1
00:00:10,440 --> 00:00:14,160
Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.

2
00:00:14,520 --> 00:00:18,400
Speaker 1: I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway. Tracy, one of

3
00:00:18,440 --> 00:00:23,080
Speaker 1: the ongoing there are numerous forces that are sort of conspiring,

4
00:00:23,200 --> 00:00:27,520
Speaker 1: so to speak, to create shortages in various commodities, but

5
00:00:27,600 --> 00:00:32,480
Speaker 1: a persistent one clearly is the ongoing war, the invasion

6
00:00:32,479 --> 00:00:35,240
Speaker 1: of Ukraine by Russia. Right, so this is something we've

7
00:00:35,280 --> 00:00:39,120
Speaker 1: spoken about, I guess multiple times at this point. But Ukraine,

8
00:00:39,120 --> 00:00:41,920
Speaker 1: of course sometimes referred to as the bread basket of

9
00:00:41,960 --> 00:00:44,800
Speaker 1: Europe or whatever cliche you want to use, a big

10
00:00:44,840 --> 00:00:48,920
Speaker 1: portion of the world's grains derived from Ukraine. And I

11
00:00:48,960 --> 00:00:51,279
Speaker 1: mean there's also lots of grain growing in Russia as well,

12
00:00:51,320 --> 00:00:55,440
Speaker 1: which is also off limits now. But there's an issue. Obviously,

13
00:00:55,840 --> 00:00:58,520
Speaker 1: Russia is blockading the country. It's hard to get that

14
00:00:58,560 --> 00:01:00,920
Speaker 1: grain out, which means that there's a shortage, which means

15
00:01:00,920 --> 00:01:03,280
Speaker 1: that prices are rising, which means that we've seen pressure,

16
00:01:03,520 --> 00:01:06,760
Speaker 1: I mean particularly in emerging markets, places like Egypt that

17
00:01:06,800 --> 00:01:10,120
Speaker 1: actually got a lot of their food supply from Ukraine. Yeah,

18
00:01:10,160 --> 00:01:12,480
Speaker 1: that's right. And so we can look here at a

19
00:01:12,600 --> 00:01:15,839
Speaker 1: chart of say wheat futures, and the price is obviously

20
00:01:15,920 --> 00:01:19,440
Speaker 1: going up. But for the American consumer, there's sort of

21
00:01:19,480 --> 00:01:24,320
Speaker 1: like underlying food commodity prices, they're only a modest contributor

22
00:01:24,440 --> 00:01:28,399
Speaker 1: to food inflation overall, and many emerging markets they're much

23
00:01:28,440 --> 00:01:31,520
Speaker 1: more exposed directly to the price. And what's worse is

24
00:01:31,520 --> 00:01:34,119
Speaker 1: not just the price but outright shortages. So it's one

25
00:01:34,120 --> 00:01:36,319
Speaker 1: thing to say, Okay, the price is up. It's another

26
00:01:36,360 --> 00:01:38,480
Speaker 1: thing to say, you literally cannot get the grade, you

27
00:01:38,520 --> 00:01:40,840
Speaker 1: literally cannot get the wheat. But that is the risk

28
00:01:40,959 --> 00:01:44,000
Speaker 1: that's being faced right now for multiple reasons, but in

29
00:01:44,160 --> 00:01:46,800
Speaker 1: large part due to this war, right, And you can

30
00:01:46,840 --> 00:01:50,320
Speaker 1: imagine that would manifest itself in political pressure in a

31
00:01:50,360 --> 00:01:52,800
Speaker 1: lot of places in the world, Like when people can't eat,

32
00:01:53,160 --> 00:01:57,680
Speaker 1: they tend to get angry, right, I mean rightfully? So, yeah,

33
00:01:57,760 --> 00:02:00,440
Speaker 1: And so then the question is, I guess there's two questions,

34
00:02:00,520 --> 00:02:04,360
Speaker 1: is like, one is what is happening with wheat plantings

35
00:02:04,360 --> 00:02:07,720
Speaker 1: in Ukraine. But then even if plantings were to somehow

36
00:02:07,800 --> 00:02:11,560
Speaker 1: be sustained amid the war, can how much of the

37
00:02:11,639 --> 00:02:14,680
Speaker 1: grain can actually get out? And as you mentioned right now,

38
00:02:14,680 --> 00:02:18,000
Speaker 1: there's very little getting out. Yeah, And this sort of

39
00:02:18,040 --> 00:02:21,920
Speaker 1: goes back to I guess the military tension between Russia

40
00:02:21,919 --> 00:02:26,079
Speaker 1: and Ukraine, But how do you actually get supplies into

41
00:02:26,120 --> 00:02:29,320
Speaker 1: the country and how do you get vital goods out

42
00:02:29,440 --> 00:02:32,480
Speaker 1: because you still want the supply of wheat and food

43
00:02:32,880 --> 00:02:36,079
Speaker 1: to be flowing relatively freely, and you also want Ukraine

44
00:02:36,080 --> 00:02:38,040
Speaker 1: to be able to make some money right at a

45
00:02:38,080 --> 00:02:40,240
Speaker 1: time when it actually needs money and could use that

46
00:02:40,280 --> 00:02:42,960
Speaker 1: to buy weapons and supplies that too, all right, So

47
00:02:43,080 --> 00:02:45,240
Speaker 1: for more we're gonna be talking about some of the

48
00:02:45,320 --> 00:02:48,880
Speaker 1: options to actually do this and whether there's a way

49
00:02:49,000 --> 00:02:51,680
Speaker 1: for the U. S Military Western forces to play a

50
00:02:51,720 --> 00:02:54,840
Speaker 1: positive role in safely getting grain out of the country.

51
00:02:54,960 --> 00:02:58,280
Speaker 1: We're gonna be speaking to Admiral James stanf Revis. He was,

52
00:02:58,440 --> 00:03:02,480
Speaker 1: among other things, the six Supreme Allied Commander of NATO.

53
00:03:02,760 --> 00:03:07,280
Speaker 1: He has personal experience in perhaps similar operations, are similar

54
00:03:07,320 --> 00:03:10,880
Speaker 1: situations of moving commodities around the world. Is a really

55
00:03:10,919 --> 00:03:13,480
Speaker 1: deep understanding of this stuff. So, Admiral, thank you so

56
00:03:13,560 --> 00:03:16,280
Speaker 1: much for coming on odd lots. I really appreciate. It's

57
00:03:16,320 --> 00:03:19,680
Speaker 1: great to be with both of you. Thank you absolutely,

58
00:03:19,680 --> 00:03:22,400
Speaker 1: thank you so much. So to start, you give us

59
00:03:22,520 --> 00:03:28,600
Speaker 1: your assessment of the current situation why exporting grain from

60
00:03:28,720 --> 00:03:32,120
Speaker 1: Ukraine right now is so constrained, well, I'm really struck

61
00:03:32,240 --> 00:03:36,000
Speaker 1: by a book I just published called to Risk It

62
00:03:36,120 --> 00:03:40,040
Speaker 1: All Nine Conflicts and the Crucible of Decision, and it's

63
00:03:40,080 --> 00:03:45,160
Speaker 1: about decision making under extreme stress. And so here I

64
00:03:45,200 --> 00:03:49,240
Speaker 1: think we have a pretty good example. Uh, both Vladimir

