you also get a very fast

0:45:19.400 --> 0:45:21.920
<v Speaker 1>browser because they have worked very hard to make that

0:45:22.000 --> 0:45:24.719
<v Speaker 1>browser quick. So even if you don't care about the

0:45:24.760 --> 0:45:28.000
<v Speaker 1>security and you just want to access your sites really fast,

0:45:28.600 --> 0:45:32.440
<v Speaker 1>you should use Firefox. Yeah. Yeah, I got Firefox. I

0:45:32.480 --> 0:45:34.960
<v Speaker 1>got stuck on Chrome because for a while Chrome was

0:45:35.000 --> 0:45:38.280
<v Speaker 1>super fast and then it got super bloated. And also

0:45:38.400 --> 0:45:41.080
<v Speaker 1>there's the more tabs you have opening Chrome. Anyone who's

0:45:41.120 --> 0:45:43.120
<v Speaker 1>done this with Chrome knows that even though it are

0:45:43.160 --> 0:45:46.839
<v Speaker 1>all supposed to be distinct instances that don't bleed over

0:45:46.880 --> 0:45:49.560
<v Speaker 1>into each other. Uh, there gets to be some memory

0:45:49.600 --> 0:45:53.080
<v Speaker 1>issues if you happen to be really a heavy user,

0:45:53.120 --> 0:45:55.560
<v Speaker 1>and everyone here at this company is a heavy user.

0:45:55.600 --> 0:45:59.239
<v Speaker 1>So Firefox is definitely going to be my browser of

0:45:59.360 --> 0:46:02.920
<v Speaker 1>choice moving forward after I did this research. I also,

0:46:02.960 --> 0:46:05.359
<v Speaker 1>I should point out, before I did this research, I

0:46:05.400 --> 0:46:08.880
<v Speaker 1>did not know this. I was just a happy, blithe,

0:46:09.040 --> 0:46:14.000
<v Speaker 1>naive Chrome user handing handing over reams of personal data

0:46:14.080 --> 0:46:17.240
<v Speaker 1>to Google, which I mean, granted, I'm sure that company's

0:46:17.280 --> 0:46:19.800
<v Speaker 1>board with me by now, but still there's some value

0:46:19.800 --> 0:46:24.120
<v Speaker 1>there um. And then that brings us to encryption. And

0:46:24.200 --> 0:46:28.080
<v Speaker 1>this encryption it gets This is sort of like complicated,

0:46:28.120 --> 0:46:30.760
<v Speaker 1>like the handshake thing. But encryption, when you boil it down,

0:46:31.280 --> 0:46:34.400
<v Speaker 1>is all about scrambling messages so that the only people

0:46:34.400 --> 0:46:36.799
<v Speaker 1>who can access it are the ones who have the

0:46:36.880 --> 0:46:39.200
<v Speaker 1>key to decode it. Right, So you have the key

0:46:39.239 --> 0:46:42.319
<v Speaker 1>to encode and the key to decode. There are various

0:46:42.640 --> 0:46:47.120
<v Speaker 1>implementations of that technology, different ways to have the public

0:46:47.200 --> 0:46:50.279
<v Speaker 1>key and private key operations. I don't need to get

0:46:50.320 --> 0:46:53.759
<v Speaker 1>into all of that because it gets way too technical. Obviously,

0:46:54.320 --> 0:46:58.480
<v Speaker 1>encrypted is better than unencrypted, but not all encryption schemes

0:46:58.520 --> 0:47:04.359
<v Speaker 1>are created equal and it pays use. So yes, that's

0:47:04.480 --> 0:47:08.640
<v Speaker 1>very true. There's there's even like there's symmetrical keys and

0:47:08.880 --> 0:47:12.920
<v Speaker 1>asymmetrical keys, and then there's like SHAW one and be

0:47:13.080 --> 0:47:16.720
<v Speaker 1>crypt and r s A. There's all these different terminologies

0:47:16.760 --> 0:47:20.279
<v Speaker 1>for encryption. But for what it's worth, all of them

0:47:20.440 --> 0:47:24.520
<v Speaker 1>jumble up your information into some kind of format that

0:47:24.600 --> 0:47:27.959
<v Speaker 1>will hopefully hopefully encrypted, so that anybody who does gain

0:47:28.000 --> 0:47:31.719
<v Speaker 1>access to the encrypted version of your information will not

0:47:31.800 --> 0:47:35.759
<v Speaker 1>be able to reverse engineer it or change it back

0:47:35.760 --> 0:47:39.359
<v Speaker 1>to its original plain text formats, so they can't read

0:47:39.400 --> 0:47:41.960
<v Speaker 1>it in like English speak, right, it would just be

0:47:42.160 --> 0:47:47.279
<v Speaker 1>meaningless garbage to them, hopefully, and its ideal, ideal implementation.

0:47:47.719 --> 0:47:49.800
<v Speaker 1>So one of the things that you may have encountered

0:47:49.800 --> 0:47:51.920
<v Speaker 1>if you've ever set up any sort of wireless network.

0:47:51.960 --> 0:47:54.120
<v Speaker 1>I think most people have, or at least they've they've

0:47:54.480 --> 0:47:57.840
<v Speaker 1>had to connect to one where they've seen the different

0:47:57.840 --> 0:48:04.239
<v Speaker 1>types of network security protocols. These are certifications that the

0:48:04.280 --> 0:48:08.960
<v Speaker 1>WiFi Security Alliance creates, and the earliest one was the

0:48:09.000 --> 0:48:13.120
<v Speaker 1>Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol or w e p H. That

0:48:13.160 --> 0:48:18.399
<v Speaker 1>one is decrepit, it's old, it's vulnerable as heck, so

0:48:18.560 --> 0:48:20.880
<v Speaker 1>don't use it. Yeah, if you have the if if

0:48:20.880 --> 0:48:23.200
<v Speaker 1>your router tells you, like asks you which one you

0:48:23.239 --> 0:48:26.279
<v Speaker 1>want to use, don't use w ep UM. It is

0:48:26.400 --> 0:48:29.640
<v Speaker 1>not secure. It is it's I mean, you could argue

0:48:29.680 --> 0:48:32.239
<v Speaker 1>it's better than nothing, but not by much because the

0:48:32.320 --> 0:48:34.959
<v Speaker 1>vulnerabilities have been known for a long time, in fact,

0:48:35.040 --> 0:48:38.239
<v Speaker 1>so long that even before the nineties were up, you

0:48:38.239 --> 0:48:42.440
<v Speaker 1>had people developing the next generation, which would have been

0:48:42.480 --> 0:48:45.759
<v Speaker 1>the WiFi Protected Access or w p A. So w

0:48:45.840 --> 0:48:48.040
<v Speaker 1>p A came out. Then you get w p A two,

0:48:48.080 --> 0:48:52.400
<v Speaker 1>which was trying to address some of the shortcomings of

0:48:52.560 --> 0:48:57.160
<v Speaker 1>w p A UH. Both of those also still have vulnerabilities.

0:48:57.280 --> 0:49:01.600
<v Speaker 1>W p A two is general talked about as being

0:49:01.600 --> 0:49:05.640
<v Speaker 1>one of the more secure UH certifications these days. There

0:49:05.760 --> 0:49:08.920
<v Speaker 1>is a w p A three also has vulnerabilities that

0:49:08.960 --> 0:49:12.920
<v Speaker 1>have pointed out within the year already. Yeah. So, but

0:49:13.160 --> 0:49:15.600
<v Speaker 1>w p I, I don't think I've even seen a

0:49:15.640 --> 0:49:18.120
<v Speaker 1>lot of stuff that's certified w p A three yet,

0:49:18.400 --> 0:49:21.920
<v Speaker 1>Like we've we've started to see some wireless routers come

0:49:21.960 --> 0:49:25.400
<v Speaker 1>out with w p A three, but they there's still

0:49:25.440 --> 0:49:30.000
<v Speaker 1>a little expensive and they haven't really gotten widespread adoption

0:49:30.080 --> 0:49:33.640
<v Speaker 1>by consumers quite yet so w P A two is

0:49:34.160 --> 0:49:37.640
<v Speaker 1>fine for most consumers to use. You just have to

0:49:37.680 --> 0:49:39.759
<v Speaker 1>make sure that you set it up correctly and you

