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Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production of I Heart Radios

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Speaker 1: How Stuff Works. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff.

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Speaker 1: I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. Forgot my own name for

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Speaker 1: a second. I'm an executive producer at iHeart Radio and

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Speaker 1: I love all things tech. And you know, uh, there's

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Speaker 1: a there's a topic that I really wanted to cover

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Speaker 1: because as I record this, we're in the holiday season.

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Speaker 1: A lot of people are traveling, They're going through airports,

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Speaker 1: maybe you're visiting family, and occasionally you need to find

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Speaker 1: a place to be elsewhere, like maybe a coffee shop

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Speaker 1: or something. That typically means we're carrying our devices with us,

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Speaker 1: and then we want to connect to different networks, but

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Speaker 1: that might not always be a great idea, And so

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Speaker 1: I decided I was going to do an episode all

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Speaker 1: about the best ways to browse the Internet with privacy

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Speaker 1: and safety in mind, going from the least private and

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Speaker 1: the least secure to perhaps the most private and most

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Speaker 1: secure here. And then I thought, hey, you dumb, dumb.

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Speaker 1: You know people who are extremely well versed in this topic,

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Speaker 1: and that's why I invited my good friend, the phenomenal

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Speaker 1: Shannon Morris to join this episode. To come back so

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Speaker 1: welcome back to Tech Stuff, Shannon. Thank you so much. Jonathan.

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Speaker 1: I'm so excited to be back on the show. How

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Speaker 1: are you doing. I'm tired. But it's at the end

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Speaker 1: of the year, so that always happens, right, like, And

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Speaker 1: here's the thing, you know, Shannon can tell you. In fact,

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Speaker 1: we were just talking about it before we went on

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Speaker 1: to the record, that the tech journalists life does not

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Speaker 1: get easier at the end of the year because you

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Speaker 1: immediately turned around and head off to Vegas for c

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Speaker 1: E S. And that's where you're gonna be in early January,

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Speaker 1: as I understand it, right, Shannon, Yes, I will. I'll

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Speaker 1: be there all week covering everything over on my channel,

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Speaker 1: So make sure to link everybody to my channel later, absolutely,

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Speaker 1: because I ain't going folks. So Shannon's your your destination

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Speaker 1: for finding all the really cool stuff. And uh, Shannon,

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Speaker 1: I can say from experience because I've watched her work

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Speaker 1: does amazing work, not just at CES but everywhere, but

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Speaker 1: particularly like under a high stress situation like CES, certain

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Speaker 1: people can light up under the camera. And uh, I'm

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Speaker 1: frankly envious of your ability to do so. So um

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Speaker 1: that's me being nice. Yeah, well, I mean, I could

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Speaker 1: be more caddy about it, but I'm gonna be nice.

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Speaker 1: The caddy would be like, how dare she? How dare

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Speaker 1: she show me up? But no, we're gonna talk about

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Speaker 1: browsing safely. So the first thing I wanted to do

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Speaker 1: before we get into the spectrum of browsing the Internet,

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Speaker 1: because you could argue that there's like the least safe, secure,

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Speaker 1: naive way to do it to what is perhaps the

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Speaker 1: most secure but not perfect. There's no perfect solution spoiler alert.

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Speaker 1: Before we get into any of that, I wanted to

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Speaker 1: talk about some stats, and these come from a few

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Speaker 1: different sources. Uh. One was a survey that was conducted

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Speaker 1: by one World Identity back in eighteen about public WiFi.

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Speaker 1: So this was just asking people about their perception and

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Speaker 1: their use of public WiFi. And Shannon, I kind of

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Speaker 1: wanted to get your reaction to this because being someone

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Speaker 1: who has been so entrenched in data security, in the

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Speaker 1: hacker culture, in you know, everything from how do we

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Speaker 1: make these systems more secure? To the white hat approach

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Speaker 1: of how do we find any vulnerability so that they

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Speaker 1: can be patched, to even the black hat culture where

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Speaker 1: people are exploiting this for their own gain. I wanted

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Speaker 1: to see what you thought about these stats. So the

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Speaker 1: first one was they asked a question to people in

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Speaker 1: the United States, in Germany, and in France, and the

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Speaker 1: question they asked was, do you ever use unsecured public

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Speaker 1: WiFi networks? In the United States? Forty percent, so nearly

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Speaker 1: half said, you know, if there's no other option, sure,

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Speaker 1: I'll do it. Thirty two percent actually said I prefer

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Speaker 1: using public WiFi to using my cellular plan, presumably because

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Speaker 1: they would not be billed for data usage right because

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Speaker 1: they're using WiFi instead of their cell data only said

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Speaker 1: they never did it. One percent said they do it,

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Speaker 1: but only with a VPN. But we'll cover VPNs a

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Speaker 1: little bit later. So, Shannon, you've you've talked with hackers.

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Speaker 1: What do you think their reaction initially would be hearing

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Speaker 1: that nearly fifty of people in the United States said yeah,

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Speaker 1: you know, if there's no other connection, I'll I'll connect

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Speaker 1: to public WiFi, and another thirty two percent and I said, oh, heck, yeah,

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Speaker 1: sign me up. Well, I'm definitely in the one percent

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Speaker 1: of only with a VPN, and and that's assuming that

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Speaker 1: I have absolutely no other option. So I'm kind of

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Speaker 1: a mix of the and the one percent, but only

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Speaker 1: only if I have a VP n UM. I would

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Speaker 1: say from my experience, all of my friends would probably

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Speaker 1: not be surprised by the that prefer public WiFi over

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Speaker 1: their cellular plants, specifically because of what you said. They'll

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Speaker 1: be able to save money, especially if they don't have

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Speaker 1: an unlimited plan through their mobile carrier. So in that way,

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Speaker 1: it makes sense, uh that say yes, if there's no

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Speaker 1: other option, there's always another option. Come on, folks, what

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Speaker 1: are you doing? Where are you at? I mean, we

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Speaker 1: we have such good cellular coverage now there's always another option,

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Speaker 1: even if you just have three G like that's manageable

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Speaker 1: from most tasks. So what what are they doing? I'm

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Speaker 1: just my draw My job kind of dropped a little

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Speaker 1: bit when I heard that number. I just thought it

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Speaker 1: was I thought that I'm doing a much better job

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Speaker 1: of educating people about the importance of not using public WiFi,

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Speaker 1: and apparently I'm not doing my job as well as

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Speaker 1: I should have been, or or the people who are

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Speaker 1: already kind of hip to it are the ones watching you, going, yeah,

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Speaker 1: she gets it, she knows, and the people who need

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Speaker 1: to see it are like, what's on the masked Singer

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Speaker 1: today or whatever, you know, like, so, yeah, I I

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Speaker 1: look at this and I think, man if I were

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Speaker 1: a black hat, I would just be doing the Mr

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Speaker 1: Burns excellent gesture over and over again, just drooling at

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Speaker 1: that opportunity, because you know, public WiFi is definitely the

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Speaker 1: most dangerous option you can pick when you're talking about

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Speaker 1: protecting your own privacy and security, especially if you're not

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Speaker 1: doing something like using a VPN uh spoiler alert will

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Speaker 1: talk more about that in a second. And so knowing

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Speaker 1: that you're your opportunity for targets is so vast has

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Speaker 1: got to be incredibly encouraging to someone who is ready

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Speaker 1: to exploit that. And that's really, you know, that's what

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Speaker 1: we're trying to protect everyone against, is you know, it's

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Speaker 1: the likelihood of you running into these situations is not

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Speaker 1: necessarily hot on a day to day basis, but the

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Speaker 1: opportunity is so huge that you need to take it

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Speaker 1: into account no matter where you happen to be. So

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Speaker 1: you you want to make yourself the hard target. You

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Speaker 1: want to be the person that makes people work really

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Speaker 1: hard to get access to your data. You don't want

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Speaker 1: to be the easy target, because the easier target you are,

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Speaker 1: the more often you're going to be targeted. You don't

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Speaker 1: want that. No, No, And I was actually talking to

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Speaker 1: a co worker today and I said, honestly, when you

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Speaker 1: look at data security, even when you're talking like, you

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Speaker 1: always get naysayers who will say, oh, sure you can

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Speaker 1: use this, but it doesn't protect you against everything. And

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Speaker 1: they may technically be right, but my answer is the

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Speaker 1: harder you make it effectively, what that means is you're

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Speaker 1: making it more expensive for someone to successfully target you.

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Speaker 1: So if you price yourself out where it would cost

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Speaker 1: them more to break your security, then they would get

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Speaker 1: from whatever they took from you. You win, because no

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Speaker 1: one's going to lose money on that. Uh exactly. It's

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Speaker 1: when you've made it so convenient that it's like it's

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Speaker 1: like it's like when someone says about a sale, I

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Speaker 1: would lose money if I didn't buy that. That's when

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Speaker 1: you're in trouble. Yes, exactly. It's they're looking for the

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Speaker 1: bargain deal. And a lot of times when a black

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Speaker 1: hat is looking at public WiFi as a way to

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Speaker 1: access information, they're in tending to profit off of that information,

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Speaker 1: whether by stealing an idea, identity or reselling that data

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Speaker 1: on the black market, like on the dark web. So

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Speaker 1: making yourself the hard target is absolutely crucial to helping

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Speaker 1: to protect you. Yeah, and and just so that you

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Speaker 1: guys out there, no, I mean I mentioned the United

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Speaker 1: States numbers. It's not like Germany and France were shining

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Speaker 1: examples of data privacy and security among the public. In Germany,

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Speaker 1: in fact of respondent said they'd used unsecured, unsecured public

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Speaker 1: WiFi over their cellular data. So it was even a

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Speaker 1: larger centers than the United States and the United United States,

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Speaker 1: it was that thirty two percent it said, oh yeah,

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Speaker 1: if I've got a choice, I'll use public over my

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Speaker 1: cellular data. In Germany it was forty six percent um

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Speaker 1: and percent said they would use it if they could

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Speaker 1: not get a cellular option. And then in France it

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Speaker 1: was closer to what the United States said, said they

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Speaker 1: preferred using public WiFi to using their cellular data and

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Speaker 1: forty percent said they'd used it if they couldn't get

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Speaker 1: any other option. So again that mirrored very closely what

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Speaker 1: the folks in the United States said. So this is

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Speaker 1: a trend that goes beyond the US. I know that

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Speaker 1: because I'm centered in the US. I often get very

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Speaker 1: US centric, and I also tend to harp on how

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Speaker 1: American citizens in particular seemed to come across to me

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Speaker 1: as being security illiterate. For in a in large part,

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Speaker 1: I mean, I just see it all the time, but

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Speaker 1: I don't know if it's not exactly reassuring to see

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Speaker 1: that's that way in other parts of the world. That

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Speaker 1: doesn't film me with confidence. I think a lot of

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Speaker 1: times people either don't know where to look for the information,

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Speaker 1: for accessible information that's that that's explained in a way

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Speaker 1: that isn't scary, or doesn't you know, create create emotions

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Speaker 1: of paranoia, or just close people down so that they

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Speaker 1: just get lose interest insecurity. Uh. And you also have

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Speaker 1: a lot of folks out there that just don't care.

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Speaker 1: But I think a lot of people do care, they

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Speaker 1: just don't know where to look for this kind of information.

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Speaker 1: So I'm glad that you, Jonathan, as well as myself

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Speaker 1: on my channel, we're putting that information out there in

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Speaker 1: a way that's easy to understand, and I'm hoping that

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Speaker 1: even if it just helps one person understand a little

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Speaker 1: bit better security and privacy, hopefully we change that percentage

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Speaker 1: over time. Absolutely, I agree. I think, uh, it can

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Speaker 1: be one of those situations where you get overwhelmed by

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Speaker 1: the scope of something. And when you get overwhelmed, it's

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Speaker 1: almost like there's a defense mechanism them in your brain, right,

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Speaker 1: it's like this is too hard, so I can't worry

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Speaker 1: about it. And I have seen this in action when

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Speaker 1: trying to tell people about like password managers, for example,

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Speaker 1: and they just shut down. They have no interest, They

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Speaker 1: get glassy eyed, and they just say, well, I don't

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Speaker 1: see what the point is. And I try to explain

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Speaker 1: the point, but as after that point, it's just it's

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Speaker 1: just like talking through talking through the air. They just

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Speaker 1: don't want anything to do with it. And and as

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Speaker 1: someone who relies heavily on a password manager like it is,

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Speaker 1: it's it's fundamentally one of the most important tools in

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Speaker 1: my toolbox to make certain that I don't do rookie

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Speaker 1: mistakes like using the same password for multiple accounts. Right.

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Speaker 1: Because as as we'll discuss as we get into this

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Speaker 1: discussion about safely browsing the Internet, one of the big

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Speaker 1: dangers is that if you through accident or or your

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Speaker 1: tricked or whatever, if you somehow share your log in

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Speaker 1: information for one service. Let's say that you have one

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Speaker 1: service that isn't using uh secure encryption for some reason.

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Speaker 1: First of all, don't do that. But if you are,

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Speaker 1: if you're using that same password anywhere else, it's like

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Speaker 1: you just handed a skeleton key to somebody, because now

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Speaker 1: they can access everything you've used that password with. I mean,

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Speaker 1: this is this is blatantly obvious. So that's why it's

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Speaker 1: so important to have unique, strong passwords for all the

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Speaker 1: different services you use. That way, if one, if worst

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Speaker 1: case scenario one gets compromised, it doesn't compromise everything else. Yes, absolutely,

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Speaker 1: I'm glad you mentioned that because the more different things

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Speaker 1: that you use that help your security and privacy, every

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Speaker 1: single step you take absolutely helps. And that's just one

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Speaker 1: of the many steps that you can take. Every single

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Speaker 1: consumer in the world does not have to take all

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Speaker 1: of these steps all at once, because that would be

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Speaker 1: quite mind boggling. But if you do take steps towards

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Speaker 1: these over time, you can increase were privacy and security

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Speaker 1: two fold. Yeah, it's fantastic. Yeah, I mean and and

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Speaker 1: and to be fair, like like I'm gonna be upfront guys,

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Speaker 1: like I used to be the dude who had like

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Speaker 1: three passwords and for everything. Yeah, I was like that

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Speaker 1: for years until until I finally like woke up to

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Speaker 1: how dangerous that was. I was fortunate in that I

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Speaker 1: was never knowingly anyway targeted for a specific like intrusion. Uh,

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Speaker 1: as far as I know, I never None of my

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Speaker 1: stuff ever got compromised because of that. Stuff has been

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Speaker 1: compromised because of data breaches that are beyond our control.

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Speaker 1: But we're really focusing on the stuff that we as

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Speaker 1: end users can do to improve our security as best

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Speaker 1: we can, knowing that we live in a world where

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Speaker 1: that's just one point of vulnerability. That's one point of attack,

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Speaker 1: but it's it's one that we have some control over another.

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Speaker 1: Another scary statistic, or at least I thought it was scary,

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Speaker 1: is that Kaspersky did a UH survey back in seventeen

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Speaker 1: and are They did an analysis of thirty two million

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Speaker 1: hot spots. Hot spots being points of contact where your

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Speaker 1: device connects over to the Internet at large, and a

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Speaker 1: hot spot can be everything from the router in a

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Speaker 1: like a coffee shop to your own cell phone. You

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Speaker 1: might be using that as a portable hot spot. Out

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Speaker 1: of the thirty two million hot spots they examined, twenty

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Speaker 1: one quarter of them had no encryption in use at all,

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Speaker 1: meaning everything is being sent in plain text, which means

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Speaker 1: that if anyone has any method of eavesdropping on those communications,

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Speaker 1: they see it all, which again blows my mind that

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Speaker 1: there would be that many networks that have no encryption

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Speaker 1: in place at all, not even bad encryption. Yeah, that's

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Speaker 1: a very scary number. That's extremely high and is a

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Speaker 1: lot higher than what I thought it would be. Uh.

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Speaker 1: If if they're not using any sort of encryption whatso

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Speaker 1: ever for a hot spot, that means that anybody within

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Speaker 1: that vicinity, within range of that device would be able

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Speaker 1: to see everything you're doing. It's very very mind boggling. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and this is one of the reasons why I wanted

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Speaker 1: to have you on the show, because we say these things, right,

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Speaker 1: We say that when you use public WiFi, you're using it.

