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Speaker 1: George Norri sent you. Now Here's a highlight from Coast

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Speaker 1: to Coast AM on iHeart Radio and welcome back to

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Speaker 1: Coast to Coast with John produce our special guest here,

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Speaker 1: the Ghost of Langley. John. You had mentioned earlier that

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Speaker 1: JFK ironically we're coming up on the fifty fourth anniversary

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Speaker 1: of his assassination, that he is a c I a ghost.

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Speaker 1: What do you mean by that? Uh? In the same

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Speaker 1: way that the examples of these officers at the Agency

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Speaker 1: become spirits, become ghosts that impact on the behavior of

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Speaker 1: their successors. Here we have a president who's um actions

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Speaker 1: were so far over the top with respect to his

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Speaker 1: this one particular opponent of his um that people still

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Speaker 1: think fifty four years later, maybe with the Cubans that

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Speaker 1: went after him. So um, that's an example for future

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Speaker 1: presidents who think, back, oh my god, Kennedy got shot.

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Speaker 1: What am I going to do. It's also an example

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Speaker 1: for people working on covert operations at the Agency, Oh

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Speaker 1: my god, if we are going to do this operation, Uh,

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Speaker 1: is it going to threaten the president? Um? So on

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Speaker 1: a certain level. And again, this is not um This

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Speaker 1: is an extrapolation from what's in the Ghost of Langley.

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Speaker 1: This is not actually part of the content of that book.

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Speaker 1: But there's a level on which you can read the

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Speaker 1: evidence to say that Kennedy is a ghost. Can the

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Speaker 1: c I A in your opinion, John, be fixed? And

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Speaker 1: should it be fixed? Um? Ken of the actually here

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Speaker 1: comes back? You know. He uh created an entity that's

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Speaker 1: called the was called the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,

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Speaker 1: and this entity still exists today as the Foreign Intelligence

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Speaker 1: Advisory Board, and it's a White House watchdog group that

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Speaker 1: looks at intelligence. And in the summer of nineteen sixty one,

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Speaker 1: after the Bay of Pigs, in fact, Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence

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Speaker 1: Advisory Board proposed that exact thing, let's break up the CIA. Uh.

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Speaker 1: The CIA at that time was moving, you know, it

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Speaker 1: was about to move to the house that Allen dull

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Speaker 1: Is built out in Langley, Virginia, and the Foreign Intelligence

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Speaker 1: Advisory Group had a fallback position, which was that, well,

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Speaker 1: let's not let the covert operators move the CIA's operations director,

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Speaker 1: which shouldn't go to Langley. We can send them someplace else.

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Speaker 1: And I think some of them thought by doing this,

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Speaker 1: they decouple the CIA from its operations director and then

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Speaker 1: the operations director, it can be led to a trophy

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Speaker 1: by itself. You don't think ahead, no, no, finish up. Um.

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Speaker 1: I don't think that's possible today, No, I don't need

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Speaker 1: I think today the CIA's Operations Directorate UM actually has

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Speaker 1: a much different function. It's feeder line for what the

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Speaker 1: agency is calling mission centers. And these mission centers all

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Speaker 1: have particular orientations and particular goals. For example, there's a

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Speaker 1: mission center for North Korea and there's a mission center

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Speaker 1: for Iran, and they're all operations oriented. UM. And because

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Speaker 1: of that, and because CIA and Analysis is now running

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Speaker 1: to support operations directly and not as a way of

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Speaker 1: understanding of the world, UM, the CIA is less capable

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Speaker 1: of getting itself out of this trouble that it is

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Speaker 1: uh sort of gotten itself into. So that leads to

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Speaker 1: the question of should the CIA be dismantled, and if

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Speaker 1: it were, what could replace it? Because as I said earlier,

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Speaker 1: you know, I think you have to have you have

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Speaker 1: to have some entity like this. But UM, I think

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Speaker 1: what we've done is let this let this organization become

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Speaker 1: too operationally oriented. We spoke briefly about the Mossad. One

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Speaker 1: of the drawbacks that the Mossad has is that it's

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Speaker 1: too operationally oriented. And I think we're letting our CIA

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Speaker 1: get into that kind of a situation, which is inherently

