WEBVTT - Illusory Truth Effect, Part 2: Fight the Lies 0:00:03.040 --> 0:00:05.840 Welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind from how Stuff 0:00:05.840 --> 0:00:14.239 Works dot com. Hey you welcome to Stuff to Blow 0:00:14.280 --> 0:00:17.040 your Mind. My name is Robert Lamb and I'm Joe McCormick, 0:00:17.040 --> 0:00:20.400 and we're back part two of our exploration of the 0:00:20.440 --> 0:00:25.360 illusory truth effect, probably the liar's best trick. If you 0:00:25.400 --> 0:00:27.760 haven't heard our last episodes, you'd probably go back listen 0:00:27.800 --> 0:00:30.680 to that first. But if you haven't, or if you have, 0:00:31.280 --> 0:00:33.160 let's just do a quick recap of what we talked 0:00:33.200 --> 0:00:36.040 about last time. We discussed all of the research on 0:00:36.159 --> 0:00:38.400 this thing that's sort of been part of folk wisdom 0:00:38.479 --> 0:00:41.519 that if you say something and if you repeat it 0:00:41.640 --> 0:00:44.840 and repeat it and repeat it, people become over time 0:00:44.920 --> 0:00:47.839 more likely to believe that thing. And that is thoroughly 0:00:48.320 --> 0:00:51.560 validated by experimental research, right. And we also talked a 0:00:51.600 --> 0:00:53.680 little bit about why does it even make sense that 0:00:53.760 --> 0:00:56.480 we would come to believe things that were not true 0:00:56.520 --> 0:00:59.200 about the world that we live in just because they 0:00:59.200 --> 0:01:02.760 were repeated. Yeah, And so the basis that we ultimately 0:01:02.880 --> 0:01:05.120 ended up on last time that seems to be favored 0:01:05.120 --> 0:01:08.040 by most of the psychologists to study this is based 0:01:08.080 --> 0:01:12.360 in the idea of processing fluency that for whatever reason, 0:01:12.920 --> 0:01:15.279 one researcher we talked about last time came to believe 0:01:15.319 --> 0:01:18.440 that it was because of conditioning based on real world effects. 0:01:18.440 --> 0:01:21.520 But for whatever reason, we tend to associate things that 0:01:21.560 --> 0:01:26.800 are easy to process, things with high processing fluency with truth. 0:01:27.080 --> 0:01:30.080 So something's easy to read, we think it's more true. 0:01:30.480 --> 0:01:33.319 Or if something is an idea we've seen or heard 0:01:33.400 --> 0:01:37.360 or encountered before, because that's easier to process. Because of familiarity, 0:01:37.680 --> 0:01:40.039 we believe that it is more likely to be true 0:01:40.120 --> 0:01:42.039 than if we're encountering it for the first time. But 0:01:42.080 --> 0:01:45.160 of course in all of this extreme implausibility is going 0:01:45.200 --> 0:01:47.200 to be a boundary condition that's going to kick in. 0:01:47.280 --> 0:01:50.760 So this is like the Ted Cruz is the Zodiac Killer? 0:01:51.120 --> 0:01:55.200 Uh level of of of implausibility? What just because the 0:01:55.240 --> 0:01:57.720 ages don't match up right well, just and it's just 0:01:57.800 --> 0:01:59.920 kind of like, all right, I'm not blieeding that that's 0:02:00.000 --> 0:02:02.920 it's ridiculous, but some people do believe that. So your 0:02:02.960 --> 0:02:06.920 boundary condition may not be where somebodynoundary condition is that 0:02:07.040 --> 0:02:10.919 the boundary conditions will vary from individual to individual. Um. 0:02:11.000 --> 0:02:14.400 So yeah, So the question that we should address to 0:02:14.480 --> 0:02:16.400 start off in this one is in the last episode, 0:02:16.440 --> 0:02:20.120 we discussed how this effect has been thoroughly validated in 0:02:20.160 --> 0:02:23.160 the lab. But here's a question does it work in 0:02:23.160 --> 0:02:25.880 the real world and is it really all that powerful? 