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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt.

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Speaker 2: Our colleague Noel is on an adventure, but will be

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Speaker 2: returning shortly.

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Speaker 3: They called me dead. We're joined as always with our

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Speaker 3: super producer Andrew Treyforce Howard. Most importantly, you are you.

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Speaker 3: You are here. That makes this the stuff they don't

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Speaker 3: want you to know. We are recording this on Monday,

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Speaker 3: May twealth, Year of our Lord, twenty twenty five, which

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Speaker 3: means here in the US, yesterday was Mother's Day. If

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Speaker 3: you are able to chat with your mom or contactor,

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Speaker 3: please do so. And we're sure that your mom will

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Speaker 3: say you don't have to call on a specific day.

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Speaker 3: She's just happy to.

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Speaker 4: Hear from you.

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Speaker 3: I'm starting absol positive note Matt for this one.

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Speaker 2: Especially, Yeah, yeah, had a great Mother's Day over here.

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Speaker 2: A bunch of mothers in a bunch of different types

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Speaker 2: of mothers, right, different stages of life over here, in

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Speaker 2: this sector of stuff they don't want you to know.

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Speaker 4: I don't know how to whatever.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, anyway, if you can, you should. And we

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Speaker 3: are with that positive note talking about something that has

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Speaker 3: worried the heck out of civilization since the close of

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Speaker 3: World War Two and rightly terrified people at times. Some

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Speaker 3: of us in the crowd may be old enough to

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Speaker 3: remember things like the Cuban missile crisis. You may have

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Speaker 3: if your history buff read about any number of near

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Speaker 3: misses in a launch of global catastrophes. We have been

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Speaker 3: scared the civilization for the better part of a century

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Speaker 3: now by the possibility of a full scale what we

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Speaker 3: call a hotter kinetic war involving two or more nuclear

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Speaker 3: capable actors. And Matt, I believe you and I are

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Speaker 3: of a generation that still grew up under the shadow

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Speaker 3: of the potential catastrophe between the USSR and the USA.

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Speaker 3: Did you ever have to do any of those nuclear drills.

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Speaker 2: No, I never got any of the nuke drills, but

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Speaker 2: we definitely got the the fear talked into us about it.

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Speaker 2: I mean, once you learn about a nuclear weapon and

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Speaker 2: Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and you learn about all the testing

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Speaker 2: and all that stuff, and yeah, I remember in school

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Speaker 2: that was hammered Home is a big deal. But also

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Speaker 2: I think it's a little bit nerved on purpose in

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Speaker 2: the American education system.

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Speaker 3: It is now. I remember, I remember fully the the

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Speaker 3: like Catch twenty two, surreal nature of those drills where

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Speaker 3: they would tell people to get under their desk in

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Speaker 3: case of a nuclear attack, which was just I think

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Speaker 3: even kids saw that that was in effective. The best

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Speaker 3: it could do is maybe shield you from some collapsing buildings.

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Speaker 3: But better than nothing, which seems to be the argument

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Speaker 3: everybody makes this.

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Speaker 2: Well, you know, one of the big reasons for that

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Speaker 2: is because of the light blast that could occur depending

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Speaker 2: on how far away you are.

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Speaker 4: From the initial explosion.

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Speaker 2: Because the it's the small small amount of increase in

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Speaker 2: PSI that right causes whilch just burst all the windows.

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Speaker 2: So actually being under the desk would probably be a

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Speaker 2: lot safer than not being there.

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Speaker 3: Sure again, better than nothing, right, but still you know,

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Speaker 3: it's better than nothing, not a global nuclear war. And

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Speaker 3: now to your point about nerving. Now the situation seems

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Speaker 3: to have a vault. Humanity is worried about one thousand

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Speaker 3: thousand things, the nuclear war situation or the conversation around it.

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Speaker 3: Now it looks better in some ways a much more

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Speaker 3: dangerous in others. So tonight we're asking what happens if

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Speaker 3: everything goes wrong, You know, if one day the geopolitical

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Speaker 3: breaks don't work and the car flies over the cliff.

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Speaker 3: What does a nuclear war actually look like? Hopefully we

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Speaker 3: get through this episode before we find out in person,

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Speaker 3: so we're going to pause for a word from our sponsors.

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Speaker 3: Here are the facts, all right, Matt. We've talked about

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Speaker 3: this in previous episodes. I read listened to our Dead

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Speaker 3: Hand episode, by the way, which holds up in a

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Speaker 3: very frightening sense. But I think it's safe to say are,

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Speaker 3: thankfully at this point, only two real world examples of

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Speaker 3: high level wartime nuclear detonation in all of history, the

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Speaker 3: US bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, that's correct, two bombs dropped from one country on

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Speaker 2: to another. The first one was August sixth, nineteen forty five.

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Speaker 4: That was over Hiroshima.

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Speaker 3: M Yeah, Yeah, it's one of those things we referred

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Speaker 3: to as a chonky boy in Maybe it was Strange News.

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Speaker 3: An American B twenty nine bomber is the first one.

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Speaker 3: This explosion. We'll get into the mechanics of these explosions later,

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Speaker 3: it immediately killed an estimated eighty thousand people, the majority

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Speaker 3: of whom were innocent civilians. That's only the beginning. Three

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Speaker 3: days later, a second B twenty nine, a second Chonky Boy,

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Speaker 3: drops another bomb, this time on Nagasaki. This kills an

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Speaker 3: estimated forty thousand people. And when we say eighty thousand

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Speaker 3: and forty thousand, fellow conspiracy realists, keep in mind we're

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Speaker 3: talking about the immediate pop the immediate deaths. Tens of

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Speaker 3: thousands more people will die in both regions as a

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Speaker 3: consequence of what we could call you know, total weapons

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Speaker 3: in total war, radiation, poisoning, the related destruction flying glass,

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Speaker 3: crashing buildings, and then of course the lack of medical care,

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Speaker 3: clean water, and food which leads to you know, proliferation

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Speaker 3: of dysentery disease. People are dying slow and agonizing deaths

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Speaker 3: from birds. You can and should have you the chance

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Speaker 3: visit places like the Hiroshima Piece memorial in the Peace Museum.

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Speaker 3: You can get a first hand look at artifacts and

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Speaker 3: consequences of this. It is a harrowing piece of history,

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Speaker 3: which means it is a piece of history that all

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Speaker 3: nations need to remember.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, yeah, For sure. Another thing to remember is

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Speaker 2: that when the US deployed those B twenty nine, they

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Speaker 2: deployed multiple for both of those you know what they

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Speaker 2: would call missions, so that several different pilots and groups

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Speaker 2: of people in planes actually dropped bombs, but only one

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Speaker 2: of them within the group actually dropped the nuke. And

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Speaker 2: that way nobody really knew who actually caused all of

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Speaker 2: that destruction and mass death.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. Similar in a macro sense to what we used

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Speaker 3: to do with firing squads, right where you would have

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Speaker 3: five or six soldiers shooting, shooting for an execution, and

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Speaker 3: only one would have a live bullet. The idea that

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Speaker 3: you could give people some sort of psychological soop, right,

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Speaker 3: or reassurance. Maybe it was not me because otherwise how

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Speaker 3: well you deal with the deaths of hundreds of thousands

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Speaker 3: of people on your conscience?

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Speaker 2: I mean, just one thing to think about, specifically with

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Speaker 2: an A bomb, an H bomb, and a nuclear weapon

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Speaker 2: of any kind that we're maybe in your mind think

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Speaker 2: of the explosion and you can see the images that

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Speaker 2: we've seen over the years of what these look like.

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Speaker 2: One thing that I always kind of slips my mind,

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Speaker 2: maybe because it is so horrifying, but just the number

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Speaker 2: of fires that get started afterwards, like after that initial explosion,

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Speaker 2: then the amount of fire that occurs on a much

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Speaker 2: larger radius that consumes so many other people, especially depending

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Speaker 2: on the time of you know, day or night that

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Speaker 2: it's dropped, and all that other stuff, and how much

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Speaker 2: warning and.

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Speaker 3: Wise conditions relative industrial infrastructure, petroleum fields, things like that,

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Speaker 3: forest forest coverage. Yeah, this is something that the Roti

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Speaker 3: Museum I visited. I won't monologue about it, but this

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Speaker 3: is something that they spend a lot of time on there.

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Speaker 3: In addition to the human costs, the environmental costs, things

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Speaker 3: that simply cannot be mitigated, cannot be repaired, right, this

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Speaker 3: is a hard stop to a lot of what we

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Speaker 3: would consider natural life and natural environmental processes on the planet.

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Speaker 3: And you could consider war analysts would consider these operations

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Speaker 3: in Japan and World War II a military success, in

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Speaker 3: success being defined by the fact that the ruler in

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Speaker 3: Burihiro Hito did surrender unconditionally as a result of these

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Speaker 3: attacks and honestly the larger failing efforts of Japan during

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Speaker 3: the war. But it was also inarguably a humanitarian disaster.

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Speaker 3: This was a pyrrhic victory for the world overall. And

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Speaker 3: if you visit either site today again, please do if

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Speaker 3: you have the chance. You'll see that a chill still

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Speaker 3: hangs in the air. This is almost more than almost

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Speaker 3: a century ago now, and the areas are physically safe

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Speaker 3: for humans, I can confirm that firsthand. But each city

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Speaker 3: still bears the scars of those horrific acts. You can

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Speaker 3: see the melted rubble of buildings, melted rubble of buildings,

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Speaker 3: and this attack, this series of attacks, also provides historians,

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Speaker 3: world leaders, and scholars and scientists with crucial data on

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Speaker 3: what could happen in the modern day if these weapons

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Speaker 3: or things like them are unleashed in other regions in

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Speaker 3: larger quantities. As a result, we see the emergence of

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Speaker 3: two incredibly different philosophies, each a reaction to the same

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Speaker 3: inescapable truths.

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Speaker 2: And when we're thinking about the devastation that was wrought

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Speaker 2: above Hiroshima with that weapon, that atomic bomb, that bomb

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Speaker 2: was known as Little Boy, and it was only a

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Speaker 2: fifteen kilo ton bomb, which you know, only fifteen kilotons.

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Speaker 2: Basically that's the amount of tons of T and T

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Speaker 2: essentially that it is equal to theoretically, so fifteen thousand basically.

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Speaker 3: And it did not reach near its full capability as well,

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Speaker 3: the technology was still very much in its early days.

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Speaker 3: And the other one, fat Man, had similar results in Nagasaki.

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Speaker 3: It was fat Man and Little Boy I believe.

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Speaker 4: For the dude names.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, fat Man is Nagasaki, and it was only twenty kilotons.

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Speaker 2: But just this concept of all of these other defensive forces,

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Speaker 2: especially on the US side, calculating well, how much more

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Speaker 2: devastation would be caused, and if we increased the kill

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Speaker 2: a toonage, you know, by two or something like that,

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Speaker 2: and then we'll talk about, as move towards the future,

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Speaker 2: towards now, how much these weapons have grown in lethality

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Speaker 2: kill a tons specifically to megatons, even agreed.

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Speaker 3: The attacks also provided historians, world leaders, scholars, and scientists

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Speaker 3: with crucial data on what might happen were these weapons

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Speaker 3: unleashed in other regions or troublingly in larger quantities. So

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Speaker 3: as a result, we witness the emergence of two vastly

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Speaker 3: different philosophies. They're drawing very different conclusions and directives from

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Speaker 3: the same set of now escapable truths. One school of thought,

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Speaker 3: which we would loosely call non proliferation argues a spectrum

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Speaker 3: of solutions, one that no new nukes should be created,

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Speaker 3: no new nations should acquire nuclear power, that there must

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Speaker 3: be a robust and force framework against building any more

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Speaker 3: of these potential world enders. And on the far end

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Speaker 3: of that spectrum, the non proliferation spectrum, you see some

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Speaker 3: groups arguing that all existing nukes should be dismantled as well.

