WEBVTT - Howard Marks Says to Expect 5% Returns Now If You Start From Scratch

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to the Bloomberg p m L Podcast. I'm pim Fox.

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<v Speaker 1>Along with my co host Lisa Bramowitz. Each day we

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<v Speaker 1>bring you the most important, noteworthy, and useful interviews for

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<v Speaker 1>you and your money, whether you're at the grocery store

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<v Speaker 1>or the trading floor. Find the Bloomberg p m L

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<v Speaker 1>Podcast on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud, and Bloomberg dot com. Howard Marks,

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<v Speaker 1>I loved your memo. Thank you for coming in. Howard Marks,

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<v Speaker 1>of course, is a legendary investor in depth markets and

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<v Speaker 1>across all asset classes. Frankly, co founder of oak Tree

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<v Speaker 1>Capital Management. Uh, Howard, in your memo, you really outlined

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<v Speaker 1>conditions that would necessitate being more cautious. Are we setting

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<v Speaker 1>up conditions that are similar to what we saw in

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand six two thousand seven, that are particip precipitating

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<v Speaker 1>a pretty big downturn? Well, Lisa, it's easy to say

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<v Speaker 1>we are seeing risky behavior in kind, but I don't

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<v Speaker 1>think at all in degree. I mean, the conditions of

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<v Speaker 1>oh six seven were uh exceptionally excessive and gave rise to,

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<v Speaker 1>of course, the worst UH financial experience of a lifetime. UM,

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<v Speaker 1>I don't think we're nowhere near in that territory. Now, yes,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean the private sector and especially the financial sector

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<v Speaker 1>is nowhere near as levered as it was at that time.

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<v Speaker 1>And uh they in many cases the leverage where you

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<v Speaker 1>was used to invest in subprime related mortgage backed securities. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>And I don't think there's an analog to those now.

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<v Speaker 1>So I'm not saying that we're looking at that. All

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<v Speaker 1>I'm saying, and maybe I didn't make it clear enough,

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<v Speaker 1>although I think I did, is that is that there

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<v Speaker 1>is a time for caution and there's a time for aggressiveness,

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<v Speaker 1>and they're different, and it's important for a professional investor

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<v Speaker 1>to make the distinction. And I believe that in relative terms,

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<v Speaker 1>this is a time when one should emphasize caution over aggressiveness.

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<v Speaker 1>And to be clear, even though you are saying caution,

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<v Speaker 1>you're not saying and you specifically said that, you are

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<v Speaker 1>not saying that this is a nonsensical bubble. Uh. It

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<v Speaker 1>just there is high risk and valuations are high. So

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<v Speaker 1>how do you proceed with caution? Can you give us

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<v Speaker 1>an example of a type of asset that would be

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<v Speaker 1>an appropriate by at this time? My point is that

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<v Speaker 1>within each investment strategy, there are aggressive ways to pursue

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<v Speaker 1>it and defensive ways to pursue it. Uh. An example,

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<v Speaker 1>one of our activities is distress debt. The higher you

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<v Speaker 1>are in the capital structure, the more dependably you make money.

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<v Speaker 1>But when things go well, the less money you make.

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<v Speaker 1>So do you want to be high in the capital

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<v Speaker 1>structure and have a very high probability of making money

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<v Speaker 1>or low in the capital structure and maximize the return

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<v Speaker 1>in good outcomes? And I would say that if in

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<v Speaker 1>a time for caution, you would move towards senior securities,

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<v Speaker 1>increase your probability of making money, decrease the absolute payoff

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<v Speaker 1>when things go great. So you're you're willing to pay

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<v Speaker 1>higher prices for better secured assets even though the absolute

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<v Speaker 1>return will be substantially less. Right, Well, what you what

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<v Speaker 1>you call higher prices? I would say, we're willing to

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<v Speaker 1>accept lower prospective returns for for greater safety. That's what

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<v Speaker 1>it's all about. If the conservative investor accepts lower expected

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<v Speaker 1>returns as the price for greater safety. There are times

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<v Speaker 1>when that's highly appropriate. There are times when that's highly inappropriate.

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<v Speaker 1>Our job is to figure out which this is. So. UM,

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<v Speaker 1>I've heard a lot of pension funds in particular say

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<v Speaker 1>that they are seeking returns and safety from this sort

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<v Speaker 1>of a bulliant environment in private debt markets, and there

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<v Speaker 1>seems to be quite a lot of cash flowing into

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<v Speaker 1>private debt. Has it gone too far? And is it

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<v Speaker 1>keeping companies alive that perhaps shouldn't be. I can't say

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<v Speaker 1>too far it's gone far. The point is everybody says, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>you should do this, We were the only ones who

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<v Speaker 1>have thought of that. Every If everybody is saying you

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<v Speaker 1>should do this because we're the only ones who thought

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<v Speaker 1>of it, then it's really obviously not as novel a

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<v Speaker 1>solution as they're suggesting. So so the eye da private

