WEBVTT - Admiral Stavridis on a Plan to Get Ukrainian Wheat Out of a Warzone 0:00:10.440 --> 0:00:14.160 Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. 0:00:14.520 --> 0:00:18.400 I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway. Tracy, one of 0:00:18.440 --> 0:00:23.080 the ongoing there are numerous forces that are sort of conspiring, 0:00:23.200 --> 0:00:27.520 so to speak, to create shortages in various commodities, but 0:00:27.600 --> 0:00:32.480 a persistent one clearly is the ongoing war, the invasion 0:00:32.479 --> 0:00:35.240 of Ukraine by Russia. Right, so this is something we've 0:00:35.280 --> 0:00:39.120 spoken about, I guess multiple times at this point. But Ukraine, 0:00:39.120 --> 0:00:41.920 of course sometimes referred to as the bread basket of 0:00:41.960 --> 0:00:44.800 Europe or whatever cliche you want to use, a big 0:00:44.840 --> 0:00:48.920 portion of the world's grains derived from Ukraine. And I 0:00:48.960 --> 0:00:51.279 mean there's also lots of grain growing in Russia as well, 0:00:51.320 --> 0:00:55.440 which is also off limits now. But there's an issue. Obviously, 0:00:55.840 --> 0:00:58.520 Russia is blockading the country. It's hard to get that 0:00:58.560 --> 0:01:00.920 grain out, which means that there's a shortage, which means 0:01:00.920 --> 0:01:03.280 that prices are rising, which means that we've seen pressure, 0:01:03.520 --> 0:01:06.760 I mean particularly in emerging markets, places like Egypt that 0:01:06.800 --> 0:01:10.120 actually got a lot of their food supply from Ukraine. Yeah, 0:01:10.160 --> 0:01:12.480 that's right. And so we can look here at a 0:01:12.600 --> 0:01:15.839 chart of say wheat futures, and the price is obviously 0:01:15.920 --> 0:01:19.440 going up. But for the American consumer, there's sort of 0:01:19.480 --> 0:01:24.320 like underlying food commodity prices, they're only a modest contributor 0:01:24.440 --> 0:01:28.399 to food inflation overall, and many emerging markets they're much 0:01:28.440 --> 0:01:31.520 more exposed directly to the price. And what's worse is 0:01:31.520 --> 0:01:34.119 not just the price but outright shortages. So it's one 0:01:34.120 --> 0:01:36.319 thing to say, Okay, the price is up. It's another 0:01:36.360 --> 0:01:38.480 thing to say, you literally cannot get the grade, you 0:01:38.520 --> 0:01:40.840 literally cannot get the wheat. But that is the risk 0:01:40.959 --> 0:01:44.000 that's being faced right now for multiple reasons, but in 0:01:44.160 --> 0:01:46.800 large part due to this war, right, And you can 0:01:46.840 --> 0:01:50.320 imagine that would manifest itself in political pressure in a 0:01:50.360 --> 0:01:52.800 lot of places in the world, Like when people can't eat, 0:01:53.160 --> 0:01:57.680 they tend to get angry, right, I mean rightfully? So, yeah, 0:01:57.760 --> 0:02:00.440 And so then the question is, I guess there's two questions, 0:02:00.520 --> 0:02:04.360 is like, one is what is happening with wheat plantings 0:02:04.360 --> 0:02:07.720 in Ukraine. But then even if plantings were to somehow 0:02:07.800 --> 0:02:11.560 be sustained amid the war, can how much of the 0:02:11.639 --> 0:02:14.680 grain can actually get out? And as you mentioned right now, 0:02:14.680 --> 0:02:18.000 there's very little getting out. Yeah, And this sort of 0:02:18.040 --> 0:02:21.920 goes back to I guess the military tension between Russia 0:02:21.919 --> 0:02:26.079 and Ukraine, But how do you actually get supplies into 0:02:26.120 --> 0:02:29.320 the country and how do you get vital goods out 0:02:29.440 --> 0:02:32.480 because you still want the supply of wheat and food 0:02:32.880 --> 0:02:36.079 to be flowing relatively freely, and you also want Ukraine 0:02:36.080 --> 0:02:38.040 to be able to make some money right at a 0:02:38.080 --> 0:02:40.240 time when it actually needs money and could use that 0:02:40.280 --> 0:02:42.960 to buy weapons and supplies that too, all right, So 0:02:43.080 --> 0:02:45.240 for more we're gonna be talking about some of the 0:02:45.320 --> 0:02:48.880 options to actually do this and whether there's a way 0:02:49.000 --> 0:02:51.680 for the U. S Military Western forces to play a 0:02:51.720 --> 0:02:54.840 positive role in safely getting grain out of the country. 