1 00:00:00,120 --> 00:00:02,400 Speaker 1: Inside the United States right now. They estimate there's ten 2 00:00:02,440 --> 00:00:06,680 Speaker 1: thousand spots undercover people living here stealing secrets. Every country 3 00:00:07,000 --> 00:00:10,320 Speaker 1: specializes in a different type of newtolergy, but we specialize 4 00:00:10,360 --> 00:00:14,960 Speaker 1: in stealing secrets. Massad and specializes in violence, liberating people 5 00:00:14,960 --> 00:00:17,040 Speaker 1: who are kidnapped and killing people who deserve to goe. 6 00:00:17,160 --> 00:00:20,200 Speaker 1: China specializes in the theft of intellectual property. But they're 7 00:00:20,200 --> 00:00:22,480 Speaker 1: not the best. You know who the best is Nigeria, 8 00:00:23,200 --> 00:00:25,160 Speaker 1: the number one threat to the United States. 9 00:00:25,239 --> 00:00:25,840 Speaker 2: It's framed. 10 00:00:26,360 --> 00:00:29,040 Speaker 1: I've essentially been a government asset since I was sixteen 11 00:00:29,120 --> 00:00:30,760 Speaker 1: years old, handling nuclear weapons. 12 00:00:30,800 --> 00:00:32,800 Speaker 2: And when you say government asset. 13 00:00:32,520 --> 00:00:35,479 Speaker 1: They put your last name in capital letters. According to 14 00:00:35,520 --> 00:00:38,000 Speaker 1: American law, when your last name appears in capital letters, 15 00:00:38,000 --> 00:00:40,120 Speaker 1: you are actually no longer an individual. You are actually 16 00:00:40,120 --> 00:00:42,680 Speaker 1: a piece of property that belongs to federal government. 17 00:00:43,080 --> 00:00:46,480 Speaker 2: Wow, you don't think Putin has cancer, correct? 18 00:00:46,520 --> 00:00:48,879 Speaker 1: Vladimir Putin that I've been watching for the last year 19 00:00:48,920 --> 00:00:51,160 Speaker 1: and a half. He may have cancer, but if he does, 20 00:00:51,200 --> 00:00:54,120 Speaker 1: he's under some kind of very effective treatment. He's still 21 00:00:54,160 --> 00:00:57,520 Speaker 1: waging a war against Ukraine. He hasn't changed much from 22 00:00:57,520 --> 00:00:59,640 Speaker 1: the guy the day before he invaded Ukraine. 23 00:01:00,160 --> 00:01:01,920 Speaker 2: The motivation behind the war. 24 00:01:02,160 --> 00:01:05,800 Speaker 1: In media, people aren't talking about the real motivation. They're 25 00:01:05,840 --> 00:01:09,399 Speaker 1: calling it an attack on democracy. In reality, that's not 26 00:01:09,480 --> 00:01:11,440 Speaker 1: the case at all. But the question of whether or 27 00:01:11,480 --> 00:01:15,520 Speaker 1: not a foreign intelligence service controlled the president. The first 28 00:01:15,560 --> 00:01:17,959 Speaker 1: time that ever came to light was with Trump. Trump. 29 00:01:18,080 --> 00:01:20,680 Speaker 1: Because he's the client, he dictates what you can and 30 00:01:20,760 --> 00:01:23,320 Speaker 1: can't do to him. So when the New York Police 31 00:01:23,360 --> 00:01:25,880 Speaker 1: wanted to go in and arrest President Trump and take 32 00:01:25,959 --> 00:01:27,800 Speaker 1: him to the court, they had to coordinate with the 33 00:01:27,840 --> 00:01:28,560 Speaker 1: Secret Service. 34 00:01:28,840 --> 00:01:29,680 Speaker 2: This is a mess. 35 00:01:29,880 --> 00:01:31,880 Speaker 1: This is why the world looks at us and laughs 36 00:01:31,880 --> 00:01:45,000 Speaker 1: at us right now, Primary and alternate audio. Man's the 37 00:01:45,000 --> 00:01:48,880 Speaker 1: way to do it. Losing an episode is the fucking man. 38 00:01:48,960 --> 00:01:53,480 Speaker 2: I'm telling you. It is heart breakholds, it is heart breakhotel. 39 00:01:54,000 --> 00:01:57,080 Speaker 2: Then like, I'll tell your story little baby. I don't know. 40 00:01:57,160 --> 00:01:58,880 Speaker 2: Do you know who little baby is? Oh? 41 00:01:58,960 --> 00:02:02,360 Speaker 1: God, yeah, you're gonna like, you're gonna be amazed how 42 00:02:02,440 --> 00:02:04,000 Speaker 1: little I know about anything. 43 00:02:04,480 --> 00:02:06,880 Speaker 3: So this is what's this is why it's so important 44 00:02:06,880 --> 00:02:10,600 Speaker 3: for these conversations. It's because you know so much. I 45 00:02:10,639 --> 00:02:13,040 Speaker 3: know you know so much because I've heard you speak. 46 00:02:12,760 --> 00:02:15,920 Speaker 1: And I'm like fuck I at the same time, right. 47 00:02:15,840 --> 00:02:18,760 Speaker 3: But then when you get danse into that culture or 48 00:02:18,800 --> 00:02:19,960 Speaker 3: our culture is like. 49 00:02:20,520 --> 00:02:22,880 Speaker 2: No, I don't know, little baby picture that. 50 00:02:24,560 --> 00:02:27,960 Speaker 3: Like a dude literally has a hundred plaques. You know Drake, 51 00:02:28,040 --> 00:02:30,639 Speaker 3: I know, yeah, Drake is the biggest shit in the world. 52 00:02:30,680 --> 00:02:31,440 Speaker 2: So okay, cool. 53 00:02:32,120 --> 00:02:34,919 Speaker 1: But that's that's that's about where it stops, and that's 54 00:02:34,960 --> 00:02:36,280 Speaker 1: that's how bad it is. 55 00:02:38,400 --> 00:02:39,320 Speaker 2: What about actors? 56 00:02:39,320 --> 00:02:41,440 Speaker 1: Give me some actors, you know, Oh, dude, every actor 57 00:02:41,480 --> 00:02:43,880 Speaker 1: I gave you, it's going to be ancient like me. Man, 58 00:02:44,120 --> 00:02:47,280 Speaker 1: it's gonna be like your Morgan Freeman's and your fucking. 59 00:02:47,400 --> 00:02:51,320 Speaker 3: Uh nobody Kevin Hart. 60 00:02:51,880 --> 00:02:57,359 Speaker 2: Let's give some names. Who are the Rock of course? Yeah? 61 00:02:57,440 --> 00:03:01,960 Speaker 3: Yeah, See, these dudes transcend culture. That's true, above it exactly. 62 00:03:02,280 --> 00:03:04,560 Speaker 2: How many people are above culture? Yeah? 63 00:03:04,680 --> 00:03:07,440 Speaker 1: Well, what's fascinating is when we talk about being above culture, 64 00:03:07,480 --> 00:03:11,120 Speaker 1: I think what we're really saying is pioneering a new culture, right, 65 00:03:11,160 --> 00:03:13,919 Speaker 1: because The Rock is in this place where he's pioneering 66 00:03:14,600 --> 00:03:20,160 Speaker 1: both people of color and yes specific Asian Americans. 67 00:03:20,240 --> 00:03:23,120 Speaker 3: Yes, right, he's putting a new twist on it again. 68 00:03:23,840 --> 00:03:25,359 Speaker 3: He's identifying something different. 69 00:03:25,400 --> 00:03:25,799 Speaker 2: The Rock. 70 00:03:25,919 --> 00:03:29,959 Speaker 3: His journey's been crazy. He comes from and we're already rolling. 71 00:03:30,000 --> 00:03:32,799 Speaker 3: It's up that podcast you know where you're at. I 72 00:03:32,840 --> 00:03:34,280 Speaker 3: don't like to do the long intro. 73 00:03:34,880 --> 00:03:35,080 Speaker 2: You know. 74 00:03:35,160 --> 00:03:39,760 Speaker 3: Another episode today we have someone that I'm so so 75 00:03:40,160 --> 00:03:43,400 Speaker 3: hyped to speak to. I get his last name wrong 76 00:03:43,520 --> 00:03:48,560 Speaker 3: one hundred percent of the time. Andrew boost de Mante. 77 00:03:48,680 --> 00:03:49,400 Speaker 3: How are you, brother? 78 00:03:49,520 --> 00:03:51,160 Speaker 1: I'm happy to be here, man, this is this is 79 00:03:51,200 --> 00:03:54,240 Speaker 1: an awesome opportunity for me. I appreciate it to have 80 00:03:54,280 --> 00:03:57,120 Speaker 1: a conversation like this and just In the in the preamble, man, 81 00:03:57,120 --> 00:03:59,480 Speaker 1: what we've been talking about. Justin's I've gotten here. I 82 00:03:59,520 --> 00:04:01,440 Speaker 1: feel the cameras haven't already been on. 83 00:04:01,520 --> 00:04:02,400 Speaker 2: Right, me too, man. 84 00:04:02,680 --> 00:04:05,600 Speaker 3: I actually at some point we want to start catching 85 00:04:05,600 --> 00:04:08,520 Speaker 3: those moments because those be the moments those soon as 86 00:04:08,520 --> 00:04:11,760 Speaker 3: you initially because you're trying to fight through what's going on, 87 00:04:11,840 --> 00:04:12,840 Speaker 3: what's your understanding? 88 00:04:13,320 --> 00:04:13,480 Speaker 2: Are? 89 00:04:13,520 --> 00:04:16,960 Speaker 3: Where are we right? And it's so interesting. First of all, 90 00:04:17,000 --> 00:04:19,360 Speaker 3: giving me your background a little bit, so, I am. 91 00:04:19,279 --> 00:04:22,839 Speaker 1: A former CIA intelligence officer. I spent seven years undercovered 92 00:04:22,839 --> 00:04:25,880 Speaker 1: with CIA working around the world, and prior to that, 93 00:04:26,040 --> 00:04:28,200 Speaker 1: I was a US military officer with the Air Force 94 00:04:28,760 --> 00:04:32,400 Speaker 1: handling nuclear weapons. I had a top secret SCIS stance 95 00:04:32,440 --> 00:04:35,720 Speaker 1: for Special Compartment and Information Clearance. I've essentially been a 96 00:04:35,720 --> 00:04:39,240 Speaker 1: cultivated government asset since I was sixteen years old. 97 00:04:39,560 --> 00:04:42,560 Speaker 3: And so for the audience, when you say government asset, 98 00:04:43,080 --> 00:04:46,560 Speaker 3: that means you've been in cahoots with the government. 99 00:04:46,839 --> 00:04:47,080 Speaker 2: Yeah. 100 00:04:47,120 --> 00:04:49,279 Speaker 1: So what a lot of people don't realize is that 101 00:04:49,320 --> 00:04:52,360 Speaker 1: when you join the military, or when you join any 102 00:04:52,440 --> 00:04:57,279 Speaker 1: kind of federal agency, they put your last name in 103 00:04:57,400 --> 00:05:00,719 Speaker 1: capital letters. And according to American law, when your last 104 00:05:00,760 --> 00:05:03,080 Speaker 1: name appears in capital letters, you are actually no longer 105 00:05:03,080 --> 00:05:05,800 Speaker 1: an individual. You are actually a piece of property that 106 00:05:05,880 --> 00:05:09,360 Speaker 1: belongs to the federal government. So my name was in 107 00:05:09,480 --> 00:05:12,960 Speaker 1: capital letters until twenty fourteen when I put in my 108 00:05:13,000 --> 00:05:14,680 Speaker 1: separation paperwork to leave CIA. 109 00:05:14,839 --> 00:05:17,440 Speaker 3: So what do they show that, I mean, is that 110 00:05:17,560 --> 00:05:20,760 Speaker 3: on your ID and things like that capital letters? 111 00:05:20,760 --> 00:05:23,080 Speaker 2: Who puts it in capital letters? And where is that? 112 00:05:23,160 --> 00:05:25,800 Speaker 3: Like if I wanted to see your name to identify 113 00:05:25,839 --> 00:05:26,480 Speaker 3: the difference. 114 00:05:26,920 --> 00:05:29,840 Speaker 1: So the specific location is on the contract that you 115 00:05:29,880 --> 00:05:33,200 Speaker 1: sign with the federal government, in your terms and your 116 00:05:33,200 --> 00:05:36,719 Speaker 1: agreements of service. So when you sign your commitment of 117 00:05:36,760 --> 00:05:39,080 Speaker 1: service with the military, you sign your commitment of service 118 00:05:39,120 --> 00:05:43,960 Speaker 1: with FBI, NSSAY, whatever it might be. When you sign 119 00:05:44,040 --> 00:05:45,719 Speaker 1: that commitment, you'll see that at the very top of 120 00:05:45,760 --> 00:05:49,280 Speaker 1: the contract, your name appears in all caps wow, yeah, 121 00:05:49,320 --> 00:05:51,719 Speaker 1: yeah yeah. And then within the terms of that contract, 122 00:05:51,720 --> 00:05:55,040 Speaker 1: it says that you know you are a you are 123 00:05:56,360 --> 00:06:00,839 Speaker 1: essentially abandoning your rights, your individual rights, and replacing them 124 00:06:00,880 --> 00:06:03,760 Speaker 1: with the needs of the service of whatever organization. 125 00:06:03,360 --> 00:06:05,719 Speaker 2: You're working with. What would make you buy into day? 126 00:06:06,640 --> 00:06:08,960 Speaker 1: For me, I grew up poor man. I grew up 127 00:06:08,960 --> 00:06:11,200 Speaker 1: poor in a rural part of Pennsylvania. I was a 128 00:06:11,200 --> 00:06:15,400 Speaker 1: brown kid in a white rural town. An opportunity just 129 00:06:15,440 --> 00:06:18,520 Speaker 1: didn't exist, right, I mean in my high school, and 130 00:06:18,560 --> 00:06:20,200 Speaker 1: I was lucky enough to go to high school, which 131 00:06:20,240 --> 00:06:23,479 Speaker 1: not everybody gets to do, right, But in my high school, 132 00:06:24,000 --> 00:06:27,560 Speaker 1: like my sophomore year of high school, our guidance counselor 133 00:06:27,600 --> 00:06:29,080 Speaker 1: called us in and talked to us all about our 134 00:06:29,080 --> 00:06:32,080 Speaker 1: future after high school. And there were really only two options. 135 00:06:32,320 --> 00:06:35,000 Speaker 1: You either go work in one of the businesses in 136 00:06:35,040 --> 00:06:37,880 Speaker 1: the same town where we live, or you go to 137 00:06:38,480 --> 00:06:42,040 Speaker 1: a local community college and you get an associate's degree 138 00:06:42,160 --> 00:06:43,600 Speaker 1: and then you come back and you work for one 139 00:06:43,600 --> 00:06:46,000 Speaker 1: of the companies that's in our little hometown. That was it. 140 00:06:46,520 --> 00:06:49,280 Speaker 1: And I remember when he told us that my sophomore year, 141 00:06:49,760 --> 00:06:51,280 Speaker 1: I just accepted it because what do you do when 142 00:06:51,279 --> 00:06:53,640 Speaker 1: you're fifteen years old? You just accept with authorities tell 143 00:06:53,680 --> 00:06:56,640 Speaker 1: you right? And I went to my mom, my mom 144 00:06:56,720 --> 00:06:58,720 Speaker 1: raising My father died when I was very young from 145 00:06:58,760 --> 00:07:01,120 Speaker 1: a violent crime. And I talked to my mom and 146 00:07:01,160 --> 00:07:03,040 Speaker 1: I was like, yeah, I guess I guess I'll get 147 00:07:03,080 --> 00:07:05,000 Speaker 1: a job because I'm not really going to go to 148 00:07:05,000 --> 00:07:07,800 Speaker 1: community college. I probably don't. I probably don't have the grades. 149 00:07:07,960 --> 00:07:08,280 Speaker 2: All right. 150 00:07:08,839 --> 00:07:12,040 Speaker 1: She was like, that's there's more than just two options. 151 00:07:12,040 --> 00:07:13,520 Speaker 1: And I was like, no, no, no. The guidance councilor said 152 00:07:13,520 --> 00:07:16,200 Speaker 1: there's only two options, and my mom went ape shit man, 153 00:07:16,240 --> 00:07:18,920 Speaker 1: and she dragged my ass in how to sit down 154 00:07:18,960 --> 00:07:21,800 Speaker 1: with the guidance counselor ripped him up with me sitting 155 00:07:21,840 --> 00:07:24,320 Speaker 1: in the room. And it was that day that I 156 00:07:24,440 --> 00:07:27,600 Speaker 1: learned that there really is nobody who has authority over us. 157 00:07:28,080 --> 00:07:28,280 Speaker 2: We have. 158 00:07:28,440 --> 00:07:31,600 Speaker 1: They have the authority we give them, and that's all 159 00:07:31,600 --> 00:07:31,880 Speaker 1: they have. 160 00:07:32,320 --> 00:07:34,560 Speaker 3: What do you think, well, I mean when you say that, 161 00:07:34,720 --> 00:07:36,880 Speaker 3: tell me more about that, because I think my audience 162 00:07:36,920 --> 00:07:38,920 Speaker 3: and and else would like to learn a little bit 163 00:07:38,960 --> 00:07:43,440 Speaker 3: more about your understanding of authority. Seeing that you've been 164 00:07:43,960 --> 00:07:47,040 Speaker 3: you know, integrated with the CIA. It's like, what does 165 00:07:47,160 --> 00:07:48,040 Speaker 3: power look. 166 00:07:47,920 --> 00:07:51,800 Speaker 1: Like to you, man, that's such a big question. So 167 00:07:51,800 --> 00:07:55,800 Speaker 1: so Cia teaches us very early on that power is 168 00:07:55,840 --> 00:08:00,680 Speaker 1: tied intrinsically to something called perception, right, is what we 169 00:08:00,760 --> 00:08:03,680 Speaker 1: all have. How you view the world. So there's the 170 00:08:03,760 --> 00:08:06,720 Speaker 1: literal version of perception, meaning you sitting where you're sitting, 171 00:08:07,160 --> 00:08:09,240 Speaker 1: your point of view. You're looking at me. So you 172 00:08:09,240 --> 00:08:11,560 Speaker 1: see the wall behind me, you see the wall over 173 00:08:11,600 --> 00:08:13,280 Speaker 1: in that direction, you see the light coming in from 174 00:08:13,280 --> 00:08:15,040 Speaker 1: that window. You see a little bit of the roof, 175 00:08:15,080 --> 00:08:16,480 Speaker 1: you see a little bit of the floor. That's your 176 00:08:16,520 --> 00:08:18,240 Speaker 1: point of view. Well, my point of view is totally 177 00:08:18,240 --> 00:08:19,760 Speaker 1: different from your point of view. I see the wall 178 00:08:19,760 --> 00:08:22,480 Speaker 1: behind you, I see a different patch of roof, I 179 00:08:22,560 --> 00:08:24,960 Speaker 1: see different lighting, exactly right. So that's the very literal 180 00:08:25,000 --> 00:08:27,480 Speaker 1: form of perception. But then there's also the perception of 181 00:08:28,040 --> 00:08:31,520 Speaker 1: what your point of view has done to program the 182 00:08:31,520 --> 00:08:33,800 Speaker 1: way you view the world. So I grew up in 183 00:08:33,840 --> 00:08:37,000 Speaker 1: a white rural neighborhood. You did not. So I have 184 00:08:37,080 --> 00:08:40,040 Speaker 1: been shaped by a childhood and a white rural neighborhood. 185 00:08:40,160 --> 00:08:42,160 Speaker 1: I have not been shaped the way that you were 186 00:08:42,200 --> 00:08:45,600 Speaker 1: shaped by your neighborhood. Right now, compound that over time, 187 00:08:45,920 --> 00:08:48,480 Speaker 1: I'm forty three years old. So compound my point of 188 00:08:48,520 --> 00:08:51,840 Speaker 1: view over forty three years of my experience, and what 189 00:08:51,880 --> 00:08:56,120 Speaker 1: you're doing is you're creating an algorithm that defines how. 190 00:08:55,960 --> 00:08:56,439 Speaker 2: I view you. 191 00:08:57,920 --> 00:09:00,920 Speaker 1: You have done the same thing exact every single person 192 00:09:00,960 --> 00:09:03,760 Speaker 1: we meet during the day and day in day out, 193 00:09:03,840 --> 00:09:07,760 Speaker 1: year after year, they've all had that different programming. If 194 00:09:07,800 --> 00:09:09,480 Speaker 1: you think about the fact that all of our brains 195 00:09:09,559 --> 00:09:14,920 Speaker 1: are like multiple millions of quantum computers, you can see 196 00:09:14,920 --> 00:09:19,400 Speaker 1: how different we all think. But the core computer is 197 00:09:19,440 --> 00:09:23,160 Speaker 1: the same. Dope, The pink matter between your ears is 198 00:09:23,160 --> 00:09:26,120 Speaker 1: the same as the pink matter between my perspective. 199 00:09:26,240 --> 00:09:28,120 Speaker 2: Yes, a perspective shapes it. 200 00:09:28,200 --> 00:09:29,240 Speaker 1: So it's all programmed. 