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<v Speaker 1>lending UH is not undiscovered. Money has flowed in. I

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<v Speaker 1>can't tell you whether it's an appropriate amount or too much. Clearly,

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<v Speaker 1>the market is more competitive to make loans than it

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<v Speaker 1>used to be, and when market is more competitive, that

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<v Speaker 1>implies lower prospective returns. UH. I still think, however, that

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<v Speaker 1>private lending is more appropriate today than than buying public

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<v Speaker 1>securities because the public money can't get to the private

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<v Speaker 1>lending opportunities. UH. And I think that the public quest

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<v Speaker 1>for high returns in a low return world has caused

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of money to flow into senior loans and

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<v Speaker 1>hi your bonds and so forth. And that is less

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<v Speaker 1>true about uh, the private dead market. But I'll add

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<v Speaker 1>one thing. When you move away from public markets, which

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<v Speaker 1>nowadays we kind of call beta markets because the return, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>your return is determined by the turn of the market

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<v Speaker 1>in large part. To alpha markets, where your return is

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<v Speaker 1>largely a factor of the skill of the manager, you

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<v Speaker 1>are accepting a new kind of risk which is substantial

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<v Speaker 1>dependence on the skill of the manager, which is different

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<v Speaker 1>than being in public markets, are being in an index fund. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, talking about index funds, you talked about the

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<v Speaker 1>threat of all of the money that moved in moving

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<v Speaker 1>out in tandem. UM. I hear a lot about cash

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<v Speaker 1>on the sidelines, and I'm not sure exactly what they're

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<v Speaker 1>talking about. I think to a large degree they're talking

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<v Speaker 1>about private equity funds that have all this dry powder

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<v Speaker 1>lying around. To what extent will that cash on the

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<v Speaker 1>sidelines buffer any declines, Well, it depends on where they

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<v Speaker 1>are and whether the cash on the sidelines is so

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<v Speaker 1>always say flexible. For example, we raised money for distress

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<v Speaker 1>debt fund in the expectation that there would be an

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<v Speaker 1>opportunity for distress which has not materialized yet. Admittedly, um,

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<v Speaker 1>and you know, if there is such an opportunity, we're

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<v Speaker 1>gonna swing into actually gonna put that money to work.

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<v Speaker 1>This is something we've done in the past. Well, we

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<v Speaker 1>hope to do it in the future if there's we

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<v Speaker 1>hope there will be an opportunity, and we hope to

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<v Speaker 1>do a good job with it. But given the nature

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<v Speaker 1>of the investment business, if uh, if let's say, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>to follow your argument, money flowed out of e t

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<v Speaker 1>F s and they had to sell the high flyers

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<v Speaker 1>that have done so well based on e t F

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<v Speaker 1>buying and they had to become sellers, and that drove

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<v Speaker 1>them down. We couldn't buy that because we can't take

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<v Speaker 1>the money we raise for distressed debt funds and buy

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<v Speaker 1>public equities. So uh. You know, in in the institutional

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<v Speaker 1>investment business, we talk about something called buckets. Which bucket

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<v Speaker 1>is your money for and our bucket is for private

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<v Speaker 1>distress debt. We can't take that money and buy put

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<v Speaker 1>it into a different bucket, which is public equities. So

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<v Speaker 1>if the if most of the dry powder is in

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<v Speaker 1>private equity and private debt and so forth, anybody who says, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, if the market goes down, those private equity

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<v Speaker 1>guys will just go in and buy them up. It's

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<v Speaker 1>unlikely because people don't step out of their bucket that often.

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<v Speaker 1>So this is fascinating. Does that mean that there's more

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<v Speaker 1>of a floor under prices of private debt, say, or

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<v Speaker 1>distress debt than there is for equities. Well, of course

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<v Speaker 1>the private debt or distressed debt guys would say no, no,

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<v Speaker 1>we're gonna let it drop before we buy. But clearly,

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<v Speaker 1>the more buying power there is on the sidelines, the

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<v Speaker 1>more there's a floor, the less uh things will will

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<v Speaker 1>drop unremittingly, you were talking about how you don't think

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<v Speaker 1>that there is the same degree of leverage at investment

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<v Speaker 1>banks that there was leading up to the two crash.

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<v Speaker 1>I am hearing more about leverage being used by hedge funds,

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<v Speaker 1>in particular to buy equities and investment grade credit. How

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<v Speaker 1>concerned are you about this? Have you been hearing about this?

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<v Speaker 1>The willingness to use more leverage after the market has

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<v Speaker 1>risen making people feel good is indicative of, in my opinion,

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<v Speaker 1>the need for caution. UH. If people are using leverage

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<v Speaker 1>today who didn't use leverage five years ago, well, is

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<v Speaker 1>it is today a better buying opportunity or a worse

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<v Speaker 1>buying opportunity? Is it safer today or risk here? I

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<v Speaker 1>would say it's a worse buying opportunity. It's risk here.