65
00:03:49,320 --> 00:03:51,960
Speaker 1: Putin on if you will, the dark side of the

66
00:03:52,000 --> 00:03:57,600
Speaker 1: equation and Volodimir Zalinsky on the lighter side on our

67
00:03:57,760 --> 00:04:00,920
Speaker 1: side of the equation. Both of these men are literally

68
00:04:01,120 --> 00:04:04,520
Speaker 1: risking at all. And one of the crucial components of

69
00:04:04,520 --> 00:04:10,320
Speaker 1: it is this ability or not to export grain. I

70
00:04:10,360 --> 00:04:13,480
Speaker 1: think you and Tracy Joe did a nice job laying

71
00:04:13,480 --> 00:04:19,440
Speaker 1: out the challenges globally if it doesn't get out, So

72
00:04:19,680 --> 00:04:24,080
Speaker 1: we come pretty quickly to okay, Admiral, So how would

73
00:04:24,080 --> 00:04:25,960
Speaker 1: you get the grain out? You know, I don't need

74
00:04:26,040 --> 00:04:30,799
Speaker 1: to tell an odd lots audience that um of all

75
00:04:30,839 --> 00:04:36,480
Speaker 1: international trade moves by sea, and grain, of course, is

76
00:04:36,839 --> 00:04:41,920
Speaker 1: a commodity that moves out in in mass, and so

77
00:04:42,279 --> 00:04:45,599
Speaker 1: the idea of trying to truck it out or even

78
00:04:45,720 --> 00:04:50,120
Speaker 1: train it out of Ukraine just it doesn't serve. So

79
00:04:50,760 --> 00:04:54,200
Speaker 1: the problem is Russia has taken their black sea fleet

80
00:04:54,279 --> 00:04:59,919
Speaker 1: about forty warships and effectively they've blockaded the entire coast

81
00:05:00,120 --> 00:05:04,200
Speaker 1: line of Ukraine. They already control on the land side

82
00:05:04,720 --> 00:05:09,120
Speaker 1: about seventy percent of that coastline on the Black Seat,

83
00:05:09,400 --> 00:05:14,280
Speaker 1: but that remaining has Odessa in it. And Odessa is

84
00:05:14,320 --> 00:05:17,159
Speaker 1: like Los Angeles Long Beach in the context of the

85
00:05:17,200 --> 00:05:22,440
Speaker 1: United States. It's dug port. And therefore the key is,

86
00:05:22,880 --> 00:05:26,680
Speaker 1: how can we if you will, open that port. And

87
00:05:26,760 --> 00:05:30,080
Speaker 1: at the moment, it's not only blockaded by Russian worships,

88
00:05:30,120 --> 00:05:34,680
Speaker 1: but it's it's mined in both by the Ukrainians and

89
00:05:34,880 --> 00:05:38,960
Speaker 1: reportedly by the Russian. So it's a very complex maritime

90
00:05:39,080 --> 00:05:43,839
Speaker 1: problem and UH, to very quickly sketch it out. What

91
00:05:43,880 --> 00:05:46,480
Speaker 1: we would do first is get rid of the minds.

92
00:05:46,520 --> 00:05:48,839
Speaker 1: I think that's pretty obvious why I need to do that.

93
00:05:49,440 --> 00:05:52,479
Speaker 1: And maybe some of the listeners can remember back to

94
00:05:52,560 --> 00:05:59,039
Speaker 1: the nineteen eighties when Iran blockaded the Straight of hor Moves.

95
00:05:59,400 --> 00:06:01,960
Speaker 1: What did the s do? Um, we got rid of

96
00:06:02,000 --> 00:06:05,719
Speaker 1: the minds. We certainly have that technology or allies. There's

97
00:06:05,760 --> 00:06:10,240
Speaker 1: a standing NATO mind sweeping task force that could be

98
00:06:10,279 --> 00:06:13,159
Speaker 1: sent up in the Black Sea to do this. We

99
00:06:13,279 --> 00:06:15,440
Speaker 1: got rid of the minds in the nineteen eighties in

100
00:06:15,440 --> 00:06:20,800
Speaker 1: the Arabian Gulf, and then we reflagged Kuwaiti tankers as

101
00:06:21,000 --> 00:06:24,960
Speaker 1: US vessels, and then we escorted them, put a cruiser,

102
00:06:25,160 --> 00:06:28,760
Speaker 1: a destroyer or a frigate alongside every one of them,

103
00:06:29,160 --> 00:06:32,720
Speaker 1: provided air cover and simply drove them in and out

104
00:06:32,760 --> 00:06:37,120
Speaker 1: and told the Iranians, in effect, don't even think about it,

105
00:06:37,600 --> 00:06:42,039
Speaker 1: and that solution could be applied here in Ukraine. And

106
00:06:42,080 --> 00:06:45,200
Speaker 1: if we don't move in that direction pretty quickly, I

107
00:06:45,240 --> 00:06:49,919
Speaker 1: think the consequences of global food security are quite dire.

108
00:06:50,560 --> 00:06:54,679
Speaker 1: So I have a bunch of questions already. But maybe

109
00:06:54,920 --> 00:06:57,080
Speaker 1: let let me start with the most pressing one. But

110
00:06:57,839 --> 00:07:01,839
Speaker 1: would an escort of ships in the manner that you

111
00:07:01,960 --> 00:07:04,800
Speaker 1: just described, would that not be seen as a provocation

112
00:07:05,200 --> 00:07:08,960
Speaker 1: by Russia? Um? I think it would be seen as

113
00:07:08,960 --> 00:07:14,160
Speaker 1: a provocation, And we have to ask ourselves, um, is

114
00:07:14,200 --> 00:07:20,080
Speaker 1: it sufficient the need to do this? Is it sufficient

115
00:07:20,480 --> 00:07:23,960
Speaker 1: to accept the level of risk? Back to the book

116
00:07:24,000 --> 00:07:27,080
Speaker 1: I just published, to Risk at All, That's exactly what

117
00:07:27,320 --> 00:07:30,480
Speaker 1: I examine in the book, in a series of maritime

118
00:07:30,520 --> 00:07:35,480
Speaker 1: case studies, is when are you willing to accept risk?

119
00:07:35,760 --> 00:07:41,400
Speaker 1: And is it justified by your ability to mitigate the risk?

120
00:07:41,640 --> 00:07:43,880
Speaker 1: And again we get rid of the minds. We put

121
00:07:44,040 --> 00:07:48,640
Speaker 1: escorts with all these ships, and we also the marsh

122
00:07:48,880 --> 00:07:51,680
Speaker 1: we publish no tams again. I don't have to tell

123
00:07:51,720 --> 00:07:54,640
Speaker 1: an odd locks audience what that is, um, And we

124
00:07:54,760 --> 00:08:03,000
Speaker 1: tell the Russians yea at each other today overestimated NOIP.