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Speaker 1: If you're using an unsecured public WiFi hot spot, especially

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Speaker 1: one that is unencrypted, that you are in danger of

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Speaker 1: this And a lot of people say, all right, but

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Speaker 1: exactly what's going on? Right? How are they doing this?

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Speaker 1: And it's that there are various pieces of software out

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Speaker 1: there that allow people who are who get onto a

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Speaker 1: network to monitor traffic that's going across that network. I

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Speaker 1: mean their entire groups out there that make different software

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Speaker 1: and hardware, uh solutions to do just this, right, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: not gonna lie. Um. I used to solder and sell

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Speaker 1: some of these products at a company that I used

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Speaker 1: to work with called hack five, So I'll definitely share

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Speaker 1: some of that information once we get closer to those

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Speaker 1: those topics with today's discussion. But yeah, those products exist,

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Speaker 1: They're very inexpensive, and some of the software is free,

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Speaker 1: and there's tutorials made by yours truly on YouTube that

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Speaker 1: show you how to use these things. So it's definitely

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Speaker 1: a thing that pretty much anybody can introduce themselves too,

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Speaker 1: and then they will be able to see what's going

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Speaker 1: on on a network. And there are different reasons to

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Speaker 1: even do this. There's obviously there's the nefarious ones that

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Speaker 1: we're concerned about, but there's also like if you're a

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Speaker 1: network administrator being able to do things like monitor network

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Speaker 1: traffic and see points of co education as well. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: there's like there's there are legit reasons to use that

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Speaker 1: sort of technology that don't that don't immediately point you

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Speaker 1: to the to the road of I'm here to steal

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Speaker 1: all your infos. It's like there's stuff that where this

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Speaker 1: is used in quote unquote legitimate purposes. I mean like

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Speaker 1: packet sniffers. That's something that sounds like it's underhanded and shady,

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Speaker 1: but they were invented not to try and sniff out

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Speaker 1: what someone else was doing, but literally to help network

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Speaker 1: administrators see how network how network traffic was moving across,

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Speaker 1: so they could make sure that everything was working properly.

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Speaker 1: So but it doesn't mean that you can't a tool.

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Speaker 1: A tool is either a tool or a weapon, depending

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Speaker 1: upon how you want to use it, And so the

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Speaker 1: same stuff that was used to help networks is also

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Speaker 1: used to exploit them. Um exactly, you could say the

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Speaker 1: same thing about a kitchen knife. I mean kitchen knives

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Speaker 1: to to you know, cut up fruits and veggies. Some

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Speaker 1: nefarious people might use one to murder somebody part of me.

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Speaker 1: But the thing I used the exact same sort of analogy,

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Speaker 1: except when I was talking to someone earlier today, but

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Speaker 1: it was a hammer, But same thing, Like a hammer

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Speaker 1: is either something that you're using to to build stuff

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Speaker 1: with or it could be used to bludgeon somebody, And

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Speaker 1: it all comes down to it's not that the tool

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Speaker 1: itself is bad, it's the intent and use of the

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Speaker 1: person wielding that tool. And the same is true of technology.

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Speaker 1: Uh So, one other stat that I wanted to mention

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Speaker 1: that's pretty alarming. Norton found out this was in so

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Speaker 1: it's a few years ago, but Americans had had their

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Speaker 1: email hacked at some point, and that twelve percent had

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Speaker 1: their financial data stolen while they were shopping online, and

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Speaker 1: that in million people globally had been a victim of

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Speaker 1: some sort of cyber crime. And that kind of shows

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Speaker 1: us the scale of why this is an important topic.

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Speaker 1: It's not just because the opportunity is there. It's because

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Speaker 1: people are actually actively taking advantage of those opportunities, and

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Speaker 1: you could be the victim of one of those actions

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Speaker 1: if you're not careful. And we love you absolutely, we too,

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Speaker 1: love you very much. I'm kind of I'm kind of

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Speaker 1: thinking that all of those numbers have probably increased given

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Speaker 1: that it's been about four years since they were they

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Speaker 1: analyzed the data and had those those statistics available, because

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Speaker 1: in the past couple of years we've seen hacks go

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Speaker 1: from a few hundred million people to almost a billion

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Speaker 1: people get hacked online. So it's entirely possible that those

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Speaker 1: numbers have increased quite a bit since, especially in the

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Speaker 1: realm of the mobile app becoming king right, because there's

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Speaker 1: there's such a proliferation of apps out there that either

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Speaker 1: through a conscious effort, are creating vulnerabilities or because of

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Speaker 1: poor design, create vulnerabilities that can later be exploited. You know,

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Speaker 1: we've seen so many examples of that where an a

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Speaker 1: p I didn't take everything into account and then someone

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Speaker 1: was able to exploit it. Famous one being Facebook and

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Speaker 1: Cambridge Analytica, where where you had an app that if

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Speaker 1: you installed the app like you would voluntarily install it

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Speaker 1: within your Facebook and you're voluntary a lee sharing your

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Speaker 1: own information. All of that is fine, right if you've

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Speaker 1: agreed to do it such a god not a good idea,

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Speaker 1: such a good example. Good example. Yeah, good example, not

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Speaker 1: a good idea to do. But it's fine if you

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Speaker 1: if you are knowingly doing that, that's fine. But the

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Speaker 1: problem that the Cambrage Analytica story brought to bears that

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Speaker 1: they took advantage of a loophole in Facebook's API and

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Speaker 1: they were able to to phish out a ton of

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Speaker 1: information about all the contacts of the people who had

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Speaker 1: installed the app. These are people who did not, uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, give permission to share their information, but the

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Speaker 1: app collected all that information regardless. And that's where we see, like,

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Speaker 1: you know, there were countless victims of this app because

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Speaker 1: none of them opted in to share that information. It

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Speaker 1: was just taken from them. And uh, that's just one

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Speaker 1: little example of the world we live in where you know,

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Speaker 1: even when you are being careful, there are there are

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Speaker 1: these opportunities for your information to get out there, which

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Speaker 1: is why we're like, this is why you need to

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Speaker 1: take the steps necessary to protect yourself as best you can,

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Speaker 1: because we live in a world where there are numerous

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Speaker 1: attack vectors that point back to us. All right, I

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Speaker 1: mean just mid December, the New York Times discussed location

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Speaker 1: tracking on phones and how ping pings to local towers

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Speaker 1: can basically give you a map of a certain phone

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Speaker 1: I D and you can track that and figure out

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Speaker 1: who that phone belongs to based on what residents and

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Speaker 1: what office they go to every day. It's extremely scary,

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Speaker 1: and the more information we have about it as consumers,

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Speaker 1: the better we can protect ourselves. Yeah, and again like, uh,

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Speaker 1: back to what you were just saying, Shannon. Facebook send

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Speaker 1: a letter to Congress just a couple of days before

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Speaker 1: we record this episode where they said, Um, even if

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Speaker 1: you opted out of location tracking, we actually know where

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Speaker 1: you are, partly because of the information people are voluntarily sharing.

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Speaker 1: Like if I tag if I take a photo while

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Speaker 1: I'm at a party and I tagged the location and

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Speaker 1: I tag people are in the photo, well, I'm voluntarily

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Speaker 1: sharing a lot of information. Maybe those people haven't given

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Speaker 1: me permission to do that, but I'm sharing that information.

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Speaker 1: So yeah, of course Facebook knows where I am when

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Speaker 1: I when I'm there, and who I'm with because I

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Speaker 1: shared the information. But they also admitted yeah, we also

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Speaker 1: use a lot of other methods where we can suss

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Speaker 1: out where you were and who you were with at

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Speaker 1: what time that aren't as obvious and aren't examples of

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Speaker 1: the user voluntarily handing over information. So yeah, scary stuff. Um.

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Speaker 1: One of the things I wanted to mention is sort

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Speaker 1: of the bird's eye view of the process of what

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Speaker 1: it's like just connecting to WiFi, so we can kind

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Speaker 1: of understand, uh, you know, what's going on, because I

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Speaker 1: think a lot of people if they think that if

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Speaker 1: they see that, for example, that there's a Wi Fi

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Speaker 1: hot spot that requires a password, they immediately think that

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Speaker 1: that is inherently more secure than a public WiFi spot

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Speaker 1: that has no password, which is not necessarily true. Um,

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Speaker 1: So connecting to WiFi is really you can think of

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Speaker 1: it as a series of handshakes between whatever device you're

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Speaker 1: using and the hot spot, whether it's a router or

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Speaker 1: something else. And this series of handshakes is not meant

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Speaker 1: to secure the data. It's not meant to encrypt a

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Speaker 1: channel necessarily, it's not meant to protect it. What's meant

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Speaker 1: to do is to identify the device and the hot

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Speaker 1: spot so that they know where the data needs to go. Right. Otherwise,

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Speaker 1: if if we all connected to a public WiFi hot

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Speaker 1: spot and there wasn't this handshake thing going on, it

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Speaker 1: would be as if we were all listening to an

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Speaker 1: open broadcast of everything all at once, and it would

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Speaker 1: just be meaningless garbage, and we would just get just

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Speaker 1: get everyone's data simultaneously, and we're like, I don't even

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Speaker 1: I don't know what we could I don't think it

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Speaker 1: would go well. But so this was this was literally

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Speaker 1: the solution to that problem. Like you know, if you're

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Speaker 1: using wired connections, that's one thing, right, you can wire

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Speaker 1: things to specific ports. You have physical hardware. When you

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Speaker 1: go wireless, you have to create a virtual version of that.

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Speaker 1: That's sort of what the handshake processes for. It's saying, hey,

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Speaker 1: there's this device that wants to connect to the network.

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Speaker 1: The network says, okay, I'm giving you permission. The device

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Speaker 1: is okay. This is who I am, and the network

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Speaker 1: devices all right, I see who you are, and now

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Speaker 1: we can send information back and forth. You can send

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Speaker 1: a requests out to the internet. I'll go out and

430
00:24:40,960 --> 00:24:43,119
Speaker 1: grab whatever it is you wanted, and I'll return it

431
00:24:43,200 --> 00:24:46,600
Speaker 1: just to you. That's the idea. That's actually a great

432
00:24:46,640 --> 00:24:50,520
Speaker 1: explanation without using any of the terminology. So I thank

433
00:24:50,560 --> 00:24:52,920
Speaker 1: you for the doing that. Yeah, I tried. I tried.

434
00:24:52,920 --> 00:24:55,679
Speaker 1: At one point, I had a spoiler alert or we'll

435
00:24:55,720 --> 00:24:58,560
Speaker 1: not even spoiler. Look behind the curtain, folks. I had

436
00:24:58,600 --> 00:25:01,760
Speaker 1: originally started to episode as a solo show, and that's

437
00:25:01,840 --> 00:25:04,040
Speaker 1: when it struck me that it would be way easier

438
00:25:04,080 --> 00:25:06,080
Speaker 1: if I brought Shannon on because she's much smarter than

439
00:25:06,119 --> 00:25:08,800
Speaker 1: I am. And so as I was doing it, I

440
00:25:08,840 --> 00:25:12,000
Speaker 1: was trying to describe this process, And I think I

441
00:25:12,040 --> 00:25:13,800
Speaker 1: went through two or three drafts when I said, you

442
00:25:13,800 --> 00:25:16,120
Speaker 1: know what, I can just step back and not get

443
00:25:16,160 --> 00:25:19,800
Speaker 1: so technical because the technical parts aren't really what's important.

444
00:25:19,920 --> 00:25:22,919
Speaker 1: What's important is just sort of understanding the concept of

445
00:25:22,960 --> 00:25:26,480
Speaker 1: the process and why it is not inherently tied to

446
00:25:26,880 --> 00:25:31,120
Speaker 1: security and privacy. It's inherently tied to just what does

447
00:25:31,160 --> 00:25:33,760
Speaker 1: it take so that you can have these two devices

448
00:25:33,800 --> 00:25:36,880
Speaker 1: communicate with one another and not have them confused with

449
00:25:36,960 --> 00:25:39,760
Speaker 1: all the other devices that hook into the same network.

450
00:25:40,240 --> 00:25:41,920
Speaker 1: And once I figured that, I was like, I'm gonna

451
00:25:41,960 --> 00:25:44,639
Speaker 1: go with that because I'm tired of trying to figure

452
00:25:44,640 --> 00:25:48,600
Speaker 1: out how to explain this handshake process. Um, it totally works.

453
00:25:48,760 --> 00:25:52,320
Speaker 1: I mean, I like the handshake terminology because it is

454
00:25:52,400 --> 00:25:55,720
Speaker 1: kind of like that, like in person, whenever you meet somebody,

455
00:25:56,040 --> 00:25:59,359
Speaker 1: you acknowledge each other, you shake each other's hands, you

456
00:25:59,440 --> 00:26:02,280
Speaker 1: kind of enticate each other by name and by face.

457
00:26:02,880 --> 00:26:06,400
Speaker 1: And that's very similar to what a router does with

458
00:26:06,520 --> 00:26:09,920
Speaker 1: a device like your smartphone or a laptop. It's basically

459
00:26:09,920 --> 00:26:13,040
Speaker 1: doing the same thing where you're you're looking for somebody

460
00:26:13,040 --> 00:26:17,600
Speaker 1: to introduce yourself to. You go in, you acknowledge each other,

461
00:26:17,720 --> 00:26:20,680
Speaker 1: you shake hands with each other, you kind of authenticate

462
00:26:20,800 --> 00:26:24,080
Speaker 1: each other by name, and then you have that connection. Yeah,

463
00:26:24,119 --> 00:26:27,120
Speaker 1: and you have that connection forever until you break it off. Yes,

464
00:26:27,359 --> 00:26:30,920
Speaker 1: And if if you're at CES, it probably also requires

465
00:26:30,960 --> 00:26:33,840
Speaker 1: you to hand over a business card because that's like, yeah,

466
00:26:33,960 --> 00:26:36,040
Speaker 1: most likely that's that's the current I guess that would

467
00:26:36,040 --> 00:26:39,800
Speaker 1: be your password, right, yeah, I guess so yeah. All right, Well,

468
00:26:39,800 --> 00:26:42,919
Speaker 1: when we come back, we're going to talk about the

469
00:26:43,640 --> 00:26:46,080
Speaker 1: how how information is sent through packets, just so that

470
00:26:46,119 --> 00:26:49,120
Speaker 1: we can understand why did that packet sniffing thing mean earlier?

471
00:26:49,680 --> 00:26:54,600
Speaker 1: But first, let's take a quick break to thank our sponsor. Recently,

472
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479
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480
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499
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Speaker 1: All right, then we're back. So I promised that we

500
00:28:41,360 --> 00:28:44,960
Speaker 1: were going to talk about packets. Packets is pretty simple concept.

501
00:28:45,240 --> 00:28:49,040
Speaker 1: So a packet switching network. You've probably heard that term before. Uh,

502
00:28:49,120 --> 00:28:51,840
Speaker 1: the Internet. When the pioneers of the Internet, we're sort

503
00:28:51,840 --> 00:28:55,560
Speaker 1: of designing this thing. They thought, well, how do we

504
00:28:56,040 --> 00:28:58,520
Speaker 1: make it so that information can be sent from one

505
00:28:58,520 --> 00:29:02,200
Speaker 1: computer to another in such a way that if something happens,

506
00:29:02,840 --> 00:29:05,400
Speaker 1: the information can continue to make its way to its

507
00:29:05,440 --> 00:29:08,920
Speaker 1: destination even if there's some sort of interruption. And if

508
00:29:08,920 --> 00:29:11,920
Speaker 1: it were just an uninterrupted string of data and there

509
00:29:11,960 --> 00:29:14,120
Speaker 1: was an interruption, then you would have a corrupt file

510
00:29:14,440 --> 00:29:17,200
Speaker 1: or you know, things would not work right, you wouldn't

511
00:29:17,200 --> 00:29:19,680
Speaker 1: get what you were wanting. So they said, what if

512
00:29:19,720 --> 00:29:25,240
Speaker 1: we bundled data into uh, certain sizes, We'll call it packets.