201 00:09:29,360 --> 00:09:29,560 Speaker 2: Yes. 202 00:09:29,720 --> 00:09:31,960 Speaker 1: So when what CIA taught us and what makes the 203 00:09:31,960 --> 00:09:34,920 Speaker 1: CI is a powerful organization, is that it teaches you 204 00:09:35,280 --> 00:09:39,600 Speaker 1: that what's important is not the coding, because you can 205 00:09:39,679 --> 00:09:44,000 Speaker 1: change the coding. What's important is understanding the computer itself. 206 00:09:43,720 --> 00:09:47,120 Speaker 3: Right, and then also understanding that you can change the coding. 207 00:09:47,440 --> 00:09:50,800 Speaker 3: Is there such thing from the CIA perspective as. 208 00:09:50,679 --> 00:09:53,920 Speaker 2: Being like hardwired like we make it? 209 00:09:54,720 --> 00:09:59,400 Speaker 3: Some people are just so far gone that you can't 210 00:09:59,720 --> 00:10:02,720 Speaker 3: energ or change the way that they viewed things. 211 00:10:02,800 --> 00:10:05,680 Speaker 1: Absolutely, and what we're talking about there is this concept 212 00:10:05,720 --> 00:10:10,040 Speaker 1: called neuroplasticity. So neuroplasticity is the idea of the human 213 00:10:10,080 --> 00:10:14,160 Speaker 1: brain is more like a plastic explosive than it is 214 00:10:14,760 --> 00:10:18,440 Speaker 1: like a plastic mold. You can constantly change the way 215 00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:20,400 Speaker 1: you think if you listen to something new, if you 216 00:10:20,400 --> 00:10:22,360 Speaker 1: start listening to new music, if you read a new book, 217 00:10:22,400 --> 00:10:24,520 Speaker 1: if you watch a new TV show, You're going to 218 00:10:24,600 --> 00:10:27,760 Speaker 1: introduce new information into your brain, which means your brain 219 00:10:27,840 --> 00:10:30,959 Speaker 1: is going to adapt to that new information. Some of 220 00:10:31,000 --> 00:10:34,200 Speaker 1: that information you disagree with, and you've had that experience, 221 00:10:34,240 --> 00:10:36,120 Speaker 1: no doubt, where somebody has said something and you just 222 00:10:37,040 --> 00:10:39,480 Speaker 1: you just straight up disagree with it, and your face 223 00:10:39,559 --> 00:10:43,400 Speaker 1: kind of strengths and you feel your forehead wrinkle and 224 00:10:43,480 --> 00:10:46,800 Speaker 1: you can feel the friction of the information. That's called 225 00:10:46,880 --> 00:10:51,240 Speaker 1: cognitive dissonance. It's the feeling you have when the information 226 00:10:51,320 --> 00:10:53,040 Speaker 1: that you know is different from the information that you're 227 00:10:53,040 --> 00:10:57,360 Speaker 1: hearing and it causes friction. Right, that's a growth process. 228 00:10:56,920 --> 00:10:57,439 Speaker 2: For the brain. 229 00:10:57,920 --> 00:11:00,800 Speaker 1: Now, some people are so far gone brain has become 230 00:11:00,920 --> 00:11:05,080 Speaker 1: so much more like a plastic mold that they willfully 231 00:11:05,120 --> 00:11:08,920 Speaker 1: reject the new information. And we see that especially in 232 00:11:08,960 --> 00:11:12,920 Speaker 1: our culture now with far left, false right. Yes, and 233 00:11:13,200 --> 00:11:14,839 Speaker 1: these people. You can tell them anything you want to 234 00:11:14,840 --> 00:11:16,240 Speaker 1: tell them. You can tell them the truth. You can 235 00:11:16,280 --> 00:11:17,720 Speaker 1: show it to them in writing, you can let them 236 00:11:17,760 --> 00:11:19,480 Speaker 1: watch a video and they will still. 237 00:11:19,600 --> 00:11:20,559 Speaker 2: Yes, deny it. 238 00:11:20,679 --> 00:11:24,040 Speaker 1: Yes, those are folks that are willfully rejecting information. They're 239 00:11:24,120 --> 00:11:28,920 Speaker 1: neuroplasticity has become artificially, they're holding it back, they're blocking 240 00:11:29,000 --> 00:11:30,360 Speaker 1: their own brain. It's become low. 241 00:11:30,600 --> 00:11:33,800 Speaker 3: I think there's a point though, in which, at least 242 00:11:34,080 --> 00:11:37,520 Speaker 3: people that I've dealt with it is where they can 243 00:11:37,559 --> 00:11:39,800 Speaker 3: act like and I want to make sure we are 244 00:11:39,920 --> 00:11:43,800 Speaker 3: recording it, says record right. Okay, Well it's a point 245 00:11:43,840 --> 00:11:47,400 Speaker 3: where they'll say they're not getting the information, but they're 246 00:11:47,440 --> 00:11:49,360 Speaker 3: really getting the information. 247 00:11:49,120 --> 00:11:51,800 Speaker 2: Right, Like you've just made you just laid it out. 248 00:11:51,559 --> 00:11:56,760 Speaker 3: So so clear that they cannot deny that, right, But 249 00:11:56,880 --> 00:12:00,280 Speaker 3: they'll steal for the sake of to say face and 250 00:12:00,320 --> 00:12:01,920 Speaker 3: all of that. I mean, how do you know when 251 00:12:01,960 --> 00:12:02,319 Speaker 3: you're not. 252 00:12:02,320 --> 00:12:05,000 Speaker 2: Dealing with that from a CIA perspective, When someone's. 253 00:12:04,720 --> 00:12:08,640 Speaker 3: Like, nah, we'll never gup by down, We'll never You're like, 254 00:12:08,720 --> 00:12:09,559 Speaker 3: now they're getting. 255 00:12:09,320 --> 00:12:10,320 Speaker 2: Weaker, yeah you know. 256 00:12:10,800 --> 00:12:13,320 Speaker 1: Yeah, So now we get into a space where you're 257 00:12:13,360 --> 00:12:17,400 Speaker 1: reading human behavior right now, human beings because our computer 258 00:12:17,520 --> 00:12:20,800 Speaker 1: is the same. Right, because that quantum computer that pink 259 00:12:20,840 --> 00:12:24,600 Speaker 1: matter between our ears is the same for everybody. You 260 00:12:24,640 --> 00:12:28,480 Speaker 1: already know what you can expect from the computer itself. 261 00:12:28,760 --> 00:12:31,520 Speaker 1: So it's just a matter of understanding the coding on 262 00:12:31,640 --> 00:12:34,480 Speaker 1: top of the computer to be able to understand human behavior. 263 00:12:34,679 --> 00:12:39,000 Speaker 1: So if you're talking to you know, Nigerian and you're 264 00:12:39,040 --> 00:12:43,199 Speaker 1: talking to a Malaysian, to completely different countries, two completely 265 00:12:43,200 --> 00:12:46,080 Speaker 1: different backgrounds, two completely different sets of coding on top 266 00:12:46,120 --> 00:12:49,040 Speaker 1: of a court computer that's the same. You just have 267 00:12:49,120 --> 00:12:52,199 Speaker 1: to understand what is the coding that is Nigerian, what 268 00:12:52,280 --> 00:12:55,480 Speaker 1: is the coding that is Malaysian, and then you can 269 00:12:55,600 --> 00:12:59,120 Speaker 1: half your way through whatever response you can understand their 270 00:12:59,120 --> 00:13:02,520 Speaker 1: behavior is much better. So yeah, it's about understanding how 271 00:13:02,559 --> 00:13:06,360 Speaker 1: the person is behaving. So for example, you know if 272 00:13:06,360 --> 00:13:08,760 Speaker 1: you're sitting across from from your kid, or if you're 273 00:13:08,760 --> 00:13:11,440 Speaker 1: sitting across from someone who's your peer. Just like you 274 00:13:11,480 --> 00:13:14,559 Speaker 1: were saying, like, you know that they are seeing the information. Yes, 275 00:13:14,600 --> 00:13:17,199 Speaker 1: it's undeniable, yes, and you know that it's starting to 276 00:13:17,240 --> 00:13:20,000 Speaker 1: sink in, right, But what happens is when you hit 277 00:13:20,040 --> 00:13:24,000 Speaker 1: that cognitive dissonance, people have a different reaction. Some people 278 00:13:24,040 --> 00:13:29,040 Speaker 1: react to cognitive dissonance by sitting back and listening more. Right, 279 00:13:29,080 --> 00:13:31,160 Speaker 1: You're that kind of person, right, You hear something that's 280 00:13:31,240 --> 00:13:34,760 Speaker 1: new to you, yes, and you're like, yeah, I don't 281 00:13:34,800 --> 00:13:37,160 Speaker 1: agree with it yet, Yes, tell me more, make me 282 00:13:37,200 --> 00:13:39,719 Speaker 1: a believer. But then you buy other people who as 283 00:13:39,720 --> 00:13:43,959 Speaker 1: soon as they hear that new information it creates way. 284 00:13:45,160 --> 00:13:48,880 Speaker 3: Now okay, so, and I'm kind of getting into it, 285 00:13:49,080 --> 00:13:51,920 Speaker 3: rushing into it, but I do want to section things off. 286 00:13:52,000 --> 00:13:53,760 Speaker 3: But for the sake of this, I think it makes 287 00:13:53,800 --> 00:13:59,160 Speaker 3: sense somebody like Putin when you're losing a war, right, 288 00:13:59,720 --> 00:14:02,720 Speaker 3: and not saying he's losing. But I can imagine in 289 00:14:02,960 --> 00:14:06,679 Speaker 3: war people take these poker faces to another level. So 290 00:14:08,000 --> 00:14:10,680 Speaker 3: I don't think you can only go off human behavior 291 00:14:10,760 --> 00:14:13,360 Speaker 3: in that scenario, right do you have to? I mean, 292 00:14:13,400 --> 00:14:16,400 Speaker 3: what other things do you look for? When you deal 293 00:14:16,440 --> 00:14:19,080 Speaker 3: with someone It has so much at stake, and so 294 00:14:19,280 --> 00:14:23,080 Speaker 3: much lying on their understanding. 295 00:14:22,520 --> 00:14:24,760 Speaker 2: And the beliefs that they've been having for so long. 296 00:14:24,840 --> 00:14:28,280 Speaker 3: So the change that belief means to lose everything, Right, 297 00:14:28,360 --> 00:14:29,440 Speaker 3: how do you know that? 298 00:14:29,560 --> 00:14:29,800 Speaker 2: Damn? 299 00:14:29,880 --> 00:14:33,880 Speaker 3: I'm dealing with someone that is circumstantial why they are 300 00:14:33,880 --> 00:14:37,160 Speaker 3: not receiving information or not that they're not receiving information, 301 00:14:37,320 --> 00:14:38,840 Speaker 3: that they're not accepting the information. 302 00:14:38,920 --> 00:14:41,120 Speaker 1: So now what you're talking about is really the heart 303 00:14:41,120 --> 00:14:44,200 Speaker 1: and soul of intelligence, especially when you start talking about 304 00:14:44,560 --> 00:14:49,760 Speaker 1: like an authoritarian leader like Vladimir Proop right, you can't 305 00:14:49,800 --> 00:14:55,360 Speaker 1: just you can't make a high probability prediction using just 306 00:14:55,440 --> 00:14:58,880 Speaker 1: one form of information. So if we're watching footin on 307 00:14:58,920 --> 00:15:02,720 Speaker 1: TV and that's our only form of information, then we're 308 00:15:02,720 --> 00:15:07,640 Speaker 1: not getting a high probability accuracy. That's why propaganda's so dangerous, 309 00:15:07,720 --> 00:15:12,440 Speaker 1: exactly because propaganda intentionally serves the masses only one form 310 00:15:12,480 --> 00:15:14,880 Speaker 1: of information. How often do you see President Biden in 311 00:15:14,920 --> 00:15:16,760 Speaker 1: any other format other than on TV? 312 00:15:17,320 --> 00:15:17,880 Speaker 2: Exactly? 313 00:15:18,120 --> 00:15:21,080 Speaker 1: It's because it's controlled, yes, right. How often do you 314 00:15:21,120 --> 00:15:24,520 Speaker 1: see celebrities in any other format other than when they 315 00:15:24,560 --> 00:15:27,280 Speaker 1: are prepped and ready for the set, the stage, the interview. 316 00:15:27,400 --> 00:15:30,280 Speaker 3: Yes, you don't, especially when you deal with the president. 317 00:15:30,400 --> 00:15:32,280 Speaker 3: You know for a fact, because we're in a world 318 00:15:32,280 --> 00:15:34,760 Speaker 3: where everything A lot of people are more visible on 319 00:15:34,800 --> 00:15:38,120 Speaker 3: social media and you don't see anything outside of that 320 00:15:38,320 --> 00:15:41,200 Speaker 3: suit on at a podium getting off of error yep 321 00:15:41,360 --> 00:15:42,160 Speaker 3: jet or whatever. 322 00:15:42,320 --> 00:15:42,960 Speaker 2: Like that's deep. 323 00:15:43,080 --> 00:15:47,360 Speaker 1: And think about President Trump. People think, people think President 324 00:15:47,400 --> 00:15:48,280 Speaker 1: Trump was so different. 325 00:15:48,600 --> 00:15:51,120 Speaker 2: He is no different exactly. 326 00:15:51,200 --> 00:15:55,320 Speaker 1: Every tweet was cultivated, every message was cultivated. Were they 327 00:15:55,360 --> 00:15:58,160 Speaker 1: cultivated by a team of social media experts. Probably not. 328 00:15:58,480 --> 00:16:01,240 Speaker 1: Some of those tweets were just Trump's firing off. But 329 00:16:01,320 --> 00:16:05,240 Speaker 1: that dude lives a life where he understands to set 330 00:16:05,280 --> 00:16:09,040 Speaker 1: a narrative, yes, and be very consistent with that narrative. 331 00:16:08,720 --> 00:16:12,360 Speaker 3: No matter what. He's also applies to what we're saying. 332 00:16:12,400 --> 00:16:14,560 Speaker 3: When it's like, Yo, I can't come out now and 333 00:16:14,600 --> 00:16:17,240 Speaker 3: say the election was good. I have too much to 334 00:16:17,320 --> 00:16:20,680 Speaker 3: lose to accept the information, even from the FIDS, the government, 335 00:16:20,760 --> 00:16:24,720 Speaker 3: the States, whoever says it, I'm still gonna say, no 336 00:16:24,760 --> 00:16:28,440 Speaker 3: matter what, Yo, they ran off with the election. 337 00:16:28,680 --> 00:16:32,360 Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah, And it's wild because you know, as adults, 338 00:16:32,720 --> 00:16:34,640 Speaker 1: we look at this and we call it unjust, and 339 00:16:34,640 --> 00:16:38,479 Speaker 1: we call it unfair, and we call it, you know, corrupt. 340 00:16:39,080 --> 00:16:41,240 Speaker 1: For anybody who ever played high school sports, I don't 341 00:16:41,240 --> 00:16:43,680 Speaker 1: know if you played high school sports, Yeah, did you 342 00:16:43,720 --> 00:16:46,760 Speaker 1: ever have a basketball, football game, baseball game, whatever sport 343 00:16:46,800 --> 00:16:48,720 Speaker 1: you played. Did you ever have a halftime where you 344 00:16:48,760 --> 00:16:51,720 Speaker 1: were losing? Yes, and the coach pulls you in, And 345 00:16:51,760 --> 00:16:54,240 Speaker 1: what does the coach say, We're going to turn this. 346 00:16:54,240 --> 00:16:55,240 Speaker 2: Around and get together. 347 00:16:55,320 --> 00:16:57,920 Speaker 1: Yes, right, you've got so much more in you. Yes, 348 00:16:58,000 --> 00:17:00,560 Speaker 1: you're going to take it down, dig deep. You know 349 00:17:00,600 --> 00:17:02,520 Speaker 1: what they really should be saying, if they're telling the truth, 350 00:17:03,520 --> 00:17:08,560 Speaker 1: You guys just sucked ass. You got beat down up right. 351 00:17:09,040 --> 00:17:13,199 Speaker 1: But that's not what motivates people. That's not what inspires change, 352 00:17:13,320 --> 00:17:16,280 Speaker 1: that's not what makes people take action. What makes people 353 00:17:16,280 --> 00:17:21,560 Speaker 1: take action is oftentimes a fictional narrative. You have so 354 00:17:21,680 --> 00:17:24,280 Speaker 1: much more in you. I had many a games where 355 00:17:24,280 --> 00:17:26,639 Speaker 1: we were losing and at halftime we were losing, and 356 00:17:26,680 --> 00:17:28,520 Speaker 1: at the end of the game we still lost because 357 00:17:28,560 --> 00:17:31,400 Speaker 1: I didn't have anymore the other team was just superior, 358 00:17:31,520 --> 00:17:32,480 Speaker 1: or because whatever else. 359 00:17:32,560 --> 00:17:32,760 Speaker 2: Right. 360 00:17:33,000 --> 00:17:37,560 Speaker 1: But the coach's job is to create inspiration, even if 361 00:17:37,600 --> 00:17:42,720 Speaker 1: it's fictional. And that's that's the truth between behind human nature. 362 00:17:43,240 --> 00:17:46,399 Speaker 1: We want to believe even if what we believe in 363 00:17:46,480 --> 00:17:51,760 Speaker 1: isn't real. And because of that you see both politicians 364 00:17:51,800 --> 00:17:57,119 Speaker 1: and Hollywood and entertainment, everybody's shaping us with inspirational fiction. 365 00:17:57,960 --> 00:18:01,440 Speaker 1: But then for some people who chase that inspirational fiction, 366 00:18:01,720 --> 00:18:03,880 Speaker 1: they end up making it a reality, and then those 367 00:18:03,920 --> 00:18:06,960 Speaker 1: become the few people that are the role models. The examples, 368 00:18:07,000 --> 00:18:11,520 Speaker 1: the examples of success that the rest of us aspire 369 00:18:11,560 --> 00:18:11,720 Speaker 1: to be. 370 00:18:12,080 --> 00:18:16,239 Speaker 3: Right and speaking of propaganda, right, I'm so glad you 371 00:18:16,280 --> 00:18:19,600 Speaker 3: said that, because you are you come from intelligence, and 372 00:18:20,240 --> 00:18:22,359 Speaker 3: we're gonna get a little bit into hip hop coach. 373 00:18:22,440 --> 00:18:24,880 Speaker 2: I just did an interview with a guy. 374 00:18:24,720 --> 00:18:28,920 Speaker 3: Who did a documentary on a rapper by the name 375 00:18:28,920 --> 00:18:29,520 Speaker 3: of King Vaughn. 376 00:18:29,640 --> 00:18:31,840 Speaker 2: This rapper is deceased RP. King Vaughn. 377 00:18:32,359 --> 00:18:36,680 Speaker 3: He was someone who was involved in what they would 378 00:18:36,720 --> 00:18:39,000 Speaker 3: like to say the life of crime, supposed to be 379 00:18:39,000 --> 00:18:41,720 Speaker 3: a lot of crime. So you have a guy from 380 00:18:41,720 --> 00:18:45,800 Speaker 3: the UK, not from this King Vaughn's from Chicago. And 381 00:18:45,800 --> 00:18:49,639 Speaker 3: if you need if you need anything answered, just ask me. Okay, 382 00:18:49,680 --> 00:18:52,719 Speaker 3: what about ask me? Because I know people that are watching. 383 00:18:53,200 --> 00:18:56,480 Speaker 3: I need this to connect. So King Vaughn was a 384 00:18:56,560 --> 00:19:00,320 Speaker 3: rapper out of Chicago with a very checkered past. Right, 385 00:19:00,359 --> 00:19:03,920 Speaker 3: He's been arrested for murders, acquitted, Certain things have happened, 386 00:19:03,960 --> 00:19:06,399 Speaker 3: He's been acquitted. Now, got a guy that I know 387 00:19:06,560 --> 00:19:09,439 Speaker 3: named tramp Lord Ross out of the UK. I just 388 00:19:09,520 --> 00:19:13,360 Speaker 3: interviewed him and we had a heated debate about me saying, Yo, 389 00:19:14,320 --> 00:19:16,679 Speaker 3: what are you thinking. The reason I say this is 390 00:19:17,280 --> 00:19:20,200 Speaker 3: tramp Lord Ross dropped the documentary and said, King Vaughn 391 00:19:20,400 --> 00:19:24,920 Speaker 3: Raps first serial killer. So he classified him a serial killer. 