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<v Speaker 1>So why are you using leverage today that you didn't

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<v Speaker 1>use five years ago? The answer is, given the low

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<v Speaker 1>prospective returns in all markets, it's hard to make money today,

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<v Speaker 1>so more and more people resort to leverage. Leverage does

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<v Speaker 1>not make an investment better. It only magnifies the results.

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<v Speaker 1>It magnifies the gains if there are gains, and losses

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<v Speaker 1>if there are losses. And uh So, the question is

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<v Speaker 1>why would you use leverage today that you didn't use

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<v Speaker 1>five years ago. It's by the way, you know, in

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<v Speaker 1>Las Vegas, Lisa, they say the more you bet, the

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<v Speaker 1>more you win when you win. Now, you can't argue

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<v Speaker 1>with that statement, but but any intelligent person should see

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<v Speaker 1>the fallacy. Uh you know you're talking about the private

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<v Speaker 1>equity and then in the cash being raised. I'm wondering,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, we have heard about the record amount of

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<v Speaker 1>money new record funds for buyouts or private debt. Do

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<v Speaker 1>you think that the worst case scenario for these is

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<v Speaker 1>that returns will be much lower, or that it could

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<v Speaker 1>potentially be even worse than that. The most likely negative

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<v Speaker 1>repercussion is that returns will be hard to come by

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<v Speaker 1>and maybe lower than investors have in mind. There's always

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<v Speaker 1>the possibility of negative returns, uh, but that would require uh,

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<v Speaker 1>something nearly cataclysmic, you know. I think that. I think

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<v Speaker 1>that in oh eight, when the global financial crisis was

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<v Speaker 1>raging after the Lehman bankruptcy, I believe that the private

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<v Speaker 1>equity font in general, the funds of oh five, six, seven,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe eight, we're looking at the prospect of losing money.

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<v Speaker 1>It happens that the government did a great job of

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<v Speaker 1>bailing out the financial sector, which reopened the credit window,

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<v Speaker 1>which enabled those companies to refinance their debts and push

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<v Speaker 1>them off. And also, of course, the government's bail out

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<v Speaker 1>brought back the economy and brought an end to the

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<v Speaker 1>to a significant recession. And the combination of those things

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<v Speaker 1>meant that those funds will now have moderate, I believe,

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<v Speaker 1>high single digit returns, and everybody will say, oh, not

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<v Speaker 1>so bad, and the returns on those funds will not

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<v Speaker 1>be bad. I believe they could have been worse, but

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<v Speaker 1>for the things that went right. So talking about returns

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<v Speaker 1>just last day, I want to touch base with you

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<v Speaker 1>on what you expect to be appropriate expectations for returns

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<v Speaker 1>for say, pension funds at this point. What's an appropriate

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<v Speaker 1>market if you if if if you walked into a

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<v Speaker 1>pension fund today which had no investments, and you were

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<v Speaker 1>given a pile of cash, and you invested today intelligently,

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<v Speaker 1>prudently but not shrinking from risk, I think you could

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<v Speaker 1>expect to make something in the vicinity of five in

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<v Speaker 1>the in the in the coming years from today. UM.

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<v Speaker 1>If you take more risk and everything goes right, you'll

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<v Speaker 1>make more, and vice versa. UM. The problem is, most

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<v Speaker 1>pension funds need seven and a half to make the

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<v Speaker 1>math work to make today's assets turn into enough to

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<v Speaker 1>pay tomorrow's benefits. Uh. And I think that making seven

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<v Speaker 1>a half from today will be quite a challenge and

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<v Speaker 1>will necessitate two things substantial risk taking and and good outcomes,

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<v Speaker 1>which means that there is a bigger risk of negative

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<v Speaker 1>outcomes and UH, much lower than even To respond to

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<v Speaker 1>the Las Vegas people, the more you bet, the more

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<v Speaker 1>you lose when you lose, So you can't have it

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<v Speaker 1>both ways. And I think that most investors see that

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<v Speaker 1>today's low return environment necessitates substantial risk taking. But substantial

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<v Speaker 1>risk taking, if it runs into bad outcomes, will will

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<v Speaker 1>lead to disappointment. That's all we can say for sure.

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<v Speaker 1>Poward Marks, thank you so much for joining. Thank you,

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<v Speaker 1>Poward Marks, co founder of oak Tree Capital Management. I

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<v Speaker 1>can hear Chris Salman singing this song. Chris Salman, the

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<v Speaker 1>chief investment officer of the California State Teachers Retirement System.

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<v Speaker 1>I believe he's got a little bit more than two

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<v Speaker 1>eight billion dollars under management. Chris, you're on your bicycle

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<v Speaker 1>now you have one in your office too. I know,

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<v Speaker 1>I wish I was. I actually tore the meniscus in

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<v Speaker 1>my knee dancing at my daughter's wedding. So I am

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<v Speaker 1>off my bike summer, but surgery. I'll be back soon, hopefully.