513
00:29:26,120 --> 00:29:28,840
Speaker 1: The packets will have information on them that will tell

514
00:29:29,000 --> 00:29:31,640
Speaker 1: the data where it needs to go, where it came from,

515
00:29:31,680 --> 00:29:34,640
Speaker 1: and how it fits within all the other packets to

516
00:29:34,720 --> 00:29:37,680
Speaker 1: make whatever the thing is. And since we're talking about

517
00:29:37,680 --> 00:29:40,080
Speaker 1: the Internet, let's be honest, chances are it's a picture

518
00:29:40,120 --> 00:29:43,120
Speaker 1: of a cat. So that cat picture is going to

519
00:29:43,160 --> 00:29:45,000
Speaker 1: be a lot of different data packets and they have

520
00:29:45,080 --> 00:29:46,840
Speaker 1: to put the packets together kind of like a puzzle

521
00:29:46,920 --> 00:29:49,720
Speaker 1: in order to recreate that image of a cat. So

522
00:29:49,840 --> 00:29:52,120
Speaker 1: that's that's what a packet is. Well, the packet because

523
00:29:52,160 --> 00:29:55,000
Speaker 1: it has that information on it about where it's going

524
00:29:55,040 --> 00:29:57,920
Speaker 1: and where it's from. That's what we would call metadata, right,

525
00:29:57,960 --> 00:30:01,400
Speaker 1: that's the data about the data, or it's data that

526
00:30:01,480 --> 00:30:05,120
Speaker 1: somehow describes the data that's inside and um and I

527
00:30:05,160 --> 00:30:07,080
Speaker 1: always always try and say that the packets on the

528
00:30:07,120 --> 00:30:10,240
Speaker 1: other side get reassembled Willy Wonka style like Mike TV

529
00:30:10,520 --> 00:30:14,040
Speaker 1: when he goes across the camera. UM like that. Yeah,

530
00:30:14,440 --> 00:30:16,560
Speaker 1: I mean it's a it's a nice way of putting it,

531
00:30:16,760 --> 00:30:18,800
Speaker 1: especially since I mean that's one of my favorite films

532
00:30:18,800 --> 00:30:21,200
Speaker 1: of all time, the Gene Wilder version of the not

533
00:30:21,280 --> 00:30:24,800
Speaker 1: the Johnny not the Johnny Den version yet. So that's

534
00:30:24,880 --> 00:30:28,920
Speaker 1: where we get the words for packets. So, a packet sniffer,

535
00:30:28,920 --> 00:30:32,440
Speaker 1: as we mentioned earlier, can be software, it can be hardware,

536
00:30:32,520 --> 00:30:34,760
Speaker 1: it can be a combination of the two. That is

537
00:30:34,800 --> 00:30:38,400
Speaker 1: meant to sort of check out the packets that are

538
00:30:38,440 --> 00:30:42,320
Speaker 1: being sent across a network, uh and get an idea

539
00:30:42,440 --> 00:30:45,480
Speaker 1: of what's going on there. And one of the things

540
00:30:46,040 --> 00:30:48,520
Speaker 1: someone can do if they have a packet sniffer and

541
00:30:48,520 --> 00:30:51,000
Speaker 1: they know how to do it, is they can look

542
00:30:51,240 --> 00:30:55,080
Speaker 1: for packets that represent essentially an unencrypted cookie or a

543
00:30:55,120 --> 00:30:59,520
Speaker 1: session key. And this is essentially where a user has

544
00:30:59,560 --> 00:31:02,240
Speaker 1: sent a request to log into a service of some

545
00:31:02,280 --> 00:31:06,280
Speaker 1: sort uh, and if the hacker is able to sniff

546
00:31:06,280 --> 00:31:09,400
Speaker 1: out that cookie, they might be able to step in

547
00:31:09,600 --> 00:31:14,360
Speaker 1: and pose as that user and thus get access to

548
00:31:14,400 --> 00:31:18,760
Speaker 1: the user's account or services. Um and this is sometimes

549
00:31:18,800 --> 00:31:23,320
Speaker 1: referred to as side jacking. I learned a lot of

550
00:31:23,440 --> 00:31:26,960
Speaker 1: hacker slang while I was doing the research. This. I'm

551
00:31:27,040 --> 00:31:29,200
Speaker 1: so proud of you. I'm not good at using it,

552
00:31:29,240 --> 00:31:31,920
Speaker 1: but I learned it. It's okay. You could go to

553
00:31:31,960 --> 00:31:34,480
Speaker 1: def Con next year and totally fitting. Yeah, except I

554
00:31:34,520 --> 00:31:36,120
Speaker 1: will be like, all right, well, I'm gonna leave all

555
00:31:36,160 --> 00:31:41,600
Speaker 1: of my devices at home. Another great idea def Con

556
00:31:41,680 --> 00:31:44,880
Speaker 1: for those who do not know is a information security

557
00:31:44,880 --> 00:31:49,040
Speaker 1: and hacking convention where if you aren't careful, they will

558
00:31:49,120 --> 00:31:52,800
Speaker 1: let you know about it. Oh yeah they do. Usually

559
00:31:52,800 --> 00:31:54,640
Speaker 1: they're nice about it, and you just end up on

560
00:31:55,040 --> 00:31:59,120
Speaker 1: this thing called the wall of shame. But luckily generally

561
00:31:59,160 --> 00:32:02,680
Speaker 1: people don't nefariously hack each other there. It's just kind

562
00:32:02,760 --> 00:32:05,240
Speaker 1: of to pop your name up on a wall of

563
00:32:05,280 --> 00:32:08,960
Speaker 1: shame and that's about it. Yeah. Essentially, essentially they're saying, hey,

564
00:32:09,200 --> 00:32:11,320
Speaker 1: you need to have a heads up, like whatever you're

565
00:32:11,360 --> 00:32:14,360
Speaker 1: doing is not sufficient. Yeah, it's it's really more like

566
00:32:14,920 --> 00:32:18,600
Speaker 1: it's really more like saying like, listen, we want you

567
00:32:18,680 --> 00:32:21,720
Speaker 1: to be safe, and right now you're not being safe.

568
00:32:22,240 --> 00:32:25,840
Speaker 1: So but but yeah, but still there's also the shame factor.

569
00:32:26,120 --> 00:32:28,800
Speaker 1: And the more the more known you are in the sphere,

570
00:32:28,840 --> 00:32:31,080
Speaker 1: I imagine, the greater the shame would be to appear

571
00:32:31,080 --> 00:32:35,280
Speaker 1: on that wall. Oh yeah, definitely. So this was I've

572
00:32:35,280 --> 00:32:36,640
Speaker 1: never been on the wall of shame, and I hope

573
00:32:36,680 --> 00:32:39,360
Speaker 1: I never congratulations. Yeah, I've never been on the wall

574
00:32:39,360 --> 00:32:42,000
Speaker 1: of shame either, But that's because I haven't gone. I

575
00:32:42,080 --> 00:32:44,880
Speaker 1: am certain I would end up doing something bone headed

576
00:32:44,920 --> 00:32:47,400
Speaker 1: and mess up. So you were talking earlier about how

577
00:32:47,440 --> 00:32:51,400
Speaker 1: you have actually actively worked on technologies that do this

578
00:32:51,480 --> 00:32:56,560
Speaker 1: this packet sniffing uh approach. Yes, yes, I have. I

579
00:32:56,640 --> 00:32:58,880
Speaker 1: used to work at a company called hack five. I

580
00:32:58,960 --> 00:33:02,640
Speaker 1: still do show on that channel, j K five, And

581
00:33:03,040 --> 00:33:06,479
Speaker 1: our our premise for that channel is educating people who

582
00:33:06,560 --> 00:33:09,840
Speaker 1: are interested in security and privacy and might want to

583
00:33:09,880 --> 00:33:15,920
Speaker 1: go into information technology or penetration testing or infosec info

584
00:33:15,960 --> 00:33:21,280
Speaker 1: security as a profession. So we teach young hackers how

585
00:33:21,320 --> 00:33:25,560
Speaker 1: to legally use their talents to actually get a job

586
00:33:25,800 --> 00:33:29,360
Speaker 1: that will help them spur the economy, help them protect

587
00:33:29,360 --> 00:33:34,880
Speaker 1: companies h and help them really get involved with their passion. Um. So,

588
00:33:35,040 --> 00:33:38,160
Speaker 1: one of the products that we created is something called

589
00:33:38,200 --> 00:33:41,520
Speaker 1: called the WiFi Pineapple. It's a little hardware device. It's

590
00:33:41,560 --> 00:33:45,400
Speaker 1: basically a router, but the software that's built into the

591
00:33:45,440 --> 00:33:50,680
Speaker 1: WiFi Pineapple allows us to do things like get people

592
00:33:50,760 --> 00:33:53,680
Speaker 1: to connect to a WiFi Pineapple as opposed to a

593
00:33:53,720 --> 00:33:57,560
Speaker 1: regular router and allow us to sniff packets just like

594
00:33:57,600 --> 00:34:02,040
Speaker 1: you were saying, um it. The product has been around

595
00:34:02,040 --> 00:34:04,760
Speaker 1: for half a decade at this point. No, actually it's

596
00:34:04,760 --> 00:34:07,000
Speaker 1: been almost a decade. Wow, I can't believe it's been

597
00:34:07,040 --> 00:34:10,239
Speaker 1: so long. But we've gone through various revisions of it,

598
00:34:10,400 --> 00:34:14,839
Speaker 1: and as security has gotten stronger, there's always been new

599
00:34:14,920 --> 00:34:19,600
Speaker 1: vulnerabilities available in wireless network technology, so we've always been

600
00:34:19,640 --> 00:34:23,240
Speaker 1: able to update the WiFi Pineapple to continue to educate

601
00:34:23,280 --> 00:34:27,400
Speaker 1: people why it's still a good idea to not connect

602
00:34:27,480 --> 00:34:33,200
Speaker 1: to public WiFi or open hotspots. And uh, it's been

603
00:34:33,239 --> 00:34:37,279
Speaker 1: a wonderful education tool since we can use it as

604
00:34:37,320 --> 00:34:40,200
Speaker 1: this kind of man in the middle attack for for

605
00:34:40,400 --> 00:34:43,080
Speaker 1: you know, helping people understand. Yeah, and I mean, like

606
00:34:43,719 --> 00:34:47,839
Speaker 1: the thing that I see people sometimes and I know

607
00:34:47,960 --> 00:34:50,799
Speaker 1: you've seen it sometimes protests that like why are you

608
00:34:50,880 --> 00:34:53,919
Speaker 1: making this thing? And the argument I would make to them,

609
00:34:53,960 --> 00:34:55,680
Speaker 1: and I'm sure it's an argument that you guys have

610
00:34:55,760 --> 00:34:59,040
Speaker 1: made numerous times, is you know that people who have

611
00:34:59,120 --> 00:35:03,080
Speaker 1: bad intentions are making stuff like this already. They're they're

612
00:35:03,200 --> 00:35:06,359
Speaker 1: they're doing it all the time. They're doing and they're

613
00:35:06,400 --> 00:35:09,280
Speaker 1: not talking about it. They're not upfront about it because

614
00:35:09,320 --> 00:35:12,239
Speaker 1: they want to take advantage of it. The reason why

615
00:35:12,320 --> 00:35:15,920
Speaker 1: you guys do it is to raise awareness, to teach

616
00:35:15,960 --> 00:35:19,799
Speaker 1: people how it works, and presumably they can then take

617
00:35:19,800 --> 00:35:23,440
Speaker 1: that knowledge and better protect whatever their future clients might

618
00:35:23,480 --> 00:35:25,560
Speaker 1: be if they end up working as a white hat hacker.

619
00:35:26,239 --> 00:35:29,160
Speaker 1: And yeah, straight up, people have made their own WiFi

620
00:35:29,200 --> 00:35:32,840
Speaker 1: pineapples using you know, different types of hardware and different

621
00:35:32,920 --> 00:35:36,160
Speaker 1: kind of software that they've made their own. But our

622
00:35:36,239 --> 00:35:39,520
Speaker 1: our products are well. Hack fives products are listed in MIST,

623
00:35:39,600 --> 00:35:44,080
Speaker 1: which is the National Institute of Standards and Technologies as

624
00:35:44,120 --> 00:35:48,600
Speaker 1: a wireless penetration testing device. So a lot of companies

625
00:35:48,640 --> 00:35:52,120
Speaker 1: see it as a professional tool and they get their

626
00:35:52,160 --> 00:35:55,719
Speaker 1: employees to purchase these items to use and make sure

627
00:35:55,760 --> 00:35:58,200
Speaker 1: that their networks are protected. Because as much as you

628
00:35:58,239 --> 00:36:01,560
Speaker 1: could use a WiFi Pineapple to hack somebody, you can

629
00:36:01,600 --> 00:36:04,239
Speaker 1: also use it to protect yourself because you're still doing

630
00:36:04,320 --> 00:36:08,239
Speaker 1: the same kind of tracking on your known network. So

631
00:36:08,320 --> 00:36:11,040
Speaker 1: if I had a WiFi Pineapple on a company's network

632
00:36:11,120 --> 00:36:15,680
Speaker 1: that I'm legally have access to as since that's my profession,

633
00:36:15,719 --> 00:36:19,600
Speaker 1: for example, hypothetically, uh, then I could see what employees

634
00:36:19,600 --> 00:36:22,040
Speaker 1: are doing on that network. So if somebody is visiting

635
00:36:22,040 --> 00:36:24,080
Speaker 1: Facebook when they shouldn't be, I could see that, and

636
00:36:24,080 --> 00:36:25,880
Speaker 1: I could tell them, hey, you need to you know,

637
00:36:26,040 --> 00:36:27,839
Speaker 1: cut that off or you're going to get written up.

638
00:36:28,440 --> 00:36:31,400
Speaker 1: Or if there was an attacker trying to gain access

639
00:36:31,440 --> 00:36:33,759
Speaker 1: to a wireless network, I would be able to see

640
00:36:33,800 --> 00:36:36,640
Speaker 1: those packets because they would not be what I normally see,

641
00:36:36,960 --> 00:36:39,040
Speaker 1: and I would be able to protect my network because

642
00:36:39,040 --> 00:36:42,440
Speaker 1: I could blacklist them then. So there's so many different

643
00:36:42,440 --> 00:36:45,239
Speaker 1: ways that you can use these tools, not just nefariously

644
00:36:45,360 --> 00:36:49,480
Speaker 1: like you had mentioned, but in like these amazing ways

645
00:36:49,560 --> 00:36:52,600
Speaker 1: that help protect so much more than just companies, but

646
00:36:52,640 --> 00:36:55,640
Speaker 1: also the employees that are working there as well. Yeah,

647
00:36:55,640 --> 00:36:58,120
Speaker 1: and that, and I've always been the type to say,

648
00:36:58,200 --> 00:37:02,200
Speaker 1: if if someone's outwardly talking about what their technology can do,

649
00:37:02,920 --> 00:37:05,920
Speaker 1: then those are the people you should trust. It's the

650
00:37:05,920 --> 00:37:09,200
Speaker 1: ones who aren't talking that you have to worry about.