0:49:39.800 --> 0:49:43.520
<v Speaker 1>don't give the entire world access to your password for

0:49:43.600 --> 0:49:47.440
<v Speaker 1>your account. Yeah that, because then there's what what were

0:49:47.440 --> 0:49:50.759
<v Speaker 1>you even thinking? There's no point then? Yeah? So so

0:49:51.080 --> 0:49:53.600
<v Speaker 1>w P A three on w P A two. All

0:49:53.680 --> 0:49:57.959
<v Speaker 1>these are our designations. And what happens is a manufacturer

0:49:58.000 --> 0:50:01.799
<v Speaker 1>will make a piece of equipment or uh either it's

0:50:01.840 --> 0:50:04.959
<v Speaker 1>a computer or a handset or maybe it's a router,

0:50:05.560 --> 0:50:08.680
<v Speaker 1>and then they submit it to this WiFi security alliance

0:50:09.160 --> 0:50:12.480
<v Speaker 1>that then makes sure that that technology meets whatever the

0:50:12.560 --> 0:50:15.600
<v Speaker 1>requirements are for the particular designation. Then they put the

0:50:15.719 --> 0:50:17.920
<v Speaker 1>stamp on it and they say, yes, this is w

0:50:17.960 --> 0:50:20.920
<v Speaker 1>P A two compliant or w P A three compliant.

0:50:21.400 --> 0:50:25.279
<v Speaker 1>So that just tells you that compliance really there. It

0:50:25.320 --> 0:50:29.520
<v Speaker 1>gets more granular than that. For example, w P A

0:50:29.560 --> 0:50:33.160
<v Speaker 1>two has two different types of encryption standards that can

0:50:33.200 --> 0:50:36.920
<v Speaker 1>be used. There's the bad one. It's Temporal key Integrity

0:50:36.920 --> 0:50:38.960
<v Speaker 1>Protocol or t k i P, and I call it

0:50:39.000 --> 0:50:42.800
<v Speaker 1>bad because yeah, t KIP. T KIP is no longer safe.

0:50:42.960 --> 0:50:46.000
<v Speaker 1>Skip the t KIP. If you skip the t KIP

0:50:46.160 --> 0:50:49.000
<v Speaker 1>like that. Yeah, it's nice mnemonic device. And then there's

0:50:49.239 --> 0:50:52.080
<v Speaker 1>Advanced Encryption Standard or a e S, and that's the

0:50:52.080 --> 0:50:55.759
<v Speaker 1>more secure of the two. So don't rely on te KIP,

0:50:55.880 --> 0:51:00.000
<v Speaker 1>rely on a s U. So that will end up

0:51:00.040 --> 0:51:03.640
<v Speaker 1>protecting you quite a bit as well. The encryption will

0:51:03.760 --> 0:51:08.160
<v Speaker 1>end up helping a great deal because you've just made

0:51:08.200 --> 0:51:12.160
<v Speaker 1>it more difficult for someone to get anything meaningful from

0:51:12.560 --> 0:51:17.600
<v Speaker 1>your browsing activity. It does not mean that you are immune.

0:51:17.840 --> 0:51:20.840
<v Speaker 1>But again, the harder you make it for somebody, the

0:51:20.960 --> 0:51:24.120
<v Speaker 1>less chance they're gonna put forth the effort to break

0:51:24.160 --> 0:51:29.320
<v Speaker 1>through whatever protections you put up. So just general note um.

0:51:29.400 --> 0:51:32.879
<v Speaker 1>And then that also brings us to secure browsing. So

0:51:33.320 --> 0:51:35.680
<v Speaker 1>back in the day, which was the Thursday, I don't

0:51:35.680 --> 0:51:38.120
<v Speaker 1>know if you know that, Uh, there was the the

0:51:38.239 --> 0:51:42.279
<v Speaker 1>Secure Sockets Layer SSL. This whenever you went to a

0:51:42.320 --> 0:51:45.040
<v Speaker 1>website that had the little padlock and the lock on

0:51:45.080 --> 0:51:48.440
<v Speaker 1>it and the HTTPS like, the original version of that

0:51:48.560 --> 0:51:50.480
<v Speaker 1>was SSL. In fact, a lot of people still refer

0:51:50.560 --> 0:51:53.359
<v Speaker 1>to SSL, even though that technically has been and has

0:51:53.440 --> 0:51:57.840
<v Speaker 1>before a while been replaced by the Transport Layer Security

0:51:57.920 --> 0:52:00.879
<v Speaker 1>or TLS, but the same order of purpose it's too.

0:52:01.000 --> 0:52:04.680
<v Speaker 1>It's meant to create the secure channel of communication between

0:52:04.680 --> 0:52:09.160
<v Speaker 1>you and a specific UH website U r L address.

0:52:09.239 --> 0:52:12.920
<v Speaker 1>So if you see HTTPS, or you see that little

0:52:12.960 --> 0:52:16.640
<v Speaker 1>locked padlock in the address bar of your browser, then

0:52:16.680 --> 0:52:21.560
<v Speaker 1>you know you are in a secure channel between you know,

0:52:21.680 --> 0:52:26.120
<v Speaker 1>your your device, and that browser, at least as far

0:52:26.160 --> 0:52:29.600
<v Speaker 1>as information going between those two points are. I mean, obviously,

0:52:29.640 --> 0:52:33.200
<v Speaker 1>if you're on a public WiFi hotspot that's unsecured, you've

0:52:33.200 --> 0:52:36.800
<v Speaker 1>got other issues. But it means that when you're browsing,

0:52:37.120 --> 0:52:39.640
<v Speaker 1>you want to make sure that that HTTPS is showing up.

0:52:40.040 --> 0:52:41.759
<v Speaker 1>You don't you don't want the h T t P

0:52:42.200 --> 0:52:43.919
<v Speaker 1>you want you want to make sure that S is there.

0:52:45.040 --> 0:52:49.279
<v Speaker 1>So one thing I've noticed very rarely, but it has

0:52:49.320 --> 0:52:53.560
<v Speaker 1>happened on occasion is where a website that requires you

0:52:53.640 --> 0:52:56.560
<v Speaker 1>to log in somewhere like their main page there dot

0:52:56.600 --> 0:53:01.480
<v Speaker 1>com address will be encrypted with HTTP. Yes, but as

0:53:01.480 --> 0:53:03.520
<v Speaker 1>soon as you go over to the log in page

0:53:03.640 --> 0:53:06.879
<v Speaker 1>or go through any tree of different sites that they

0:53:06.880 --> 0:53:10.160
<v Speaker 1>have created on their dot com domain, all the rest

0:53:10.200 --> 0:53:13.239
<v Speaker 1>of their pages are h T t P. They are unencrypted.

0:53:13.320 --> 0:53:14.920
<v Speaker 1>So if you go to the log in page and

0:53:15.000 --> 0:53:18.359
<v Speaker 1>my cat agrees, she's mewing behind me and you put

0:53:18.400 --> 0:53:21.680
<v Speaker 1>in your user name and password. Those would be copied

0:53:21.719 --> 0:53:26.360
<v Speaker 1>through plain text, and if anybody was, you know, tracking

0:53:26.480 --> 0:53:29.120
<v Speaker 1>or sniffing your packets, they would be able to see

0:53:29.160 --> 0:53:32.800
<v Speaker 1>that plane text user name and passwords. So, for example,

0:53:32.840 --> 0:53:36.520
<v Speaker 1>if my password was my cat's name is Starbuck, and

0:53:36.640 --> 0:53:40.360
<v Speaker 1>that was a plain text, unencrypted website just using HTTP,

0:53:41.120 --> 0:53:44.799
<v Speaker 1>then if somebody was sniffing those packets, they could see

0:53:44.880 --> 0:53:48.440
<v Speaker 1>that passwords show up in their software through whatever hardware

0:53:48.440 --> 0:53:51.439
<v Speaker 1>device they might be using, and just be able to see, oh,

0:53:51.440 --> 0:53:53.799
<v Speaker 1>she entered Starbuck, and then they could go to the

0:53:53.800 --> 0:53:56.880
<v Speaker 1>website type that in and gain access to my login

