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Speaker 1: If you have your own story of being in a

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Speaker 1: cult or a high control group, or.

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Speaker 2: If you've had experience with manipulation or abusive power that

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Speaker 2: you'd like to share.

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Speaker 1: Leave us a message on our hotline number at three

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Speaker 1: four seven eight six trust.

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Speaker 2: That's three four seven eight six eight seven eight seven eight,

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Speaker 2: or showed.

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Speaker 1: Us an email at trust Me pod at gmail dot com.

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Speaker 3: Trust me, Trust trust me. I'm like a swat person.

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Speaker 3: I've never lived to you, and we.

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Speaker 4: Never have a live.

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Speaker 2: If you think that one person has all the answers,

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Speaker 2: don't welcome to trust Me. The podcast about cults, extreme

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Speaker 2: belief manipulation from two hackers who've actually experienced it. I

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Speaker 2: am Lo La Blanc and I am Megan Elizabeth. And

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Speaker 2: today our guest is Adam Levin, host of What the Hack,

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Speaker 2: and he is here to talk to us about all

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Speaker 2: things Internet scams. We're gonna talk about phishing, the scams

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Speaker 2: we've each experienced and in my case, committed, and the

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Speaker 2: heartbreaking romance scams that target the elderly.

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Speaker 1: We'll also discuss social engineering, who scammers are and what

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Speaker 1: happens when they get caught, Plus a bunch of tips

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Speaker 1: for how to protect your identity.

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Speaker 2: Online Adam Levin, not to be confused with Adam Levine

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Speaker 2: or another guy named Adam Levin, who I guess Jack

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Speaker 2: has gotten into reading. He's an author.

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Speaker 5: This is wow.

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Speaker 2: This is the cyber security Adam Levin. In case anyone

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Speaker 2: was confused and thought the singer of Moon five was

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Speaker 2: on our podcast.

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Speaker 5: No he is not. That Adam is a different one.

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Speaker 2: Gratefully look thankfully. Okay, So Megan tell me your GOLDI

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Speaker 2: Is thing.

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Speaker 1: Okay, this one's pretty wild. This takes place in Colombia.

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Speaker 1: Dozens of teenage girls have had to be taken to

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Speaker 1: the hospital because they've been playing the Ouiji board. So

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Speaker 1: two girls started playing the Ouiji board, they got really sick,

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Speaker 1: and then it became kind of an epidemic of people

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Speaker 1: playing the Ouiji boards and having to go to the hospital.

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Speaker 2: Oh. I have so many I have so many things

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Speaker 2: to say. I have so many things, but I'm not

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Speaker 2: going to say them all. I'm just gonna say that

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Speaker 2: this isn't saying. I know, like a significant number of

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Speaker 2: adults who like are actually afraid of Ouiji boards. So

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Speaker 2: I don't want to offend any of our listeners, but

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Speaker 2: it is my opinion that this would potentially be a

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Speaker 2: psychosomatic scenario here thoughts.

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Speaker 1: Well, you would think that, Lola, because you're in the

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Speaker 1: beginning of a horror movie about a girl who doesn't

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Speaker 1: believe in Ouiji plays.

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Speaker 2: I have one, and I used to play like all

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Speaker 2: the time because I wanted so desperately to see a

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Speaker 2: ghost and I could never make it happen. And my

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Speaker 2: friends and I would like, you know, the thing moves,

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Speaker 2: but it just has random nonsense words because it's just

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Speaker 2: the vibrations of your fingers.

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Speaker 1: See, here's how unimaginative my friends and I were. We

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Speaker 1: would play all the time. It never moved even a centimeter. Really,

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Speaker 1: most people are like messing with each other. We never

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Speaker 1: got into miss so I don't know.

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Speaker 2: We had friends who would occasional make it say word,

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Speaker 2: but we all everyone would always admit that they were

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Speaker 2: fucking with it. But like the vibrations of your fingers,

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Speaker 2: like even if you do it by yourself, like your

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Speaker 2: hands shake a little at least, mind you, so it

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Speaker 2: moves round. Yeah you know, but it says like.

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Speaker 1: Up club right three, But it is kind of culty

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Speaker 1: that it's spreading.

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Speaker 2: Yeah yeah, yeah, I mean it's fascinating. I want to

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Speaker 2: do a movie on it, but it's it seems probably

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Speaker 2: like heuse of mass hysteria. But obviously that's coming from

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Speaker 2: a skeptic and other people feel differently than I do

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Speaker 2: about what we do words, So take it well your

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Speaker 2: own conclusions.

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Speaker 5: What about you, what's the cultiest thing that happened to

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Speaker 5: you this week?

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Speaker 2: Well, I just have fallen into this, like down this

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Speaker 2: rabbit hole about psychiatric hospitals.

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Speaker 5: Okay, talking to Zach, I.

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Speaker 2: Get talking to Zach was part of it. I'm also

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Speaker 2: working on a script that stars a mental health professional,

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Speaker 2: so I wanted to just kind of explore that world

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Speaker 2: and see if it was something, if it was a

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Speaker 2: setting I was interested in. But I just keep getting

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Speaker 2: more and more interested in it. And it's so crazy

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Speaker 2: the things that happen. I mean, like, obviously they're an

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Speaker 2: incredibly important institution. We desperately need them for we need

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Speaker 2: more of them. We have so many people who are

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Speaker 2: on the streets who actually need mental health care. But

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Speaker 2: also at the same time, there are a lot of

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Speaker 2: problems happening within our psychiatric system that can get a

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Speaker 2: little cultsy, and it makes me very concerned for patients

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Speaker 2: who might not be in the safest of psych words.

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Speaker 2: For example, once you're in it can be like in

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Speaker 2: the movies. There are a lot of stories of people

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Speaker 2: who were determined to have some diagnosis incorrectly and were

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Speaker 2: basically trapped there or convinced that they had a particular

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Speaker 2: thing that they did not have. There are a lot

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Speaker 2: of instances of sexual assault of patients happening, both by staff,

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Speaker 2: but I would say largely by other patients, because there

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Speaker 2: are so many co ed wards and it happens even

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Speaker 2: when it isn't a co so there's a fair amount

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Speaker 2: of sexual assault that goes on. And then also, I mean,

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Speaker 2: you can get force medication if you act out at all.

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Speaker 2: I mean, there are just so many things that seem

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Speaker 2: like your autonomy is taken away. And obviously that's really

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Speaker 2: important for people who are suicidal or maybe a danger

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Speaker 2: to others and such, But there are enough instances of

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Speaker 2: that happening where it's not appropriate that it seems like

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Speaker 2: it is an area of our country that needs more examination. Also,

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Speaker 2: the racism in this particular world is obviously, of course

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Speaker 2: fucked up. There was a woman who went just to

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Speaker 2: get her anxiety meds from her like social worker or whatever,

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Speaker 2: and the social worker left the room of the black woman.

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Speaker 2: This was in Queens. This was not that long ago.

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Speaker 2: This is like two years ago or something. Her social

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Speaker 2: worker left the room and then someone else was like, okay,

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Speaker 2: we're admitting you and like just assumed that she was

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Speaker 2: supposed to be like checked in and like suddenly she's

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Speaker 2: an examination and she's being given medication that she doesn't

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Speaker 2: want or need, and she's just like suddenly like in

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Speaker 2: the fucking system. And fortunately she got out after not

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Speaker 2: super long. But there's another story of a woman being

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Speaker 2: pulled over, a black woman being pulled over and the

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Speaker 2: police not believing that she drove a fucking BMW. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: did you hear the story? Yeah. Anyway, there are stories

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Speaker 2: like that where she was held for fucking ten days

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Speaker 2: because they were like, there's no way that you're an

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Speaker 2: investment banker and you drive a BMW in Barack Obama

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Speaker 2: follows you on Twitter. You must be insane?

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Speaker 5: What that is?

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Speaker 2: So fucking crazy. Anyway, Obviously, there are so many incredible

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Speaker 2: people working at these places, and it's just an imperfect

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Speaker 2: system still and there needs to be more productions for people.

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Speaker 2: So that's a rabbit hole. I'm falling down and I'm

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Speaker 2: sure we will be talking about it more in the future.

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Speaker 5: I hope. So love it great? Should we talk? Should

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Speaker 5: we get into the interview?

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Speaker 3: Let's do it.

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Speaker 2: Welcome Adam Levin to trust Me. Thank you, thanks for

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Speaker 2: being here.

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Speaker 5: Adam.

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Speaker 2: So, you are a co host of What the Hack,

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Speaker 2: which I was loving as I was listening to the

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Speaker 2: past couple of days, a podcast about cybersecurity hacking. How

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Speaker 2: would you describe it?

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Speaker 4: Well, we think of it as like car Talk, but

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Speaker 4: for cyber love that. Yeah, and with some dad jokes thrown.

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Speaker 1: Into I was gonna say my dad loved car Talk

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Speaker 1: every day on the way to school or I don't

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Speaker 1: even remember when we listened to car Talk.

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Speaker 2: Yep, I miss car Talk. Yeah.

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Speaker 6: I Talk was like the original podcast.

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Speaker 2: You're right, You're right, yeah, Wow. It totally has that vibe.

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Speaker 2: It's like just some guys hanging out and talking about

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Speaker 2: this topic that they know a lot about and we

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Speaker 2: love it. So anyway, can you tell us a little

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Speaker 2: bit about your background to start and how you came

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Speaker 2: to specialize in these topics?

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Speaker 3: Oh?

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Speaker 4: Sure, Well, I was the consumer Affairs director for the

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Speaker 4: State of New Jersey, for five years one hundred and

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Speaker 4: fifty years ago, and then then had one of the

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Speaker 4: original online credit, product, service and education companies, Credit dot Com,

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Speaker 4: and then morphed into over the years through people contacting

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Speaker 4: me asking for any help they could get relative to

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Speaker 4: putting their identities back together again. We started a company

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Speaker 4: in two thousand and three called Identity Theft nine one one.

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Speaker 3: After a few.

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Speaker 4: Years we sufficiently scared enough companies that were using us

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Speaker 4: saying your name is terrifying, can you make it different?

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Speaker 4: We became IDT nine one one, and then people started saying,

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Speaker 4: so you're an alarm company or you a phone company.

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Speaker 4: And as we became global, we were able to get

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Speaker 4: the name cyber Scout. We were sort of the back

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Speaker 4: office cyber organization for several hundred insurance companies, and then

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Speaker 4: ended up getting sold inquired in two thousand and twenty

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Speaker 4: one by a company called Antique, which then got acquired

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Speaker 4: by Transunions. So that was my journey in But my

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Speaker 4: start was really in consumer protection, and there were so

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Speaker 4: many people that had contacted us over the years that

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Speaker 4: were concerned about a their credit and protecting their credit

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Speaker 4: and b protecting their identities that it was kind of

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Speaker 4: a natural flow all the way in to cyber got

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Speaker 4: it And.

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Speaker 2: What kinds of people do y'all typically have on the podcast,

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Speaker 2: just to kind of set the landscape here, Well, we.

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Speaker 4: Have people from all different walks of life. We've had

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Speaker 4: it actually, interestingly enough, a number of newspeople who have

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Speaker 4: had family members who have suffered romance scams and things

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Speaker 4: like that. We had one prominent news reporter who lost

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Speaker 4: her wallet and for two years was living an identity theft. Hell,

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Speaker 4: we've had folks like Al Franken who came on and

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Speaker 4: he wrote a skit with us about his dream hearing

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Speaker 4: in Congress, which is, what if you had a hearing

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Speaker 4: about privacy and your two principal witnesses were Siri and Alexa,

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Speaker 4: And he got Lorraine Newman to play Alexa, and Susan Bennett,

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Speaker 4: who's the actual voice of Siri, to play Siri.

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Speaker 2: Oh my god, wait, I never I mean, of course,

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Speaker 2: there's an actual woman who voiced Siri, but that never

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Speaker 2: occurred to me for some reason. That's amazing. I want

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Speaker 2: to be her friend and just make her talk to me.

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Speaker 3: Well, she's totally true.

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Speaker 4: I'm not sure who the voices were behind the British

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Speaker 4: boy band one or there's a number of voices now

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Speaker 4: that you can get. But Susan Bennett is the original

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Speaker 4: voice of Siri. She's great, fun, hysterical and super at

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Speaker 4: what she does.

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Speaker 2: I hope she's rich. I hope they paid her so

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Speaker 2: much money. Yeah, have you been scammed?

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Speaker 4: Every so often I get a scam that come along

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Speaker 4: that I say to myself, this real, not real. I've managed,

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Speaker 4: for the most part to be okay because I had

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Speaker 4: this huge company standing behind me. Just like Todd Davis

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Speaker 4: when he would post his Social Security number on a billboard,

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Speaker 4: he had lifelocks standing behind him.

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Speaker 3: So we were the lucky guys.

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Speaker 4: Even if someone scammed us, we instantly got taken care of.

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Speaker 4: But so many people around the world become victims of

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Speaker 4: all kinds of scams. And just like our friend Jessica

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Speaker 4: Roy from the Los Angeles Times, she said, no one

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Speaker 4: would help me, and I spent two years having to

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Speaker 4: do pretty much everything myself. And the reason is that,

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Speaker 4: first of all, a lot of law enforcement agencies they're understaffed,

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Speaker 4: under resourced. They really don't have the training to understand,

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Speaker 4: you know, how to deal with it. People that run

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Speaker 4: into problems with the IRS because someone got their identity

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Speaker 4: and filed at fake return they found for years because

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Speaker 4: the IRS was being cut back and back and back.

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Speaker 4: That a they couldn't on one on the phone and

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Speaker 4: be if they did, half the time, people had no

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Speaker 4: idea what they were talking about, damn. And the other

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Speaker 4: problem with a lot of these scams is that many

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Speaker 4: of the people perpetrating the scams are operating beyond the

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Speaker 4: jurisdiction of the United States. Right Either they're operating in

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Speaker 4: a country that doesn't care, or a country like, for instance,

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Speaker 4: North Korea, where they have a budget line that's based

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Speaker 4: on all the revenue that they get from people paying

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Speaker 4: ransomware attacks and things like that.

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Speaker 2: Wait, okay, so tell us more about that, because I

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Speaker 2: wanted to ask you about that anyway, we might as

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Speaker 2: well get to it now. Who are these people who

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Speaker 2: is scamming people? Who are the hackers? Who's doing this?

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Speaker 1: Is it?

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Speaker 2: How often is it like just some guy who's good

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Speaker 2: at it, versus like a factory of the hackers in

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Speaker 2: a room.

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Speaker 4: Well, there are four types of hackers, or we call

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Speaker 4: them thread actors, because there are a lot of hackers

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Speaker 4: that are good people, that are just trying to see

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Speaker 4: if they can make things better. But the threat actors there,

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Speaker 4: you have the state sponsored folks. Those are the people

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Speaker 4: that are actually working for a country or they are

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Speaker 4: independent contractors that have been retained by a country to

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Speaker 4: do hacking for them. And we've seen that in a

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Speaker 4: lot of the hacks, a lot of the healthcare related

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Speaker 4: hacks where state sponsored hacking. China has been very active

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Speaker 4: in that they've hacked everything from the Office of Personnel

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Speaker 4: Management in Washington, DC all the way up through hotel chains, airlines,

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Speaker 4: all kinds of different research facilities because China they not

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Speaker 4: only are interested in the information for espionage purposes, but

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Speaker 4: it's kind of like why have to start any kind

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Speaker 4: of a system from scratch when you can basically steal

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Speaker 4: enough information that you can use someone else's system.

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Speaker 5: May so, may I ask what you think about TikTok.

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Speaker 4: Well, TikTok is of great concern to a lot of

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Speaker 4: people because, frankly, any company that's operating out of or

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Speaker 4: having a base in China is pretty much under the

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Speaker 4: thumb of China. So you know, even though they say

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Speaker 4: they're collecting information and it's going to it's on us

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Speaker 4: servers and things like that. You just you never know,

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Speaker 4: especially with a country that has made its mark over

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Speaker 4: the years in cybercrime, right has it?