651
00:37:09,760 --> 00:37:12,040
Speaker 1: So yeah, it's the same thing for me when people

652
00:37:12,080 --> 00:37:15,040
Speaker 1: are talking about security vulnerabilities that they found in systems,

653
00:37:15,080 --> 00:37:17,600
Speaker 1: where they might come forward and say, yeah, I reported

654
00:37:17,640 --> 00:37:20,319
Speaker 1: this like three months ago, the company still hasn't done

655
00:37:20,320 --> 00:37:22,600
Speaker 1: anything about it. The only reason I'm coming forward is

656
00:37:22,640 --> 00:37:25,360
Speaker 1: because that puts the pressure on the company to definitely

657
00:37:25,400 --> 00:37:29,000
Speaker 1: make a change, because that vulnerability exists, whether they talk

658
00:37:29,040 --> 00:37:31,560
Speaker 1: about it or not. Now they have to do something

659
00:37:31,560 --> 00:37:34,560
Speaker 1: because the public knows about it, and and they're you know,

660
00:37:34,680 --> 00:37:36,520
Speaker 1: I'm I'm fully on board with that too. I mean,

661
00:37:36,560 --> 00:37:39,960
Speaker 1: I think that you always give the entity the chance

662
00:37:40,080 --> 00:37:44,080
Speaker 1: to address it, but if they haven't shown any movement

663
00:37:44,160 --> 00:37:47,080
Speaker 1: towards that, I think it's the responsibility of someone who's

664
00:37:47,080 --> 00:37:50,560
Speaker 1: found a vulnerability to come forward with it because otherwise

665
00:37:51,280 --> 00:37:53,560
Speaker 1: it's just it's just a ticking time bomb. Someone's going

666
00:37:53,600 --> 00:37:56,200
Speaker 1: to take advantage of it, and then it becomes a

667
00:37:56,239 --> 00:37:59,480
Speaker 1: problem far bigger than coming forward and saying, hey, guys,

668
00:37:59,480 --> 00:38:02,399
Speaker 1: need to fix your stuff. And it's it's not just

669
00:38:02,800 --> 00:38:05,799
Speaker 1: you know, devices like the WiFi Pineapple, but as we

670
00:38:05,840 --> 00:38:08,920
Speaker 1: had mentioned, it's also software that's involved too that can

671
00:38:08,960 --> 00:38:13,640
Speaker 1: do very similar type of tracking on networks. There's a

672
00:38:13,719 --> 00:38:17,040
Speaker 1: technology called wire Shark, which I'll bring up not just

673
00:38:17,080 --> 00:38:22,040
Speaker 1: because you know, I have no financial responsibility via hack five.

674
00:38:22,160 --> 00:38:25,720
Speaker 1: So like if if you know, somebody purchases a WiFi

675
00:38:25,719 --> 00:38:28,160
Speaker 1: Pineapple when they hear this talk, I don't get anything

676
00:38:28,200 --> 00:38:30,640
Speaker 1: from that, no compensation whatsoever. I just do a show

677
00:38:30,640 --> 00:38:32,719
Speaker 1: on that channel, So don't worry. I'm not. I don't

678
00:38:32,719 --> 00:38:36,520
Speaker 1: get referrals or anything. But there's also software like wire shark,

679
00:38:36,960 --> 00:38:40,200
Speaker 1: which is a free service online that anybody can download

680
00:38:40,280 --> 00:38:44,160
Speaker 1: and that allows you to do packet sniffing. I've used

681
00:38:44,200 --> 00:38:47,120
Speaker 1: it to test my own home network and make sure

682
00:38:47,200 --> 00:38:51,239
Speaker 1: that my smart coot devices are secure and they're encrypted,

683
00:38:51,680 --> 00:38:55,160
Speaker 1: and that has luckily, luckily, all of my devices are,

684
00:38:55,520 --> 00:38:58,680
Speaker 1: you know, totally secure, which is wonderful. But back in

685
00:38:58,719 --> 00:39:00,840
Speaker 1: the day when I first started using wire Shark, I

686
00:39:00,920 --> 00:39:04,800
Speaker 1: discovered that when I was using Instagram on my phone,

687
00:39:05,280 --> 00:39:07,880
Speaker 1: I could see links to the pictures that I was

688
00:39:08,000 --> 00:39:11,399
Speaker 1: liking as I liked them, so as I gave them

689
00:39:11,400 --> 00:39:14,719
Speaker 1: the little hearts, it would pull up a little HTTP

690
00:39:14,880 --> 00:39:17,120
Speaker 1: link and I could click on that through wire Shark,

691
00:39:17,160 --> 00:39:19,920
Speaker 1: and I could see exactly which pictures I was liking,

692
00:39:20,000 --> 00:39:24,239
Speaker 1: which was so creepy. I mean, definitely something that you

693
00:39:24,280 --> 00:39:27,200
Speaker 1: should be aware of is what kind of data is

694
00:39:27,239 --> 00:39:30,759
Speaker 1: being passed through with no encryption whatsoever, and what kind

695
00:39:30,760 --> 00:39:35,000
Speaker 1: of data is being encrypted too. Yeah, totally and you

696
00:39:35,040 --> 00:39:37,280
Speaker 1: means crazy. You mentioned the man in the middle attack.

697
00:39:37,600 --> 00:39:41,839
Speaker 1: That's that's kind of another step up, where you have

698
00:39:42,080 --> 00:39:46,680
Speaker 1: a hacker that sets their machine in between a user

699
00:39:46,880 --> 00:39:50,319
Speaker 1: and some other computer that might be a router. So

700
00:39:50,400 --> 00:39:51,640
Speaker 1: you might actually have a man in the middle of

701
00:39:51,640 --> 00:39:53,960
Speaker 1: attack where someone say at the coffee shop, and they

702
00:39:53,960 --> 00:39:57,000
Speaker 1: set up uh their computer so that it appears to

703
00:39:57,040 --> 00:40:00,880
Speaker 1: be the coffee shops network. There's actually ways where you

704
00:40:00,920 --> 00:40:04,160
Speaker 1: can force a reboot of a system and then pose

705
00:40:04,239 --> 00:40:07,520
Speaker 1: as that system so that when it does reboot, you

706
00:40:07,560 --> 00:40:12,880
Speaker 1: are effectively a middleman in that relationship, and meanwhile you

707
00:40:12,880 --> 00:40:14,799
Speaker 1: see all the stuff that goes across that because your

708
00:40:14,880 --> 00:40:18,960
Speaker 1: computer is acting as the network spot for where where

709
00:40:18,960 --> 00:40:22,000
Speaker 1: everybody's connecting through UH. So that's that's one way, but

710
00:40:22,080 --> 00:40:24,040
Speaker 1: there's also ways of began doing a man in the

711
00:40:24,040 --> 00:40:28,799
Speaker 1: middle of attack between a like a client and an

712
00:40:28,840 --> 00:40:32,800
Speaker 1: actual service, like you know, directing people to fake bank

713
00:40:33,080 --> 00:40:35,799
Speaker 1: log in pages and things. Of that nature. Um, So

714
00:40:35,840 --> 00:40:37,359
Speaker 1: those are things you also have to be aware of,

715
00:40:37,680 --> 00:40:41,239
Speaker 1: although that can happen pretty much in every scenario we're

716
00:40:41,239 --> 00:40:43,879
Speaker 1: going to talk about. That requires you to pay close

717
00:40:43,920 --> 00:40:47,840
Speaker 1: attention to what you are doing as you're browsing. UM.

718
00:40:47,880 --> 00:40:50,279
Speaker 1: And I mentioned earlier about the idea that if you

719
00:40:50,440 --> 00:40:53,640
Speaker 1: are using public WiFi that is password protected. Let's say

720
00:40:53,640 --> 00:40:56,359
Speaker 1: you're at us coffee shop where yeah, you can log

721
00:40:56,400 --> 00:40:59,120
Speaker 1: into their their WiFi, but you have to first go

722
00:40:59,200 --> 00:41:01,279
Speaker 1: up to the cash regis her and find out what

723
00:41:01,320 --> 00:41:03,040
Speaker 1: the password is, and then you find that out and

724
00:41:03,080 --> 00:41:05,640
Speaker 1: you log in. Some people feel like that gives them

725
00:41:05,640 --> 00:41:10,000
Speaker 1: that extra area of security. Honestly, that doesn't, because there's

726
00:41:10,040 --> 00:41:12,719
Speaker 1: nothing stopping a hacker going into that same coffee shop

727
00:41:12,760 --> 00:41:16,120
Speaker 1: getting that same password and like that. It doesn't add

728
00:41:16,160 --> 00:41:19,080
Speaker 1: any like by itself, it doesn't add any extra security.

729
00:41:19,080 --> 00:41:23,080
Speaker 1: It just as one extra little step. Yeah, it's true.

730
00:41:23,280 --> 00:41:26,959
Speaker 1: Uh yeah, anybody even in the vicinity, if they've ever

731
00:41:27,040 --> 00:41:32,359
Speaker 1: had access to that wireless password and the coffee shop,

732
00:41:32,400 --> 00:41:34,719
Speaker 1: for example, has never changed the password, Like they could

733
00:41:34,760 --> 00:41:38,680
Speaker 1: easily get access again with a long range antenna on

734
00:41:38,719 --> 00:41:40,600
Speaker 1: the other side of a parking lot and be able

735
00:41:40,640 --> 00:41:43,439
Speaker 1: to sniff what everybody in that coffee shop is doing.

736
00:41:43,960 --> 00:41:47,279
Speaker 1: So yeah, I don't even use coffee shop WiFi or

737
00:41:47,360 --> 00:41:51,080
Speaker 1: airport WiFi if we want to use that example. Those

738
00:41:51,120 --> 00:41:54,560
Speaker 1: aren't even trustworthy exactly, and I think that those are

739
00:41:54,760 --> 00:41:57,680
Speaker 1: perfect examples, especially as people are traveling a lot for

740
00:41:57,680 --> 00:42:01,560
Speaker 1: the holidays. Like I that's why I think of seeing

741
00:42:01,560 --> 00:42:03,880
Speaker 1: people whipping out their computers the most is airports and

742
00:42:03,880 --> 00:42:08,480
Speaker 1: coffee shops. That's it, um. But yeah, if you have

743
00:42:08,760 --> 00:42:14,920
Speaker 1: an encrypted network, that's better. It's again like this is

744
00:42:14,960 --> 00:42:19,200
Speaker 1: another step where we're getting into uh more secure area,

745
00:42:19,280 --> 00:42:21,960
Speaker 1: and we'll talk about different types of encryption in a second,

746
00:42:22,400 --> 00:42:26,360
Speaker 1: but before we get to that, there's actually also a

747
00:42:26,400 --> 00:42:30,040
Speaker 1: difference in the types of browsers, right. Different browsers offer

748
00:42:30,160 --> 00:42:36,080
Speaker 1: different levels of features that either uh enable security and

749
00:42:36,120 --> 00:42:40,360
Speaker 1: privacy or they make it really difficult to protect. So

750
00:42:40,640 --> 00:42:43,760
Speaker 1: on the bad end of the scale. As the Internet

751
00:42:43,760 --> 00:42:49,800
Speaker 1: Explorer for multiple reasons, it was never the best browser

752
00:42:49,840 --> 00:42:53,080
Speaker 1: when it comes to security and privacy. But it's really

753
00:42:53,120 --> 00:42:57,120
Speaker 1: not great now because Microsoft no longer actively supports it. UM.

754
00:42:57,160 --> 00:43:00,799
Speaker 1: They will push out a security update on occasion, but

755
00:43:00,920 --> 00:43:04,640
Speaker 1: it's not frequent, which means that there are a lot

756
00:43:04,680 --> 00:43:10,120
Speaker 1: more opportunities for people to discover and exploit vulnerabilities and

757
00:43:10,120 --> 00:43:14,200
Speaker 1: and be fairly sure that those vulnerabilities will stick around

758
00:43:14,239 --> 00:43:17,280
Speaker 1: for a while. So it's not even like a rush

759
00:43:17,520 --> 00:43:22,320
Speaker 1: because Microsoft isn't updating it that frequently with security patches,

760
00:43:22,520 --> 00:43:27,360
Speaker 1: So that's a bad one. Don't use it. Microsoft. Microsoft

761
00:43:27,440 --> 00:43:33,279
Speaker 1: Edge only slightly better than the completely unsupported Internet Explorer. Um,

762
00:43:33,320 --> 00:43:37,279
Speaker 1: at least as far as privacy is concerned. Uh, I

763
00:43:37,360 --> 00:43:40,080
Speaker 1: use Google Chrome a lot, but admittedly Google Chrome not

764
00:43:40,160 --> 00:43:42,600
Speaker 1: great either. It's kind of on the bottom half of

765
00:43:42,640 --> 00:43:47,040
Speaker 1: the middle of the pack. So, uh, they're better about security,

766
00:43:47,080 --> 00:43:49,800
Speaker 1: but they are the pets when it comes to privacy.

767
00:43:49,920 --> 00:43:54,839
Speaker 1: Also not a big surprise, because I mean, what's Google's business, right,

768
00:43:54,920 --> 00:43:59,080
Speaker 1: Google owns you? Yeah, your data is Google's That's what

769
00:43:59,239 --> 00:44:04,480
Speaker 1: Google buys and sells. It's your information, that's that's Google's currency.

770
00:44:04,560 --> 00:44:10,320
Speaker 1: So clearly it does not behoove Google too lockdown privacy

771
00:44:10,440 --> 00:44:13,200
Speaker 1: super tight. They want to know all the information about

772
00:44:13,200 --> 00:44:16,520
Speaker 1: you they make that's how they make their money. Um. So,

773
00:44:17,080 --> 00:44:19,680
Speaker 1: of all the common browsers, like the ones that are

774
00:44:19,680 --> 00:44:23,279
Speaker 1: frequently used out there, the one that that tends to

775
00:44:23,360 --> 00:44:27,320
Speaker 1: rank the highest is Firefox, higher than Opera higher than Chrome,

776
00:44:27,480 --> 00:44:32,280
Speaker 1: higher than safari Um. So it does really well, especially

777
00:44:32,360 --> 00:44:35,359
Speaker 1: for security and privacy. It can support a lot of

778
00:44:35,719 --> 00:44:39,280
Speaker 1: features that protect you when you're when you're surfing stuff

779
00:44:39,280 --> 00:44:41,880
Speaker 1: that will end up cutting down on things like targeted

780
00:44:41,880 --> 00:44:45,799
Speaker 1: advertising because you can really limit the information that's being

781
00:44:45,880 --> 00:44:50,560
Speaker 1: shared by the sites that you're visiting. UM and you

782
00:44:50,600 --> 00:44:54,120
Speaker 1: can also enhance it with various add ons that you

783
00:44:54,160 --> 00:44:58,000
Speaker 1: can find, although obviously anytime you're going to be adding

784
00:44:58,040 --> 00:45:02,080
Speaker 1: anything to UH an ext a sting program, it pays

785
00:45:02,120 --> 00:45:03,960
Speaker 1: to do your research to make sure that it is

786
00:45:05,280 --> 00:45:12,440
Speaker 1: offered by a reputable and dependable app developer. Yeah, Firefox

787
00:45:12,520 --> 00:45:16,120
Speaker 1: is an excellent choice UH and two fold. If you

788
00:45:16,200 --> 00:45:19,320
Speaker 1: download something like Firefox, you also get a very fast

789
00:45:19,400 --> 00:45:21,920
Speaker 1: browser because they have worked very hard to make that

790
00:45:22,000 --> 00:45:24,719
Speaker 1: browser quick. So even if you don't care about the

791
00:45:24,760 --> 00:45:28,000
Speaker 1: security and you just want to access your sites really fast,

792
00:45:28,600 --> 00:45:32,440
Speaker 1: you should use Firefox. Yeah. Yeah, I got Firefox. I

793
00:45:32,480 --> 00:45:34,960
Speaker 1: got stuck on Chrome because for a while Chrome was

794
00:45:35,000 --> 00:45:38,280
Speaker 1: super fast and then it got super bloated. And also

795
00:45:38,400 --> 00:45:41,080
Speaker 1: there's the more tabs you have opening Chrome. Anyone who's

796
00:45:41,120 --> 00:45:43,120
Speaker 1: done this with Chrome knows that even though it are

797
00:45:43,160 --> 00:45:46,839
Speaker 1: all supposed to be distinct instances that don't bleed over

798
00:45:46,880 --> 00:45:49,560
Speaker 1: into each other. Uh, there gets to be some memory

799
00:45:49,600 --> 00:45:53,080
Speaker 1: issues if you happen to be really a heavy user,

800
00:45:53,120 --> 00:45:55,560
Speaker 1: and everyone here at this company is a heavy user.