125
00:08:03,400 --> 00:08:06,160
Speaker 1: I'm sure the audience gets it. It's the hosts in

126
00:08:06,160 --> 00:08:08,520
Speaker 1: this case you need to explain it, okay. Indeed, for

127
00:08:08,680 --> 00:08:12,600
Speaker 1: our hosts, note TAM is a notice to mariners, and

128
00:08:12,720 --> 00:08:16,320
Speaker 1: it is it can be published about a floating object

129
00:08:16,400 --> 00:08:22,320
Speaker 1: that's become an obstruction, about newly discovered underwater formations UM,

130
00:08:22,680 --> 00:08:25,600
Speaker 1: or about a missile shoot or a gun shoot that

131
00:08:25,760 --> 00:08:28,320
Speaker 1: enable worship is going to conduct. It's really just the

132
00:08:28,680 --> 00:08:33,000
Speaker 1: equivalent of posting public notice of operations. So we would

133
00:08:33,120 --> 00:08:36,440
Speaker 1: we would the marsh the Russians. What that means is

134
00:08:36,720 --> 00:08:40,760
Speaker 1: go diplomat to diplomat, and we would issue no tams

135
00:08:40,840 --> 00:08:44,720
Speaker 1: noticed mariners, which goes, if you will, mariner to mariner,

136
00:08:44,880 --> 00:08:49,920
Speaker 1: worships to worships. The calculus then shifts over to the Russians.

137
00:08:50,040 --> 00:08:52,360
Speaker 1: And here you just have to put yourself in the

138
00:08:52,360 --> 00:08:55,160
Speaker 1: shoes of the Russians and ask yourself, um, you know,

139
00:08:55,360 --> 00:08:58,559
Speaker 1: in in the words of Clint Eastwood, are you feeling

140
00:08:58,640 --> 00:09:01,760
Speaker 1: lucky today. I don't think the Russians would take a

141
00:09:01,800 --> 00:09:06,199
Speaker 1: shot at a merchant ship escorted by a US warship,

142
00:09:06,720 --> 00:09:12,760
Speaker 1: therefore highly defended doing a humanitarian mission taking grain to

143
00:09:12,840 --> 00:09:17,040
Speaker 1: a starving world. I just don't see Russia taking that shot.

144
00:09:17,440 --> 00:09:21,760
Speaker 1: You know, there is obviously an incredible amount of hesitance

145
00:09:22,160 --> 00:09:25,520
Speaker 1: about committing any sort of US anything that would resemble

146
00:09:25,760 --> 00:09:30,439
Speaker 1: sort of like direct US military involvement. We're willing to

147
00:09:30,720 --> 00:09:35,280
Speaker 1: send weapons and of course money to Ukraine, obviously, all

148
00:09:35,320 --> 00:09:38,320
Speaker 1: of native well short of actually anything beyond that. But

149
00:09:38,400 --> 00:09:42,600
Speaker 1: in your view, something like escorting a ship through the

150
00:09:42,640 --> 00:09:48,000
Speaker 1: Black Sea or demining the area does not compose to

151
00:09:48,040 --> 00:09:51,440
Speaker 1: that at all. In your view, it does not. As follows,

152
00:09:51,640 --> 00:09:54,559
Speaker 1: where we have drawn the red line as to US

153
00:09:54,679 --> 00:10:01,560
Speaker 1: involvement is on the soil of the Ukrainian land or

154
00:10:02,200 --> 00:10:05,760
Speaker 1: Russian soil. But here we're talking about neither of those.

155
00:10:05,800 --> 00:10:10,400
Speaker 1: We're talking about international waters, so these ships would not

156
00:10:10,480 --> 00:10:15,319
Speaker 1: be passing through Russian claimed waters at all. These would

157
00:10:15,360 --> 00:10:19,359
Speaker 1: be international high seas. So I think that's a crucial

158
00:10:19,480 --> 00:10:26,040
Speaker 1: difference and one that we would certainly articulate and be

159
00:10:26,240 --> 00:10:29,360
Speaker 1: very clear with the Russians. Look, we're not entering your

160
00:10:29,480 --> 00:10:33,040
Speaker 1: territorial waters to conduct this mission. We're going into a

161
00:10:33,240 --> 00:10:37,680
Speaker 1: Ukrainian port, but through international waters and of course through

162
00:10:37,679 --> 00:10:42,960
Speaker 1: the Ukrainian territorial sea, with their permission. So I think

163
00:10:43,080 --> 00:10:48,640
Speaker 1: this passes the risk test. But I will also say,

164
00:10:48,960 --> 00:10:51,680
Speaker 1: at this point, do we really need to worry about

165
00:10:51,720 --> 00:10:55,520
Speaker 1: provoking Russia in the sense that they're the ones who

166
00:10:55,520 --> 00:10:58,880
Speaker 1: have invaded this country with two hundred thousand troops, committed

167
00:10:59,080 --> 00:11:05,840
Speaker 1: hideous war crimes, are refusing negotiations, and are blocking food

168
00:11:06,200 --> 00:11:08,559
Speaker 1: from the rest of the world. I mean, at some

169
00:11:08,640 --> 00:11:11,640
Speaker 1: point you just have to look a bully in the

170
00:11:11,679 --> 00:11:14,160
Speaker 1: eye and say, no, your behavior is unacceptable. Here's what

171
00:11:14,160 --> 00:11:16,160
Speaker 1: we're gonna do about it. I think we've hit that

172
00:11:16,240 --> 00:11:32,640
Speaker 1: point in this particular course of action. So one thing

173
00:11:32,840 --> 00:11:35,880
Speaker 1: you mentioned in your writings on this topic is the

174
00:11:35,920 --> 00:11:40,160
Speaker 1: idea of having to reflag the Ukrainian carriers to something else.

175
00:11:40,400 --> 00:11:43,439
Speaker 1: Can you explain why that would need to be done.

176
00:11:44,600 --> 00:11:48,800
Speaker 1: I actually don't think that is a crucial step. I

177
00:11:48,840 --> 00:11:53,760
Speaker 1: think it ups the anti for Russia. But let's face it,

178
00:11:54,120 --> 00:11:57,320
Speaker 1: as as this audience will know, um, there are many,

179
00:11:57,360 --> 00:12:01,080
Speaker 1: many flags of convenience all around the seas of the world.

180
00:12:01,280 --> 00:12:05,360
Speaker 1: Many of these grain tankers are non Ukrainian. But it

181
00:12:05,480 --> 00:12:10,720
Speaker 1: does alleviate one aspect of this, which is that, um,

182
00:12:10,760 --> 00:12:15,360
Speaker 1: it would be Russia conceivably could say well, we're engaged

183
00:12:15,400 --> 00:12:20,080
Speaker 1: in the special military operation. We're attacking Ukrainian targets. So

184
00:12:20,120 --> 00:12:23,520
Speaker 1: we would say, okay, we'll take down the Ukrainian flag

185
00:12:23,559 --> 00:12:26,360
Speaker 1: and put up really wouldn't have to be a U. S. Flag.

186
00:12:26,400 --> 00:12:28,520
Speaker 1: It could be Panamanian, it could be Greek, it could

187
00:12:28,520 --> 00:12:32,240
Speaker 1: be any nation willing to participate, could be any of

188
00:12:32,280 --> 00:12:35,319
Speaker 1: the NATO nations. If NATO signed up to it. It

189
00:12:35,400 --> 00:12:38,400
Speaker 1: would just be quite streamlined. And this was the case

190
00:12:38,920 --> 00:12:42,079
Speaker 1: in the operation Earnest Will in the nineteen eighties and

191
00:12:42,120 --> 00:12:46,280
Speaker 1: the Arabian See. Um, it's just quicker you can put

192
00:12:46,280 --> 00:12:49,040
Speaker 1: a U. S. Flag on it because the US government says, yep,

193
00:12:49,200 --> 00:12:52,720
Speaker 1: we'll take that ship. Um. But is that crucial now?