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Speaker 2: Is that a known thing? I don't know anything about

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Speaker 2: that cybercrime. Is China known for its cyber crime? Oh?

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Speaker 4: Yeah, China. As a matter of fact, a few years ago,

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Speaker 4: President Obama made an agreement with the president of China

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Speaker 4: that hacking for espionage purposes. You know, it's kind of

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Speaker 4: like everybody does it, but when you start hacking companies

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Speaker 4: and stealing intellectual property and potentially putting companies under and

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Speaker 4: people at risk, that they would kind of lay back.

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Speaker 4: They rapidly decided that they weren't interested in that agreement anymore.

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Speaker 4: And they've been extremely active. As a matter of fact,

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Speaker 4: not too long ago, the head of the FBI based

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Speaker 4: said that if you look at all of the hacks

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Speaker 4: that China's participated in, that is more than all other

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Speaker 4: hacks combined. Oh wow, almost in the history of hacking.

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Speaker 4: I mean, they're very active, they're really good at what

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Speaker 4: they do, and they've been very successful. So that's state

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Speaker 4: spart of course, then you have the Russian hackers, and

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Speaker 4: you have hackers, and well, Israel has a very professional

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Speaker 4: group of hackers, both offense and defense. Britain, France, the

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Speaker 4: United States, we are well known for being exceptionally good

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Speaker 4: at offensive hacking and not so good at defense against hacking.

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Speaker 6: That's so interesting.

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Speaker 2: You're making me think there needs to be a move

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Speaker 2: like a new version of the movie Hackers, but like

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Speaker 2: in today's landscape, because I want to see what the

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Speaker 2: heck is actually going on behind the scenes. It's so

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Speaker 2: interesting to me.

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Speaker 3: It's fascinating stuff.

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Speaker 4: And the truth is that, you know, the United States

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Speaker 4: is focusing a lot more on defensive cybersecurity now and

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Speaker 4: putting into place public public private partnerships.

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Speaker 3: Say that fast five times.

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Speaker 4: And Jen Hoisterly, who's head of SISA, which is the

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Speaker 4: Infrastructure Security Agency here in the US.

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Speaker 3: She's remarkable. And she and.

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Speaker 4: Christopher Krebs, who Donald Trump fired because Crebs worked very

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Speaker 4: hard to make sure that the last election was in

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Speaker 4: fact safe and secure and everything since twenty sixteen. That

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Speaker 4: didn't sit well with the president, so he was out.

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Speaker 4: But that state sponsor. Then you have the for profit folks,

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Speaker 4: and they hack into anything and everything where they can

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Speaker 4: generate money, either for themselves or for somebody who's hired

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Speaker 4: them to do it. We saw that in hacks like

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Speaker 4: Target Home Depot and many of the other hacks that

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Speaker 4: have begun an Then you have the cause hackers, and

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Speaker 4: that's when people are like anonymous as well known for hacking,

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Speaker 4: because either they may be upset with law enforcement or

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Speaker 4: they've been particularly active in hacking Russia after the attack

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Speaker 4: in the Ukraine. That and then there's the because I

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Speaker 4: can hacker, or as one former president referred to as

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Speaker 4: the four hundred pound hacker operating on a mattress in

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Speaker 4: his mother's basement in New Jersey. Although I don't know

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Speaker 4: too many four hundred pound hackers. They're all pretty thin.

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Speaker 4: But so those are really the four types, and they

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Speaker 4: come after us all kinds of ways, either online, on

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Speaker 4: the phone, texting, emailing, these kinds of things, so we

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Speaker 4: have to be particularly careful about that. I call it

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Speaker 4: the Pantheon of ishings. There's fishing, which is dear cardholder,

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Speaker 4: dear member, dear policy holder. There's beer fishing, where they

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Speaker 4: would say dear Lola, dear Megan.

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Speaker 3: And then there would be the.

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Speaker 4: Fishing, which is where you get a phone call you

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Speaker 4: think it's from the irs. They don't make phone calls

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Speaker 4: your bank. They don't really call you and ask you

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Speaker 4: to identify yourself. They know who you are, that's why

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Speaker 4: they're calling. And then they're smishing or SMS text based fishing,

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Speaker 4: and that's where you get that text and it does

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Speaker 4: everything from your account has been frozen and you don't

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Speaker 4: even know what account, but you panic and you know,

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Speaker 4: click here to reauthenticate yourself or anything that comes to

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Speaker 4: you by way.

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Speaker 5: Of text ups.

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Speaker 1: I always get your UPS package is so really available,

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Speaker 1: and I'm like.

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Speaker 6: Never that one, you know.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I've told this on the podcast before. But I

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Speaker 2: tweeted at what was it verb verbo, verbo dot com

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Speaker 2: or whatever that I was unhappy with some with basically

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Speaker 2: like I didn't get to stay in the place I

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Speaker 2: was supposed to stay and it was the day before

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Speaker 2: and I had no where to stay and they didn't help me,

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Speaker 2: and so I tweeted at them about it, and I

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Speaker 2: got a phone call. And this was before I had

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Speaker 2: successfully removed my information from like all of the Yellow

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Speaker 2: Pages websites or white measures or whatever. I got a

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Speaker 2: phone call saying, Lola, this is Jeff from Verbo. I'm

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Speaker 2: so sorry to hear you had a bad experience, and

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Speaker 2: I was like, well, who else would have my phone number?

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Speaker 2: It must be Verbo And.

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Speaker 6: You're like, hello, Verbo, nice to speak.

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Speaker 2: And then like seven minutes and he had me click

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Speaker 2: a link and I was like, oh, he's having me

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Speaker 2: click a random link. This is extremely shady. Of course

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Speaker 2: you're a scammer. And so I was like, oh, God,

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Speaker 2: damn it, Jeff, and he was like, wait, don't hang up.

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Speaker 2: And I was like, Jeff, you scammed me. He tried

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Speaker 2: calling me back and then I blocked his number, But.

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Speaker 5: I mean, it's just kiddy.

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Speaker 4: You know, people have a tendency. They get a phone

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Speaker 4: call from somebody they think is an authority, whether it's

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Speaker 4: the Jury Commission, the Health Department, the Eternal Revenue Service,

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Speaker 4: a financial institution, somebody raising money for a charity, and

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Speaker 4: they're asked for information, and you know, people are pretty open.

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Speaker 4: They tend to give it, and that's why they get

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Speaker 4: themselves in trouble. So rule number one. If anyone contacts

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Speaker 4: you for any reason whatsoever, and I don't care if

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Speaker 4: the call or ID says the United States Government, if

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Speaker 4: they ask you to authenticate yourself, hang up independently verify if.

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Speaker 3: You think it's legitimate.

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Speaker 4: Independently verify the right phone number or the right website.

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Speaker 4: And then if you go on that website or you

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Speaker 4: call that phone number and someone is asking you to

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Speaker 4: authenticate yourself, they're actually trying to protect you. But you

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Speaker 4: have to be in control of the exchange. Do not

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Speaker 4: be sort of the recipient of the communication and then

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Speaker 4: give it all away.

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Speaker 1: Here's a fun hat could just never answer your phone

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Speaker 1: or your text ever.

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Speaker 2: That's my Don't click on anything in your text.

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Speaker 6: Just never communicate with the outside world. That's my end.

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Speaker 4: No if I you know, unless you want to live,

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Speaker 4: you know, in a bottle cap under loon lake.

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Speaker 3: We're out there.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, and so we have to be very careful and

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Speaker 4: we have to understand that no one has the interest

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Speaker 4: in protecting us that we do. That we are the

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00:21:14,680 --> 00:21:18,800
Speaker 4: ultimate guardians of our data. Yes, our credit and our identity.

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Speaker 4: I'll give you something to think about. You know, when

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00:21:21,000 --> 00:21:25,680
Speaker 4: people say the word portfolio, the insitant response is investments.

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00:21:25,920 --> 00:21:29,120
Speaker 4: But we all have different portfolios in our lives, whether

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Speaker 4: it's our education portfolio, our medical portfolio. But two of

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Speaker 4: the big ones you have credit, your identity, and just

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Speaker 4: as you would hope that somebody professional would manage your money.

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Speaker 4: We each of us has to be the professional manager

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Speaker 4: of our credit and our identity. We have to build them,

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Speaker 4: nurture them, manage them, and protect them.

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Speaker 2: This is not that relevant of a story, but one

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Speaker 2: time I logged into credit Karma and my credit is

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Speaker 2: typically historically quite bad. I'm rebuilding it now. Calm down, everyone.

414
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Speaker 2: But long time I was broke and had bad luck

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Speaker 2: with some things, and my credit was in the trash

416
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Speaker 2: and I logged into my credit Karma and it said

417
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Speaker 2: my credit card was like seven eighty and I was like,

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Speaker 2: did someone steal my identity?

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Speaker 5: But like make it better?

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Speaker 2: This is amazing. I've bought three houses and successfully paid

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Speaker 2: on multiple cars. And then it turned out that for

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Speaker 2: some reason, my dad's information had gone through my email address,

423
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Speaker 2: and I was like, no, it's it's much lower. It's

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Speaker 2: I did not.

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Speaker 3: Ride with it, ride with it. No.

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Speaker 4: We were once working with someone at cyberscout where they

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00:22:32,000 --> 00:22:34,280
Speaker 4: they said, you know, now that I know everything, my

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Speaker 4: scammer has so much better credit than I do, I'll

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Speaker 4: ride with him.

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Speaker 6: Right, Yeah, that's okay.

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Speaker 1: So I was listening to one of your podcasts and

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Speaker 1: they were talking about in Nigeria. The scammers call themselves

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Speaker 1: the Yahoo Boys and they're like sharing information with each other.

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Speaker 6: They have a.

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00:22:52,440 --> 00:22:55,680
Speaker 1: Board up on the wall where they're like writing down

436
00:22:55,720 --> 00:23:00,359
Speaker 1: their marks information. What type of scammer are they falling under?

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00:23:00,480 --> 00:23:01,520
Speaker 5: What is that?

438
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Speaker 6: Are they just the romance schemes? Is that the kind?

439
00:23:04,960 --> 00:23:06,880
Speaker 4: Well, you know a lot of the scams coming out

440
00:23:06,880 --> 00:23:11,680
Speaker 4: of Nigeria, aside from congratulations in Nigerian Prince has decided

441
00:23:11,720 --> 00:23:15,800
Speaker 4: to be study with twenty million dollars. A lot of

442
00:23:15,800 --> 00:23:18,919
Speaker 4: them are romance scams. Some of them are crypto scams.

443
00:23:19,880 --> 00:23:22,920
Speaker 4: They do a lot of business email compromise scams out

444
00:23:22,960 --> 00:23:26,080
Speaker 4: of there. That's where someone in an organization gets an

445
00:23:26,080 --> 00:23:29,680
Speaker 4: email they think it's from a superior that's asking them

446
00:23:29,760 --> 00:23:33,480
Speaker 4: to wire money someplace, and they do. Then they find

447
00:23:33,480 --> 00:23:36,760
Speaker 4: out it wasn't their boss, and then the money's gone

448
00:23:36,840 --> 00:23:37,600
Speaker 4: and they're gone.

449
00:23:39,000 --> 00:23:40,240
Speaker 3: So they're very proficient.

450
00:23:40,320 --> 00:23:45,119
Speaker 4: They had one a scammer group operating out of Nigeria

451
00:23:45,119 --> 00:23:47,920
Speaker 4: that was so sophisticated. They would get into an email

452
00:23:47,960 --> 00:23:51,399
Speaker 4: system in particularly, they were interested in anywhere where money

453
00:23:51,480 --> 00:23:54,960
Speaker 4: was being wired, either in and out, and they would

454
00:23:54,960 --> 00:23:59,440
Speaker 4: wait till wiring instructions were sent and in transit as

455
00:23:59,480 --> 00:24:03,440
Speaker 4: the wire instructions were going to the recipient. They actually

456
00:24:03,600 --> 00:24:07,040
Speaker 4: changed the direction of where those wired funds should go.

457
00:24:07,280 --> 00:24:08,080
Speaker 2: Wow.

458
00:24:08,560 --> 00:24:11,119
Speaker 4: And the fellow who was the head of it was

459
00:24:11,640 --> 00:24:15,760
Speaker 4: highly respected in his community, was an elder of the church,

460
00:24:16,160 --> 00:24:18,760
Speaker 4: and no one had any idea that he was running

461
00:24:18,800 --> 00:24:19,480
Speaker 4: this operation.

462
00:24:19,840 --> 00:24:20,159
Speaker 1: Wow.

463
00:24:20,320 --> 00:24:21,240
Speaker 5: How did they catch him?

464
00:24:21,240 --> 00:24:23,119
Speaker 6: How did scammers typically get caught?

465
00:24:23,320 --> 00:24:27,640
Speaker 4: Sometimes they just leave a trail of breadcrumbs. Sometimes it's

466
00:24:27,720 --> 00:24:31,720
Speaker 4: that one scammer gets caught for something and they roll

467
00:24:31,800 --> 00:24:35,320
Speaker 4: over on other scammers as part of their deal with

468
00:24:35,359 --> 00:24:37,640
Speaker 4: the government. You know, we had one guy in the show,

469
00:24:37,880 --> 00:24:42,560
Speaker 4: Terrific guy, Brett Johnson, hysterically funny, and he was one

470
00:24:42,600 --> 00:24:46,720
Speaker 4: of the heads of what was an original credit card

471
00:24:47,760 --> 00:24:51,680
Speaker 4: website where they sold credit card stolen credit card numbers.

472
00:24:52,080 --> 00:24:52,399
Speaker 5: Wow.

473
00:24:52,440 --> 00:24:55,560
Speaker 4: And so he managed to escape law enforcement. They finally

474
00:24:55,600 --> 00:24:58,240
Speaker 4: caught him, They arrested him, they made him a deal.

475
00:24:58,880 --> 00:25:01,800
Speaker 4: He said, okay, I'll I'll work with you. And then

476
00:25:01,880 --> 00:25:04,879
Speaker 4: while he was working with the federal agency, he was

477
00:25:04,960 --> 00:25:09,040
Speaker 4: running a side hustle where he was using stolen identities

478
00:25:09,080 --> 00:25:11,960
Speaker 4: to file fake tax returns. He's making a fortune.

479
00:25:12,119 --> 00:25:12,359
Speaker 1: Wow.

480
00:25:12,440 --> 00:25:13,320
Speaker 3: He got away again.

481
00:25:13,480 --> 00:25:16,600
Speaker 4: They finally caught him in Disneyland. They just like, hey,

482
00:25:16,680 --> 00:25:19,280
Speaker 4: Tom Brady, who just won the Super Bowls, Like, hey, bread,

483
00:25:19,680 --> 00:25:21,960
Speaker 4: you just nailed somebody for one hundred and sixty thousand

484
00:25:22,000 --> 00:25:22,800
Speaker 4: dollars this week.

485
00:25:22,800 --> 00:25:23,560
Speaker 3: What are you doing.

486
00:25:23,960 --> 00:25:27,359
Speaker 4: He went to Disneyland, they caught him, he served time,

487
00:25:27,880 --> 00:25:32,120
Speaker 4: and now he is a consultant to business and consumers.

488
00:25:32,760 --> 00:25:37,120
Speaker 4: He's got a website, he's got shows, podcasts. He's terrific,

489
00:25:37,440 --> 00:25:39,840
Speaker 4: and he talks about how he sort of fell into

490
00:25:39,880 --> 00:25:42,560
Speaker 4: it and got himself out of it. Another well known

491
00:25:42,640 --> 00:25:48,080
Speaker 4: hacker that has become very sort of mainstream brilliant Kevin Mitnick.