801
00:45:55,600 --> 00:45:59,239
Speaker 1: So Firefox is definitely going to be my browser of

802
00:45:59,360 --> 00:46:02,920
Speaker 1: choice moving forward after I did this research. I also,

803
00:46:02,960 --> 00:46:05,359
Speaker 1: I should point out, before I did this research, I

804
00:46:05,400 --> 00:46:08,880
Speaker 1: did not know this. I was just a happy, blithe,

805
00:46:09,040 --> 00:46:14,000
Speaker 1: naive Chrome user handing handing over reams of personal data

806
00:46:14,080 --> 00:46:17,240
Speaker 1: to Google, which I mean, granted, I'm sure that company's

807
00:46:17,280 --> 00:46:19,800
Speaker 1: board with me by now, but still there's some value

808
00:46:19,800 --> 00:46:24,120
Speaker 1: there um. And then that brings us to encryption. And

809
00:46:24,200 --> 00:46:28,080
Speaker 1: this encryption it gets This is sort of like complicated,

810
00:46:28,120 --> 00:46:30,760
Speaker 1: like the handshake thing. But encryption, when you boil it down,

811
00:46:31,280 --> 00:46:34,400
Speaker 1: is all about scrambling messages so that the only people

812
00:46:34,400 --> 00:46:36,799
Speaker 1: who can access it are the ones who have the

813
00:46:36,880 --> 00:46:39,200
Speaker 1: key to decode it. Right, So you have the key

814
00:46:39,239 --> 00:46:42,319
Speaker 1: to encode and the key to decode. There are various

815
00:46:42,640 --> 00:46:47,120
Speaker 1: implementations of that technology, different ways to have the public

816
00:46:47,200 --> 00:46:50,279
Speaker 1: key and private key operations. I don't need to get

817
00:46:50,320 --> 00:46:53,759
Speaker 1: into all of that because it gets way too technical. Obviously,

818
00:46:54,320 --> 00:46:58,480
Speaker 1: encrypted is better than unencrypted, but not all encryption schemes

819
00:46:58,520 --> 00:47:04,359
Speaker 1: are created equal and it pays use. So yes, that's

820
00:47:04,480 --> 00:47:08,640
Speaker 1: very true. There's there's even like there's symmetrical keys and

821
00:47:08,880 --> 00:47:12,920
Speaker 1: asymmetrical keys, and then there's like SHAW one and be

822
00:47:13,080 --> 00:47:16,720
Speaker 1: crypt and r s A. There's all these different terminologies

823
00:47:16,760 --> 00:47:20,279
Speaker 1: for encryption. But for what it's worth, all of them

824
00:47:20,440 --> 00:47:24,520
Speaker 1: jumble up your information into some kind of format that

825
00:47:24,600 --> 00:47:27,959
Speaker 1: will hopefully hopefully encrypted, so that anybody who does gain

826
00:47:28,000 --> 00:47:31,719
Speaker 1: access to the encrypted version of your information will not

827
00:47:31,800 --> 00:47:35,759
Speaker 1: be able to reverse engineer it or change it back

828
00:47:35,760 --> 00:47:39,359
Speaker 1: to its original plain text formats, so they can't read

829
00:47:39,400 --> 00:47:41,960
Speaker 1: it in like English speak, right, it would just be

830
00:47:42,160 --> 00:47:47,279
Speaker 1: meaningless garbage to them, hopefully, and its ideal, ideal implementation.

831
00:47:47,719 --> 00:47:49,800
Speaker 1: So one of the things that you may have encountered

832
00:47:49,800 --> 00:47:51,920
Speaker 1: if you've ever set up any sort of wireless network.

833
00:47:51,960 --> 00:47:54,120
Speaker 1: I think most people have, or at least they've they've

834
00:47:54,480 --> 00:47:57,840
Speaker 1: had to connect to one where they've seen the different

835
00:47:57,840 --> 00:48:04,239
Speaker 1: types of network security protocols. These are certifications that the

836
00:48:04,280 --> 00:48:08,960
Speaker 1: WiFi Security Alliance creates, and the earliest one was the

837
00:48:09,000 --> 00:48:13,120
Speaker 1: Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol or w e p H. That

838
00:48:13,160 --> 00:48:18,399
Speaker 1: one is decrepit, it's old, it's vulnerable as heck, so

839
00:48:18,560 --> 00:48:20,880
Speaker 1: don't use it. Yeah, if you have the if if

840
00:48:20,880 --> 00:48:23,200
Speaker 1: your router tells you, like asks you which one you

841
00:48:23,239 --> 00:48:26,279
Speaker 1: want to use, don't use w ep UM. It is

842
00:48:26,400 --> 00:48:29,640
Speaker 1: not secure. It is it's I mean, you could argue

843
00:48:29,680 --> 00:48:32,239
Speaker 1: it's better than nothing, but not by much because the

844
00:48:32,320 --> 00:48:34,959
Speaker 1: vulnerabilities have been known for a long time, in fact,

845
00:48:35,040 --> 00:48:38,239
Speaker 1: so long that even before the nineties were up, you

846
00:48:38,239 --> 00:48:42,440
Speaker 1: had people developing the next generation, which would have been

847
00:48:42,480 --> 00:48:45,759
Speaker 1: the WiFi Protected Access or w p A. So w

848
00:48:45,840 --> 00:48:48,040
Speaker 1: p A came out. Then you get w p A two,

849
00:48:48,080 --> 00:48:52,400
Speaker 1: which was trying to address some of the shortcomings of

850
00:48:52,560 --> 00:48:57,160
Speaker 1: w p A UH. Both of those also still have vulnerabilities.

851
00:48:57,280 --> 00:49:01,600
Speaker 1: W p A two is general talked about as being

852
00:49:01,600 --> 00:49:05,640
Speaker 1: one of the more secure UH certifications these days. There

853
00:49:05,760 --> 00:49:08,920
Speaker 1: is a w p A three also has vulnerabilities that

854
00:49:08,960 --> 00:49:12,920
Speaker 1: have pointed out within the year already. Yeah. So, but

855
00:49:13,160 --> 00:49:15,600
Speaker 1: w p I, I don't think I've even seen a

856
00:49:15,640 --> 00:49:18,120
Speaker 1: lot of stuff that's certified w p A three yet,

857
00:49:18,400 --> 00:49:21,920
Speaker 1: Like we've we've started to see some wireless routers come

858
00:49:21,960 --> 00:49:25,400
Speaker 1: out with w p A three, but they there's still

859
00:49:25,440 --> 00:49:30,000
Speaker 1: a little expensive and they haven't really gotten widespread adoption

860
00:49:30,080 --> 00:49:33,640
Speaker 1: by consumers quite yet so w P A two is

861
00:49:34,160 --> 00:49:37,640
Speaker 1: fine for most consumers to use. You just have to

862
00:49:37,680 --> 00:49:39,759
Speaker 1: make sure that you set it up correctly and you

863
00:49:39,800 --> 00:49:43,520
Speaker 1: don't give the entire world access to your password for

864
00:49:43,600 --> 00:49:47,440
Speaker 1: your account. Yeah that, because then there's what what were

865
00:49:47,440 --> 00:49:50,759
Speaker 1: you even thinking? There's no point then? Yeah? So so

866
00:49:51,080 --> 00:49:53,600
Speaker 1: w P A three on w P A two. All

867
00:49:53,680 --> 00:49:57,959
Speaker 1: these are our designations. And what happens is a manufacturer

868
00:49:58,000 --> 00:50:01,799
Speaker 1: will make a piece of equipment or uh either it's

869
00:50:01,840 --> 00:50:04,959
Speaker 1: a computer or a handset or maybe it's a router,

870
00:50:05,560 --> 00:50:08,680
Speaker 1: and then they submit it to this WiFi security alliance

871
00:50:09,160 --> 00:50:12,480
Speaker 1: that then makes sure that that technology meets whatever the

872
00:50:12,560 --> 00:50:15,600
Speaker 1: requirements are for the particular designation. Then they put the

873
00:50:15,719 --> 00:50:17,920
Speaker 1: stamp on it and they say, yes, this is w

874
00:50:17,960 --> 00:50:20,920
Speaker 1: P A two compliant or w P A three compliant.

875
00:50:21,400 --> 00:50:25,279
Speaker 1: So that just tells you that compliance really there. It

876
00:50:25,320 --> 00:50:29,520
Speaker 1: gets more granular than that. For example, w P A

877
00:50:29,560 --> 00:50:33,160
Speaker 1: two has two different types of encryption standards that can

878
00:50:33,200 --> 00:50:36,920
Speaker 1: be used. There's the bad one. It's Temporal key Integrity

879
00:50:36,920 --> 00:50:38,960
Speaker 1: Protocol or t k i P, and I call it

880
00:50:39,000 --> 00:50:42,800
Speaker 1: bad because yeah, t KIP. T KIP is no longer safe.

881
00:50:42,960 --> 00:50:46,000
Speaker 1: Skip the t KIP. If you skip the t KIP

882
00:50:46,160 --> 00:50:49,000
Speaker 1: like that. Yeah, it's nice mnemonic device. And then there's

883
00:50:49,239 --> 00:50:52,080
Speaker 1: Advanced Encryption Standard or a e S, and that's the

884
00:50:52,080 --> 00:50:55,759
Speaker 1: more secure of the two. So don't rely on te KIP,

885
00:50:55,880 --> 00:51:00,000
Speaker 1: rely on a s U. So that will end up

886
00:51:00,040 --> 00:51:03,640
Speaker 1: protecting you quite a bit as well. The encryption will

887
00:51:03,760 --> 00:51:08,160
Speaker 1: end up helping a great deal because you've just made

888
00:51:08,200 --> 00:51:12,160
Speaker 1: it more difficult for someone to get anything meaningful from

889
00:51:12,560 --> 00:51:17,600
Speaker 1: your browsing activity. It does not mean that you are immune.

890
00:51:17,840 --> 00:51:20,840
Speaker 1: But again, the harder you make it for somebody, the

891
00:51:20,960 --> 00:51:24,120
Speaker 1: less chance they're gonna put forth the effort to break

892
00:51:24,160 --> 00:51:29,320
Speaker 1: through whatever protections you put up. So just general note um.

893
00:51:29,400 --> 00:51:32,879
Speaker 1: And then that also brings us to secure browsing. So

894
00:51:33,320 --> 00:51:35,680
Speaker 1: back in the day, which was the Thursday, I don't

895
00:51:35,680 --> 00:51:38,120
Speaker 1: know if you know that, Uh, there was the the

896
00:51:38,239 --> 00:51:42,279
Speaker 1: Secure Sockets Layer SSL. This whenever you went to a

897
00:51:42,320 --> 00:51:45,040
Speaker 1: website that had the little padlock and the lock on

898
00:51:45,080 --> 00:51:48,440
Speaker 1: it and the HTTPS like, the original version of that

899
00:51:48,560 --> 00:51:50,480
Speaker 1: was SSL. In fact, a lot of people still refer

900
00:51:50,560 --> 00:51:53,359
Speaker 1: to SSL, even though that technically has been and has

901
00:51:53,440 --> 00:51:57,840
Speaker 1: before a while been replaced by the Transport Layer Security

902
00:51:57,920 --> 00:52:00,879
Speaker 1: or TLS, but the same order of purpose it's too.

903
00:52:01,000 --> 00:52:04,680
Speaker 1: It's meant to create the secure channel of communication between

904
00:52:04,680 --> 00:52:09,160
Speaker 1: you and a specific UH website U r L address.

905
00:52:09,239 --> 00:52:12,920
Speaker 1: So if you see HTTPS, or you see that little

906
00:52:12,960 --> 00:52:16,640
Speaker 1: locked padlock in the address bar of your browser, then

907
00:52:16,680 --> 00:52:21,560
Speaker 1: you know you are in a secure channel between you know,

908
00:52:21,680 --> 00:52:26,120
Speaker 1: your your device, and that browser, at least as far

909
00:52:26,160 --> 00:52:29,600
Speaker 1: as information going between those two points are. I mean, obviously,

910
00:52:29,640 --> 00:52:33,200
Speaker 1: if you're on a public WiFi hotspot that's unsecured, you've

911
00:52:33,200 --> 00:52:36,800
Speaker 1: got other issues. But it means that when you're browsing,

912
00:52:37,120 --> 00:52:39,640
Speaker 1: you want to make sure that that HTTPS is showing up.

913
00:52:40,040 --> 00:52:41,759
Speaker 1: You don't you don't want the h T t P

914
00:52:42,200 --> 00:52:43,919
Speaker 1: you want you want to make sure that S is there.

915
00:52:45,040 --> 00:52:49,279
Speaker 1: So one thing I've noticed very rarely, but it has

916
00:52:49,320 --> 00:52:53,560
Speaker 1: happened on occasion is where a website that requires you

917
00:52:53,640 --> 00:52:56,560
Speaker 1: to log in somewhere like their main page there dot

918
00:52:56,600 --> 00:53:01,480
Speaker 1: com address will be encrypted with HTTP. Yes, but as

919
00:53:01,480 --> 00:53:03,520
Speaker 1: soon as you go over to the log in page

920
00:53:03,640 --> 00:53:06,879
Speaker 1: or go through any tree of different sites that they

921
00:53:06,880 --> 00:53:10,160
Speaker 1: have created on their dot com domain, all the rest

922
00:53:10,200 --> 00:53:13,239
Speaker 1: of their pages are h T t P. They are unencrypted.

923
00:53:13,320 --> 00:53:14,920
Speaker 1: So if you go to the log in page and

924
00:53:15,000 --> 00:53:18,359
Speaker 1: my cat agrees, she's mewing behind me and you put

925
00:53:18,400 --> 00:53:21,680
Speaker 1: in your user name and password. Those would be copied

926
00:53:21,719 --> 00:53:26,360
Speaker 1: through plain text, and if anybody was, you know, tracking

927
00:53:26,480 --> 00:53:29,120
Speaker 1: or sniffing your packets, they would be able to see

928
00:53:29,160 --> 00:53:32,800
Speaker 1: that plane text user name and passwords. So, for example,

929
00:53:32,840 --> 00:53:36,520
Speaker 1: if my password was my cat's name is Starbuck, and

930
00:53:36,640 --> 00:53:40,360
Speaker 1: that was a plain text, unencrypted website just using HTTP,

931
00:53:41,120 --> 00:53:44,799
Speaker 1: then if somebody was sniffing those packets, they could see

932
00:53:44,880 --> 00:53:48,440
Speaker 1: that passwords show up in their software through whatever hardware

933
00:53:48,440 --> 00:53:51,439
Speaker 1: device they might be using, and just be able to see, oh,

934
00:53:51,440 --> 00:53:53,799
Speaker 1: she entered Starbuck, and then they could go to the

935
00:53:53,800 --> 00:53:56,880
Speaker 1: website type that in and gain access to my login

936
00:53:57,280 --> 00:54:01,279
Speaker 1: account information. Yeah, and that is what we call no bueno, right,

937
00:54:01,440 --> 00:54:04,840
Speaker 1: like yeah, yeah and ho and more and more sites

938
00:54:04,880 --> 00:54:09,440
Speaker 1: are getting better about making certain that their entire presence

939
00:54:10,040 --> 00:54:13,040
Speaker 1: is being secure, but you can it's actually harder and

940
00:54:13,120 --> 00:54:17,000
Speaker 1: harder to find examples websites doing that, so which I'm

941
00:54:17,040 --> 00:54:19,400
Speaker 1: happy to see because that makes my job harder and

942
00:54:19,440 --> 00:54:22,560
Speaker 1: that means people are listening. Uh, So, I am happy

943
00:54:22,600 --> 00:54:24,680
Speaker 1: to see that less sites are doing that, but we

944
00:54:24,760 --> 00:54:27,319
Speaker 1: still have issues. There's still some out there. And then

945
00:54:27,360 --> 00:54:31,000
Speaker 1: occasionally you have browsers that will alert you if you

946
00:54:31,080 --> 00:54:34,040
Speaker 1: try to navigate to a site that is not secure,

947
00:54:34,040 --> 00:54:36,800
Speaker 1: it'll give you a little alert, which is good too,

948
00:54:37,160 --> 00:54:40,640
Speaker 1: because you know, if the people on the website aren't

949
00:54:40,680 --> 00:54:43,840
Speaker 1: being diligent, it at least gives the user on the

950
00:54:43,880 --> 00:54:46,399
Speaker 1: other end the heads up of, Hey, you probably thought

951
00:54:46,400 --> 00:54:48,600
Speaker 1: this was secure, but turns out it's not. Maybe you

952
00:54:48,640 --> 00:54:50,560
Speaker 1: want to rethink that. Are you sure you want to

953
00:54:50,560 --> 00:54:52,960
Speaker 1: go ahead? You will probably be eaten by a group,

954
00:54:53,440 --> 00:54:56,400
Speaker 1: and then you decide what you can do it. Um Now,

955
00:54:56,640 --> 00:54:59,239
Speaker 1: when we come back, we're going to talk about one

956
00:54:59,280 --> 00:55:03,040
Speaker 1: other topic before we get into like the super secret stuff,

957
00:55:03,400 --> 00:55:06,239
Speaker 1: and that is what the heck is incognito mode for.