194
00:12:52,800 --> 00:12:55,000
Speaker 1: I don't think so. Um, So you and I don't

195
00:12:55,000 --> 00:12:58,000
Speaker 1: think it would change the calculus. Particularly so you were

196
00:12:58,080 --> 00:13:01,880
Speaker 1: part of that operation just Will in the late nineties

197
00:13:02,040 --> 00:13:04,680
Speaker 1: eighties to get oil out of the street of Hermus.

198
00:13:04,880 --> 00:13:08,959
Speaker 1: Why do you describe your role in that operation and

199
00:13:09,000 --> 00:13:14,000
Speaker 1: what made it successful? Um? My role was obviously that

200
00:13:14,080 --> 00:13:18,000
Speaker 1: was many years ago, I was a very young lieutenant commander.

201
00:13:18,200 --> 00:13:21,880
Speaker 1: I suppose I was in my late twenties, maybe thirty,

202
00:13:22,000 --> 00:13:26,800
Speaker 1: and I was the operations officer on an Aegis cruiser

203
00:13:26,960 --> 00:13:31,600
Speaker 1: USS Valley Forge, and and as the ops boss um,

204
00:13:31,640 --> 00:13:35,679
Speaker 1: my job was to participate in all the planning that

205
00:13:35,720 --> 00:13:40,320
Speaker 1: went into the operation, alongside the Admiral's flag staff and

206
00:13:40,400 --> 00:13:42,760
Speaker 1: my equivalence from all the other ships that were in

207
00:13:42,800 --> 00:13:44,840
Speaker 1: the task force. So we would get together on the

208
00:13:44,920 --> 00:13:48,520
Speaker 1: carrier and kind of sketch out the whole operation, would

209
00:13:48,600 --> 00:13:50,360
Speaker 1: send it up the chain of command, it would get

210
00:13:50,360 --> 00:13:53,880
Speaker 1: approved and come back. So step one for me was

211
00:13:54,200 --> 00:13:59,840
Speaker 1: planning process, very deeply involved. And then in the execution phase,

212
00:14:00,240 --> 00:14:05,640
Speaker 1: I was the tactical action officer on board the Valley Forge,

213
00:14:05,920 --> 00:14:09,760
Speaker 1: effectively the officer on watch with the firing key. So

214
00:14:10,000 --> 00:14:14,840
Speaker 1: if we were overflown by Iranian combat aircraft, I had

215
00:14:14,880 --> 00:14:19,000
Speaker 1: permission to shoot them down. If the Iranian small boats

216
00:14:19,000 --> 00:14:23,320
Speaker 1: were to attack the tanker, I could engage them with

217
00:14:23,360 --> 00:14:27,720
Speaker 1: our gun systems um Naturally, if if a situation like

218
00:14:27,760 --> 00:14:31,120
Speaker 1: that developed, the Captain would come very quickly into the

219
00:14:31,160 --> 00:14:35,080
Speaker 1: combat information center to make sure Lieutenant Commander Staffordis didn't

220
00:14:35,080 --> 00:14:38,280
Speaker 1: do anything foolish. But as as I described it, we

221
00:14:38,320 --> 00:14:40,960
Speaker 1: would just sail right up through the straight of her

222
00:14:41,000 --> 00:14:43,520
Speaker 1: moves and up the center of the Arabian golf and

223
00:14:43,520 --> 00:14:46,800
Speaker 1: go up, and the tankers would load load oil up

224
00:14:46,800 --> 00:14:49,800
Speaker 1: at the ports in Kuwait, and then would turn around

225
00:14:49,800 --> 00:14:52,000
Speaker 1: and take them back down. And when we got him

226
00:14:52,000 --> 00:14:55,640
Speaker 1: into the Indian Ocean and out of range of Iranian

227
00:14:55,720 --> 00:15:00,040
Speaker 1: aircraft Iranian warships, we were able to uh cut the

228
00:15:00,160 --> 00:15:03,080
Speaker 1: loose enough they would go. This was actually gonna be

229
00:15:03,120 --> 00:15:06,280
Speaker 1: my next question. So how far would a military escort

230
00:15:06,400 --> 00:15:09,040
Speaker 1: for ships normally go to? You take them all the

231
00:15:09,040 --> 00:15:11,560
Speaker 1: way to well, presumably you wouldn't take them all the

232
00:15:11,600 --> 00:15:14,160
Speaker 1: way to their destination, but how do you decide when

233
00:15:14,160 --> 00:15:18,480
Speaker 1: they're out of you know, the danger zone? Yeah, in

234
00:15:18,480 --> 00:15:23,440
Speaker 1: in that particular situation, um, it was relatively easy to

235
00:15:23,520 --> 00:15:28,320
Speaker 1: calculate by looking at Iranian military capability. Um, how far

236
00:15:28,400 --> 00:15:32,359
Speaker 1: could their attack aircraft fly? How far did they typically

237
00:15:32,400 --> 00:15:37,200
Speaker 1: operate warships? Answer? In both cases not very far. In

238
00:15:37,240 --> 00:15:42,000
Speaker 1: the case of Russia, I think safely speaking, we would

239
00:15:42,200 --> 00:15:46,440
Speaker 1: escort them down through the Bosphorus and out the out

240
00:15:46,440 --> 00:15:48,440
Speaker 1: of the Black Sea and into the A G and C.

241
00:15:48,640 --> 00:15:50,920
Speaker 1: I think that's where you're gonna cut them loose. Again,

242
00:15:51,800 --> 00:15:54,560
Speaker 1: highly unlikely in my view that Russia is going to

243
00:15:55,160 --> 00:15:59,680
Speaker 1: come after commercial shipping. Frankly, whether it's Ukrainian flag or not,

244
00:15:59,720 --> 00:16:03,200
Speaker 1: but safe for sake of argument, we've reflagged UM and

245
00:16:03,240 --> 00:16:06,400
Speaker 1: they're flying a U. S flag or a Danish flag

246
00:16:07,520 --> 00:16:11,240
Speaker 1: from a NATO member, very unlikely Rush is gonna go

247
00:16:11,480 --> 00:16:15,240
Speaker 1: any anywhere outside their zone of control, which is really

248
00:16:15,280 --> 00:16:19,960
Speaker 1: the Northern Black Sea. More broadly, today, what are the

249
00:16:20,040 --> 00:16:24,680
Speaker 1: existing either US or NATO resources that either have the

250
00:16:24,720 --> 00:16:29,000
Speaker 1: best equipment or the best experience in working with the

251
00:16:29,080 --> 00:16:33,520
Speaker 1: safety and securing of commercial fleet. All of the NATO

252
00:16:33,640 --> 00:16:37,680
Speaker 1: navies do this quite well, and most of the NATO

253
00:16:38,360 --> 00:16:44,920
Speaker 1: nations have very capable coastguards, including obviously our own and

254
00:16:45,560 --> 00:16:49,280
Speaker 1: again and odd lots. Audience will know well the close

255
00:16:49,360 --> 00:16:53,240
Speaker 1: working relationship of the U. S. Coast Guard to merchant shipping. UM.