492
00:25:48,320 --> 00:25:50,360
Speaker 2: I was about to say, I know Kevin Mitnick. He's

493
00:25:50,400 --> 00:25:53,639
Speaker 2: like a family friend. Yeah, that's so smart. That's a

494
00:25:53,800 --> 00:25:54,679
Speaker 2: smart career path.

495
00:25:54,960 --> 00:25:56,879
Speaker 3: So you know, he can done really well.

496
00:25:56,920 --> 00:25:58,840
Speaker 4: And you know he's one of the big guys over

497
00:25:58,920 --> 00:26:01,280
Speaker 4: it to know before and they went public, so I'm

498
00:26:01,320 --> 00:26:03,639
Speaker 4: sure he did very well with that. And he's a

499
00:26:03,800 --> 00:26:07,200
Speaker 4: he's a wonderful orator and gives great presentations.

500
00:26:07,320 --> 00:26:07,520
Speaker 2: Yeah.

501
00:26:07,640 --> 00:26:08,480
Speaker 5: Yeah, So you.

502
00:26:08,440 --> 00:26:11,640
Speaker 1: Guys are saying that scammers can reform and we can

503
00:26:11,760 --> 00:26:14,360
Speaker 1: trust them, not.

504
00:26:14,600 --> 00:26:19,400
Speaker 4: Exactly when they have reformed, once they have independently verified

505
00:26:19,480 --> 00:26:23,120
Speaker 4: their reformation, and the fact that they've gone the straight and.

506
00:26:23,160 --> 00:26:27,320
Speaker 3: Narrow, maybe still be again. Yeah, you know, it.

507
00:26:27,680 --> 00:26:32,439
Speaker 4: Depends upon the personality and the orientation of the individual.

508
00:26:32,320 --> 00:26:35,800
Speaker 2: Right right, Yeah, yeah, I mean it's nice to know

509
00:26:35,840 --> 00:26:38,000
Speaker 2: that anyone gets caught, because I feel like I have

510
00:26:38,119 --> 00:26:43,119
Speaker 2: this idea in my head of a hacker who's like indestructible,

511
00:26:43,320 --> 00:26:45,479
Speaker 2: and I don't know, like they're a superhero, Like hackers

512
00:26:45,480 --> 00:26:47,480
Speaker 2: are superheroes. They can never be caught. You're never going

513
00:26:47,520 --> 00:26:48,800
Speaker 2: to figure out who it is. And then of course

514
00:26:48,840 --> 00:26:49,960
Speaker 2: that's obviously not true.

515
00:26:50,160 --> 00:26:51,760
Speaker 5: So disappointing when you see them.

516
00:26:52,320 --> 00:26:53,040
Speaker 6: It really is.

517
00:26:53,240 --> 00:26:56,439
Speaker 2: And they're not hot, like Angelina Jolie and me, and

518
00:26:56,480 --> 00:26:57,080
Speaker 2: you're like, oh my.

519
00:26:57,080 --> 00:26:59,480
Speaker 5: God, you you can look kind of sad.

520
00:26:59,760 --> 00:27:02,200
Speaker 6: Yeah, you know, I really wanted to stone you to

521
00:27:02,240 --> 00:27:03,000
Speaker 6: do something.

522
00:27:03,040 --> 00:27:04,160
Speaker 2: How many hackers are women?

523
00:27:04,320 --> 00:27:04,560
Speaker 4: You know?

524
00:27:04,840 --> 00:27:06,120
Speaker 2: Actually, how many hackers are women?

525
00:27:06,280 --> 00:27:11,000
Speaker 3: Yeah, there are not as many as one would assume.

526
00:27:11,200 --> 00:27:13,400
Speaker 4: And in fact, if you know, you talk to most

527
00:27:13,400 --> 00:27:15,560
Speaker 4: women in cybersecurity, they say there's not.

528
00:27:15,680 --> 00:27:16,280
Speaker 3: Enough of us.

529
00:27:16,680 --> 00:27:22,080
Speaker 4: Yeah, and there is a huge drive on to get

530
00:27:22,119 --> 00:27:26,320
Speaker 4: people more involved in cybersecurity, men and women, but particularly

531
00:27:26,400 --> 00:27:28,800
Speaker 4: they would they are really interested in getting more women

532
00:27:28,840 --> 00:27:31,680
Speaker 4: into cybersecurity, and you know, if you want to talk

533
00:27:31,720 --> 00:27:34,720
Speaker 4: about a career path. In the next few years, there

534
00:27:34,760 --> 00:27:39,880
Speaker 4: will be almost two million more cyber security positions available. Wow,

535
00:27:39,880 --> 00:27:43,200
Speaker 4: and there are trained cybersecurity professionals to fill them.

536
00:27:43,320 --> 00:27:49,200
Speaker 2: Oh wow, Okay, ladies get involved. I imagine women would

537
00:27:49,200 --> 00:27:52,560
Speaker 2: be I imagine there's a type of hacking or scamming that

538
00:27:52,640 --> 00:27:55,760
Speaker 2: women would be better at. On the other end as well,

539
00:27:56,280 --> 00:27:58,040
Speaker 2: like I don't know, you trust a woman more if

540
00:27:58,040 --> 00:27:59,600
Speaker 2: she calls you, I would I do?

541
00:27:59,760 --> 00:28:01,160
Speaker 6: Yeah, yeah, no.

542
00:28:01,240 --> 00:28:02,360
Speaker 3: I don't disagree.

543
00:28:02,400 --> 00:28:07,040
Speaker 4: And in fact, we had Michelle Danity on the phone

544
00:28:07,640 --> 00:28:09,639
Speaker 4: not too long ago, who's one of the you know,

545
00:28:09,720 --> 00:28:12,960
Speaker 4: really top privacy people in the world, and you know,

546
00:28:13,040 --> 00:28:15,280
Speaker 4: she was talking about the fact that if you look

547
00:28:15,480 --> 00:28:19,560
Speaker 4: at the numbers on scams, you will find that men

548
00:28:19,760 --> 00:28:23,160
Speaker 4: actually get scammed more often than women really.

549
00:28:23,280 --> 00:28:25,320
Speaker 6: But they don't want to talk about it, do they.

550
00:28:25,520 --> 00:28:27,520
Speaker 3: Well, men do not want to talk about it.

551
00:28:27,560 --> 00:28:30,280
Speaker 1: No, So we don't have the correct numbers because women

552
00:28:30,320 --> 00:28:32,159
Speaker 1: are like I got scammed and men are.

553
00:28:32,040 --> 00:28:35,400
Speaker 2: Like I am ashamed of Yeah, yeah, yeah, I mean

554
00:28:36,080 --> 00:28:39,240
Speaker 2: we talk about that in terms of cult victims as well, like,

555
00:28:39,360 --> 00:28:42,640
Speaker 2: are there actually far more women who've been you know,

556
00:28:42,720 --> 00:28:45,960
Speaker 2: manipulated and prayabon. I don't know, or are women just

557
00:28:46,000 --> 00:28:48,920
Speaker 2: more willing to talk about it? It's always an interesting

558
00:28:49,000 --> 00:28:49,320
Speaker 2: question too.

559
00:28:49,400 --> 00:28:51,680
Speaker 4: I think women are more open, but I think more importantly,

560
00:28:51,840 --> 00:28:54,880
Speaker 4: women have a tendency to be more skeptical than men,

561
00:28:55,120 --> 00:28:56,920
Speaker 4: even though men don't like to admit it.

562
00:28:58,520 --> 00:29:01,680
Speaker 2: Interesting. Tell me why why you think that?

563
00:29:02,080 --> 00:29:04,400
Speaker 4: Well, I just you know, most of the women that

564
00:29:04,480 --> 00:29:06,400
Speaker 4: I know and i've met are very you know, it's

565
00:29:06,440 --> 00:29:09,080
Speaker 4: got kind of it's like Missouri show me.

566
00:29:10,720 --> 00:29:13,360
Speaker 2: Well, we've had, like I guess, we've spent our whole

567
00:29:13,360 --> 00:29:16,080
Speaker 2: lives fending off people trying to trick us into sleeping

568
00:29:16,120 --> 00:29:18,480
Speaker 2: with them. So, yeah, that's a little of it, you

569
00:29:18,480 --> 00:29:21,640
Speaker 2: know what I mean? Speaking of women, Can we talk

570
00:29:21,800 --> 00:29:24,280
Speaker 2: about romance scams?

571
00:29:24,640 --> 00:29:27,160
Speaker 4: Oh? Yeah, No, romance scams are you know, one of

572
00:29:27,160 --> 00:29:31,520
Speaker 4: my favorite subjects. Not because I think boy romance scams

573
00:29:31,520 --> 00:29:32,520
Speaker 4: are great, They're horrible.

574
00:29:32,720 --> 00:29:34,520
Speaker 3: Yeah, And I've.

575
00:29:34,520 --> 00:29:37,040
Speaker 4: Done shows with For instance, I did a show with

576
00:29:37,120 --> 00:29:41,920
Speaker 4: two women who were home healthcare providers and they were

577
00:29:41,960 --> 00:29:45,800
Speaker 4: in there, i'd say mid fifties. They were each approached

578
00:29:45,880 --> 00:29:49,560
Speaker 4: by different scammers and they ended up being scammed out

579
00:29:49,560 --> 00:29:53,400
Speaker 4: of sixty thousand dollars each. Oh and you know, people think,

580
00:29:53,480 --> 00:29:57,040
Speaker 4: do romance scams have to be complicated? The truth is

581
00:29:57,080 --> 00:29:59,920
Speaker 4: they really don't have to be because so many people

582
00:30:00,120 --> 00:30:03,320
Speaker 4: are open to them. And you know, you go on

583
00:30:03,400 --> 00:30:07,200
Speaker 4: dating sites, you can find people who are you looking

584
00:30:07,400 --> 00:30:11,600
Speaker 4: for relationships. You can go on other websites and see

585
00:30:11,640 --> 00:30:16,040
Speaker 4: people who are lonely and would like companionships. Certainly the

586
00:30:16,160 --> 00:30:20,400
Speaker 4: elderly community. Most of the senior citizens I know, and

587
00:30:20,440 --> 00:30:24,840
Speaker 4: I am in fact a senior citizen, are very They're

588
00:30:24,920 --> 00:30:27,240
Speaker 4: happy to talk to people, they want to talk to people.

589
00:30:27,720 --> 00:30:30,400
Speaker 4: And this is where people get in there and use

590
00:30:30,880 --> 00:30:34,800
Speaker 4: some misplaced trust in order to get their hands on

591
00:30:34,880 --> 00:30:38,720
Speaker 4: their money or things that are compromising and then squeeze them.

592
00:30:38,720 --> 00:30:41,280
Speaker 4: And so you have so many romance scams and people

593
00:30:41,320 --> 00:30:43,840
Speaker 4: go with they are they that much different? The answer is,

594
00:30:43,880 --> 00:30:47,320
Speaker 4: think of it. It's the same music, but different lyrics

595
00:30:47,320 --> 00:30:49,080
Speaker 4: depending upon what the scam is.

596
00:30:49,320 --> 00:30:50,719
Speaker 2: But it's so much more cruel.

597
00:30:52,120 --> 00:30:53,680
Speaker 3: No, it's terrible, it's terrible.

598
00:30:53,720 --> 00:30:57,760
Speaker 4: And you know, the playbook on a romance scam is

599
00:30:58,160 --> 00:31:02,040
Speaker 4: you meet somebody online and then unless it's pig butchering

600
00:31:02,240 --> 00:31:04,800
Speaker 4: and I mean it's a horrible name, but that's when

601
00:31:05,320 --> 00:31:09,880
Speaker 4: somebody essentially fattens someone up for the kill, and that's

602
00:31:09,960 --> 00:31:13,120
Speaker 4: they pay a lot of attention to you. They spend

603
00:31:13,160 --> 00:31:16,480
Speaker 4: a lot of time. Everything is about how do you

604
00:31:16,560 --> 00:31:19,640
Speaker 4: feel today, how's your day going with bombing wine?

605
00:31:20,080 --> 00:31:20,960
Speaker 3: Can I help you?

606
00:31:21,520 --> 00:31:25,479
Speaker 4: And then they crawl into your circle of trust and

607
00:31:25,560 --> 00:31:28,760
Speaker 4: then they get you. But a lot of these romance scams,

608
00:31:28,800 --> 00:31:31,800
Speaker 4: it's like you're communicating with somebody and after like a

609
00:31:31,880 --> 00:31:34,320
Speaker 4: day and a half, they either want you to have

610
00:31:34,400 --> 00:31:36,560
Speaker 4: their child or they want to have your child.

611
00:31:36,800 --> 00:31:40,240
Speaker 1: Ah, I think something, Oh sorry, just really quickly. I

612
00:31:40,240 --> 00:31:42,720
Speaker 1: think something in romance scams I didn't realize until I

613
00:31:42,760 --> 00:31:45,800
Speaker 1: listened to your podcast was that they also always seem

614
00:31:45,920 --> 00:31:50,200
Speaker 1: to have for certain jobs. They're like doctors or diamond

615
00:31:50,240 --> 00:31:53,840
Speaker 1: minors or something very specific that has a lot of

616
00:31:53,920 --> 00:31:56,720
Speaker 1: money coming in, but they might need just a little

617
00:31:56,760 --> 00:31:59,720
Speaker 1: bit more from you for right now, right now.

618
00:32:00,120 --> 00:32:00,520
Speaker 5: Correct.

619
00:32:00,760 --> 00:32:05,239
Speaker 4: Oh, absolutely, They're always having a crisis, right and you know,

620
00:32:05,280 --> 00:32:09,200
Speaker 4: whether it's their child has been kidnapped, we've seen those

621
00:32:09,840 --> 00:32:14,720
Speaker 4: to there's been an illness in the family, someone died,

622
00:32:14,800 --> 00:32:18,240
Speaker 4: the bread word of their family just died, or we

623
00:32:18,280 --> 00:32:21,040
Speaker 4: had one where there was a he was a doctor.

624
00:32:21,080 --> 00:32:26,920
Speaker 4: He had a very elaborate profile on LinkedIn talked to

625
00:32:26,960 --> 00:32:30,320
Speaker 4: a woman, got her very interested in him. He said

626
00:32:30,360 --> 00:32:34,479
Speaker 4: he had taken a hiatus from his profession and gone

627
00:32:34,520 --> 00:32:38,120
Speaker 4: to open a clinic in the Middle East and everything

628
00:32:38,240 --> 00:32:41,239
Speaker 4: was going great, had the staff had everything, but the

629
00:32:41,280 --> 00:32:44,440
Speaker 4: equipment that they ordered coming in from the United States

630
00:32:44,920 --> 00:32:48,840
Speaker 4: got held up at customs and he needed thirty thousand

631
00:32:48,880 --> 00:32:52,200
Speaker 4: dollars in order to get them through customs. Yeah.

632
00:32:52,600 --> 00:32:54,440
Speaker 3: Yeah, And her answer was.

633
00:32:54,600 --> 00:32:58,000
Speaker 4: I don't think so. But she was one of the

634
00:32:58,080 --> 00:33:01,360
Speaker 4: lucky ones there. You know, one known story in the

635
00:33:01,400 --> 00:33:05,160
Speaker 4: cyber community is one woman ended up partying with over

636
00:33:05,280 --> 00:33:09,680
Speaker 4: two million dollars to a scammer. It could have been

637
00:33:09,680 --> 00:33:13,640
Speaker 4: a boiler room of scammers, but a scammer, and the

638
00:33:13,800 --> 00:33:18,160
Speaker 4: only way it ended was that the financial advisor, who

639
00:33:18,200 --> 00:33:21,880
Speaker 4: could not get her to stop, finally called her family

640
00:33:21,960 --> 00:33:25,920
Speaker 4: and said, your mom is just why it's taking money out.