0:02:54.960 --> 0:02:58.280 We're gonna be speaking to Admiral James stanf Revis. He was, 0:02:58.440 --> 0:03:02.480 among other things, the six Supreme Allied Commander of NATO. 0:03:02.760 --> 0:03:07.280 He has personal experience in perhaps similar operations, are similar 0:03:07.320 --> 0:03:10.880 situations of moving commodities around the world. Is a really 0:03:10.919 --> 0:03:13.480 deep understanding of this stuff. So, Admiral, thank you so 0:03:13.560 --> 0:03:16.280 much for coming on odd lots. I really appreciate. It's 0:03:16.320 --> 0:03:19.680 great to be with both of you. Thank you absolutely, 0:03:19.680 --> 0:03:22.400 thank you so much. So to start, you give us 0:03:22.520 --> 0:03:28.600 your assessment of the current situation why exporting grain from 0:03:28.720 --> 0:03:32.120 Ukraine right now is so constrained, well, I'm really struck 0:03:32.240 --> 0:03:36.000 by a book I just published called to Risk It 0:03:36.120 --> 0:03:40.040 All Nine Conflicts and the Crucible of Decision, and it's 0:03:40.080 --> 0:03:45.160 about decision making under extreme stress. And so here I 0:03:45.200 --> 0:03:49.240 think we have a pretty good example. Uh, both Vladimir 0:03:49.320 --> 0:03:51.960 Putin on if you will, the dark side of the 0:03:52.000 --> 0:03:57.600 equation and Volodimir Zalinsky on the lighter side on our 0:03:57.760 --> 0:04:00.920 side of the equation. Both of these men are literally 0:04:01.120 --> 0:04:04.520 risking at all. And one of the crucial components of 0:04:04.520 --> 0:04:10.320 it is this ability or not to export grain. I 0:04:10.360 --> 0:04:13.480 think you and Tracy Joe did a nice job laying 0:04:13.480 --> 0:04:19.440 out the challenges globally if it doesn't get out, So 0:04:19.680 --> 0:04:24.080 we come pretty quickly to okay, Admiral, So how would 0:04:24.080 --> 0:04:25.960 you get the grain out? You know, I don't need 0:04:26.040 --> 0:04:30.799 to tell an odd lots audience that um of all 0:04:30.839 --> 0:04:36.480 international trade moves by sea, and grain, of course, is 0:04:36.839 --> 0:04:41.920 a commodity that moves out in in mass, and so 0:04:42.279 --> 0:04:45.599 the idea of trying to truck it out or even 0:04:45.720 --> 0:04:50.120 train it out of Ukraine just it doesn't serve. So 0:04:50.760 --> 0:04:54.200 the problem is Russia has taken their black sea fleet 0:04:54.279 --> 0:04:59.919 about forty warships and effectively they've blockaded the entire coast 0:05:00.120 --> 0:05:04.200 line of Ukraine. They already control on the land side 0:05:04.720 --> 0:05:09.120 about seventy percent of that coastline on the Black Seat, 0:05:09.400 --> 0:05:14.280 but that remaining has Odessa in it. And Odessa is 0:05:14.320 --> 0:05:17.159 like Los Angeles Long Beach in the context of the 0:05:17.200 --> 0:05:22.440 United States. It's dug port. And therefore the key is, 0:05:22.880 --> 0:05:26.680 how can we if you will, open that port. And 0:05:26.760 --> 0:05:30.080 at the moment, it's not only blockaded by Russian worships, 0:05:30.120 --> 0:05:34.680 but it's it's mined in both by the Ukrainians and 0:05:34.880 --> 0:05:38.960 reportedly by the Russian. So it's a very complex maritime 0:05:39.080 --> 0:05:43.839 problem and UH, to very quickly sketch it out. What 0:05:43.880 --> 0:05:46.480 we would do first is get rid of the minds. 0:05:46.520 --> 0:05:48.839 I think that's pretty obvious why I need to do that. 0:05:49.440 --> 0:05:52.479 And maybe some of the listeners can remember back to 0:05:52.560 --> 0:05:59.039 the nineteen eighties when Iran blockaded the Straight of hor Moves. 