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Speaker 3: So every nuclear nation then becomes Frodo right there in

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Speaker 3: Mount Doom. And you're trying to talk them into throwing

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Speaker 3: the ring into the fire spoiler, it does not work.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, that ring has some real I don't know what

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Speaker 2: would you call it, pull just this concept if the

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Speaker 2: ring is in fact the power that comes with having

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Speaker 2: deployable nukes just in your back pocket there right.

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Speaker 3: And Tolkien was not writing about nuclear power actually in

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Speaker 3: Lord of the Rings. He found it irritating when people said, so,

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Speaker 3: so we want to bust that myth on his half

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Speaker 3: on his behalf posthumously.

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Speaker 4: But it also works perfectly.

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Speaker 3: It works perfectly, is the thing Jarr. So the other philosophy, again,

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Speaker 3: drawing from the exact same set of data and objective observations,

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Speaker 3: they go in a very different direction, and they argue

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Speaker 3: any nation currently in possession of nukes must logically fight

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Speaker 3: their damnedest to keep them, especially after the lessons of Libya,

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Speaker 3: right or failing that, if you are a nation with

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Speaker 3: the capability to acquire this power, then you need to

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Speaker 3: do so immediately. And this is where we see things

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Speaker 3: like the nuclear arms race of the Cold War, or

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Speaker 3: of course, the philosophy of MAD mutual assured destruction. And

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Speaker 3: here I want to pause to give a shout out

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Speaker 3: to our old pal, good friend of the show, Josh Clark,

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Speaker 3: who wrote an article for How Stuff Works that holds

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Speaker 3: up regarding MAD. So just look up that article and

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Speaker 3: you can get the quick skinny on this. The concept

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Speaker 3: is counterintuitively, the more nations that have nuclear weapons, the

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Speaker 3: more valuable nukes become as a deterrent instead of a

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Speaker 3: gun you actually fire. So similar to the old you

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Speaker 3: know standoff in wild West fiction or film, if everybody

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Speaker 3: has a gun and we're all the same room, we're

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Speaker 3: all pointing at each other, then the likelihood of anyone

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Speaker 3: firing drops drastically. That is, for a time, that theory

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Speaker 3: seem to hold true, especially because multiple other nations possed up,

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Speaker 3: you know, like NATO Article five is probably the most

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Speaker 3: famous example. You attack one of our guys and the

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Speaker 3: whole gang jumps into the frame.

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Speaker 2: Well, yeah, the game changes from who has nukes to

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Speaker 2: who has the most outdated early detection system, who has

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Speaker 2: the best early detection system for a launch?

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Speaker 4: Right?

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Speaker 2: And does anybody glitch out all the time or send

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Speaker 2: the wrong information? Because imagine that room where everybody's got

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Speaker 2: a gun, right, and nobody's firing because everybody's got a gun.

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Speaker 2: What if there's somebody who has a hearing aid that

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Speaker 2: malfunctions and they think somebody shot, so they fire.

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Speaker 3: And there have been a lot of close calls, right,

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Speaker 3: some immortalized in film and fiction, but definitely based on

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Speaker 3: real world events. We also know that once the first

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Speaker 3: bullet in this comparison fires, other bullets inevitably follow. In

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Speaker 3: the standoff, it's no longer standoff now it's a race

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Speaker 3: to get rid of all your bullets. Right, And so,

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Speaker 3: in other words, this scenario where to continue results in

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Speaker 3: a world where the winner or the winners defined by

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Speaker 3: whichever nations are left standing amid the rubble. What they're

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Speaker 3: ruling over is little more than ashes and poison, and

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Speaker 3: we know, we know this is a possibility. This is

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Speaker 3: not just a mad cap thought experiment. Since the development

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Speaker 3: of nuclear weaponry and it's later proliferation, there have been

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Speaker 3: well over two thousand documented nuclear explosions, and a spooky

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Speaker 3: thing about it is we don't know for sure how

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Speaker 3: many have actually been exploded, right The majority have been

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Speaker 3: tests right now, the estimation is something like twenty six

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Speaker 3: hundred and twenty four. But then does it count things

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Speaker 3: like the Vela incident. Does it count things that occurred

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Speaker 3: somehow without observation, especially in the early days out in

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Speaker 3: the stands of the USSR. Some of these were held

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Speaker 3: in secret, But then if you look at the cases

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Speaker 3: like the DPRK, these tests are loudly broadcast to send

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Speaker 3: a message to the world, you know. So it's weird

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Speaker 3: because we have to tell you hat in hand that

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Speaker 3: it is difficult to know exactly how many detonations occurred.

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Speaker 3: It is actually a matter of debate, as we record

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Speaker 3: in twenty twenty five, but we do know with each detonation,

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Speaker 3: civilization learn more about the possibilities on the horizon, which

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Speaker 3: means that no matter what they said to their domestic

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Speaker 3: population in power structures across the planet. Military leaders privately

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Speaker 3: and at times publicly agreed. Look, nuclear bombs present terrifying possibilities.

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Speaker 3: These warheads canned in the world, But the most terrifying

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Speaker 3: possibility is that our nation might not have access to

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Speaker 3: some of these capabilities. Right, we know that guns exist,

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Speaker 3: we know that other people have guns. What can we

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Speaker 3: do to protect ourselves? And there's a logic to that.

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Speaker 3: It's a brutal logic, but it makes sense.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, absolutely, So we'll.

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Speaker 3: Fast forward to May twelfth, twenty twenty five. As we're

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Speaker 3: recording this episode. The situation has changed, and Matt, I

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Speaker 3: think it's fair to say there have been attempts at

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Speaker 3: stepping down the global nuclear arsenal, but for people who

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Speaker 3: want it eliminated, that's still not enough. We know that

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Speaker 3: there have been various agreements, especially between the Russian Federation

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Speaker 3: and the United States, to decommission and to disassemble some

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Speaker 3: of their warheads. But at the same time, more nations

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Speaker 3: acquired this ability, right, China, France, the UK, Pakistan, India, Israel,

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Speaker 3: and North Korea plus Russian in the US, those are

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Speaker 3: what we call the Big Nine. And if you got

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Speaker 3: these guys to all put aside their disagreements and count

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Speaker 3: together how many warheads that is in total, the global

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Speaker 3: tally is something like twelve thousand, three hundred and thirty one, which,

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Speaker 3: just for a so off note for those of us

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Speaker 3: playing along at home, Yes, that is more than enough

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Speaker 3: to end civilization as we know it several times over

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Speaker 3: according to current scientific estimates.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it's weird to look at the little map from

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Speaker 2: the Federation of American Scientists looking at the US having

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Speaker 2: around around three thousand, seven hundred and Russia having around

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Speaker 2: four thousand, three hundred. But then I don't know lately,

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Speaker 2: maybe just with the news, maybe simply because they are

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Speaker 2: engaged in a current hot conflict that is in a

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Speaker 2: quote ceasefire. The one hundred and seventy nukes that Pakistan

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Speaker 2: holds and the one hundred and eighty that India holds,

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Speaker 2: it's given me pause.

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Speaker 5: Yeah, and also on my end, it gives me pause,

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Speaker 5: even when you know, when I was studying this professionally,

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Speaker 5: it gives me pause that the numbers are always caveated.

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Speaker 3: With around yeah, and estimated. Maybe it factors and in

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Speaker 3: factors in guests, secrecy, and a bunch of other things

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Speaker 3: that they don't want enemy nations to know. But that

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Speaker 3: also those caveats also come as a result of not

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Speaker 3: knowing maintenance regimen for a lot of a lot of disarmaments,

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Speaker 3: specifically Russian, but other countries as well. Because these are

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Speaker 3: not like the old rotisseri made for old made for

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Speaker 3: TV rotisserie chicken commercials, where you quote, set it and

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Speaker 3: forget it. You have to keep checking in on these

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Speaker 3: things because they're you know, they're finicky anyway. Point B.

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Speaker 3: With all this, proponents of mad and other philosophies believe

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Speaker 3: that they will tell you this results in a fragile stability.

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Speaker 3: Critics of proliferation say, look twenty twenty five, the present,

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Speaker 3: the current now is too different from the past for

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Speaker 3: those old assumptions to remain serviceable. What about, for instance,

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Speaker 3: non state actors acquiring nuclear weaponry, terrorist separatists, religious extremist

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Speaker 3: with a dirty bomb and an act to grind What

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Speaker 3: if one of those near misses that we alluded to

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Speaker 3: earlier actually does go wrong? What if it's no longer

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Speaker 3: a near miss? What happens then? Luckily the world hasn't

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Speaker 3: found out yet. But we're going to pause for a

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Speaker 3: word from our sponsors. And dive in. Here's where it

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Speaker 3: gets crazy. Okay, Matt, we'll talk about some of the

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Speaker 3: I think specific game theory and regional hotspots in a moment,

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Speaker 3: but I think we can both agree a nuclear war

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Speaker 3: as we've defined it now would result in things going

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Speaker 3: extremely wrong, extremely quickly.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, definitely. We've got a couple of different the

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Speaker 2: scenarios that have been written about out recently and explored

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Speaker 2: thoroughly pretty recently, from in twenty nineteen and then again

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Speaker 2: last year in twenty twenty four. So we can shout

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Speaker 2: out Annie Jacobsen for her book Nuclear War, A scenario

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Speaker 2: then goes through pretty much what we're about to take

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Speaker 2: you through. It's what happens if the world is at war,

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Speaker 2: not just a NATO country versus let's say Russia, where

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Speaker 2: it's just happening in one part of Europe and Asia

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Speaker 2: over there, it's the entire world is launching nukes. Right,

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Speaker 2: that's what we're going to talk about, first full scale war.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, let's get to that. Let's also shout out

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Speaker 3: Nuclear Choices for the twenty first Century, a citizen's guide

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Speaker 3: that's written by Richard Wolfson. We need to shout out

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Speaker 3: the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, because they do great

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Speaker 3: work here, hosting as well the doomsday clock, which we've

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Speaker 3: we've talked about in the past. Shout out to our

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Speaker 3: pal Jack O'Brien.

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Speaker 2: And definitely Princeton Signs and Global Security and Alex Glazer

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Speaker 2: in particular, because there's a thing on YouTube you can

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Speaker 2: watch that is basically what we're going to be walking

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Speaker 2: through here of what happens when the nukes launched, where

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Speaker 2: did they launch, and then what are the casualties.

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Speaker 4: It's fun.