641
00:33:26,120 --> 00:33:28,520
Speaker 4: Almost every day, she's taking out two million bucks.

642
00:33:28,920 --> 00:33:30,560
Speaker 3: The family got involved.

643
00:33:30,200 --> 00:33:33,480
Speaker 4: They ran an investigation, They proved to her that she

644
00:33:33,680 --> 00:33:37,280
Speaker 4: was being scammed, and her final comment on the issue was,

645
00:33:38,000 --> 00:33:41,000
Speaker 4: I know I've been scammed, but in my heart I

646
00:33:41,080 --> 00:33:41,840
Speaker 4: still love him.

647
00:33:42,080 --> 00:33:44,600
Speaker 5: Yeah. It's an addiction. You're now addicted to the love.

648
00:33:44,640 --> 00:33:47,280
Speaker 6: And even if it's not real. You still want.

649
00:33:47,040 --> 00:33:51,440
Speaker 4: It, I know if you're in love with love, yeah, yeah,

650
00:33:50,320 --> 00:33:53,880
Speaker 4: And and they get into your they crawl into your

651
00:33:53,960 --> 00:33:56,440
Speaker 4: life and it's like they squeeze.

652
00:33:56,000 --> 00:33:57,840
Speaker 3: The lifeblood out of you.

653
00:33:58,760 --> 00:34:05,760
Speaker 4: And onean recently who was also a reporter, her mom

654
00:34:06,120 --> 00:34:10,839
Speaker 4: got involved with someone. Her mom was older, her dad

655
00:34:10,880 --> 00:34:15,040
Speaker 4: had died of cancer. Her mom found out she had cancer,

656
00:34:15,400 --> 00:34:17,560
Speaker 4: and she was in kind of the final year or

657
00:34:17,560 --> 00:34:22,960
Speaker 4: two of her life, and some guy who was very

658
00:34:23,080 --> 00:34:26,759
Speaker 4: suave kind of talked her into the fact that he

659
00:34:26,840 --> 00:34:29,560
Speaker 4: was so interested in her. And she was saying, I

660
00:34:29,640 --> 00:34:32,080
Speaker 4: love my mom, but she was kind of an overweight,

661
00:34:32,239 --> 00:34:35,520
Speaker 4: elderly woman. Why would a forty year old, super suave

662
00:34:35,640 --> 00:34:40,040
Speaker 4: guy be interested in my mom. She ended up giving

663
00:34:40,120 --> 00:34:43,160
Speaker 4: him three hundred and eighty thousand, and even after her

664
00:34:43,239 --> 00:34:46,840
Speaker 4: daughter kept saying, Mom, you're being taken. I've done investigations.

665
00:34:47,400 --> 00:34:50,120
Speaker 4: Her aunts got mad at her for interfering with their

666
00:34:50,160 --> 00:34:51,280
Speaker 4: mom's love life.

667
00:34:51,320 --> 00:34:53,680
Speaker 3: And I mean, it got to be very complicated.

668
00:34:53,680 --> 00:34:57,239
Speaker 4: And what a lot of people don't understand is a

669
00:34:57,360 --> 00:35:01,640
Speaker 4: romance scam doesn't interest involve the the members of their

670
00:35:01,719 --> 00:35:05,840
Speaker 4: family get involved. It can create rifts within a family.

671
00:35:05,880 --> 00:35:12,080
Speaker 4: It can also drain an estate of course. Yeah, so

672
00:35:12,280 --> 00:35:15,880
Speaker 4: it can affect generations of people. But these scammers they

673
00:35:15,880 --> 00:35:17,799
Speaker 4: don't they don't care. They don't care.

674
00:35:19,120 --> 00:35:22,440
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's happened to a friend of mine. Actually, several

675
00:35:22,480 --> 00:35:26,680
Speaker 2: friends of mine, their grandmothers, and they will not listen.

676
00:35:26,800 --> 00:35:30,319
Speaker 2: They don't like their families are telling them scam there.

677
00:35:30,640 --> 00:35:33,680
Speaker 2: They even like blocked one account for one woman and

678
00:35:33,960 --> 00:35:36,440
Speaker 2: she just found another, just used a different one. Like

679
00:35:37,160 --> 00:35:40,360
Speaker 2: it is amazing how much it must be just providing

680
00:35:40,480 --> 00:35:42,440
Speaker 2: so much meaning and need them.

681
00:35:43,080 --> 00:35:46,520
Speaker 1: Yeah, just constant attention kind of job is just to

682
00:35:46,640 --> 00:35:48,960
Speaker 1: check on you in a lonely time of your life.

683
00:35:49,239 --> 00:35:51,160
Speaker 1: One thing I did think was really cool is that

684
00:35:51,440 --> 00:35:53,759
Speaker 1: I heard this on your podcast as well, is that

685
00:35:53,880 --> 00:35:57,040
Speaker 1: banks are now closing down people's accounts if they think

686
00:35:57,080 --> 00:36:00,560
Speaker 1: that they're being scammed. They're like taking the initial because

687
00:36:00,640 --> 00:36:03,120
Speaker 1: they're losing so much money from these scammers.

688
00:36:03,239 --> 00:36:05,359
Speaker 4: Well, they are, and the banks are afraid at some point,

689
00:36:05,600 --> 00:36:08,719
Speaker 4: if it's clear, you know, the old torte thing, you

690
00:36:08,880 --> 00:36:12,520
Speaker 4: should have known, if it's clear that the financial institution

691
00:36:12,680 --> 00:36:16,120
Speaker 4: should have known that something was really wrong, they always

692
00:36:16,239 --> 00:36:19,840
Speaker 4: run the risk of being drawn into litigation. And you know,

693
00:36:20,000 --> 00:36:22,799
Speaker 4: one thing banks don't want is litigation. And you know

694
00:36:22,840 --> 00:36:25,040
Speaker 4: you have so many people go, I'm just a regular person.

695
00:36:25,080 --> 00:36:28,279
Speaker 4: Why would anyone want to scam me? Yeah, I don't

696
00:36:28,320 --> 00:36:30,120
Speaker 4: have that much money. You know, when you look in

697
00:36:30,160 --> 00:36:32,960
Speaker 4: the mirror, you see you, right, But when a scammer

698
00:36:33,000 --> 00:36:37,160
Speaker 4: looks at you, they see Jaz Beyonce, Adam Levine.

699
00:36:37,560 --> 00:36:39,799
Speaker 3: It's like, we got what they want.

700
00:36:39,960 --> 00:36:43,759
Speaker 4: We have data, we have money, we have personal identifying

701
00:36:43,840 --> 00:36:47,720
Speaker 4: information that could be used in other scams of other people.

702
00:36:48,440 --> 00:36:53,120
Speaker 4: We had one person on our show who his identity

703
00:36:53,239 --> 00:36:56,759
Speaker 4: was stolen and his identity was being used by the

704
00:36:56,840 --> 00:37:02,680
Speaker 4: scammer in romance scam. His ex boyfriend was trying to

705
00:37:02,800 --> 00:37:06,399
Speaker 4: lure in other men, and in fact, he did lure

706
00:37:06,480 --> 00:37:10,160
Speaker 4: in one guy who when they got together, the guy said,

707
00:37:10,280 --> 00:37:12,799
Speaker 4: wait a minute, you're not the person that I know

708
00:37:13,040 --> 00:37:13,800
Speaker 4: from the website.

709
00:37:13,800 --> 00:37:14,319
Speaker 3: Who are you?

710
00:37:15,160 --> 00:37:18,080
Speaker 4: And he convinced him know that it was just a

711
00:37:18,120 --> 00:37:21,359
Speaker 4: picture he used and the guy dropped his credit card

712
00:37:21,400 --> 00:37:27,160
Speaker 4: on the way out the door, and our guest's boyfriend

713
00:37:27,600 --> 00:37:31,000
Speaker 4: ran up the credit card. But because he was using

714
00:37:31,400 --> 00:37:36,320
Speaker 4: our guests data, the police came after our guest.

715
00:37:36,400 --> 00:37:38,440
Speaker 5: He became the victim.

716
00:37:39,200 --> 00:37:44,239
Speaker 4: And there's even an organization now called Advocates against Romance Scammers,

717
00:37:45,440 --> 00:37:48,320
Speaker 4: one of whom was on our show, and one of

718
00:37:48,400 --> 00:37:51,560
Speaker 4: the members of the board of that organization is a

719
00:37:51,960 --> 00:37:57,600
Speaker 4: very high ranking military official whose profile was basically used

720
00:37:57,640 --> 00:38:01,600
Speaker 4: in hundreds of scams that he wasn't aware of because

721
00:38:01,880 --> 00:38:05,160
Speaker 4: they know they say women are very attracted to military men.

722
00:38:05,960 --> 00:38:11,839
Speaker 2: Wow, that's so fascinating. That must feel so weird as him.

723
00:38:12,640 --> 00:38:14,799
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's very weird.

724
00:38:14,840 --> 00:38:16,920
Speaker 4: We had someone else who thought that they were in

725
00:38:16,960 --> 00:38:19,080
Speaker 4: a romance scam with the head of an oil or

726
00:38:19,280 --> 00:38:22,439
Speaker 4: the CFO of an oil company, only to find out

727
00:38:22,520 --> 00:38:25,000
Speaker 4: that the CFO of the oil company had absolutely no

728
00:38:25,160 --> 00:38:30,000
Speaker 4: idea that his profile was being used in these scams.

729
00:38:30,320 --> 00:38:32,719
Speaker 4: And then there was a scam operating out of Colorado.

730
00:38:32,840 --> 00:38:36,240
Speaker 4: It was a mother and daughter team that were posing

731
00:38:36,480 --> 00:38:40,880
Speaker 4: as soldiers who had been deployed to the Middle East

732
00:38:41,120 --> 00:38:44,720
Speaker 4: who were lonely, and in the end we're asking people

733
00:38:44,760 --> 00:38:47,360
Speaker 4: for money and they ended up stealing about a million

734
00:38:47,440 --> 00:38:51,919
Speaker 4: dollars from victims and they finally got caught. I mean,

735
00:38:52,200 --> 00:38:56,840
Speaker 4: there's always one moment where someone makes a mistake, or again,

736
00:38:57,040 --> 00:39:00,279
Speaker 4: someone gets arrested or rolls over on somebody else they

737
00:39:00,360 --> 00:39:04,960
Speaker 4: no and you get caught. So even though it's not

738
00:39:05,200 --> 00:39:07,880
Speaker 4: easy to catch these folks, and there are not a

739
00:39:07,920 --> 00:39:12,000
Speaker 4: lot of prosecutions because it's again not easy to prosecute

740
00:39:12,000 --> 00:39:16,000
Speaker 4: people when they're not there. You know, it's it's a

741
00:39:16,040 --> 00:39:16,640
Speaker 4: tough sled.

742
00:39:18,960 --> 00:39:23,200
Speaker 2: Maybe I've told this story and it's so shameful talking

743
00:39:23,200 --> 00:39:27,120
Speaker 2: about it now. But when I exactly when I was, No,

744
00:39:28,120 --> 00:39:31,600
Speaker 2: on the other end, oh, when I was seventeen, when

745
00:39:31,640 --> 00:39:34,400
Speaker 2: I was when I was seventeen, I worked in a

746
00:39:34,400 --> 00:39:39,920
Speaker 2: telemarketing scam room for one month, and it was a

747
00:39:40,239 --> 00:39:44,800
Speaker 2: room of basically like musicians who didn't want a normal

748
00:39:44,840 --> 00:39:47,040
Speaker 2: a job with normal hours so that they could still

749
00:39:47,080 --> 00:39:49,600
Speaker 2: have their creative lives. So you going from like six

750
00:39:49,680 --> 00:39:52,880
Speaker 2: am to eleven am and you're calling people. This was

751
00:39:53,120 --> 00:39:55,920
Speaker 2: you know, fifteen, How old am I twenty years ago? No,

752
00:39:56,200 --> 00:39:59,279
Speaker 2: almost twenty years eighteen years ago, So it wasn't like,

753
00:39:59,440 --> 00:40:01,560
Speaker 2: you know, the most advanced thing ever. But we were

754
00:40:01,560 --> 00:40:05,000
Speaker 2: calling people and basically like telling them that they were

755
00:40:05,920 --> 00:40:08,960
Speaker 2: that our toner prices for their printers were gonna go

756
00:40:09,160 --> 00:40:12,640
Speaker 2: up and if they didn't get it now, then you know,

757
00:40:12,800 --> 00:40:15,240
Speaker 2: they would miss out on the good price or whatever.

758
00:40:15,680 --> 00:40:18,439
Speaker 2: They did actually receive toner, but it was like ten

759
00:40:18,520 --> 00:40:22,080
Speaker 2: times more than what it normally costs, and it was

760
00:40:22,560 --> 00:40:25,120
Speaker 2: it was it was really interesting. I only lasted a

761
00:40:25,160 --> 00:40:27,440
Speaker 2: month because I was like, I feel terrible. I just

762
00:40:27,560 --> 00:40:29,719
Speaker 2: called an old person and a priest. But the thing

763
00:40:29,840 --> 00:40:33,279
Speaker 2: is I wasn't. The people in the room were not

764
00:40:33,400 --> 00:40:36,960
Speaker 2: the closers, so it was really like and everyone in

765
00:40:37,000 --> 00:40:39,440
Speaker 2: that room, I feel like, it's like a really solid person,

766
00:40:39,520 --> 00:40:41,759
Speaker 2: Like I knew those people pretty well, and everyone they

767
00:40:41,840 --> 00:40:45,319
Speaker 2: just like wanted a job. And so the people who

768
00:40:45,400 --> 00:40:48,399
Speaker 2: ran that room were being it were like they were

769
00:40:48,440 --> 00:40:52,000
Speaker 2: the ones who actually knew exactly how much they were

770
00:40:52,040 --> 00:40:55,840
Speaker 2: scamming people out of, exactly what the crime was that

771
00:40:55,920 --> 00:40:57,879
Speaker 2: was going on. The rest of us were just like, well,

772
00:40:57,920 --> 00:41:00,399
Speaker 2: I guess we'll just make these phone calls and will

773
00:41:00,640 --> 00:41:02,520
Speaker 2: try not to think about it. And they're not that

774
00:41:02,680 --> 00:41:04,239
Speaker 2: human to us because we don't have to like talk

775
00:41:04,280 --> 00:41:06,160
Speaker 2: to them at length. We're just doing the initial calls.

776
00:41:06,400 --> 00:41:09,160
Speaker 2: So anyway, I imagine it's something like that where it's

777
00:41:09,200 --> 00:41:11,719
Speaker 2: not like all of these people are like psychopaths trying

778
00:41:11,719 --> 00:41:14,000
Speaker 2: to scam people out of money, but there's like levels

779
00:41:14,680 --> 00:41:18,880
Speaker 2: to the scam, you know, because not everyone can handle

780
00:41:18,880 --> 00:41:21,759
Speaker 2: that psychologically. I mean, I couldn't even handle it, you know,

781
00:41:21,960 --> 00:41:22,560
Speaker 2: for the month.

782
00:41:23,160 --> 00:41:26,960
Speaker 4: But yeah, no, it's there's all kinds of like for instance,

783
00:41:28,280 --> 00:41:32,440
Speaker 4: the person who did that, we had on recently and

784
00:41:32,520 --> 00:41:35,200
Speaker 4: she was talking about her mom that when the scammers

785
00:41:35,360 --> 00:41:38,719
Speaker 4: drained everything her mother could give. And this is a

786
00:41:38,719 --> 00:41:41,000
Speaker 4: woman that could barely get out of bed by this

787
00:41:41,040 --> 00:41:44,640
Speaker 4: point because the cancer had riddled her. They then used

788
00:41:44,640 --> 00:41:47,080
Speaker 4: her as a money mule, which is that they would

789
00:41:47,120 --> 00:41:49,359
Speaker 4: send money, they would wash it in and her out,

790
00:41:49,440 --> 00:41:51,800
Speaker 4: in and out of her accounts, so they were laundering money.