392 00:19:24,960 --> 00:19:28,040 Speaker 3: And I said, man, where did he get that? The 393 00:19:28,119 --> 00:19:32,440 Speaker 3: dude's never been convicted. The dudes never like, I don't 394 00:19:32,480 --> 00:19:35,480 Speaker 3: know somebody from the UK. Where did he get that from? 395 00:19:35,520 --> 00:19:37,800 Speaker 3: So I talked to him. He said, well, the dude 396 00:19:37,840 --> 00:19:40,399 Speaker 3: rapped about it. The dude always talked about bodies. The 397 00:19:40,480 --> 00:19:43,880 Speaker 3: dude always certain things, he said. And I was like, yo, 398 00:19:44,000 --> 00:19:48,359 Speaker 3: but you called him a serial killer. And I believe 399 00:19:48,440 --> 00:19:51,680 Speaker 3: that he made that decision based on nothing but tweets 400 00:19:52,040 --> 00:19:55,400 Speaker 3: and social media. And you just spoke to why it 401 00:19:55,480 --> 00:19:59,119 Speaker 3: is ill advised to make decisions off one piece of information. 402 00:20:02,359 --> 00:20:03,919 Speaker 3: I just wanted to lay that out because I do 403 00:20:04,000 --> 00:20:06,119 Speaker 3: want my audience to understand that. I want to also 404 00:20:06,200 --> 00:20:09,320 Speaker 3: go back to this because we grew up so different. 405 00:20:10,440 --> 00:20:13,240 Speaker 2: I know you said that you didn't have any choices. 406 00:20:13,280 --> 00:20:16,240 Speaker 3: What kind of kid were you that were you interested 407 00:20:16,359 --> 00:20:18,600 Speaker 3: in the kind of thing that you're doing now as 408 00:20:18,640 --> 00:20:18,920 Speaker 3: a kid. 409 00:20:20,119 --> 00:20:22,280 Speaker 1: That's I think that's a great question. So I was. 410 00:20:22,400 --> 00:20:26,480 Speaker 1: I was a good kid. I grew up. I'm Mexican, 411 00:20:26,840 --> 00:20:29,880 Speaker 1: I'm ambiguously brown, right, and I totally own that right. 412 00:20:30,280 --> 00:20:34,400 Speaker 1: But I am three quarters Mexican and one quarter Navajo Indians. 413 00:20:34,600 --> 00:20:39,840 Speaker 1: That's where this freaking weird Mayan like Indian look comes from. 414 00:20:40,320 --> 00:20:43,639 Speaker 1: But so I grew up in a household where my father, 415 00:20:43,720 --> 00:20:47,159 Speaker 1: who was Indian, was killed in a violent crime, and 416 00:20:47,240 --> 00:20:49,840 Speaker 1: my mother raised me. My mother, my grandmother raised me 417 00:20:49,880 --> 00:20:52,160 Speaker 1: till I was five. So I was very much one 418 00:20:52,160 --> 00:20:59,359 Speaker 1: of those boys that lived in a strong, matriarchal home, right, Mexican, Catholic, 419 00:21:00,040 --> 00:21:04,760 Speaker 1: strict home. And that's those my formative years one through five. 420 00:21:04,800 --> 00:21:07,320 Speaker 1: That's how I was shaped. So when my mom remarried, 421 00:21:07,600 --> 00:21:09,800 Speaker 1: and she remarried a white guy who took us to 422 00:21:09,800 --> 00:21:13,880 Speaker 1: Pennsylvania and built his built his career in Pennsylvania, I 423 00:21:13,920 --> 00:21:16,480 Speaker 1: always was like at the right hand side of my mom. 424 00:21:17,080 --> 00:21:20,000 Speaker 1: That's that was my protector, that was my lion ass, 425 00:21:20,080 --> 00:21:22,119 Speaker 1: that was my you know, she was the one that 426 00:21:22,160 --> 00:21:27,040 Speaker 1: directed so to let mom down, to go contrary to 427 00:21:27,119 --> 00:21:29,280 Speaker 1: mom's expectations. It was not going to. 428 00:21:29,280 --> 00:21:31,360 Speaker 2: Ask heavy And it was scary, yes. 429 00:21:31,240 --> 00:21:33,240 Speaker 1: Right, because Mom didn't Mom didn't come and have a 430 00:21:33,320 --> 00:21:36,080 Speaker 1: nice encouraging conversation with you like the coach did. Mom 431 00:21:36,119 --> 00:21:39,000 Speaker 1: came at you hard and fast, and you know, your 432 00:21:39,080 --> 00:21:41,520 Speaker 1: father was killed. I can't let that happen to you. 433 00:21:41,640 --> 00:21:43,399 Speaker 1: My one job is to keep you alive and make 434 00:21:43,440 --> 00:21:45,280 Speaker 1: sure you make better decisions than he did. 435 00:21:45,640 --> 00:21:48,760 Speaker 3: That's heavy shit, right, And I was thinking, like moms 436 00:21:48,840 --> 00:21:53,360 Speaker 3: are usually coming based on, like you said, their experiences, 437 00:21:53,400 --> 00:21:56,760 Speaker 3: their algorithm. Yo, Well, I've got to this place. I'm 438 00:21:56,800 --> 00:21:58,720 Speaker 3: trying to give you a head start, and this is 439 00:21:58,760 --> 00:22:00,960 Speaker 3: my version of your head start. 440 00:22:01,480 --> 00:22:01,760 Speaker 2: Right. 441 00:22:01,800 --> 00:22:05,960 Speaker 3: And as the world changes, you know, even someone like me. 442 00:22:06,160 --> 00:22:09,240 Speaker 3: To get out of poverty, I had to go contrary 443 00:22:09,280 --> 00:22:13,080 Speaker 3: to mom. And that was rough because Mom don't see this. 444 00:22:13,280 --> 00:22:15,760 Speaker 3: Mom didn't see this being what this is. There's no 445 00:22:15,880 --> 00:22:19,040 Speaker 3: way Mom said, go get a job, go work twenty 446 00:22:19,119 --> 00:22:21,480 Speaker 3: thirty years, right, but continue. 447 00:22:21,680 --> 00:22:24,359 Speaker 1: So I followed mom's guidance, right. That's the kind of 448 00:22:24,440 --> 00:22:27,200 Speaker 1: kid I was. Do what mom says because I didn't 449 00:22:27,240 --> 00:22:30,400 Speaker 1: really let any other information in. So I went and 450 00:22:30,960 --> 00:22:32,600 Speaker 1: I studied in high school. And when I was in 451 00:22:32,680 --> 00:22:35,359 Speaker 1: high school, I turned my grades around really fast and 452 00:22:35,400 --> 00:22:38,600 Speaker 1: really young, because I saw that I could. My mom 453 00:22:38,640 --> 00:22:42,000 Speaker 1: showed me that authority did not belong with the school, right, 454 00:22:42,040 --> 00:22:44,919 Speaker 1: that the teachers, the principles, the guidance counselors were just 455 00:22:45,000 --> 00:22:49,000 Speaker 1: people flawed, They had their own coding. They were weaker 456 00:22:49,000 --> 00:22:51,680 Speaker 1: than my mom, and I was the offspring of my mom, 457 00:22:52,080 --> 00:22:54,920 Speaker 1: so I was probably stronger than this in the school too. Yes, yes, 458 00:22:55,240 --> 00:22:58,159 Speaker 1: So once that kind of changed my mindset, everything was 459 00:22:58,200 --> 00:23:00,920 Speaker 1: about make mom proud, make mom proud, and nick mom proud. 460 00:23:01,119 --> 00:23:02,800 Speaker 1: So that's why I went to college, and that's why 461 00:23:02,840 --> 00:23:04,440 Speaker 1: I chose my college. I went to the Air Force 462 00:23:04,440 --> 00:23:07,200 Speaker 1: Academy I got I became an officer in the military. 463 00:23:07,240 --> 00:23:09,280 Speaker 1: I became a pilot, I became a nuclear missiles. So 464 00:23:09,440 --> 00:23:13,240 Speaker 1: you was always into straight laced man straight laced until 465 00:23:13,600 --> 00:23:15,560 Speaker 1: two thousand and seven when I was at CIA, and 466 00:23:15,600 --> 00:23:19,560 Speaker 1: then CIA put me through their training school. And when 467 00:23:19,600 --> 00:23:24,000 Speaker 1: I went through their training school, they absolutely crushed the 468 00:23:24,040 --> 00:23:28,240 Speaker 1: worldview that I had had and gave me a truly 469 00:23:28,320 --> 00:23:31,959 Speaker 1: transparent view on the world. And that was when I 470 00:23:32,000 --> 00:23:35,560 Speaker 1: realized all of mom's flaws, and that's when I started 471 00:23:35,560 --> 00:23:38,560 Speaker 1: making decisions that just didn't cooperate with them. So for 472 00:23:38,720 --> 00:23:41,760 Speaker 1: my mom, how challenging was that she had this little 473 00:23:41,760 --> 00:23:43,720 Speaker 1: boy who listened to her until she was like fifty 474 00:23:43,800 --> 00:23:46,280 Speaker 1: years old, and then I was like, I'm gonna go 475 00:23:46,320 --> 00:23:47,080 Speaker 1: do my own thing now. 476 00:23:47,240 --> 00:23:49,399 Speaker 2: So it's rough. It's rough. 477 00:23:49,440 --> 00:23:52,160 Speaker 1: So now I'm an entrepreneur. Now I'm an internet you know, 478 00:23:52,240 --> 00:23:54,640 Speaker 1: and internet voice. I don't know if I'm a safe. 479 00:23:54,640 --> 00:23:59,040 Speaker 2: Yeah, we're giving you that. Listen. It's so important that 480 00:23:59,200 --> 00:24:00,680 Speaker 2: you'll experience, is man. 481 00:24:00,840 --> 00:24:03,840 Speaker 3: Your experience has calls for you to be able to 482 00:24:03,880 --> 00:24:06,679 Speaker 3: explain things in a very unique way. You know, like 483 00:24:06,720 --> 00:24:09,280 Speaker 3: you said, you have now what's called I would consider 484 00:24:09,320 --> 00:24:13,320 Speaker 3: a world view which draws people like me and people 485 00:24:13,440 --> 00:24:17,600 Speaker 3: like all of the countless amazing big platforms you've been on, Like, 486 00:24:17,800 --> 00:24:19,960 Speaker 3: was so interested in Yo, what do you think about this? 487 00:24:20,600 --> 00:24:21,320 Speaker 2: Right? Because you do? 488 00:24:21,560 --> 00:24:24,560 Speaker 3: They did drag you through that school of like, no, 489 00:24:24,720 --> 00:24:27,199 Speaker 3: we're gonna do you like this? Now, help me understand 490 00:24:27,280 --> 00:24:29,239 Speaker 3: some of the things they crushed. What was something that 491 00:24:29,320 --> 00:24:32,760 Speaker 3: was disappointing or something that they crushed for you? 492 00:24:32,800 --> 00:24:34,640 Speaker 2: Because that's so heavy. 493 00:24:34,440 --> 00:24:36,199 Speaker 1: Yeah, dude, So I'm going to start you off with 494 00:24:36,240 --> 00:24:36,960 Speaker 1: the heaviest one. 495 00:24:37,160 --> 00:24:37,360 Speaker 2: Right. 496 00:24:37,920 --> 00:24:44,760 Speaker 1: There is a connection, an empirical, scientific connection between high 497 00:24:44,760 --> 00:24:50,320 Speaker 1: performing people, high achieving people, professional athletes, you know, professional entertainers, 498 00:24:50,800 --> 00:24:55,760 Speaker 1: anybody who's made it right. The grit and the courage 499 00:24:55,880 --> 00:24:58,240 Speaker 1: and the hard work and the discipline and the practice 500 00:24:58,240 --> 00:25:00,600 Speaker 1: that it takes for us to get there. There's a 501 00:25:00,640 --> 00:25:04,840 Speaker 1: strong connection between that and childhood trauma. Wow, which means 502 00:25:05,200 --> 00:25:07,760 Speaker 1: that if you have not been traumatized as a child, 503 00:25:07,800 --> 00:25:11,040 Speaker 1: may you may never taste success. 504 00:25:12,040 --> 00:25:12,600 Speaker 2: Wow. 505 00:25:12,680 --> 00:25:16,080 Speaker 1: And the success that people like you and I and 506 00:25:16,440 --> 00:25:18,399 Speaker 1: other entertainers that you're friends with and some of the 507 00:25:18,440 --> 00:25:21,520 Speaker 1: biggest names that we've all heard before. The reason that 508 00:25:21,560 --> 00:25:25,040 Speaker 1: they have the success they have was because is. 509 00:25:24,920 --> 00:25:25,920 Speaker 2: It that crazy? 510 00:25:26,200 --> 00:25:29,199 Speaker 3: And I believe that because I come from trauma, and 511 00:25:29,280 --> 00:25:32,400 Speaker 3: you would just explain in trauma right, it's like, yo, 512 00:25:32,680 --> 00:25:34,919 Speaker 3: we come from things man and so heavy. 513 00:25:35,240 --> 00:25:38,560 Speaker 1: But and we grow up thinking, Man, I know because 514 00:25:38,560 --> 00:25:40,760 Speaker 1: I've gone to bed at night as an adult wishing 515 00:25:40,800 --> 00:25:43,760 Speaker 1: that never happened. But to wish that that never happened 516 00:25:43,760 --> 00:25:45,400 Speaker 1: would be to also wish. 517 00:25:45,320 --> 00:25:47,800 Speaker 2: Take that ingredient out that makes the cake what the 518 00:25:47,840 --> 00:25:51,200 Speaker 2: cake is exactly right? Wow, that is so crazy. 519 00:25:51,400 --> 00:25:54,879 Speaker 1: So they teach us at CIA, hey, you're all fucked 520 00:25:54,920 --> 00:25:58,399 Speaker 1: up and we like you that way, and you're better 521 00:25:58,440 --> 00:26:01,840 Speaker 1: for it. So don't fight it, don't criticize yourself for it, 522 00:26:01,880 --> 00:26:06,000 Speaker 1: don't judge yourself for it. Just own it and shape 523 00:26:06,040 --> 00:26:06,760 Speaker 1: it right. 524 00:26:06,800 --> 00:26:09,840 Speaker 3: And that's the most important part. And I think that 525 00:26:10,160 --> 00:26:14,440 Speaker 3: we in my culture forget to shape it. We learn 526 00:26:14,520 --> 00:26:17,320 Speaker 3: how to deal with it, but deal will Dealing with 527 00:26:17,400 --> 00:26:20,040 Speaker 3: it ain't enough. You must learn how to shape it. 528 00:26:20,440 --> 00:26:23,679 Speaker 3: Take what happened to you and make it, make it 529 00:26:23,680 --> 00:26:27,119 Speaker 3: a benefit for you. That that's so crazy. Tell me 530 00:26:27,920 --> 00:26:30,080 Speaker 3: have you ever been busted out? 531 00:26:30,119 --> 00:26:30,439 Speaker 2: Like so? 532 00:26:31,720 --> 00:26:34,240 Speaker 3: Give me the different facets of the CIA in regards 533 00:26:34,280 --> 00:26:36,720 Speaker 3: to were you someone that put the masks on, put 534 00:26:36,760 --> 00:26:39,639 Speaker 3: the you know how, what level were you own? And 535 00:26:39,680 --> 00:26:42,359 Speaker 3: also explain the other levels even if you were not 536 00:26:42,440 --> 00:26:44,399 Speaker 3: owned them, because I just want to understand the branches. 537 00:26:44,480 --> 00:26:47,440 Speaker 1: Yeah, absolutely so. CIA is a big complicated machine in 538 00:26:47,480 --> 00:26:49,280 Speaker 1: a lot of ways, but it really boils down to, 539 00:26:49,680 --> 00:26:52,919 Speaker 1: you know, a handful of different disciplines. There's technical officers, 540 00:26:53,040 --> 00:26:55,840 Speaker 1: and those are all the people that do, uh they 541 00:26:55,880 --> 00:26:59,240 Speaker 1: create the listening devices and they hack in the computers 542 00:26:59,280 --> 00:27:02,280 Speaker 1: and they do everything technical. And then you've got the analysts. 543 00:27:02,640 --> 00:27:05,840 Speaker 1: And your analysts are individuals who take all different types 544 00:27:05,880 --> 00:27:11,280 Speaker 1: of information newspapers, radio clippings, special reports that come in 545 00:27:11,320 --> 00:27:14,800 Speaker 1: from other intelligence services whatever. But then they read, they 546 00:27:14,840 --> 00:27:18,720 Speaker 1: synthesize the information, and they create a conclusion. Right, Those 547 00:27:18,760 --> 00:27:21,680 Speaker 1: are your analysts, and then you have your field officers. 548 00:27:22,040 --> 00:27:24,760 Speaker 1: Field officers are the ones who live and work undercover. 549 00:27:25,000 --> 00:27:28,080 Speaker 1: They're the ones that put on disguises, whether that disguisees 550 00:27:28,080 --> 00:27:30,600 Speaker 1: fake skin or whether that disguises a fat suit. They're 551 00:27:30,640 --> 00:27:33,120 Speaker 1: the ones that go out in the field and sometimes 552 00:27:33,160 --> 00:27:35,880 Speaker 1: they're shooting at bad guys and sometimes they're you know, 553 00:27:35,960 --> 00:27:41,880 Speaker 1: swimming underwater and sneaking up on a roadblock, and other 554 00:27:41,920 --> 00:27:44,760 Speaker 1: times they're meeting in a fancy suit in a nice 555 00:27:44,760 --> 00:27:48,280 Speaker 1: restaurant or tending to be somebody they're not. I came 556 00:27:48,320 --> 00:27:49,520 Speaker 1: from the field officer. 557 00:27:49,240 --> 00:27:52,520 Speaker 3: World, which is the world you just explained, right, Wow, 558 00:27:52,600 --> 00:27:53,360 Speaker 3: I came from the world. 559 00:27:53,480 --> 00:27:54,919 Speaker 2: We got a lot to talk about. 560 00:27:54,880 --> 00:27:58,920 Speaker 1: Disguise and human interaction and sneaking up and faking people out, right. 561 00:27:59,280 --> 00:28:01,880 Speaker 1: But to get there for that, for that one discipline 562 00:28:01,920 --> 00:28:04,400 Speaker 1: to work, you need the other disciplines. You need technical 563 00:28:04,400 --> 00:28:06,160 Speaker 1: officers because they're the ones that give you the listening 564 00:28:06,200 --> 00:28:08,600 Speaker 1: devices that you can plant on other people. You need 565 00:28:08,640 --> 00:28:11,080 Speaker 1: analysts because analysts are the people who tell you who's 566 00:28:11,119 --> 00:28:12,439 Speaker 1: worth talking to and who's not. 567 00:28:12,960 --> 00:28:13,640 Speaker 2: Team work. 568 00:28:14,359 --> 00:28:16,080 Speaker 1: It's not like it is in the movies where James 569 00:28:16,080 --> 00:28:19,280 Speaker 1: Bond goes out there buying take Yeah, he can't. It's 570 00:28:19,400 --> 00:28:22,040 Speaker 1: James bond with like fifty people behind him. 571 00:28:22,200 --> 00:28:24,760 Speaker 3: Well, I think sometimes with those movies they did make 572 00:28:24,840 --> 00:28:27,879 Speaker 3: them kind of phone into the big screen where people 573 00:28:28,040 --> 00:28:30,520 Speaker 3: in there, you know, like it's faking, like it's a 574 00:28:30,640 --> 00:28:33,159 Speaker 3: thousand screens, you know. So I think they tried to 575 00:28:33,200 --> 00:28:36,280 Speaker 3: give a little bit of team, but it was overly 576 00:28:36,320 --> 00:28:38,840 Speaker 3: exaggerated that a one man on me in such a 577 00:28:38,880 --> 00:28:40,920 Speaker 3: complex situation like. 578 00:28:42,520 --> 00:28:43,800 Speaker 2: Okay, field officer. 579 00:28:44,160 --> 00:28:46,480 Speaker 3: Where you do you know of any stories of people 580 00:28:46,520 --> 00:28:50,000 Speaker 3: being caught in the act of all the time this 581 00:28:50,160 --> 00:28:51,160 Speaker 3: dude's an operative. 582 00:28:51,360 --> 00:28:53,400 Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean it happens more often than you think. 583 00:28:53,440 --> 00:28:56,360 Speaker 1: It almost happened to me, and one I'm in the 584 00:28:56,400 --> 00:28:59,880 Speaker 1: process right now of getting CIA approval to talk about 585 00:29:00,120 --> 00:29:03,800 Speaker 1: my personal background. We sign a lifetime secrecy agreement, which 586 00:29:03,840 --> 00:29:06,640 Speaker 1: means that for the rest of our life we can't 587 00:29:06,680 --> 00:29:10,360 Speaker 1: talk about certain things without getting their approval first. Cool, 588 00:29:10,480 --> 00:29:13,080 Speaker 1: and one of the things I'm trying to get permission 589 00:29:13,240 --> 00:29:16,000 Speaker 1: from them to do is talk about my own operational history. 590 00:29:16,520 --> 00:29:19,120 Speaker 1: I think a lot of people infer or assume some 591 00:29:19,160 --> 00:29:20,880 Speaker 1: of my background based off of what I talk about 592 00:29:20,920 --> 00:29:23,000 Speaker 1: and what I know about, and that's safe. 593 00:29:23,080 --> 00:29:25,800 Speaker 2: So you can't say where you none to. 594 00:29:25,800 --> 00:29:28,160 Speaker 1: Day, I can say I was in Asia, right, I 595 00:29:28,200 --> 00:29:29,480 Speaker 1: can say that I served undercover. 