0:05:59.400 --> 0:06:01.960 What did the s do? Um, we got rid of 0:06:02.000 --> 0:06:05.719 the minds. We certainly have that technology or allies. There's 0:06:05.760 --> 0:06:10.240 a standing NATO mind sweeping task force that could be 0:06:10.279 --> 0:06:13.159 sent up in the Black Sea to do this. We 0:06:13.279 --> 0:06:15.440 got rid of the minds in the nineteen eighties in 0:06:15.440 --> 0:06:20.800 the Arabian Gulf, and then we reflagged Kuwaiti tankers as 0:06:21.000 --> 0:06:24.960 US vessels, and then we escorted them, put a cruiser, 0:06:25.160 --> 0:06:28.760 a destroyer or a frigate alongside every one of them, 0:06:29.160 --> 0:06:32.720 provided air cover and simply drove them in and out 0:06:32.760 --> 0:06:37.120 and told the Iranians, in effect, don't even think about it, 0:06:37.600 --> 0:06:42.039 and that solution could be applied here in Ukraine. And 0:06:42.080 --> 0:06:45.200 if we don't move in that direction pretty quickly, I 0:06:45.240 --> 0:06:49.919 think the consequences of global food security are quite dire. 0:06:50.560 --> 0:06:54.679 So I have a bunch of questions already. But maybe 0:06:54.920 --> 0:06:57.080 let let me start with the most pressing one. But 0:06:57.839 --> 0:07:01.839 would an escort of ships in the manner that you 0:07:01.960 --> 0:07:04.800 just described, would that not be seen as a provocation 0:07:05.200 --> 0:07:08.960 by Russia? Um? I think it would be seen as 0:07:08.960 --> 0:07:14.160 a provocation, And we have to ask ourselves, um, is 0:07:14.200 --> 0:07:20.080 it sufficient the need to do this? Is it sufficient 0:07:20.480 --> 0:07:23.960 to accept the level of risk? Back to the book 0:07:24.000 --> 0:07:27.080 I just published, to Risk at All, That's exactly what 0:07:27.320 --> 0:07:30.480 I examine in the book, in a series of maritime 0:07:30.520 --> 0:07:35.480 case studies, is when are you willing to accept risk? 0:07:35.760 --> 0:07:41.400 And is it justified by your ability to mitigate the risk? 0:07:41.640 --> 0:07:43.880 And again we get rid of the minds. We put 0:07:44.040 --> 0:07:48.640 escorts with all these ships, and we also the marsh 0:07:48.880 --> 0:07:51.680 we publish no tams again. I don't have to tell 0:07:51.720 --> 0:07:54.640 an odd locks audience what that is, um, And we 0:07:54.760 --> 0:08:03.000 tell the Russians yea at each other today overestimated NOIP. 0:08:03.400 --> 0:08:06.160 I'm sure the audience gets it. It's the hosts in 0:08:06.160 --> 0:08:08.520 this case you need to explain it, okay. Indeed, for 0:08:08.680 --> 0:08:12.600 our hosts, note TAM is a notice to mariners, and 0:08:12.720 --> 0:08:16.320 it is it can be published about a floating object 0:08:16.400 --> 0:08:22.320 that's become an obstruction, about newly discovered underwater formations UM, 0:08:22.680 --> 0:08:25.600 or about a missile shoot or a gun shoot that 0:08:25.760 --> 0:08:28.320 enable worship is going to conduct. It's really just the 0:08:28.680 --> 0:08:33.000 equivalent of posting public notice of operations. So we would 0:08:33.120 --> 0:08:36.440 we would the marsh the Russians. What that means is 0:08:36.720 --> 0:08:40.760 go diplomat to diplomat, and we would issue no tams 0:08:40.840 --> 0:08:44.720 noticed mariners, which goes, if you will, mariner to mariner, 0:08:44.880 --> 0:08:49.920 worships to worships. The calculus then shifts over to the Russians. 0:08:50.040 --> 0:08:52.360 And here you just have to put yourself in the 0:08:52.360 --> 0:08:55.160 shoes of the Russians and ask yourself, um, you know, 0:08:55.360 --> 0:08:58.559 in in the words of Clint Eastwood, are you feeling 0:08:58.640 --> 0:09:01.760 lucky today. I don't think the Russians would take a 0:09:01.800 --> 0:09:06.199 shot at a merchant ship escorted by a US warship, 0:09:06.720 --> 0:09:12.760 therefore highly defended doing a humanitarian mission taking grain to 0:09:12.840 --> 0:09:17.040 a starving world. I just don't see Russia taking that shot. 0:09:17.440 --> 0:09:21.760 You know, there is obviously an incredible amount of hesitance 0:09:22.160 --> 0:09:25.520 about committing any sort of US anything that would resemble 0:09:25.760 --> 0:09:30.439 sort of like direct US military involvement. We're willing to 0:09:30.720 --> 0:09:35.280 send weapons and of course money to Ukraine, obviously, all 0:09:35.320 --> 0:09:38.320 of native well short of actually anything beyond that. But 0:09:38.400 --> 0:09:42.600 in your view, something like escorting a ship through the 0:09:42.640 --> 0:09:48.000 Black Sea or demining the area does not compose to 0:09:48.040 --> 0:09:51.440 that at all. In your view, it does not. As follows, 0:09:51.640 --> 0:09:54.559 where we have drawn the red line as to US 0:09:54.679 --> 0:10:01.560 involvement is on the soil of the Ukrainian land or 0:10:02.200 --> 0:10:05.760 Russian soil. But here we're talking about neither of those. 