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Speaker 3: It will also introduce, you know, just in the case

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Speaker 3: of farness and injectivity here, some scientific disputes by various

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Speaker 3: people who are questioning some of these calculations. But anyhow,

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Speaker 3: let's go anecdotal first and we'll shout out more sources

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Speaker 3: along the way. The harsh reality is that the days

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Speaker 3: of World War two are long past, which means that

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Speaker 3: people have been working on this technology pretty much around

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Speaker 3: the clock since that time, since the discovery. So the

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Speaker 3: capabilities of twenty twenty five are streets ahead, as community

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Speaker 3: would say, of what was available in the nineteen forties,

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Speaker 3: again the better part of a century ago. I would add,

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Speaker 3: it's also important to recognize that population centers have shifted. Now,

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Speaker 3: Unlike in the nineteen forties, most people live in large

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Speaker 3: metro areas, cities, conurbations. That means that there are more

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Speaker 3: targets in one place. There are also more bombs to

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Speaker 3: hit those targets. And further, there are more efficient ways

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Speaker 3: of moving those bombs across the planet from point A

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Speaker 3: to point Z. And now we've got you know, we've

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Speaker 3: got these posse contracts. I'll just loosely call them. We

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Speaker 3: don't call them that in the Ivory Tower, but several

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Speaker 3: of the Big Nine have almost all the Big Nine

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Speaker 3: have hard limits and constraints about how these things could

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Speaker 3: hypothetically be deployed. Several of them have something we call

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Speaker 3: no first use policy, arguing that even in most regional

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Speaker 3: conflicts or times of high tension, they're not going to

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Speaker 3: be the first guys to launch a warhead. Their nukes

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Speaker 3: therefore launch only as a counter attack or a response

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Speaker 3: retaliation measure. But other countries like Pakistan don't bother to

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Speaker 3: make such vows. And then yet other countries like Israel

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Speaker 3: are reluctant to openly admit to any nuclear capability in

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Speaker 3: the first place, which is a lot like a teenager

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Speaker 3: coming home being very high and pretending they just like snacks.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, we're talking about like Israel.

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Speaker 2: But you know, officially on the books in all of

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Speaker 2: these places anywhere that's talking about nuclear weapons nowadays, including

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Speaker 2: the Federation of American Scientists points out that Israel has

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Speaker 2: at least ninety nukes.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. Yeah, and for their credit, Israel has never denied it.

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Speaker 3: They've just never confirmed it. And that's part of the strategy.

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Speaker 4: There right now.

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Speaker 2: Well, and how many of those are tactical nuclear weapons

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Speaker 2: that would would register as a nuclear weapon but not

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Speaker 2: in the same way as some of the older detection

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Speaker 2: let's say technologies across the world could even probably see

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Speaker 2: it's interesting. It's interesting that it's all going down, it's

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Speaker 2: all that's all stuff. And you know, we're talking about

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Speaker 2: capabilities still here in past World War two and if

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Speaker 2: bombs dropped now and when they would drop. An important

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Speaker 2: thing to take into account is, in most like gamed

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Speaker 2: out scenarios of nuclear war, it's almost all military targets,

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Speaker 2: at least in the first few salvos.

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Speaker 3: In the first waves, yeah, the first two waves or

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Speaker 3: military targets.

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Speaker 2: And that could that could just be hours We're talking

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Speaker 2: hours between when the military targets get taken out then

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Speaker 2: the city centers could get taken out, right, which is

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Speaker 2: just shorter than a conventional war. Yeah, it's much shorter,

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Speaker 2: but it is just I guess it's in my mind.

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Speaker 2: There's this thing called Plan A you can look up

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Speaker 2: and that's by that Alex Glazer person, a bunch of

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Speaker 2: other folks that where they actually use that nuke map

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Speaker 2: site that you can go to and you can basically

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Speaker 2: drop specific kiloton weapons on different places around the globe

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Speaker 2: and you can map out where the nuclear fallout goes

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Speaker 2: and how many casualties roughly because of the populations as

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Speaker 2: they go through there. They built a scenario they called

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Speaker 2: Plan A in twenty nineteen which basically shows all of

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Speaker 2: those military targets happening if it started in Europe basically

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Speaker 2: with NATO versus Russia, then expanded out to NATO calling

435
00:28:52,440 --> 00:28:56,000
Speaker 2: in the US to launch their ICBMs, to then Russia

436
00:28:56,320 --> 00:29:00,760
Speaker 2: launching their ICBMs. And it's all based on detection, right,

437
00:29:01,160 --> 00:29:06,200
Speaker 2: It's not based on nuke's dropping. It's based on somebody

438
00:29:06,480 --> 00:29:08,720
Speaker 2: got an alert that a nuke.

439
00:29:08,720 --> 00:29:12,360
Speaker 3: Got launched, Detection of launch, not detection of detonation. Yeah,

440
00:29:12,400 --> 00:29:14,280
Speaker 3: and that's an important point. We also want to shout

441
00:29:14,280 --> 00:29:18,520
Speaker 3: out Alex Wellerstein, who I believe is the author or

442
00:29:18,560 --> 00:29:22,360
Speaker 3: one of the maps I was using Nuclear Secrecy dot Com.

443
00:29:22,840 --> 00:29:28,720
Speaker 3: That map. That's a pretty great one too, terrifying by

444
00:29:28,720 --> 00:29:35,080
Speaker 3: which means great. This is the thing, right we're talking about.

445
00:29:35,120 --> 00:29:37,760
Speaker 3: We and many other people much brighter than us, have

446
00:29:37,880 --> 00:29:42,000
Speaker 3: gained out what they see as the potential call and response, right,

447
00:29:42,280 --> 00:29:48,560
Speaker 3: the chain of action that occurs, and inevitably, in most scenarios,

448
00:29:48,680 --> 00:29:52,920
Speaker 3: other people jump into the fray. NATO Article five. That's

449
00:29:52,920 --> 00:29:56,800
Speaker 3: a great example. These countries are bound to back each

450
00:29:56,840 --> 00:29:59,760
Speaker 3: other up depending on a type of conflict that occurs,

451
00:30:00,080 --> 00:30:04,400
Speaker 3: and in backing each other up and enjoining that conflict conversation,

452
00:30:05,400 --> 00:30:10,440
Speaker 3: the entire situation escalates. And this leads to this leads

453
00:30:10,480 --> 00:30:13,480
Speaker 3: to the concern about what we could call regional hotspots,

454
00:30:13,520 --> 00:30:16,360
Speaker 3: which I suggest we get to in a moment. But first,

455
00:30:16,400 --> 00:30:20,280
Speaker 3: maybe we talked about this. What happens on the ground

456
00:30:20,840 --> 00:30:26,160
Speaker 3: the first warhead launches and successfully detonates, that's the real

457
00:30:26,400 --> 00:30:30,080
Speaker 3: what happens. And I suggest we stay pretty general because

458
00:30:31,040 --> 00:30:34,160
Speaker 3: as we know, a wealth of factors and variables affect

459
00:30:34,160 --> 00:30:37,440
Speaker 3: the aftermath. The key to variables here are going to

460
00:30:37,480 --> 00:30:42,600
Speaker 3: be who attacks whom, and where those attacks occur. The

461
00:30:42,600 --> 00:30:47,960
Speaker 3: most immediate effect of a nuclear explosion lasts under a second.

462
00:30:48,360 --> 00:30:52,600
Speaker 3: It's an intense burst of nuclear radiation, mostly gamma rays

463
00:30:52,640 --> 00:30:55,880
Speaker 3: and neutrons. Our friends thinks, our friends at MIT for

464
00:30:55,960 --> 00:30:58,360
Speaker 3: confirming a lot of this. But the thing is, even

465
00:30:58,400 --> 00:31:02,560
Speaker 3: though that lasts under a second, it travels. The direct

466
00:31:02,680 --> 00:31:08,880
Speaker 3: radiation extends nearly a mile from say a ten kiloton explosion,

467
00:31:09,240 --> 00:31:15,360
Speaker 3: and it's lethal. This weirdly enough, frighteningly enough, this is

468
00:31:15,520 --> 00:31:20,320
Speaker 3: not that significant. Other lethal effects come into play at

469
00:31:20,400 --> 00:31:24,640
Speaker 3: even greater distances. But if you're right there, if you

470
00:31:24,680 --> 00:31:29,960
Speaker 3: have that tragic, heartbreaking front seat to this, you'll see

471
00:31:29,960 --> 00:31:33,960
Speaker 3: an exploding nuclear weapon instantly vaporizes and for a time

472
00:31:34,120 --> 00:31:37,239
Speaker 3: it generates a gas, or it becomes a gas that

473
00:31:37,360 --> 00:31:39,800
Speaker 3: is hotter than the core of the Sun. And this

474
00:31:39,880 --> 00:31:43,320
Speaker 3: hot gas has its own energy X rays. They heat

475
00:31:43,360 --> 00:31:46,719
Speaker 3: the surrounding air. This creates, as we alluded to earlier,

476
00:31:46,960 --> 00:31:51,240
Speaker 3: a fireball that forms and quickly grows. If you take

477
00:31:51,280 --> 00:31:54,959
Speaker 3: a one megaton explosion, after ten seconds, you have a

478
00:31:54,960 --> 00:31:58,959
Speaker 3: fireball a mile in diameter. And if you are fifty

479
00:31:59,040 --> 00:32:02,320
Speaker 3: miles away, this still looks brighter than the sun.

480
00:32:04,080 --> 00:32:07,200
Speaker 2: And just a reminder, we're talking about one megaton, which

481
00:32:07,240 --> 00:32:11,120
Speaker 2: is like the big version, right. The first ICBM that

482
00:32:11,200 --> 00:32:14,400
Speaker 2: China deployed was the dong Feing four and that was

483
00:32:14,480 --> 00:32:19,280
Speaker 2: three point three mega tons. And if you go into

484
00:32:19,440 --> 00:32:23,040
Speaker 2: just the current arsenals that many other countries have, including

485
00:32:23,520 --> 00:32:26,160
Speaker 2: you know the US, the old minute Men warheads, those

486
00:32:26,160 --> 00:32:30,800
Speaker 2: were a full megaton, and the old Soviet, the old

487
00:32:30,880 --> 00:32:33,200
Speaker 2: Soviet missiles, the ones that were involved in the Cuban

488
00:32:33,200 --> 00:32:36,240
Speaker 2: missile crisis, those were two point four to two mega tons.

489
00:32:37,000 --> 00:32:40,600
Speaker 2: So they're big old bombs and they get a lot

490
00:32:40,640 --> 00:32:42,840
Speaker 2: bigger than that too, and.

491
00:32:42,960 --> 00:32:47,760
Speaker 3: Most dangerous potentially have never been detonated. Important note, folks,

492
00:32:48,240 --> 00:32:53,040
Speaker 3: uh Matt saying deployed that means move somewhere, put into

493
00:32:53,080 --> 00:32:57,520
Speaker 3: maybe activation. The possible use thereof deploy is not detonation.

494
00:32:58,040 --> 00:33:02,840
Speaker 3: But deploy is a huge signal, right, and it's a

495
00:33:02,880 --> 00:33:05,920
Speaker 3: signal that can be very difficult to walk back. We

496
00:33:06,600 --> 00:33:12,080
Speaker 3: know that along with this fireball there comes a lot

497
00:33:12,120 --> 00:33:15,160
Speaker 3: of heat. This is something called a thermal flash, and

498
00:33:15,200 --> 00:33:20,800
Speaker 3: the thermal flash has a lot of consequences far after detonation,

499
00:33:21,280 --> 00:33:25,719
Speaker 3: it ignites fires from far away as twenty miles. It

500
00:33:25,720 --> 00:33:31,200
Speaker 3: can cause severe, even fatal burns, So twenty miles away,

501
00:33:31,520 --> 00:33:35,160
Speaker 3: for instance, as we learned in the museum, two thirds

502
00:33:35,720 --> 00:33:41,440
Speaker 3: of people who somehow survived Hiroshima did so with extensive,

503
00:33:41,640 --> 00:33:46,480
Speaker 3: severe burns. You can look at plenty of documentation about this.