958
00:55:07,520 --> 00:55:19,440
Speaker 1: But before we do that, let's take another quick break. So, Shannon,

959
00:55:20,680 --> 00:55:27,520
Speaker 1: I have I've I've gone to a private network, right,

960
00:55:27,640 --> 00:55:30,839
Speaker 1: I'm it's not maybe mine, but it's a private ones

961
00:55:30,840 --> 00:55:35,520
Speaker 1: not open to the public. It's encrypted password access. I've

962
00:55:35,560 --> 00:55:37,960
Speaker 1: done all those wonderful things. And then I think, you

963
00:55:38,000 --> 00:55:39,839
Speaker 1: know what, I'm gonna look at some so like your

964
00:55:39,880 --> 00:55:44,040
Speaker 1: friend's house or something. Yeah, yeah, yeah, And uh, I decided,

965
00:55:44,120 --> 00:55:45,560
Speaker 1: you know what I want to do. I wanna I'm

966
00:55:45,560 --> 00:55:48,680
Speaker 1: gonna look at some I'm gonna look at some some

967
00:55:48,719 --> 00:55:51,759
Speaker 1: stuff that I don't think my friends would really understand.

968
00:55:51,800 --> 00:55:54,479
Speaker 1: Maybe maybe I'm gonna look into this that my little

969
00:55:54,520 --> 00:55:57,960
Speaker 1: pony fan fiction. Uh, and I don't want my friends

970
00:55:57,960 --> 00:55:59,439
Speaker 1: to know about it. So I'm like, well, I'm gonna

971
00:55:59,440 --> 00:56:02,000
Speaker 1: be super sneak, gay, I'm gonna go into incognito mode. Now,

972
00:56:02,080 --> 00:56:04,319
Speaker 1: no one's ever done to know. So I click on

973
00:56:04,320 --> 00:56:08,200
Speaker 1: that little incognito mode and little bitty shadow Man pops up,

974
00:56:08,200 --> 00:56:10,880
Speaker 1: and I'm like, oh, yeah, I'm totally safe and totally secret.

975
00:56:10,880 --> 00:56:13,880
Speaker 1: Nobody knows it's me. And I start looking at my

976
00:56:13,920 --> 00:56:19,520
Speaker 1: browny fan fiction. Oh you know the term. Hey, look,

977
00:56:20,880 --> 00:56:24,560
Speaker 1: I wouldn't listen. Listen, you just give yourself away. Listen.

978
00:56:24,600 --> 00:56:28,480
Speaker 1: Princess Celestia and I have an understanding. Okay, so we

979
00:56:28,520 --> 00:56:30,600
Speaker 1: are not going to go down that road. We're not

980
00:56:30,640 --> 00:56:33,200
Speaker 1: gonna go there. Like, yeah, Fluttershy and I we're like,

981
00:56:33,280 --> 00:56:37,160
Speaker 1: we're tight, so we're not. It's fine, Okay, it's acceptable behavior,

982
00:56:37,480 --> 00:56:40,000
Speaker 1: but no, it is acceptable, but I don't want my

983
00:56:40,040 --> 00:56:43,440
Speaker 1: friend to know that. Now here's the sad thing folks

984
00:56:44,480 --> 00:56:48,359
Speaker 1: on the podcast. One one, whoops, I guess there should

985
00:56:48,360 --> 00:56:52,319
Speaker 1: be more secure with my data. And secondly, secondly, incognito mode.

986
00:56:52,360 --> 00:56:55,919
Speaker 1: That's not how that works. It doesn't protect you from

987
00:56:55,960 --> 00:56:59,280
Speaker 1: anyone who has any access to the network from seeing

988
00:56:59,280 --> 00:57:02,200
Speaker 1: what you're doing, right right, that's correct. Um. Yeah, so

989
00:57:02,320 --> 00:57:05,200
Speaker 1: incognito mode. Uh, you you've probably seen it on your

990
00:57:05,239 --> 00:57:08,040
Speaker 1: own computer. If you go up into the menu for

991
00:57:08,080 --> 00:57:11,040
Speaker 1: your regular browser and go into like the dropdown menu,

992
00:57:11,160 --> 00:57:14,960
Speaker 1: there's usually an option to choose incognito mode or like

993
00:57:15,080 --> 00:57:18,400
Speaker 1: secret mode or something like private browsing or whatever. Yeah,

994
00:57:18,400 --> 00:57:21,720
Speaker 1: private browsing, Yeah, that's another one. Uh. So if you

995
00:57:21,720 --> 00:57:24,480
Speaker 1: click that, it opens up a completely different window on

996
00:57:24,520 --> 00:57:27,040
Speaker 1: your computer or on your phone as well. You can

997
00:57:27,120 --> 00:57:30,360
Speaker 1: do it on your phone. Uh, and you start to browse.

998
00:57:30,440 --> 00:57:33,880
Speaker 1: But basically the only thing that incognito mode is really

999
00:57:33,920 --> 00:57:39,120
Speaker 1: doing is uh not putting anything into your local history

1000
00:57:39,240 --> 00:57:42,520
Speaker 1: or your your web browsing history, So if somebody else

1001
00:57:42,560 --> 00:57:44,600
Speaker 1: got it on your computer, they would not know what

1002
00:57:44,680 --> 00:57:47,960
Speaker 1: you were doing in incognito mode. Uh. And it also

1003
00:57:48,120 --> 00:57:52,800
Speaker 1: doesn't store the cookies on your computer, so any information

1004
00:57:52,840 --> 00:57:55,520
Speaker 1: that you were sharing with a website during your incognito

1005
00:57:55,560 --> 00:57:59,360
Speaker 1: mode would not be stored afterwards, So all those cookies

1006
00:57:59,480 --> 00:58:02,280
Speaker 1: that might have happened during a session, they'll just be erased,

1007
00:58:02,400 --> 00:58:06,640
Speaker 1: like you never existed that that can actually be very useful.

1008
00:58:07,680 --> 00:58:10,439
Speaker 1: For example, if you're looking for a fun hack, if

1009
00:58:10,520 --> 00:58:13,520
Speaker 1: you want to save some money on airplane flights, you

1010
00:58:13,600 --> 00:58:17,320
Speaker 1: can track them. You can look up airplane flight prices

1011
00:58:17,760 --> 00:58:20,720
Speaker 1: in incognito mode and compare them to your regular browser.

1012
00:58:21,320 --> 00:58:25,000
Speaker 1: And sometimes on occasion you can find cheaper prices in

1013
00:58:25,160 --> 00:58:29,080
Speaker 1: incognito mode because it doesn't see how much you are searching,

1014
00:58:29,080 --> 00:58:31,440
Speaker 1: It doesn't see how how many websites you've gone to.

1015
00:58:31,800 --> 00:58:35,200
Speaker 1: Those cookies just aren't it there, So the website is

1016
00:58:35,200 --> 00:58:37,480
Speaker 1: going to give you the best price through that that

1017
00:58:37,640 --> 00:58:41,520
Speaker 1: private browsing mode. Uh, that's pretty much like the most

1018
00:58:41,560 --> 00:58:45,640
Speaker 1: interesting thing that I use for incognito mode for But

1019
00:58:45,720 --> 00:58:50,160
Speaker 1: it can be used to secretly access websites without anybody

1020
00:58:50,200 --> 00:58:53,400
Speaker 1: else knowing that you're accessing those websites at the time.

1021
00:58:53,760 --> 00:58:57,080
Speaker 1: For example, if you are a Brownie. Yeah, so this

1022
00:58:57,160 --> 00:58:59,919
Speaker 1: works on the device level, but not the network level.

1023
00:59:00,240 --> 00:59:02,960
Speaker 1: So yeah, so if my friend gets hold of my

1024
00:59:03,440 --> 00:59:06,240
Speaker 1: phone or my computer, there would be no record of

1025
00:59:06,280 --> 00:59:09,840
Speaker 1: me having gone on the Browny fan fiction community site,

1026
00:59:10,560 --> 00:59:15,840
Speaker 1: uh where I post by q d mark. They would

1027
00:59:15,880 --> 00:59:17,240
Speaker 1: not be able to see that. But if they were

1028
00:59:17,280 --> 00:59:20,880
Speaker 1: to look at the network traffic. They'd say, huh, this

1029
00:59:21,080 --> 00:59:24,080
Speaker 1: I P address is going to this brownie site a lot,

1030
00:59:24,400 --> 00:59:28,640
Speaker 1: and it's not my computer, so it's obviously your device

1031
00:59:29,160 --> 00:59:31,400
Speaker 1: and so and so this is why, Like, if you

1032
00:59:31,400 --> 00:59:33,439
Speaker 1: were to use let's say that you're at work. Let's

1033
00:59:33,440 --> 00:59:35,520
Speaker 1: say you're what the example I like to give is

1034
00:59:35,560 --> 00:59:38,200
Speaker 1: your Let's say you are stuck in a crappy job.

1035
00:59:38,880 --> 00:59:41,960
Speaker 1: You're doing your job, but you're miserable and you would

1036
00:59:42,040 --> 00:59:44,560
Speaker 1: really love to be able to get something else, but

1037
00:59:44,640 --> 00:59:47,240
Speaker 1: you don't have any time outside of your job where

1038
00:59:47,240 --> 00:59:51,320
Speaker 1: you can really dedicate towards things like searching for job openings.

1039
00:59:51,480 --> 00:59:54,400
Speaker 1: So on your lunch break, you slip into incognito mode

1040
00:59:54,440 --> 00:59:57,880
Speaker 1: and you go on a job search website. Well, just

1041
00:59:57,920 --> 01:00:00,760
Speaker 1: because you're an incognito mode doesn't me that at the

1042
01:00:00,800 --> 01:00:03,800
Speaker 1: network level, they can't see exactly what's going on, So

1043
01:00:03,880 --> 01:00:06,400
Speaker 1: it doesn't actually protect what you're doing or how you're

1044
01:00:06,440 --> 01:00:10,000
Speaker 1: doing it. So one thing you might want to use

1045
01:00:10,040 --> 01:00:13,040
Speaker 1: incognito mode for if you're someone like me who does

1046
01:00:13,080 --> 01:00:15,960
Speaker 1: a lot of research. Let's say I'm researching into something

1047
01:00:16,240 --> 01:00:18,960
Speaker 1: that you know, it's it's just not my bag, you know,

1048
01:00:19,000 --> 01:00:20,800
Speaker 1: it's I need to do an episode about it, but

1049
01:00:20,840 --> 01:00:24,080
Speaker 1: it's not something I'm particularly interested in on a personal level,

1050
01:00:24,600 --> 01:00:29,080
Speaker 1: or might even be something that I would find very awkward.

1051
01:00:29,160 --> 01:00:32,680
Speaker 1: Let's say that I was doing an episode about uh,

1052
01:00:32,920 --> 01:00:35,440
Speaker 1: dating websites, and so I have to do a whole

1053
01:00:35,480 --> 01:00:37,680
Speaker 1: bunch of research on dating websites. Well, then I might

1054
01:00:37,720 --> 01:00:40,400
Speaker 1: want to use incognito mode so it doesn't build up

1055
01:00:40,480 --> 01:00:44,120
Speaker 1: this cookie history that relates back to me personally, so

1056
01:00:44,160 --> 01:00:46,760
Speaker 1: that maybe I log onto something like Facebook and then

1057
01:00:46,800 --> 01:00:49,000
Speaker 1: suddenly all the ads are for dating sites. That would

1058
01:00:49,000 --> 01:00:52,480
Speaker 1: be awkward, right, That would be super awkward, especially if

1059
01:00:52,480 --> 01:00:55,040
Speaker 1: you were married. Yes, I'm not a good thing. Yeah.

1060
01:00:55,080 --> 01:00:57,360
Speaker 1: I had a similar occasion with I was looking up

1061
01:00:57,480 --> 01:01:02,400
Speaker 1: pregnancy and birth information for somebody in my family. I'm

1062
01:01:02,400 --> 01:01:05,760
Speaker 1: nowhere near any time soon giving you know, birth to

1063
01:01:05,880 --> 01:01:08,640
Speaker 1: any children in my life except for my beautiful for

1064
01:01:08,800 --> 01:01:11,320
Speaker 1: babies that I have in my house with me. So

1065
01:01:11,440 --> 01:01:13,480
Speaker 1: I was looking up this information and I was just like,

1066
01:01:14,160 --> 01:01:18,120
Speaker 1: do I want Twitter on Instagram to start promoting like

1067
01:01:18,480 --> 01:01:21,080
Speaker 1: baby items to me or do I want them to

1068
01:01:21,160 --> 01:01:24,160
Speaker 1: keep on promoting like makeup in sailor moon items, which

1069
01:01:24,160 --> 01:01:28,080
Speaker 1: I'm actually into. So I looked up the information about

1070
01:01:28,120 --> 01:01:32,200
Speaker 1: pregnancy and birth for the other person through incognito mode,

1071
01:01:32,720 --> 01:01:36,120
Speaker 1: so that that information wouldn't actually be tracked and identified

1072
01:01:36,160 --> 01:01:41,040
Speaker 1: as a part of my online personality. So that way,

1073
01:01:41,040 --> 01:01:44,040
Speaker 1: I was able to keep the same ads that I actually,

1074
01:01:44,360 --> 01:01:48,240
Speaker 1: you know, sometimes kind of enjoy looking at because they

1075
01:01:48,280 --> 01:01:51,800
Speaker 1: do pertain to my lifestyle, but nothing that had to

1076
01:01:51,800 --> 01:01:54,840
Speaker 1: do with pregnancy, right. And and that's a great example too,

1077
01:01:54,840 --> 01:01:57,320
Speaker 1: because there was that famous example a few years ago

1078
01:01:58,240 --> 01:02:01,240
Speaker 1: of a retailer. Want to say it was Target, but

1079
01:02:01,320 --> 01:02:04,200
Speaker 1: I could be wrong, but it was a retailer Target. Yeah,

1080
01:02:04,240 --> 01:02:07,920
Speaker 1: and they had identified through the browsing history of a

1081
01:02:08,720 --> 01:02:11,720
Speaker 1: user that she was pregnant because of the things she

1082
01:02:11,800 --> 01:02:14,720
Speaker 1: was searching for, so they proactively sent her through the

1083
01:02:15,000 --> 01:02:19,880
Speaker 1: snail mail a package of coupons for pregnancy related items.

1084
01:02:20,160 --> 01:02:24,360
Speaker 1: And her father was the one who intercepted the letter

1085
01:02:24,440 --> 01:02:28,440
Speaker 1: the coupons, and she had not told him that she

1086
01:02:28,680 --> 01:02:32,200
Speaker 1: was pregnant, and he had assumed that Target had made

1087
01:02:32,240 --> 01:02:36,160
Speaker 1: this assumption and got super mad, and then turned out

1088
01:02:36,200 --> 01:02:39,160
Speaker 1: that he was mad about something that actually had happened.