0:53:57.280 --> 0:54:01.279
<v Speaker 1>account information. Yeah, and that is what we call no bueno, right,

0:54:01.440 --> 0:54:04.840
<v Speaker 1>like yeah, yeah and ho and more and more sites

0:54:04.880 --> 0:54:09.440
<v Speaker 1>are getting better about making certain that their entire presence

0:54:10.040 --> 0:54:13.040
<v Speaker 1>is being secure, but you can it's actually harder and

0:54:13.120 --> 0:54:17.000
<v Speaker 1>harder to find examples websites doing that, so which I'm

0:54:17.040 --> 0:54:19.400
<v Speaker 1>happy to see because that makes my job harder and

0:54:19.440 --> 0:54:22.560
<v Speaker 1>that means people are listening. Uh, So, I am happy

0:54:22.600 --> 0:54:24.680
<v Speaker 1>to see that less sites are doing that, but we

0:54:24.760 --> 0:54:27.319
<v Speaker 1>still have issues. There's still some out there. And then

0:54:27.360 --> 0:54:31.000
<v Speaker 1>occasionally you have browsers that will alert you if you

0:54:31.080 --> 0:54:34.040
<v Speaker 1>try to navigate to a site that is not secure,

0:54:34.040 --> 0:54:36.800
<v Speaker 1>it'll give you a little alert, which is good too,

0:54:37.160 --> 0:54:40.640
<v Speaker 1>because you know, if the people on the website aren't

0:54:40.680 --> 0:54:43.840
<v Speaker 1>being diligent, it at least gives the user on the

0:54:43.880 --> 0:54:46.399
<v Speaker 1>other end the heads up of, Hey, you probably thought

0:54:46.400 --> 0:54:48.600
<v Speaker 1>this was secure, but turns out it's not. Maybe you

0:54:48.640 --> 0:54:50.560
<v Speaker 1>want to rethink that. Are you sure you want to

0:54:50.560 --> 0:54:52.960
<v Speaker 1>go ahead? You will probably be eaten by a group,

0:54:53.440 --> 0:54:56.400
<v Speaker 1>and then you decide what you can do it. Um Now,

0:54:56.640 --> 0:54:59.239
<v Speaker 1>when we come back, we're going to talk about one

0:54:59.280 --> 0:55:03.040
<v Speaker 1>other topic before we get into like the super secret stuff,

0:55:03.400 --> 0:55:06.239
<v Speaker 1>and that is what the heck is incognito mode for.

0:55:07.520 --> 0:55:19.440
<v Speaker 1>But before we do that, let's take another quick break. So, Shannon,

0:55:20.680 --> 0:55:27.520
<v Speaker 1>I have I've I've gone to a private network, right,

0:55:27.640 --> 0:55:30.839
<v Speaker 1>I'm it's not maybe mine, but it's a private ones

0:55:30.840 --> 0:55:35.520
<v Speaker 1>not open to the public. It's encrypted password access. I've

0:55:35.560 --> 0:55:37.960
<v Speaker 1>done all those wonderful things. And then I think, you

0:55:38.000 --> 0:55:39.839
<v Speaker 1>know what, I'm gonna look at some so like your

0:55:39.880 --> 0:55:44.040
<v Speaker 1>friend's house or something. Yeah, yeah, yeah, And uh, I decided,

0:55:44.120 --> 0:55:45.560
<v Speaker 1>you know what I want to do. I wanna I'm

0:55:45.560 --> 0:55:48.680
<v Speaker 1>gonna look at some I'm gonna look at some some

0:55:48.719 --> 0:55:51.759
<v Speaker 1>stuff that I don't think my friends would really understand.

0:55:51.800 --> 0:55:54.479
<v Speaker 1>Maybe maybe I'm gonna look into this that my little

0:55:54.520 --> 0:55:57.960
<v Speaker 1>pony fan fiction. Uh, and I don't want my friends

0:55:57.960 --> 0:55:59.439
<v Speaker 1>to know about it. So I'm like, well, I'm gonna

0:55:59.440 --> 0:56:02.000
<v Speaker 1>be super sneak, gay, I'm gonna go into incognito mode. Now,

0:56:02.080 --> 0:56:04.319
<v Speaker 1>no one's ever done to know. So I click on

0:56:04.320 --> 0:56:08.200
<v Speaker 1>that little incognito mode and little bitty shadow Man pops up,

0:56:08.200 --> 0:56:10.880
<v Speaker 1>and I'm like, oh, yeah, I'm totally safe and totally secret.

0:56:10.880 --> 0:56:13.880
<v Speaker 1>Nobody knows it's me. And I start looking at my

0:56:13.920 --> 0:56:19.520
<v Speaker 1>browny fan fiction. Oh you know the term. Hey, look,

0:56:20.880 --> 0:56:24.560
<v Speaker 1>I wouldn't listen. Listen, you just give yourself away. Listen.

0:56:24.600 --> 0:56:28.480
<v Speaker 1>Princess Celestia and I have an understanding. Okay, so we

0:56:28.520 --> 0:56:30.600
<v Speaker 1>are not going to go down that road. We're not

0:56:30.640 --> 0:56:33.200
<v Speaker 1>gonna go there. Like, yeah, Fluttershy and I we're like,

0:56:33.280 --> 0:56:37.160
<v Speaker 1>we're tight, so we're not. It's fine, Okay, it's acceptable behavior,

0:56:37.480 --> 0:56:40.000
<v Speaker 1>but no, it is acceptable, but I don't want my

0:56:40.040 --> 0:56:43.440
<v Speaker 1>friend to know that. Now here's the sad thing folks

0:56:44.480 --> 0:56:48.359
<v Speaker 1>on the podcast. One one, whoops, I guess there should

0:56:48.360 --> 0:56:52.319
<v Speaker 1>be more secure with my data. And secondly, secondly, incognito mode.

0:56:52.360 --> 0:56:55.919
<v Speaker 1>That's not how that works. It doesn't protect you from

0:56:55.960 --> 0:56:59.280
<v Speaker 1>anyone who has any access to the network from seeing

0:56:59.280 --> 0:57:02.200
<v Speaker 1>what you're doing, right right, that's correct. Um. Yeah, so

0:57:02.320 --> 0:57:05.200
<v Speaker 1>incognito mode. Uh, you you've probably seen it on your

0:57:05.239 --> 0:57:08.040
<v Speaker 1>own computer. If you go up into the menu for

0:57:08.080 --> 0:57:11.040
<v Speaker 1>your regular browser and go into like the dropdown menu,

0:57:11.160 --> 0:57:14.960
<v Speaker 1>there's usually an option to choose incognito mode or like

0:57:15.080 --> 0:57:18.400
<v Speaker 1>secret mode or something like private browsing or whatever. Yeah,

0:57:18.400 --> 0:57:21.720
<v Speaker 1>private browsing, Yeah, that's another one. Uh. So if you

0:57:21.720 --> 0:57:24.480
<v Speaker 1>click that, it opens up a completely different window on

0:57:24.520 --> 0:57:27.040
<v Speaker 1>your computer or on your phone as well. You can

0:57:27.120 --> 0:57:30.360
<v Speaker 1>do it on your phone. Uh, and you start to browse.

0:57:30.440 --> 0:57:33.880
<v Speaker 1>But basically the only thing that incognito mode is really

0:57:33.920 --> 0:57:39.120
<v Speaker 1>doing is uh not putting anything into your local history

0:57:39.240 --> 0:57:42.520
<v Speaker 1>or your your web browsing history, So if somebody else

0:57:42.560 --> 0:57:44.600
<v Speaker 1>got it on your computer, they would not know what

0:57:44.680 --> 0:57:47.960
<v Speaker 1>you were doing in incognito mode. Uh. And it also

0:57:48.120 --> 0:57:52.800
<v Speaker 1>doesn't store the cookies on your computer, so any information

0:57:52.840 --> 0:57:55.520
<v Speaker 1>that you were sharing with a website during your incognito

0:57:55.560 --> 0:57:59.360
<v Speaker 1>mode would not be stored afterwards, So all those cookies

0:57:59.480 --> 0:58:02.280
<v Speaker 1>that might have happened during a session, they'll just be erased,

0:58:02.400 --> 0:58:06.640
<v Speaker 1>like you never existed that that can actually be very useful.