0:02:26.000 --> 0:02:29.520 Like a lot of researchers seem to assume that, surely, 0:02:29.639 --> 0:02:33.880 if you already know something about a subject, repetition of 0:02:33.880 --> 0:02:38.520 a contradictory false statement wouldn't actually undermine your real knowledge, 0:02:38.639 --> 0:02:42.160 would it. Surely they would tend to assume that this 0:02:42.600 --> 0:02:45.600 slusory truth effect only works for state statements that were 0:02:45.680 --> 0:02:50.120 uncertain about to begin with, and statements that seem highly plausible, 0:02:50.400 --> 0:02:53.200 like if you didn't know anything about either Ted Cruz 0:02:53.320 --> 0:02:55.360 or the Zodiac Killer really and then you would just 0:02:55.400 --> 0:02:57.800 sort of say, all right, maybe that's possible, whereas an 0:02:57.800 --> 0:03:01.120 individual who has read multiple books on the Zodiac Killer 0:03:01.600 --> 0:03:03.800 would say, no, that doesn't that doesn't match up. That 0:03:03.919 --> 0:03:08.280 is just ridiculous. Yeah, So that that's the assumption. But unfortunately, 0:03:08.440 --> 0:03:12.520 some more recent research has really turned that assumption on 0:03:12.600 --> 0:03:15.359 its head. So I want to talk about an important 0:03:15.400 --> 0:03:18.720 recent study in the illusory truth effect that brings it's 0:03:18.720 --> 0:03:21.920 a bearer of bad news. The study is from the 0:03:22.000 --> 0:03:27.600 Journal of Experimental Psychology General in by Fasio Brashier, Pain 0:03:27.720 --> 0:03:31.720 and marsh and it's called knowledge does not protect against 0:03:31.720 --> 0:03:35.440 illusory truth. So they pointed out that the illusory truth 0:03:35.440 --> 0:03:39.120 effect that we talked about last time, based on processing fluency, 0:03:39.160 --> 0:03:42.800 is widely accepted, well established, but it had been previously 0:03:42.880 --> 0:03:46.480 thought that this effect was constrained by a few things. Now, 0:03:46.640 --> 0:03:50.280 one constraint shown to actually exist in the literature is 0:03:50.520 --> 0:03:54.240 recollection of the quality of the source of the information. 0:03:55.080 --> 0:03:58.280 So previous studies have shown that if you specifically remember 0:03:58.800 --> 0:04:02.320 where a statement came from, and you consider the source 0:04:02.320 --> 0:04:06.200 of the statement a dishonest or untrustworthy source, that can 0:04:06.560 --> 0:04:09.760 produce kind of a reverse truth effect, where repetition of 0:04:09.760 --> 0:04:12.040 a statement known to come from a liar or an 0:04:12.120 --> 0:04:15.680 untrustworthy source causes us to disbelieve it. So this sounds 0:04:15.720 --> 0:04:17.840 like this should be good news, right right? Yeah? Did 0:04:17.880 --> 0:04:22.640 I ultimately the question did I hear that on the radio? Did? 0:04:22.839 --> 0:04:24.520 Or did I see it on a T shirt? Yeah? 0:04:24.640 --> 0:04:27.359 Or was this on the cover of the National Enquirer? 0:04:27.800 --> 0:04:30.640 Like you remember that's where it came from, and you're 0:04:30.880 --> 0:04:33.320 you know, that's an untrustworthy source. So it actually has 0:04:33.360 --> 0:04:36.240 the reverse effect. You hear that repeated and it makes 0:04:36.279 --> 0:04:38.599 you go, no, no, no, that's not true at all. 0:04:39.560 --> 0:04:42.400 But this isn't as much of a protection as we think, 0:04:43.000 --> 0:04:46.919 because honestly, how well do you remember the exact source 0:04:46.960 --> 0:04:50.440 of every bit of semantic knowledge in your head? Why no, 0:04:50.560 --> 0:04:53.279 bat Boy did not come from the New York Times, 0:04:53.560 --> 0:04:55.279 But there are lots of other things that are in 0:04:55.360 --> 0:04:57.160 your head that did come from the cover of the 0:04:57.240 --> 0:04:59.840 National Enquirer, and you don't remember that that's where it 0:05:00.000 --> 0:05:03.800 aim from. I guarantee it you've stood in line at 0:05:03.800 --> 0:05:07.080 the grocery store. Well, if it's a story about any 0:05:07.360 --> 0:05:12.680 particular aged celebrities, brave last days or sad last days, 0:05:13.040 --> 0:05:16.080 they probably came from inquired But yes, there there, there's 0:05:16.120 --> 0:05:18.000 probably there are probably some stories in there that I 0:05:18.000 --> 0:05:20.919 would not definitely be able to pin down to inquire 0:05:21.080 --> 0:05:23.840 versus other sources, Robert, I see right through your bravado. 