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Speaker 1: dangerous and which now we are lacking the safety net

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Speaker 1: that could have supported the agency when it got into

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Speaker 1: trouble with With everything that's been happening with the CIA

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Speaker 1: in the past and in the future, how would you

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Speaker 1: compare what they do with China? And what is China's

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Speaker 1: agency called? The Chinese Agency is an artifact of the

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Speaker 1: Ministry of Security UM, and it has UH alpha numeric

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Speaker 1: designators for different sections. It's a pot pourri, really, and

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Speaker 1: I can't describe to you much about the the the

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Speaker 1: organization of the entity of Chinese intelligence. Much of what

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Speaker 1: we know about Chinese intelligence is based simply on what

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Speaker 1: we know about what they've attempted to do. For example,

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Speaker 1: the hacking of the UH the White House Officer of

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Speaker 1: Personnel Management. A few years ago or a few years

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Speaker 1: before that, there was a case in which Chinese agents

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Speaker 1: had suborned UM, an FBI H middle level official out

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Speaker 1: in California or UH in certain other instances. There was

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Speaker 1: one of these in Louisiana and another one in California

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Speaker 1: where UH Chinese agents had been purchasing and otherwise acquiring

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Speaker 1: American technology and UH technological UM blueprints machine tools that

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Speaker 1: kind of thing for their industry. The California Representative Christopher Cox,

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Speaker 1: maybe middle Aughts, was concerned enough about this that he

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Speaker 1: held hearings and produced what is probably the most comprehensive

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Speaker 1: view of what Chinese intelligence is doing and wants from

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Speaker 1: the United States. And I mentioned that because we have

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Speaker 1: we had a similar debate in the nineteen eighties, this

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Speaker 1: time about the Russians and the KGB, where UM, the

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Speaker 1: KGB had a department that was just in charge of

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Speaker 1: UH sort of procuring foreign technologies and UH things that

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Speaker 1: could be used to enhance the Soviet economy. But in

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Speaker 1: any case, UH, when analyzes were done about what was

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Speaker 1: the impact of these foreign technological acquisitions on the Soviet economy,

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Speaker 1: what the analysts came up with is that the impact

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Speaker 1: actually is relatively minor because their economy was so big,

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Speaker 1: and because the relative value of the foreign technology that

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Speaker 1: they were requiring was limited. And I think you can

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Speaker 1: apply that same argument to the case of China. The

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Speaker 1: Chinese UH economy is so large today that the differential

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Speaker 1: that's added to it by their foreign espionage is limited.

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Speaker 1: Having said that, I will tell you that if you

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Speaker 1: looked at a set of the latest line of Chinese weapons,

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Speaker 1: you know, the fighter and the aircraft carrier, and the

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Speaker 1: new rocket and whatnot. UM A lot of their front

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Speaker 1: line technology, new self propelled artillery guns, new fighter jets

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Speaker 1: look an awful lot like ours. Absolutely, if you were

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Speaker 1: running the CIA today, John, what would you do? UM?

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Speaker 1: I would move away from this mission center idea that

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Speaker 1: they've got and UH actually attempt to recreate a more

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Speaker 1: traditional director of operations, and I would UM very much

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Speaker 1: enhance the agency's analytical capability. We're in a environment today

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Speaker 1: in which actually the terror war thing is really a

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Speaker 1: smaller part of our security problem. Our security problem needs

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Speaker 1: to look at the effects of climate change on national

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Speaker 1: behavior and people's behavior. The UH changes that are going

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Speaker 1: to be wrought in international behavior by things like the

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Speaker 1: scarcity of water UH. The kinds of activity is on

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Speaker 1: the parts of people that are going to be fueled

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Speaker 1: by their desperation and their dependence on various UH kinds

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Speaker 1: of products or um UH or their their actual geographic situations.

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Speaker 1: And these are the things increasingly I think that are

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Speaker 1: going to be fueling behavior both non state actors and

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Speaker 1: from nation states, and the CIA needs to be in

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Speaker 1: a position to understand those developments and to anticipate them,

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Speaker 1: and that's the way you protect American national security. Good point.

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Speaker 1: Listen to more Coast to Coast AM every weeknight at

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