0:58:07.680 --> 0:58:10.439
<v Speaker 1>For example, if you're looking for a fun hack, if

0:58:10.520 --> 0:58:13.520
<v Speaker 1>you want to save some money on airplane flights, you

0:58:13.600 --> 0:58:17.320
<v Speaker 1>can track them. You can look up airplane flight prices

0:58:17.760 --> 0:58:20.720
<v Speaker 1>in incognito mode and compare them to your regular browser.

0:58:21.320 --> 0:58:25.000
<v Speaker 1>And sometimes on occasion you can find cheaper prices in

0:58:25.160 --> 0:58:29.080
<v Speaker 1>incognito mode because it doesn't see how much you are searching,

0:58:29.080 --> 0:58:31.440
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't see how how many websites you've gone to.

0:58:31.800 --> 0:58:35.200
<v Speaker 1>Those cookies just aren't it there, So the website is

0:58:35.200 --> 0:58:37.480
<v Speaker 1>going to give you the best price through that that

0:58:37.640 --> 0:58:41.520
<v Speaker 1>private browsing mode. Uh, that's pretty much like the most

0:58:41.560 --> 0:58:45.640
<v Speaker 1>interesting thing that I use for incognito mode for But

0:58:45.720 --> 0:58:50.160
<v Speaker 1>it can be used to secretly access websites without anybody

0:58:50.200 --> 0:58:53.400
<v Speaker 1>else knowing that you're accessing those websites at the time.

0:58:53.760 --> 0:58:57.080
<v Speaker 1>For example, if you are a Brownie. Yeah, so this

0:58:57.160 --> 0:58:59.919
<v Speaker 1>works on the device level, but not the network level.

0:59:00.240 --> 0:59:02.960
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, so if my friend gets hold of my

0:59:03.440 --> 0:59:06.240
<v Speaker 1>phone or my computer, there would be no record of

0:59:06.280 --> 0:59:09.840
<v Speaker 1>me having gone on the Browny fan fiction community site,

0:59:10.560 --> 0:59:15.840
<v Speaker 1>uh where I post by q d mark. They would

0:59:15.880 --> 0:59:17.240
<v Speaker 1>not be able to see that. But if they were

0:59:17.280 --> 0:59:20.880
<v Speaker 1>to look at the network traffic. They'd say, huh, this

0:59:21.080 --> 0:59:24.080
<v Speaker 1>I P address is going to this brownie site a lot,

0:59:24.400 --> 0:59:28.640
<v Speaker 1>and it's not my computer, so it's obviously your device

0:59:29.160 --> 0:59:31.400
<v Speaker 1>and so and so this is why, Like, if you

0:59:31.400 --> 0:59:33.439
<v Speaker 1>were to use let's say that you're at work. Let's

0:59:33.440 --> 0:59:35.520
<v Speaker 1>say you're what the example I like to give is

0:59:35.560 --> 0:59:38.200
<v Speaker 1>your Let's say you are stuck in a crappy job.

0:59:38.880 --> 0:59:41.960
<v Speaker 1>You're doing your job, but you're miserable and you would

0:59:42.040 --> 0:59:44.560
<v Speaker 1>really love to be able to get something else, but

0:59:44.640 --> 0:59:47.240
<v Speaker 1>you don't have any time outside of your job where

0:59:47.240 --> 0:59:51.320
<v Speaker 1>you can really dedicate towards things like searching for job openings.

0:59:51.480 --> 0:59:54.400
<v Speaker 1>So on your lunch break, you slip into incognito mode

0:59:54.440 --> 0:59:57.880
<v Speaker 1>and you go on a job search website. Well, just

0:59:57.920 --> 1:00:00.760
<v Speaker 1>because you're an incognito mode doesn't me that at the

1:00:00.800 --> 1:00:03.800
<v Speaker 1>network level, they can't see exactly what's going on, So

1:00:03.880 --> 1:00:06.400
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't actually protect what you're doing or how you're

1:00:06.440 --> 1:00:10.000
<v Speaker 1>doing it. So one thing you might want to use

1:00:10.040 --> 1:00:13.040
<v Speaker 1>incognito mode for if you're someone like me who does

1:00:13.080 --> 1:00:15.960
<v Speaker 1>a lot of research. Let's say I'm researching into something

1:00:16.240 --> 1:00:18.960
<v Speaker 1>that you know, it's it's just not my bag, you know,

1:00:19.000 --> 1:00:20.800
<v Speaker 1>it's I need to do an episode about it, but

1:00:20.840 --> 1:00:24.080
<v Speaker 1>it's not something I'm particularly interested in on a personal level,

1:00:24.600 --> 1:00:29.080
<v Speaker 1>or might even be something that I would find very awkward.

1:00:29.160 --> 1:00:32.680
<v Speaker 1>Let's say that I was doing an episode about uh,

1:00:32.920 --> 1:00:35.440
<v Speaker 1>dating websites, and so I have to do a whole

1:00:35.480 --> 1:00:37.680
<v Speaker 1>bunch of research on dating websites. Well, then I might

1:00:37.720 --> 1:00:40.400
<v Speaker 1>want to use incognito mode so it doesn't build up

1:00:40.480 --> 1:00:44.120
<v Speaker 1>this cookie history that relates back to me personally, so

1:00:44.160 --> 1:00:46.760
<v Speaker 1>that maybe I log onto something like Facebook and then

1:00:46.800 --> 1:00:49.000
<v Speaker 1>suddenly all the ads are for dating sites. That would

1:00:49.000 --> 1:00:52.480
<v Speaker 1>be awkward, right, That would be super awkward, especially if

1:00:52.480 --> 1:00:55.040
<v Speaker 1>you were married. Yes, I'm not a good thing. Yeah.

1:00:55.080 --> 1:00:57.360
<v Speaker 1>I had a similar occasion with I was looking up

1:00:57.480 --> 1:01:02.400
<v Speaker 1>pregnancy and birth information for somebody in my family. I'm

1:01:02.400 --> 1:01:05.760
<v Speaker 1>nowhere near any time soon giving you know, birth to

1:01:05.880 --> 1:01:08.640
<v Speaker 1>any children in my life except for my beautiful for

1:01:08.800 --> 1:01:11.320
<v Speaker 1>babies that I have in my house with me. So

1:01:11.440 --> 1:01:13.480
<v Speaker 1>I was looking up this information and I was just like,

1:01:14.160 --> 1:01:18.120
<v Speaker 1>do I want Twitter on Instagram to start promoting like

1:01:18.480 --> 1:01:21.080
<v Speaker 1>baby items to me or do I want them to

1:01:21.160 --> 1:01:24.160
<v Speaker 1>keep on promoting like makeup in sailor moon items, which

1:01:24.160 --> 1:01:28.080
<v Speaker 1>I'm actually into. So I looked up the information about

1:01:28.120 --> 1:01:32.200
<v Speaker 1>pregnancy and birth for the other person through incognito mode,

1:01:32.720 --> 1:01:36.120
<v Speaker 1>so that that information wouldn't actually be tracked and identified

1:01:36.160 --> 1:01:41.040
<v Speaker 1>as a part of my online personality. So that way,

1:01:41.040 --> 1:01:44.040
<v Speaker 1>I was able to keep the same ads that I actually,

1:01:44.360 --> 1:01:48.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, sometimes kind of enjoy looking at because they

1:01:48.280 --> 1:01:51.800
<v Speaker 1>do pertain to my lifestyle, but nothing that had to

1:01:51.800 --> 1:01:54.840
<v Speaker 1>do with pregnancy, right. And and that's a great example too,

1:01:54.840 --> 1:01:57.320
<v Speaker 1>because there was that famous example a few years ago

1:01:58.240 --> 1:02:01.240
<v Speaker 1>of a retailer. Want to say it was Target, but

1:02:01.320 --> 1:02:04.200
<v Speaker 1>I could be wrong, but it was a retailer Target. Yeah,

1:02:04.240 --> 1:02:07.920
<v Speaker 1>and they had identified through the browsing history of a

1:02:08.720 --> 1:02:11.720
<v Speaker 1>user that she was pregnant because of the things she

1:02:11.800 --> 1:02:14.720
<v Speaker 1>was searching for, so they proactively sent her through the

1:02:15.000 --> 1:02:19.880
<v Speaker 1>snail mail a package of coupons for pregnancy related items.