256
00:16:53,360 --> 00:16:57,400
Speaker 1: That's replicated by the French Coastguard, the German Coastguard, the

257
00:16:57,480 --> 00:17:02,000
Speaker 1: Danish Coastguard, and I think that UM, you could certainly

258
00:17:02,120 --> 00:17:06,840
Speaker 1: draw on that expertise. Finally, Tracy and Joe, I would

259
00:17:06,880 --> 00:17:11,320
Speaker 1: say that UM, we have experienced doing this much more

260
00:17:11,400 --> 00:17:14,359
Speaker 1: recently during the period of time when I was Supreme

261
00:17:14,400 --> 00:17:18,359
Speaker 1: Allied Commander of NATO from two thousand nine and two thirteen,

262
00:17:18,640 --> 00:17:23,280
Speaker 1: we were facing pirates off the coast of East Africa.

263
00:17:23,359 --> 00:17:26,880
Speaker 1: This of course is the time of Captain Phillips who

264
00:17:26,960 --> 00:17:31,680
Speaker 1: is captured from the Mayorsclabama, rescued by a very heroic

265
00:17:31,800 --> 00:17:35,080
Speaker 1: navy operation. Frankly, one of the case studies in my book,

266
00:17:35,080 --> 00:17:38,360
Speaker 1: To Risk at All is about that operation. In that

267
00:17:38,440 --> 00:17:42,280
Speaker 1: period of time, all of our navies worked very closely

268
00:17:42,359 --> 00:17:46,680
Speaker 1: with the international shipping community, if you will, and I

269
00:17:46,760 --> 00:17:51,040
Speaker 1: would go every few months to London to the International

270
00:17:51,080 --> 00:17:55,720
Speaker 1: Maritime Organization, which functioned as a kind of umbrella over

271
00:17:56,320 --> 00:18:00,119
Speaker 1: both the major shipping companies. So we had represented is

272
00:18:00,119 --> 00:18:03,040
Speaker 1: there from all of them in the major navies that

273
00:18:03,080 --> 00:18:05,879
Speaker 1: were part of the counterpiracy. So we've got very recent

274
00:18:05,920 --> 00:18:10,119
Speaker 1: experience working alongside our merchant marine colleagues, and frankly, that

275
00:18:10,200 --> 00:18:14,040
Speaker 1: relationship is generally pretty comfortable. So can you actually talk

276
00:18:14,080 --> 00:18:16,600
Speaker 1: a little bit more about these sort of day to

277
00:18:16,680 --> 00:18:21,600
Speaker 1: day relationship between the military and merchant carriers. And you know,

278
00:18:21,600 --> 00:18:24,120
Speaker 1: I'm thinking Tracy to like about even some of these

279
00:18:24,119 --> 00:18:26,920
Speaker 1: conversations that we had with Salton post already talked about

280
00:18:26,920 --> 00:18:29,320
Speaker 1: this exactly where it's like, you know, what the FED

281
00:18:29,520 --> 00:18:32,639
Speaker 1: was to the financial crisis, the military is going to

282
00:18:32,680 --> 00:18:36,040
Speaker 1: have to be the sort of global commodity crisis. But

283
00:18:36,119 --> 00:18:39,639
Speaker 1: even before the sort of current acute tension, what is

284
00:18:39,680 --> 00:18:43,920
Speaker 1: the sort of normal role that the U. S. Military

285
00:18:44,000 --> 00:18:47,080
Speaker 1: or the Navy plays in just sort of the securing

286
00:18:47,400 --> 00:18:50,280
Speaker 1: of the of the global trade that I guess we

287
00:18:50,320 --> 00:18:53,840
Speaker 1: all take for grant. Yeah, I think the key phrase there,

288
00:18:53,920 --> 00:18:57,480
Speaker 1: Joe is take for granted. And and we all of us,

289
00:18:57,880 --> 00:19:02,440
Speaker 1: the global population kind of just feels as though there's

290
00:19:02,440 --> 00:19:06,000
Speaker 1: no problems out there. And yet as again as recently

291
00:19:06,240 --> 00:19:11,520
Speaker 1: as within the decade, we saw organized, uh strongly land

292
00:19:11,560 --> 00:19:16,200
Speaker 1: based pirate operations coming out of Somalia. Um we continue

293
00:19:16,240 --> 00:19:21,120
Speaker 1: to see pretty vicious piracy in the Straits of Malacca,

294
00:19:21,200 --> 00:19:24,040
Speaker 1: We see it off the coast of West Africa. We

295
00:19:24,720 --> 00:19:27,239
Speaker 1: see kind of hints of it in and around the

296
00:19:27,240 --> 00:19:32,480
Speaker 1: Caribbean at times. Um So piracy continues a second zone,

297
00:19:33,119 --> 00:19:35,159
Speaker 1: and I always say the oceans in many ways of

298
00:19:35,240 --> 00:19:39,600
Speaker 1: the world's largest crime syne another major challenge. And you know,

299
00:19:40,080 --> 00:19:44,720
Speaker 1: we tend to think of this as merchant ships, tankers,

300
00:19:44,800 --> 00:19:50,000
Speaker 1: break bolt container ships, but how about the thousands and

301
00:19:50,080 --> 00:19:54,040
Speaker 1: thousands of thousands of significant fishing craft that are out there.

302
00:19:54,400 --> 00:19:59,280
Speaker 1: They are commercial and they are under assault. Frequently a

303
00:19:59,280 --> 00:20:01,480
Speaker 1: lot of the pirates se is directed against them, and

304
00:20:01,520 --> 00:20:03,960
Speaker 1: by the way, a lot of them are conducting illegal

305
00:20:04,320 --> 00:20:07,760
Speaker 1: fishery activities, and some of that is state sponsored, by

306
00:20:07,800 --> 00:20:11,160
Speaker 1: the way. So that's a long way of saying there

307
00:20:11,160 --> 00:20:13,400
Speaker 1: are many problems out there, and that's before we get

308
00:20:13,440 --> 00:20:18,480
Speaker 1: into illegal dumping and pollution. Again, that's commercial activity that's

309
00:20:18,520 --> 00:20:21,879
Speaker 1: going on out there, albeit illegal. So all of the

310
00:20:21,920 --> 00:20:25,080
Speaker 1: world's navies and coast guards are are very focused on

311
00:20:25,119 --> 00:20:32,680
Speaker 1: this and are working very closely both ashore with conferences

312
00:20:32,720 --> 00:20:37,439
Speaker 1: and symposia and exchanging information and data sharing. UM we

313
00:20:37,480 --> 00:20:42,879
Speaker 1: share immense amounts of data from US maritime centers, for example,

314
00:20:42,960 --> 00:20:48,080
Speaker 1: with commercial shipping companies, and they reciprocate. UM. It's a

315
00:20:48,160 --> 00:20:52,640
Speaker 1: it's a very close and positive relationship. UM As as

316
00:20:52,680 --> 00:20:54,280
Speaker 1: we all know, the coast guard has a bit of

317
00:20:54,320 --> 00:20:57,720
Speaker 1: a different role, more law enforcement, so you know they're

318
00:20:57,720 --> 00:21:01,240
Speaker 1: going to have a perhaps less of a warm and

319
00:21:01,359 --> 00:21:07,280
Speaker 1: cozy relationship. UM. I think navies and commercial shipping are

320
00:21:07,400 --> 00:21:11,120
Speaker 1: quite close and frankly had been back to the time

321
00:21:11,160 --> 00:21:14,840
Speaker 1: of the ancient Greeks. So I knew your expertise is

322
00:21:14,920 --> 00:21:18,520
Speaker 1: on the shipping aspect for obvious reasons. But is there