596 00:29:29,560 --> 00:29:32,320 Speaker 3: I can say that I so okay, so we get 597 00:29:32,360 --> 00:29:34,720 Speaker 3: it's context. It got to be contexts and people just 598 00:29:34,760 --> 00:29:35,840 Speaker 3: do what they what they make. 599 00:29:35,960 --> 00:29:38,400 Speaker 1: Yeah, yea for now. But I know where I want 600 00:29:38,440 --> 00:29:42,960 Speaker 1: to go because I am trying to build a brand, right, 601 00:29:43,040 --> 00:29:45,560 Speaker 1: my company every day Spy and me myself, my name, 602 00:29:46,160 --> 00:29:52,280 Speaker 1: or trying to represent a brand that represents truth, transparency, honesty, yes, right, 603 00:29:52,520 --> 00:29:56,160 Speaker 1: and that goes completely contrary to everything that CIA values. 604 00:29:56,720 --> 00:30:01,080 Speaker 1: They value secrecy, they value discretion, right. So it's a 605 00:30:01,160 --> 00:30:04,560 Speaker 1: challenge because I'm trying to build something where my background 606 00:30:04,880 --> 00:30:09,200 Speaker 1: has a policy, an official policy against transparency analysis. 607 00:30:08,960 --> 00:30:10,920 Speaker 2: Right, And that's crazy. So how hard is it to 608 00:30:10,920 --> 00:30:15,160 Speaker 2: build that? I mean, what made you? What's making you 609 00:30:15,200 --> 00:30:15,560 Speaker 2: do that? 610 00:30:16,040 --> 00:30:18,959 Speaker 1: So it's a personal mission for me. And that personal 611 00:30:18,960 --> 00:30:23,640 Speaker 1: mission became because the second big AHA moment for me 612 00:30:23,720 --> 00:30:27,120 Speaker 1: happened when I left CIA. So the first Aha moment 613 00:30:27,160 --> 00:30:29,360 Speaker 1: was when I was at CIA and they explained to me, hey, 614 00:30:29,480 --> 00:30:32,160 Speaker 1: childhood trauma made you who you are. You have to 615 00:30:32,200 --> 00:30:36,240 Speaker 1: accept that and shape it. That was just absolutely inspiring. 616 00:30:36,720 --> 00:30:39,840 Speaker 1: And then in twenty fourteen when I left CIA, and 617 00:30:39,880 --> 00:30:41,880 Speaker 1: I left CIA for reasons I'm sure we can talk 618 00:30:41,880 --> 00:30:45,040 Speaker 1: about whenever. But when I left CIA, it was the 619 00:30:45,080 --> 00:30:48,360 Speaker 1: first time that I stepped out from under the umbrella, 620 00:30:49,080 --> 00:30:52,680 Speaker 1: and that changed my perspective again. And when I saw 621 00:30:53,280 --> 00:30:57,760 Speaker 1: what CIA did to its own officers, I realized that 622 00:30:57,920 --> 00:31:01,520 Speaker 1: CIA taught us how to manipulate people and how to 623 00:31:01,680 --> 00:31:04,160 Speaker 1: make people do what we wanted them to do without 624 00:31:04,200 --> 00:31:07,600 Speaker 1: even realizing it. And then when I stepped out, I 625 00:31:07,640 --> 00:31:10,920 Speaker 1: realized that CIA was doing the same thing to. 626 00:31:10,960 --> 00:31:14,600 Speaker 3: Us, mating y'all do yes, yeah, that makes sense because 627 00:31:14,600 --> 00:31:16,080 Speaker 3: that's the business model. 628 00:31:16,120 --> 00:31:18,640 Speaker 1: That's the business model, that's the hierarchy, but you don't 629 00:31:18,640 --> 00:31:21,240 Speaker 1: even realize it. So somehow it was a really hard 630 00:31:21,280 --> 00:31:23,240 Speaker 1: decision to get out of CIA, because I felt like 631 00:31:23,240 --> 00:31:25,720 Speaker 1: I'm letting my country down and I'm disappointing my peers. 632 00:31:25,720 --> 00:31:27,840 Speaker 1: And I went through all this training and like, I 633 00:31:27,840 --> 00:31:31,280 Speaker 1: feel a moral obligation to continue serving. But when I left, 634 00:31:31,280 --> 00:31:33,320 Speaker 1: I left for family reasons. I wanted to take care 635 00:31:33,320 --> 00:31:35,040 Speaker 1: of a family, I wanted to raise my children. I 636 00:31:35,040 --> 00:31:37,000 Speaker 1: didn't want to be the absentee dad that my father 637 00:31:37,080 --> 00:31:39,080 Speaker 1: never got the chance to be for me. Yes, right, 638 00:31:39,480 --> 00:31:43,520 Speaker 1: But stepping away, I realized, oh shit, all of my guilt, shame, 639 00:31:43,920 --> 00:31:45,760 Speaker 1: all those feelings that made me feel like I was 640 00:31:45,800 --> 00:31:49,320 Speaker 1: abandoning Cia. That was all just part of the worldview 641 00:31:49,320 --> 00:31:52,440 Speaker 1: that they had programmed into me to get me to 642 00:31:52,800 --> 00:31:56,160 Speaker 1: say yes to dangerous missions, put my life at risk 643 00:31:56,440 --> 00:31:58,760 Speaker 1: and potentially leave my wife and my children without dad. 644 00:31:59,200 --> 00:32:02,600 Speaker 2: And that's what I'm saying. Man, Wow, that is so deep. 645 00:32:04,040 --> 00:32:06,720 Speaker 3: What are some of the tactics that they use to 646 00:32:07,040 --> 00:32:10,960 Speaker 3: manipulate people or teach you like manipulation? Let's talk about 647 00:32:10,960 --> 00:32:11,560 Speaker 3: that a little bit. 648 00:32:11,720 --> 00:32:16,640 Speaker 1: Absolutely. So, the first and largest tool that we're given, 649 00:32:16,680 --> 00:32:18,920 Speaker 1: the system that we're given to really hack into human 650 00:32:18,960 --> 00:32:23,320 Speaker 1: brains and understand how to control the way someone else thinks, 651 00:32:23,640 --> 00:32:27,640 Speaker 1: is to understand their four core motivations. All human beings, 652 00:32:27,960 --> 00:32:31,440 Speaker 1: all education levels, all races, all ethnicities, all ages have 653 00:32:31,560 --> 00:32:34,600 Speaker 1: four core motivations. And the acronym that we use for 654 00:32:34,600 --> 00:32:38,680 Speaker 1: that is called RICE, R, I, C, E, RICE, and 655 00:32:38,760 --> 00:32:42,479 Speaker 1: the letters each have a meaning, and the R stands 656 00:32:42,480 --> 00:32:47,680 Speaker 1: for rewards, the I stands for ideology, the C stands 657 00:32:47,720 --> 00:32:51,720 Speaker 1: for coercion, and the E stands for ego. So all 658 00:32:51,760 --> 00:32:55,640 Speaker 1: human beings are motivated by a mix of these four 659 00:32:55,760 --> 00:32:59,800 Speaker 1: primary motivations. So if you want to control someone else's behavior, 660 00:33:00,040 --> 00:33:03,440 Speaker 1: want to manipulate someone, or if you want to motivate someone, 661 00:33:03,720 --> 00:33:05,719 Speaker 1: So your high school coach was doing this just as 662 00:33:05,760 --> 00:33:08,480 Speaker 1: much the abusive girlfriend or boyfriend that you have. Right, 663 00:33:08,840 --> 00:33:12,800 Speaker 1: they mix these four things together. They'll offer you rewards. 664 00:33:12,840 --> 00:33:15,880 Speaker 1: Maybe that's we'll give you a a bonus at the 665 00:33:15,960 --> 00:33:17,800 Speaker 1: end of the year, I'll pay you a little extra, 666 00:33:18,080 --> 00:33:20,160 Speaker 1: I'll pay you at all, right, Or you can win 667 00:33:20,200 --> 00:33:22,160 Speaker 1: a prize if you give me your phone number, or 668 00:33:22,200 --> 00:33:24,800 Speaker 1: if you sign your mom up and for this free 669 00:33:24,840 --> 00:33:27,480 Speaker 1: cruise and just give her give us her address and 670 00:33:27,480 --> 00:33:30,520 Speaker 1: her phone number and her whatever without her consent. Right, 671 00:33:30,560 --> 00:33:34,520 Speaker 1: those are all types of manipulating people for reward. Ideology 672 00:33:34,560 --> 00:33:36,560 Speaker 1: is a really strong one and a really obvious one. 673 00:33:36,600 --> 00:33:39,600 Speaker 1: This is where you have people who become super ideological 674 00:33:39,640 --> 00:33:44,120 Speaker 1: about their religion. They become ideological about family values, they 675 00:33:44,120 --> 00:33:48,840 Speaker 1: become nationalistic right America first, who raw everybody else? Second? 676 00:33:48,880 --> 00:33:51,760 Speaker 1: Kind of thing. It's where you see people become hardcore 677 00:33:52,560 --> 00:33:57,240 Speaker 1: Broncos fans or hardcore Chargers fans. That's ideology. 678 00:33:57,320 --> 00:33:57,520 Speaker 2: Right. 679 00:33:57,640 --> 00:33:59,920 Speaker 1: Then You've got to see see as COERSI and coer 680 00:34:00,320 --> 00:34:05,400 Speaker 1: is all the stuff that is like shame, guilt, violence, 681 00:34:05,520 --> 00:34:09,880 Speaker 1: when you threaten someone. That's coercion. Coercion is a tool 682 00:34:10,000 --> 00:34:13,320 Speaker 1: that works, but it's actually the weakest and most dangerous 683 00:34:13,360 --> 00:34:16,520 Speaker 1: tool to use because once you use it and you're 684 00:34:16,560 --> 00:34:18,840 Speaker 1: caught using it, you can never use it again. 685 00:34:18,920 --> 00:34:23,640 Speaker 3: It ruins and also it ruins it almost it almost 686 00:34:23,680 --> 00:34:28,440 Speaker 3: transcend that category and ruins like your reputation in other things, 687 00:34:28,440 --> 00:34:31,399 Speaker 3: because people start to look at you now like caught 688 00:34:31,480 --> 00:34:32,040 Speaker 3: you lyne. 689 00:34:32,160 --> 00:34:34,319 Speaker 1: Yes, I can't trust that guy, right, everything I give 690 00:34:34,360 --> 00:34:36,439 Speaker 1: him it uses against it. And then the last one 691 00:34:36,480 --> 00:34:39,400 Speaker 1: is ego. E is ego, and ego is often the 692 00:34:39,400 --> 00:34:42,200 Speaker 1: one that's the most mistaken. Ego does not mean that 693 00:34:42,320 --> 00:34:45,520 Speaker 1: someone is egotistical. Egotistical means you think you're better than 694 00:34:45,520 --> 00:34:48,920 Speaker 1: everybody else. That's not the same thing as ego. Ego 695 00:34:49,120 --> 00:34:53,080 Speaker 1: is you trying to shape the way that other people 696 00:34:53,120 --> 00:34:56,279 Speaker 1: see you. So, if you want people to see you 697 00:34:56,320 --> 00:35:00,000 Speaker 1: as sacrificial in giving, that's your ego. You want people 698 00:35:00,080 --> 00:35:02,040 Speaker 1: to see you as powerful and bold, that's your ego. 699 00:35:02,080 --> 00:35:05,560 Speaker 1: If you want people to see you as studious and intelligent, 700 00:35:05,680 --> 00:35:06,279 Speaker 1: that's your ego. 701 00:35:06,440 --> 00:35:09,680 Speaker 3: So so say we have a rapper like that has 702 00:35:09,719 --> 00:35:12,640 Speaker 3: a bunch of money, and people say, well, he doesn't 703 00:35:12,680 --> 00:35:16,400 Speaker 3: win your or he always dresses down is could that 704 00:35:16,560 --> 00:35:19,760 Speaker 3: be his personality or is that his ego that's trying 705 00:35:19,760 --> 00:35:22,760 Speaker 3: to be like I'm unphased by the money. That money 706 00:35:22,760 --> 00:35:25,640 Speaker 3: stuff means nothing to me, Like which one is there? 707 00:35:25,800 --> 00:35:28,320 Speaker 1: So you could? I mean, by just looking at the person, 708 00:35:28,719 --> 00:35:32,520 Speaker 1: you're giving yourself only one information stream, so you make 709 00:35:32,560 --> 00:35:36,520 Speaker 1: a low probability assesses. But as you as you spend 710 00:35:36,560 --> 00:35:38,280 Speaker 1: time with that person, as you talk to that person, 711 00:35:38,320 --> 00:35:40,920 Speaker 1: as you learn about that person, read a biography written 712 00:35:40,960 --> 00:35:43,560 Speaker 1: about them by somebody else, you might learn that there's 713 00:35:43,600 --> 00:35:46,719 Speaker 1: some ideological reason. And maybe when they were growing up, 714 00:35:46,840 --> 00:35:50,160 Speaker 1: their mom or dad taught them that showing off your 715 00:35:50,200 --> 00:35:53,880 Speaker 1: money makes you weak or poor, you know, poor of 716 00:35:53,960 --> 00:35:55,799 Speaker 1: spirit or poor of soul. Who knows what. Maybe they're 717 00:35:55,800 --> 00:35:59,000 Speaker 1: super religious, you don't know, or yeah, or it could 718 00:35:59,000 --> 00:36:01,839 Speaker 1: be that they're just used good operational security and they 719 00:36:01,960 --> 00:36:03,680 Speaker 1: want to walk down the street without the whole world 720 00:36:03,719 --> 00:36:06,959 Speaker 1: thinking that they're wealthy. Yes, I've got one of the 721 00:36:07,000 --> 00:36:09,480 Speaker 1: primary client sets that I serve are ultra high net 722 00:36:09,560 --> 00:36:14,640 Speaker 1: worth professional athletes, professional entertainers, business executives, and they hire 723 00:36:14,640 --> 00:36:16,240 Speaker 1: me to come in and consult with them on anything 724 00:36:16,280 --> 00:36:19,640 Speaker 1: from business to personal security, to securing their family or 725 00:36:19,640 --> 00:36:22,640 Speaker 1: their home or their property. And one of the first 726 00:36:22,719 --> 00:36:25,600 Speaker 1: questions that they always have is, you know, am I 727 00:36:25,640 --> 00:36:28,439 Speaker 1: a target? And you can look at somebody right away 728 00:36:28,480 --> 00:36:31,520 Speaker 1: and say yes, you would be a target, because the 729 00:36:31,600 --> 00:36:35,160 Speaker 1: bad guys out there look at you and me differently 730 00:36:35,320 --> 00:36:36,759 Speaker 1: than you and I look at each other like we 731 00:36:36,800 --> 00:36:38,960 Speaker 1: look at each other's face to face. I look at 732 00:36:39,000 --> 00:36:41,759 Speaker 1: your eyes. I look at your face, and then I noticed, oh, 733 00:36:41,760 --> 00:36:43,440 Speaker 1: you've got a cool necklace. And then I notice I 734 00:36:43,480 --> 00:36:46,160 Speaker 1: like your watch. Bad guys they don't look at your face. 735 00:36:46,520 --> 00:36:48,960 Speaker 1: They look at your wrist, and then once they see 736 00:36:49,000 --> 00:36:51,080 Speaker 1: the risk, they look up what else does this guy have? 737 00:36:51,239 --> 00:36:53,399 Speaker 1: And then finally they look at your face and they 738 00:36:53,400 --> 00:36:55,680 Speaker 1: decide whether or not you're you're the right mark for them. 739 00:36:55,840 --> 00:36:57,760 Speaker 2: Right man, this is so much. 740 00:36:58,000 --> 00:37:00,719 Speaker 3: And I also want to talk about go back a 741 00:37:00,719 --> 00:37:03,799 Speaker 3: little bit, because you were speaking about the coheresion, you know, 742 00:37:04,960 --> 00:37:08,960 Speaker 3: coming up in the inner city, in the drug game. 743 00:37:09,320 --> 00:37:13,040 Speaker 2: I always said to myself, these dudes, now that I'm old, 744 00:37:13,120 --> 00:37:15,839 Speaker 2: I look back and say, well, damn, they were manipulating 745 00:37:15,920 --> 00:37:16,640 Speaker 2: us as kids. 746 00:37:17,160 --> 00:37:20,759 Speaker 3: Right, So the older guys in the neighborhood would take 747 00:37:20,800 --> 00:37:23,400 Speaker 3: a stance and this is people still don't notice this 748 00:37:23,600 --> 00:37:25,520 Speaker 3: operating in that world right now. 749 00:37:25,560 --> 00:37:28,960 Speaker 2: So this is important for y'all because I always. 750 00:37:28,600 --> 00:37:32,000 Speaker 3: Preach getting out of whatever circumstances you were placed in. 751 00:37:32,160 --> 00:37:35,560 Speaker 3: I understand being placed there, but I don't understand stand 752 00:37:35,640 --> 00:37:40,440 Speaker 3: now you know. But the older guys in the neighborhood 753 00:37:40,800 --> 00:37:45,400 Speaker 3: trick they would run. They would position themselves as big 754 00:37:45,480 --> 00:37:49,960 Speaker 3: homie like, which is over everybody in the neighborhood, maybe 755 00:37:49,960 --> 00:37:53,440 Speaker 3: because they got access to things to Again, everybody's fighting 756 00:37:53,440 --> 00:37:58,759 Speaker 3: for financial game. It's financial hardship. They would say, yo, 757 00:37:58,840 --> 00:38:01,759 Speaker 3: little homie, you don't even sell drugs. You don't know 758 00:38:01,880 --> 00:38:04,279 Speaker 3: nothing about drugs. A lot of people just how to 759 00:38:04,400 --> 00:38:07,319 Speaker 3: introduce to drugs by someone older that has a lot 760 00:38:07,360 --> 00:38:09,799 Speaker 3: of drugs, It says, little home I'm looking out for 761 00:38:09,840 --> 00:38:12,160 Speaker 3: you'll want to put some in your pocket. You don't 762 00:38:12,160 --> 00:38:14,399 Speaker 3: want to get you up and rolling and hand them 763 00:38:14,400 --> 00:38:16,799 Speaker 3: some drugs to work for them. Now, I used to 764 00:38:16,840 --> 00:38:19,919 Speaker 3: take that as a young man, as man the boy 765 00:38:20,000 --> 00:38:23,839 Speaker 3: showing me love. As I got old, I said, no, 766 00:38:24,000 --> 00:38:26,799 Speaker 3: they need help getting that stuff off. So this is 767 00:38:26,920 --> 00:38:29,920 Speaker 3: business for them. This is not love. This is them saying, yo, 768 00:38:31,200 --> 00:38:33,680 Speaker 3: I can't have all this stuff sitting in one place. 769 00:38:34,080 --> 00:38:36,560 Speaker 2: So I'm going to get young kids in inner. 770 00:38:36,280 --> 00:38:39,000 Speaker 3: City and say, but little bro, I'm messing with you, 771 00:38:39,239 --> 00:38:42,560 Speaker 3: like I'm put something in your hand and literally set 772 00:38:42,600 --> 00:38:44,080 Speaker 3: people down their wrong path. 773 00:38:44,160 --> 00:38:44,319 Speaker 2: Man. 774 00:38:44,400 --> 00:38:49,840 Speaker 3: And as you say that manipulation, I connected to that 775 00:38:49,880 --> 00:38:52,279 Speaker 3: because I can see that clearly as they now. It 776 00:38:52,320 --> 00:38:55,440 Speaker 3: ain't no love in that. That's not love. It's almost 777 00:38:55,480 --> 00:39:01,000 Speaker 3: not even opportunity. It's out of their self preservation of saying, hey, 778 00:39:01,160 --> 00:39:04,080 Speaker 3: I've had friends that had a bunch of stuff laying somewhere. 779 00:39:04,480 --> 00:39:07,799 Speaker 3: They get arrested and they got everything they got. So 780 00:39:07,880 --> 00:39:10,760 Speaker 3: the goal is to put everything out on the streets 781 00:39:10,760 --> 00:39:14,360 Speaker 3: with people you trust, just in case someone get kicks 782 00:39:14,440 --> 00:39:16,840 Speaker 3: in the door to police or something and it's badly 783 00:39:16,880 --> 00:39:17,399 Speaker 3: nothing here. 784 00:39:17,920 --> 00:39:21,080 Speaker 1: Yeah, you know. So the terminology that we use to 785 00:39:21,120 --> 00:39:25,319 Speaker 1: describe what you just laid out is leverage and compromise. 786 00:39:26,040 --> 00:39:27,880 Speaker 1: And that's what the big homies were doing to the 787 00:39:27,920 --> 00:39:33,360 Speaker 1: little homies, right. They came in looking like and giving 788 00:39:33,360 --> 00:39:36,240 Speaker 1: the impression that they were helping. Right, so hey, little homie, 789 00:39:36,280 --> 00:39:38,359 Speaker 1: let me help. Because help is one of those things 790 00:39:38,360 --> 00:39:42,160 Speaker 1: that we don't culturally and like as human nature, we 791 00:39:42,200 --> 00:39:47,040 Speaker 1: don't deny help will take help until we train ourselves 792 00:39:47,120 --> 00:39:48,439 Speaker 1: to reject help, will take help. 793 00:39:48,520 --> 00:39:48,680 Speaker 2: Right. 