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<v Speaker 1>Well it was allah. It was all on a good cause,

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<v Speaker 1>as they say, exactly. I was dipping her. I I

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<v Speaker 1>have father daughter dance. I got to dip her and

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<v Speaker 1>boom out with my knee. I didn't drop though, So

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<v Speaker 1>it's okay. It was wonderful. Well good, Yeah, that that's

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<v Speaker 1>that's sort of like the investment philosophy, right, you know,

0:14:50.520 --> 0:14:52.920
<v Speaker 1>you take the risk and then you hope that nothing

0:14:52.960 --> 0:14:56.360
<v Speaker 1>bad happens and you bounce back. Good for you. Agree

0:14:56.480 --> 0:15:00.240
<v Speaker 1>with Howard Marks. But I have a couple of other

0:15:00.280 --> 0:15:02.440
<v Speaker 1>points to raise. Well, I want you to raise them.

0:15:02.440 --> 0:15:04.800
<v Speaker 1>I just want to offer people the context for that

0:15:04.880 --> 0:15:08.200
<v Speaker 1>California State Teachers Retirement System, which of course is the

0:15:08.240 --> 0:15:12.440
<v Speaker 1>second largest US pension fund, you earned thirteen point four

0:15:12.520 --> 0:15:17.880
<v Speaker 1>percent in the fiscal year ended June. Well done, there

0:15:17.880 --> 0:15:19.600
<v Speaker 1>you go. That does that make up for the for

0:15:19.640 --> 0:15:22.840
<v Speaker 1>the bad years? You know? Well, look at this tim

0:15:22.920 --> 0:15:26.880
<v Speaker 1>we made ten percent over five years. We've made just

0:15:27.080 --> 0:15:32.560
<v Speaker 1>about seven percent over the last twenty years net of fees.

0:15:33.160 --> 0:15:37.280
<v Speaker 1>That includes two very nasty recessions. So well, that's that

0:15:37.400 --> 0:15:39.400
<v Speaker 1>seven and a half bogey, right the seven and a

0:15:39.400 --> 0:15:43.200
<v Speaker 1>half percent the hurdle. No, it is below that, but

0:15:43.280 --> 0:15:46.360
<v Speaker 1>it's right out about seven. We're lowering our assumption rate

0:15:46.720 --> 0:15:48.760
<v Speaker 1>from seven and a half seven in the corner last

0:15:48.840 --> 0:15:52.160
<v Speaker 1>year seven percent this coming year. So you said that

0:15:52.200 --> 0:15:56.360
<v Speaker 1>you had some some responses to Howard Marks's comments where

0:15:56.360 --> 0:16:00.440
<v Speaker 1>he basically said that going forward, if pension funds were

0:16:00.520 --> 0:16:03.720
<v Speaker 1>to invest new money today, all of their money knew,

0:16:04.040 --> 0:16:08.240
<v Speaker 1>not including older legacy investments. That they could probably reliably

0:16:08.320 --> 0:16:12.880
<v Speaker 1>get a five percent return without taking excessive risk and

0:16:13.000 --> 0:16:16.440
<v Speaker 1>risking potential losses. Do you agree with that? Let me

0:16:16.520 --> 0:16:19.920
<v Speaker 1>frame the way, and I think for your investor listeners

0:16:19.920 --> 0:16:23.280
<v Speaker 1>that would help to frame that. Think about two thousand,

0:16:23.440 --> 0:16:27.120
<v Speaker 1>sixteen and seventeen as a vintage year. So your IRA

0:16:27.320 --> 0:16:30.880
<v Speaker 1>contribution this year, your money, if you invested it, as

0:16:30.920 --> 0:16:35.040
<v Speaker 1>you're saying, this year new money, what's a realistic expectation

0:16:35.200 --> 0:16:39.280
<v Speaker 1>for that over the near term? Five percent might be

0:16:39.440 --> 0:16:44.440
<v Speaker 1>acceptable The differences I invest every year again and again

0:16:44.600 --> 0:16:47.600
<v Speaker 1>for thirty years. So right now my portfolio, I have

0:16:47.720 --> 0:16:51.240
<v Speaker 1>investments that are over twenty five years old that were

0:16:51.280 --> 0:16:54.120
<v Speaker 1>made in the at the end of the nineties, where

0:16:54.160 --> 0:16:57.120
<v Speaker 1>they're going to have a double digit return, and I

0:16:57.160 --> 0:17:00.320
<v Speaker 1>think seven percent over the next thirty years is a

0:17:00.360 --> 0:17:03.400
<v Speaker 1>realistic number if you use today as a starting date.

0:17:03.440 --> 0:17:09.240
<v Speaker 1>And that's where Howard's coming from. Capital asset prices are expensive,

0:17:09.280 --> 0:17:13.640
<v Speaker 1>whether it's equities, public securities, and private securities are almost

0:17:13.680 --> 0:17:17.760
<v Speaker 1>priced to perfection, and so we recognize that new money

0:17:17.760 --> 0:17:20.120
<v Speaker 1>going to work this year may not have that great

0:17:20.119 --> 0:17:23.159
<v Speaker 1>of our return. This vintage year for private equity, this

0:17:23.359 --> 0:17:26.680
<v Speaker 1>vintage year for real estate, you can't expect to buy

0:17:26.680 --> 0:17:30.080
<v Speaker 1>a building at these prices and have a really high return.