0:05:24.080 --> 0:05:27.520 Some Inquirer stories have gotten through to you. Uh yeah. 0:05:27.600 --> 0:05:30.080 Other studies have backed this up. After just a period 0:05:30.120 --> 0:05:32.760 of a few weeks, what may have once been stored 0:05:32.760 --> 0:05:36.400 in the brain as false claim by an untrustworthy source 0:05:36.560 --> 0:05:41.680 could potentially, over time become just a familiar statement I remember, which, 0:05:41.720 --> 0:05:45.760 of course, once it's familiar translates it into more likely 0:05:45.800 --> 0:05:48.720 to be a true fact. There was at least one 0:05:48.760 --> 0:05:51.720 study that looked into this by beg Annas and far 0:05:51.839 --> 0:05:56.480 Nacci in nineteen two called Dissociation of Processes and belief, 0:05:56.520 --> 0:06:00.159 source recollections, statement, familiarity, and the Illusion of truth, And 0:06:00.279 --> 0:06:02.880 basically they found that when the source of a claim 0:06:02.960 --> 0:06:07.520 is not super memorable as unreliable, familiarity can be more 0:06:07.560 --> 0:06:11.479 important than truth or reliability. Okay, so it's not necessarily 0:06:11.560 --> 0:06:16.200 a like a magazine that that has a negative reputation 0:06:16.240 --> 0:06:19.279 in your mind, but it's not something that's completely reputable either. 0:06:19.320 --> 0:06:21.160 It just kind of follows in between. Or even if 0:06:21.160 --> 0:06:23.719 it has a negative reputation and it's just not all 0:06:23.760 --> 0:06:27.320 that memorable, you can lose track of where it came 0:06:27.400 --> 0:06:30.839 from and it will suffer from the illusory truth effect. 0:06:31.120 --> 0:06:34.080 This can happen even when you should have remembered that 0:06:34.160 --> 0:06:37.159 it came from an untrustworthy source. There are exceptions when 0:06:37.160 --> 0:06:40.240 the source is really memorable, but a lot of times 0:06:40.360 --> 0:06:44.840 it doesn't protect you. Now, the second assumption about constraints 0:06:45.040 --> 0:06:48.640 on the illusory truth effect is about knowledge. Right, We've 0:06:48.640 --> 0:06:51.919 all got knowledge already in our heads, and the idea 0:06:51.960 --> 0:06:54.960 is that pre existing knowledge will protect against the effect, 0:06:55.320 --> 0:06:58.040 and this is what came under scrutiny in this particular 0:06:58.080 --> 0:07:02.200 study by Fasio and our co co authors. In so, 0:07:02.600 --> 0:07:05.680 despite being an assumption repeated again and again in the 0:07:05.720 --> 0:07:09.720 illusory truth literature, very few of the studies actually bothered 0:07:09.760 --> 0:07:13.280 to test whether knowledge protects people. I was just sort 0:07:13.320 --> 0:07:16.280 of asserted to be true as if it were obvious, 0:07:16.600 --> 0:07:18.680 and the few that did bother to test it in 0:07:18.720 --> 0:07:21.760 any way generally did so by testing how the effect 0:07:21.840 --> 0:07:26.720 presented in people who claimed subject area expertise. So uh, 0:07:26.760 --> 0:07:30.120 these studies yielded contradictory results. But here's a couple of examples. 0:07:30.520 --> 0:07:33.440 Scroll in nineteen eight three found that if you rate 0:07:33.480 --> 0:07:36.040 yourself as an expert on cars, Robert, would you rate 0:07:36.080 --> 0:07:39.360 yourself as an expert on cars? But some people would win. 0:07:39.600 --> 0:07:42.559 Some people around the office. Yeah, car experts, well found 0:07:42.600 --> 0:07:47.200 suffered smaller illusory truth effects uh than non experts on 0:07:47.320 --> 0:07:50.320 car trivia. So that would suggest, okay, knowledge gives you 0:07:50.360 --> 0:07:53.000 a little bit of an edge. You're not You're not 0:07:53.120 --> 0:07:56.600 as susceptible as amateurs. And then Parks and Tough in 0:07:56.720 --> 0:08:00.320 two thousand and six had people rate claims about known 0:08:00.680 --> 0:08:04.880 versus unknown consumer brands, and the illusory truth effect was 0:08:04.920 --> 0:08:08.120 bigger for statements about brands that people were unfamiliar with. 0:08:08.600 --> 0:08:10.280 That makes sense. So like, if you didn't already know 0:08:10.360 --> 0:08:14.240 anything about this brand, you were more susceptible to illusory 0:08:14.240 --> 0:08:16.920 truth effect on statements about the brand. Yeah, that makes 0:08:17.000 --> 0:08:21.160 perfect sense. On the other hand, Archy's Hackett and boem 0:08:21.200 --> 0:08:24.200 in nine nine found the opposite, that the higher a 0:08:24.280 --> 0:08:28.280 person rated their expertise in a subject, the more susceptible 0:08:28.320 --> 0:08:31.280 they were to the illusory truth effect