794 00:39:49,760 --> 00:39:51,319 Speaker 1: But then what they were actually doing is when they 795 00:39:51,360 --> 00:39:54,680 Speaker 1: gave you the drugs, if you took those drugs, now 796 00:39:54,719 --> 00:39:58,359 Speaker 1: what they're doing is they're compromising you because now you're 797 00:39:58,400 --> 00:40:02,000 Speaker 1: actually in a position where you have accepted what they've 798 00:40:02,040 --> 00:40:05,800 Speaker 1: given you as and it's a material good. It's got value. 799 00:40:06,239 --> 00:40:08,239 Speaker 1: So if that drug disappears, if you lose it, if 800 00:40:08,239 --> 00:40:10,799 Speaker 1: you drop it, you're going to owe them something. If 801 00:40:10,840 --> 00:40:13,680 Speaker 1: you sell it, you're going to owe them something, right, 802 00:40:13,680 --> 00:40:16,040 Speaker 1: and you're going to be connected to them. So they've 803 00:40:16,080 --> 00:40:19,880 Speaker 1: compromised you, right, And the more that someone compromises you 804 00:40:20,400 --> 00:40:24,080 Speaker 1: to them, the more leverage they have over you. So 805 00:40:24,840 --> 00:40:29,120 Speaker 1: I think this is a fantastic example because what does 806 00:40:29,160 --> 00:40:32,400 Speaker 1: the banking system do to every human being, the exact 807 00:40:32,480 --> 00:40:36,040 Speaker 1: same thing that big homies dode a little homes saying hey, 808 00:40:36,080 --> 00:40:38,560 Speaker 1: you need a house, you need a car, Let me 809 00:40:38,640 --> 00:40:41,160 Speaker 1: help you, let me give you exactly. 810 00:40:41,280 --> 00:40:43,040 Speaker 2: Yeah, And that's what I'm saying. 811 00:40:43,120 --> 00:40:46,200 Speaker 3: And for us, it's like how many people has been 812 00:40:46,239 --> 00:40:49,040 Speaker 3: affected by And again we're gonna get into the warm 813 00:40:49,200 --> 00:40:50,920 Speaker 3: drugs and all of that. I want to speak on 814 00:40:50,960 --> 00:40:53,040 Speaker 3: some of that, but let me bag up a little 815 00:40:53,040 --> 00:40:58,480 Speaker 3: bit because I'm going deep into it. But yeah, that 816 00:40:58,560 --> 00:41:02,319 Speaker 3: manipulation that these guys were running, man, I think that 817 00:41:02,920 --> 00:41:06,440 Speaker 3: it was far misunderstood in the in the city that 818 00:41:06,920 --> 00:41:08,600 Speaker 3: you know, A lot of this, a lot of this 819 00:41:08,760 --> 00:41:13,319 Speaker 3: led to gain uh formation and everything, because it's like, yo, 820 00:41:13,560 --> 00:41:14,359 Speaker 3: he the one put. 821 00:41:14,400 --> 00:41:18,160 Speaker 2: Me in the game, like he claiming blewe crip or whatever. 822 00:41:18,200 --> 00:41:19,600 Speaker 2: I got to claim that, right. 823 00:41:19,640 --> 00:41:22,120 Speaker 3: And so what I'm trying to speak to or the 824 00:41:22,200 --> 00:41:24,640 Speaker 3: young homies that need them to understand, is that there's 825 00:41:24,640 --> 00:41:28,880 Speaker 3: a level of manipulation that's happening when you in that 826 00:41:29,080 --> 00:41:32,279 Speaker 3: in that world, man. And that's to me, it's so important. 827 00:41:32,520 --> 00:41:36,200 Speaker 1: Yeah, absolutely, and so much of the of the world 828 00:41:36,200 --> 00:41:40,400 Speaker 1: that we live in right now has been formed around manipulation. 829 00:41:40,560 --> 00:41:43,640 Speaker 1: That's the right word. Manipulation is when you get people 830 00:41:43,680 --> 00:41:46,360 Speaker 1: to do what you want them to do because it 831 00:41:46,440 --> 00:41:50,960 Speaker 1: benefits you, right, And this is important. Manipulation is when 832 00:41:51,000 --> 00:41:53,040 Speaker 1: you get people to do what you want them to 833 00:41:53,080 --> 00:41:56,680 Speaker 1: do because it benefits the It's just one side of 834 00:41:56,719 --> 00:41:59,640 Speaker 1: a coin, though, the other side of the same coin 835 00:42:00,200 --> 00:42:04,719 Speaker 1: is motivation. Motivation is when you get people to do 836 00:42:05,440 --> 00:42:08,959 Speaker 1: what they want to do and it benefits them. 837 00:42:09,480 --> 00:42:12,080 Speaker 2: Mmmm. Right, same coin. 838 00:42:12,520 --> 00:42:13,240 Speaker 1: Two sides. 839 00:42:13,320 --> 00:42:14,960 Speaker 2: That is so, that is so right. 840 00:42:15,080 --> 00:42:18,400 Speaker 1: One side is manipulation, one side is motivation. The skills 841 00:42:18,760 --> 00:42:21,640 Speaker 1: that you need to make the coin are the same skills. 842 00:42:21,800 --> 00:42:23,960 Speaker 3: That is so. That is so right. That is a 843 00:42:24,080 --> 00:42:27,080 Speaker 3: light bulb for me. That is so correct because it 844 00:42:27,200 --> 00:42:29,120 Speaker 3: is the exact same formation. 845 00:42:29,520 --> 00:42:32,120 Speaker 1: Yeah, every country has their own intelligent service, and intelligent 846 00:42:32,160 --> 00:42:34,880 Speaker 1: services are broken down into two parts. There's an external 847 00:42:34,880 --> 00:42:38,120 Speaker 1: intelligent service that collects intelligence from outside of the country, 848 00:42:38,560 --> 00:42:41,280 Speaker 1: and then there's an internal intelligent service that collects intelligence 849 00:42:41,280 --> 00:42:43,960 Speaker 1: from inside the country. If you look at the United States, 850 00:42:44,000 --> 00:42:46,319 Speaker 1: we have the same thing, two intelligent services. We have 851 00:42:46,400 --> 00:42:49,920 Speaker 1: more than two, but the two primary are CIA. CIA 852 00:42:50,000 --> 00:42:54,880 Speaker 1: collects all the external intelligence. We collect secrets from other countries, 853 00:42:54,960 --> 00:42:57,680 Speaker 1: not American secrets, other country secrets. 854 00:42:58,120 --> 00:43:02,080 Speaker 2: No, no, and FB okay, that's how it's okay. 855 00:43:02,320 --> 00:43:06,920 Speaker 1: FBI collects internal secrets, secrets about any kind of threat 856 00:43:07,040 --> 00:43:10,160 Speaker 1: inside the United States. So you were getting to Edward, Snowden. 857 00:43:10,160 --> 00:43:14,120 Speaker 1: I'm pretty sure an NSA and there are weird different 858 00:43:14,280 --> 00:43:17,160 Speaker 1: part that we have. The UK also has a third 859 00:43:17,200 --> 00:43:20,040 Speaker 1: part like this or they collect intelligence from signals. 860 00:43:20,400 --> 00:43:22,360 Speaker 2: Okay, and we'll get to Snowden because that's gonna be 861 00:43:22,400 --> 00:43:24,399 Speaker 2: a good one. But let's do chi. Let's do child. 862 00:43:25,239 --> 00:43:28,600 Speaker 1: So China has a very similar breakdown to the United States. 863 00:43:28,640 --> 00:43:31,799 Speaker 1: They have an external service. That external service is called 864 00:43:31,840 --> 00:43:35,920 Speaker 1: the Ministry of State Security the MSS WOW, and then 865 00:43:35,920 --> 00:43:38,120 Speaker 1: they have their own internal service. They have their own 866 00:43:38,120 --> 00:43:43,360 Speaker 1: military service, they have their own counterintelligence service. But the organization, 867 00:43:43,480 --> 00:43:48,239 Speaker 1: the intelligence operatives of China that work against us are 868 00:43:48,280 --> 00:43:49,400 Speaker 1: called the MSS. 869 00:43:50,120 --> 00:43:53,480 Speaker 3: Isn't it weird that we have all this intelligence stuff 870 00:43:53,480 --> 00:43:56,560 Speaker 3: for against each other and all this war by proxy 871 00:43:56,640 --> 00:43:58,920 Speaker 3: stuff going on, but yet we do business? 872 00:44:00,200 --> 00:44:04,240 Speaker 2: How Like? How weird is that? It's? 873 00:44:04,320 --> 00:44:08,920 Speaker 1: It's it seems when you don't have that new worldview, 874 00:44:10,040 --> 00:44:12,000 Speaker 1: it seems like that wouldn't make sense. It seemed like 875 00:44:12,040 --> 00:44:14,839 Speaker 1: those those things are in conflict. But once you kind 876 00:44:14,840 --> 00:44:18,200 Speaker 1: of start to learn a larger worldview, you realize it 877 00:44:18,239 --> 00:44:22,000 Speaker 1: makes sense. Because what do we always try to teach 878 00:44:22,680 --> 00:44:25,960 Speaker 1: anybody in business or anyone in school? Right, you you 879 00:44:26,200 --> 00:44:29,920 Speaker 1: do what you're supposed to do, but you're also checked. 880 00:44:30,760 --> 00:44:32,840 Speaker 1: So like you take a test or a quiz in 881 00:44:32,920 --> 00:44:35,800 Speaker 1: high school and you answer the questions, the teacher doesn't 882 00:44:35,840 --> 00:44:38,239 Speaker 1: just give you credit for the test because you took it. 883 00:44:39,040 --> 00:44:42,000 Speaker 1: They then go back and check the answer the answers. Right. 884 00:44:42,160 --> 00:44:44,399 Speaker 1: In business, we go through, we do a year's worth 885 00:44:44,400 --> 00:44:45,759 Speaker 1: of business, and then what do we submit at the 886 00:44:45,840 --> 00:44:48,640 Speaker 1: end of the year Texas, and they check to make 887 00:44:48,680 --> 00:44:50,440 Speaker 1: sure that you're doing everything lawfully. 888 00:44:50,520 --> 00:44:50,880 Speaker 2: Right. 889 00:44:50,960 --> 00:44:54,280 Speaker 1: Intelligence services do the same thing. Why would we trust 890 00:44:54,280 --> 00:44:57,399 Speaker 1: what China tells us? We don't, So we have an 891 00:44:57,400 --> 00:45:00,839 Speaker 1: intelligence service that checks to make sure that they're telling 892 00:45:00,960 --> 00:45:03,960 Speaker 1: us the truth and to steal the secrets they're not 893 00:45:04,000 --> 00:45:04,480 Speaker 1: telling us. 894 00:45:04,680 --> 00:45:06,680 Speaker 3: Yeah, and see that's what I'm saying. All of that 895 00:45:06,840 --> 00:45:12,880 Speaker 3: just seems like a conflict. But does China, China's version, 896 00:45:13,080 --> 00:45:16,719 Speaker 3: which is MSS and CIA communicate at all? 897 00:45:16,920 --> 00:45:18,680 Speaker 2: Have they ever communicated in history? 898 00:45:18,719 --> 00:45:24,920 Speaker 1: They do, actually, and intelligence services communicate over shared common threats. Now, 899 00:45:24,920 --> 00:45:27,880 Speaker 1: one of the things that's tricky about China specifically is 900 00:45:28,239 --> 00:45:32,320 Speaker 1: the United States are number one concern from two thousand 901 00:45:32,360 --> 00:45:36,920 Speaker 1: and one to twenty twenty one basically was terrorism, and 902 00:45:37,000 --> 00:45:39,879 Speaker 1: we were fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we 903 00:45:39,880 --> 00:45:42,560 Speaker 1: were on a global war against terrorism right the g 904 00:45:42,680 --> 00:45:47,680 Speaker 1: WATT That was our focus. China doesn't really care about terrorism, 905 00:45:48,040 --> 00:45:51,959 Speaker 1: but they do care about the United States. So their 906 00:45:52,120 --> 00:45:57,360 Speaker 1: MSS created a group to track terrorists specifically so that 907 00:45:57,400 --> 00:46:01,560 Speaker 1: they could keep in contact with us. So where enemies 908 00:46:01,840 --> 00:46:05,080 Speaker 1: cooperate is over a shared third enemy. 909 00:46:04,920 --> 00:46:08,200 Speaker 3: Right, And see, I just don't those relationships. I mean 910 00:46:08,239 --> 00:46:11,760 Speaker 3: again without the I understand it though, because I also 911 00:46:11,880 --> 00:46:15,239 Speaker 3: understand in the culture how we do business or in 912 00:46:15,360 --> 00:46:18,439 Speaker 3: business period, how we have to you know, I may 913 00:46:18,480 --> 00:46:20,279 Speaker 3: have to buy something from over here that I really 914 00:46:20,320 --> 00:46:22,920 Speaker 3: don't care for these individuals, but the price is better, 915 00:46:22,960 --> 00:46:25,880 Speaker 3: the quality of it is great, and it keeps a 916 00:46:25,920 --> 00:46:29,160 Speaker 3: bottom line low. So it's it's uh, you know, I 917 00:46:29,239 --> 00:46:31,920 Speaker 3: have to do it, but it just feels wrong. It 918 00:46:32,000 --> 00:46:34,760 Speaker 3: just feels funny. It feels like it's not safe. 919 00:46:34,920 --> 00:46:37,520 Speaker 2: It feels you know what you're getting at. 920 00:46:37,560 --> 00:46:40,600 Speaker 1: There is another really important principle that they teach us, 921 00:46:40,760 --> 00:46:44,360 Speaker 1: and this is one of the This lesson is a 922 00:46:44,440 --> 00:46:47,839 Speaker 1: lesson that causes the most issues when I tell people 923 00:46:47,840 --> 00:46:51,360 Speaker 1: about it, right, And it's called moral and ethical flexibility. 924 00:46:52,280 --> 00:46:59,080 Speaker 1: We're trained, we're recruited because we're already carrying some moral flexibility, right. Right, 925 00:46:59,280 --> 00:47:01,960 Speaker 1: So there are some people who would never cheat on 926 00:47:02,000 --> 00:47:05,080 Speaker 1: a girlfriend, and then there are some people who would 927 00:47:05,160 --> 00:47:07,520 Speaker 1: cheat on a girlfriend if the situation was right. And 928 00:47:07,520 --> 00:47:08,560 Speaker 1: then there's other people. 929 00:47:08,280 --> 00:47:12,120 Speaker 2: Who just don't matter that out cheat. 930 00:47:12,320 --> 00:47:16,040 Speaker 1: Yeah, So the CIA doesn't want the person who cheats 931 00:47:16,200 --> 00:47:18,040 Speaker 1: all the time, and they don't want the person who 932 00:47:18,080 --> 00:47:20,759 Speaker 1: cheats never. They want the person who cheats under the 933 00:47:20,840 --> 00:47:24,640 Speaker 1: right circumstances because that's a person who can be manipulated 934 00:47:24,680 --> 00:47:32,080 Speaker 1: and shaped into a different worldview. Right, So that ethical flexibility, 935 00:47:32,239 --> 00:47:36,480 Speaker 1: that moral flexibility, is a really important element when CIA 936 00:47:36,560 --> 00:47:39,399 Speaker 1: goes to find its intelligence officers. Just like you're saying 937 00:47:39,440 --> 00:47:42,160 Speaker 1: the same thing. It doesn't feel right, but the bottom 938 00:47:42,200 --> 00:47:44,880 Speaker 1: line gets the benefit. It's a better product as the 939 00:47:44,880 --> 00:47:46,879 Speaker 1: superior quality. So I'm going to do it even though 940 00:47:46,880 --> 00:47:48,000 Speaker 1: it doesn't feel makes sense. 941 00:47:49,880 --> 00:47:53,000 Speaker 2: I've never heard CIA pick anybody from the ghetto. 942 00:47:53,760 --> 00:47:58,279 Speaker 1: They actually pick a lot of people from from I 943 00:47:56,640 --> 00:47:59,840 Speaker 1: don't I don't have nobody I knowed it. 944 00:48:00,200 --> 00:48:02,880 Speaker 3: Like yo, CIA tried to give me. I got dudes 945 00:48:02,920 --> 00:48:04,120 Speaker 3: in the Navy. 946 00:48:04,000 --> 00:48:07,480 Speaker 2: Army, Marines, but I haven't heard CIA. 947 00:48:07,960 --> 00:48:10,040 Speaker 1: So a lot of times what ends up happening is 948 00:48:10,440 --> 00:48:14,040 Speaker 1: CIA's requirements because it's still a government organization, so that 949 00:48:14,160 --> 00:48:17,120 Speaker 1: means you still have to have a really strict set 950 00:48:17,120 --> 00:48:19,920 Speaker 1: of requirements that you meet before you can be recruited. 951 00:48:20,600 --> 00:48:22,520 Speaker 1: So for a lot of folks. What that means is 952 00:48:22,560 --> 00:48:25,399 Speaker 1: they have to go through the Navy of the Army, 953 00:48:25,440 --> 00:48:27,960 Speaker 1: the Air Force, the Marine Corps. First, they have to 954 00:48:28,000 --> 00:48:30,080 Speaker 1: go to college, right, you have to have a four 955 00:48:30,160 --> 00:48:34,160 Speaker 1: year degree. So my guess is that what I've seen 956 00:48:34,239 --> 00:48:36,359 Speaker 1: on the inside and what you haven't yet seen from 957 00:48:36,360 --> 00:48:39,120 Speaker 1: the outside yet, because I'm sure you will, is that 958 00:48:39,280 --> 00:48:42,440 Speaker 1: full life cycle of an individual somebody who starts I 959 00:48:42,440 --> 00:48:43,880 Speaker 1: don't know quite what you mean when you say in 960 00:48:43,920 --> 00:48:46,399 Speaker 1: the ghetto, but I'm guessing you mean poverty just. 961 00:48:46,360 --> 00:48:50,320 Speaker 2: From poverty, like just from poverty and the inner city. 962 00:48:50,400 --> 00:48:53,879 Speaker 2: You know, I just haven't heard of any Yo. Man, 963 00:48:53,920 --> 00:48:54,680 Speaker 2: I almost. 964 00:48:54,360 --> 00:48:56,680 Speaker 3: Got recruited to the CIA, but like you said, I 965 00:48:56,680 --> 00:48:59,439 Speaker 3: haven't given that time, right, you know, it takes time 966 00:48:59,480 --> 00:49:00,440 Speaker 3: to go get that degree. 967 00:49:00,480 --> 00:49:03,879 Speaker 2: It takes time to be you need years. Yeah, maybe 968 00:49:03,960 --> 00:49:04,520 Speaker 2: that's what it is. 969 00:49:04,560 --> 00:49:08,000 Speaker 1: And you also need to have people who get their 970 00:49:08,040 --> 00:49:11,319 Speaker 1: life started without any kind of criminal record and they 971 00:49:11,360 --> 00:49:15,000 Speaker 1: continue through those really difficult years without a criminal. 972 00:49:14,640 --> 00:49:17,560 Speaker 3: Record and coming from poverty without their criminal worlds, which 973 00:49:18,120 --> 00:49:21,000 Speaker 3: makes it a little harder. Yeah, And I mean at 974 00:49:21,000 --> 00:49:23,440 Speaker 3: a benefit different in the CIA? Did all mean, like, 975 00:49:23,640 --> 00:49:24,840 Speaker 3: is it perks different? 976 00:49:24,960 --> 00:49:27,680 Speaker 1: Is absolutely? Yeah? So you get paid more. That's an 977 00:49:27,680 --> 00:49:30,359 Speaker 1: easy perk, but then you also have I mean with 978 00:49:30,440 --> 00:49:34,759 Speaker 1: the with the military, you are following orders. When you're 979 00:49:34,760 --> 00:49:38,480 Speaker 1: in the CIA, you're given objectives. You carry out your 980 00:49:38,480 --> 00:49:41,080 Speaker 1: objective in the best way that you see fit, right, 981 00:49:41,120 --> 00:49:43,799 Speaker 1: as long as you deliver. They a lot of times 982 00:49:43,800 --> 00:49:45,600 Speaker 1: don't mind how you deliver, as long as it's within 983 00:49:45,719 --> 00:49:48,400 Speaker 1: certain guidelines. Very different in the military, where in the 984 00:49:48,400 --> 00:49:50,520 Speaker 1: military it's like you're going to do exactly what you do. 985 00:49:50,680 --> 00:49:50,879 Speaker 2: Yes. 986 00:49:51,840 --> 00:49:56,080 Speaker 3: With China being someone who I'm always intrigued by them 987 00:49:56,640 --> 00:50:01,200 Speaker 3: and stealing of our intellectual property, the CIA view something 988 00:50:01,280 --> 00:50:02,120 Speaker 3: like that, it's a. 989 00:50:02,120 --> 00:50:04,480 Speaker 1: Crime, like it's a it's a crime, and it's a 990 00:50:04,480 --> 00:50:09,160 Speaker 1: massive problem, especially with CI, with with China. So every 991 00:50:09,200 --> 00:50:13,520 Speaker 1: country specializes in a different type of intelligence. So we 992 00:50:13,640 --> 00:50:20,440 Speaker 1: specialize in stealing secrets, specifically political and government secrets. Masad 993 00:50:21,120 --> 00:50:25,480 Speaker 1: specializes in violence. They're the Israeli intelligence service. They specialize 994 00:50:25,480 --> 00:50:28,480 Speaker 1: in liberating people who are kidnapped and killing people who 995 00:50:28,520 --> 00:50:32,759 Speaker 1: deserve to die. Right. China specializes in the theft of 996 00:50:32,760 --> 00:50:35,640 Speaker 1: intellectual property. But they're not the best. Do you know 997 00:50:35,680 --> 00:50:36,440 Speaker 1: who the best is? 998 00:50:36,560 --> 00:50:37,279 Speaker 2: Aligeria? 