1089
01:02:39,200 --> 01:02:41,800
Speaker 1: She just had not she had not had the occasion,

1090
01:02:41,880 --> 01:02:44,680
Speaker 1: she had not found the way to tell him. And

1091
01:02:45,000 --> 01:02:49,400
Speaker 1: that's awful. Uh, yeah, it's such a breach of privacy,

1092
01:02:49,480 --> 01:02:52,000
Speaker 1: to be honest, is when they start tracking you like

1093
01:02:52,040 --> 01:02:57,000
Speaker 1: that and sending you information. It's like unsolicited advertising. I

1094
01:02:58,280 --> 01:03:00,600
Speaker 1: hate it. We deal with it every single day. Line. Yeah,

1095
01:03:00,680 --> 01:03:05,240
Speaker 1: it's it's it's even worse than unsolicited advice, Like that's bad,

1096
01:03:05,680 --> 01:03:09,520
Speaker 1: but unsolicited advertising is even worse because they're like, yeah,

1097
01:03:09,720 --> 01:03:12,880
Speaker 1: they're so eager to make that sale that they can

1098
01:03:12,920 --> 01:03:17,439
Speaker 1: overstep very easily. Well, let's wrap up by talking about

1099
01:03:17,480 --> 01:03:19,640
Speaker 1: some of the more secure ways you can browse if

1100
01:03:19,680 --> 01:03:21,520
Speaker 1: you have to connect, and we mentioned this at the

1101
01:03:21,600 --> 01:03:25,280
Speaker 1: very top of the show, where VPNs are virtual private networks,

1102
01:03:25,720 --> 01:03:28,480
Speaker 1: and we mentioned that sort of man in the middle

1103
01:03:28,480 --> 01:03:32,520
Speaker 1: attack where you are logging into a hackers machine thinking

1104
01:03:32,560 --> 01:03:35,600
Speaker 1: that that's a legit hotspot, and then the hackers kind

1105
01:03:35,600 --> 01:03:39,040
Speaker 1: of relaying information and sniffing the entire time and learning

1106
01:03:39,240 --> 01:03:41,800
Speaker 1: all about you. Vp ns are kind of like that,

1107
01:03:41,800 --> 01:03:44,280
Speaker 1: but on the legit side, where you are logging into

1108
01:03:44,320 --> 01:03:50,360
Speaker 1: a remote server somewhere far away, probably through an encrypted connection,

1109
01:03:50,840 --> 01:03:53,720
Speaker 1: and then when you browse, it's as if you're browsing

1110
01:03:53,880 --> 01:03:59,000
Speaker 1: from the servers location, not your personal device. So if

1111
01:03:59,000 --> 01:04:02,040
Speaker 1: I were to blog into a VPN and then log

1112
01:04:02,120 --> 01:04:04,680
Speaker 1: into a web service. The web service would see my

1113
01:04:04,760 --> 01:04:08,600
Speaker 1: location as the location of the VPN server, not my

1114
01:04:09,120 --> 01:04:13,160
Speaker 1: gadget that's actually in front of me, right and not

1115
01:04:13,320 --> 01:04:16,120
Speaker 1: necessarily just for if you want to look at your

1116
01:04:16,280 --> 01:04:19,880
Speaker 1: my little pony browny fan fix. But VPNs can be

1117
01:04:19,960 --> 01:04:22,800
Speaker 1: extremely useful if you're trying to access a website that's

1118
01:04:22,840 --> 01:04:26,720
Speaker 1: only available in select countries. So if you choose to

1119
01:04:26,760 --> 01:04:30,840
Speaker 1: purchase like a consumer facing VPN product, and there's many

1120
01:04:30,880 --> 01:04:34,640
Speaker 1: out there, I could make recommendations, but they're constantly changing

1121
01:04:34,680 --> 01:04:38,760
Speaker 1: as far as their privacy and security terms and policies go,

1122
01:04:38,960 --> 01:04:43,680
Speaker 1: so I won't make any major recommendations here. But if

1123
01:04:43,720 --> 01:04:48,080
Speaker 1: you choose a VPN that has a a uh, for example,

1124
01:04:48,160 --> 01:04:51,680
Speaker 1: a country facing server that's in Japan, that means that

1125
01:04:51,720 --> 01:04:55,280
Speaker 1: I could download this VPN, log into it, connect through Japan,

1126
01:04:55,480 --> 01:04:58,960
Speaker 1: and be able to access a website that's only available

1127
01:04:58,960 --> 01:05:02,720
Speaker 1: to Japanese residences. UH. So I I had to do

1128
01:05:02,760 --> 01:05:04,920
Speaker 1: that a few years ago when I wanted to purchase

1129
01:05:04,960 --> 01:05:09,720
Speaker 1: tickets for the Studio Ghibli Museum through the Japanese website.

1130
01:05:09,800 --> 01:05:13,080
Speaker 1: It wouldn't let you access it through an American server

1131
01:05:13,360 --> 01:05:16,480
Speaker 1: or an American connection, so I logged in through my

1132
01:05:16,600 --> 01:05:20,479
Speaker 1: VPN through the Japanese server UH and I was able

1133
01:05:20,520 --> 01:05:24,040
Speaker 1: to purchase those tickets through the Japanese website. It thought

1134
01:05:24,040 --> 01:05:25,760
Speaker 1: that I was in Japan, so it let me do it,

1135
01:05:25,800 --> 01:05:27,920
Speaker 1: and that way I was able to save myself so

1136
01:05:28,040 --> 01:05:31,000
Speaker 1: much money. It was wonderful. So you can do it

1137
01:05:31,000 --> 01:05:35,000
Speaker 1: for you know, buying goods, buying tickets for you know,

1138
01:05:35,240 --> 01:05:37,560
Speaker 1: going to a concert in a different country, or a

1139
01:05:37,640 --> 01:05:40,440
Speaker 1: museum or something like that in a different country. You

1140
01:05:40,480 --> 01:05:44,680
Speaker 1: can use it to access online streaming portals that are

1141
01:05:44,720 --> 01:05:49,200
Speaker 1: only available in specific countries. You can use it to

1142
01:05:49,280 --> 01:05:52,520
Speaker 1: download specific things that are only available in specific countries.

1143
01:05:52,600 --> 01:05:54,960
Speaker 1: Like the list goes on and on, as far as

1144
01:05:55,200 --> 01:05:58,200
Speaker 1: different ways that you can use VPNs that aren't necessarily

1145
01:05:58,280 --> 01:06:01,480
Speaker 1: just directed for security and privacy, but are also directed

1146
01:06:01,520 --> 01:06:06,520
Speaker 1: at manipulating where the website thinks that you are coming from. Yeah,

1147
01:06:06,640 --> 01:06:09,240
Speaker 1: and this can be a matter of life and death

1148
01:06:09,320 --> 01:06:11,360
Speaker 1: for some people. Like here in the United States, we

1149
01:06:11,520 --> 01:06:14,480
Speaker 1: largely use it for the purposes of things like privacy, security,

1150
01:06:14,480 --> 01:06:17,800
Speaker 1: and convenience. But in other places where you might be

1151
01:06:18,480 --> 01:06:23,200
Speaker 1: UH in a country with a more authoritarian government, one

1152
01:06:23,280 --> 01:06:28,640
Speaker 1: that is far more restrictive in access to certain services.

1153
01:06:28,720 --> 01:06:32,080
Speaker 1: If you're able to connect through a VPN, which you know, granted,

1154
01:06:32,120 --> 01:06:34,400
Speaker 1: that means that that government agency hasn't been paying very

1155
01:06:34,440 --> 01:06:36,560
Speaker 1: close attention. But if we're able to do that, then

1156
01:06:36,640 --> 01:06:39,120
Speaker 1: you can log in two different things as if you

1157
01:06:39,160 --> 01:06:41,479
Speaker 1: were from some other part of the world and maybe

1158
01:06:41,520 --> 01:06:44,560
Speaker 1: get access to vital information or services that otherwise you

1159
01:06:44,600 --> 01:06:47,360
Speaker 1: would not have at your disposal. So they play a

1160
01:06:47,480 --> 01:06:51,280
Speaker 1: very important role. In fact, I gave an example today

1161
01:06:51,320 --> 01:06:53,560
Speaker 1: with a friend of mine about how I would see

1162
01:06:53,640 --> 01:06:59,240
Speaker 1: VPNs and incognito mode together being incredibly important. So imagine

1163
01:06:59,680 --> 01:07:02,200
Speaker 1: that this is a terrible scenario and I put that

1164
01:07:02,280 --> 01:07:05,280
Speaker 1: out there first, but imagine that you are in some

1165
01:07:05,400 --> 01:07:09,840
Speaker 1: form of abusive situation at home, and whether it's a

1166
01:07:10,160 --> 01:07:13,560
Speaker 1: spouse of a parent, a parent, some sort of authority figure,

1167
01:07:13,600 --> 01:07:16,320
Speaker 1: whatever it may be. But you're in that abusive experience,

1168
01:07:16,600 --> 01:07:19,120
Speaker 1: You're going to feel like you are helpless and you

1169
01:07:19,160 --> 01:07:22,360
Speaker 1: want to look for resources that can help you get

1170
01:07:22,400 --> 01:07:24,560
Speaker 1: out of that situation. But at the same time, you

1171
01:07:24,600 --> 01:07:28,400
Speaker 1: have a very legitimate fear of being found out for

1172
01:07:28,440 --> 01:07:31,560
Speaker 1: seeking out those resources and the fear of reprisal that

1173
01:07:31,680 --> 01:07:34,360
Speaker 1: you might face as a result of that. Well, using

1174
01:07:34,400 --> 01:07:37,680
Speaker 1: something like a VPN and incognito mode would mean that

1175
01:07:37,960 --> 01:07:40,840
Speaker 1: you're not leaving a trace on the network of what

1176
01:07:40,880 --> 01:07:42,800
Speaker 1: you're doing, because as far as the network is concerned,

1177
01:07:42,880 --> 01:07:45,960
Speaker 1: all you're doing is visiting this VPN server. It's not

1178
01:07:46,040 --> 01:07:48,520
Speaker 1: seeing what else you're doing. All he knows you went

1179
01:07:48,520 --> 01:07:51,439
Speaker 1: to that VPN server. Incognito mode means you're not leaving

1180
01:07:51,480 --> 01:07:54,160
Speaker 1: the trace on whatever device you're actually using to do

1181
01:07:54,240 --> 01:07:56,760
Speaker 1: that sort of search. So these are the sort of

1182
01:07:56,760 --> 01:08:00,280
Speaker 1: tools that can literally mean life or death scenario eos

1183
01:08:00,360 --> 01:08:05,439
Speaker 1: for people. And you know, thatsraically together and it yeah,

1184
01:08:05,640 --> 01:08:08,920
Speaker 1: and once you start combining those different security and privacy

1185
01:08:08,920 --> 01:08:13,040
Speaker 1: products together that are very consumer friendly, then you can

1186
01:08:13,120 --> 01:08:17,080
Speaker 1: end up having a much more secure experience online, especially

1187
01:08:17,120 --> 01:08:19,320
Speaker 1: if you're dealing with some kind of like like an

1188
01:08:19,360 --> 01:08:23,040
Speaker 1: abusive relationship or something like that that can be uh

1189
01:08:23,640 --> 01:08:27,440
Speaker 1: something that you seriously have to worry about, So definitely

1190
01:08:27,520 --> 01:08:31,680
Speaker 1: take those into consideration. Using an incognito mode and VPNs

1191
01:08:31,720 --> 01:08:34,880
Speaker 1: together is so easy too. It's just as simple as

1192
01:08:34,920 --> 01:08:39,439
Speaker 1: opening up that browser window in private browsing mode and

1193
01:08:39,560 --> 01:08:42,280
Speaker 1: turning on your VPN, which is usually with a lot

1194
01:08:42,320 --> 01:08:44,920
Speaker 1: of software nowadays, is the click of a switch in

1195
01:08:45,040 --> 01:08:47,880
Speaker 1: your computer and there are a lot of VPN apps

1196
01:08:47,920 --> 01:08:49,439
Speaker 1: out there, like there are a lot of the services

1197
01:08:49,479 --> 01:08:52,080
Speaker 1: where if you subscribe to the service, you can use

1198
01:08:52,720 --> 01:08:55,320
Speaker 1: uh your computer, or you can use a mobile device,

1199
01:08:55,400 --> 01:08:57,640
Speaker 1: or you can use some combination of multiples. And there

1200
01:08:57,640 --> 01:08:59,639
Speaker 1: are even ones where you can have it set as

1201
01:08:59,760 --> 01:09:02,240
Speaker 1: a fault that as soon as you connect to Wi

1202
01:09:02,320 --> 01:09:04,800
Speaker 1: Fi networks, you connect through the VPN, so you don't

1203
01:09:04,840 --> 01:09:07,720
Speaker 1: even have to think about it in that case, which

1204
01:09:07,760 --> 01:09:10,599
Speaker 1: is definitely good. If you're using like a mobile device

1205
01:09:10,600 --> 01:09:13,040
Speaker 1: and you're connecting to public WiFi frequently, you definitely want

1206
01:09:13,040 --> 01:09:15,519
Speaker 1: to have that that that turned on, because if you

1207
01:09:15,560 --> 01:09:17,880
Speaker 1: ever forget about it, that's when you're going to have

1208
01:09:17,960 --> 01:09:21,880
Speaker 1: the opportunities for people to take advantage of you. The

1209
01:09:22,000 --> 01:09:26,080
Speaker 1: last examples go ahead, I'm sorry. There's also the option

1210
01:09:26,120 --> 01:09:29,519
Speaker 1: to build your own VPN, but that gets very much

1211
01:09:29,520 --> 01:09:32,559
Speaker 1: into the nitty gritty UH since there are a lot

1212
01:09:32,560 --> 01:09:36,160
Speaker 1: of consumer facing ones that are generally fine for the

1213
01:09:36,200 --> 01:09:40,200
Speaker 1: average consumer. That's what I wouldn't normally recommend. But when

1214
01:09:40,240 --> 01:09:43,559
Speaker 1: I go to Defcon, for example, I bring like my

1215
01:09:43,600 --> 01:09:46,560
Speaker 1: own certificate, my own VPN, and my own little o

1216
01:09:47,160 --> 01:09:50,639
Speaker 1: VPN basically file, and I stick that on my phone

1217
01:09:50,720 --> 01:09:54,439
Speaker 1: to actually run my own VPN. When you do that,

1218
01:09:54,640 --> 01:09:58,439
Speaker 1: you're basically creating your own secure profile as opposed to

1219
01:09:58,479 --> 01:10:02,160
Speaker 1: trusting a VPN company with your information and hoping that

1220
01:10:02,200 --> 01:10:04,840
Speaker 1: they are doing it for you. Yeah. Then that's a

1221
01:10:04,920 --> 01:10:07,679
Speaker 1: great point, Shannon, because a lot of these solutions actually

1222
01:10:07,720 --> 01:10:11,800
Speaker 1: ultimately require you to put trust in another entity. And

1223
01:10:12,400 --> 01:10:15,280
Speaker 1: you know, there have been cases where even VPNs have

1224
01:10:15,439 --> 01:10:19,880
Speaker 1: suffered data breaches in recent past, where you know, you

1225
01:10:19,920 --> 01:10:22,800
Speaker 1: have to worry about that kind of stuff too. There

1226
01:10:22,840 --> 01:10:25,439
Speaker 1: does come a point where you have, ultimately you have

1227
01:10:25,520 --> 01:10:27,679
Speaker 1: to say to yourself, at what point am I comfortable

1228
01:10:27,720 --> 01:10:31,200
Speaker 1: handing over control or handing over you know, some of

1229
01:10:31,200 --> 01:10:35,559
Speaker 1: my data, because either you're doing that or you're doing nothing.