in that subject area. 0:08:32.160 --> 0:08:34.959 Makes you wonder if there's like some kind of insecurity 0:08:35.160 --> 0:08:37.800 or like identity protective thing going on that. Yeah, like 0:08:37.960 --> 0:08:39.720 I don't want I don't I don't want to be wrong, 0:08:39.800 --> 0:08:42.480 So I'm just gonna nod my head on that. I 0:08:42.520 --> 0:08:44.960 don't want to look bad. I've already staked my reputation 0:08:45.000 --> 0:08:50.400 on being a car expert. Also, boem in nineteen found 0:08:50.480 --> 0:08:54.720 that psychology majors showed a larger illusory truth effect on 0:08:54.800 --> 0:08:59.679 psychology than non majors. But there's some issues with these studies, 0:08:59.679 --> 0:09:02.600 so Assio and her co authors point out that these 0:09:02.640 --> 0:09:06.400 types of tests don't actually manipulate direct knowledge of whether 0:09:06.440 --> 0:09:08.640 the statements are true or false, just sort of the 0:09:08.679 --> 0:09:12.960 perception of related knowledge. So they wanted to test this directly. 0:09:13.000 --> 0:09:15.680 They created a big list of statements like we've seen 0:09:15.679 --> 0:09:18.040 in these other tests, where you'll have true statements and 0:09:18.040 --> 0:09:21.680 false statements, and they base this off existing lists of 0:09:21.760 --> 0:09:24.160 facts that have been shown in previous studies to be 0:09:24.200 --> 0:09:28.640 either generally known or generally unknown. And this created four 0:09:28.720 --> 0:09:33.439 categories of statements. You've got known truths, unknown truths, known falsehoods, 0:09:33.480 --> 0:09:37.040 and unknown falsehoods. Here's some examples. You've got a known 0:09:37.080 --> 0:09:40.800 truth quote, the cyclops is a legendary one eyed giant 0:09:40.840 --> 0:09:44.280 of Greek mythology. Robert checks out. Checks out. Okay, how 0:09:44.280 --> 0:09:47.240 about the Pacific Ocean is the largest ocean in the world. 0:09:47.360 --> 0:09:51.280 Checks out. Then you go into known falsehoods. The minotaur 0:09:51.520 --> 0:09:54.800 is the legendary one eyed giant of Greek mythology. Absolutely not. 0:09:55.360 --> 0:09:58.120 The Atlantic Ocean is the largest ocean in the world, 0:09:58.559 --> 0:10:00.959 and most people are expected to know that these are 0:10:00.960 --> 0:10:05.040 not true statements. Then you've got unknown stuff. Here's an example. 0:10:05.120 --> 0:10:08.360 Unknown truth Billy the kid's real last name? What was it? 0:10:08.360 --> 0:10:13.240 It's Bonnie. Unknown falsehood Billy the kid's real last name 0:10:13.320 --> 0:10:16.120 is Garrett. Yeah, I would have It would have been 0:10:16.120 --> 0:10:18.520 a toss up for me because I did not know 0:10:18.600 --> 0:10:20.320 Billy the kid's last name. I thought maybe it was 0:10:20.320 --> 0:10:24.160 a kid, you know, as in kid Rock as Kid 0:10:24.240 --> 0:10:26.480 Rocks first name is Billy kids last name and his 0:10:26.520 --> 0:10:31.040 middle name is there. There you go. So experiment one 0:10:31.160 --> 0:10:34.120 using this set of statements, forty students in the first phase. 0:10:34.280 --> 0:10:37.080 Subjects were shown a subset of statements from the list 0:10:37.120 --> 0:10:39.480 of all four types, and they were just asked to 0:10:39.559 --> 0:10:43.280 judge how interesting the statements were. You know, that sounds 0:10:43.280 --> 0:10:45.920 like a really fun task, right, Billy the kid's last 0:10:46.000 --> 0:10:49.079 name is Bonnie? How interesting was that? I get? More 0:10:49.120 --> 0:10:53.000 interesting than some names? Yeah? Maybe, I guess. I don't know. 0:10:53.160 --> 0:10:55.800 I didn't find that one that interesting. Yeah, I don't know. 0:10:56.200 --> 0:10:58.680 I guess it sounds like Bonnie as in like pretty 0:10:58.840 --> 0:11:01.080 it sounds. It sounds maybe a little odd for what, 0:11:01.200 --> 0:11:02.720 based on the photos, need to be kind of like 0:11:03.000 --> 0:11:06.240 an ugly looking, you know, Western outlaw. It makes me 0:11:06.240 --> 0:11:08.240 think like a Robert Burns kind of poem thing. And 0:11:08.400 --> 0:11:11.320 Bonnie Glenn or whereas Garrett sound, you know, it has 0:11:11.360 --> 0:11:13.880 kind of a guttural sound to it. Ye, got right, okay, 0:11:14.000 --> 