999 00:50:37,400 --> 00:50:41,200 Speaker 1: No, France, Wow, France is the best in the world. 1000 00:50:41,280 --> 00:50:44,520 Speaker 1: It's stealing intellectual property. So the number one threat to 1001 00:50:44,560 --> 00:50:48,280 Speaker 1: the United States for our economic secrets and our industrial 1002 00:50:48,280 --> 00:50:50,880 Speaker 1: secrets isn't even China, It's France. 1003 00:50:51,000 --> 00:50:52,640 Speaker 2: How did you know it? I mean, I know, I 1004 00:50:52,680 --> 00:50:54,279 Speaker 2: trust you, But how do we know that? 1005 00:50:54,560 --> 00:50:58,280 Speaker 1: We know that because we we watch our own systems, 1006 00:50:58,680 --> 00:51:02,319 Speaker 1: We watch our own corporateations. Remember, FBI collects intelligence from 1007 00:51:02,320 --> 00:51:06,880 Speaker 1: inside the United States. They watch our Googles, our sales forces, 1008 00:51:07,000 --> 00:51:10,879 Speaker 1: our Amazons, our massive players, right Netflix, and they see 1009 00:51:10,880 --> 00:51:13,240 Speaker 1: who's trying to penetrate those systems, who's trying to steal 1010 00:51:13,280 --> 00:51:17,200 Speaker 1: those secrets. They find spies inside the United States, inside 1011 00:51:17,200 --> 00:51:20,160 Speaker 1: the United States right now. They estimate there's ten thousand spies, 1012 00:51:21,080 --> 00:51:26,040 Speaker 1: ten thousand spies, undercover people living here stealing secrets. FBI 1013 00:51:26,120 --> 00:51:27,320 Speaker 1: covers all that, Right. 1014 00:51:27,360 --> 00:51:31,200 Speaker 2: What secrets do you get from Netflix or YouTube? Were like, 1015 00:51:31,480 --> 00:51:32,759 Speaker 2: what what secrets do you get? 1016 00:51:32,840 --> 00:51:35,640 Speaker 3: I mean, I get analytical secrets, like from the back 1017 00:51:35,719 --> 00:51:41,040 Speaker 3: engine of But like if you come here from say China, 1018 00:51:41,360 --> 00:51:46,120 Speaker 3: and you look into tapping the Netflix, like, what information 1019 00:51:46,719 --> 00:51:48,759 Speaker 3: globally do you get from Netflix? 1020 00:51:48,760 --> 00:51:49,680 Speaker 2: There's worth anything? 1021 00:51:49,760 --> 00:51:51,879 Speaker 1: Well, it may not be global information that you're looking for. 1022 00:51:52,120 --> 00:51:54,399 Speaker 1: It may be information about a specific country. So let's 1023 00:51:54,440 --> 00:51:56,120 Speaker 1: jump into this and I'm going to geek out on this, Dude, 1024 00:51:56,320 --> 00:51:59,279 Speaker 1: I'm with stuff that I love. Right, if you were 1025 00:51:59,320 --> 00:52:02,600 Speaker 1: able to steal the back end metrics or the back 1026 00:52:02,719 --> 00:52:05,239 Speaker 1: end metadata for Netflix, and metadata is. 1027 00:52:06,280 --> 00:52:08,040 Speaker 2: Who what when? Yeah? Who when? 1028 00:52:08,160 --> 00:52:11,600 Speaker 1: I have exactly right. Now you know who's watching what 1029 00:52:11,800 --> 00:52:14,880 Speaker 1: shows at what times and what places. So if you 1030 00:52:15,080 --> 00:52:19,480 Speaker 1: see that one particular show is popular in Nashville that 1031 00:52:19,640 --> 00:52:22,719 Speaker 1: isn't popular in LA, you can actually see what that 1032 00:52:22,800 --> 00:52:24,440 Speaker 1: show is about. And now you have a sense of 1033 00:52:24,440 --> 00:52:26,880 Speaker 1: what the people in Nashville care about and what the 1034 00:52:26,880 --> 00:52:29,360 Speaker 1: people in LA don't care about. So if you wanted 1035 00:52:29,400 --> 00:52:32,320 Speaker 1: to craft some sort of fake news. 1036 00:52:32,120 --> 00:52:36,279 Speaker 2: Story, you know the hot buttons to hot okay. 1037 00:52:36,080 --> 00:52:38,879 Speaker 1: Based on the city, right, And that's a very basic example. Right. 1038 00:52:39,160 --> 00:52:44,160 Speaker 1: You also figure out which neighborhoods have the most Netflix accounts, 1039 00:52:44,160 --> 00:52:47,560 Speaker 1: the most Netflix subscribers, and you can also cross reference 1040 00:52:47,600 --> 00:52:50,279 Speaker 1: that against what zip codes make the most money. So 1041 00:52:50,320 --> 00:52:52,200 Speaker 1: if you were to find which zip codes have the 1042 00:52:52,200 --> 00:52:53,640 Speaker 1: most money, and then you find out that one of 1043 00:52:53,640 --> 00:52:55,600 Speaker 1: those wealthy zip codes also have a bunch of people 1044 00:52:55,640 --> 00:52:58,040 Speaker 1: on Netflix, now all of a sudden it becomes worth 1045 00:52:58,080 --> 00:53:01,319 Speaker 1: it to create a trojan horse piece of code that 1046 00:53:01,400 --> 00:53:05,279 Speaker 1: can piggyback on Netflix and go into someone's laptop, on 1047 00:53:05,320 --> 00:53:09,320 Speaker 1: someone's cell phone, someone's computer, someone's smart TV and mine 1048 00:53:09,560 --> 00:53:11,560 Speaker 1: for bank data account down. 1049 00:53:11,640 --> 00:53:15,400 Speaker 2: So but that okay, So how does that? How do 1050 00:53:15,480 --> 00:53:16,919 Speaker 2: they coexist? 1051 00:53:17,000 --> 00:53:21,200 Speaker 3: Like how do you get information to phish on their 1052 00:53:21,280 --> 00:53:25,359 Speaker 3: laptop by just working for Netflix or something like that? Like, so, 1053 00:53:25,400 --> 00:53:28,200 Speaker 3: how do they give me an example of getting the 1054 00:53:28,280 --> 00:53:32,080 Speaker 3: information some information like that? Like how does someone from 1055 00:53:32,200 --> 00:53:35,320 Speaker 3: China come in? Do they get a position in Netflix? 1056 00:53:35,360 --> 00:53:38,799 Speaker 3: Do they heck into their system? Like what is the role? 1057 00:53:38,920 --> 00:53:39,080 Speaker 2: Now? 1058 00:53:39,280 --> 00:53:42,600 Speaker 1: So the most there's both things can happen. So in 1059 00:53:42,640 --> 00:53:45,200 Speaker 1: the United States specifically, we have a very big problem 1060 00:53:45,719 --> 00:53:50,600 Speaker 1: where foreign workers. Foreign skilled employees can get a visa 1061 00:53:50,680 --> 00:53:52,239 Speaker 1: to come to the United States to work for these 1062 00:53:52,239 --> 00:53:54,360 Speaker 1: companies because they'll take a lower paycheck than what an 1063 00:53:54,400 --> 00:53:57,840 Speaker 1: American will pick. Right, but they're actually being planted here 1064 00:53:58,360 --> 00:54:01,359 Speaker 1: by a foreign intelligence service or when they come here 1065 00:54:01,400 --> 00:54:03,719 Speaker 1: and they get the job, then they reach out to 1066 00:54:03,840 --> 00:54:06,239 Speaker 1: their own home foreign intelligence service and say, hey, guess 1067 00:54:06,239 --> 00:54:08,000 Speaker 1: who I work for right now? Would you like me 1068 00:54:08,040 --> 00:54:09,960 Speaker 1: to do something extra for an extra paycheck? 1069 00:54:10,160 --> 00:54:10,359 Speaker 2: Right? 1070 00:54:11,360 --> 00:54:14,800 Speaker 1: That's called an insider threat. When you have someone who's 1071 00:54:14,840 --> 00:54:19,520 Speaker 1: inside your organization, who's corrupting your organization from inside, selling 1072 00:54:19,520 --> 00:54:23,200 Speaker 1: your secrets, embezzling money, lying about lining to your clients, 1073 00:54:23,239 --> 00:54:24,400 Speaker 1: that's an insider threat. 1074 00:54:24,560 --> 00:54:27,600 Speaker 2: But when we say secrets, that's what I'm trying to understand. 1075 00:54:28,760 --> 00:54:35,080 Speaker 1: Secrets Like, Yeah, proprietary information, the algorithms that Netflix uses, 1076 00:54:35,320 --> 00:54:38,000 Speaker 1: Like think about how fast Netflix loads. Have you ever 1077 00:54:38,040 --> 00:54:40,960 Speaker 1: wondered why does Netflix load so fast on your phone? 1078 00:54:41,440 --> 00:54:44,600 Speaker 1: But when you go to a blog page it takes Yeah? 1079 00:54:44,640 --> 00:54:47,759 Speaker 1: Why is that? It's because they have proprietary algorithms that 1080 00:54:47,800 --> 00:54:50,720 Speaker 1: they have used that they've created to make their load 1081 00:54:50,800 --> 00:54:53,359 Speaker 1: time shorter and faster because they don't want to lose 1082 00:54:53,400 --> 00:54:55,000 Speaker 1: you because it takes too long to get your video. 1083 00:54:55,120 --> 00:54:58,080 Speaker 3: But child are interested in that? I mean, of course 1084 00:54:58,160 --> 00:55:01,080 Speaker 3: not that, but I'm just wondering what can they get. 1085 00:55:01,200 --> 00:55:06,320 Speaker 3: I definitely like the example of zip codes and netflicks. 1086 00:55:05,719 --> 00:55:07,800 Speaker 2: And how that you know, corresponds. 1087 00:55:07,800 --> 00:55:11,600 Speaker 3: But I'm just wondering, you know, to come into those 1088 00:55:11,640 --> 00:55:14,800 Speaker 3: ten thousand people are where doing? What if you were 1089 00:55:15,360 --> 00:55:18,520 Speaker 3: sent into America as a spy, Like what would that 1090 00:55:18,600 --> 00:55:19,080 Speaker 3: look like? 1091 00:55:19,600 --> 00:55:21,280 Speaker 1: I mean it could look a number of different ways, 1092 00:55:21,280 --> 00:55:24,800 Speaker 1: but give me an extreme example, so let me okay, 1093 00:55:24,840 --> 00:55:27,919 Speaker 1: So a very extreme example is when you're embedded into 1094 00:55:28,000 --> 00:55:31,080 Speaker 1: a foreign country because you are a violent threat. Right, 1095 00:55:31,520 --> 00:55:32,160 Speaker 1: that's called. 1096 00:55:31,960 --> 00:55:33,400 Speaker 2: A sleeper cello. 1097 00:55:33,600 --> 00:55:37,080 Speaker 1: Oftentimes it happens with terrorists, but you also find illegals. 1098 00:55:37,520 --> 00:55:39,520 Speaker 1: Illegal is a term that the Russians use when they 1099 00:55:39,520 --> 00:55:42,640 Speaker 1: insert a sleeper illegal into the United States or into 1100 00:55:42,640 --> 00:55:45,680 Speaker 1: a foreign country to do what to be on, to 1101 00:55:45,760 --> 00:55:49,040 Speaker 1: be on soil, to be on on the soil, creating 1102 00:55:49,040 --> 00:55:53,120 Speaker 1: your own life, doing your own job, paying real taxes, 1103 00:55:53,239 --> 00:55:56,400 Speaker 1: waiting for the day that you get one order to 1104 00:55:56,440 --> 00:55:57,279 Speaker 1: do something. 1105 00:55:57,400 --> 00:55:59,520 Speaker 2: Extreme that as deep, right. 1106 00:55:59,480 --> 00:56:03,400 Speaker 1: That's called sleeper's and that's also called an illegal, not 1107 00:56:03,520 --> 00:56:05,880 Speaker 1: the illegal like we hear about in the newspapers, not 1108 00:56:05,920 --> 00:56:09,279 Speaker 1: an illegal alien, but like the term that we use 1109 00:56:09,360 --> 00:56:12,319 Speaker 1: is that is an illegal agent. So that is one 1110 00:56:12,440 --> 00:56:15,439 Speaker 1: very extreme example, and that's an extreme scary example. There's 1111 00:56:15,480 --> 00:56:18,400 Speaker 1: also extremely not scary examples, right. And one of the 1112 00:56:18,480 --> 00:56:23,000 Speaker 1: most common examples of a not scary person who's sent 1113 00:56:23,040 --> 00:56:25,480 Speaker 1: in the United States is somebody who's sent here because 1114 00:56:25,520 --> 00:56:28,799 Speaker 1: they're they're like a water or electricity engineer, like they 1115 00:56:28,960 --> 00:56:33,640 Speaker 1: understand soil or they understand how water purification works, and 1116 00:56:33,680 --> 00:56:36,680 Speaker 1: they're sent here to get their American citizenship and to 1117 00:56:36,680 --> 00:56:39,120 Speaker 1: get their green card. And their job is to go 1118 00:56:39,200 --> 00:56:43,880 Speaker 1: to you know, Atlanta and become part of the Atlanta 1119 00:56:43,960 --> 00:56:48,319 Speaker 1: water utility network, and they build a career. They're doing 1120 00:56:48,360 --> 00:56:51,480 Speaker 1: that job. And all they're supposed to do is send 1121 00:56:51,480 --> 00:56:55,560 Speaker 1: a report every week about how Atlanta purifies their water. 1122 00:56:56,120 --> 00:56:59,240 Speaker 1: And why would that person be needed because if China 1123 00:56:59,280 --> 00:57:02,560 Speaker 1: and America go to war, they want to poison the water. 1124 00:57:02,680 --> 00:57:05,319 Speaker 2: Yeah, right, wow, and they report. 1125 00:57:05,320 --> 00:57:07,960 Speaker 1: And one more thing. The report just went out this week, right, 1126 00:57:08,080 --> 00:57:10,080 Speaker 1: and while you and I are recording this, it's May 1127 00:57:10,080 --> 00:57:12,520 Speaker 1: twenty seventh, I want to say it is. Yes, a 1128 00:57:12,600 --> 00:57:15,320 Speaker 1: report just went out this week where FBI made a 1129 00:57:15,360 --> 00:57:18,560 Speaker 1: formal announcement to the entire American public letting them know 1130 00:57:18,920 --> 00:57:23,480 Speaker 1: that we've seen an increase in Chinese agents infiltrating American 1131 00:57:23,600 --> 00:57:27,800 Speaker 1: utility and power networks. Why are they infiltrating, Why are 1132 00:57:27,800 --> 00:57:30,040 Speaker 1: they spending the money in the time to learn about 1133 00:57:30,080 --> 00:57:32,680 Speaker 1: how our power grid, our power grid, and our water 1134 00:57:32,800 --> 00:57:35,840 Speaker 1: works because if they want to, they want to be 1135 00:57:35,840 --> 00:57:38,560 Speaker 1: able to shut them down in a snap of fingers. Wow, 1136 00:57:38,760 --> 00:57:40,600 Speaker 1: you and I might never see that in our lifetime. 1137 00:57:40,800 --> 00:57:42,080 Speaker 1: But they still want to know how to do it. 1138 00:57:42,280 --> 00:57:44,120 Speaker 3: This is what's crazy, and this is what I think 1139 00:57:44,240 --> 00:57:48,320 Speaker 3: is important to know, is that they're covering all bases. 1140 00:57:48,840 --> 00:57:49,000 Speaker 2: Right. 1141 00:57:49,040 --> 00:57:51,600 Speaker 3: It's like some of this we may never use, but 1142 00:57:51,680 --> 00:57:53,600 Speaker 3: we send our toolbox just in case. 1143 00:57:53,720 --> 00:57:55,440 Speaker 1: Now, if they're doing that to us, guess what that 1144 00:57:55,520 --> 00:57:56,480 Speaker 1: tells you about us. 1145 00:57:56,880 --> 00:57:58,640 Speaker 2: We're doing it to them. 1146 00:57:58,320 --> 00:58:00,360 Speaker 1: And if we're doing it to one country. 1147 00:58:00,080 --> 00:58:01,440 Speaker 2: Were doing it to all of them. 1148 00:58:01,800 --> 00:58:07,080 Speaker 3: Now with them China and specifically because I want to 1149 00:58:07,120 --> 00:58:09,640 Speaker 3: ask you about the who I mean, it seems like 1150 00:58:09,720 --> 00:58:13,960 Speaker 3: China's more visible with intellectual property, even though France is 1151 00:58:14,960 --> 00:58:15,720 Speaker 3: more prevalent. 1152 00:58:16,080 --> 00:58:17,320 Speaker 2: Right, it's crazy. 1153 00:58:17,400 --> 00:58:19,360 Speaker 1: It's because of their It's what's known as them O. 1154 00:58:19,480 --> 00:58:21,479 Speaker 1: You've heard of an m O in the movies and stuff. 1155 00:58:21,840 --> 00:58:25,600 Speaker 1: MOO stands for modus operandi and your modus operandi. Your 1156 00:58:25,600 --> 00:58:28,680 Speaker 1: modus operandi is the way that you execute your operations. 1157 00:58:29,360 --> 00:58:31,919 Speaker 1: There are usually two types, and we classify them as 1158 00:58:32,080 --> 00:58:37,960 Speaker 1: bulls and snakes. Bulls like to go in and break 1159 00:58:38,000 --> 00:58:41,479 Speaker 1: your shit and leave their calling card and let you know, hey, 1160 00:58:42,480 --> 00:58:45,000 Speaker 1: that's on me. Your shit was busted up. I'm the 1161 00:58:45,000 --> 00:58:47,800 Speaker 1: one that busted it up. Snakes like to go in there, 1162 00:58:49,200 --> 00:58:50,920 Speaker 1: you know, mess with your shit, but not break it, 1163 00:58:51,000 --> 00:58:52,800 Speaker 1: and then leave without you even knowing they were there. 1164 00:58:53,400 --> 00:58:59,919 Speaker 1: Like us, right, Russia, the United States, France, the UK, 1165 00:59:00,480 --> 00:59:02,680 Speaker 1: We're all snakes. We like to go in, do what 1166 00:59:02,720 --> 00:59:04,240 Speaker 1: we need to do, steal what we want to steal, 1167 00:59:04,280 --> 00:59:06,960 Speaker 1: and leave without you even knowing we were there. China, 1168 00:59:07,240 --> 00:59:11,280 Speaker 1: North Korea, Cuba, these are bulls. They like to go 1169 00:59:11,360 --> 00:59:13,880 Speaker 1: in there, break your shit, leave your calling card, and 1170 00:59:13,880 --> 00:59:16,760 Speaker 1: then when you try to make a formal accusation, they 1171 00:59:16,840 --> 00:59:20,880 Speaker 1: just deny it. Right in twenty fourteen, I think it 1172 00:59:20,920 --> 00:59:23,760 Speaker 1: was twenty fourteen, and maybe in twenty seventeen, China went 1173 00:59:23,800 --> 00:59:28,439 Speaker 1: into the military's Office of Personal Records, the military all 1174 00:59:28,480 --> 00:59:32,720 Speaker 1: of the military wow, and they had a massive scrape 1175 00:59:32,760 --> 00:59:36,680 Speaker 1: where they stole personal information about everybody who was in 1176 00:59:36,680 --> 00:59:40,640 Speaker 1: the military, a massive hack wow. And they left their 1177 00:59:40,680 --> 00:59:42,880 Speaker 1: code all over it. It was crystal clear that it 1178 00:59:42,920 --> 00:59:45,800 Speaker 1: was the Chinese. They left their calling card. But then 1179 00:59:45,840 --> 00:59:51,480 Speaker 1: when the ambassador to the United States went in Beijing 1180 00:59:51,600 --> 00:59:54,800 Speaker 1: and said this was an unacceptable violation of American privacy, 1181 00:59:55,040 --> 00:59:58,680 Speaker 1: they just denied it. If you ever watch a presidential debate, 1182 00:59:58,720 --> 01:00:01,440 Speaker 1: a fantastic presidential bait is if you go back in 1183 01:00:01,520 --> 01:00:05,160 Speaker 1: time and you watch when President Romney was debating President Obama. 1184 01:00:05,840 --> 01:00:06,760 Speaker 1: Do you remember that debate. 