0:17:30.720 --> 0:17:33.760
<v Speaker 1>But as he pointed out, when prices dropped, and that's

0:17:33.800 --> 0:17:37.000
<v Speaker 1>when Howard loves to invest. When when prices go down,

0:17:37.720 --> 0:17:39.800
<v Speaker 1>then he'll come into the market, and so will we.

0:17:40.440 --> 0:17:44.080
<v Speaker 1>I often say we're countercyclical. We have thirty year money.

0:17:44.240 --> 0:17:46.640
<v Speaker 1>We don't have to buy at the top. We can

0:17:46.680 --> 0:17:49.800
<v Speaker 1>wait and be patient and and look for lower prices.

0:17:49.880 --> 0:17:52.679
<v Speaker 1>And that's been a big discussion of my staff. I

0:17:52.800 --> 0:17:54.879
<v Speaker 1>was just with a group of c I O s

0:17:54.960 --> 0:17:58.320
<v Speaker 1>up in Canada last week. That was our key discussion

0:17:58.400 --> 0:18:02.920
<v Speaker 1>was asset prices being perfection. How much dry powder should

0:18:02.960 --> 0:18:07.159
<v Speaker 1>you hold back? How cautious should you be? Are you

0:18:07.160 --> 0:18:10.320
<v Speaker 1>holding back? Well? Right now, we're over two percent in cash,

0:18:10.400 --> 0:18:13.320
<v Speaker 1>and my staff met last week and is talking about

0:18:13.400 --> 0:18:16.840
<v Speaker 1>potentially raising that. We've been taking profits, Lisa, in this

0:18:17.040 --> 0:18:20.240
<v Speaker 1>US equity market since the start of the year. Every

0:18:20.240 --> 0:18:22.200
<v Speaker 1>time it hits the new high, we just shave off

0:18:22.240 --> 0:18:24.719
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of that profit. We've been putting that

0:18:24.800 --> 0:18:27.920
<v Speaker 1>in Europe and in Asia, but also building up our

0:18:28.359 --> 0:18:33.080
<v Speaker 1>our de risking assets, assets that that do better or

0:18:33.119 --> 0:18:36.600
<v Speaker 1>hold value when the markets go down. Um so those

0:18:36.640 --> 0:18:38.840
<v Speaker 1>assets didn't do well last year because the market was

0:18:38.920 --> 0:18:43.159
<v Speaker 1>up so so strong. But we're trying to balance that portfolio.

0:18:43.240 --> 0:18:45.560
<v Speaker 1>You've heard me say a year after year to the

0:18:45.640 --> 0:18:49.480
<v Speaker 1>to the listeners. It's all about rebalancing your asset allocation.

0:18:49.680 --> 0:18:54.080
<v Speaker 1>Don't let your equities run, rebalance into the less risky assets.

0:18:54.320 --> 0:18:57.240
<v Speaker 1>And I think that's what Howard's saying. Well, Chris Alman,

0:18:57.680 --> 0:18:59.719
<v Speaker 1>you know you you spend a lot of time listening

0:18:59.720 --> 0:19:02.119
<v Speaker 1>to hundits and experts, and you know you read all

0:19:02.200 --> 0:19:05.160
<v Speaker 1>the reports. I mean, what you're what you're proposing sounds

0:19:05.200 --> 0:19:08.119
<v Speaker 1>pretty reasonable and you don't necessarily need a PhD to

0:19:08.160 --> 0:19:11.359
<v Speaker 1>figure this out? Or do you? No, you don't. I

0:19:11.400 --> 0:19:14.720
<v Speaker 1>listen to you. You're the pundits expert. Don't do that.

0:19:15.200 --> 0:19:16.720
<v Speaker 1>You know that I listen to you. I ride my

0:19:16.760 --> 0:19:19.160
<v Speaker 1>bike to work sometimes I and I listen to you guys,

0:19:19.640 --> 0:19:23.280
<v Speaker 1>so and I hear and you're right. But my point is,

0:19:23.280 --> 0:19:25.560
<v Speaker 1>every time you ask, Chris, every time you ask someone

0:19:25.720 --> 0:19:29.560
<v Speaker 1>went to sell, no one ever has an answer. Oh exactly.

0:19:29.600 --> 0:19:32.679
<v Speaker 1>But but look at the stage advice from people like

0:19:32.720 --> 0:19:36.800
<v Speaker 1>Warren Buffett. You buy when everybody is nervous, and you

0:19:36.840 --> 0:19:40.040
<v Speaker 1>sell when everybody is greedy. So right now things are

0:19:40.080 --> 0:19:42.840
<v Speaker 1>priced to perfection. But even as Howard, he put out

0:19:42.840 --> 0:19:46.320
<v Speaker 1>a newsletter last week where he said it's it's they're

0:19:46.359 --> 0:19:50.160
<v Speaker 1>at it again again, but he admits he's often early.