791
00:41:52,239 --> 00:41:52,520
Speaker 1: Wow.

792
00:41:52,600 --> 00:41:55,120
Speaker 4: So what they do is when they got you, first

793
00:41:55,160 --> 00:41:57,000
Speaker 4: of all, you go on kind of their hit list,

794
00:41:57,080 --> 00:42:00,680
Speaker 4: which means they're fellow scammers, find out out about you,

795
00:42:00,760 --> 00:42:02,280
Speaker 4: and then they find different ways.

796
00:42:03,160 --> 00:42:04,799
Speaker 6: It's like if you've been in a cult, you're more

797
00:42:04,920 --> 00:42:07,240
Speaker 6: likely to be in a cult again. If you get scammed,

798
00:42:07,280 --> 00:42:09,399
Speaker 6: you're more likely to get scammed again. Sorry to cut

799
00:42:09,400 --> 00:42:11,720
Speaker 6: you off, but yes, there you're in a database.

800
00:42:11,760 --> 00:42:14,879
Speaker 4: Now, you're absolutely right. And and once you know, it's

801
00:42:14,920 --> 00:42:18,120
Speaker 4: like the roach motel. Once you're in, you're in, and

802
00:42:18,320 --> 00:42:20,080
Speaker 4: as much as people try to get out of it,

803
00:42:20,520 --> 00:42:22,879
Speaker 4: and then of course you have the horrible even more

804
00:42:23,200 --> 00:42:27,680
Speaker 4: just disgusting scams, which is the textortion scams where uh,

805
00:42:27,719 --> 00:42:29,640
Speaker 4: there was a story of a young guy that within

806
00:42:29,960 --> 00:42:34,239
Speaker 4: a couple hours went online thought he was talking to

807
00:42:34,880 --> 00:42:39,719
Speaker 4: a young woman sent she sent him compromising pictures, asked

808
00:42:39,760 --> 00:42:41,880
Speaker 4: him to send her compromising pictures.

809
00:42:42,239 --> 00:42:44,040
Speaker 3: He did, and then he.

810
00:42:44,160 --> 00:42:48,359
Speaker 4: Was immediately told by the way, unless you pay us

811
00:42:48,480 --> 00:42:50,640
Speaker 4: something that there was no way this kid could afford.

812
00:42:51,600 --> 00:42:54,359
Speaker 4: We're going to release these pictures online and tell your

813
00:42:54,440 --> 00:42:55,800
Speaker 4: family and your friends.

814
00:42:56,360 --> 00:42:57,280
Speaker 3: And he killed himself.

815
00:42:57,440 --> 00:43:00,200
Speaker 4: And you know there are, I mean, there are are

816
00:43:00,320 --> 00:43:04,840
Speaker 4: just horrendous real world consequences to all of these kinds

817
00:43:04,880 --> 00:43:08,040
Speaker 4: of scams. And a lot of these scams operate on

818
00:43:08,239 --> 00:43:11,080
Speaker 4: first they try to suck you in through social well

819
00:43:11,080 --> 00:43:13,560
Speaker 4: they always try to suck you in through social engineering,

820
00:43:14,200 --> 00:43:16,080
Speaker 4: and then they try to get money from you and

821
00:43:16,120 --> 00:43:16,720
Speaker 4: they try.

822
00:43:16,560 --> 00:43:17,759
Speaker 3: To scare you half to debt.

823
00:43:17,920 --> 00:43:22,960
Speaker 4: So either the scam is based on love, greed, fear,

824
00:43:23,360 --> 00:43:26,480
Speaker 4: and everything is impulse. They want to get you to

825
00:43:26,560 --> 00:43:30,239
Speaker 4: do something that maybe you wouldn't ordinarily do, and that's

826
00:43:30,280 --> 00:43:31,080
Speaker 4: when they got you.

827
00:43:31,120 --> 00:43:33,160
Speaker 2: What can you define social engineering?

828
00:43:33,480 --> 00:43:38,560
Speaker 4: Social engineering is when someone presents themselves as someone else

829
00:43:39,200 --> 00:43:41,719
Speaker 4: for the purpose of getting you to do something that

830
00:43:41,960 --> 00:43:44,640
Speaker 4: any person who really took time to think about what

831
00:43:44,680 --> 00:43:48,920
Speaker 4: they were doing, wouldn't do it, and whether it's someone

832
00:43:49,200 --> 00:43:52,600
Speaker 4: comes at you as if they're your boss and they

833
00:43:52,640 --> 00:43:55,840
Speaker 4: need you to give them credentials to something which gets

834
00:43:55,880 --> 00:43:58,840
Speaker 4: them into the network. Like I'm on vacation right now,

835
00:43:59,320 --> 00:44:02,440
Speaker 4: and I've I left.

836
00:44:03,400 --> 00:44:04,680
Speaker 3: All the stuff that I had left it.

837
00:44:04,680 --> 00:44:07,240
Speaker 4: At home, and I really need to get a memo

838
00:44:07,320 --> 00:44:09,239
Speaker 4: to somebody. Could you just do me a favor and

839
00:44:09,480 --> 00:44:13,640
Speaker 4: get this memo to somebody and just send this attachment along.

840
00:44:14,120 --> 00:44:15,759
Speaker 4: And if you think about it, you go, well, first

841
00:44:15,760 --> 00:44:18,600
Speaker 4: of all, why would I send someone else's attachment, especially

842
00:44:18,600 --> 00:44:21,279
Speaker 4: somebody I don't know, Or even if it's somebody I

843
00:44:21,360 --> 00:44:23,880
Speaker 4: do know, I'm not really sure they would ask me

844
00:44:23,960 --> 00:44:27,880
Speaker 4: to do something like this, and or all of the

845
00:44:28,120 --> 00:44:30,840
Speaker 4: you know, one example of a woman got scamed that

846
00:44:30,920 --> 00:44:34,960
Speaker 4: a technology scam. She got a letter, actual letter that

847
00:44:35,040 --> 00:44:37,680
Speaker 4: said it was from the Geek Squad and that she

848
00:44:37,880 --> 00:44:43,320
Speaker 4: had paid in advance too much money and they wanted

849
00:44:43,640 --> 00:44:46,799
Speaker 4: to call this number and we'll help you get your

850
00:44:46,840 --> 00:44:50,480
Speaker 4: money back. So she calls the number and then they said, Okay,

851
00:44:50,680 --> 00:44:53,319
Speaker 4: in order to really be effective in helping you get

852
00:44:53,360 --> 00:44:56,080
Speaker 4: your money back, you have to let us in your

853
00:44:56,160 --> 00:45:00,319
Speaker 4: computer so we can get into your bank account, open

854
00:45:00,360 --> 00:45:03,480
Speaker 4: it up, and then get the money into your bank account.

855
00:45:03,600 --> 00:45:07,359
Speaker 4: So she did that and then they said, oh, and

856
00:45:07,400 --> 00:45:09,799
Speaker 4: by the way, we need you to get us gift cards.

857
00:45:10,680 --> 00:45:11,279
Speaker 5: A gift card.

858
00:45:11,360 --> 00:45:13,439
Speaker 2: Yeah, they love the gift cards, and they.

859
00:45:13,719 --> 00:45:16,080
Speaker 4: They wanted two thousand dollars in gift cards. They told

860
00:45:16,120 --> 00:45:18,799
Speaker 4: her to go down to uh I think it was CBS.

861
00:45:19,480 --> 00:45:21,919
Speaker 4: She went down there and the person behind the counter

862
00:45:22,120 --> 00:45:24,000
Speaker 4: was saying, I don't know if I should give you

863
00:45:24,080 --> 00:45:26,240
Speaker 4: two thoughts, but I'll give you a thousand of gift cards.

864
00:45:26,280 --> 00:45:30,680
Speaker 4: It's like, if you felt uncomfortable giving someone two thousand

865
00:45:30,719 --> 00:45:33,680
Speaker 4: of gift cards, why would you feel comfortable in giving

866
00:45:33,719 --> 00:45:35,040
Speaker 4: them one thousand gift cards.

867
00:45:35,040 --> 00:45:37,960
Speaker 1: Imagine getting a two thousand dollars CVS gift card.

868
00:45:38,400 --> 00:45:41,440
Speaker 4: There it is, or you're w CVS and you were

869
00:45:41,480 --> 00:45:44,799
Speaker 4: buying Walmart gift cards, you know. So the other thing

870
00:45:44,840 --> 00:45:48,000
Speaker 4: they said is do not take the phone and leave

871
00:45:48,120 --> 00:45:51,600
Speaker 4: the phone in your car while you go in there, obviously,

872
00:45:51,640 --> 00:45:54,759
Speaker 4: because if someone sees you talking on the phone and saying, oh,

873
00:45:54,800 --> 00:45:56,239
Speaker 4: by the way, what is that, I know, Oh, yeah,

874
00:45:56,239 --> 00:45:58,839
Speaker 4: I need two thousand dollars in gift guards. It's like,

875
00:45:58,960 --> 00:46:03,200
Speaker 4: what are you doing? So they asked her, and somewhere

876
00:46:03,560 --> 00:46:08,520
Speaker 4: as she was traveling from CBS to Walmart to get

877
00:46:08,520 --> 00:46:11,240
Speaker 4: the rest of the gift guards, she said, wait a minute,

878
00:46:11,280 --> 00:46:14,160
Speaker 4: they owe me money. Why am I getting gift guards?

879
00:46:14,320 --> 00:46:15,440
Speaker 2: Right right?

880
00:46:15,960 --> 00:46:17,959
Speaker 4: But they just catch you at a point they can't.

881
00:46:17,960 --> 00:46:21,359
Speaker 4: They confuse you exactly, and they get you to do

882
00:46:21,400 --> 00:46:23,719
Speaker 4: stuff that you that you normally wouldn't do.

883
00:46:24,120 --> 00:46:25,960
Speaker 2: I mean, I feel like it's like, you know, our

884
00:46:26,080 --> 00:46:31,000
Speaker 2: brains have cognitive bias where we make the mental shortcuts. Basically,

885
00:46:31,040 --> 00:46:33,799
Speaker 2: if something feels close enough to the truth, we just

886
00:46:33,840 --> 00:46:35,600
Speaker 2: don't really even stop to think about it. And I

887
00:46:35,600 --> 00:46:38,800
Speaker 2: feel like when I've had phone calls with my actual

888
00:46:38,840 --> 00:46:42,719
Speaker 2: bank or like with a company that involves my money

889
00:46:42,719 --> 00:46:45,640
Speaker 2: and anyway, it can be so convoluted and so confusing

890
00:46:46,160 --> 00:46:49,080
Speaker 2: that some of the scams I feel like, I'm like, oh, okay,

891
00:46:49,120 --> 00:46:51,480
Speaker 2: I guess if that's what you know, it just feels close.

892
00:46:51,320 --> 00:46:54,479
Speaker 1: Enough, busy, they make it urgent. We don't have enough

893
00:46:54,520 --> 00:46:57,440
Speaker 1: time to like figure it out. Yeah, Yeah, it's such

894
00:46:57,480 --> 00:46:59,400
Speaker 1: a ripe environment.

895
00:47:00,520 --> 00:47:03,680
Speaker 2: I also wanted to ask, like the in the romance scams,

896
00:47:03,719 --> 00:47:07,080
Speaker 2: like they're not typically asking for that stuff right away, right, Like,

897
00:47:07,120 --> 00:47:10,800
Speaker 2: there's a period of like priming the person and making

898
00:47:10,840 --> 00:47:13,120
Speaker 2: them develop feelings.

899
00:47:12,719 --> 00:47:14,320
Speaker 3: That is that is correct.

900
00:47:14,480 --> 00:47:17,000
Speaker 4: And what they will do is they will gain lure

901
00:47:17,040 --> 00:47:18,960
Speaker 4: you in and then they will come up with us.

902
00:47:19,000 --> 00:47:21,720
Speaker 4: It's like a Grade B movie. They will use lines

903
00:47:21,960 --> 00:47:24,799
Speaker 4: on you that if you do research, you find out

904
00:47:24,920 --> 00:47:26,200
Speaker 4: came from.

905
00:47:25,960 --> 00:47:29,200
Speaker 3: A movie or a book.

906
00:47:29,880 --> 00:47:31,960
Speaker 4: And in fact, if you take some of the lines,

907
00:47:32,080 --> 00:47:35,800
Speaker 4: especially ones that come in by way of email and copy,

908
00:47:36,239 --> 00:47:40,279
Speaker 4: and then put them in Google, you'll be shocked to

909
00:47:40,280 --> 00:47:42,640
Speaker 4: find that they show up in all kinds of wow

910
00:47:42,800 --> 00:47:46,480
Speaker 4: of places. Just like pictures, you can do reverse searches

911
00:47:46,520 --> 00:47:50,680
Speaker 4: with pictures and find out that picture has five different

912
00:47:50,760 --> 00:47:51,960
Speaker 4: names attached to it.

913
00:47:52,160 --> 00:47:56,040
Speaker 2: Right, So, when you're online dating and you're like, what

914
00:47:56,160 --> 00:47:58,399
Speaker 2: are some things to look out for?

915
00:47:58,760 --> 00:48:03,400
Speaker 4: Well, first of all, with online dating, stay on the app.

916
00:48:03,760 --> 00:48:06,319
Speaker 4: When they start getting you to try to move off

917
00:48:06,360 --> 00:48:10,560
Speaker 4: the app, then some of the more stringent rules and

918
00:48:10,600 --> 00:48:13,760
Speaker 4: regulations of the dating app go out the window.

919
00:48:13,800 --> 00:48:15,200
Speaker 3: So they love to get you.

920
00:48:15,160 --> 00:48:19,520
Speaker 4: On What's app for instance Wow, And just because they're

921
00:48:19,520 --> 00:48:22,279
Speaker 4: getting you in a different environment, you become more and

922
00:48:22,320 --> 00:48:26,280
Speaker 4: more trusting, and then they start asking you for additional information,

923
00:48:26,520 --> 00:48:28,920
Speaker 4: like can I have your phone number, what's your address?

924
00:48:29,000 --> 00:48:32,600
Speaker 4: And a lot of people say, well, we've all said

925
00:48:32,600 --> 00:48:36,040
Speaker 4: over the years, guard your SOLI security number with your life,

926
00:48:36,040 --> 00:48:38,680
Speaker 4: because this is skeleton key to your life. But there

927
00:48:38,719 --> 00:48:42,120
Speaker 4: is another number that we all have that's actually more

928
00:48:42,239 --> 00:48:44,160
Speaker 4: ubiquitous than your SOLI security number.

929
00:48:44,280 --> 00:48:44,759
Speaker 3: What is it?

930
00:48:45,000 --> 00:48:45,800
Speaker 5: Your phone number?

931
00:48:46,360 --> 00:48:48,080
Speaker 3: You got it? Your cell phone number?

932
00:48:48,480 --> 00:48:48,760
Speaker 1: Wow?

933
00:48:48,760 --> 00:48:50,040
Speaker 3: And if you think about it.

934
00:48:50,040 --> 00:48:54,560
Speaker 4: What are the two things most logins require? Obviously yours

935
00:48:54,600 --> 00:48:58,359
Speaker 4: or ID and your passwords? Yeah, so most people use

936
00:48:58,800 --> 00:49:02,560
Speaker 4: really simple passwords. Their user idea in many cases is

937
00:49:02,600 --> 00:49:05,920
Speaker 4: their email address. And when they do two factor authentication,

938
00:49:06,360 --> 00:49:07,239
Speaker 4: where does the code go?

939
00:49:07,640 --> 00:49:08,759
Speaker 3: Your cell phone number? Right?