1185 01:00:07,360 --> 01:00:10,120 Speaker 2: I was just watching one of those, so it's about 1186 01:00:10,120 --> 01:00:10,640 Speaker 2: a month ago. 1187 01:00:10,880 --> 01:00:14,560 Speaker 1: Obama did this fantastic job of saying, Romney, you said this. 1188 01:00:15,320 --> 01:00:17,240 Speaker 1: Romney was just in front of everybody. 1189 01:00:17,640 --> 01:00:18,240 Speaker 2: No, I didn't. 1190 01:00:19,240 --> 01:00:21,480 Speaker 1: And the debate went on like that for like an hour, 1191 01:00:21,800 --> 01:00:25,000 Speaker 1: multiple multiple points. Obama was like, you said this about 1192 01:00:25,280 --> 01:00:27,280 Speaker 1: middle class, you said this about the wealth, you said 1193 01:00:27,280 --> 01:00:30,120 Speaker 1: this about taxes, you said this about healthcare, and Romney 1194 01:00:30,120 --> 01:00:32,440 Speaker 1: would just take the same talking point. I did not 1195 01:00:32,480 --> 01:00:34,840 Speaker 1: say those words. I didn't say those things. After the 1196 01:00:34,840 --> 01:00:36,960 Speaker 1: debate was over and all the fact checking came in, 1197 01:00:37,480 --> 01:00:39,560 Speaker 1: Obama was right. But it doesn't matter. 1198 01:00:39,800 --> 01:00:43,280 Speaker 2: See that. So Romney was the first fake news fake. 1199 01:00:43,120 --> 01:00:45,600 Speaker 3: News if you look at that way Trump is because 1200 01:00:45,600 --> 01:00:48,120 Speaker 3: there's basically Trump do the same like fake news, it's 1201 01:00:48,120 --> 01:00:51,120 Speaker 3: fake news. So I discredit fake news, fake news, like 1202 01:00:51,160 --> 01:00:53,840 Speaker 3: I said, even with the election thing, it was just 1203 01:00:53,960 --> 01:00:58,360 Speaker 3: it's crazy to see him stand on that. But still 1204 01:00:58,600 --> 01:01:03,600 Speaker 3: with China is interesting, man, that their is too you know, 1205 01:01:03,760 --> 01:01:09,720 Speaker 3: fashion goods and like anything made you can get from China, 1206 01:01:09,800 --> 01:01:12,800 Speaker 3: and that is spooky knowing that's a crime. They're still 1207 01:01:12,840 --> 01:01:17,439 Speaker 3: able to use utilize our postal service. They're still able 1208 01:01:17,440 --> 01:01:22,439 Speaker 3: to utilize our system sending things over this illegal as wow. 1209 01:01:22,880 --> 01:01:25,479 Speaker 1: So what you have here is there's a spectrum that's 1210 01:01:25,520 --> 01:01:28,880 Speaker 1: really important in espionage and we call it the security 1211 01:01:28,920 --> 01:01:32,240 Speaker 1: and convenience spectrum, and it applies to everyday life too. 1212 01:01:33,120 --> 01:01:35,400 Speaker 1: If you put security on one side of the spectrum, 1213 01:01:35,440 --> 01:01:40,160 Speaker 1: the other side of the spectrum is is convenience. The 1214 01:01:40,160 --> 01:01:45,920 Speaker 1: more something becomes secure, the less convenient it is. The 1215 01:01:45,920 --> 01:01:49,760 Speaker 1: more something becomes convenient, guess what, the less secure it is. 1216 01:01:50,160 --> 01:01:53,280 Speaker 1: So if the US Postal Service wants to make male 1217 01:01:53,800 --> 01:01:58,600 Speaker 1: convenience for Americans, it makes it a little less secure, 1218 01:01:59,120 --> 01:02:01,880 Speaker 1: so it can be infraltry and abused. Right. And if 1219 01:02:01,920 --> 01:02:05,160 Speaker 1: you want to make the borders more secure, you end 1220 01:02:05,240 --> 01:02:07,920 Speaker 1: up making them a lot less convenient. And that's a 1221 01:02:07,960 --> 01:02:09,760 Speaker 1: trade off that we always have to make. So the 1222 01:02:09,800 --> 01:02:14,320 Speaker 1: government is always asking itself the question how much security 1223 01:02:14,360 --> 01:02:17,040 Speaker 1: do we need? How much convenience can we sacrifice? 1224 01:02:17,520 --> 01:02:22,560 Speaker 3: I'm wondering speaking of China as well, with them spying 1225 01:02:22,640 --> 01:02:24,960 Speaker 3: on us or you know you so, do you think 1226 01:02:24,960 --> 01:02:25,800 Speaker 3: they're our biggest straight? 1227 01:02:25,840 --> 01:02:26,960 Speaker 2: It's China our biggest threat. 1228 01:02:27,280 --> 01:02:29,400 Speaker 1: It doesn't matter what I think they are. These stated 1229 01:02:29,480 --> 01:02:32,280 Speaker 1: number one global threats to the United States according to 1230 01:02:32,440 --> 01:02:34,960 Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs of Staff and according to the National 1231 01:02:35,040 --> 01:02:36,040 Speaker 1: Intelligence Director. 1232 01:02:38,200 --> 01:02:41,800 Speaker 3: With social media with chet GPT, let's get into like 1233 01:02:42,600 --> 01:02:48,479 Speaker 3: election interference and chat GPT, TikTok coming through China. Let's 1234 01:02:48,560 --> 01:02:53,240 Speaker 3: let's start with TikTok and China. Do you think they 1235 01:02:53,360 --> 01:02:54,480 Speaker 3: used that to spy on us? 1236 01:02:54,600 --> 01:02:57,600 Speaker 1: Absolutely? Absolutely, the same way that you would use Netflix. 1237 01:02:57,680 --> 01:03:00,400 Speaker 1: Right then, the Netflix example that we talked about, So 1238 01:03:01,040 --> 01:03:05,920 Speaker 1: you've got this. So TikTok's proprietary information is all in China. 1239 01:03:06,320 --> 01:03:08,760 Speaker 1: That's where it was developed, that was created, they created 1240 01:03:08,760 --> 01:03:11,920 Speaker 1: the algorithms, they ConTroll it. So what that means is 1241 01:03:12,400 --> 01:03:17,640 Speaker 1: are they spying on on like American political secrets. Probably not, 1242 01:03:17,680 --> 01:03:21,480 Speaker 1: because those political secrets probably don't go on TikTok. But 1243 01:03:21,560 --> 01:03:23,080 Speaker 1: what they are able to do is they're able to 1244 01:03:23,200 --> 01:03:27,520 Speaker 1: shape everything from what kind of information gets sent to 1245 01:03:27,640 --> 01:03:30,840 Speaker 1: what ZIP code, to what people are watching and what 1246 01:03:30,880 --> 01:03:35,240 Speaker 1: people are liking. So a fantastic oversimplified example is that 1247 01:03:35,280 --> 01:03:40,840 Speaker 1: within China, TikTok information right, the content that's put on TikTok, 1248 01:03:41,520 --> 01:03:44,480 Speaker 1: it's cultivated in a way where it's mostly educational. 1249 01:03:45,400 --> 01:03:48,360 Speaker 2: Bad dance is doing something totally different with it over there. 1250 01:03:48,240 --> 01:03:52,080 Speaker 1: But when the algorithm applies to the United States, it's 1251 01:03:52,120 --> 01:03:54,800 Speaker 1: totally different. It's stuff that makes us dumber, stuff that 1252 01:03:54,840 --> 01:03:58,120 Speaker 1: makes us angry, feeds us our own political concerns right 1253 01:03:58,160 --> 01:03:58,680 Speaker 1: back to us. 1254 01:03:58,840 --> 01:04:01,360 Speaker 2: It's crazy how the algorithm that way. 1255 01:04:01,560 --> 01:04:04,840 Speaker 3: And again, when I was reading something the other day, 1256 01:04:05,120 --> 01:04:08,120 Speaker 3: it's crazy that you said that again they put all 1257 01:04:08,120 --> 01:04:10,680 Speaker 3: these different things in the toolbox because I was reading 1258 01:04:10,680 --> 01:04:14,000 Speaker 3: that China is getting a lot of facial recognition and 1259 01:04:14,040 --> 01:04:15,760 Speaker 3: all of that from the app and they don't even 1260 01:04:15,840 --> 01:04:18,560 Speaker 3: know how to utilize that night, but they know at 1261 01:04:18,600 --> 01:04:23,160 Speaker 3: some point we're making use some American facial recognition to 1262 01:04:23,240 --> 01:04:23,800 Speaker 3: do something. 1263 01:04:23,840 --> 01:04:26,240 Speaker 2: Now, I was listening to Mike Baker. 1264 01:04:25,960 --> 01:04:29,160 Speaker 3: You familiar with Mike Baker, and he was speaking about, 1265 01:04:30,240 --> 01:04:32,880 Speaker 3: of course that you know that they're doing some looking 1266 01:04:32,920 --> 01:04:36,040 Speaker 3: into things, but he was saying more so, he believes 1267 01:04:36,080 --> 01:04:41,040 Speaker 3: that China is just TikTok, is just eating the food 1268 01:04:41,440 --> 01:04:43,000 Speaker 3: of the market share. 1269 01:04:43,280 --> 01:04:45,120 Speaker 2: Right. They just came in and. 1270 01:04:45,880 --> 01:04:48,600 Speaker 3: Blue Facebook out the water, almost crashed a couple of 1271 01:04:48,640 --> 01:04:49,640 Speaker 3: these big companies. 1272 01:04:49,760 --> 01:04:50,960 Speaker 2: What do you say to that, do you? 1273 01:04:51,240 --> 01:04:54,000 Speaker 1: Yeah, that's just that's just good business. Right, that's just 1274 01:04:54,080 --> 01:04:54,960 Speaker 1: disruptive technico. 1275 01:04:54,960 --> 01:04:57,080 Speaker 3: So how do we know if it's good business or 1276 01:04:57,160 --> 01:04:59,880 Speaker 3: if it's them actually doing the illegal thing. 1277 01:05:00,120 --> 01:05:03,560 Speaker 1: Not supposed to know? The best illegal things are the 1278 01:05:03,640 --> 01:05:05,840 Speaker 1: things that you don't really know whether they're just good 1279 01:05:05,880 --> 01:05:09,560 Speaker 1: business or illegal. Right. That's that's how you craft a 1280 01:05:09,680 --> 01:05:13,680 Speaker 1: really effective espionage operation, is that it's it's called the 1281 01:05:13,720 --> 01:05:18,560 Speaker 1: shadow of doubt. You create something that people suspect, but 1282 01:05:18,640 --> 01:05:22,960 Speaker 1: they use it anyways. Right. It's kind of like, I 1283 01:05:23,000 --> 01:05:25,080 Speaker 1: think another group that does this really well is the 1284 01:05:25,200 --> 01:05:29,560 Speaker 1: national gun market. The US gun market does a really 1285 01:05:29,600 --> 01:05:34,560 Speaker 1: good job of managing this shadow of a doubt. There 1286 01:05:34,560 --> 01:05:36,720 Speaker 1: are some people out there who are like, there should 1287 01:05:36,720 --> 01:05:40,320 Speaker 1: be no guns in America, right. Guns are guns kill people, 1288 01:05:40,400 --> 01:05:42,080 Speaker 1: that's all they're built to do, and that's that's why 1289 01:05:42,080 --> 01:05:44,000 Speaker 1: we should get rid of them. But then there's another 1290 01:05:44,000 --> 01:05:45,640 Speaker 1: group of people that's like, no, we have a we 1291 01:05:45,720 --> 01:05:49,360 Speaker 1: have a Second Amendment right to bear arms, and this 1292 01:05:49,400 --> 01:05:52,960 Speaker 1: is the arm that I choose to bear. There's there's 1293 01:05:53,000 --> 01:05:56,120 Speaker 1: a shadow of doubt. Both sides really do have to 1294 01:05:56,160 --> 01:05:59,560 Speaker 1: acknowledge that both arguments are kind of valid. Yeah, we 1295 01:05:59,600 --> 01:06:02,160 Speaker 1: do have right to bare arms and guns aren't meant 1296 01:06:02,160 --> 01:06:06,160 Speaker 1: for one thing. Yes, right, So that's why you see 1297 01:06:06,280 --> 01:06:11,720 Speaker 1: such a long term debate with no real resolution and intelligence. 1298 01:06:11,760 --> 01:06:14,040 Speaker 1: You want that kind of thing. You want long term 1299 01:06:14,080 --> 01:06:17,840 Speaker 1: suspicion without anyone ever landing you a final decision. 1300 01:06:18,320 --> 01:06:20,760 Speaker 2: I mean it's almost like, so what do you take what? 1301 01:06:21,440 --> 01:06:24,080 Speaker 3: As an American do we look at when they bring 1302 01:06:24,160 --> 01:06:27,080 Speaker 3: TikTok CEO to the Senate or to the floor down 1303 01:06:27,120 --> 01:06:30,000 Speaker 3: there and they have to talk. We think that's the 1304 01:06:30,000 --> 01:06:32,920 Speaker 3: big boss. We think they come now, we're gonna bust 1305 01:06:32,960 --> 01:06:35,880 Speaker 3: you out. Now it's over right, And this is people 1306 01:06:35,880 --> 01:06:39,080 Speaker 3: with no information. I totally don't think that, but I 1307 01:06:39,120 --> 01:06:41,160 Speaker 3: know people see them pulling. 1308 01:06:40,840 --> 01:06:43,000 Speaker 2: TikTok up to speak. 1309 01:06:42,720 --> 01:06:44,440 Speaker 3: In front of all these people, and they feel as 1310 01:06:44,440 --> 01:06:48,400 Speaker 3: though this is accountability of some sort, when in my opinion, 1311 01:06:48,840 --> 01:06:51,080 Speaker 3: I didn't really I didn't really see any. 1312 01:06:51,200 --> 01:06:54,160 Speaker 1: Yeah, you're seeing what's known as a dog and pony show. 1313 01:06:54,760 --> 01:06:58,960 Speaker 1: They're putting pressure, public pressure on TikTok. But what people 1314 01:06:58,960 --> 01:07:02,200 Speaker 1: don't realize is that they're there's a whole school house 1315 01:07:02,200 --> 01:07:05,600 Speaker 1: of attorneys prepping that CEO before they ever sit in 1316 01:07:05,640 --> 01:07:07,880 Speaker 1: front of the Senate, and then the Senate Intelligence or 1317 01:07:07,880 --> 01:07:12,000 Speaker 1: the Senate Committee that's holding the hearing is under American law, 1318 01:07:12,400 --> 01:07:14,920 Speaker 1: which means there are certain things they can't talk about 1319 01:07:14,920 --> 01:07:17,680 Speaker 1: according to American law, which is different than Chinese law. 1320 01:07:17,920 --> 01:07:20,880 Speaker 1: And which CEO are they talking to? Are they talking 1321 01:07:20,880 --> 01:07:23,480 Speaker 1: to the CEO of the Chinese company the CEO of 1322 01:07:23,560 --> 01:07:27,240 Speaker 1: the North American company? Because there's you can see businesses 1323 01:07:27,240 --> 01:07:30,680 Speaker 1: are there's a shell effect in business a lot and 1324 01:07:30,720 --> 01:07:34,680 Speaker 1: you shell off one business with another business name ll 1325 01:07:34,760 --> 01:07:38,280 Speaker 1: c's inside LLC's inside ll c's and there's tax benefits 1326 01:07:38,320 --> 01:07:40,440 Speaker 1: for doing that, but there's also legal benefits. 1327 01:07:40,040 --> 01:07:42,680 Speaker 2: For doing that. What are some of the ways that 1328 01:07:42,840 --> 01:07:44,320 Speaker 2: China infiltrates America. 1329 01:07:45,600 --> 01:07:47,960 Speaker 1: One of the biggest ways that China gets into the 1330 01:07:48,040 --> 01:07:52,640 Speaker 1: United States is through technology. They're very adept at cyber hacking, 1331 01:07:53,040 --> 01:07:57,400 Speaker 1: so whether they're a great example, actually just happened last year, 1332 01:07:58,320 --> 01:08:00,640 Speaker 1: I think it was last year. China found a way 1333 01:08:00,680 --> 01:08:04,520 Speaker 1: to hack into a company I forget their name right now, 1334 01:08:04,960 --> 01:08:10,200 Speaker 1: but the company was a cloud storage company that connected 1335 01:08:10,440 --> 01:08:14,200 Speaker 1: other companies to cloud storage. So by hacking into that 1336 01:08:14,840 --> 01:08:17,840 Speaker 1: storage company, what they were able to do is manipulate 1337 01:08:17,880 --> 01:08:20,120 Speaker 1: the code of that one company so that they could 1338 01:08:20,160 --> 01:08:25,520 Speaker 1: then follow the the hardwire connections and the digital connections 1339 01:08:25,520 --> 01:08:28,240 Speaker 1: into all of their clients, and their clients that were 1340 01:08:28,320 --> 01:08:32,719 Speaker 1: using their service included state government clients, federal government clients, 1341 01:08:32,760 --> 01:08:37,160 Speaker 1: military clients, you know, top tier Fortune ten company clients. 1342 01:08:37,479 --> 01:08:40,320 Speaker 1: And they get in there and they steal intellectual property, 1343 01:08:40,360 --> 01:08:43,200 Speaker 1: they steal personal data, they steal credit card data, they 1344 01:08:43,200 --> 01:08:45,880 Speaker 1: steal anything that could compromise the company. And they're not 1345 01:08:46,040 --> 01:08:49,439 Speaker 1: just interested in, like, you know, how does the United 1346 01:08:49,479 --> 01:08:52,640 Speaker 1: States create the next generation of software. They're not just 1347 01:08:52,720 --> 01:08:55,760 Speaker 1: interested in that. They're also interested in, you know, what 1348 01:08:55,920 --> 01:08:59,280 Speaker 1: is the voltage that's being used to power the servers? Wow, 1349 01:08:59,360 --> 01:09:02,839 Speaker 1: what is the type of wire that's connecting the primary 1350 01:09:02,880 --> 01:09:06,160 Speaker 1: server to the alternate server. They want all that information 1351 01:09:06,280 --> 01:09:09,040 Speaker 1: because if there's an efficiency that they can replicate for 1352 01:09:09,080 --> 01:09:11,720 Speaker 1: their own systems, they want it. But also they want 1353 01:09:11,760 --> 01:09:13,519 Speaker 1: to know how our systems work if they ever want. 1354 01:09:13,400 --> 01:09:14,839 Speaker 2: To crash it exactly. 1355 01:09:14,960 --> 01:09:18,120 Speaker 1: And it's not just at a national like a global war. 1356 01:09:18,560 --> 01:09:23,920 Speaker 1: It's also like if if you want a Chinese car manufacturer, 1357 01:09:23,920 --> 01:09:25,760 Speaker 1: the Chinese have been vying to be the number one 1358 01:09:25,760 --> 01:09:28,200 Speaker 1: producer of electric vehicles for a long time. Their number 1359 01:09:28,200 --> 01:09:31,000 Speaker 1: one competitor, of course, is in the United States. So 1360 01:09:31,080 --> 01:09:33,160 Speaker 1: the only way that China would ever actually get a 1361 01:09:33,240 --> 01:09:36,400 Speaker 1: chance to manufacture more electric vehicles than anybody else is 1362 01:09:36,439 --> 01:09:39,840 Speaker 1: either to win market share through quality of product, which 1363 01:09:40,200 --> 01:09:48,080 Speaker 1: won't happen, or create so much operational challenge for another Yes, 1364 01:09:48,400 --> 01:09:52,000 Speaker 1: slow it down, muck it up, make them lose money 1365 01:09:52,000 --> 01:09:53,760 Speaker 1: trying to fix a problem that they don't even know 1366 01:09:53,840 --> 01:09:57,320 Speaker 1: exists exactly. And that's that's industrial lesbianis. 1367 01:09:57,120 --> 01:10:00,840 Speaker 3: Wow, that is so crazy, wouldn't we Here's something like 1368 01:10:00,920 --> 01:10:05,200 Speaker 3: Putin has cancer? How does CIA get some information like 1369 01:10:05,240 --> 01:10:07,000 Speaker 3: that if we even heard it from CIA? 1370 01:10:07,400 --> 01:10:08,639 Speaker 1: CIA didn't get you that information? 1371 01:10:08,720 --> 01:10:11,160 Speaker 2: Okay, when we do so when we hear something like that, 1372 01:10:11,200 --> 01:10:12,000 Speaker 2: What is that about? 