504
00:33:46,640 --> 00:33:49,160
Speaker 3: We suggest that you have a strong stomach should you

505
00:33:49,280 --> 00:33:52,640
Speaker 3: choose to do so. Then after that, of course, there's

506
00:33:52,680 --> 00:33:56,160
Speaker 3: the blast wave, there's the ground wave. The blast wave

507
00:33:56,240 --> 00:33:58,360
Speaker 3: is something we talked about briefly off air, but I

508
00:33:58,440 --> 00:34:01,800
Speaker 3: know we both researched this extent. It goes down to

509
00:34:01,880 --> 00:34:06,760
Speaker 3: psi pressure per square inch. The blast wave moves outward

510
00:34:07,160 --> 00:34:11,480
Speaker 3: thousands of miles per hour. It slows as it spreads naturally,

511
00:34:11,880 --> 00:34:14,440
Speaker 3: but it carries with it about half of a bomb's

512
00:34:14,560 --> 00:34:18,760
Speaker 3: explosive energy, regardless of the yield size of the bomb.

513
00:34:19,400 --> 00:34:23,160
Speaker 3: It's responsible for most of the physical destruction you see,

514
00:34:23,200 --> 00:34:27,879
Speaker 3: and people can actually as odd People can actually, under

515
00:34:27,920 --> 00:34:33,120
Speaker 3: some circumstances, deal with a deteriorating blast wave, but they

516
00:34:33,160 --> 00:34:36,920
Speaker 3: are very vulnerable to collapsing buildings, to pieces of glass

517
00:34:37,000 --> 00:34:41,839
Speaker 3: that become you know, a rainstorm of knives. Essentially the

518
00:34:41,880 --> 00:34:45,600
Speaker 3: force of this wave can be such that glass, which

519
00:34:45,640 --> 00:34:48,760
Speaker 3: is a breakable thing, right, you can break stone with glass,

520
00:34:48,760 --> 00:34:51,640
Speaker 3: but the glass is flying at such a high speed

521
00:34:51,960 --> 00:34:57,240
Speaker 3: that it can embed itself into stone structures. A human

522
00:34:57,280 --> 00:35:01,040
Speaker 3: flesh stands no chance against this force can slam you

523
00:35:01,800 --> 00:35:04,839
Speaker 3: through the air into walls, you know. I mean, if

524
00:35:05,239 --> 00:35:09,920
Speaker 3: you're close enough to nuclear blast, your shadow can be

525
00:35:10,000 --> 00:35:17,640
Speaker 3: burned into the material behind you. So that happens. That

526
00:35:17,719 --> 00:35:19,200
Speaker 3: all happens very very.

527
00:35:19,120 --> 00:35:25,120
Speaker 2: Quickly, right, yeah, yes, And the way an attack would function,

528
00:35:25,400 --> 00:35:28,840
Speaker 2: if it was on any scale, there would be dozens,

529
00:35:28,960 --> 00:35:33,240
Speaker 2: if not hundreds, of these types of explosions happening almost

530
00:35:33,239 --> 00:35:35,120
Speaker 2: simultaneously across the world.

531
00:35:36,320 --> 00:35:41,960
Speaker 3: And things get extraordinarily complicated if they start happening in

532
00:35:42,040 --> 00:35:47,120
Speaker 3: areas close together. Right, So let's go to the midterm.

533
00:35:47,360 --> 00:35:51,080
Speaker 3: Let's talk fallout. Fallout defined on two levels, First the

534
00:35:51,120 --> 00:35:55,560
Speaker 3: actual radiation, and then second, I would argue the political,

535
00:35:56,560 --> 00:36:01,359
Speaker 3: the geopolitical fallout as a result of that first nation. So,

536
00:36:01,440 --> 00:36:06,279
Speaker 3: the most heavily analyzed scenario time after time has been

537
00:36:06,760 --> 00:36:11,239
Speaker 3: Russia and the US attacking one another. Because of the

538
00:36:11,400 --> 00:36:18,360
Speaker 3: relatively US centric analysis at play, that's the easiest stuff

539
00:36:18,360 --> 00:36:22,240
Speaker 3: for Westerners to access. The assumption is always that Russia

540
00:36:22,280 --> 00:36:25,439
Speaker 3: attacks first because it makes US look like the good

541
00:36:25,440 --> 00:36:28,719
Speaker 3: guys in these scenarios. So let's say Russia attacks the

542
00:36:28,760 --> 00:36:34,719
Speaker 3: US first. Then, because NATO members UK and France also

543
00:36:34,840 --> 00:36:39,840
Speaker 3: have their own nuclear weapons, they are bound by NATO's

544
00:36:39,920 --> 00:36:43,839
Speaker 3: Article five to defend the United States. So Russia, being

545
00:36:43,920 --> 00:36:48,800
Speaker 3: well aware of this, logically hits UK and France as well,

546
00:36:48,840 --> 00:36:51,600
Speaker 3: to the best of its abilities, with any military targets

547
00:36:51,640 --> 00:36:55,360
Speaker 3: that they feel might be capable of launching nuclear weapons.

548
00:36:55,560 --> 00:36:59,600
Speaker 3: The add on possibility here the bonus points would be

549
00:36:59,680 --> 00:37:04,200
Speaker 3: to attack those places in such a way that uses

550
00:37:04,280 --> 00:37:09,160
Speaker 3: their own weapons against them that also detonates the nuclear

551
00:37:09,600 --> 00:37:16,000
Speaker 3: material on site. Double whemming. Yep, hasn't happened yet. But

552
00:37:16,160 --> 00:37:19,160
Speaker 3: by this point, to your earlier note there, Matt, it's

553
00:37:19,239 --> 00:37:23,000
Speaker 3: well known that by the time Russia is doing this,

554
00:37:23,680 --> 00:37:30,319
Speaker 3: within a very short period of ours, probably retaliation has

555
00:37:30,360 --> 00:37:34,520
Speaker 3: already occurred. The US and allies, assuming they retain any

556
00:37:35,000 --> 00:37:39,320
Speaker 3: capability which spoiler they will, they strike back. So Moscow,

557
00:37:39,480 --> 00:37:45,160
Speaker 3: Saint Petersburg, several military sites leveled. No stone upon a stone,

558
00:37:45,400 --> 00:37:50,320
Speaker 3: and the dystopian theory would argue that this continues until

559
00:37:50,400 --> 00:37:58,200
Speaker 3: someone is surrendering or incapable of continuing. In our standoff analogy,

560
00:37:58,280 --> 00:38:01,520
Speaker 3: you fire the bullets until you're it clicks dry. So

561
00:38:01,600 --> 00:38:05,560
Speaker 3: if Moscow is wiped immediately, we might finally see the

562
00:38:05,640 --> 00:38:11,760
Speaker 3: dead Hand activate, which is just insane. I still wonder

563
00:38:12,239 --> 00:38:15,200
Speaker 3: if it, if it could actually work, and I want

564
00:38:15,200 --> 00:38:18,399
Speaker 3: to pause because that's just a personal hobby horse of mind.

565
00:38:18,400 --> 00:38:21,040
Speaker 3: But Matt, do you think the dead Hand still functions?

566
00:38:21,520 --> 00:38:22,800
Speaker 3: Do you think it ever did function?

567
00:38:24,000 --> 00:38:26,880
Speaker 2: I think yes, but I think there I think there

568
00:38:26,880 --> 00:38:28,879
Speaker 2: are still humans at the wheel with the Dead Hand,

569
00:38:28,920 --> 00:38:31,840
Speaker 2: They're just in strategic places where they won't get touched,

570
00:38:32,480 --> 00:38:36,279
Speaker 2: like in certain military facilities. I don't think it's this.

571
00:38:36,520 --> 00:38:39,919
Speaker 2: I don't think it's a system where nukes just fire automatically,

572
00:38:40,520 --> 00:38:44,360
Speaker 2: but there are Again, we go back to the detection systems.

573
00:38:44,880 --> 00:38:47,719
Speaker 2: In that plan A that I was looking at. It

574
00:38:47,760 --> 00:38:53,280
Speaker 2: starts with one tactical nuke being launched by Russia basically

575
00:38:53,440 --> 00:38:57,720
Speaker 2: onto Ukraine or into a into a NATO controlled area,

576
00:38:58,200 --> 00:39:00,799
Speaker 2: and then NATO retaliates with one of there like a

577
00:39:00,840 --> 00:39:05,040
Speaker 2: small singular tactical nuclear weapon which is much smaller. Right,

578
00:39:06,040 --> 00:39:08,680
Speaker 2: it's meant to take out a facility or something like that.

579
00:39:08,760 --> 00:39:09,800
Speaker 3: So called bunker buster.

580
00:39:10,520 --> 00:39:11,280
Speaker 4: Yeah, exactly.

581
00:39:11,480 --> 00:39:14,879
Speaker 2: But in that scenario, the only thing that messes up

582
00:39:15,200 --> 00:39:20,640
Speaker 2: is the early detection systems that are aging out in Russia,

583
00:39:20,760 --> 00:39:25,080
Speaker 2: so the system believes that it is a much larger salvo,

584
00:39:25,920 --> 00:39:29,480
Speaker 2: so that it does activate basically the early warning system

585
00:39:29,480 --> 00:39:31,680
Speaker 2: that says, hey, we're being attacked, we need to hit

586
00:39:32,000 --> 00:39:35,040
Speaker 2: the military sites now before ours get taken out.

587
00:39:35,960 --> 00:39:39,240
Speaker 3: And check out our episode on the dead hand, which

588
00:39:39,640 --> 00:39:42,200
Speaker 3: bust some of the more extremist myths about it, but

589
00:39:42,320 --> 00:39:46,799
Speaker 3: does give you a sense of how this would work. Essentially,

590
00:39:46,880 --> 00:39:52,080
Speaker 3: it's a line of continual check ins with these various

591
00:39:52,080 --> 00:39:56,839
Speaker 3: facilities to power structures of the Russian government, and if

592
00:39:56,880 --> 00:40:02,400
Speaker 3: those power structures don't have the right communication protocol, then

593
00:40:02,480 --> 00:40:05,520
Speaker 3: there's another series of tracks balances, and if that also

594
00:40:05,920 --> 00:40:09,960
Speaker 3: goes for loop, then the then a satellite is launched,

595
00:40:10,080 --> 00:40:13,880
Speaker 3: or excuse me, a missile is launched that communicates with

596
00:40:14,080 --> 00:40:20,120
Speaker 3: other remaining nuclear facilities or par nuclear launch sites such

597
00:40:20,160 --> 00:40:22,359
Speaker 3: that then they would begin to launch on their own

598
00:40:22,400 --> 00:40:23,840
Speaker 3: preprogrammed paths.

599
00:40:24,520 --> 00:40:28,560
Speaker 2: Yeah, and there is a thing that we need to

600
00:40:28,600 --> 00:40:32,319
Speaker 2: talk about that I just have to find here. It's

601
00:40:32,360 --> 00:40:36,040
Speaker 2: something that Annie Jacobsen talks about in her book something

602
00:40:36,120 --> 00:40:39,680
Speaker 2: that every single leader who is in charge of that

603
00:40:39,800 --> 00:40:43,400
Speaker 2: decision of whether or not to launch a nuke, generally

604
00:40:43,440 --> 00:40:46,280
Speaker 2: a president or somebody high up in an executive branch

605
00:40:46,480 --> 00:40:51,319
Speaker 2: in any country. This concept of jamming that occurs in

606
00:40:51,360 --> 00:40:54,359
Speaker 2: those moments, because we're talking about moments, not you know,

607
00:40:55,080 --> 00:40:58,160
Speaker 2: the person in charge has a week to moll over

608
00:40:58,640 --> 00:41:02,920
Speaker 2: the consequences of whether or not we unleash these ungodly weapons,

609
00:41:02,960 --> 00:41:06,640
Speaker 2: because we've had them launched at US. You were talking minutes,

610
00:41:07,400 --> 00:41:11,719
Speaker 2: literally minutes where you were going to have basically everyone

611
00:41:11,840 --> 00:41:14,440
Speaker 2: in your ear that is of sufficient rank from the

612
00:41:14,440 --> 00:41:18,040
Speaker 2: military trying to tell you what you need to do.