1:02:20.160 --> 1:02:24.360
<v Speaker 1>And her father was the one who intercepted the letter

1:02:24.440 --> 1:02:28.440
<v Speaker 1>the coupons, and she had not told him that she

1:02:28.680 --> 1:02:32.200
<v Speaker 1>was pregnant, and he had assumed that Target had made

1:02:32.240 --> 1:02:36.160
<v Speaker 1>this assumption and got super mad, and then turned out

1:02:36.200 --> 1:02:39.160
<v Speaker 1>that he was mad about something that actually had happened.

1:02:39.200 --> 1:02:41.800
<v Speaker 1>She just had not she had not had the occasion,

1:02:41.880 --> 1:02:44.680
<v Speaker 1>she had not found the way to tell him. And

1:02:45.000 --> 1:02:49.400
<v Speaker 1>that's awful. Uh, yeah, it's such a breach of privacy,

1:02:49.480 --> 1:02:52.000
<v Speaker 1>to be honest, is when they start tracking you like

1:02:52.040 --> 1:02:57.000
<v Speaker 1>that and sending you information. It's like unsolicited advertising. I

1:02:58.280 --> 1:03:00.600
<v Speaker 1>hate it. We deal with it every single day. Line. Yeah,

1:03:00.680 --> 1:03:05.240
<v Speaker 1>it's it's it's even worse than unsolicited advice, Like that's bad,

1:03:05.680 --> 1:03:09.520
<v Speaker 1>but unsolicited advertising is even worse because they're like, yeah,

1:03:09.720 --> 1:03:12.880
<v Speaker 1>they're so eager to make that sale that they can

1:03:12.920 --> 1:03:17.439
<v Speaker 1>overstep very easily. Well, let's wrap up by talking about

1:03:17.480 --> 1:03:19.640
<v Speaker 1>some of the more secure ways you can browse if

1:03:19.680 --> 1:03:21.520
<v Speaker 1>you have to connect, and we mentioned this at the

1:03:21.600 --> 1:03:25.280
<v Speaker 1>very top of the show, where VPNs are virtual private networks,

1:03:25.720 --> 1:03:28.480
<v Speaker 1>and we mentioned that sort of man in the middle

1:03:28.480 --> 1:03:32.520
<v Speaker 1>attack where you are logging into a hackers machine thinking

1:03:32.560 --> 1:03:35.600
<v Speaker 1>that that's a legit hotspot, and then the hackers kind

1:03:35.600 --> 1:03:39.040
<v Speaker 1>of relaying information and sniffing the entire time and learning

1:03:39.240 --> 1:03:41.800
<v Speaker 1>all about you. Vp ns are kind of like that,

1:03:41.800 --> 1:03:44.280
<v Speaker 1>but on the legit side, where you are logging into

1:03:44.320 --> 1:03:50.360
<v Speaker 1>a remote server somewhere far away, probably through an encrypted connection,

1:03:50.840 --> 1:03:53.720
<v Speaker 1>and then when you browse, it's as if you're browsing

1:03:53.880 --> 1:03:59.000
<v Speaker 1>from the servers location, not your personal device. So if

1:03:59.000 --> 1:04:02.040
<v Speaker 1>I were to blog into a VPN and then log

1:04:02.120 --> 1:04:04.680
<v Speaker 1>into a web service. The web service would see my

1:04:04.760 --> 1:04:08.600
<v Speaker 1>location as the location of the VPN server, not my

1:04:09.120 --> 1:04:13.160
<v Speaker 1>gadget that's actually in front of me, right and not

1:04:13.320 --> 1:04:16.120
<v Speaker 1>necessarily just for if you want to look at your

1:04:16.280 --> 1:04:19.880
<v Speaker 1>my little pony browny fan fix. But VPNs can be

1:04:19.960 --> 1:04:22.800
<v Speaker 1>extremely useful if you're trying to access a website that's

1:04:22.840 --> 1:04:26.720
<v Speaker 1>only available in select countries. So if you choose to

1:04:26.760 --> 1:04:30.840
<v Speaker 1>purchase like a consumer facing VPN product, and there's many

1:04:30.880 --> 1:04:34.640
<v Speaker 1>out there, I could make recommendations, but they're constantly changing

1:04:34.680 --> 1:04:38.760
<v Speaker 1>as far as their privacy and security terms and policies go,

1:04:38.960 --> 1:04:43.680
<v Speaker 1>so I won't make any major recommendations here. But if

1:04:43.720 --> 1:04:48.080
<v Speaker 1>you choose a VPN that has a a uh, for example,

1:04:48.160 --> 1:04:51.680
<v Speaker 1>a country facing server that's in Japan, that means that

1:04:51.720 --> 1:04:55.280
<v Speaker 1>I could download this VPN, log into it, connect through Japan,

1:04:55.480 --> 1:04:58.960
<v Speaker 1>and be able to access a website that's only available

1:04:58.960 --> 1:05:02.720
<v Speaker 1>to Japanese residences. UH. So I I had to do

1:05:02.760 --> 1:05:04.920
<v Speaker 1>that a few years ago when I wanted to purchase

1:05:04.960 --> 1:05:09.720
<v Speaker 1>tickets for the Studio Ghibli Museum through the Japanese website.

1:05:09.800 --> 1:05:13.080
<v Speaker 1>It wouldn't let you access it through an American server

1:05:13.360 --> 1:05:16.480
<v Speaker 1>or an American connection, so I logged in through my

1:05:16.600 --> 1:05:20.479
<v Speaker 1>VPN through the Japanese server UH and I was able

1:05:20.520 --> 1:05:24.040
<v Speaker 1>to purchase those tickets through the Japanese website. It thought

1:05:24.040 --> 1:05:25.760
<v Speaker 1>that I was in Japan, so it let me do it,

1:05:25.800 --> 1:05:27.920
<v Speaker 1>and that way I was able to save myself so

1:05:28.040 --> 1:05:31.000
<v Speaker 1>much money. It was wonderful. So you can do it

1:05:31.000 --> 1:05:35.000
<v Speaker 1>for you know, buying goods, buying tickets for you know,

1:05:35.240 --> 1:05:37.560
<v Speaker 1>going to a concert in a different country, or a

1:05:37.640 --> 1:05:40.440
<v Speaker 1>museum or something like that in a different country. You

1:05:40.480 --> 1:05:44.680
<v Speaker 1>can use it to access online streaming portals that are

1:05:44.720 --> 1:05:49.200
<v Speaker 1>only available in specific countries. You can use it to

1:05:49.280 --> 1:05:52.520
<v Speaker 1>download specific things that are only available in specific countries.

1:05:52.600 --> 1:05:54.960
<v Speaker 1>Like the list goes on and on, as far as

1:05:55.200 --> 1:05:58.200
<v Speaker 1>different ways that you can use VPNs that aren't necessarily

1:05:58.280 --> 1:06:01.480
<v Speaker 1>just directed for security and privacy, but are also directed

1:06:01.520 --> 1:06:06.520
<v Speaker 1>at manipulating where the website thinks that you are coming from. Yeah,

1:06:06.640 --> 1:06:09.240
<v Speaker 1>and this can be a matter of life and death

1:06:09.320 --> 1:06:11.360
<v Speaker 1>for some people. Like here in the United States, we

1:06:11.520 --> 1:06:14.480
<v Speaker 1>largely use it for the purposes of things like privacy, security,

1:06:14.480 --> 1:06:17.800
<v Speaker 1>and convenience. But in other places where you might be

1:06:18.480 --> 1:06:23.200
<v Speaker 1>UH in a country with a more authoritarian government, one

1:06:23.280 --> 1:06:28.640
<v Speaker 1>that is far more restrictive in access to certain services.