0:10:05.800 --> 0:10:10.400 We're talking about international waters, so these ships would not 0:10:10.480 --> 0:10:15.319 be passing through Russian claimed waters at all. These would 0:10:15.360 --> 0:10:19.359 be international high seas. So I think that's a crucial 0:10:19.480 --> 0:10:26.040 difference and one that we would certainly articulate and be 0:10:26.240 --> 0:10:29.360 very clear with the Russians. Look, we're not entering your 0:10:29.480 --> 0:10:33.040 territorial waters to conduct this mission. We're going into a 0:10:33.240 --> 0:10:37.680 Ukrainian port, but through international waters and of course through 0:10:37.679 --> 0:10:42.960 the Ukrainian territorial sea, with their permission. So I think 0:10:43.080 --> 0:10:48.640 this passes the risk test. But I will also say, 0:10:48.960 --> 0:10:51.680 at this point, do we really need to worry about 0:10:51.720 --> 0:10:55.520 provoking Russia in the sense that they're the ones who 0:10:55.520 --> 0:10:58.880 have invaded this country with two hundred thousand troops, committed 0:10:59.080 --> 0:11:05.840 hideous war crimes, are refusing negotiations, and are blocking food 0:11:06.200 --> 0:11:08.559 from the rest of the world. I mean, at some 0:11:08.640 --> 0:11:11.640 point you just have to look a bully in the 0:11:11.679 --> 0:11:14.160 eye and say, no, your behavior is unacceptable. Here's what 0:11:14.160 --> 0:11:16.160 we're gonna do about it. I think we've hit that 0:11:16.240 --> 0:11:32.640 point in this particular course of action. So one thing 0:11:32.840 --> 0:11:35.880 you mentioned in your writings on this topic is the 0:11:35.920 --> 0:11:40.160 idea of having to reflag the Ukrainian carriers to something else. 0:11:40.400 --> 0:11:43.439 Can you explain why that would need to be done. 0:11:44.600 --> 0:11:48.800 I actually don't think that is a crucial step. I 0:11:48.840 --> 0:11:53.760 think it ups the anti for Russia. But let's face it, 0:11:54.120 --> 0:11:57.320 as as this audience will know, um, there are many, 0:11:57.360 --> 0:12:01.080 many flags of convenience all around the seas of the world. 0:12:01.280 --> 0:12:05.360 Many of these grain tankers are non Ukrainian. But it 0:12:05.480 --> 0:12:10.720 does alleviate one aspect of this, which is that, um, 0:12:10.760 --> 0:12:15.360 it would be Russia conceivably could say well, we're engaged 0:12:15.400 --> 0:12:20.080 in the special military operation. We're attacking Ukrainian targets. So 0:12:20.120 --> 0:12:23.520 we would say, okay, we'll take down the Ukrainian flag 0:12:23.559 --> 0:12:26.360 and put up really wouldn't have to be a U. S. Flag. 0:12:26.400 --> 0:12:28.520 It could be Panamanian, it could be Greek, it could 0:12:28.520 --> 0:12:32.240 be any nation willing to participate, could be any of 0:12:32.280 --> 0:12:35.319 the NATO nations. If NATO signed up to it. It 0:12:35.400 --> 0:12:38.400 would just be quite streamlined. And this was the case 0:12:38.920 --> 0:12:42.079 in the operation Earnest Will in the nineteen eighties and 0:12:42.120 --> 0:12:46.280 the Arabian See. Um, it's just quicker you can put 0:12:46.280 --> 0:12:49.040 a U. S. Flag on it because the US government says, yep, 0:12:49.200 --> 0:12:52.720 we'll take that ship. Um. But is that crucial now? 0:12:52.800 --> 0:12:55.000 I don't think so. Um, So you and I don't 0:12:55.000 --> 0:12:58.000 think it would change the calculus. Particularly so you were 0:12:58.080 --> 0:13:01.880 part of that operation just Will in the late nineties 0:13:02.040 --> 0:13:04.680 eighties to get oil out of the street of Hermus. 0:13:04.880 --> 0:13:08.959 Why do you describe your role in that operation and 0:13:09.000 --> 0:13:14.000 what made it successful? Um? My role was obviously that 0:13:14.080 --> 0:13:18.000 was many years ago, I was a very young lieutenant commander. 