940
00:49:09,560 --> 00:49:13,439
Speaker 2: And do people are people able to somehow intercept the

941
00:49:13,560 --> 00:49:15,200
Speaker 2: two factor authentication texts?

942
00:49:15,480 --> 00:49:18,560
Speaker 4: Absolutely, because what they do is they contact mobile providers

943
00:49:18,880 --> 00:49:21,480
Speaker 4: and a lot of people don't use a pin number

944
00:49:21,760 --> 00:49:26,200
Speaker 4: to protect their data with their cell phone provider. And

945
00:49:26,560 --> 00:49:29,439
Speaker 4: usually they can pay somebody off in the company who

946
00:49:29,480 --> 00:49:31,920
Speaker 4: gives them information or they find another way to get

947
00:49:31,960 --> 00:49:35,560
Speaker 4: it from you, and then now they have your cell number.

948
00:49:35,560 --> 00:49:38,440
Speaker 4: And there've been a lot of litigation, like, for instance,

949
00:49:38,480 --> 00:49:42,839
Speaker 4: one guy looks twenty four million in crypto because and

950
00:49:42,880 --> 00:49:46,799
Speaker 4: he sued the mobile provider by saying one of your

951
00:49:46,840 --> 00:49:53,239
Speaker 4: people gave away my information. They transferred the number to

952
00:49:53,360 --> 00:49:56,640
Speaker 4: another device, so when a code went out, it went

953
00:49:56,719 --> 00:50:00,799
Speaker 4: on that device. Or what they'll do is they'll use

954
00:50:00,840 --> 00:50:03,360
Speaker 4: some kind of scammer. They're asking you to authenticate yourself

955
00:50:04,000 --> 00:50:07,120
Speaker 4: and they ask you to get a code, and then

956
00:50:07,200 --> 00:50:09,800
Speaker 4: they say, okay, now prove you're you read us the code.

957
00:50:09,840 --> 00:50:13,040
Speaker 4: You just got reading the code.

958
00:50:12,680 --> 00:50:14,920
Speaker 3: And they use that code to get in those.

959
00:50:16,800 --> 00:50:17,640
Speaker 6: That can't.

960
00:50:17,680 --> 00:50:20,279
Speaker 4: That's social engineering. That's that's how they get people to

961
00:50:20,640 --> 00:50:23,799
Speaker 4: trust them. And the other important thing that everyone has

962
00:50:23,840 --> 00:50:26,520
Speaker 4: to keep in mind, we all have day jobs. Whether

963
00:50:26,600 --> 00:50:31,040
Speaker 4: it's a podcast, you're working for someone, you're running a business,

964
00:50:31,280 --> 00:50:35,040
Speaker 4: you're raising a family, you're involved in educational activities, or

965
00:50:35,080 --> 00:50:39,200
Speaker 4: you're dedicated to yourself to philanthropic activities. That's your day job.

966
00:50:39,600 --> 00:50:44,080
Speaker 4: When you're facing off against state sponsored for profit, cause

967
00:50:44,160 --> 00:50:48,360
Speaker 4: related or because I can hackers, you are their day job, right.

968
00:50:49,080 --> 00:50:50,200
Speaker 5: And they're trading off.

969
00:50:50,280 --> 00:50:52,560
Speaker 1: Like some of these hackers, you think you're talking to

970
00:50:52,600 --> 00:50:55,359
Speaker 1: one man in these romance schemes, there's ten of them

971
00:50:55,640 --> 00:50:58,799
Speaker 1: giving you constant attention, and they're doing the same thing

972
00:50:58,840 --> 00:51:00,040
Speaker 1: cults do where they're trying.

973
00:50:59,840 --> 00:51:00,920
Speaker 5: To keep you up all night.

974
00:51:01,360 --> 00:51:04,920
Speaker 1: They're taking each other's parts. Like now she's now you

975
00:51:04,960 --> 00:51:07,239
Speaker 1: start talking to her, she thinks she's talking to the

976
00:51:07,239 --> 00:51:10,920
Speaker 1: same person. They're sleep depriving this person and now they

977
00:51:10,960 --> 00:51:12,000
Speaker 1: have all of her money.

978
00:51:12,200 --> 00:51:15,840
Speaker 4: That's right, they're counting on the factor if you're sleep deprived,

979
00:51:15,880 --> 00:51:17,960
Speaker 4: they can get you to make costs.

980
00:51:18,120 --> 00:51:20,720
Speaker 2: That's so interesting. Did you hear that on this podcast?

981
00:51:20,800 --> 00:51:20,960
Speaker 1: Yes?

982
00:51:21,200 --> 00:51:24,840
Speaker 2: Wow, yeah, that is so culty. I mean that's exactly

983
00:51:24,920 --> 00:51:27,959
Speaker 2: how you manipulate a person. Don't do it, listeners, don't

984
00:51:28,000 --> 00:51:30,680
Speaker 2: do it. But that's how you get your hours.

985
00:51:31,120 --> 00:51:34,120
Speaker 4: And for these folks, as far as they're concerned, there

986
00:51:34,160 --> 00:51:35,920
Speaker 4: is a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow,

987
00:51:36,239 --> 00:51:37,960
Speaker 4: and you are the pot of gold.

988
00:51:38,160 --> 00:51:40,360
Speaker 3: Right, and especially we're.

989
00:51:40,239 --> 00:51:43,160
Speaker 4: Living in a world we have it's a surveillance economy, right,

990
00:51:43,200 --> 00:51:46,920
Speaker 4: I mean, everything we do somebody's tracking, gathering the data.

991
00:51:47,400 --> 00:51:52,279
Speaker 4: There have been thousands upon thousands of breaches of companies

992
00:51:52,560 --> 00:51:56,879
Speaker 4: with billions of files involving hundreds of millions of view

993
00:51:56,920 --> 00:51:59,760
Speaker 4: I mean Equifax alone was one hundred and fifty million people.

994
00:52:00,280 --> 00:52:05,120
Speaker 4: Their files were stolen. That information is out there right now.

995
00:52:05,880 --> 00:52:10,120
Speaker 4: And what happens is they look at your identity as

996
00:52:10,360 --> 00:52:13,719
Speaker 4: tiles on a mosaic. The more information that can either

997
00:52:13,800 --> 00:52:16,600
Speaker 4: get out of you or get out of someone that

998
00:52:16,760 --> 00:52:20,960
Speaker 4: knows you, and then combine it with other information that

999
00:52:21,000 --> 00:52:24,480
Speaker 4: has either been bought or stolen on the dark web,

1000
00:52:24,800 --> 00:52:27,560
Speaker 4: and then they piece together you so they can more

1001
00:52:27,600 --> 00:52:32,279
Speaker 4: effectively be you and on. Once they essentially become you,

1002
00:52:32,600 --> 00:52:36,520
Speaker 4: they end up getting access to bank accounts, social media accounts.

1003
00:52:36,800 --> 00:52:38,400
Speaker 4: I mean, we've had a lot of people on the

1004
00:52:38,440 --> 00:52:42,439
Speaker 4: show that their Instagram accounts have been stolen and they

1005
00:52:42,640 --> 00:52:46,560
Speaker 4: can barely get them back because Instagram doesn't really care.

1006
00:52:46,640 --> 00:52:49,759
Speaker 4: They've come up with, let's say, a more effective way

1007
00:52:49,800 --> 00:52:52,719
Speaker 4: of helping people restore their accounts, but an awful lot

1008
00:52:52,719 --> 00:52:54,839
Speaker 4: of people didn't. And what's one of the things they

1009
00:52:54,840 --> 00:52:56,920
Speaker 4: didn't do. They didn't use two factor authentication.

1010
00:52:58,760 --> 00:53:02,880
Speaker 2: So if your identity he does get stolen, what do

1011
00:53:02,920 --> 00:53:05,000
Speaker 2: you do? It happened to my friend and it was

1012
00:53:05,080 --> 00:53:07,840
Speaker 2: like so complicated and it went on for so long.

1013
00:53:07,960 --> 00:53:10,000
Speaker 5: Yeah, and how do we protect our phone number?

1014
00:53:10,360 --> 00:53:12,719
Speaker 4: Well, I say to people, look, you got to live

1015
00:53:12,760 --> 00:53:16,799
Speaker 4: your life, so you should operate with something. Beau Friedlander

1016
00:53:16,800 --> 00:53:18,680
Speaker 4: and my co host and I we wrote a book

1017
00:53:18,719 --> 00:53:21,960
Speaker 4: called Swiped how to protect yourself in a world full

1018
00:53:22,000 --> 00:53:25,279
Speaker 4: of scammers, fishers and identity thieves. And we came up

1019
00:53:25,320 --> 00:53:28,040
Speaker 4: with a framework that people could could really focus on

1020
00:53:28,080 --> 00:53:30,640
Speaker 4: that would be helpful to them. And the first it's

1021
00:53:30,680 --> 00:53:33,520
Speaker 4: called the three ms. How do you minimize your risk

1022
00:53:33,560 --> 00:53:36,799
Speaker 4: of exposure? How do you monitors so you know as

1023
00:53:36,880 --> 00:53:40,200
Speaker 4: quickly as possible you have a problem, And how do

1024
00:53:40,239 --> 00:53:45,279
Speaker 4: you manage the damage? So minimize monitor manage First is

1025
00:53:46,040 --> 00:53:49,440
Speaker 4: long and strong passwords. Do not share passwords across your

1026
00:53:49,520 --> 00:53:54,000
Speaker 4: universe of websites or get a password manager. Use two

1027
00:53:54,080 --> 00:53:57,600
Speaker 4: factor authentication, where you can say to yourself, I am

1028
00:53:57,640 --> 00:53:59,360
Speaker 4: not going to click on a link or open an

1029
00:53:59,400 --> 00:54:03,080
Speaker 4: attachment unless I am deadly sure that I know who

1030
00:54:03,120 --> 00:54:06,480
Speaker 4: it came from. I personally am a buzzkill. If you

1031
00:54:06,520 --> 00:54:09,279
Speaker 4: were to send me an E card, I would call

1032
00:54:09,320 --> 00:54:11,640
Speaker 4: you and say, I don't mean to kill the buzz

1033
00:54:11,719 --> 00:54:15,080
Speaker 4: But you just send me an E card like I'm.

1034
00:54:14,960 --> 00:54:17,200
Speaker 2: Just trying to wish you a merry Christmas at them.

1035
00:54:17,760 --> 00:54:18,600
Speaker 3: Yeah, that's it.

1036
00:54:19,239 --> 00:54:21,920
Speaker 4: You know, some people send me Christmas cards and by

1037
00:54:21,960 --> 00:54:24,040
Speaker 4: the time I'm done, they go, I'm never sending you

1038
00:54:24,080 --> 00:54:28,080
Speaker 4: a Christmas guard again ever. But it's it's and even

1039
00:54:28,200 --> 00:54:32,799
Speaker 4: someone can believe they're honestly forwarding you something they received

1040
00:54:33,160 --> 00:54:36,400
Speaker 4: that they opened, they don't realize that they just opened

1041
00:54:36,400 --> 00:54:40,160
Speaker 4: something that had malware on it. Like cat pictures, for instance,

1042
00:54:40,239 --> 00:54:44,200
Speaker 4: have been a wonderful conduit of malware and ransomware.

1043
00:54:45,960 --> 00:54:46,360
Speaker 6: Honest.

1044
00:54:46,880 --> 00:54:49,879
Speaker 4: Oh no, listen, I have a cat who normally sits

1045
00:54:49,960 --> 00:54:54,240
Speaker 4: on my shoulder and she's a little Egyptian.

1046
00:54:54,280 --> 00:54:54,960
Speaker 3: Now she's very.

1047
00:54:54,960 --> 00:54:58,919
Speaker 4: Cute, but you know, you don't do that when you're

1048
00:54:59,040 --> 00:55:02,000
Speaker 4: setting up security questions and answers.

1049
00:55:02,640 --> 00:55:03,960
Speaker 3: Why like a superhero.

1050
00:55:04,280 --> 00:55:07,759
Speaker 4: Oh, they don't tell people who they are, right, right,

1051
00:55:07,960 --> 00:55:10,799
Speaker 4: Because if you think about it, a lot of the

1052
00:55:10,840 --> 00:55:15,120
Speaker 4: things that are answers to security questions is it's information

1053
00:55:15,680 --> 00:55:17,799
Speaker 4: that you post on social.

1054
00:55:17,600 --> 00:55:19,880
Speaker 3: Media or people who know you post.

1055
00:55:20,400 --> 00:55:22,880
Speaker 4: So if they ask you what your mother's maid name is,

1056
00:55:23,239 --> 00:55:24,480
Speaker 4: why if they ask.

1057
00:55:24,320 --> 00:55:26,400
Speaker 3: You what your high school was? Why?

1058
00:55:26,840 --> 00:55:30,200
Speaker 4: The website doesn't care if you're being truthful or not.

1059
00:55:30,719 --> 00:55:33,239
Speaker 4: All they care about is are you being consistent?

1060
00:55:33,719 --> 00:55:36,120
Speaker 6: Miley Cyrus got hacked that way so long ago.

1061
00:55:36,200 --> 00:55:39,360
Speaker 1: I remember she like talked about her childhood dog on

1062
00:55:40,000 --> 00:55:42,960
Speaker 1: something and somebody was like, I bet that's her password

1063
00:55:43,040 --> 00:55:44,719
Speaker 1: for something, And you know.

1064
00:55:44,840 --> 00:55:47,040
Speaker 2: It is really hard to pick those answers, because if

1065
00:55:47,120 --> 00:55:49,880
Speaker 2: it's not something that's just like readily available, I've probably

1066
00:55:49,920 --> 00:55:52,800
Speaker 2: talked about it, like in an interview at some point. Yeah,

1067
00:55:52,840 --> 00:55:55,279
Speaker 2: so lying is a really smart But then.

1068
00:55:55,320 --> 00:55:57,080
Speaker 6: Do you just where do you write down all your life?

1069
00:55:57,120 --> 00:55:58,120
Speaker 5: I know, how can you remember?

1070
00:55:58,120 --> 00:55:59,760
Speaker 3: Well, actually, you know you could.

1071
00:56:00,040 --> 00:56:03,000
Speaker 4: You could assemble them and then put them on an

1072
00:56:03,080 --> 00:56:05,400
Speaker 4: encrypted thumb drive and then all you have to remember

1073
00:56:05,520 --> 00:56:08,480
Speaker 4: is the password to your thumb drive. And oh, by

1074
00:56:08,520 --> 00:56:12,840
Speaker 4: the way, where you put your thumb drive. Okay, some people,

1075
00:56:13,000 --> 00:56:15,319
Speaker 4: you know, create a sheet of paper. In the old days,

1076
00:56:15,320 --> 00:56:17,600
Speaker 4: we would say do not put a sticky with all

1077
00:56:17,640 --> 00:56:21,239
Speaker 4: your passwords on your computer, because someone walking through your

1078
00:56:21,239 --> 00:56:23,640
Speaker 4: house might get access to it. But with all of

1079
00:56:23,680 --> 00:56:26,879
Speaker 4: the breaches and all of the information out there, it's

1080
00:56:26,960 --> 00:56:30,080
Speaker 4: almost safer on a sticky sitting on your computer than

1081
00:56:30,120 --> 00:56:33,600
Speaker 4: it is any anywhere else. We even see password managers

1082
00:56:33,640 --> 00:56:37,040
Speaker 4: that have gotten breached, but the level of encryption is

1083
00:56:37,040 --> 00:56:40,759
Speaker 4: so high that it's highly unlikely that the passwords are

1084
00:56:40,760 --> 00:56:43,960
Speaker 4: going to be cracked. So password managers are a very

1085
00:56:44,000 --> 00:56:48,839
Speaker 4: good way to keep, certainly to keep your passwords. And

1086
00:56:48,880 --> 00:56:50,440
Speaker 4: the great thing about them is you can change you

1087
00:56:50,520 --> 00:56:53,520
Speaker 4: on the fly. And if you say I want to

1088
00:56:53,600 --> 00:56:57,440
Speaker 4: change my password every sixty days, use the password manager

1089
00:56:57,480 --> 00:56:59,640
Speaker 4: and it can and then you've got it. Just make

1090
00:56:59,680 --> 00:57:03,880
Speaker 4: sure that it's multiplatform so that it covers all your devices,

1091
00:57:03,920 --> 00:57:06,520
Speaker 4: so you're not sitting there going what the heck did

1092
00:57:06,560 --> 00:57:10,120
Speaker 4: I just do on my stright thing on my computer?