613
00:41:18,600 --> 00:41:22,319
Speaker 2: And then you generally, as either a civilian leader if

614
00:41:22,360 --> 00:41:26,200
Speaker 2: it's a democratic world country or like in the US,

615
00:41:26,560 --> 00:41:28,440
Speaker 2: or if you're in another country where you've got more

616
00:41:28,440 --> 00:41:31,160
Speaker 2: of an autocratic thing, you still have to make that

617
00:41:31,560 --> 00:41:35,160
Speaker 2: decision so quickly, based on the best intelligence you have,

618
00:41:35,600 --> 00:41:39,640
Speaker 2: based on the sensors that your country has deployed.

619
00:41:41,400 --> 00:41:47,440
Speaker 3: And based on further your awareness of enemy force capability

620
00:41:47,600 --> 00:41:51,719
Speaker 3: and distribution, which is why nuclear capable subs are such

621
00:41:51,719 --> 00:41:56,440
Speaker 3: a crown jewel for the US and Western navies. This

622
00:41:56,640 --> 00:41:59,920
Speaker 3: if we okay, so let's assume things continue to go wrong,

623
00:42:00,160 --> 00:42:05,200
Speaker 3: with each detonation increasingly desperate and ruthless, and happening within

624
00:42:05,239 --> 00:42:09,520
Speaker 3: a short period of time. We see the same consequences,

625
00:42:09,560 --> 00:42:14,280
Speaker 3: and those consequences can become magnified and exacerbated depending upon

626
00:42:14,840 --> 00:42:20,479
Speaker 3: how closely various detonations occur. So if, for instance, if

627
00:42:20,719 --> 00:42:24,719
Speaker 3: Washington gets hit and then New York City also gets hit,

628
00:42:25,160 --> 00:42:29,080
Speaker 3: then the areas between DC and New York City encounter

629
00:42:29,320 --> 00:42:34,360
Speaker 3: a much higher degree of consequence and a horrific aftermath.

630
00:42:34,840 --> 00:42:38,440
Speaker 3: And this applies not just to those regions, but to

631
00:42:38,600 --> 00:42:42,479
Speaker 3: the number of detonations across the globe. This is where

632
00:42:42,520 --> 00:42:46,960
Speaker 3: we enter the concept of nuclear winter. Long story short,

633
00:42:47,480 --> 00:42:51,600
Speaker 3: If hundreds of nuclear explosions occur in a short enough

634
00:42:51,640 --> 00:42:56,480
Speaker 3: span of time, civilization can encounter a new realm of

635
00:42:56,840 --> 00:43:01,960
Speaker 3: environmental devastation called nuclear winter. Now, nuclear winter has not

636
00:43:02,160 --> 00:43:06,120
Speaker 3: occurred at this point, scientists still argue about it, but

637
00:43:06,600 --> 00:43:11,799
Speaker 3: one of the best comparisons we could have would be

638
00:43:12,040 --> 00:43:17,280
Speaker 3: how gargantuan volcanic eruption events can darken the sky. Right,

639
00:43:17,520 --> 00:43:21,640
Speaker 3: that is a thing that we know can happen. Concerns

640
00:43:21,640 --> 00:43:24,920
Speaker 3: about nuclear winter they hit the forefront in the nineteen seventies.

641
00:43:24,960 --> 00:43:28,760
Speaker 3: We get this fellow conspiracy realist. The boffins knew about

642
00:43:28,760 --> 00:43:33,600
Speaker 3: the damaging effects of light, heat, last radiation, and smoke

643
00:43:33,760 --> 00:43:36,759
Speaker 3: caused by nuclear explosions. They knew about it for decades,

644
00:43:37,280 --> 00:43:42,000
Speaker 3: and world leaders sort of ignored it. They didn't really

645
00:43:42,040 --> 00:43:44,440
Speaker 3: talk about it, even though they knew well before the

646
00:43:44,520 --> 00:43:45,440
Speaker 3: nineteen seventies.

647
00:43:46,000 --> 00:43:49,440
Speaker 2: Yeah, they did well, Yeah, because they figured out with

648
00:43:49,520 --> 00:43:53,760
Speaker 2: some of the first nuclear testing what occurs when an

649
00:43:53,880 --> 00:43:56,879
Speaker 2: atom bomb, a nuclear weapon, an h bomb, whatever it is,

650
00:43:56,920 --> 00:43:58,160
Speaker 2: when it explodes.

651
00:43:58,560 --> 00:44:00,400
Speaker 4: We talked about that.

652
00:44:00,680 --> 00:44:05,000
Speaker 2: Giant sun essentially hotter than the sun, fireball that it

653
00:44:05,040 --> 00:44:08,719
Speaker 2: creates when that explosion occurs, especially if there's like a

654
00:44:08,719 --> 00:44:12,520
Speaker 2: city underneath where that fireball is, and all that combustible stuff,

655
00:44:12,520 --> 00:44:17,080
Speaker 2: including the concrete, starts to vaporize and carbonize, basically turn

656
00:44:17,160 --> 00:44:20,960
Speaker 2: into just carbon floating through the air. It creates this

657
00:44:21,200 --> 00:44:23,319
Speaker 2: huge we've seen the mushroom clouds. We know what that

658
00:44:23,360 --> 00:44:26,520
Speaker 2: looks like. But that mushroom cloud, as it's forced up

659
00:44:26,560 --> 00:44:29,880
Speaker 2: from all the heat below it, it goes up past

660
00:44:30,000 --> 00:44:33,240
Speaker 2: the rain clouds, past the tropopause where the rain clouds

661
00:44:33,280 --> 00:44:35,959
Speaker 2: form like the biggest rain clouds, and you get what's

662
00:44:36,000 --> 00:44:41,600
Speaker 2: called a pyrocumulonimbus cloud that is above all the other

663
00:44:41,680 --> 00:44:47,200
Speaker 2: clouds and that crap. Once it's up there for each explosion,

664
00:44:47,560 --> 00:44:53,000
Speaker 2: it sticks around for years, not days, not months, years,

665
00:44:53,120 --> 00:44:56,560
Speaker 2: potentially up to a decade. It sticks up there, and

666
00:44:56,640 --> 00:45:00,439
Speaker 2: it is a black dark cloud that covers up even

667
00:45:00,440 --> 00:45:03,359
Speaker 2: the clouds below it, right, and the cities below it,

668
00:45:03,440 --> 00:45:05,680
Speaker 2: and the agriculture below it.

669
00:45:08,840 --> 00:45:12,480
Speaker 3: Yeah, we also need to talk about the stratosphere. The

670
00:45:12,520 --> 00:45:16,399
Speaker 3: stratosphere is home to a layer of what we call ozone.

671
00:45:16,880 --> 00:45:20,320
Speaker 3: Ozone is running interference for life on Earth by shielding

672
00:45:20,440 --> 00:45:25,120
Speaker 3: everyone from the harmful ultraviolet radiation of the sun. The

673
00:45:25,120 --> 00:45:28,960
Speaker 3: ozone can be depleted by the large amount of nitrogen

674
00:45:29,080 --> 00:45:33,400
Speaker 3: oxide produced by the nuclear explosions. To the studies about

675
00:45:33,480 --> 00:45:37,040
Speaker 3: large amounts of dust and soot and smoke, Yes, they

676
00:45:37,040 --> 00:45:42,080
Speaker 3: can potentially block sunlight from reaching Earth's surface. This leads

677
00:45:42,120 --> 00:45:46,640
Speaker 3: to a temporary cooling of the air. It's exacerbated by

678
00:45:46,800 --> 00:45:50,960
Speaker 3: the vast swaths of smoke and pollutants coming from the

679
00:45:51,000 --> 00:45:54,720
Speaker 3: forest that will burn then the plastics, the oil fields,

680
00:45:54,760 --> 00:45:59,440
Speaker 3: the petroleum stores. The best study for this, or I

681
00:45:59,480 --> 00:46:04,160
Speaker 3: would say the most prominent, is the t TAPS study

682
00:46:04,440 --> 00:46:10,799
Speaker 3: from nineteen eighty three. It's named after its four authors, RP. Turco, Optoon,

683
00:46:11,200 --> 00:46:15,160
Speaker 3: TP Ackerman, JB. Pollock, and Carl Sagan. At least one

684
00:46:15,160 --> 00:46:17,240
Speaker 3: of those guys is very well known to the public,

685
00:46:17,719 --> 00:46:21,799
Speaker 3: and there the idea of nuclear winter hinges not so

686
00:46:21,920 --> 00:46:25,600
Speaker 3: much on the emission of radiation from the initial blast.

687
00:46:26,040 --> 00:46:29,560
Speaker 3: It's the fireballs, the smoke, the soot, the dust. They

688
00:46:29,640 --> 00:46:34,359
Speaker 3: drift at high altitudes and they ride strong established west

689
00:46:34,400 --> 00:46:39,600
Speaker 3: to east winds. If this happens between say, the USSR

690
00:46:39,680 --> 00:46:44,480
Speaker 3: excuse me, Russia and the US, then this knock on

691
00:46:44,719 --> 00:46:49,880
Speaker 3: consequence can form a uniform belt of particles that circle

692
00:46:50,000 --> 00:46:53,439
Speaker 3: the northern hemisphere like a big girdle or corset from

693
00:46:53,880 --> 00:46:59,720
Speaker 3: thirty to sixty degrees latitude. These clouds block out almost

694
00:46:59,800 --> 00:47:03,719
Speaker 3: all all of the light from the sun, and initially

695
00:47:03,840 --> 00:47:06,399
Speaker 3: their study said this could be several weeks. But even

696
00:47:06,440 --> 00:47:10,160
Speaker 3: if it's just several weeks, the consequences are immediate. Surface

697
00:47:10,160 --> 00:47:16,560
Speaker 3: temperatures plummet. Most importantly, plants photosynthesis halts because the plants

698
00:47:16,560 --> 00:47:20,080
Speaker 3: can't eat anymore. This kills a huge portion of vegetation

699
00:47:20,400 --> 00:47:25,320
Speaker 3: animal life, including human animals, and this occurs in step

700
00:47:25,440 --> 00:47:29,800
Speaker 3: with the existing damage to all human infrastructure. So even

701
00:47:29,840 --> 00:47:34,279
Speaker 3: if nuclear winter just happened without nuclear attax, we'd be

702
00:47:34,320 --> 00:47:37,640
Speaker 3: in a tight spot. But for it to occur after

703
00:47:37,800 --> 00:47:44,520
Speaker 3: all like medical rescue, communication infrastructure has just rolled craps,

704
00:47:45,040 --> 00:47:48,279
Speaker 3: then the situation becomes very dire. Indeed, we're talking about

705
00:47:48,280 --> 00:47:52,560
Speaker 3: a massive and sudden drop in human population. The immediate

706
00:47:52,640 --> 00:47:55,080
Speaker 3: radiation could largely be a thing of the past. Now

707
00:47:55,120 --> 00:47:59,640
Speaker 3: we're talking about starvation, exposure, disease, and of course crime,

708
00:48:00,080 --> 00:48:01,640
Speaker 3: people become increasingly desperate.