0:19:50.240 --> 0:19:52.280
<v Speaker 1>We're at the we're in the late stages of this

0:19:52.359 --> 0:19:55.800
<v Speaker 1>economic expansion. But it could last for another year or

0:19:55.840 --> 0:19:59.000
<v Speaker 1>even two years. You don't know when it will crack.

0:19:59.240 --> 0:20:01.560
<v Speaker 1>So let's talk ab at that. Because we have heard

0:20:01.840 --> 0:20:06.720
<v Speaker 1>from some pensions, particularly in UH in Canada, they have

0:20:06.800 --> 0:20:10.720
<v Speaker 1>been investing directly in companies, buying them directly, basically competing

0:20:10.760 --> 0:20:15.359
<v Speaker 1>with private equity companies. You know that Cowper's is considering

0:20:15.440 --> 0:20:18.879
<v Speaker 1>doing the same. What about Calistas. We're looking at the

0:20:18.920 --> 0:20:20.919
<v Speaker 1>idea of teaming up with people. We don't think we

0:20:20.960 --> 0:20:23.680
<v Speaker 1>want to start from scratch um. We want to team

0:20:23.720 --> 0:20:26.080
<v Speaker 1>up with people that are already in the marketplace. And

0:20:26.119 --> 0:20:29.000
<v Speaker 1>this is part of recognizing as Pen was hitting me

0:20:29.080 --> 0:20:33.040
<v Speaker 1>with lower return environment. We can make or return out

0:20:33.040 --> 0:20:35.600
<v Speaker 1>of private equity, but if we can reduce our costs

0:20:35.880 --> 0:20:38.760
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of investing in private equity, that enhances

0:20:38.800 --> 0:20:41.960
<v Speaker 1>our return. So the idea of going and buying mid

0:20:42.080 --> 0:20:45.399
<v Speaker 1>sized companies directly instead of the old two and twenty

0:20:45.440 --> 0:20:49.520
<v Speaker 1>private equity model is much more attractive, and we've recognized

0:20:49.600 --> 0:20:52.439
<v Speaker 1>the spread and private equity has come down. You're not

0:20:52.480 --> 0:20:57.280
<v Speaker 1>getting three basis points are full three over public stocks,

0:20:57.400 --> 0:20:59.840
<v Speaker 1>probably only getting a hundred and fifty or one and

0:21:00.040 --> 0:21:02.840
<v Speaker 1>half percent over public stocks, but you're still getting a

0:21:02.880 --> 0:21:07.480
<v Speaker 1>premium over public markets. Chris just quickly. Is the investing

0:21:07.560 --> 0:21:11.159
<v Speaker 1>environment for let's say, environmentally friendly companies or companies that

0:21:11.520 --> 0:21:15.280
<v Speaker 1>respect the environment and so on, socially responsible? Is that

0:21:15.359 --> 0:21:17.399
<v Speaker 1>a key theme or is that something that was just

0:21:17.440 --> 0:21:20.400
<v Speaker 1>a buzzword and has gone away PIM I think we're

0:21:20.400 --> 0:21:23.359
<v Speaker 1>going to see today and into the future. I would

0:21:23.359 --> 0:21:27.440
<v Speaker 1>describe it as managements that actually think bigger and broader

0:21:27.440 --> 0:21:30.359
<v Speaker 1>than just the risks that appear in the next ninety days.

0:21:30.800 --> 0:21:33.920
<v Speaker 1>Managements that look out three to five years and think

0:21:33.960 --> 0:21:37.840
<v Speaker 1>about a broad section of material risk to their business.

0:21:37.960 --> 0:21:41.040
<v Speaker 1>Those companies are going to outperform other companies, says the

0:21:41.080 --> 0:21:43.840
<v Speaker 1>man who rides his bike to work. Chris Alman. Always

0:21:43.840 --> 0:21:45.680
<v Speaker 1>a pleasure. We love speaking with you. Chris Alman is

0:21:45.720 --> 0:21:49.159
<v Speaker 1>Chief Investment Officer of the California State Teachers Retirement System,

0:21:49.160 --> 0:21:52.600
<v Speaker 1>with more than two hundred billion dollars under management. It's

0:21:52.640 --> 0:22:08.520
<v Speaker 1>based in Sacramento, California. Now let's turn our attention to Sprint.

0:22:08.560 --> 0:22:10.120
<v Speaker 1>I want to find out what's going on there. We've

0:22:10.119 --> 0:22:12.160
<v Speaker 1>got John Butler. He is an expert when it comes

0:22:12.200 --> 0:22:16.680
<v Speaker 1>to telecom and telecom equipment, and he is joining us now.