1093
00:57:10,680 --> 00:57:13,200
Speaker 3: So you know, do that. So those are the things

1094
00:57:13,200 --> 00:57:15,440
Speaker 3: freeze your credit. And you know, in the.

1095
00:57:15,360 --> 00:57:17,800
Speaker 4: Old days, it would cost you ten dollars to freeze

1096
00:57:17,840 --> 00:57:18,680
Speaker 4: ten dollars to.

1097
00:57:18,680 --> 00:57:19,520
Speaker 3: Thaw your credit.

1098
00:57:19,960 --> 00:57:24,080
Speaker 4: Today it's free, and especially in light of the Equifax breach,

1099
00:57:24,320 --> 00:57:27,160
Speaker 4: a lot of people felt that freezing credit should be free.

1100
00:57:27,400 --> 00:57:29,280
Speaker 4: And when you freeze your credit, you have to do

1101
00:57:29,320 --> 00:57:32,600
Speaker 4: it independently with each of the three reporting agencies. And

1102
00:57:33,000 --> 00:57:34,880
Speaker 4: you know, some people go, it's going to take so

1103
00:57:34,960 --> 00:57:37,480
Speaker 4: much time. I just did it for somebody recently. It

1104
00:57:37,560 --> 00:57:38,680
Speaker 4: took fifteen minutes.

1105
00:57:38,960 --> 00:57:40,880
Speaker 3: Oh all three bureaus.

1106
00:57:41,080 --> 00:57:43,600
Speaker 4: And the great thing is because you're doing it independently

1107
00:57:43,640 --> 00:57:46,480
Speaker 4: with each bureau, every time you decide you want to

1108
00:57:46,520 --> 00:57:49,720
Speaker 4: apply for credit, you don't have to thaw all three

1109
00:57:49,880 --> 00:57:52,240
Speaker 4: other than if you're going for a mortgage where they

1110
00:57:52,280 --> 00:57:55,920
Speaker 4: pull a triple credit report. Every other type of credit

1111
00:57:55,960 --> 00:57:58,160
Speaker 4: that you might go for they only pull a credit

1112
00:57:58,200 --> 00:58:02,000
Speaker 4: report from one of the bureaus. So just when you're

1113
00:58:02,000 --> 00:58:04,919
Speaker 4: applying for credit somewhere, just say you know, by the way,

1114
00:58:05,240 --> 00:58:07,880
Speaker 4: which bureau are you pulling the credit from, because I

1115
00:58:07,920 --> 00:58:09,000
Speaker 4: have my credit frozen.

1116
00:58:09,360 --> 00:58:10,800
Speaker 3: They'll actually will.

1117
00:58:10,640 --> 00:58:14,680
Speaker 4: Be impressed by that for you, so freeze your credit

1118
00:58:15,240 --> 00:58:18,120
Speaker 4: or use a fraud alert on your files. So that's

1119
00:58:18,400 --> 00:58:22,240
Speaker 4: the first M. The second M is and it's much shorter.

1120
00:58:22,800 --> 00:58:25,920
Speaker 4: How do you monitor? Get your credit report? You're entitled

1121
00:58:25,920 --> 00:58:28,120
Speaker 4: to a free copy from each of the three bureaus

1122
00:58:28,160 --> 00:58:31,200
Speaker 4: once a year. There are so many different programs now

1123
00:58:31,200 --> 00:58:35,040
Speaker 4: that it's not that expensive to get multiple credit reports

1124
00:58:35,120 --> 00:58:36,040
Speaker 4: during a year.

1125
00:58:36,360 --> 00:58:36,840
Speaker 3: Check them.

1126
00:58:37,120 --> 00:58:39,480
Speaker 4: Don't just say hey, I got my credit report. I

1127
00:58:39,520 --> 00:58:42,520
Speaker 4: mean really look to see what it says, to see

1128
00:58:42,520 --> 00:58:45,640
Speaker 4: if there's anything on there that doesn't look right, and

1129
00:58:45,640 --> 00:58:48,720
Speaker 4: then if you see something, say something. The second thing

1130
00:58:48,800 --> 00:58:51,480
Speaker 4: is monitor your credit score because if it takes a sudden,

1131
00:58:51,480 --> 00:58:55,680
Speaker 4: precipitous drop that you can't explain, there's only really three reasons.

1132
00:58:55,920 --> 00:58:58,040
Speaker 4: You haven't paid a bill on time. You need to

1133
00:58:58,120 --> 00:59:01,000
Speaker 4: know that you're using too much of your available credit

1134
00:59:01,080 --> 00:59:03,400
Speaker 4: so it puts your score down. You need to know

1135
00:59:03,440 --> 00:59:07,000
Speaker 4: that or you're a victim of identity theft and you

1136
00:59:07,120 --> 00:59:09,640
Speaker 4: really need to know that. Also sign up for it's

1137
00:59:09,680 --> 00:59:13,360
Speaker 4: called transaction alerts. They're free from your bank or your

1138
00:59:13,360 --> 00:59:17,040
Speaker 4: credit card company that notifies you anytime there's activity in

1139
00:59:17,080 --> 00:59:19,200
Speaker 4: your account because you're going to look at it and go,

1140
00:59:19,280 --> 00:59:23,000
Speaker 4: wait a minute, I was in that zip code, but

1141
00:59:23,120 --> 00:59:25,080
Speaker 4: I wasn't on that street corner.

1142
00:59:25,120 --> 00:59:27,880
Speaker 2: It wasn't me huh interesting, And then you can.

1143
00:59:27,760 --> 00:59:30,920
Speaker 4: Notify your institution. Also, believe it or not, when you

1144
00:59:30,920 --> 00:59:34,200
Speaker 4: get your explanation of benefit statements from your health insurer

1145
00:59:34,840 --> 00:59:38,640
Speaker 4: because you've had an appointment with your doctor or you've

1146
00:59:38,640 --> 00:59:42,040
Speaker 4: had a procedure or something, look at it. Because we

1147
00:59:42,600 --> 00:59:45,520
Speaker 4: had one woman who was a client who seventy two

1148
00:59:45,640 --> 00:59:49,120
Speaker 4: year old grandmother on opposite sides of the country on

1149
00:59:49,200 --> 00:59:53,040
Speaker 4: the same day. Her insurance was built for a sperm

1150
00:59:53,160 --> 00:59:59,800
Speaker 4: viability test and a pregnancy test, so you can find

1151
00:59:59,800 --> 01:00:02,840
Speaker 4: that it's not you, right, And then there are course

1152
01:00:02,920 --> 01:00:07,160
Speaker 4: more sophisticated forms of monitoring that monitor dark web activity

1153
01:00:07,200 --> 01:00:12,280
Speaker 4: involving your personal identifiable information. And something also known as

1154
01:00:12,320 --> 01:00:18,080
Speaker 4: the instant alert, which is someone right now is applying

1155
01:00:18,200 --> 01:00:20,840
Speaker 4: for credit using your Social Security number.

1156
01:00:21,280 --> 01:00:26,000
Speaker 2: Is it you yes or no, oh, well, okay, as opposed.

1157
01:00:25,640 --> 01:00:26,440
Speaker 3: To five weeks.

1158
01:00:26,480 --> 01:00:29,360
Speaker 4: You know, LifeLock had a funny commercial where everyone at

1159
01:00:29,400 --> 01:00:31,800
Speaker 4: a bank is there's a gun to their head. They're

1160
01:00:31,840 --> 01:00:35,160
Speaker 4: all on the floor, and the security guard is staying

1161
01:00:35,240 --> 01:00:39,760
Speaker 4: there going I think we're being robbed, And that's the

1162
01:00:39,920 --> 01:00:43,480
Speaker 4: old way, as opposed to someone pressing the button going

1163
01:00:43,800 --> 01:00:45,480
Speaker 4: there's a robbery going on right now.

1164
01:00:45,760 --> 01:00:47,400
Speaker 3: So there's that, and.

1165
01:00:47,360 --> 01:00:49,760
Speaker 4: The third m has managed the damage. Now you can

1166
01:00:49,800 --> 01:00:52,120
Speaker 4: do it yourself, which means you might as well write

1167
01:00:52,160 --> 01:00:55,160
Speaker 4: off many hours of your life and you'll spend your

1168
01:00:55,240 --> 01:00:59,840
Speaker 4: life on a telephone watching it go by, waiting for

1169
01:01:00,040 --> 01:01:03,880
Speaker 4: I'm going to answer the phone. Or they're either through

1170
01:01:04,320 --> 01:01:08,760
Speaker 4: more sophisticated credit monitoring programs, they come with resolution programs,

1171
01:01:09,480 --> 01:01:12,440
Speaker 4: or a lot of people don't realize through their insurance company,

1172
01:01:12,560 --> 01:01:16,480
Speaker 4: their bank, or the HR department where they work, there

1173
01:01:16,520 --> 01:01:20,000
Speaker 4: are programs available to them as a perk of their relationship,

1174
01:01:20,200 --> 01:01:24,280
Speaker 4: or through an employee assistance program that will help you

1175
01:01:24,320 --> 01:01:30,080
Speaker 4: through identity incidents. So ask your insurance agent, your bank rep,

1176
01:01:30,400 --> 01:01:33,240
Speaker 4: or your HR department do you have a program to

1177
01:01:33,280 --> 01:01:36,000
Speaker 4: help me through an incident? Am I in it? If not,

1178
01:01:36,240 --> 01:01:38,680
Speaker 4: what I need to do to get in it. Is

1179
01:01:38,720 --> 01:01:42,560
Speaker 4: it free, deeply discounted or what's the story is?

1180
01:01:42,760 --> 01:01:45,000
Speaker 2: It always seems to me like in order to actually

1181
01:01:45,040 --> 01:01:48,000
Speaker 2: get a program to help you repair identity theft, it

1182
01:01:48,120 --> 01:01:52,080
Speaker 2: costs money, which seems wildly unfair to me. Is that true?

1183
01:01:52,160 --> 01:01:54,560
Speaker 2: Or or are there more free programs than I?

1184
01:01:55,080 --> 01:01:55,160
Speaker 1: No?

1185
01:01:55,320 --> 01:01:58,680
Speaker 4: Generally, well, the programs are if you're paying for monitoring.

1186
01:01:59,120 --> 01:02:03,760
Speaker 4: The resolution comes along with it. But there are some

1187
01:02:03,800 --> 01:02:08,160
Speaker 4: insurance companies that give it to their policy holders as

1188
01:02:08,200 --> 01:02:12,320
Speaker 4: a thank you for using them as your insurer, either

1189
01:02:12,440 --> 01:02:16,920
Speaker 4: through your homeowner's policy, your renter's policy, or your auto

1190
01:02:17,000 --> 01:02:21,280
Speaker 4: insurance policy, or it'll be an endorsement to your policy.

1191
01:02:21,720 --> 01:02:23,280
Speaker 3: But it's cheap, so.

1192
01:02:23,560 --> 01:02:27,200
Speaker 4: You should really, in particular, ask your insurance sation. You'd

1193
01:02:27,200 --> 01:02:30,400
Speaker 4: be surprised at what's out there and available to you

1194
01:02:30,480 --> 01:02:31,600
Speaker 4: through insurance companies.

1195
01:02:31,760 --> 01:02:35,000
Speaker 2: Got it. I got an alert that my phone number

1196
01:02:35,240 --> 01:02:38,480
Speaker 2: is on a dark web website because I have credit monitoring.

1197
01:02:39,240 --> 01:02:41,600
Speaker 2: That did that just kind of happen to everyone with

1198
01:02:41,640 --> 01:02:44,640
Speaker 2: the Equifax thing? Or is that something to be particularly

1199
01:02:44,680 --> 01:02:45,280
Speaker 2: alarmed about?

1200
01:02:45,440 --> 01:02:48,400
Speaker 4: Well, no, it happens, you know, because again, our phone

1201
01:02:48,480 --> 01:02:50,480
Speaker 4: numbers so ubiquitous, and there have been some I mean,

1202
01:02:50,560 --> 01:02:53,960
Speaker 4: breaches have become the third certainty in life behind death

1203
01:02:54,000 --> 01:02:57,920
Speaker 4: and taxes. So you have to assume at some point

1204
01:02:57,960 --> 01:03:00,360
Speaker 4: your information is going to be out there. If you're

1205
01:03:00,440 --> 01:03:03,640
Speaker 4: notified that your data's on the dark web, and like

1206
01:03:03,720 --> 01:03:05,920
Speaker 4: your phone number, you could go and you could get

1207
01:03:05,920 --> 01:03:10,480
Speaker 4: a Google number, which then basically passes through to your

1208
01:03:10,520 --> 01:03:13,280
Speaker 4: phone number. But what it's really saying to you is

1209
01:03:13,480 --> 01:03:17,520
Speaker 4: be alert because you could be receiving a text that

1210
01:03:17,800 --> 01:03:21,800
Speaker 4: looks legitimate that may not be legitimate because someone got

1211
01:03:21,800 --> 01:03:22,960
Speaker 4: a hold of your phone number.

1212
01:03:23,280 --> 01:03:24,960
Speaker 3: So it's really all about.

1213
01:03:25,240 --> 01:03:29,840
Speaker 4: Being aware, being alert, and guess what we have a

1214
01:03:29,880 --> 01:03:33,560
Speaker 4: shared response. Look, business hasn't done enough, the government certainly

1215
01:03:33,600 --> 01:03:36,360
Speaker 4: hasn't done enough, and frankly a lot of consumers haven't

1216
01:03:36,400 --> 01:03:40,000
Speaker 4: done enough to protect our data. So what we have

1217
01:03:40,080 --> 01:03:43,120
Speaker 4: to do is become more active in the protection of

1218
01:03:43,120 --> 01:03:48,440
Speaker 4: our data, which means be more concerned about privacy and security.

1219
01:03:48,120 --> 01:03:49,160
Speaker 3: And be more alert.

1220
01:03:49,760 --> 01:03:54,400
Speaker 4: And if anything doesn't look right, don't assume somebody else

1221
01:03:54,520 --> 01:03:57,040
Speaker 4: made a mistake. It really could be that your data

1222
01:03:57,200 --> 01:04:00,920
Speaker 4: is out there and is right now being exploited by somebody,

1223
01:04:01,280 --> 01:04:03,640
Speaker 4: and you need to know as quickly as possible so

1224
01:04:03,680 --> 01:04:05,000
Speaker 4: you can do something.

1225
01:04:04,680 --> 01:04:05,400
Speaker 2: About it right.

1226
01:04:05,480 --> 01:04:07,800
Speaker 1: Awesome, Wow, thank you so much for all the work

1227
01:04:07,800 --> 01:04:10,080
Speaker 1: that you do and spreading this information.

1228
01:04:10,720 --> 01:04:12,320
Speaker 6: It's so needed.

1229
01:04:12,440 --> 01:04:16,120
Speaker 1: And I have a lot of password work to do, don't.

1230
01:04:15,960 --> 01:04:18,600
Speaker 4: You an yes, yeah, no. And you know, I noticed

1231
01:04:18,600 --> 01:04:21,160
Speaker 4: one of the things is, you know, Google, who likes

1232
01:04:21,160 --> 01:04:25,080
Speaker 4: to be the repository of your knowledge, and Apple that

1233
01:04:25,120 --> 01:04:28,520
Speaker 4: they now will send you a note going you know,

1234
01:04:28,680 --> 01:04:32,400
Speaker 4: by the way, we found thirty instances of where you're

1235
01:04:32,480 --> 01:04:37,040
Speaker 4: using the same password or you're using a similar password.