709
00:48:02,920 --> 00:48:03,200
Speaker 4: Yeah.

710
00:48:03,239 --> 00:48:07,319
Speaker 2: Absolutely, I just want to differentiate the two sets of

711
00:48:07,520 --> 00:48:10,600
Speaker 2: cloud cover that can occur, because you are absolutely right

712
00:48:10,600 --> 00:48:13,920
Speaker 2: you're talking about there's there are different amounts, different amounts

713
00:48:13,920 --> 00:48:15,200
Speaker 2: of smoke and types of smoke that.

714
00:48:15,160 --> 00:48:16,080
Speaker 4: Are going to be generated.

715
00:48:16,120 --> 00:48:18,839
Speaker 2: And as you're talking about the knock on effects like

716
00:48:19,120 --> 00:48:22,719
Speaker 2: forest fires, those kinds of things, petroleum burning, anything that's

717
00:48:22,760 --> 00:48:27,480
Speaker 2: just almost what I would call a normal insane fire

718
00:48:27,600 --> 00:48:30,439
Speaker 2: happening on Earth that is going to do those things

719
00:48:30,480 --> 00:48:33,000
Speaker 2: where it lasts, you know, a couple of weeks as

720
00:48:33,040 --> 00:48:36,560
Speaker 2: those clouds kind of circulate around the Earth. But the

721
00:48:37,000 --> 00:48:39,879
Speaker 2: really scary one that causes the winter, at least from

722
00:48:39,920 --> 00:48:42,560
Speaker 2: what I'm my understanding, from a couple of sources is

723
00:48:42,600 --> 00:48:45,160
Speaker 2: that it's the stuff that goes above the clouds. So

724
00:48:45,400 --> 00:48:49,800
Speaker 2: imagine another layer of clouds up near that more ozone

725
00:48:49,840 --> 00:48:53,000
Speaker 2: layer that you're talking not quite that high up in altitude,

726
00:48:53,040 --> 00:48:55,960
Speaker 2: but near there. That that's the thing that actually blankets

727
00:48:57,400 --> 00:49:00,600
Speaker 2: everything that doesn't it's not subject to the same system

728
00:49:01,120 --> 00:49:05,440
Speaker 2: of rainfall and then clouds forming again, and then all

729
00:49:05,480 --> 00:49:08,239
Speaker 2: those particulate, all that particular matter just falling back to

730
00:49:08,280 --> 00:49:11,080
Speaker 2: the earth pretty rapidly. That's the stuff that can last

731
00:49:11,080 --> 00:49:14,879
Speaker 2: for decades, which is that's how you get in some scenarios,

732
00:49:15,400 --> 00:49:20,120
Speaker 2: two billion people starving quickly because the agricultural ability of

733
00:49:20,280 --> 00:49:24,640
Speaker 2: humanity is halved. That's it. That's base. That's the basic

734
00:49:24,680 --> 00:49:26,960
Speaker 2: scenario for if the US goes to war with Russia.

735
00:49:27,080 --> 00:49:30,360
Speaker 2: Right now, you have the amount of food that humans

736
00:49:30,360 --> 00:49:31,320
Speaker 2: can produce.

737
00:49:31,880 --> 00:49:34,279
Speaker 3: And that would be do uh, that would be doing

738
00:49:34,320 --> 00:49:38,640
Speaker 3: no small part to the geographic bread basket locations the

739
00:49:38,680 --> 00:49:41,240
Speaker 3: interior of the United States and Ukraine.

740
00:49:42,120 --> 00:49:46,200
Speaker 2: Yeah, but and and also but hey, but the good

741
00:49:46,239 --> 00:49:49,200
Speaker 2: thing is if you're in parts of Australia and Argentina,

742
00:49:49,280 --> 00:49:52,560
Speaker 2: you're gonna be good to go because almost none of

743
00:49:52,600 --> 00:49:53,880
Speaker 2: that stuff is going to affect you.

744
00:49:53,920 --> 00:49:55,520
Speaker 4: In the southern hemisphere that far.

745
00:49:55,440 --> 00:49:58,759
Speaker 3: South, depending again on the nature of the conflict, and

746
00:49:58,800 --> 00:50:01,200
Speaker 3: you can check out a great thing video by our

747
00:50:01,320 --> 00:50:04,960
Speaker 3: Fowls in a Nutshell for a quick explainer on that.

748
00:50:05,880 --> 00:50:09,400
Speaker 3: We also need to note again it's important. It's important

749
00:50:09,400 --> 00:50:14,960
Speaker 3: to acknowledge scientists still dispute the exact calculations evolved with

750
00:50:15,120 --> 00:50:21,000
Speaker 3: those earlier studies. Thankfully, this dispute can occur because a

751
00:50:21,080 --> 00:50:27,040
Speaker 3: nuclear winter has yet to occur. Again, thankfully, speaking of

752
00:50:27,120 --> 00:50:29,279
Speaker 3: things that have yet to occur, We're going to take

753
00:50:29,320 --> 00:50:31,759
Speaker 3: a break for a word from our sponsors, and then

754
00:50:32,080 --> 00:50:33,879
Speaker 3: what do you think We'll dive into some of those

755
00:50:33,920 --> 00:50:45,239
Speaker 3: regional hotspots. Okay, all of the things we've mentioned so far,

756
00:50:46,520 --> 00:50:50,000
Speaker 3: and by the way, in that earlier conversation, both of

757
00:50:50,040 --> 00:50:54,160
Speaker 3: those forms of messing with the air are very bad.

758
00:50:54,320 --> 00:50:56,640
Speaker 3: There's not one that's better than the other. They're still

759
00:50:56,719 --> 00:50:59,560
Speaker 3: terrible for people on the ground. This is why people

760
00:50:59,600 --> 00:51:03,120
Speaker 3: are paying so much attention to what we call regional hotspots.

761
00:51:03,440 --> 00:51:06,000
Speaker 3: These are areas of local conflict that in the pre

762
00:51:06,239 --> 00:51:10,799
Speaker 3: nuclear days could still have sown chaos now right, you know,

763
00:51:11,000 --> 00:51:15,000
Speaker 3: like Franz Ferdinand that was a non nuclear conflict. But

764
00:51:15,760 --> 00:51:19,960
Speaker 3: these regional hotspots now more than ever, hold the potential

765
00:51:20,040 --> 00:51:24,640
Speaker 3: for creating this existential threat nuclear exchange with global consequences,

766
00:51:24,840 --> 00:51:28,080
Speaker 3: spelling doom for billions of people half a world away.

767
00:51:29,600 --> 00:51:33,320
Speaker 3: When we talk about regional hotspots, it seems like three

768
00:51:33,360 --> 00:51:36,280
Speaker 3: of the most prominent are going to be Russia, Eastern Europe,

769
00:51:37,160 --> 00:51:40,080
Speaker 3: India and Pakistan, and of course the Middle East.

770
00:51:40,760 --> 00:51:44,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, definitely, and India Pakistan is top of mind because

771
00:51:44,440 --> 00:51:48,239
Speaker 2: there's currently a truce of some sort, there's a ceasefire,

772
00:51:48,640 --> 00:51:51,520
Speaker 2: but that was not the case just several days ago.

773
00:51:52,120 --> 00:51:56,960
Speaker 2: There was serious hot conflict happening with Indian Pakistan because

774
00:51:56,960 --> 00:51:59,640
Speaker 2: of the Kashmir region. That is we talked about that

775
00:51:59,680 --> 00:52:03,320
Speaker 2: in the line of actual control and the different groups

776
00:52:03,360 --> 00:52:07,160
Speaker 2: that say, hey, this is ours or this is partly mine,

777
00:52:07,160 --> 00:52:09,920
Speaker 2: and I get to have the military force and control

778
00:52:09,960 --> 00:52:10,480
Speaker 2: this area.

779
00:52:11,960 --> 00:52:16,200
Speaker 3: Yeah, as everyone watching the news is aware, India and Pakistan,

780
00:52:16,480 --> 00:52:19,279
Speaker 3: who have been beefed up since more or less at

781
00:52:19,320 --> 00:52:22,360
Speaker 3: each other's throats since nineteen forty seven, are reaching a

782
00:52:22,440 --> 00:52:27,120
Speaker 3: new level of tension. They're both nuclear states, they're extremely

783
00:52:27,200 --> 00:52:30,600
Speaker 3: hostile toward one another, and they are right next to

784
00:52:30,920 --> 00:52:37,279
Speaker 3: another nuclear capable power, China. So almost all of the

785
00:52:37,360 --> 00:52:43,839
Speaker 3: time they have had different propagandistic saber rattling events, right.

786
00:52:43,880 --> 00:52:49,120
Speaker 3: We see this often in the form of missile tests.

787
00:52:50,520 --> 00:52:56,000
Speaker 3: These tests have recently escalated into actual non nuclear missile

788
00:52:56,120 --> 00:53:01,760
Speaker 3: launches against military sites in both countries. Something that concerned

789
00:53:01,760 --> 00:53:04,040
Speaker 3: a lot of people here in the United States or

790
00:53:04,040 --> 00:53:08,440
Speaker 3: in the global West was when the current Vice President JD. Vance,

791
00:53:08,640 --> 00:53:11,879
Speaker 3: speaking about this rising conflict, said it was quote none

792
00:53:11,880 --> 00:53:16,799
Speaker 3: of our business and just apolitically. This left nuclear scholars

793
00:53:17,160 --> 00:53:22,239
Speaker 3: baffled because, you know, the logic being a nuclear exchange

794
00:53:22,239 --> 00:53:26,480
Speaker 3: between these two densely populated countries will have effects on

795
00:53:26,560 --> 00:53:29,200
Speaker 3: the rest of the world, definitely on the rest of

796
00:53:29,239 --> 00:53:32,200
Speaker 3: the region. So what's kind of everybody's business?

797
00:53:32,719 --> 00:53:33,839
Speaker 4: Yeah, you're absolutely right.

798
00:53:34,480 --> 00:53:39,040
Speaker 3: You know, this also brings us to something you mentioned earlier,

799
00:53:39,840 --> 00:53:45,040
Speaker 3: limited nuclear war scenarios, right, and tactical nukes. Even if

800
00:53:45,120 --> 00:53:50,680
Speaker 3: there's a limited scenario and everybody else refuses to get

801
00:53:50,719 --> 00:53:54,120
Speaker 3: involved to a greater degree, to a global degree, then

802
00:53:54,320 --> 00:53:59,520
Speaker 3: India and Pakistan can still use like one hundred strategic

803
00:53:59,600 --> 00:54:03,600
Speaker 3: weapons to attack military and urban centers, which means very

804
00:54:03,719 --> 00:54:07,680
Speaker 3: quickly fatalities can reach fifty to one hundred and twenty

805
00:54:07,680 --> 00:54:11,880
Speaker 3: five million people. Again, just like Kiroshima and Nagasaki, the

806
00:54:12,000 --> 00:54:15,880
Speaker 3: vast majority of these people are innocence. They are civilians.

807
00:54:16,080 --> 00:54:21,239
Speaker 3: They're just trying to live their lives. That's why. Interestingly enough,

808
00:54:21,360 --> 00:54:26,160
Speaker 3: maybe this is almost inspiring everyone outside the region. Every

809
00:54:26,200 --> 00:54:30,200
Speaker 3: other nation has sort of put aside their concerns and

810
00:54:30,239 --> 00:54:35,400
Speaker 3: disagreements to argue for restraint. Even you know, China and

811
00:54:35,520 --> 00:54:38,520
Speaker 3: Russia and the US are unified on this, and those

812
00:54:38,520 --> 00:54:40,560
Speaker 3: are three countries that do not like each other.