1230
01:10:36,080 --> 01:10:39,479
Speaker 1: But you know, deciding where that point is is a

1231
01:10:39,600 --> 01:10:42,439
Speaker 1: very personal choice. Uh. The very last one I want

1232
01:10:42,479 --> 01:10:44,320
Speaker 1: to talk about, and we can do this very briefly,

1233
01:10:44,880 --> 01:10:48,960
Speaker 1: is Tour, the Tour browser. Tour initially was an acronym

1234
01:10:49,000 --> 01:10:51,719
Speaker 1: instead for the Onion router. And the reason it's called

1235
01:10:51,760 --> 01:10:56,360
Speaker 1: Onion is because it does encryption in layers, each outer

1236
01:10:56,520 --> 01:10:59,840
Speaker 1: layer being another layer of encryption. And I gave a

1237
01:11:00,040 --> 01:11:03,479
Speaker 1: very simple analogy. Imagine that you are trying to ship

1238
01:11:03,520 --> 01:11:05,599
Speaker 1: a present. Let's say I'm shipping a present to Shannon,

1239
01:11:06,280 --> 01:11:09,040
Speaker 1: but you're welcome, But I don't want you to know

1240
01:11:09,080 --> 01:11:12,240
Speaker 1: where I live um for some reason, and I don't

1241
01:11:12,240 --> 01:11:15,320
Speaker 1: want anyone to know that I'm sending a present specifically

1242
01:11:15,320 --> 01:11:18,080
Speaker 1: to you for some reason. So what I've done is

1243
01:11:18,160 --> 01:11:21,960
Speaker 1: I've nested your package that has your present in it

1244
01:11:22,080 --> 01:11:25,240
Speaker 1: inside another package that's gonna go to a totally different address.

1245
01:11:25,439 --> 01:11:29,839
Speaker 1: And I've nested that. What's that Is it a brown package?

1246
01:11:30,439 --> 01:11:34,320
Speaker 1: There's probably some you know, my little Pony temporary tattoo

1247
01:11:34,720 --> 01:11:38,360
Speaker 1: sheets there, So that's in there, and then that's in

1248
01:11:38,360 --> 01:11:40,880
Speaker 1: a second package. The second package is in a third,

1249
01:11:40,880 --> 01:11:43,160
Speaker 1: the third packages in the fourth. Each package has a

1250
01:11:43,160 --> 01:11:46,320
Speaker 1: different address on it. So I've got a really big

1251
01:11:46,360 --> 01:11:49,000
Speaker 1: package that ultimately is just holding a bunch of boxes

1252
01:11:49,040 --> 01:11:52,080
Speaker 1: and a couple of sheets of temporary tattoos and the

1253
01:11:52,160 --> 01:11:56,120
Speaker 1: innermost box. I ship that to the first address. The

1254
01:11:56,400 --> 01:11:58,840
Speaker 1: person at the first address opens up this big box

1255
01:11:58,880 --> 01:12:01,240
Speaker 1: and they see that there's a lightly smaller box inside

1256
01:12:01,280 --> 01:12:04,040
Speaker 1: with a different address on it. So they plopped that

1257
01:12:04,080 --> 01:12:06,240
Speaker 1: back into the post office. Post office takes that to

1258
01:12:06,280 --> 01:12:10,000
Speaker 1: the second destination. They opened up the package. Well, Destination

1259
01:12:10,040 --> 01:12:12,639
Speaker 1: number two. They know that the package came from destination

1260
01:12:12,760 --> 01:12:15,400
Speaker 1: number one, but they don't know anything further back from that.

1261
01:12:15,520 --> 01:12:18,000
Speaker 1: They don't know that I was the person who originally

1262
01:12:18,040 --> 01:12:20,439
Speaker 1: put the package in the mail, and they don't know

1263
01:12:20,479 --> 01:12:22,920
Speaker 1: where the package is ultimately going to. They just see

1264
01:12:22,960 --> 01:12:27,759
Speaker 1: Destination three on the shipping label of that inner package,

1265
01:12:28,120 --> 01:12:30,559
Speaker 1: so they send it to Destination three. Destination three gets it.

1266
01:12:30,600 --> 01:12:32,960
Speaker 1: They opened it up. They know it came from destination too.

1267
01:12:33,240 --> 01:12:35,760
Speaker 1: They don't know about Destination one. They definitely don't know

1268
01:12:35,800 --> 01:12:38,120
Speaker 1: about me, and they see that they need to send

1269
01:12:38,120 --> 01:12:40,200
Speaker 1: on the next package to Destination four, and so on

1270
01:12:40,200 --> 01:12:42,919
Speaker 1: and so forth, until finally you get to the innermost package,

1271
01:12:43,000 --> 01:12:45,800
Speaker 1: which has Shannon's address on it. She gets it. She

1272
01:12:45,840 --> 01:12:48,720
Speaker 1: knows it came from the previous site, but doesn't know

1273
01:12:48,880 --> 01:12:51,360
Speaker 1: any of the rest of the history, including where it

1274
01:12:51,400 --> 01:12:53,200
Speaker 1: came from, except I probably put a note in the

1275
01:12:53,240 --> 01:12:56,880
Speaker 1: inside of the package saying, hey, it's from me, Brownie Joe,

1276
01:12:57,200 --> 01:13:00,439
Speaker 1: and then then she gets the package. You would probably

1277
01:13:00,439 --> 01:13:02,360
Speaker 1: want to make sure that your message is encrypted. Yes,

1278
01:13:03,640 --> 01:13:06,080
Speaker 1: there's like a you know, I tell you that you

1279
01:13:06,080 --> 01:13:09,120
Speaker 1: need to use your super secret Captain Crusader decoder ring

1280
01:13:09,400 --> 01:13:12,720
Speaker 1: or whatever to decrypt the message and then and then

1281
01:13:12,760 --> 01:13:15,320
Speaker 1: she would be able to to use a similar process

1282
01:13:15,360 --> 01:13:18,320
Speaker 1: to send information to me. Uh. Now, this is a

1283
01:13:18,439 --> 01:13:21,639
Speaker 1: very secure way typically of sending information. There are ways

1284
01:13:21,640 --> 01:13:23,960
Speaker 1: to try and sniff out things, just as there are

1285
01:13:24,040 --> 01:13:28,360
Speaker 1: with any network communication, but it's hard. It's very hard

1286
01:13:28,439 --> 01:13:32,360
Speaker 1: to get anything meaningful through this process. It is possible,

1287
01:13:32,479 --> 01:13:35,800
Speaker 1: it's not fool proof, but it's real hard and uh.

1288
01:13:35,920 --> 01:13:39,479
Speaker 1: And so this is generally considered the most secure way

1289
01:13:39,520 --> 01:13:43,800
Speaker 1: to browse the Internet. However, with that security there comes

1290
01:13:43,800 --> 01:13:46,160
Speaker 1: a tradeoff, and that tradeoff is mainly felt in the

1291
01:13:46,200 --> 01:13:50,080
Speaker 1: form of speed. Yes, because it's having to go through

1292
01:13:51,760 --> 01:13:56,720
Speaker 1: it's definitely slower. Uh. And there has been talk on

1293
01:13:56,720 --> 01:14:01,040
Speaker 1: on the Internet many years ago that govern ment agencies

1294
01:14:01,080 --> 01:14:04,760
Speaker 1: had access to some of the UM end notes, the

1295
01:14:05,439 --> 01:14:09,120
Speaker 1: very last place that your package would hit before it

1296
01:14:09,200 --> 01:14:12,360
Speaker 1: went on to whoever it was supposed to go to. UM.

1297
01:14:12,479 --> 01:14:14,880
Speaker 1: So you do have to consider where where is this

1298
01:14:14,960 --> 01:14:18,519
Speaker 1: information being sent and who has access to the very

1299
01:14:18,760 --> 01:14:21,960
Speaker 1: end of that tunnel that you're sending that information through

1300
01:14:22,560 --> 01:14:27,360
Speaker 1: UM And if that's protected, then yeah, it's great option. UM.

1301
01:14:27,400 --> 01:14:30,799
Speaker 1: But of course with tour as well as with VPNs

1302
01:14:30,840 --> 01:14:34,680
Speaker 1: and incognito mode. You shouldn't use just one of these options,

1303
01:14:34,720 --> 01:14:36,680
Speaker 1: you should use all of them if they are at

1304
01:14:36,760 --> 01:14:40,320
Speaker 1: your disposal. But again, do you want to deal with

1305
01:14:40,360 --> 01:14:43,599
Speaker 1: the slowness that you're going to experience when you add

1306
01:14:43,600 --> 01:14:47,479
Speaker 1: these additional tunnels and additional nodes onto whatever you're trying

1307
01:14:47,520 --> 01:14:50,360
Speaker 1: to gain access to, or are you going to deal

1308
01:14:50,400 --> 01:14:57,080
Speaker 1: with the security um uh minimal experience and add that

1309
01:14:57,120 --> 01:15:01,240
Speaker 1: additional convenience to your experience by just not using it.

1310
01:15:01,600 --> 01:15:04,200
Speaker 1: So there are trade offs either way, and you've summarized

1311
01:15:04,240 --> 01:15:06,200
Speaker 1: it perfectly, Shannon. I mean, this is like we said

1312
01:15:06,200 --> 01:15:09,479
Speaker 1: at the beginning, this is a spectrum, and the important

1313
01:15:09,479 --> 01:15:11,960
Speaker 1: thing is to be educated to that spectrum so you

1314
01:15:11,960 --> 01:15:15,879
Speaker 1: can make your own educated decisions and not just trust

1315
01:15:16,000 --> 01:15:18,920
Speaker 1: to the fates. I have a tattoo on my back

1316
01:15:19,040 --> 01:15:23,479
Speaker 1: of the fool tarot card, the eternal Optimist. Don't be

1317
01:15:23,600 --> 01:15:26,840
Speaker 1: the fool. You get the tattoo who wants pretty awesome,

1318
01:15:26,840 --> 01:15:29,280
Speaker 1: It's dope, But don't don't be the don't be the

1319
01:15:29,320 --> 01:15:32,880
Speaker 1: fool in life? Right, Don't just trust that you can

1320
01:15:32,920 --> 01:15:34,880
Speaker 1: take a step off a cliff and you're not going

1321
01:15:34,920 --> 01:15:38,200
Speaker 1: to fall to your death. The fool is taking a

1322
01:15:38,240 --> 01:15:40,960
Speaker 1: step off a cliff in the traditional tarot card. So

1323
01:15:41,280 --> 01:15:43,520
Speaker 1: you don't want to be like that. You want to

1324
01:15:43,560 --> 01:15:46,960
Speaker 1: be informed and make choices, and you know, there might

1325
01:15:47,000 --> 01:15:50,400
Speaker 1: be instances where you think, Okay, I'm in a public spot,

1326
01:15:50,640 --> 01:15:52,599
Speaker 1: I am going to use WiFi, but I'm using it

1327
01:15:52,640 --> 01:15:56,160
Speaker 1: for something that's not related to my personal information. I'm

1328
01:15:56,200 --> 01:15:58,720
Speaker 1: literally maybe I'm looking up a restaurant to find out

1329
01:15:58,720 --> 01:16:01,160
Speaker 1: what hours it's open and that it's it. You know,

1330
01:16:01,560 --> 01:16:04,040
Speaker 1: they're different levels. But if you're thinking i want to

1331
01:16:04,080 --> 01:16:07,240
Speaker 1: do some shopping, or I'm going to check my bank statement,

1332
01:16:07,680 --> 01:16:10,479
Speaker 1: or I'm going to log into my email or this

1333
01:16:10,520 --> 01:16:12,800
Speaker 1: one's a big one for us here at my heart,

1334
01:16:13,080 --> 01:16:16,759
Speaker 1: if I'm going to access any of my my work stuff,

1335
01:16:17,240 --> 01:16:19,320
Speaker 1: right like anything that's stored on there, any of the

1336
01:16:19,360 --> 01:16:22,519
Speaker 1: services that are on here, definitely use a VPN in

1337
01:16:22,560 --> 01:16:25,320
Speaker 1: those cases, because you're talking about things that affect not

1338
01:16:25,439 --> 01:16:27,960
Speaker 1: just you but other people. Right, You're talking about the

1339
01:16:28,000 --> 01:16:34,799
Speaker 1: potential of affecting uh, essentially an entire company if if

1340
01:16:34,840 --> 01:16:37,599
Speaker 1: the wrong information were to get out. You know, especially

1341
01:16:37,600 --> 01:16:39,559
Speaker 1: if you're talking about things like publicly traded companies, you

1342
01:16:39,560 --> 01:16:42,400
Speaker 1: want to make sure that you're being a good steward

1343
01:16:43,080 --> 01:16:46,040
Speaker 1: of the information that's been entrusted to you, not just

1344
01:16:46,160 --> 01:16:51,120
Speaker 1: your own but others. So uh, Shannon, this has been

1345
01:16:51,120 --> 01:16:54,240
Speaker 1: a joy. You have given generously of your time and

1346
01:16:54,280 --> 01:16:57,679
Speaker 1: your expertise, and I greatly appreciate it. Please let people

1347
01:16:57,720 --> 01:17:01,720
Speaker 1: know where they can find your work well. Thank you

1348
01:17:01,840 --> 01:17:05,559
Speaker 1: so much, Jonathan. I love security and privacy and I

1349
01:17:05,600 --> 01:17:08,599
Speaker 1: think of it as a habit that you build upon

1350
01:17:08,720 --> 01:17:11,280
Speaker 1: over time, and the more that you learn about it,

1351
01:17:11,320 --> 01:17:13,360
Speaker 1: the better off you can be in the future. So

1352
01:17:14,080 --> 01:17:17,920
Speaker 1: build upon your security for your future self and for

1353
01:17:18,000 --> 01:17:21,160
Speaker 1: your family too, because the more secure here you are,

1354
01:17:21,640 --> 01:17:24,200
Speaker 1: the more secure they will be as well. Uh. And

1355
01:17:24,280 --> 01:17:28,520
Speaker 1: if you're interested in learning more about consumer privacy and security,

1356
01:17:28,600 --> 01:17:30,920
Speaker 1: you can check out my YouTube channel. It's YouTube dot

1357
01:17:30,920 --> 01:17:34,320
Speaker 1: com slash Shannon Morse uh and that's m O R

1358
01:17:34,560 --> 01:17:36,680
Speaker 1: s E just like Morse Code. And I will be

1359
01:17:36,720 --> 01:17:39,519
Speaker 1: going to c e S just like Jonathan. Jonathan mentioned.

1360
01:17:39,840 --> 01:17:42,719
Speaker 1: I'm very excited, so I will be posting a lot

1361
01:17:42,760 --> 01:17:46,880
Speaker 1: of content from the Consumer Electronic Show and I will

1362
01:17:46,920 --> 01:17:51,400
Speaker 1: have tons in store through the year of awesome. Shannon's

1363
01:17:51,479 --> 01:17:53,679
Speaker 1: always a pleasure. I am so sad that I will

1364
01:17:53,680 --> 01:17:55,320
Speaker 1: not be seeing you at c E S. Will have

1365
01:17:55,360 --> 01:17:58,599
Speaker 1: to make time for some other tech conference. I'm sure,

1366
01:17:58,640 --> 01:18:01,080
Speaker 1: or next time I'm out our way, I'll give you

1367
01:18:01,160 --> 01:18:03,559
Speaker 1: a shout and maybe we can, like yeah, we can

1368
01:18:03,720 --> 01:18:06,959
Speaker 1: can go grab ramin or something and chat about security.

1369
01:18:07,560 --> 01:18:10,120
Speaker 1: That would be awesome. Al Right, guys, Well, if you

1370
01:18:10,200 --> 01:18:13,000
Speaker 1: want to reach out to me, you can reach out

1371
01:18:13,040 --> 01:18:16,000
Speaker 1: over our social media channels. Were on the facebooks and

1372
01:18:16,040 --> 01:18:20,519
Speaker 1: the twitters with text stuff hs W And that wraps

1373
01:18:20,560 --> 01:18:22,920
Speaker 1: this up. I hope you guys learned something and that

1374
01:18:23,040 --> 01:18:26,000
Speaker 1: you put that information to you. Be safe, We love you,

1375
01:18:26,160 --> 01:18:33,920
Speaker 1: and I'll talk to you again really soon. Text Stuff

1376
01:18:33,960 --> 01:18:36,280
Speaker 1: is a production of I Heart Radio's How Stuff Works.

1377
01:18:36,439 --> 01:18:39,280
Speaker 1: For more podcasts from my heart Radio, visit the I

1378
01:18:39,400 --> 01:18:42,600
Speaker 1: heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to

1379
01:18:42,640 --> 01:18:43,599
Speaker 1: your favorite shows.