0:22:16.720 --> 0:22:19.879
<v Speaker 1>He's of course from Bloomberg Intelligence and John Sprint up

0:22:19.920 --> 0:22:22.760
<v Speaker 1>a ten percent. That's the stock right now. What are

0:22:22.800 --> 0:22:27.520
<v Speaker 1>they doing? What what's causing this big move higher? Well? Sprinted? Okay,

0:22:27.600 --> 0:22:29.960
<v Speaker 1>in the quarter, you know, it was steady as she

0:22:30.080 --> 0:22:34.320
<v Speaker 1>goes um. Frankly, you know, they always do a very

0:22:34.359 --> 0:22:38.639
<v Speaker 1>good job about sort of managing investor expectations and giving

0:22:38.680 --> 0:22:42.000
<v Speaker 1>people the sense that they're writing the ship, and they are,

0:22:42.200 --> 0:22:45.120
<v Speaker 1>but it really is a cost cutting thing for them

0:22:45.119 --> 0:22:48.199
<v Speaker 1>more than a top line story. At this point. What

0:22:48.320 --> 0:22:51.359
<v Speaker 1>I think is driving the stock up is CEO Marcello

0:22:51.480 --> 0:22:59.680
<v Speaker 1>Clare was asked about potential combinations Charter, Yes, and he

0:22:59.720 --> 0:23:04.679
<v Speaker 1>told people to expect something coming soon. Um in the

0:23:04.720 --> 0:23:08.440
<v Speaker 1>near future, I believe was the term he used. Uh,

0:23:08.520 --> 0:23:09.840
<v Speaker 1>what are some of the what are some of the

0:23:09.920 --> 0:23:13.000
<v Speaker 1>possibilities in John Butler's Well, Before I answer that, I'll

0:23:13.040 --> 0:23:15.600
<v Speaker 1>just say I hope he's right, you know, Sprint has

0:23:15.640 --> 0:23:19.320
<v Speaker 1>been on the block for a while. Um Soft Bank

0:23:19.520 --> 0:23:25.160
<v Speaker 1>and in particular CEO uh Massa Yoshi San owns eight

0:23:25.280 --> 0:23:29.560
<v Speaker 1>percent of Sprint and he has really tried to monetize

0:23:29.600 --> 0:23:32.480
<v Speaker 1>that asset for a long time now, so tried to

0:23:32.520 --> 0:23:35.480
<v Speaker 1>sell it. Yeah, and it feels like a house that's

0:23:35.520 --> 0:23:37.879
<v Speaker 1>been on the market a little bit too long. You know,

0:23:38.080 --> 0:23:42.800
<v Speaker 1>it begins to get people wondering as to aging to Yeah,

0:23:42.920 --> 0:23:47.040
<v Speaker 1>what's really wrong there? But you know there's a convergence

0:23:47.080 --> 0:23:51.000
<v Speaker 1>now happening between cable and telecom or it's looming more

0:23:51.080 --> 0:23:54.240
<v Speaker 1>than anything. You see a T and T buying Time

0:23:54.240 --> 0:23:59.800
<v Speaker 1>Warner getting into content. Verizon has shown interest there through

0:24:00.000 --> 0:24:02.320
<v Speaker 1>a O L and Yahoo, both of which you have

0:24:02.359 --> 0:24:05.280
<v Speaker 1>a lot of content, and there's been talk that they're

0:24:05.359 --> 0:24:08.919
<v Speaker 1>kicking the tires and media land. So you know, the

0:24:08.960 --> 0:24:12.479
<v Speaker 1>potential for a cable company to buy Sprint or Sprint

0:24:12.520 --> 0:24:14.800
<v Speaker 1>to buy a cable company has been high on the

0:24:14.880 --> 0:24:20.639
<v Speaker 1>rumor mill um. You know, there's again potential, there's bundling potential.

0:24:20.680 --> 0:24:24.240
<v Speaker 1>They're right where people can buy their wireless, their cable,

0:24:24.280 --> 0:24:27.679
<v Speaker 1>their broadband all from one provider. You know, I have

0:24:27.760 --> 0:24:30.320
<v Speaker 1>to say, John and I this just shows the narrow

0:24:30.440 --> 0:24:33.359
<v Speaker 1>lens with through which I see the world. But here Sprint,

0:24:33.400 --> 0:24:36.040
<v Speaker 1>and I think, wow, They're the biggest issuer in the

0:24:36.119 --> 0:24:38.679
<v Speaker 1>high old bond market and the one point three trillion

0:24:38.720 --> 0:24:42.400
<v Speaker 1>dollar US higher bond market. They have more than twenty

0:24:42.440 --> 0:24:47.080
<v Speaker 1>four billion dollars in the main index that people track,

0:24:47.560 --> 0:24:49.800
<v Speaker 1>And this just makes me wonder. I mean, first of all,

0:24:49.920 --> 0:24:52.960
<v Speaker 1>would any buyer have to assume that date debt? And

0:24:52.960 --> 0:24:56.440
<v Speaker 1>how much of an obstacle is that to purchase? And