813
00:54:41,680 --> 00:54:44,080
Speaker 2: It's weird because it would the effects would be roughly

814
00:54:44,200 --> 00:54:47,919
Speaker 2: nuclear autumn. Right what we've described there was nuclear winter.

815
00:54:48,040 --> 00:54:52,560
Speaker 2: This would be bad, and a lot of places wouldn't

816
00:54:52,560 --> 00:54:55,160
Speaker 2: be able to produce food anymore, at least in the

817
00:54:55,160 --> 00:54:57,239
Speaker 2: same way that they produce them now. A lot would

818
00:54:57,280 --> 00:54:59,800
Speaker 2: have to change in order to make food production happen.

819
00:54:59,560 --> 00:55:00,000
Speaker 4: In those areas.

820
00:55:00,280 --> 00:55:04,760
Speaker 2: But you know, it would only cause a couple hundred

821
00:55:04,800 --> 00:55:08,319
Speaker 2: million people to starve, he said sarcastically.

822
00:55:09,280 --> 00:55:13,160
Speaker 3: And you know, also, while we're continuing with I guess

823
00:55:13,160 --> 00:55:16,960
Speaker 3: cold comfort news, it's not that either country, Pakistan or

824
00:55:17,080 --> 00:55:20,759
Speaker 3: India has officially declared they're going to launch nukes. It's

825
00:55:20,840 --> 00:55:24,799
Speaker 3: that at any time either country could and there's a

826
00:55:25,000 --> 00:55:30,279
Speaker 3: lot of sigan and analysis going into location and movement, right,

827
00:55:30,400 --> 00:55:35,080
Speaker 3: and a lot of very frantic conversations on both sides.

828
00:55:35,400 --> 00:55:37,719
Speaker 3: We know millions would die as a result. And then

829
00:55:37,760 --> 00:55:41,600
Speaker 3: we go to we go to something that is probably

830
00:55:41,640 --> 00:55:44,319
Speaker 3: a little more familiar to a lot of people in

831
00:55:44,440 --> 00:55:49,920
Speaker 3: the quote unquote Global West. Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine

832
00:55:50,040 --> 00:55:54,120
Speaker 3: began in twenty fourteen in earnest continues as we record

833
00:55:54,800 --> 00:55:59,480
Speaker 3: in recent months and multiple news sources up to it,

834
00:55:59,560 --> 00:56:02,800
Speaker 3: including just a few days ago. In fact, Russian President

835
00:56:02,880 --> 00:56:07,600
Speaker 3: Vladimir Putin has made these repeated, at times cryptic statements

836
00:56:07,760 --> 00:56:12,120
Speaker 3: about the possibility of deploying and detonating nukes in the conflict.

837
00:56:12,200 --> 00:56:14,360
Speaker 3: As of so we said, we're recorded on May twelfth,

838
00:56:14,520 --> 00:56:18,440
Speaker 3: As of May fourth, literally last week of Vladimir Putin

839
00:56:18,520 --> 00:56:21,520
Speaker 3: stated the need to use nukes in Ukraine has not

840
00:56:21,600 --> 00:56:24,960
Speaker 3: yet arisen, and he get this, hopes it will not.

841
00:56:25,480 --> 00:56:28,600
Speaker 3: That is a world away from saying Russia will not

842
00:56:28,680 --> 00:56:29,720
Speaker 3: attack in this manner.

843
00:56:30,880 --> 00:56:33,000
Speaker 4: That's a yeah, that seems insane.

844
00:56:33,680 --> 00:56:38,839
Speaker 2: Yeah, I just I just don't understand, because you you can't, Ben,

845
00:56:38,920 --> 00:56:43,359
Speaker 2: Can you imagine a scenario where Russian forces for one reason,

846
00:56:43,440 --> 00:56:48,320
Speaker 2: or another decide to launch a large ton like a

847
00:56:48,360 --> 00:56:50,880
Speaker 2: several mega ton nuke in that conflict.

848
00:56:51,440 --> 00:56:55,360
Speaker 4: I can't imagine that being a good strategic decision.

849
00:56:56,080 --> 00:56:56,920
Speaker 3: It's not rational.

850
00:56:57,760 --> 00:56:58,680
Speaker 4: Yeah, maybe that's it.

851
00:56:59,280 --> 00:57:02,920
Speaker 3: That's the see axiom of all game theory, and arguably

852
00:57:03,000 --> 00:57:06,279
Speaker 3: that can be a weakness when we're talking about you know,

853
00:57:07,320 --> 00:57:10,600
Speaker 3: theocracies or people with nothing to lose. I mean, look,

854
00:57:12,000 --> 00:57:17,760
Speaker 3: current game theory informs prudent statements from everything we can tell.

855
00:57:17,920 --> 00:57:22,360
Speaker 3: Yet Western analysts remains skeptical, especially because of that. I

856
00:57:22,400 --> 00:57:25,880
Speaker 3: hope we don't have to do it caveat, which is frightening.

857
00:57:26,800 --> 00:57:30,120
Speaker 3: Russia conventional military is in dire straits. And we don't

858
00:57:30,160 --> 00:57:33,959
Speaker 3: mean they're playing backup for the band haha. They've got

859
00:57:33,960 --> 00:57:41,200
Speaker 3: hard supply manpower issues, multiple operations are disastrous. Their access

860
00:57:41,240 --> 00:57:45,680
Speaker 3: to consumables like ammo and electronics have conspired to render

861
00:57:45,720 --> 00:57:49,560
Speaker 3: this invasion a quagmire. You know, it seems like achieving

862
00:57:49,640 --> 00:57:54,560
Speaker 3: the original Russian conditions for success is increasingly a pipe dream.

863
00:57:55,160 --> 00:57:58,880
Speaker 3: But those same conditions make it almost impossible to fully

864
00:57:58,920 --> 00:58:03,480
Speaker 3: withdraw it. As though Russia shot a barbed arrow into

865
00:58:03,520 --> 00:58:05,960
Speaker 3: the West and now that arrow, like it or not,

866
00:58:06,200 --> 00:58:08,720
Speaker 3: is stuck in the flesh, it's hard to pull it out.

867
00:58:09,200 --> 00:58:12,400
Speaker 3: So the way you could win logically is by changing

868
00:58:12,440 --> 00:58:14,080
Speaker 3: the rule of the game. And this goes to what

869
00:58:14,560 --> 00:58:17,160
Speaker 3: you were talking about earlier. The prime axiom of game

870
00:58:17,240 --> 00:58:22,920
Speaker 3: theory always assumes a rational actor. Any rational actor in

871
00:58:23,040 --> 00:58:26,200
Speaker 3: charge of Russia would conclude, similar to what we just did,

872
00:58:26,240 --> 00:58:30,040
Speaker 3: that deploy nukes is a no win situation. Population and

873
00:58:30,120 --> 00:58:33,960
Speaker 3: industrial centers in Russia would be certainly hit within days

874
00:58:34,040 --> 00:58:38,200
Speaker 3: or even hours afterward. So the concern in the West,

875
00:58:38,480 --> 00:58:43,000
Speaker 3: the reason we're mentioning this on air. It's still whispered down,

876
00:58:43,040 --> 00:58:47,280
Speaker 3: but it's increasingly prevalent. If Putin is somehow no longer

877
00:58:47,360 --> 00:58:50,360
Speaker 3: a rational actor, what if all those rumors about his

878
00:58:50,480 --> 00:58:53,320
Speaker 3: health for the last few years are true. What if

879
00:58:53,320 --> 00:58:57,200
Speaker 3: he feels, for one reason or another, that he's gone

880
00:58:57,240 --> 00:59:00,280
Speaker 3: too far into the water to return to the shore

881
00:59:00,320 --> 00:59:02,040
Speaker 3: of logic, you know what I mean? What if it's

882
00:59:02,080 --> 00:59:04,800
Speaker 3: all about legacy? What if he has what if he

883
00:59:04,880 --> 00:59:08,640
Speaker 3: has This is speculation that I heard off book, and

884
00:59:08,680 --> 00:59:10,360
Speaker 3: so we don't want to give too much credence to it.

885
00:59:10,400 --> 00:59:13,600
Speaker 3: But what if what if he has a terminal diagnosis

886
00:59:13,600 --> 00:59:16,320
Speaker 3: of some sort? How does that affect his decision.

887
00:59:17,160 --> 00:59:20,800
Speaker 2: What if the people that oppose him are equally irrational.

888
00:59:21,080 --> 00:59:26,440
Speaker 3: Right, yes, exactly, And that goes to the idea of irrationality. Yeah,

889
00:59:26,480 --> 00:59:29,600
Speaker 3: that takes us, of course, to the Middle East, which

890
00:59:29,800 --> 00:59:31,360
Speaker 3: I think we have to spend a little bit of

891
00:59:31,360 --> 00:59:35,360
Speaker 3: time on the current crown jewel of potential nuclear disaster

892
00:59:35,800 --> 00:59:38,200
Speaker 3: the Middle East, or if one be more accurate, we

893
00:59:38,200 --> 00:59:43,200
Speaker 3: could call it West Asia. Only Israel currently possesses nuclear

894
00:59:43,240 --> 00:59:47,480
Speaker 3: power in the region. Sorry, guys, everybody knows, but various

895
00:59:47,520 --> 00:59:50,840
Speaker 3: other countries desperately want this power. And we talked about

896
00:59:51,760 --> 00:59:54,000
Speaker 3: the lesson of Libya, but we didn't say what that was.

897
00:59:54,520 --> 00:59:57,760
Speaker 3: Libya stepped back its efforts to become a nuclear power,

898
00:59:58,280 --> 01:00:02,640
Speaker 3: and for people like the the Kim dynasty in North Korea,

899
01:00:03,800 --> 01:00:09,320
Speaker 3: that's a parable. That is a warning. They see the

900
01:00:09,360 --> 01:00:12,240
Speaker 3: death of Gaddafi in the toppling of that regime as

901
01:00:12,560 --> 01:00:19,360
Speaker 3: a more or less direct consequence of complying with demands

902
01:00:19,360 --> 01:00:20,920
Speaker 3: to become a non nuclear power.

903
01:00:21,000 --> 01:00:24,920
Speaker 2: And well, he agreed in two thousand and three to disarm,

904
01:00:25,040 --> 01:00:27,920
Speaker 2: right and then that was a long process and he

905
01:00:28,080 --> 01:00:32,000
Speaker 2: wasn't taken out until twenty eleven something like that.

906
01:00:33,000 --> 01:00:35,400
Speaker 3: And I'm on record saying I think that was more

907
01:00:35,600 --> 01:00:38,680
Speaker 3: closely affiliated with him messing with the money.

908
01:00:39,960 --> 01:00:44,240
Speaker 2: I'm glad you're on record for that. But yeah, I

909
01:00:44,280 --> 01:00:47,720
Speaker 2: don't I don't. I don't know what killed him. But

910
01:00:47,720 --> 01:00:51,439
Speaker 2: it's definitely one of those things where if you as

911
01:00:51,480 --> 01:00:56,440
Speaker 2: a country give up that power, and what is to

912
01:00:56,520 --> 01:01:00,360
Speaker 2: stop anyone with conventional weapons to come out in there?

913
01:01:00,680 --> 01:01:02,400
Speaker 4: Who's more powerful to take over?