1:06:28.720 --> 1:06:32.080
<v Speaker 1>If you're able to connect through a VPN, which you know, granted,

1:06:32.120 --> 1:06:34.400
<v Speaker 1>that means that that government agency hasn't been paying very

1:06:34.440 --> 1:06:36.560
<v Speaker 1>close attention. But if we're able to do that, then

1:06:36.640 --> 1:06:39.120
<v Speaker 1>you can log in two different things as if you

1:06:39.160 --> 1:06:41.479
<v Speaker 1>were from some other part of the world and maybe

1:06:41.520 --> 1:06:44.560
<v Speaker 1>get access to vital information or services that otherwise you

1:06:44.600 --> 1:06:47.360
<v Speaker 1>would not have at your disposal. So they play a

1:06:47.480 --> 1:06:51.280
<v Speaker 1>very important role. In fact, I gave an example today

1:06:51.320 --> 1:06:53.560
<v Speaker 1>with a friend of mine about how I would see

1:06:53.640 --> 1:06:59.240
<v Speaker 1>VPNs and incognito mode together being incredibly important. So imagine

1:06:59.680 --> 1:07:02.200
<v Speaker 1>that this is a terrible scenario and I put that

1:07:02.280 --> 1:07:05.280
<v Speaker 1>out there first, but imagine that you are in some

1:07:05.400 --> 1:07:09.840
<v Speaker 1>form of abusive situation at home, and whether it's a

1:07:10.160 --> 1:07:13.560
<v Speaker 1>spouse of a parent, a parent, some sort of authority figure,

1:07:13.600 --> 1:07:16.320
<v Speaker 1>whatever it may be. But you're in that abusive experience,

1:07:16.600 --> 1:07:19.120
<v Speaker 1>You're going to feel like you are helpless and you

1:07:19.160 --> 1:07:22.360
<v Speaker 1>want to look for resources that can help you get

1:07:22.400 --> 1:07:24.560
<v Speaker 1>out of that situation. But at the same time, you

1:07:24.600 --> 1:07:28.400
<v Speaker 1>have a very legitimate fear of being found out for

1:07:28.440 --> 1:07:31.560
<v Speaker 1>seeking out those resources and the fear of reprisal that

1:07:31.680 --> 1:07:34.360
<v Speaker 1>you might face as a result of that. Well, using

1:07:34.400 --> 1:07:37.680
<v Speaker 1>something like a VPN and incognito mode would mean that

1:07:37.960 --> 1:07:40.840
<v Speaker 1>you're not leaving a trace on the network of what

1:07:40.880 --> 1:07:42.800
<v Speaker 1>you're doing, because as far as the network is concerned,

1:07:42.880 --> 1:07:45.960
<v Speaker 1>all you're doing is visiting this VPN server. It's not

1:07:46.040 --> 1:07:48.520
<v Speaker 1>seeing what else you're doing. All he knows you went

1:07:48.520 --> 1:07:51.439
<v Speaker 1>to that VPN server. Incognito mode means you're not leaving

1:07:51.480 --> 1:07:54.160
<v Speaker 1>the trace on whatever device you're actually using to do

1:07:54.240 --> 1:07:56.760
<v Speaker 1>that sort of search. So these are the sort of

1:07:56.760 --> 1:08:00.280
<v Speaker 1>tools that can literally mean life or death scenario eos

1:08:00.360 --> 1:08:05.439
<v Speaker 1>for people. And you know, thatsraically together and it yeah,

1:08:05.640 --> 1:08:08.920
<v Speaker 1>and once you start combining those different security and privacy

1:08:08.920 --> 1:08:13.040
<v Speaker 1>products together that are very consumer friendly, then you can

1:08:13.120 --> 1:08:17.080
<v Speaker 1>end up having a much more secure experience online, especially

1:08:17.120 --> 1:08:19.320
<v Speaker 1>if you're dealing with some kind of like like an

1:08:19.360 --> 1:08:23.040
<v Speaker 1>abusive relationship or something like that that can be uh

1:08:23.640 --> 1:08:27.440
<v Speaker 1>something that you seriously have to worry about, So definitely

1:08:27.520 --> 1:08:31.680
<v Speaker 1>take those into consideration. Using an incognito mode and VPNs

1:08:31.720 --> 1:08:34.880
<v Speaker 1>together is so easy too. It's just as simple as

1:08:34.920 --> 1:08:39.439
<v Speaker 1>opening up that browser window in private browsing mode and

1:08:39.560 --> 1:08:42.280
<v Speaker 1>turning on your VPN, which is usually with a lot

1:08:42.320 --> 1:08:44.920
<v Speaker 1>of software nowadays, is the click of a switch in

1:08:45.040 --> 1:08:47.880
<v Speaker 1>your computer and there are a lot of VPN apps

1:08:47.920 --> 1:08:49.439
<v Speaker 1>out there, like there are a lot of the services

1:08:49.479 --> 1:08:52.080
<v Speaker 1>where if you subscribe to the service, you can use

1:08:52.720 --> 1:08:55.320
<v Speaker 1>uh your computer, or you can use a mobile device,

1:08:55.400 --> 1:08:57.640
<v Speaker 1>or you can use some combination of multiples. And there

1:08:57.640 --> 1:08:59.639
<v Speaker 1>are even ones where you can have it set as

1:08:59.760 --> 1:09:02.240
<v Speaker 1>a fault that as soon as you connect to Wi

1:09:02.320 --> 1:09:04.800
<v Speaker 1>Fi networks, you connect through the VPN, so you don't

1:09:04.840 --> 1:09:07.720
<v Speaker 1>even have to think about it in that case, which

1:09:07.760 --> 1:09:10.599
<v Speaker 1>is definitely good. If you're using like a mobile device

1:09:10.600 --> 1:09:13.040
<v Speaker 1>and you're connecting to public WiFi frequently, you definitely want

1:09:13.040 --> 1:09:15.519
<v Speaker 1>to have that that that turned on, because if you

1:09:15.560 --> 1:09:17.880
<v Speaker 1>ever forget about it, that's when you're going to have

1:09:17.960 --> 1:09:21.880
<v Speaker 1>the opportunities for people to take advantage of you. The

1:09:22.000 --> 1:09:26.080
<v Speaker 1>last examples go ahead, I'm sorry. There's also the option

1:09:26.120 --> 1:09:29.519
<v Speaker 1>to build your own VPN, but that gets very much

1:09:29.520 --> 1:09:32.559
<v Speaker 1>into the nitty gritty UH since there are a lot

1:09:32.560 --> 1:09:36.160
<v Speaker 1>of consumer facing ones that are generally fine for the

1:09:36.200 --> 1:09:40.200
<v Speaker 1>average consumer. That's what I wouldn't normally recommend. But when

1:09:40.240 --> 1:09:43.559
<v Speaker 1>I go to Defcon, for example, I bring like my

1:09:43.600 --> 1:09:46.560
<v Speaker 1>own certificate, my own VPN, and my own little o

1:09:47.160 --> 1:09:50.639
<v Speaker 1>VPN basically file, and I stick that on my phone

1:09:50.720 --> 1:09:54.439
<v Speaker 1>to actually run my own VPN. When you do that,

1:09:54.640 --> 1:09:58.439
<v Speaker 1>you're basically creating your own secure profile as opposed to

1:09:58.479 --> 1:10:02.160
<v Speaker 1>trusting a VPN company with your information and hoping that

1:10:02.200 --> 1:10:04.840
<v Speaker 1>they are doing it for you. Yeah. Then that's a

1:10:04.920 --> 1:10:07.679
<v Speaker 1>great point, Shannon, because a lot of these solutions actually

1:10:07.720 --> 1:10:11.800
<v Speaker 1>ultimately require you to put trust in another entity. And

1:10:12.400 --> 1:10:15.280
<v Speaker 1>you know, there have been cases where even VPNs have

1:10:15.439 --> 1:10:19.880
<v Speaker 1>suffered data breaches in recent past, where you know, you

1:10:19.920 --> 1:10:22.800
<v Speaker 1>have to worry about that kind of stuff too. There

1:10:22.840 --> 1:10:25.439
<v Speaker 1>does come a point where you have, ultimately you have

1:10:25.520 --> 1:10:27.679
<v Speaker 1>to say to yourself, at what point am I comfortable

1:10:27.720 --> 1:10:31.200
<v Speaker 1>handing over control or handing over you know, some of

1:10:31.200 --> 1:10:35.559
<v Speaker 1>my data, because either you're doing that or you're doing nothing.