0:11:16.479 So then they got the second phase. This happened immediately 0:11:16.520 --> 0:11:19.360 after the first phase. Students were given another subset of 0:11:19.400 --> 0:11:22.080 statements from the list, again all four types of statements, 0:11:22.400 --> 0:11:24.880 and they were warned that some statements were true and 0:11:24.920 --> 0:11:27.400 some were false, And they were also warned that they 0:11:27.400 --> 0:11:29.640 would see some repeats from the list that they had 0:11:29.679 --> 0:11:32.679 just reviewed for how interesting they were. And then they 0:11:32.760 --> 0:11:34.560 rated the claims on a scale of one to six 0:11:34.600 --> 0:11:36.719 about how true they were. There was also at the 0:11:36.800 --> 0:11:40.160 end an open ended knowledge check test with it had 0:11:40.200 --> 0:11:43.600 these open ended questions like what is the world's largest ocean? 0:11:44.120 --> 0:11:47.160 What is the one eyed monster of Greek myth uh 0:11:47.240 --> 0:11:50.559 to strengthen the experiment or's picture of the individual knowledge 0:11:50.559 --> 0:11:53.960 of each participant. So then you got the results. First 0:11:54.000 --> 0:11:56.520 of all, the original findings of the illusory truth effect 0:11:56.559 --> 0:12:00.880 were replicated. Repeated statements got higher truth ratings new statements 0:12:00.960 --> 0:12:04.520 that the students had never seen before. But also, quite surprisingly, 0:12:05.000 --> 0:12:09.160 knowledge did not seem to prevent the illusory truth effect. 0:12:09.559 --> 0:12:14.720 Statements about both previously known and previously unknown facts were 0:12:14.800 --> 0:12:17.640 rated more true if they were repeated than if they 0:12:17.640 --> 0:12:22.400 were new. In other words, repetition increased perceived truthfulness, even 0:12:22.440 --> 0:12:26.440 for contradictions of facts that you know. So I want 0:12:26.440 --> 0:12:29.760 to quote from the author's quote reading a statement like 0:12:30.160 --> 0:12:33.240 a sorry is the name of the short pleaded skirt 0:12:33.320 --> 0:12:38.520 worn by Scott's increased participants later belief that that statement 0:12:38.559 --> 0:12:41.840 was true, even if they could correctly answer the question 0:12:42.280 --> 0:12:44.800 what is the name of the short pleaded skirt worn 0:12:44.880 --> 0:12:49.200 by Scotts? Isn't that bizarre? So like you ask somebody 0:12:49.240 --> 0:12:51.720 what is the short pleaded skirt worn by Scots and 0:12:51.760 --> 0:12:55.480 they answer kilt. But if you show them the phrase 0:12:55.800 --> 0:12:58.120 a sorry is the name of the short pleaded skirts 0:12:58.200 --> 0:13:01.120 skirt worn by Scots, and then show them the phrase 0:13:01.160 --> 0:13:04.600 again later, they will they will take the repeated phrase 0:13:04.880 --> 0:13:07.679 as evidence that that statement is more true than if 0:13:07.720 --> 0:13:10.480 they saw the statement for the first time. Again, it 0:13:11.040 --> 0:13:13.400 comes back to the shortcuts that our brain makes. How 0:13:13.679 --> 0:13:18.080 how weird? This's bizarre? I mean again, it's kind of 0:13:18.120 --> 0:13:21.400 a reminder that the human culture and human language just 0:13:21.640 --> 0:13:26.000 complicates everything. Yeah, it's crazy. Uh So again, the authors 0:13:26.040 --> 0:13:28.520 found that the repetition effect also emerged for truth. So 0:13:28.559 --> 0:13:30.679 it wasn't just false statements, it was true statements. To 0:13:30.840 --> 0:13:33.040 whether it's true or false, If you repeat it, people 0:13:33.120 --> 0:13:36.439 believe it more. So the takeaway from this first experiment 0:13:36.520 --> 0:13:39.640 is whether a statement is true or false, and whether 0:13:39.720 --> 0:13:42.680 you already no better or not. If somebody repeats the 0:13:42.720 --> 0:13:46.199 statement to you, on average, you're more likely to believe it. 0:13:46.960 --> 0:13:48.600 And then the second part of their study was kind 0:13:48.600 --> 0:13:51.760 of interesting. So they're discussing their own finding and they say, quote, 0:13:52.280 --> 0:13:56.640 the data suggests a counterintuitive relationship between fluency. Remember that's 0:13:56.720 --> 0:13:59.960 the fluency processing fluency. How easy it is