0:13:18.200 --> 0:13:21.880 I suppose I was in my late twenties, maybe thirty, 0:13:22.000 --> 0:13:26.800 and I was the operations officer on an Aegis cruiser 0:13:26.960 --> 0:13:31.600 USS Valley Forge, and and as the ops boss um, 0:13:31.640 --> 0:13:35.679 my job was to participate in all the planning that 0:13:35.720 --> 0:13:40.320 went into the operation, alongside the Admiral's flag staff and 0:13:40.400 --> 0:13:42.760 my equivalence from all the other ships that were in 0:13:42.800 --> 0:13:44.840 the task force. So we would get together on the 0:13:44.920 --> 0:13:48.520 carrier and kind of sketch out the whole operation, would 0:13:48.600 --> 0:13:50.360 send it up the chain of command, it would get 0:13:50.360 --> 0:13:53.880 approved and come back. So step one for me was 0:13:54.200 --> 0:13:59.840 planning process, very deeply involved. And then in the execution phase, 0:14:00.240 --> 0:14:05.640 I was the tactical action officer on board the Valley Forge, 0:14:05.920 --> 0:14:09.760 effectively the officer on watch with the firing key. So 0:14:10.000 --> 0:14:14.840 if we were overflown by Iranian combat aircraft, I had 0:14:14.880 --> 0:14:19.000 permission to shoot them down. If the Iranian small boats 0:14:19.000 --> 0:14:23.320 were to attack the tanker, I could engage them with 0:14:23.360 --> 0:14:27.720 our gun systems um Naturally, if if a situation like 0:14:27.760 --> 0:14:31.120 that developed, the Captain would come very quickly into the 0:14:31.160 --> 0:14:35.080 combat information center to make sure Lieutenant Commander Staffordis didn't 0:14:35.080 --> 0:14:38.280 do anything foolish. But as as I described it, we 0:14:38.320 --> 0:14:40.960 would just sail right up through the straight of her 0:14:41.000 --> 0:14:43.520 moves and up the center of the Arabian golf and 0:14:43.520 --> 0:14:46.800 go up, and the tankers would load load oil up 0:14:46.800 --> 0:14:49.800 at the ports in Kuwait, and then would turn around 0:14:49.800 --> 0:14:52.000 and take them back down. And when we got him 0:14:52.000 --> 0:14:55.640 into the Indian Ocean and out of range of Iranian 0:14:55.720 --> 0:15:00.040 aircraft Iranian warships, we were able to uh cut the 0:15:00.160 --> 0:15:03.080 loose enough they would go. This was actually gonna be 0:15:03.120 --> 0:15:06.280 my next question. So how far would a military escort 0:15:06.400 --> 0:15:09.040 for ships normally go to? You take them all the 0:15:09.040 --> 0:15:11.560 way to well, presumably you wouldn't take them all the 0:15:11.600 --> 0:15:14.160 way to their destination, but how do you decide when 0:15:14.160 --> 0:15:18.480 they're out of you know, the danger zone? Yeah, in 0:15:18.480 --> 0:15:23.440 in that particular situation, um, it was relatively easy to 0:15:23.520 --> 0:15:28.320 calculate by looking at Iranian military capability. Um, how far 0:15:28.400 --> 0:15:32.359 could their attack aircraft fly? How far did they typically 0:15:32.400 --> 0:15:37.200 operate warships? Answer? In both cases not very far. In 0:15:37.240 --> 0:15:42.000 the case of Russia, I think safely speaking, we would 0:15:42.200 --> 0:15:46.440 escort them down through the Bosphorus and out the out 0:15:46.440 --> 0:15:48.440 of the Black Sea and into the A G and C. 0:15:48.640 --> 0:15:50.920 I think that's where you're gonna cut them loose. Again, 0:15:51.800 --> 0:15:54.560 highly unlikely in my view that Russia is going to 0:15:55.160 --> 0:15:59.680 come after commercial shipping. Frankly, whether it's Ukrainian flag or not, 0:15:59.720 --> 0:16:03.200 but safe for sake of argument, we've reflagged UM and 0:16:03.240 --> 0:16:06.400 they're flying a U. S flag or a Danish flag 0:16:07.520 --> 0:16:11.240 from a NATO member, very unlikely Rush is gonna go 0:16:11.480 --> 0:16:15.240 any anywhere outside their zone of control, which is really 0:16:15.280 --> 0:16:19.960 the Northern Black Sea. More broadly, today, what are the 0:16:20.040 --> 0:16:24.680 existing either US or NATO resources that either have the 0:16:24.720 --> 0:16:29.000 best equipment or the best experience in working with the 0:16:29.080 --> 0:16:33.520 