1373 01:10:12,080 --> 01:10:14,120 Speaker 1: The problem with the world that we live in right 1374 01:10:14,160 --> 01:10:16,240 Speaker 1: now is that we live in a world that's very 1375 01:10:16,360 --> 01:10:21,479 Speaker 1: much focused on sensational information, right We don't like we've 1376 01:10:21,520 --> 01:10:24,120 Speaker 1: become so accustomed in the industry in the information era, 1377 01:10:24,560 --> 01:10:28,000 Speaker 1: we've become so accustomed to getting any information we want 1378 01:10:28,040 --> 01:10:31,599 Speaker 1: when we want it, that we have stopped vetting the 1379 01:10:31,640 --> 01:10:35,439 Speaker 1: information itself. Wow, So that the idea that Putin had cancer, 1380 01:10:35,439 --> 01:10:36,720 Speaker 1: it's a great example. I was just talking about it 1381 01:10:36,760 --> 01:10:38,920 Speaker 1: with a client the other day. I think that was 1382 01:10:38,960 --> 01:10:42,040 Speaker 1: like April or May after they invaded. 1383 01:10:41,760 --> 01:10:44,000 Speaker 2: Last year, the year, and they just start saying, oh. 1384 01:10:43,920 --> 01:10:46,280 Speaker 1: Putin's got cancer, he's gonna he's got like health issues 1385 01:10:46,360 --> 01:10:48,640 Speaker 1: or as. And then what ends up happening is you 1386 01:10:48,680 --> 01:10:50,280 Speaker 1: never hear about it again, and that doesn't prove to 1387 01:10:50,280 --> 01:10:53,479 Speaker 1: be true. So somewhere somebody it could have been a blogger, 1388 01:10:53,800 --> 01:10:54,400 Speaker 1: it could have been. 1389 01:10:55,000 --> 01:10:56,439 Speaker 2: So you take it not to be true. 1390 01:10:56,520 --> 01:10:58,720 Speaker 1: You can't. There's well, first of all, when you when 1391 01:10:58,720 --> 01:11:01,679 Speaker 1: you heard the information, you only heard it from one stream. 1392 01:11:01,880 --> 01:11:03,559 Speaker 1: It was in the news primarily, right. 1393 01:11:04,360 --> 01:11:07,120 Speaker 3: But then they point to they point to like certain 1394 01:11:07,160 --> 01:11:10,360 Speaker 3: ways he does, certain things, like it's certain little things 1395 01:11:10,400 --> 01:11:13,759 Speaker 3: they point to, and it's like, I don't know. 1396 01:11:13,720 --> 01:11:16,599 Speaker 1: So you treat it like a data point, right, rreaty point. 1397 01:11:17,320 --> 01:11:19,760 Speaker 1: But do you get more like what do we get 1398 01:11:19,800 --> 01:11:22,240 Speaker 1: more data later that makes us really think that it's true? 1399 01:11:22,280 --> 01:11:24,800 Speaker 3: And I think some more stuff has came out now 1400 01:11:24,960 --> 01:11:28,080 Speaker 3: I think that one time they said, but again it's 1401 01:11:28,320 --> 01:11:32,000 Speaker 3: what what is it authentic that when it's coming out? 1402 01:11:32,160 --> 01:11:36,000 Speaker 3: But what is authentic nowadays? Again, because nobody vets information, 1403 01:11:36,120 --> 01:11:39,040 Speaker 3: so when when something comes out do we know do 1404 01:11:39,120 --> 01:11:41,040 Speaker 3: we don't know? So you so you take that not 1405 01:11:41,120 --> 01:11:44,840 Speaker 3: to be the case. You you don't think Putin has CANCD, correct. 1406 01:11:45,160 --> 01:11:47,759 Speaker 1: I think that Vladimir Putin, based on what the Vladimir 1407 01:11:47,840 --> 01:11:49,760 Speaker 1: Putin that I've been watching for the last year and 1408 01:11:49,800 --> 01:11:54,240 Speaker 1: a half longer, really that Vladimir Putin is full of energy. 1409 01:11:54,840 --> 01:11:57,120 Speaker 1: He may have cancer, but if he does, he's under 1410 01:11:57,160 --> 01:12:00,200 Speaker 1: some kind of very effective treatment, because the dude still 1411 01:12:00,200 --> 01:12:03,160 Speaker 1: seems to be active, he still seems to be strong, 1412 01:12:03,240 --> 01:12:05,519 Speaker 1: he still seems to be in control of Russia. He's 1413 01:12:05,560 --> 01:12:09,160 Speaker 1: still waging a war against Ukraine. Like he hasn't changed 1414 01:12:09,240 --> 01:12:12,280 Speaker 1: much from what I've seen from the guy the day 1415 01:12:12,320 --> 01:12:13,680 Speaker 1: before he invaded Ukraine. 1416 01:12:14,120 --> 01:12:19,599 Speaker 3: Okay, let's get to your thoughts on Ukraine and Russia's war. Yeah, 1417 01:12:19,880 --> 01:12:24,000 Speaker 3: can you give my audience a synopsis of what's going 1418 01:12:24,040 --> 01:12:24,639 Speaker 3: on over there. 1419 01:12:24,880 --> 01:12:30,000 Speaker 1: Yeah. So, in February twenty fourth of twenty twenty two, 1420 01:12:31,080 --> 01:12:34,679 Speaker 1: Russia invaded Ukraine. And that invasion has been called and lawful, 1421 01:12:34,680 --> 01:12:37,720 Speaker 1: it's been called illegal, it's been called an attack on democracy. 1422 01:12:37,720 --> 01:12:43,759 Speaker 1: There's a lot of political narrative around the invasion, but basically, 1423 01:12:43,800 --> 01:12:47,120 Speaker 1: starting on the day that they were invaded, Ukraine started 1424 01:12:47,120 --> 01:12:49,040 Speaker 1: getting a lot of support from the West, from the 1425 01:12:49,080 --> 01:12:53,240 Speaker 1: United States and from NATO, sending them weapons, sending them equipment, 1426 01:12:53,320 --> 01:12:56,080 Speaker 1: sending them medical goods, sending them anything they need to 1427 01:12:56,120 --> 01:13:01,080 Speaker 1: carry out their defense against the Russian invasion. And what's 1428 01:13:01,120 --> 01:13:04,360 Speaker 1: played out over the last sixteen or so months is 1429 01:13:04,400 --> 01:13:10,160 Speaker 1: that Ukraine, this small, poor country with no significant support 1430 01:13:10,200 --> 01:13:13,839 Speaker 1: from outside other than weapons and material, has been fighting 1431 01:13:13,880 --> 01:13:18,400 Speaker 1: back and defeating this invasion. On this Russian invasion, when 1432 01:13:18,400 --> 01:13:20,960 Speaker 1: everybody was so afraid that Russia was this powerful country, 1433 01:13:20,960 --> 01:13:22,600 Speaker 1: now it's starting to look like Russia's not such a 1434 01:13:22,600 --> 01:13:26,320 Speaker 1: powerful country. Now. We went into a ceaspire period, not 1435 01:13:26,400 --> 01:13:28,639 Speaker 1: a ceaspire, but we went into a period of reduced 1436 01:13:28,680 --> 01:13:32,960 Speaker 1: aggression in about November of last year, and since then 1437 01:13:33,360 --> 01:13:38,080 Speaker 1: people have been waiting for a counter offensive, another counter 1438 01:13:38,160 --> 01:13:43,519 Speaker 1: offensive from Ukraine and or another counter offensive from Russia 1439 01:13:43,960 --> 01:13:46,519 Speaker 1: to try to see where the war goes next. And 1440 01:13:46,560 --> 01:13:48,519 Speaker 1: that brings us to where we are today. People are 1441 01:13:48,760 --> 01:13:51,000 Speaker 1: waiting to see if this counter offense is going to happen. 1442 01:13:52,080 --> 01:13:55,920 Speaker 1: NATO and European and Western allies continue to send new 1443 01:13:55,960 --> 01:13:58,799 Speaker 1: weapons and new support to Ukraine to fight back against 1444 01:13:58,800 --> 01:14:05,160 Speaker 1: the Russians, and Russia continues to increase its defensive positions 1445 01:14:05,479 --> 01:14:09,400 Speaker 1: across eastern Ukraine, where it's taken over approximately seventeen percent 1446 01:14:09,520 --> 01:14:10,919 Speaker 1: of the Ukraine territory. 1447 01:14:11,040 --> 01:14:13,719 Speaker 2: So what's the motivation behind the war. 1448 01:14:14,000 --> 01:14:16,559 Speaker 1: This is what is so frustrating to me is that 1449 01:14:17,680 --> 01:14:21,960 Speaker 1: in media people aren't talking about the real motivation. They're 1450 01:14:22,080 --> 01:14:25,919 Speaker 1: calling it an attack on democracy, like Russia just decided 1451 01:14:25,960 --> 01:14:29,560 Speaker 1: one day to attack Ukraine because they were a democracy. 1452 01:14:30,400 --> 01:14:34,000 Speaker 1: That's not the case at all. In reality, Russia as 1453 01:14:34,040 --> 01:14:36,760 Speaker 1: a country does not have the capability, It doesn't have 1454 01:14:36,800 --> 01:14:40,320 Speaker 1: the resources on its own to be able to maintain 1455 01:14:41,720 --> 01:14:45,240 Speaker 1: a level a lifestyle or a healthy lifestyle for its 1456 01:14:45,320 --> 01:14:50,360 Speaker 1: own people by itself. Russia has always been part of 1457 01:14:50,400 --> 01:14:53,599 Speaker 1: what was known as a union of states. The most 1458 01:14:53,600 --> 01:14:57,639 Speaker 1: famous union was the Soviet Union. So Russia created this 1459 01:14:57,800 --> 01:15:01,120 Speaker 1: reliance where it had to rely on the other Soviet 1460 01:15:01,120 --> 01:15:04,880 Speaker 1: statellites so that it could feed and tax its own people. 1461 01:15:05,280 --> 01:15:09,080 Speaker 1: When the Soviet Union fell in nineteen ninety one nineteen 1462 01:15:09,120 --> 01:15:14,240 Speaker 1: eighty nine, when the Berlin Wall fell, Russia lost its 1463 01:15:14,280 --> 01:15:18,280 Speaker 1: satellite states. Now at the time they were all so 1464 01:15:19,160 --> 01:15:22,240 Speaker 1: mingled together, they all needed each other to survive. But 1465 01:15:22,280 --> 01:15:26,160 Speaker 1: then since ninety one, NATO in the West have started 1466 01:15:26,160 --> 01:15:29,680 Speaker 1: creating new alliances with the former Soviet states, so now 1467 01:15:29,720 --> 01:15:31,720 Speaker 1: if there are former Soviet states that are actually part 1468 01:15:31,760 --> 01:15:35,320 Speaker 1: of NATO. So in that process, what happened is Russia 1469 01:15:35,439 --> 01:15:38,519 Speaker 1: lost access to the resources that it needed to protect 1470 01:15:38,560 --> 01:15:42,280 Speaker 1: its own national security. One of those, one of the 1471 01:15:42,400 --> 01:15:46,679 Speaker 1: key most important resources that it has is the flow 1472 01:15:46,800 --> 01:15:50,880 Speaker 1: of natural gas and the flow of oil into Europe. 1473 01:15:50,960 --> 01:15:53,639 Speaker 1: And guess where all of that oil and gas flows 1474 01:15:53,680 --> 01:15:59,280 Speaker 1: through Russia, Ukraine, Ukraine. It all flows through eastern Ukraine. 1475 01:15:59,800 --> 01:16:03,839 Speaker 1: So if Russia loses Ukraine, if Ukraine becomes pro Western, 1476 01:16:03,920 --> 01:16:06,519 Speaker 1: if Ukraine becomes part of NATO, if Ukraine becomes a 1477 01:16:06,520 --> 01:16:10,639 Speaker 1: country that has then it can essentially cut Russia off 1478 01:16:11,280 --> 01:16:13,559 Speaker 1: from being able to sell US fuel and oil anywhere. 1479 01:16:13,680 --> 01:16:15,320 Speaker 3: And that's what I was going to ask you about 1480 01:16:15,320 --> 01:16:18,240 Speaker 3: the energy dependence and all of that, because I knew 1481 01:16:18,320 --> 01:16:22,880 Speaker 3: that it was some underlying happening with that. 1482 01:16:22,880 --> 01:16:23,879 Speaker 2: That's so crazy. 1483 01:16:23,960 --> 01:16:27,720 Speaker 1: It's not an attack on democracy. Ukraine was never a democracy, right. 1484 01:16:27,920 --> 01:16:30,920 Speaker 1: Amnesty International and multiple think tanks around the world have 1485 01:16:31,000 --> 01:16:34,439 Speaker 1: looked at Ukraine and looked at Ukraine going back back 1486 01:16:34,479 --> 01:16:36,760 Speaker 1: to two thousand and one and before, and it has 1487 01:16:36,840 --> 01:16:41,679 Speaker 1: always been a struggling or transitional democracy, and it struggles 1488 01:16:41,720 --> 01:16:44,879 Speaker 1: because it's heavily corrupt. It's based off of an archaic 1489 01:16:45,920 --> 01:16:49,559 Speaker 1: Soviet system. Right, it is not a fair and open 1490 01:16:50,520 --> 01:16:53,240 Speaker 1: place with human rights. It's not a democracy. It's scored 1491 01:16:53,560 --> 01:16:56,439 Speaker 1: I think it's scored a six out of ten, possibly 1492 01:16:56,520 --> 01:16:59,760 Speaker 1: less in terms of Amnesty International's ratings for a first 1493 01:16:59,800 --> 01:17:02,960 Speaker 1: world world country or for a fair and equal democracy. 1494 01:17:03,680 --> 01:17:05,680 Speaker 1: One of the first things Ukraine did after they were 1495 01:17:05,680 --> 01:17:12,280 Speaker 1: invaded is they conscribed They conscripted all men to mandatory 1496 01:17:12,320 --> 01:17:16,120 Speaker 1: service in the military. That is a human rights violation, right. 1497 01:17:16,240 --> 01:17:19,760 Speaker 1: You cannot restrict the freedom of movement based on gender, right, 1498 01:17:19,960 --> 01:17:22,400 Speaker 1: And that's exactly what they did. So it's really tricky 1499 01:17:23,040 --> 01:17:27,479 Speaker 1: because the most of most of the societies is only 1500 01:17:27,560 --> 01:17:32,080 Speaker 1: told what benefits the narrative. Because newspapers want people to 1501 01:17:32,120 --> 01:17:33,960 Speaker 1: read the news, and they want people to be angry, 1502 01:17:33,960 --> 01:17:35,639 Speaker 1: and they want people to be offended, and they want 1503 01:17:35,640 --> 01:17:37,040 Speaker 1: people to come back the next day and buy the 1504 01:17:37,040 --> 01:17:40,439 Speaker 1: newspaper again, or click on the ad or click on 1505 01:17:40,479 --> 01:17:42,559 Speaker 1: the website. Right, they want that, So they have to 1506 01:17:42,640 --> 01:17:46,880 Speaker 1: tell a story from a certain direction that triggers your emotions. 1507 01:17:47,320 --> 01:17:49,880 Speaker 1: That's us dealing with propaganda all over it. 1508 01:17:50,080 --> 01:17:51,840 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, and that's to me. 1509 01:17:52,200 --> 01:17:54,960 Speaker 3: I look at propaganda, and I see even when I 1510 01:17:55,000 --> 01:17:58,160 Speaker 3: think about China and COVID, I say, man, we dealt 1511 01:17:58,200 --> 01:18:03,120 Speaker 3: with a lot of propaganda even in that facet. How 1512 01:18:03,160 --> 01:18:07,320 Speaker 3: did the CIA, or how would someone in that position, 1513 01:18:07,439 --> 01:18:08,840 Speaker 3: how did you view COVID? 1514 01:18:09,040 --> 01:18:11,599 Speaker 2: Was that attack or was that so? 1515 01:18:11,960 --> 01:18:14,400 Speaker 1: My my assessment of COVID is that COVID was a 1516 01:18:14,479 --> 01:18:20,519 Speaker 1: legitimate mutation of a virus that was novel. Right. It 1517 01:18:20,600 --> 01:18:23,520 Speaker 1: wasn't engineered, it wasn't created. 1518 01:18:23,120 --> 01:18:23,200 Speaker 2: And. 1519 01:18:24,760 --> 01:18:27,760 Speaker 1: I do not believe it was. I believe that there 1520 01:18:27,800 --> 01:18:28,320 Speaker 1: was a lab. 1521 01:18:28,560 --> 01:18:29,120 Speaker 2: I believe that. 1522 01:18:29,080 --> 01:18:31,920 Speaker 1: People were looking at chemical and biological warfare. I do 1523 01:18:32,000 --> 01:18:37,439 Speaker 1: not believe that somebody successfully on paper created COVID and 1524 01:18:37,479 --> 01:18:41,479 Speaker 1: then replicated that plan in a in a test tube 1525 01:18:41,720 --> 01:18:45,679 Speaker 1: and then released it on its own population. I don't 1526 01:18:45,680 --> 01:18:48,080 Speaker 1: believe that that happened. What I do believe is that 1527 01:18:48,120 --> 01:18:51,120 Speaker 1: maybe they were trying to create a supervirus and then 1528 01:18:51,160 --> 01:18:54,760 Speaker 1: somebody dropped the test tube and some bat got infected, 1529 01:18:55,080 --> 01:18:57,440 Speaker 1: and then that bat carried it to a rat, et cetera, 1530 01:18:57,640 --> 01:18:58,720 Speaker 1: and some lesser furs. 1531 01:19:00,200 --> 01:19:02,680 Speaker 3: While because this is a good one, so you do 1532 01:19:02,800 --> 01:19:06,400 Speaker 3: not believe helped me under I mean, there's a lot 1533 01:19:06,479 --> 01:19:11,360 Speaker 3: being said about again this being engineered. There's a lot 1534 01:19:11,400 --> 01:19:15,440 Speaker 3: of great minds that believe this may have been engineered, 1535 01:19:15,600 --> 01:19:18,000 Speaker 3: and you're saying, give me some reasons why you do 1536 01:19:18,080 --> 01:19:18,800 Speaker 3: not believe that. 1537 01:19:19,200 --> 01:19:23,439 Speaker 1: So the there's a difference. First of all, I think 1538 01:19:23,479 --> 01:19:23,920 Speaker 1: a lot. 1539 01:19:23,800 --> 01:19:28,200 Speaker 3: Of the narrative engineered and released intentionally, yes, right, because 1540 01:19:28,200 --> 01:19:31,400 Speaker 3: it was engineered. Could have been engineered, because we do 1541 01:19:31,560 --> 01:19:33,240 Speaker 3: engineer these things, right. 1542 01:19:33,280 --> 01:19:35,080 Speaker 1: So there's a couple of things, right. So, first of all, 1543 01:19:35,080 --> 01:19:37,040 Speaker 1: I feel like a lot of the narrative that people 1544 01:19:37,080 --> 01:19:39,400 Speaker 1: are hearing, even from the great minds, talking about an 1545 01:19:39,479 --> 01:19:44,920 Speaker 1: engineered virus, there's a lot of the narrative that's leaving 1546 01:19:45,000 --> 01:19:47,760 Speaker 1: out the details of what they're saying. So what a 1547 01:19:47,760 --> 01:19:50,160 Speaker 1: lot of big minds are saying is that there was 1548 01:19:50,200 --> 01:19:54,920 Speaker 1: an that people have been engineering. The coronavirus, right. The 1549 01:19:54,920 --> 01:19:57,920 Speaker 1: coronavirus is a is a type of cell, a type 1550 01:19:57,920 --> 01:20:01,599 Speaker 1: of viral cell that can attach itself and spread easily. 1551 01:20:02,040 --> 01:20:05,080 Speaker 1: There's lots of reasons that you would engineer a virus 1552 01:20:05,160 --> 01:20:09,240 Speaker 1: like that and work to use it to create something. 1553 01:20:09,360 --> 01:20:12,320 Speaker 1: You could use a virus like that secure cancer. You 1554 01:20:12,320 --> 01:20:16,120 Speaker 1: could use a virus like that to cure disease because 1555 01:20:16,160 --> 01:20:19,000 Speaker 1: it spreads and it attaches very easily, so there's lots 1556 01:20:19,040 --> 01:20:21,760 Speaker 1: of reasons why people would be investigating how do we 1557 01:20:21,920 --> 01:20:25,720 Speaker 1: use this coronavirus to do something positive? And that means 1558 01:20:25,720 --> 01:20:28,599 Speaker 1: there's also reasons that you would look at creating weapons 1559 01:20:28,600 --> 01:21:09,200 Speaker 1: out of it too. 1560 01:21:14,640 --> 01:21:16,840 Speaker 2: What's going on in your boy, big Loon? Right now? 1561 01:21:16,880 --> 01:21:18,880 Speaker 3: If you looked at this clip and you enjoyed it, 1562 01:21:18,960 --> 01:21:22,000 Speaker 3: hit subscribe watch the next video. We on the road 1563 01:21:22,040 --> 01:21:25,880 Speaker 3: to one hundred k subscribers on YouTube. If you're a fan, 1564 01:21:26,000 --> 01:21:29,799 Speaker 3: come to Patreon. We got exclusive videos there and also 1565 01:21:29,880 --> 01:21:31,320 Speaker 3: the show with just Me alone. 1566 01:21:31,520 --> 01:21:35,400 Speaker 2: Salute to the supporters. Verify your customers and know whose 1567 01:21:35,400 --> 01:21:37,800 Speaker 2: your viewers. It's up There podcast. Let's get it yo? 1568 01:21:37,880 --> 01:21:40,160 Speaker 2: What up this Big Loon? This is? It's up There 1569 01:21:40,240 --> 01:21:40,840 Speaker 2: Podcast