to press 0:14:00.040 --> 0:14:04.960 this information between fluency and knowledge. Prior work assumes that 0:14:05.120 --> 0:14:09.880 people only rely on fluency if knowledge retrieval is unsuccessful 0:14:09.960 --> 0:14:13.160 i e. If participants lack relevant knowledge or fail to 0:14:13.200 --> 0:14:17.000 search memory at all. Experiment one demonstrated that the reverse 0:14:17.120 --> 0:14:20.960 may be true. Perhaps people retrieve their knowledge only if 0:14:21.000 --> 0:14:24.480 fluency is absent. So to test this out, they did 0:14:24.480 --> 0:14:27.400 a second experiment and they repeated a modified version of 0:14:27.440 --> 0:14:30.040 the experiment to test it. Uh. They believe that their 0:14:30.040 --> 0:14:34.400 results indicate that people sometimes use a fluency conditional model, 0:14:34.440 --> 0:14:38.080 which means they would rely on fluency even if knowledge 0:14:38.080 --> 0:14:42.080 is available to them. You start with fluency, and influency fails, 0:14:42.120 --> 0:14:45.680 you fall back on what you actually know. We shouldn't 0:14:45.720 --> 0:14:49.360 over interpret it, but in a limited way. There may 0:14:49.400 --> 0:14:51.760 be processes in the brain that say, I'm going to 0:14:51.840 --> 0:14:55.160 go for what feels easy before I even check my 0:14:55.280 --> 0:14:57.600 memory to see what, I know, what kind of lines 0:14:57.680 --> 0:15:00.960 up with there the mind's tendency to want to offload 0:15:01.000 --> 0:15:05.200 memory to people and gadgets like I do I have 0:15:05.240 --> 0:15:07.080 to remember that anymore if the machine is going to 0:15:07.120 --> 0:15:08.720 do it or my spouse is going to do it, 0:15:09.160 --> 0:15:11.720 and the brain says no, I think, well, that's completely 0:15:12.080 --> 0:15:15.520 prune that section. Here's the question. How often have you 0:15:15.640 --> 0:15:18.800 used a calculator to do math that you could yourself 0:15:18.840 --> 0:15:22.560 easily do? Um? You know what I mean? Like, not 0:15:22.560 --> 0:15:25.400 not problems that would be really hard, but something that 0:15:25.440 --> 0:15:28.040 if you just took ten seconds you could probably solve 0:15:28.080 --> 0:15:30.280 in your head. Yeah. I do that in Dungeons and 0:15:30.320 --> 0:15:33.400 Dragons sometimes when we get into hit points and whatnot. 0:15:33.840 --> 0:15:36.000 You know, I could certainly easy. I could either do 0:15:36.040 --> 0:15:38.240 it in my mind or just do it, you know, 0:15:38.280 --> 0:15:40.080 and pin and pencil real quick. But I'll go ahead 0:15:40.120 --> 0:15:44.000 and type it into my calculator just to yeah, I 0:15:44.000 --> 0:15:46.200 get it done. I've done the same thing too. It's weird. 0:15:46.280 --> 0:15:49.840 It's a little disturbing why or search engines, you know, 0:15:49.960 --> 0:15:53.880 just just throwing in the mathematical equation something really simple, 0:15:54.360 --> 0:15:57.040 um so, such as just determining how old a particular 0:15:57.320 --> 0:15:59.600 actor is or how old they would have been during 0:15:59.600 --> 0:16:01.880 a certain movie. I feel like I do that all 0:16:01.920 --> 0:16:06.040 the time, Like you're saying, you do that even though 0:16:06.160 --> 0:16:08.960 you could easily know the answer if you checked your 0:16:09.000 --> 0:16:12.200 own memory. M hm. I feel like I do that 0:16:12.280 --> 0:16:15.800 less with search engine Like I definitely do the calculator thing. Yeah, 0:16:16.520 --> 0:16:19.040 not so much that I would remember, say how old 0:16:19.200 --> 0:16:22.560 Robert de Niro was during Godfather Too, but I would 0:16:22.600 --> 0:16:25.400 just use it. Would suddenly wonder how old he was, 0:16:25.440 --> 0:16:28.160 And so I would you do the simple mathematical scenario 0:16:28.240 --> 0:16:31.520 of you know, subtracting subtracting one year from the other. 