323
00:21:18,520 --> 00:21:20,879
Speaker 1: anything that we need to be done on the land

324
00:21:21,000 --> 00:21:24,679
Speaker 1: side in order to get more grains to the ports

325
00:21:24,960 --> 00:21:27,840
Speaker 1: so that they could then be escorted and exported to

326
00:21:27,880 --> 00:21:33,440
Speaker 1: the rest of the world. Um, great question, Tracy. Um. First,

327
00:21:33,960 --> 00:21:40,200
Speaker 1: we need to ensure that we're efficiently moving containers and

328
00:21:40,440 --> 00:21:44,080
Speaker 1: cargoes in and out of these ports. And let's face it,

329
00:21:44,160 --> 00:21:46,760
Speaker 1: we have a bit of a double whammy here in

330
00:21:46,800 --> 00:21:50,399
Speaker 1: the sense that we're still just coming off COVID in

331
00:21:50,520 --> 00:21:54,920
Speaker 1: many places, we also are seeing very high inflation. It's

332
00:21:55,040 --> 00:22:01,080
Speaker 1: impacting labor forces. We're facing a major strike. Los Angeles

333
00:22:01,119 --> 00:22:05,040
Speaker 1: long Beaches were recording this and that's replicated around the world.

334
00:22:05,280 --> 00:22:10,000
Speaker 1: As longshoreman, for example, are looking at rising inflation, they

335
00:22:10,040 --> 00:22:14,160
Speaker 1: want to organize, they want to get more understandably so

336
00:22:14,200 --> 00:22:17,240
Speaker 1: they can keep up with inflation. So we have to

337
00:22:17,280 --> 00:22:22,800
Speaker 1: have efficient, well run ports that offer good compensation for

338
00:22:23,160 --> 00:22:25,600
Speaker 1: the kind of quality work we need in those ports.

339
00:22:26,000 --> 00:22:28,679
Speaker 1: Uh Number two, we need to make sure the ports

340
00:22:28,680 --> 00:22:32,040
Speaker 1: are safe and secure. We worked very hard in the

341
00:22:32,440 --> 00:22:35,680
Speaker 1: during the period after nine eleven to create much more

342
00:22:35,720 --> 00:22:38,679
Speaker 1: security around ports globally, and a lot of that is

343
00:22:38,680 --> 00:22:43,200
Speaker 1: still in place, not unlike the implementation of the t

344
00:22:43,480 --> 00:22:46,560
Speaker 1: s A regime in all the airports. Um we need

345
00:22:46,600 --> 00:22:49,760
Speaker 1: to go back and relook at that security, I think,

346
00:22:50,000 --> 00:22:53,880
Speaker 1: and make sure that it meets today's needs. And then

347
00:22:54,080 --> 00:23:00,440
Speaker 1: third we need uh to ensure that logistically we can

348
00:23:00,480 --> 00:23:06,120
Speaker 1: go from these ports quickly and efficiently into the nations

349
00:23:06,119 --> 00:23:10,359
Speaker 1: that are receiving. So in the military context we would

350
00:23:10,359 --> 00:23:15,159
Speaker 1: say this is from port to fort, those railheads, those

351
00:23:15,359 --> 00:23:19,679
Speaker 1: trucking systems, whatever, the means of cargo delivery is a

352
00:23:19,720 --> 00:23:23,320
Speaker 1: whole secondary back office, if you will, where we at

353
00:23:23,400 --> 00:23:25,960
Speaker 1: least here in the United States have some well documented

354
00:23:26,000 --> 00:23:29,120
Speaker 1: challenges as well. Like everything else in today's world, it's

355
00:23:29,160 --> 00:23:33,280
Speaker 1: a big, complicated global supply chain, and when a portion

356
00:23:33,359 --> 00:23:36,600
Speaker 1: of it is distended as it is now by the

357
00:23:36,640 --> 00:23:40,320
Speaker 1: events in Ukraine on top of post COVID let's let's

358
00:23:40,320 --> 00:23:45,160
Speaker 1: hope post COVID, on top of staggeringly high inflation, it's

359
00:23:45,200 --> 00:23:49,240
Speaker 1: a very difficult moment for global shipping and it will

360
00:23:49,280 --> 00:23:52,200
Speaker 1: have impact on on the grain in particular, and that

361
00:23:52,400 --> 00:23:55,879
Speaker 1: I think is needs to be a key focus, very

362
00:23:55,920 --> 00:24:01,000
Speaker 1: minor aside question is the military dealing also seeing a

363
00:24:01,080 --> 00:24:04,200
Speaker 1: labor shortage right now, like every like other entities are,

364
00:24:04,400 --> 00:24:09,160
Speaker 1: we are seeing some pressure on our recruiting. Yes, and

365
00:24:09,280 --> 00:24:12,520
Speaker 1: so for the first time in a long while. For example,

366
00:24:12,600 --> 00:24:17,960
Speaker 1: the Army has extended the tours of its recruiters. Those

367
00:24:18,000 --> 00:24:20,560
Speaker 1: are the men and women who you know are out

368
00:24:20,560 --> 00:24:23,320
Speaker 1: in the field trying to convince high school seniors to

369
00:24:23,359 --> 00:24:27,199
Speaker 1: come join the military. And the reason they're doing that

370
00:24:27,320 --> 00:24:32,360
Speaker 1: is because they're facing pressure meeting their targets for all

371
00:24:32,400 --> 00:24:34,320
Speaker 1: the reasons we've talked about. And by the way, as

372
00:24:34,359 --> 00:24:36,680
Speaker 1: in a side, it's important to know and this may

373
00:24:36,760 --> 00:24:40,000
Speaker 1: surprise many people you know who tend to think, oh, well,

374
00:24:40,040 --> 00:24:42,119
Speaker 1: you know, if I if I can't go to college

375
00:24:42,200 --> 00:24:43,640
Speaker 1: or I don't want to go to college, I guess

376
00:24:43,680 --> 00:24:47,520
Speaker 1: I'll just join the military. Um, it's hard to be

377
00:24:47,640 --> 00:24:52,760
Speaker 1: accepted as a volunteer in the US military. Only about

378
00:24:53,280 --> 00:24:58,280
Speaker 1: of high school seniors are eligible for military service. You've

379
00:24:58,280 --> 00:25:01,920
Speaker 1: got to be a graduate. You've gotta have reasonably high grades,

380
00:25:02,320 --> 00:25:06,400
Speaker 1: you've got to be in essentially perfect health. You've got

381
00:25:06,400 --> 00:25:26,080
Speaker 1: to have no drug use, no arrests. Going back to

382
00:25:26,240 --> 00:25:31,680
Speaker 1: the challenge right now and Ukraine demining the water around

383
00:25:31,760 --> 00:25:35,760
Speaker 1: Odessa or demining any water sounds extreme, sounds difficult. What

384
00:25:35,840 --> 00:25:37,679
Speaker 1: does it take to do that? And what is the

385
00:25:37,800 --> 00:25:40,959
Speaker 1: time frame for just that part to make it uh

386
00:25:41,320 --> 00:25:44,880
Speaker 1: safe to move it? All? Right? So these are not

387
00:25:45,600 --> 00:25:48,439
Speaker 1: floating minds. In other words, these are not minds that

388
00:25:48,480 --> 00:25:52,640
Speaker 1: are just drifting all around. That's a much harder problem.