safety and securing of commercial fleet. All of the NATO 0:16:33.640 --> 0:16:37.680 navies do this quite well, and most of the NATO 0:16:38.360 --> 0:16:44.920 nations have very capable coastguards, including obviously our own and 0:16:45.560 --> 0:16:49.280 again and odd lots. Audience will know well the close 0:16:49.360 --> 0:16:53.240 working relationship of the U. S. Coast Guard to merchant shipping. UM. 0:16:53.360 --> 0:16:57.400 That's replicated by the French Coastguard, the German Coastguard, the 0:16:57.480 --> 0:17:02.000 Danish Coastguard, and I think that UM, you could certainly 0:17:02.120 --> 0:17:06.840 draw on that expertise. Finally, Tracy and Joe, I would 0:17:06.880 --> 0:17:11.320 say that UM, we have experienced doing this much more 0:17:11.400 --> 0:17:14.359 recently during the period of time when I was Supreme 0:17:14.400 --> 0:17:18.359 Allied Commander of NATO from two thousand nine and two thirteen, 0:17:18.640 --> 0:17:23.280 we were facing pirates off the coast of East Africa. 0:17:23.359 --> 0:17:26.880 This of course is the time of Captain Phillips who 0:17:26.960 --> 0:17:31.680 is captured from the Mayorsclabama, rescued by a very heroic 0:17:31.800 --> 0:17:35.080 navy operation. Frankly, one of the case studies in my book, 0:17:35.080 --> 0:17:38.360 To Risk at All is about that operation. In that 0:17:38.440 --> 0:17:42.280 period of time, all of our navies worked very closely 0:17:42.359 --> 0:17:46.680 with the international shipping community, if you will, and I 0:17:46.760 --> 0:17:51.040 would go every few months to London to the International 0:17:51.080 --> 0:17:55.720 Maritime Organization, which functioned as a kind of umbrella over 0:17:56.320 --> 0:18:00.119 both the major shipping companies. So we had represented is 0:18:00.119 --> 0:18:03.040 there from all of them in the major navies that 0:18:03.080 --> 0:18:05.879 were part of the counterpiracy. So we've got very recent 0:18:05.920 --> 0:18:10.119 experience working alongside our merchant marine colleagues, and frankly, that 0:18:10.200 --> 0:18:14.040 relationship is generally pretty comfortable. So can you actually talk 0:18:14.080 --> 0:18:16.600 a little bit more about these sort of day to 0:18:16.680 --> 0:18:21.600 day relationship between the military and merchant carriers. And you know, 0:18:21.600 --> 0:18:24.120 I'm thinking Tracy to like about even some of these 0:18:24.119 --> 0:18:26.920 conversations that we had with Salton post already talked about 0:18:26.920 --> 0:18:29.320 this exactly where it's like, you know, what the FED 0:18:29.520 --> 0:18:32.639 was to the financial crisis, the military is going to 0:18:32.680 --> 0:18:36.040 have to be the sort of global commodity crisis. But 0:18:36.119 --> 0:18:39.639 even before the sort of current acute tension, what is 0:18:39.680 --> 0:18:43.920 the sort of normal role that the U. S. Military 0:18:44.000 --> 0:18:47.080 or the Navy plays in just sort of the securing 0:18:47.400 --> 0:18:50.280 of the of the global trade that I guess we 0:18:50.320 --> 0:18:53.840 all take for grant. Yeah, I think the key phrase there, 0:18:53.920 --> 0:18:57.480 Joe is take for granted. And and we all of us, 0:18:57.880 --> 0:19:02.440 the global population kind of just feels as though there's 0:19:02.440 --> 0:19:06.000 no problems out there. And yet as again as recently 0:19:06.240 --> 0:19:11.520 as within the decade, we saw organized, uh strongly land 0:19:11.560 --> 0:19:16.200 based pirate operations coming out of Somalia. Um we continue 0:19:16.240 --> 0:19:21.120 to see pretty vicious piracy in the Straits of Malacca, 0:19:21.200 --> 0:19:24.040 We see it off the coast of West Africa. We 0:19:24.720 --> 0:19:27.239 see kind of hints of it in and around the 0:19:27.240 --> 0:19:32.480 Caribbean at times. Um So piracy continues a second zone, 0:19:33.119 --> 0:19:35.159 and I always say the oceans in many ways of 0:19:35.240 --> 0:19:39.600 the world's largest crime syne another major challenge. And you know, 0:19:40.080 --> 0:19:44.720 we tend to think of this as merchant ships, tankers, 0:19:44.800 --> 0:19:50.000 break bolt container ships, but how about the thousands and 0:19:50.080 --> 0:19:54.040 thousands of thousands of significant fishing craft that are out there. 