0:16:31.960 --> 0:16:34.840 Let's plant a lie in everybody's mind right now, Robert 0:16:34.880 --> 0:16:37.360 de Niro was four hundred and twenty three years old 0:16:37.400 --> 0:16:39.800 when he did Godfather Too. And now you'll remember that 0:16:40.000 --> 0:16:43.400 that's implausible. That that's the implausibility barrier in action. Oh yeah, 0:16:43.440 --> 0:16:45.920 maybe I should do something else. Yeah, we'll come back 0:16:45.960 --> 0:16:49.640 to that. But anyway, So the conclusion of this experiment 0:16:49.840 --> 0:16:54.000 by Fasio and Co. Authors is that quote participants demonstrated 0:16:54.160 --> 0:16:58.280 knowledge neglect or the failure to rely on stored knowledge 0:16:58.320 --> 0:17:02.480 in the face of fluent processing experiences, so they'd rather 0:17:02.520 --> 0:17:05.480 go for what was easy to process than what was 0:17:05.520 --> 0:17:08.399 the correct answer based on their own knowledge. At the 0:17:08.440 --> 0:17:10.560 same time, it's really important to note that this doesn't 0:17:10.560 --> 0:17:13.280 happen every time, it doesn't happen with every person, it 0:17:13.320 --> 0:17:16.159 doesn't happen with every question, and it doesn't necessarily happen 0:17:16.480 --> 0:17:21.399 with huge effects, so the effect is relatively small. This 0:17:21.520 --> 0:17:24.400 was actually pointed out pretty well in a BBC article 0:17:24.440 --> 0:17:27.879 in sixteen by Tom Stafford. He pointed out that while 0:17:27.920 --> 0:17:32.480 repeated exposure to statements increase their believability, the biggest influence 0:17:32.520 --> 0:17:34.719 on whether a statement was rated true or not was 0:17:34.920 --> 0:17:39.200 whether it was actually true. So the the illusory truth 0:17:39.240 --> 0:17:42.879 effect is valid, and it does change the averages of 0:17:42.920 --> 0:17:46.400 the answers, but it's not like the only thing that matters, 0:17:46.440 --> 0:17:49.560 and it doesn't overpower our real knowledge about the truth. 0:17:49.960 --> 0:17:53.240 It's just weird that it does have some effect in 0:17:53.280 --> 0:17:56.399 the face of actual knowledge we have when actual knowledge 0:17:56.400 --> 0:18:00.280 should mean it has no effect. Does that make sense again? 0:18:00.320 --> 0:18:02.639 I just come back to the you know to to 0:18:02.840 --> 0:18:05.800 to the fact that the mind is going to offload 0:18:05.840 --> 0:18:08.920 whatever information it can or whatever processing it can. Yeah, 0:18:08.960 --> 0:18:11.160 those lazy brains of ours. Okay, well, we should take 0:18:11.160 --> 0:18:12.520 a quick break and the when we come back, we 0:18:12.560 --> 0:18:16.480 will discuss more recent research on the illusory truth effect 0:18:16.560 --> 0:18:19.640 and some related concepts and what it means for our lives. 0:18:20.480 --> 0:18:24.800 Than all right, we're back. So we've discussed the subject 0:18:24.840 --> 0:18:27.639 of false memories before. The many ways in which false 0:18:27.680 --> 0:18:32.320 memories can form UM. Psychologist Daniel Shackter identified seven in 0:18:32.400 --> 0:18:36.600 fact his his work the seventh sins of memory, transients 0:18:36.680 --> 0:18:42.639 and absent mindedness, blocking, misattribution, bias, persistence. Uh, and I 0:18:42.760 --> 0:18:45.119 like to think of it this way. Memory is is 0:18:45.119 --> 0:18:48.120 not something that is carved in stone, but rather uh, 0:18:48.200 --> 0:18:50.679 something that is sculptured from clay. And the clay of 0:18:50.720 --> 0:18:53.919 memory remains valuable every time we retrieve it from the 0:18:54.000 --> 0:18:58.440 drawer and handle it. As psychologist Pascal Boyer, who referenced 0:18:58.440 --> 0:19:01.800 in our last episode pointed out, um examples of this 0:19:01.920 --> 0:19:06.720 range from wordless recall, intrusions and experiments, to therapy induced 0:19:06.760 --> 0:19:10.800 imaginings of past lives and or ritual abuse, which we've 0:19:11.080 --> 0:19:12.920 we've discussed on the episode on the on the show 0:19:12.960 --> 0:19:16.040 before in past episodes. Uh so, memory retrieval is a 0:19:16.119 --> 0:19:21.200 very delicate stage. There's actually a line from the television 0:19:21.240 --> 0:19:24.360 series The Expanse that I think captures this perfectly well. 0:19:24.400 --> 0:19:28.439 The character Miller played by Thomas jane Um. He sums 0:19:28.480 --> 0:19:30.560 up that they have the character sum up this rather 0:19:30.640 --> 0:19:33.560 perfectly says, you know, every time you remember something, your 0:19:33.600 --> 0:19:36.280 mind changes it a little, until your best and worst 0:19:36.320 --> 0:19:39.680 