389
00:25:52,680 --> 00:25:56,080
Speaker 1: These are minds that are fixed to the bottom, and

390
00:25:56,240 --> 00:25:58,720
Speaker 1: therefore you don't have to take them all out. You

391
00:25:58,840 --> 00:26:01,719
Speaker 1: just got to take out enough so that you can

392
00:26:01,840 --> 00:26:04,840
Speaker 1: drive a tanker up a channel. So you've got to

393
00:26:04,920 --> 00:26:09,479
Speaker 1: d mine the channels. And that's a finite space that

394
00:26:09,560 --> 00:26:12,639
Speaker 1: you have to do. Now, could could Russia do some

395
00:26:12,760 --> 00:26:16,320
Speaker 1: dirty tricks and throw some floating minds in their conceivable,

396
00:26:16,600 --> 00:26:19,520
Speaker 1: particularly if they felt they could do it without us

397
00:26:19,600 --> 00:26:22,960
Speaker 1: knowing it. But we're watching for that. They know we're

398
00:26:23,000 --> 00:26:26,320
Speaker 1: watching for that. So let's let's take as an entering

399
00:26:26,400 --> 00:26:30,159
Speaker 1: argument that you have to clear the channels. You have

400
00:26:30,640 --> 00:26:34,040
Speaker 1: mind sweepers, and there are several classes of these, but

401
00:26:34,119 --> 00:26:37,120
Speaker 1: there are ships that are devoted to this task and

402
00:26:37,440 --> 00:26:41,160
Speaker 1: they're quite capable there. Uh. They have a very good

403
00:26:41,240 --> 00:26:43,679
Speaker 1: sonar that can look into the water and find the

404
00:26:43,720 --> 00:26:47,520
Speaker 1: mines and then they have a remotely operated apparatus that

405
00:26:47,560 --> 00:26:49,840
Speaker 1: can go and neutralize it. I don't want to go

406
00:26:49,880 --> 00:26:53,399
Speaker 1: into more detail than that, but our capability in this

407
00:26:53,520 --> 00:26:57,840
Speaker 1: regard is quite good. Um. We practice constantly. To clear

408
00:26:57,920 --> 00:27:01,680
Speaker 1: a channel from Odessa into clear waters of the Black

409
00:27:01,720 --> 00:27:04,800
Speaker 1: Sea would be a matter of some weeks. It certainly

410
00:27:04,800 --> 00:27:08,119
Speaker 1: wouldn't be months and months. So one thing we've been

411
00:27:08,119 --> 00:27:10,280
Speaker 1: talking about on all thoughts for the past couple of

412
00:27:10,320 --> 00:27:13,520
Speaker 1: years now our supply chains and logistics, And it feels

413
00:27:13,560 --> 00:27:16,680
Speaker 1: like the pandemic has really thrown into very sharp relief

414
00:27:17,160 --> 00:27:19,400
Speaker 1: just how much those matter and how much they are

415
00:27:19,440 --> 00:27:23,800
Speaker 1: often taken for granted in the modern economy. And my

416
00:27:23,920 --> 00:27:29,120
Speaker 1: understanding is that in military conflict there has always been

417
00:27:29,520 --> 00:27:32,840
Speaker 1: an emphasis on supply chains and logistics because those are

418
00:27:32,840 --> 00:27:35,400
Speaker 1: the things that can win or lose you wars. Can

419
00:27:35,400 --> 00:27:37,919
Speaker 1: you talk a little bit more, just in general about

420
00:27:38,200 --> 00:27:42,960
Speaker 1: the importance of supply chains to military conflict, I can

421
00:27:43,080 --> 00:27:46,560
Speaker 1: Tracy um. An old saying in the military is that

422
00:27:46,880 --> 00:27:51,440
Speaker 1: amateurs focus on the strategy. The professionals are looking at

423
00:27:51,440 --> 00:27:56,239
Speaker 1: the logistics. That the business equivalent of that expression is

424
00:27:56,920 --> 00:28:03,280
Speaker 1: execution eats strategy for lunch, meaning logistics, right, and you

425
00:28:03,280 --> 00:28:06,480
Speaker 1: know again, odd lots audience. UM, that's what we all

426
00:28:06,520 --> 00:28:11,359
Speaker 1: do for a living, moving through these global supply chains

427
00:28:12,280 --> 00:28:15,920
Speaker 1: and what we've discovered. And our logisticians are the very

428
00:28:16,000 --> 00:28:19,760
Speaker 1: best in the world, full stop military logisticians. But they've

429
00:28:19,760 --> 00:28:23,560
Speaker 1: got a pretty controlled environment. And that sounds funny to say,

430
00:28:23,640 --> 00:28:27,240
Speaker 1: right because they're they're dealing with war, but they're also

431
00:28:27,400 --> 00:28:33,320
Speaker 1: dealing from stockpiles. They have UM, they have endless training,

432
00:28:33,400 --> 00:28:38,320
Speaker 1: they constantly conduct, they have exquisite intelligence, UM, they can

433
00:28:38,320 --> 00:28:43,840
Speaker 1: mitigate the combat risk quite effectively. The military logisticians do

434
00:28:43,960 --> 00:28:47,160
Speaker 1: not have to face the big challenge that the global

435
00:28:47,240 --> 00:28:50,920
Speaker 1: supply chains face, which is that it's kind of it's

436
00:28:50,960 --> 00:28:54,840
Speaker 1: all open source. It's it's in many ways it's market driven.

437
00:28:55,240 --> 00:28:58,479
Speaker 1: It's not like these global shipping firms are getting together

438
00:28:58,560 --> 00:29:03,080
Speaker 1: and training together and practicing together and our right a

439
00:29:03,200 --> 00:29:06,160
Speaker 1: schedule that they're going to follow for the next ten years,

440
00:29:06,200 --> 00:29:09,360
Speaker 1: which the military could do that because it has control

441
00:29:09,640 --> 00:29:13,160
Speaker 1: over all these inputs in a way that big shipping

442
00:29:13,160 --> 00:29:16,840
Speaker 1: companies just don't have control over the inputs. And as

443
00:29:16,880 --> 00:29:21,080
Speaker 1: a result of that, the kind of supply chain issues

444
00:29:21,920 --> 00:29:26,000
Speaker 1: hurt badly because they hit a system that had already

445
00:29:26,040 --> 00:29:29,840
Speaker 1: moved so far to the just in time principle that

446
00:29:29,920 --> 00:29:35,000
Speaker 1: it was very vulnerable to these kind of distortions. And again,

447
00:29:35,040 --> 00:29:39,520
Speaker 1: first it's COVID, then it's the war, and then now

448
00:29:39,600 --> 00:29:44,240
Speaker 1: it's this rampant inflation. All that is severely distending these

449
00:29:44,400 --> 00:29:48,600
Speaker 1: global systems. It's going to require pre significant rewiring. I think,

450
00:29:48,920 --> 00:29:52,880
Speaker 1: is there anything that private industry could learn from the

451
00:29:52,880 --> 00:29:56,120
Speaker 1: military when it comes to managing supply chains. Well, I

452
00:29:56,160 --> 00:30:00,160
Speaker 1: mentioned a couple of things. One is training. Another, there

453
00:30:00,320 --> 00:30:04,000
Speaker 1: is information sharing with each other and with the government,

454
00:30:04,080 --> 00:30:07,320
Speaker 1: and of course you know they're in competition and that's hard.