1:10:36.080 --> 1:10:39.479
<v Speaker 1>But you know, deciding where that point is is a

1:10:39.600 --> 1:10:42.439
<v Speaker 1>very personal choice. Uh. The very last one I want

1:10:42.479 --> 1:10:44.320
<v Speaker 1>to talk about, and we can do this very briefly,

1:10:44.880 --> 1:10:48.960
<v Speaker 1>is Tour, the Tour browser. Tour initially was an acronym

1:10:49.000 --> 1:10:51.719
<v Speaker 1>instead for the Onion router. And the reason it's called

1:10:51.760 --> 1:10:56.360
<v Speaker 1>Onion is because it does encryption in layers, each outer

1:10:56.520 --> 1:10:59.840
<v Speaker 1>layer being another layer of encryption. And I gave a

1:11:00.040 --> 1:11:03.479
<v Speaker 1>very simple analogy. Imagine that you are trying to ship

1:11:03.520 --> 1:11:05.599
<v Speaker 1>a present. Let's say I'm shipping a present to Shannon,

1:11:06.280 --> 1:11:09.040
<v Speaker 1>but you're welcome, But I don't want you to know

1:11:09.080 --> 1:11:12.240
<v Speaker 1>where I live um for some reason, and I don't

1:11:12.240 --> 1:11:15.320
<v Speaker 1>want anyone to know that I'm sending a present specifically

1:11:15.320 --> 1:11:18.080
<v Speaker 1>to you for some reason. So what I've done is

1:11:18.160 --> 1:11:21.960
<v Speaker 1>I've nested your package that has your present in it

1:11:22.080 --> 1:11:25.240
<v Speaker 1>inside another package that's gonna go to a totally different address.

1:11:25.439 --> 1:11:29.839
<v Speaker 1>And I've nested that. What's that Is it a brown package?

1:11:30.439 --> 1:11:34.320
<v Speaker 1>There's probably some you know, my little Pony temporary tattoo

1:11:34.720 --> 1:11:38.360
<v Speaker 1>sheets there, So that's in there, and then that's in

1:11:38.360 --> 1:11:40.880
<v Speaker 1>a second package. The second package is in a third,

1:11:40.880 --> 1:11:43.160
<v Speaker 1>the third packages in the fourth. Each package has a

1:11:43.160 --> 1:11:46.320
<v Speaker 1>different address on it. So I've got a really big

1:11:46.360 --> 1:11:49.000
<v Speaker 1>package that ultimately is just holding a bunch of boxes

1:11:49.040 --> 1:11:52.080
<v Speaker 1>and a couple of sheets of temporary tattoos and the

1:11:52.160 --> 1:11:56.120
<v Speaker 1>innermost box. I ship that to the first address. The

1:11:56.400 --> 1:11:58.840
<v Speaker 1>person at the first address opens up this big box

1:11:58.880 --> 1:12:01.240
<v Speaker 1>and they see that there's a lightly smaller box inside

1:12:01.280 --> 1:12:04.040
<v Speaker 1>with a different address on it. So they plopped that

1:12:04.080 --> 1:12:06.240
<v Speaker 1>back into the post office. Post office takes that to

1:12:06.280 --> 1:12:10.000
<v Speaker 1>the second destination. They opened up the package. Well, Destination

1:12:10.040 --> 1:12:12.639
<v Speaker 1>number two. They know that the package came from destination

1:12:12.760 --> 1:12:15.400
<v Speaker 1>number one, but they don't know anything further back from that.

1:12:15.520 --> 1:12:18.000
<v Speaker 1>They don't know that I was the person who originally

1:12:18.040 --> 1:12:20.439
<v Speaker 1>put the package in the mail, and they don't know

1:12:20.479 --> 1:12:22.920
<v Speaker 1>where the package is ultimately going to. They just see

1:12:22.960 --> 1:12:27.759
<v Speaker 1>Destination three on the shipping label of that inner package,

1:12:28.120 --> 1:12:30.559
<v Speaker 1>so they send it to Destination three. Destination three gets it.

1:12:30.600 --> 1:12:32.960
<v Speaker 1>They opened it up. They know it came from destination too.

1:12:33.240 --> 1:12:35.760
<v Speaker 1>They don't know about Destination one. They definitely don't know

1:12:35.800 --> 1:12:38.120
<v Speaker 1>about me, and they see that they need to send

1:12:38.120 --> 1:12:40.200
<v Speaker 1>on the next package to Destination four, and so on

1:12:40.200 --> 1:12:42.919
<v Speaker 1>and so forth, until finally you get to the innermost package,

1:12:43.000 --> 1:12:45.800
<v Speaker 1>which has Shannon's address on it. She gets it. She

1:12:45.840 --> 1:12:48.720
<v Speaker 1>knows it came from the previous site, but doesn't know

1:12:48.880 --> 1:12:51.360
<v Speaker 1>any of the rest of the history, including where it

1:12:51.400 --> 1:12:53.200
<v Speaker 1>came from, except I probably put a note in the

1:12:53.240 --> 1:12:56.880
<v Speaker 1>inside of the package saying, hey, it's from me, Brownie Joe,

1:12:57.200 --> 1:13:00.439
<v Speaker 1>and then then she gets the package. You would probably

1:13:00.439 --> 1:13:02.360
<v Speaker 1>want to make sure that your message is encrypted. Yes,

1:13:03.640 --> 1:13:06.080
<v Speaker 1>there's like a you know, I tell you that you

1:13:06.080 --> 1:13:09.120
<v Speaker 1>need to use your super secret Captain Crusader decoder ring

1:13:09.400 --> 1:13:12.720
<v Speaker 1>or whatever to decrypt the message and then and then

1:13:12.760 --> 1:13:15.320
<v Speaker 1>she would be able to to use a similar process

1:13:15.360 --> 1:13:18.320
<v Speaker 1>to send information to me. Uh. Now, this is a

1:13:18.439 --> 1:13:21.639
<v Speaker 1>very secure way typically of sending information. There are ways

1:13:21.640 --> 1:13:23.960
<v Speaker 1>to try and sniff out things, just as there are

1:13:24.040 --> 1:13:28.360
<v Speaker 1>with any network communication, but it's hard. It's very hard

1:13:28.439 --> 1:13:32.360
<v Speaker 1>to get anything meaningful through this process. It is possible,

1:13:32.479 --> 1:13:35.800
<v Speaker 1>it's not fool proof, but it's real hard and uh.

1:13:35.920 --> 1:13:39.479
<v Speaker 1>And so this is generally considered the most secure way

1:13:39.520 --> 1:13:43.800
<v Speaker 1>to browse the Internet. However, with that security there comes

1:13:43.800 --> 1:13:46.160
<v Speaker 1>a tradeoff, and that tradeoff is mainly felt in the

1:13:46.200 --> 1:13:50.080
<v Speaker 1>form of speed. Yes, because it's having to go through

1:13:51.760 --> 1:13:56.720
<v Speaker 1>it's definitely slower. Uh. And there has been talk on

1:13:56.720 --> 1:14:01.040
<v Speaker 1>on the Internet many years ago that govern ment agencies

1:14:01.080 --> 1:14:04.760
<v Speaker 1>had access to some of the UM end notes, the

1:14:05.439 --> 1:14:09.120
<v Speaker 1>very last place that your package would hit before it

1:14:09.200 --> 1:14:12.360
<v Speaker 1>went on to whoever it was supposed to go to. UM.

1:14:12.479 --> 1:14:14.880
<v Speaker 1>So you do have to consider where where is this

1:14:14.960 --> 1:14:18.519
<v Speaker 1>information being sent and who has access to the very

1:14:18.760 --> 1:14:21.960
<v Speaker 1>end of that tunnel that you're sending that information through

1:14:22.560 --> 1:14:27.360
<v Speaker 1>UM And if that's protected, then yeah, it's great option. UM.

1:14:27.400 --> 1:14:30.799
<v Speaker 1>But of course with tour as well as with VPNs

1:14:30.840 --> 1:14:34.680
<v Speaker 1>and incognito mode. You shouldn't use just one of these options,

1:14:34.720 --> 1:14:36.680
<v Speaker 1>you should use all of them if they are at

1:14:36.760 --> 1:14:40.320
<v Speaker 1>your disposal. But again, do you want to deal with

1:14:40.360 --> 1:14:43.599
<v Speaker 1>the slowness that you're going to experience when you add

1:14:43.600 --> 1:14:47.479
<v Speaker 1>these additional tunnels and additional nodes onto whatever you're trying

1:14:47.520 --> 1:14:50.360
<v Speaker 1>to gain access to, or are you going to deal

1:14:50.400 --> 1:14:57.080
<v Speaker 1>with the security um uh minimal experience and add that

1:14:57.120 --> 1:15:01.240
<v Speaker 1>additional convenience to your experience by just not using it.