memories are your biggest illusions. So in the two thousand 0:19:39.680 --> 0:19:44.280 and eleven paper Remembering makes evidence compelling retrieval from memory 0:19:44.280 --> 0:19:47.119 can give rise to the illusion of truth from Jason 0:19:47.200 --> 0:19:52.159 d Azubko and Jonathan Fugel, saying the authors conclude that quote, 0:19:52.200 --> 0:19:55.840 memory retrieval is a powerful method for increasing the perceived 0:19:56.080 --> 0:19:59.800 validity of statements and subsequent illusion of truth, and that 0:19:59.840 --> 0:20:02.680 the illusion of truth is a robust effect that can 0:20:02.720 --> 0:20:07.680 be observed even without directly pulling the factual statements in question. WHOA, 0:20:07.920 --> 0:20:09.960 so this is sort of the same effect, but not 0:20:10.280 --> 0:20:13.880 statements coming in from the outside. Right. So they conducted 0:20:13.920 --> 0:20:17.920 a two seven person study, all individuals from the University 0:20:17.960 --> 0:20:20.920 of Waterloo, so we're, you know, relatively small study, and 0:20:20.920 --> 0:20:23.760 they and they admit that they quote may have made 0:20:23.760 --> 0:20:27.080 it particularly difficult to observe any differences between our control 0:20:27.119 --> 0:20:30.879 condition and our experimental conditions. So as always, you know, 0:20:30.920 --> 0:20:35.919 more studies are required. But uh, here's how it shakes out. Quote. 0:20:35.960 --> 0:20:38.760 If this account is correct, the current work demonstrates that 0:20:38.880 --> 0:20:42.840 information retrieved from memory cannot only be viewed as relatively 0:20:42.880 --> 0:20:46.160 more important than more difficult to retrieve information, but can 0:20:46.200 --> 0:20:49.159 also be viewed as more important than information that is 0:20:49.200 --> 0:20:53.680 explicitly provided. In particular, information that is retrieved from memory 0:20:54.040 --> 0:20:58.560 may actually be more fluently processed in general than information 0:20:58.600 --> 0:21:01.399 that is directly perceived. So the idea here is that 0:21:01.480 --> 0:21:05.959 repetition entailed in memory retrieval need not be from an 0:21:05.960 --> 0:21:08.080 external source. It can be internal. In the form of 0:21:08.080 --> 0:21:11.240 memory retrieval, it is it is quote naturally more familiar 0:21:11.240 --> 0:21:15.520 in fluent than information that is perceived. Wow, that that 0:21:15.680 --> 0:21:20.919 is profound. Actually, like the idea that you that your memories, 0:21:21.080 --> 0:21:25.480 the haze of your memories is greater evidence sometimes to 0:21:25.520 --> 0:21:27.920 your own mind than what's in front of your eyes 0:21:28.080 --> 0:21:31.000 right now. Yeah, and it and it means that like 0:21:31.080 --> 0:21:36.480 for the for the lie or the untruth to to resonate, Uh, 0:21:36.600 --> 0:21:39.119 it only needs to be memorable, like something that you'll 0:21:39.160 --> 0:21:42.720 continually retrieve and that forms that serves as a form 0:21:42.800 --> 0:21:45.480 of repetition. Oh, and this is so true of so 0:21:45.520 --> 0:21:47.840 many of these lies they get repeated so often in 0:21:48.000 --> 0:21:52.320 public conversations. Is that they're the really memorable, weird, outlandish 0:21:52.359 --> 0:21:56.080 ones that stick around. I think about in the last episode, 0:21:56.440 --> 0:21:59.840 we talked about the the belief that's still so common 0:21:59.840 --> 0:22:02.719 that Barack Obama was born in Kenya. Yes, there's no 0:22:02.800 --> 0:22:05.720 evidence of it, and it's like such a weird thing 0:22:05.800 --> 0:22:09.080 to suggest that it sticks in people's brains, right, Yeah, 0:22:09.160 --> 0:22:12.000 and then you keep coming back to you keep rethinking it. Um, 0:22:12.160 --> 0:22:14.120 I guess we just made you think of it again. Yeah, 0:22:14.600 --> 0:22:17.320 that's the horrible thing about this, right. We'll have to 0:22:17.320 --> 0:22:19.240 have a discussion about that at the end of the episode. 0:22:19.840 --> 0:22:21.959 Another way of looking at it is this, So, if 0:22:21.960 --> 0:22:24.680 you're a regular listener to this podcast, if I were 0:22:24.720 --> 0:22:28.119 to remind you in every episode that Joe drinks a 0:22:28.200 --> 0:22:30.440