0:19:54.400 --> 0:19:59.280 They are commercial and they are under assault. Frequently a 0:19:59.280 --> 0:20:01.480 lot of the pirates se is directed against them, and 0:20:01.520 --> 0:20:03.960 by the way, a lot of them are conducting illegal 0:20:04.320 --> 0:20:07.760 fishery activities, and some of that is state sponsored, by 0:20:07.800 --> 0:20:11.160 the way. So that's a long way of saying there 0:20:11.160 --> 0:20:13.400 are many problems out there, and that's before we get 0:20:13.440 --> 0:20:18.480 into illegal dumping and pollution. Again, that's commercial activity that's 0:20:18.520 --> 0:20:21.879 going on out there, albeit illegal. So all of the 0:20:21.920 --> 0:20:25.080 world's navies and coast guards are are very focused on 0:20:25.119 --> 0:20:32.680 this and are working very closely both ashore with conferences 0:20:32.720 --> 0:20:37.439 and symposia and exchanging information and data sharing. UM we 0:20:37.480 --> 0:20:42.879 share immense amounts of data from US maritime centers, for example, 0:20:42.960 --> 0:20:48.080 with commercial shipping companies, and they reciprocate. UM. It's a 0:20:48.160 --> 0:20:52.640 it's a very close and positive relationship. UM As as 0:20:52.680 --> 0:20:54.280 we all know, the coast guard has a bit of 0:20:54.320 --> 0:20:57.720 a different role, more law enforcement, so you know they're 0:20:57.720 --> 0:21:01.240 going to have a perhaps less of a warm and 0:21:01.359 --> 0:21:07.280 cozy relationship. UM. I think navies and commercial shipping are 0:21:07.400 --> 0:21:11.120 quite close and frankly had been back to the time 0:21:11.160 --> 0:21:14.840 of the ancient Greeks. So I knew your expertise is 0:21:14.920 --> 0:21:18.520 on the shipping aspect for obvious reasons. But is there 0:21:18.520 --> 0:21:20.879 anything that we need to be done on the land 0:21:21.000 --> 0:21:24.679 side in order to get more grains to the ports 0:21:24.960 --> 0:21:27.840 so that they could then be escorted and exported to 0:21:27.880 --> 0:21:33.440 the rest of the world. Um, great question, Tracy. Um. First, 0:21:33.960 --> 0:21:40.200 we need to ensure that we're efficiently moving containers and 0:21:40.440 --> 0:21:44.080 cargoes in and out of these ports. And let's face it, 0:21:44.160 --> 0:21:46.760 we have a bit of a double whammy here in 0:21:46.800 --> 0:21:50.399 the sense that we're still just coming off COVID in 0:21:50.520 --> 0:21:54.920 many places, we also are seeing very high inflation. It's 0:21:55.040 --> 0:22:01.080 impacting labor forces. We're facing a major strike. Los Angeles 0:22:01.119 --> 0:22:05.040 long Beaches were recording this and that's replicated around the world. 0:22:05.280 --> 0:22:10.000 As longshoreman, for example, are looking at rising inflation, they 0:22:10.040 --> 0:22:14.160 want to organize, they want to get more understandably so 0:22:14.200 --> 0:22:17.240 they can keep up with inflation. So we have to 0:22:17.280 --> 0:22:22.800 have efficient, well run ports that offer good compensation for 0:22:23.160 --> 0:22:25.600 the kind of quality work we need in those ports. 0:22:26.000 --> 0:22:28.679 Uh Number two, we need to make sure the ports 0:22:28.680 --> 0:22:32.040 are safe and secure. We worked very hard in the 0:22:32.440 --> 0:22:35.680 during the period after nine eleven to create much more 0:22:35.720 --> 0:22:38.679 security around ports globally, and a lot of that is 0:22:38.680 --> 0:22:43.200 still in place, not unlike the implementation of the t 0:22:43.480 --> 0:22:46.560 s A regime in all the airports. Um we need 0:22:46.600 --> 0:22:49.760 to go back and relook at that security, I think, 0:22:50.000 --> 0:22:53.880 and make sure that it meets today's needs. And then 0:22:54.080 --> 0:23:00.440 third we need uh to ensure that logistically we can 0:23:00.480 --> 0:23:06.120 go from these ports quickly and efficiently into the nations 0:23:06.119 --> 0:23:10.359 that are receiving. So in the military context we would 0:23:10.359 --> 0:23:15.159 