1:15:01.600 --> 1:15:04.200
<v Speaker 1>So there are trade offs either way, and you've summarized

1:15:04.240 --> 1:15:06.200
<v Speaker 1>it perfectly, Shannon. I mean, this is like we said

1:15:06.200 --> 1:15:09.479
<v Speaker 1>at the beginning, this is a spectrum, and the important

1:15:09.479 --> 1:15:11.960
<v Speaker 1>thing is to be educated to that spectrum so you

1:15:11.960 --> 1:15:15.879
<v Speaker 1>can make your own educated decisions and not just trust

1:15:16.000 --> 1:15:18.920
<v Speaker 1>to the fates. I have a tattoo on my back

1:15:19.040 --> 1:15:23.479
<v Speaker 1>of the fool tarot card, the eternal Optimist. Don't be

1:15:23.600 --> 1:15:26.840
<v Speaker 1>the fool. You get the tattoo who wants pretty awesome,

1:15:26.840 --> 1:15:29.280
<v Speaker 1>It's dope, But don't don't be the don't be the

1:15:29.320 --> 1:15:32.880
<v Speaker 1>fool in life? Right, Don't just trust that you can

1:15:32.920 --> 1:15:34.880
<v Speaker 1>take a step off a cliff and you're not going

1:15:34.920 --> 1:15:38.200
<v Speaker 1>to fall to your death. The fool is taking a

1:15:38.240 --> 1:15:40.960
<v Speaker 1>step off a cliff in the traditional tarot card. So

1:15:41.280 --> 1:15:43.520
<v Speaker 1>you don't want to be like that. You want to

1:15:43.560 --> 1:15:46.960
<v Speaker 1>be informed and make choices, and you know, there might

1:15:47.000 --> 1:15:50.400
<v Speaker 1>be instances where you think, Okay, I'm in a public spot,

1:15:50.640 --> 1:15:52.599
<v Speaker 1>I am going to use WiFi, but I'm using it

1:15:52.640 --> 1:15:56.160
<v Speaker 1>for something that's not related to my personal information. I'm

1:15:56.200 --> 1:15:58.720
<v Speaker 1>literally maybe I'm looking up a restaurant to find out

1:15:58.720 --> 1:16:01.160
<v Speaker 1>what hours it's open and that it's it. You know,

1:16:01.560 --> 1:16:04.040
<v Speaker 1>they're different levels. But if you're thinking i want to

1:16:04.080 --> 1:16:07.240
<v Speaker 1>do some shopping, or I'm going to check my bank statement,

1:16:07.680 --> 1:16:10.479
<v Speaker 1>or I'm going to log into my email or this

1:16:10.520 --> 1:16:12.800
<v Speaker 1>one's a big one for us here at my heart,

1:16:13.080 --> 1:16:16.759
<v Speaker 1>if I'm going to access any of my my work stuff,

1:16:17.240 --> 1:16:19.320
<v Speaker 1>right like anything that's stored on there, any of the

1:16:19.360 --> 1:16:22.519
<v Speaker 1>services that are on here, definitely use a VPN in

1:16:22.560 --> 1:16:25.320
<v Speaker 1>those cases, because you're talking about things that affect not

1:16:25.439 --> 1:16:27.960
<v Speaker 1>just you but other people. Right, You're talking about the

1:16:28.000 --> 1:16:34.799
<v Speaker 1>potential of affecting uh, essentially an entire company if if

1:16:34.840 --> 1:16:37.599
<v Speaker 1>the wrong information were to get out. You know, especially

1:16:37.600 --> 1:16:39.559
<v Speaker 1>if you're talking about things like publicly traded companies, you

1:16:39.560 --> 1:16:42.400
<v Speaker 1>want to make sure that you're being a good steward

1:16:43.080 --> 1:16:46.040
<v Speaker 1>of the information that's been entrusted to you, not just

1:16:46.160 --> 1:16:51.120
<v Speaker 1>your own but others. So uh, Shannon, this has been

1:16:51.120 --> 1:16:54.240
<v Speaker 1>a joy. You have given generously of your time and

1:16:54.280 --> 1:16:57.679
<v Speaker 1>your expertise, and I greatly appreciate it. Please let people

1:16:57.720 --> 1:17:01.720
<v Speaker 1>know where they can find your work well. Thank you

1:17:01.840 --> 1:17:05.559
<v Speaker 1>so much, Jonathan. I love security and privacy and I

1:17:05.600 --> 1:17:08.599
<v Speaker 1>think of it as a habit that you build upon

1:17:08.720 --> 1:17:11.280
<v Speaker 1>over time, and the more that you learn about it,

1:17:11.320 --> 1:17:13.360
<v Speaker 1>the better off you can be in the future. So

1:17:14.080 --> 1:17:17.920
<v Speaker 1>build upon your security for your future self and for

1:17:18.000 --> 1:17:21.160
<v Speaker 1>your family too, because the more secure here you are,

1:17:21.640 --> 1:17:24.200
<v Speaker 1>the more secure they will be as well. Uh. And

1:17:24.280 --> 1:17:28.520
<v Speaker 1>if you're interested in learning more about consumer privacy and security,

1:17:28.600 --> 1:17:30.920
<v Speaker 1>you can check out my YouTube channel. It's YouTube dot

1:17:30.920 --> 1:17:34.320
<v Speaker 1>com slash Shannon Morse uh and that's m O R

1:17:34.560 --> 1:17:36.680
<v Speaker 1>s E just like Morse Code. And I will be

1:17:36.720 --> 1:17:39.519
<v Speaker 1>going to c e S just like Jonathan. Jonathan mentioned.

1:17:39.840 --> 1:17:42.719
<v Speaker 1>I'm very excited, so I will be posting a lot

1:17:42.760 --> 1:17:46.880
<v Speaker 1>of content from the Consumer Electronic Show and I will

1:17:46.920 --> 1:17:51.400
<v Speaker 1>have tons in store through the year of awesome. Shannon's

1:17:51.479 --> 1:17:53.679
<v Speaker 1>always a pleasure. I am so sad that I will

1:17:53.680 --> 1:17:55.320
<v Speaker 1>not be seeing you at c E S. Will have

1:17:55.360 --> 1:17:58.599
<v Speaker 1>to make time for some other tech conference. I'm sure,

1:17:58.640 --> 1:18:01.080
<v Speaker 1>or next time I'm out our way, I'll give you

1:18:01.160 --> 1:18:03.559
<v Speaker 1>a shout and maybe we can, like yeah, we can

1:18:03.720 --> 1:18:06.959
<v Speaker 1>can go grab ramin or something and chat about security.

1:18:07.560 --> 1:18:10.120
<v Speaker 1>That would be awesome. Al Right, guys, Well, if you

1:18:10.200 --> 1:18:13.000
<v Speaker 1>want to reach out to me, you can reach out

1:18:13.040 --> 1:18:16.000
<v Speaker 1>over our social media channels. Were on the facebooks and

1:18:16.040 --> 1:18:20.519
<v Speaker 1>the twitters with text stuff hs W And that wraps

1:18:20.560 --> 1:18:22.920
<v Speaker 1>this up. I hope you guys learned something and that

1:18:23.040 --> 1:18:26.000
<v Speaker 1>you put that information to you. Be safe, We love you,

1:18:26.160 --> 1:18:33.920
<v Speaker 1>and I'll talk to you again really soon. Text Stuff

1:18:33.960 --> 1:18:36.280
<v Speaker 1>is a production of I Heart Radio's How Stuff Works.

1:18:36.439 --> 1:18:39.280
<v Speaker 1>For more podcasts from my heart Radio, visit the I

1:18:39.400 --> 1:18:42.600
<v Speaker 1>heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to

1:18:42.640 --> 1:18:43.599
<v Speaker 1>your favorite shows.