455
00:30:07,360 --> 00:30:10,080
Speaker 1: But you know, look at the airlines on the issue

456
00:30:10,320 --> 00:30:17,960
Speaker 1: of maintenance and safety. They constantly work together and share information. Thirdly,

457
00:30:18,200 --> 00:30:22,520
Speaker 1: and we talked about it already, work with the various governments,

458
00:30:23,400 --> 00:30:30,200
Speaker 1: build those relationships. Fourthly, international organizations being part of shipping

459
00:30:30,560 --> 00:30:35,080
Speaker 1: professional associations with which many of these are part of already,

460
00:30:35,120 --> 00:30:39,440
Speaker 1: but also with the International Maritime Organization, for example in London,

461
00:30:39,520 --> 00:30:42,840
Speaker 1: be part of that kind of effort. Um, there's four

462
00:30:42,920 --> 00:30:46,000
Speaker 1: or five ideas for you, Admirald James stever Is this

463
00:30:46,120 --> 00:30:48,800
Speaker 1: was a real treat to hear your perspective in this

464
00:30:48,880 --> 00:30:50,880
Speaker 1: sort of like deep knowledge that you have in this

465
00:30:51,360 --> 00:30:54,000
Speaker 1: Thank you so much for coming on odd lots. It's

466
00:30:54,120 --> 00:30:57,480
Speaker 1: my pleasure, and I'll just mention it one more time.

467
00:30:58,080 --> 00:31:00,760
Speaker 1: New book out, a maritime book that I think this

468
00:31:00,800 --> 00:31:04,800
Speaker 1: audience would really like to risk at all nine conflicts

469
00:31:04,840 --> 00:31:08,800
Speaker 1: and the cruciabil of decision about making decisions under extreme

470
00:31:08,880 --> 00:31:11,560
Speaker 1: pressure in real risk. I definitely want to read it

471
00:31:11,600 --> 00:31:14,280
Speaker 1: now because just hearing you sort of like walk through

472
00:31:14,560 --> 00:31:16,720
Speaker 1: the sort of you know, the operation risk and the

473
00:31:16,760 --> 00:31:20,160
Speaker 1: decision making and the difficulties really fascinating. And I'm definitely

474
00:31:20,160 --> 00:31:22,240
Speaker 1: going to check out the mar Thank you for coming out,

475
00:31:37,240 --> 00:31:41,400
Speaker 1: you know, Tracy. Just even beyond the acute crisis that

476
00:31:41,480 --> 00:31:44,800
Speaker 1: we're facing with the war in Ukraine and the commodity

477
00:31:44,800 --> 00:31:47,720
Speaker 1: shortage in particular food, the role that the U. S

478
00:31:47,800 --> 00:31:51,680
Speaker 1: Military or that military plays in normal times just sort

479
00:31:51,680 --> 00:31:55,720
Speaker 1: of keeping the global trade operations going is definitely something

480
00:31:55,760 --> 00:31:59,600
Speaker 1: that we haven't discussed much, oh totally. So I think

481
00:31:59,720 --> 00:32:01,640
Speaker 1: when someone says, oh, We're going to have a military

482
00:32:01,800 --> 00:32:04,760
Speaker 1: escort for a bunch of ships carrying grain out of Ukraine,

483
00:32:05,200 --> 00:32:07,200
Speaker 1: I think a lot of people their knee jerk reaction

484
00:32:07,320 --> 00:32:09,760
Speaker 1: is like, oh, this is a big you know, departure

485
00:32:10,280 --> 00:32:13,720
Speaker 1: or what the military normally does. But actually a lot

486
00:32:14,000 --> 00:32:18,160
Speaker 1: of policing on the seas is done by the military,

487
00:32:18,240 --> 00:32:21,239
Speaker 1: like someone has to keep those trade routes safe, and

488
00:32:21,280 --> 00:32:25,560
Speaker 1: typically it's the military. Yeah. No, And obviously, you know,

489
00:32:25,880 --> 00:32:29,400
Speaker 1: as he mentioned, there's piracy or criminality or his line

490
00:32:29,560 --> 00:32:31,760
Speaker 1: is that the oceans are the biggest primacy in the world.

491
00:32:31,960 --> 00:32:34,520
Speaker 1: So this is always going on. And now, of course

492
00:32:34,560 --> 00:32:37,760
Speaker 1: there's this acute issue of can we get grain out

493
00:32:37,760 --> 00:32:40,920
Speaker 1: of Ukraine? Can the blockade be broken? Can it be

494
00:32:41,000 --> 00:32:45,360
Speaker 1: broken in a way such that it doesn't dangerously escalate conflict?

495
00:32:45,680 --> 00:32:48,520
Speaker 1: And I have to say I still have some reservations

496
00:32:48,600 --> 00:32:52,719
Speaker 1: about whether you could do that without provoking a response

497
00:32:52,960 --> 00:32:55,880
Speaker 1: from Russia. But you know, I also appreciate the admiral's

498
00:32:56,080 --> 00:32:59,240
Speaker 1: statement that, well, you know, they're the aggressor, so maybe

499
00:32:59,280 --> 00:33:01,200
Speaker 1: we shouldn't worry so much about the response. There are

500
00:33:01,280 --> 00:33:04,400
Speaker 1: the aggressor, and it's an international waters and it's not

501
00:33:04,720 --> 00:33:10,920
Speaker 1: necessarily an offensive operation to simply escort a ship carrying grain.

502
00:33:11,280 --> 00:33:14,040
Speaker 1: So it's an interesting idea. And of course, as you know,

503
00:33:14,120 --> 00:33:17,920
Speaker 1: he it's a it is a crisis, the global food crisis,

504
00:33:18,000 --> 00:33:21,040
Speaker 1: and it's been done before or at least something analoguess,

505
00:33:21,120 --> 00:33:24,800
Speaker 1: such as the operation that he was part of. All right,

506
00:33:25,080 --> 00:33:26,920
Speaker 1: shall we leave it there, Let's leave it there. This

507
00:33:26,960 --> 00:33:29,640
Speaker 1: has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm

508
00:33:29,680 --> 00:33:32,280
Speaker 1: Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at Tracy

509
00:33:32,280 --> 00:33:35,280
Speaker 1: Alloway and I'm Joe Wisn'tal. You can follow me on

510
00:33:35,320 --> 00:33:38,600
Speaker 1: Twitter at the Stalwart. Follow our guest, Admiral James Steve

511
00:33:38,680 --> 00:33:42,280
Speaker 1: ritz He's at Steve Rita's JA. He's also the author

512
00:33:42,320 --> 00:33:44,800
Speaker 1: of the new book To Risk at All, Nine Conflicts

513
00:33:44,960 --> 00:33:48,040
Speaker 1: in the Cruci Bold of Decision. Follow our producer Kerman

514
00:33:48,160 --> 00:33:51,680
Speaker 1: Rodriguez at Carmen Armann. Followed the Bloomberg head of podcast,

515
00:33:51,720 --> 00:33:55,280
Speaker 1: Francesca Leavy at Francisco Today. And check out all of

516
00:33:55,320 --> 00:33:59,400
Speaker 1: our podcasts Bloomberg under the handle at podcasts. Thanks for

517
00:33:59,440 --> 00:33:59,840
Speaker 1: listening to