say this is from port to fort, those railheads, those 0:23:15.359 --> 0:23:19.679 trucking systems, whatever, the means of cargo delivery is a 0:23:19.720 --> 0:23:23.320 whole secondary back office, if you will, where we at 0:23:23.400 --> 0:23:25.960 least here in the United States have some well documented 0:23:26.000 --> 0:23:29.120 challenges as well. Like everything else in today's world, it's 0:23:29.160 --> 0:23:33.280 a big, complicated global supply chain, and when a portion 0:23:33.359 --> 0:23:36.600 of it is distended as it is now by the 0:23:36.640 --> 0:23:40.320 events in Ukraine on top of post COVID let's let's 0:23:40.320 --> 0:23:45.160 hope post COVID, on top of staggeringly high inflation, it's 0:23:45.200 --> 0:23:49.240 a very difficult moment for global shipping and it will 0:23:49.280 --> 0:23:52.200 have impact on on the grain in particular, and that 0:23:52.400 --> 0:23:55.879 I think is needs to be a key focus, very 0:23:55.920 --> 0:24:01.000 minor aside question is the military dealing also seeing a 0:24:01.080 --> 0:24:04.200 labor shortage right now, like every like other entities are, 0:24:04.400 --> 0:24:09.160 we are seeing some pressure on our recruiting. Yes, and 0:24:09.280 --> 0:24:12.520 so for the first time in a long while. For example, 0:24:12.600 --> 0:24:17.960 the Army has extended the tours of its recruiters. Those 0:24:18.000 --> 0:24:20.560 are the men and women who you know are out 0:24:20.560 --> 0:24:23.320 in the field trying to convince high school seniors to 0:24:23.359 --> 0:24:27.199 come join the military. And the reason they're doing that 0:24:27.320 --> 0:24:32.360 is because they're facing pressure meeting their targets for all 0:24:32.400 --> 0:24:34.320 the reasons we've talked about. And by the way, as 0:24:34.359 --> 0:24:36.680 in a side, it's important to know and this may 0:24:36.760 --> 0:24:40.000 surprise many people you know who tend to think, oh, well, 0:24:40.040 --> 0:24:42.119 you know, if I if I can't go to college 0:24:42.200 --> 0:24:43.640 or I don't want to go to college, I guess 0:24:43.680 --> 0:24:47.520 I'll just join the military. Um, it's hard to be 0:24:47.640 --> 0:24:52.760 accepted as a volunteer in the US military. Only about 0:24:53.280 --> 0:24:58.280 of high school seniors are eligible for military service. You've 0:24:58.280 --> 0:25:01.920 got to be a graduate. You've gotta have reasonably high grades, 0:25:02.320 --> 0:25:06.400 you've got to be in essentially perfect health. You've got 0:25:06.400 --> 0:25:26.080 to have no drug use, no arrests. Going back to 0:25:26.240 --> 0:25:31.680 the challenge right now and Ukraine demining the water around 0:25:31.760 --> 0:25:35.760 Odessa or demining any water sounds extreme, sounds difficult. What 0:25:35.840 --> 0:25:37.679 does it take to do that? And what is the 0:25:37.800 --> 0:25:40.959 time frame for just that part to make it uh 0:25:41.320 --> 0:25:44.880 safe to move it? All? Right? So these are not 0:25:45.600 --> 0:25:48.439 floating minds. In other words, these are not minds that 0:25:48.480 --> 0:25:52.640 are just drifting all around. That's a much harder problem. 0:25:52.680 --> 0:25:56.080 These are minds that are fixed to the bottom, and 0:25:56.240 --> 0:25:58.720 therefore you don't have to take them all out. You 0:25:58.840 --> 0:26:01.719 just got to take out enough so that you can 0:26:01.840 --> 0:26:04.840 drive a tanker up a channel. So you've got to 0:26:04.920 --> 0:26:09.479 d mine the channels. And that's a finite space that 0:26:09.560 --> 0:26:12.639 you have to do. Now, could could Russia do some 0:26:12.760 --> 0:26:16.320 dirty tricks and throw some floating minds in their conceivable, 0:26:16.600 --> 0:26:19.520 particularly if they felt they could do it without us 0:26:19.600 --> 0:26:22.960 knowing it. But we're watching for that. They know we're 0:26:23.000 --> 0:26:26.320 watching for that. So let's let's take as an entering 0:26:26.400 --> 0:26:30.159 argument that you have to clear the channels. You have 0:26:30.640 --> 0:26:34.040 mind sweepers, and there are several classes of these, but 0:26:34.119 --> 0:26:37.120