0:24:56.800 --> 0:24:59.840
<v Speaker 1>second of all, if it doesn't fall through, is there

0:25:00.080 --> 0:25:02.680
<v Speaker 1>chance that Sprint could go into a spiral and sort

0:25:02.680 --> 0:25:06.320
<v Speaker 1>of fail to pay the mounting UH interest payments that

0:25:06.400 --> 0:25:10.439
<v Speaker 1>it owes. We'll start by saying, thank god, I'm not

0:25:10.520 --> 0:25:14.200
<v Speaker 1>our credit analysts. We have a telecom credit analyst named

0:25:14.240 --> 0:25:17.400
<v Speaker 1>Steve Flynn who who knows the details better than I do.

0:25:17.560 --> 0:25:20.959
<v Speaker 1>But I will say if someone did acquire Sprint, they

0:25:21.000 --> 0:25:24.720
<v Speaker 1>would probably have to acquire that debt. And I think

0:25:24.760 --> 0:25:27.679
<v Speaker 1>Sprint is on a track now where they're sort of

0:25:27.800 --> 0:25:31.879
<v Speaker 1>out of danger in terms of making those payments. Things

0:25:31.920 --> 0:25:35.040
<v Speaker 1>can change overnight and telecom, as we all know, but

0:25:35.680 --> 0:25:38.920
<v Speaker 1>based on the current trajectory um, I would say they're

0:25:38.920 --> 0:25:43.920
<v Speaker 1>in pretty good shape for now Apple, what do you expect?

0:25:44.720 --> 0:25:48.080
<v Speaker 1>You know, the current quarter doesn't matter. People are really

0:25:48.160 --> 0:25:52.080
<v Speaker 1>all eyes are on September, uh, the September quarter, which

0:25:52.119 --> 0:25:55.960
<v Speaker 1>is their fiscal fourth quarter. Um, they have the launch

0:25:56.040 --> 0:25:59.800
<v Speaker 1>of the new iPhones coming, and just to sort of

0:26:00.040 --> 0:26:03.439
<v Speaker 1>at the table, we're expecting three new i phones. So

0:26:03.520 --> 0:26:06.199
<v Speaker 1>we'll get sort of a standard feature update of the

0:26:06.240 --> 0:26:09.920
<v Speaker 1>iPhone seven and seven plus that are on the market now.

0:26:10.520 --> 0:26:13.800
<v Speaker 1>So the iPhone seven s and the seven s plus

0:26:14.240 --> 0:26:20.359
<v Speaker 1>will have a similar screen, probably offer wireless charging, truly wireless,

0:26:20.480 --> 0:26:24.880
<v Speaker 1>or waterproof ports, and maybe a better camera. That's typically

0:26:24.920 --> 0:26:27.439
<v Speaker 1>what you see with you know, those kind of feature

0:26:27.520 --> 0:26:31.119
<v Speaker 1>upgrades or what you see with that sort of talk

0:26:31.200 --> 0:26:35.560
<v Speaker 1>here where you just get modest upgrades. But it is

0:26:35.600 --> 0:26:39.040
<v Speaker 1>the tenure anniversary of the iPhone, and there will be

0:26:39.160 --> 0:26:43.199
<v Speaker 1>hopefully a third iPhone called the iPhone X or the

0:26:43.240 --> 0:26:46.440
<v Speaker 1>iPhone eight as I've been calling it, which will be

0:26:47.040 --> 0:26:49.720
<v Speaker 1>a much bigger device, rumored to have a five point

0:26:49.760 --> 0:26:54.400
<v Speaker 1>eight inch screen, no bezels or those little side bars

0:26:54.440 --> 0:26:58.160
<v Speaker 1>that frame the screen on the side, So they're going

0:26:58.280 --> 0:27:01.000
<v Speaker 1>bezel lists, which will give you more real estate there.

0:27:01.760 --> 0:27:05.520
<v Speaker 1>And um, you know there's been talk of Component Delays.

0:27:07.400 --> 0:27:11.960
<v Speaker 1>John Butler, Senior Telecom Services and Equipment Analyst for Bloomberg Intelligence.

0:27:12.040 --> 0:27:18.280
<v Speaker 1>Always our pleasure to speak with you. Thanks for listening

0:27:18.359 --> 0:27:21.240
<v Speaker 1>to the Bloomberg P and L podcast. You can subscribe

0:27:21.240 --> 0:27:24.840
<v Speaker 1>and listen to interviews at Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud, or whatever

0:27:24.920 --> 0:27:28.399
<v Speaker 1>podcast platform you prefer. I'm pim Fox. I'm on Twitter

0:27:28.680 --> 0:27:32.440
<v Speaker 1>at pim Fox. I'm on Twitter at Lisa Abramo wits one.

0:27:32.640 --> 0:27:35.320
<v Speaker 1>Before the podcast, you can always catch us worldwide on

0:27:35.400 --> 0:27:36.240
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Radio