1236
01:04:37,320 --> 01:04:40,840
Speaker 4: Another place that people get into trouble too, is where

1237
01:04:40,880 --> 01:04:45,560
Speaker 4: they recycle passwords, which means you used it once and

1238
01:04:45,800 --> 01:04:49,440
Speaker 4: you think that website is gone, forgotten and you're not

1239
01:04:49,480 --> 01:04:52,480
Speaker 4: there anymore. And then later you're trying to think of

1240
01:04:52,520 --> 01:04:55,280
Speaker 4: a password and you go, that's a great password, but

1241
01:04:55,360 --> 01:04:58,479
Speaker 4: you don't realize that it's actually a password you've used

1242
01:04:58,520 --> 01:05:01,880
Speaker 4: in the past. And that's why password managers are so

1243
01:05:01,960 --> 01:05:05,560
Speaker 4: much better, because they constantly come up with with new

1244
01:05:05,640 --> 01:05:09,040
Speaker 4: configurations of letters and numbers. And the other thing people

1245
01:05:09,080 --> 01:05:11,320
Speaker 4: have to understand is, you know, you may think you

1246
01:05:11,400 --> 01:05:15,800
Speaker 4: have an indecipherable password. It's nothing worse than dumb passwords,

1247
01:05:16,440 --> 01:05:22,680
Speaker 4: uh like COURTI or password. A lot of people, yeah,

1248
01:05:22,880 --> 01:05:25,200
Speaker 4: or one one one or you know. Now you can

1249
01:05:25,240 --> 01:05:28,640
Speaker 4: protect your SIM card on your phone and you can

1250
01:05:28,680 --> 01:05:29,400
Speaker 4: create a U.

1251
01:05:31,480 --> 01:05:32,840
Speaker 3: A code for it.

1252
01:05:32,920 --> 01:05:34,800
Speaker 4: But a lot of people don't realize that when you

1253
01:05:34,880 --> 01:05:37,360
Speaker 4: do one one one one, that's kind of easy for

1254
01:05:37,440 --> 01:05:42,040
Speaker 4: someone to figure out. So, you know, be creative and

1255
01:05:42,440 --> 01:05:45,080
Speaker 4: be attentive to that. But you could have the most

1256
01:05:45,120 --> 01:05:48,960
Speaker 4: complex password in the world, but if it's been exposed

1257
01:05:49,040 --> 01:05:52,439
Speaker 4: in a breach, then it's out there, right, And that's

1258
01:05:52,480 --> 01:05:55,200
Speaker 4: why one of the sites that you should definitely go

1259
01:05:55,320 --> 01:05:59,200
Speaker 4: to is have I Been Pawned? But that's p w

1260
01:05:59,720 --> 01:06:03,880
Speaker 4: n ed, which is Internet lingo for have you been

1261
01:06:04,160 --> 01:06:09,160
Speaker 4: basically compromised? Right? So have I Been punned dot com?

1262
01:06:09,520 --> 01:06:11,760
Speaker 4: You can put in your email address and you'll get

1263
01:06:11,760 --> 01:06:16,280
Speaker 4: a list of every website where your email existed where

1264
01:06:16,320 --> 01:06:19,320
Speaker 4: it's been exposed in a breach. Cool, and you can

1265
01:06:19,360 --> 01:06:21,760
Speaker 4: also put your phone number in there and you'll also

1266
01:06:21,880 --> 01:06:25,160
Speaker 4: get that information. And what you want to do is

1267
01:06:25,840 --> 01:06:29,480
Speaker 4: remember the password that you were using with that email

1268
01:06:29,720 --> 01:06:32,680
Speaker 4: for that website and then change.

1269
01:06:32,400 --> 01:06:36,360
Speaker 2: It right right right. Awesome of where can people find

1270
01:06:36,360 --> 01:06:37,480
Speaker 2: you and your podcast?

1271
01:06:37,760 --> 01:06:42,880
Speaker 4: Okay, we were on Apple, Spotify, anywhere you get your

1272
01:06:42,920 --> 01:06:46,960
Speaker 4: pot tune in Amazon. Uh, and it's what the Heck

1273
01:06:47,040 --> 01:06:50,440
Speaker 4: with Adam Leven is the podcast. You can also got

1274
01:06:50,480 --> 01:06:55,280
Speaker 4: an Adam Levin dot com where we have all the

1275
01:06:55,320 --> 01:06:59,160
Speaker 4: information about the podcast plus a great deal of additional

1276
01:06:59,200 --> 01:07:04,080
Speaker 4: information about what we're doing. Articles were writing ways that

1277
01:07:04,120 --> 01:07:05,960
Speaker 4: people should better protect themselves.

1278
01:07:06,600 --> 01:07:08,000
Speaker 3: Uh, and that's how you can find me.

1279
01:07:08,240 --> 01:07:11,160
Speaker 4: Wonderful And I'm also on Twitter and Facebook and that

1280
01:07:11,320 --> 01:07:17,320
Speaker 4: with Adam underscore k underscore Levin or some derivation of that.

1281
01:07:17,560 --> 01:07:18,760
Speaker 5: And what's your password for that?

1282
01:07:20,080 --> 01:07:24,320
Speaker 3: Well, let me see which which password for which it?

1283
01:07:25,920 --> 01:07:27,480
Speaker 4: Usually when I said to people were on there on

1284
01:07:27,520 --> 01:07:29,880
Speaker 4: the show is Oh, by the way, listen before you leave,

1285
01:07:30,200 --> 01:07:32,080
Speaker 4: can you just tell us what you're SOLF security?

1286
01:07:32,160 --> 01:07:38,800
Speaker 2: The awesome, Thanks so much for joining us, Adam.

1287
01:07:38,880 --> 01:07:41,120
Speaker 4: Thank you so much for inviting me. This was great fun.

1288
01:07:41,640 --> 01:07:46,560
Speaker 2: Okay, Megan, yuh huh. Obviously there's not a cult here,

1289
01:07:47,520 --> 01:07:52,120
Speaker 2: and we already know your scam experiences, so so we

1290
01:07:52,160 --> 01:07:55,240
Speaker 2: actually so we talked about TikTok in this interview, and

1291
01:07:55,960 --> 01:07:58,800
Speaker 2: TikTok has a potential security risk. An interesting thing has

1292
01:07:58,800 --> 01:08:01,160
Speaker 2: been happening online that I had no idea about until

1293
01:08:01,160 --> 01:08:03,560
Speaker 2: I logged onto Twitter this week, which is that like

1294
01:08:04,040 --> 01:08:07,280
Speaker 2: having concerns about TikTok is now being coded as being

1295
01:08:07,360 --> 01:08:10,800
Speaker 2: like a conservative point of view or an anti LGBTQ

1296
01:08:10,960 --> 01:08:13,720
Speaker 2: point of view, which I think is very like I

1297
01:08:13,760 --> 01:08:17,280
Speaker 2: guess I understand because on some level because it's largely

1298
01:08:17,320 --> 01:08:20,879
Speaker 2: coming from the Republican Party, this line of questioning in Congress.

1299
01:08:21,200 --> 01:08:24,719
Speaker 2: But also I mean, I like, I'm literally so fucking

1300
01:08:24,760 --> 01:08:29,320
Speaker 2: pro LGBTQ community, and I also think that TikTok has

1301
01:08:29,840 --> 01:08:32,599
Speaker 2: flaws and there are things we should be concerned about,

1302
01:08:32,680 --> 01:08:37,680
Speaker 2: not even necessarily about Chinese information warfare or whatever, or

1303
01:08:38,080 --> 01:08:41,519
Speaker 2: Chinese information gathering. So much is just like our attention spans.

1304
01:08:41,560 --> 01:08:42,599
Speaker 2: But what do you think?

1305
01:08:43,200 --> 01:08:44,360
Speaker 6: I completely agree.

1306
01:08:44,400 --> 01:08:46,880
Speaker 1: I mean, our attention spans are gone either way, it's

1307
01:08:46,920 --> 01:08:49,280
Speaker 1: just going to be replaced with a different app. But

1308
01:08:49,840 --> 01:08:54,280
Speaker 1: probably shouldn't all have an app streaming private information.

1309
01:08:54,680 --> 01:08:57,640
Speaker 2: My main issue is just that, like so much misinformation

1310
01:08:57,720 --> 01:09:01,160
Speaker 2: spreads on that app, and so much content that is

1311
01:09:01,680 --> 01:09:06,160
Speaker 2: preying on our worst impulses, which are like fear mongering

1312
01:09:06,479 --> 01:09:10,439
Speaker 2: and negativity bias and all of you know, just the

1313
01:09:10,479 --> 01:09:14,920
Speaker 2: things that make us less happy as a society, as

1314
01:09:14,920 --> 01:09:16,360
Speaker 2: a culture, as a being.

1315
01:09:16,680 --> 01:09:19,599
Speaker 1: I can also see how young people would really enjoy it.

1316
01:09:19,600 --> 01:09:22,360
Speaker 1: It's a really cool way to connect. It's a cool

1317
01:09:22,680 --> 01:09:25,920
Speaker 1: way to share things. And also you can get a

1318
01:09:25,960 --> 01:09:28,360
Speaker 1: shit ton of views, which would be exciting. I mean,

1319
01:09:28,360 --> 01:09:31,200
Speaker 1: it would be exciting for an adult, but even more

1320
01:09:31,200 --> 01:09:32,720
Speaker 1: so as a kid. But I've just been reading a

1321
01:09:32,760 --> 01:09:34,840
Speaker 1: lot of things. I don't know where I read those.

1322
01:09:34,880 --> 01:09:37,800
Speaker 1: But somebody logged in pretending to be a fourteen year

1323
01:09:37,840 --> 01:09:40,040
Speaker 1: old girl to TikTok. We might have already talked about

1324
01:09:40,040 --> 01:09:42,800
Speaker 1: it on here, but she was immediately just inundated with

1325
01:09:43,240 --> 01:09:48,599
Speaker 1: self harm information, Andrew Tate information like quotes by Andrew Tate,

1326
01:09:49,000 --> 01:09:53,839
Speaker 1: eat pro anorexia information, A guy did it. He pretended

1327
01:09:53,880 --> 01:09:56,559
Speaker 1: to be a boy, lots of guns, lots of whatever.

1328
01:09:56,720 --> 01:09:59,320
Speaker 1: But if you log into China as a fourteen year

1329
01:09:59,320 --> 01:10:03,160
Speaker 1: old kid, it shows you really cool science experiments and

1330
01:10:03,200 --> 01:10:06,000
Speaker 1: how to, you know, make dinner for your family. It's

1331
01:10:06,160 --> 01:10:09,400
Speaker 1: it's two very different things that they're pushing forward.

1332
01:10:09,600 --> 01:10:12,360
Speaker 2: I mean, and obviously whatever you're interested in, the algorithm

1333
01:10:12,360 --> 01:10:14,360
Speaker 2: will show you more of that. So like if you

1334
01:10:14,960 --> 01:10:17,479
Speaker 2: are a science geek, here you it will show you

1335
01:10:17,560 --> 01:10:20,840
Speaker 2: science ze content you know, and and yeah, of course

1336
01:10:20,880 --> 01:10:24,080
Speaker 2: it's an amazing tool for connection. It's an amazing tool

1337
01:10:24,160 --> 01:10:27,120
Speaker 2: for independent artists to get out there. I mean, you

1338
01:10:27,200 --> 01:10:30,639
Speaker 2: used to literally completely rely on and on a label

1339
01:10:30,760 --> 01:10:33,679
Speaker 2: to develop you and get your music out into the world,

1340
01:10:33,680 --> 01:10:35,960
Speaker 2: and that's not a thing anymore. You can you can

1341
01:10:36,000 --> 01:10:38,040
Speaker 2: find your own audience. And I think these are all incredible,

1342
01:10:38,560 --> 01:10:40,760
Speaker 2: incredible things, and it's like anything on the Internet where

1343
01:10:40,800 --> 01:10:44,200
Speaker 2: can be used for good or bad. And I just

1344
01:10:44,360 --> 01:10:47,759
Speaker 2: I just get very fearful about societally losing our critical

1345
01:10:47,800 --> 01:10:51,280
Speaker 2: thinking and TikTok is not the only reason for that

1346
01:10:51,360 --> 01:10:54,240
Speaker 2: by any means, but it is just a contributor I think,

1347
01:10:54,720 --> 01:10:56,920
Speaker 2: given the way that we consume content on the app.

1348
01:10:57,120 --> 01:10:59,879
Speaker 2: I just want to be clear though fully pro LGBTQ

1349
01:11:00,160 --> 01:11:02,840
Speaker 2: on here. That is just a separate thing. And in

1350
01:11:02,880 --> 01:11:05,160
Speaker 2: my opinion, it's black and white thinking to think that

1351
01:11:05,240 --> 01:11:07,800
Speaker 2: those things are mutually exclusive. Does that make sense?

1352
01:11:07,880 --> 01:11:08,680
Speaker 5: Of course it is.

1353
01:11:08,720 --> 01:11:11,040
Speaker 1: It's black and white thinking, and it's just so easy

1354
01:11:11,040 --> 01:11:11,559
Speaker 1: to fall into.

1355
01:11:11,760 --> 01:11:14,960
Speaker 2: Meanwhile, I'm gonna post on our TikTok ten nights.

1356
01:11:15,360 --> 01:11:16,600
Speaker 5: I know, I was just thinking that.

1357
01:11:16,680 --> 01:11:19,200
Speaker 1: I was like, but God, I wish somebody was good

1358
01:11:19,240 --> 01:11:23,240
Speaker 1: at posting at TikTok, and you would we're suss.

1359
01:11:22,640 --> 01:11:26,040
Speaker 2: And help us at posting. We're so bad at posting.

1360
01:11:28,040 --> 01:11:30,880
Speaker 1: But you know what, Lots of stressful stuff out there,

1361
01:11:30,960 --> 01:11:32,679
Speaker 1: but still some good stuff too.

1362
01:11:32,720 --> 01:11:34,559
Speaker 5: We hope you guys enjoy the rest of your week.

1363
01:11:34,760 --> 01:11:37,360
Speaker 1: We can't wait to see you again next time, and

1364
01:11:37,479 --> 01:11:40,960
Speaker 1: as always, remember to follow your gut, watch out for.

1365
01:11:41,000 --> 01:11:51,000
Speaker 2: It lags, and never ever trust me A Trust Me

1366
01:11:51,040 --> 01:11:54,240
Speaker 2: as produced by Kirsten Woodward, Gabby Rapp and Steve Delemator.

1367
01:11:54,320 --> 01:11:56,320
Speaker 5: The special thanks to Stacy Para and.

1368
01:11:56,280 --> 01:11:58,639
Speaker 2: Our theme song was composed by Holly amber Church.

1369
01:11:58,840 --> 01:12:00,799
Speaker 1: You can find us on an instaum raam at trust

1370
01:12:00,840 --> 01:12:04,320
Speaker 1: Me Podcast, Twitter at trust Me Cult pod, or on

1371
01:12:04,400 --> 01:12:06,960
Speaker 1: TikTok at trust Me Cult Podcast.

1372
01:12:07,160 --> 01:12:10,520
Speaker 2: I'm Ula Lola on Instagram and Ola Lola on Twitter.

1373
01:12:10,240 --> 01:12:13,880
Speaker 1: And I am Megan Elizabeth eleven on Instagram and Bebraham

1374
01:12:13,960 --> 01:12:15,000
Speaker 1: Hicks on Twitter.

1375
01:12:15,160 --> 01:12:17,479
Speaker 2: Remember to rate and review and spread the word