914
01:01:03,080 --> 01:01:07,520
Speaker 3: Yeah, back to our Old West scenario. That's why it's

915
01:01:07,600 --> 01:01:10,520
Speaker 3: relatively rare in a standoff for you know, that's why

916
01:01:10,520 --> 01:01:14,120
Speaker 3: everybody says put the gun down, and people almost never

917
01:01:14,200 --> 01:01:17,320
Speaker 3: do that, you know what I mean, unless there's a hostage.

918
01:01:16,800 --> 01:01:18,800
Speaker 4: But instead they say pick up the gun.

919
01:01:19,720 --> 01:01:23,800
Speaker 3: You put the gun down. But yeah, so because of

920
01:01:24,120 --> 01:01:27,760
Speaker 3: what And again, to be clear, I'm giving the perspective

921
01:01:28,000 --> 01:01:31,720
Speaker 3: of people in nation states pursuing nuclear power given the

922
01:01:31,800 --> 01:01:35,520
Speaker 3: lessons of Libya. From their perspective, it's almost certain that

923
01:01:35,600 --> 01:01:38,200
Speaker 3: none of these countries in the area would ever step

924
01:01:38,280 --> 01:01:41,520
Speaker 3: back from nuclear status once they attained it. And if

925
01:01:41,520 --> 01:01:45,240
Speaker 3: you are, if we're talking perspectives here, the chief concern

926
01:01:45,280 --> 01:01:49,840
Speaker 3: of Israel is Iran. Iran is a powerful regional theocracy,

927
01:01:50,240 --> 01:01:54,040
Speaker 3: and despite its public statements, it seems pretty set on

928
01:01:54,400 --> 01:02:00,640
Speaker 3: acquiring nuclear technology. Now, the official statement of Iran is

929
01:02:00,760 --> 01:02:06,120
Speaker 3: usually we're acquiring peaceful nuclear technology, right, not nuclear weaponry.

930
01:02:06,160 --> 01:02:09,840
Speaker 3: But we've talked about the development and enrichment process. It's

931
01:02:09,880 --> 01:02:13,000
Speaker 3: basically the same thing. The difference is the matter of iterations,

932
01:02:13,120 --> 01:02:14,640
Speaker 3: kind of in your Centerfuges.

933
01:02:15,760 --> 01:02:18,760
Speaker 4: Everybody is developing peaceful nuclear power.

934
01:02:18,960 --> 01:02:21,080
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, yeah, you know, just like we have the

935
01:02:21,120 --> 01:02:25,880
Speaker 3: Department of Defense almost when Chicago like defense.

936
01:02:25,960 --> 01:02:30,080
Speaker 4: But our Department of Energy, right, you know, heavily involved in.

937
01:02:30,080 --> 01:02:36,240
Speaker 3: Nukes in a very peaceful way, because so peaceful, peaceful

938
01:02:36,280 --> 01:02:40,960
Speaker 3: AF which again I'm still startled that people thought that

939
01:02:41,080 --> 01:02:44,960
Speaker 3: AF stood as as fore told, peaceful as for told.

940
01:02:45,680 --> 01:02:49,479
Speaker 3: So much this concern is so big that Israel has

941
01:02:49,600 --> 01:02:54,640
Speaker 3: repeatedly floated the idea of a preemptive nuclear strike on

942
01:02:54,800 --> 01:02:59,439
Speaker 3: facilities before Iran acquires the bomb.

943
01:02:59,640 --> 01:03:01,680
Speaker 4: And this or just kill all the scientists right.

944
01:03:01,800 --> 01:03:06,479
Speaker 3: Right or implants stucksnet. Yeah. There have been many non

945
01:03:06,760 --> 01:03:11,600
Speaker 3: nuclear operations to prevent this capability. So the idea of

946
01:03:11,680 --> 01:03:15,560
Speaker 3: launching a nuke, even like a tactical one, is still

947
01:03:17,440 --> 01:03:21,120
Speaker 3: for some parts of Israel's government and still very much

948
01:03:21,240 --> 01:03:23,680
Speaker 3: on the table, or I should say they're military structures.

949
01:03:23,680 --> 01:03:27,000
Speaker 3: So the thing is, even supporters of that plan, if

950
01:03:27,040 --> 01:03:30,560
Speaker 3: you talk to them, they will honestly acknowledge. Yeah, preemptive

951
01:03:30,600 --> 01:03:36,120
Speaker 3: attack would be pretty chaotic. It would trigger instability, there'd

952
01:03:36,120 --> 01:03:39,880
Speaker 3: be hard conflict across the region. Right, it would exacerbate

953
01:03:39,960 --> 01:03:44,280
Speaker 3: pre existing tensions and lead to inevitable attacks on the

954
01:03:44,360 --> 01:03:48,240
Speaker 3: nation of Israel. But the argument amid the supporters is

955
01:03:48,280 --> 01:03:52,600
Speaker 3: that not attacking, not doing a preemptive nuclear attack will

956
01:03:52,640 --> 01:03:57,040
Speaker 3: result in something far worse. That's their perspective.

957
01:03:57,560 --> 01:04:03,160
Speaker 2: Yeah, I'm thinking more and more about how a nuke

958
01:04:03,200 --> 01:04:08,040
Speaker 2: would be deployed because you tell me what you've found, Ben,

959
01:04:08,080 --> 01:04:12,640
Speaker 2: Because what I've found is that most of these detection systems,

960
01:04:13,000 --> 01:04:15,160
Speaker 2: going way back to like VELA, going way back to

961
01:04:15,200 --> 01:04:19,040
Speaker 2: all these they are detecting ICBM launches mostly right like

962
01:04:19,080 --> 01:04:25,440
Speaker 2: the exactly, so with all of the like we've been

963
01:04:25,480 --> 01:04:29,080
Speaker 2: reading about how there are so many different rockets being

964
01:04:29,120 --> 01:04:32,120
Speaker 2: sent up to deploy satellites right now across the world,

965
01:04:33,160 --> 01:04:37,800
Speaker 2: humanity is just flinging thousands of these smaller scale satellites

966
01:04:37,920 --> 01:04:41,240
Speaker 2: to float around the globe for a while. It does

967
01:04:41,320 --> 01:04:45,360
Speaker 2: feel like if if a country decided to deploy a

968
01:04:45,440 --> 01:04:48,680
Speaker 2: NW old school style, like with a bomber where you

969
01:04:48,760 --> 01:04:51,960
Speaker 2: just drop it out of the sky. That's not going

970
01:04:52,040 --> 01:04:55,080
Speaker 2: to be detected in the same way you detect the plane.

971
01:04:55,880 --> 01:04:58,680
Speaker 2: But you wouldn't detect that it's a nuclear weapon falling

972
01:04:58,720 --> 01:05:01,160
Speaker 2: to the earth until it needs.

973
01:05:01,240 --> 01:05:04,320
Speaker 3: You would need to have you would need to have

974
01:05:04,360 --> 01:05:06,840
Speaker 3: the ability to see what kind of payload is on

975
01:05:06,880 --> 01:05:09,480
Speaker 3: the plane, and there are ways to do that. But yeah,

976
01:05:09,600 --> 01:05:13,600
Speaker 3: you're you're right. You don't have a single No one

977
01:05:14,800 --> 01:05:17,480
Speaker 3: who's got their vinegar about them, in my opinion, has

978
01:05:17,520 --> 01:05:25,560
Speaker 3: a sig single detection strategy, meaning nothing depends on just

979
01:05:25,800 --> 01:05:29,360
Speaker 3: the one basket of chicken eggs. Instead, you have a

980
01:05:29,360 --> 01:05:32,040
Speaker 3: lot of cigarette You still even have humans, which is

981
01:05:32,880 --> 01:05:36,120
Speaker 3: not a job, not a job most people want.

982
01:05:36,800 --> 01:05:40,440
Speaker 2: Well, we're talking about physically watching where nuclear materials are,

983
01:05:40,480 --> 01:05:44,800
Speaker 2: where warheads are and if some if materials are missing,

984
01:05:45,000 --> 01:05:47,520
Speaker 2: or if a warhead is missing. In that kind of thing,

985
01:05:47,560 --> 01:05:51,760
Speaker 2: and that intelligence gathering on every side, right, people are

986
01:05:51,760 --> 01:05:54,400
Speaker 2: just watching each other for all of that stuff. And

987
01:05:54,520 --> 01:05:57,360
Speaker 2: that's why the dirty bomb scenario was always kind of scary,

988
01:05:57,440 --> 01:06:02,360
Speaker 2: right briefcase, quick look just on that nuke map site,

989
01:06:02,360 --> 01:06:05,320
Speaker 2: and it's not absolute, right, but it's it's a pretty

990
01:06:05,320 --> 01:06:07,520
Speaker 2: good idea when you're looking at that site, just to

991
01:06:07,560 --> 01:06:11,240
Speaker 2: see the radiuses of different things like the fireball, and

992
01:06:11,280 --> 01:06:14,720
Speaker 2: then where that that PSI change is going to be

993
01:06:14,760 --> 01:06:18,960
Speaker 2: where glass shatters. But with a smaller like a dirty bomb,

994
01:06:19,560 --> 01:06:22,720
Speaker 2: it is only rated, at least according to that website

995
01:06:22,760 --> 01:06:26,280
Speaker 2: and some stuff I've just looked up, it would we're

996
01:06:26,320 --> 01:06:31,120
Speaker 2: talking tons, not kill a tons with a dirty bomb, theoretically,

997
01:06:32,360 --> 01:06:34,800
Speaker 2: at least from everything I've found. And if you look

998
01:06:34,840 --> 01:06:39,040
Speaker 2: at that type of damage, it's still massive, but it

999
01:06:39,120 --> 01:06:43,280
Speaker 2: is not in any way the same thing as a

1000
01:06:43,480 --> 01:06:48,440
Speaker 2: one of these larger, possibly mega ton bombs that have

1001
01:06:50,000 --> 01:06:51,840
Speaker 2: that a major country would drop on another.

1002
01:06:52,720 --> 01:06:55,680
Speaker 3: Right, and then we also have to consider and you're

1003
01:06:55,760 --> 01:06:58,280
Speaker 3: running along here, but we also have to consider the

1004
01:06:58,360 --> 01:07:03,760
Speaker 3: possibility of satellite deployment. Oh yeah, right, which is a

1005
01:07:03,800 --> 01:07:10,280
Speaker 3: big part of according to publicly available information, this is

1006
01:07:10,360 --> 01:07:13,520
Speaker 3: not a big part of X thirty seven b's mission X.

1007
01:07:13,440 --> 01:07:15,560
Speaker 4: Thirty seven boom.

1008
01:07:15,600 --> 01:07:18,439
Speaker 3: And there's a kicker combo to all of this, which

1009
01:07:18,480 --> 01:07:21,960
Speaker 3: needs to be said. Due to again, these what we

1010
01:07:22,000 --> 01:07:26,200
Speaker 3: call them earlier posse contracts held by almost all nuclear nations,

1011
01:07:26,240 --> 01:07:28,840
Speaker 3: in some degree or another, it is possible that a

1012
01:07:28,920 --> 01:07:31,960
Speaker 3: single exchange in one of these hot spots we mentioned

1013
01:07:32,320 --> 01:07:38,520
Speaker 3: could trigger exchanges in other, like non geographically related regions

1014
01:07:38,680 --> 01:07:41,840
Speaker 3: as well, And once a set of countries goes hot,

1015
01:07:42,240 --> 01:07:46,200
Speaker 3: the others are likewise emboldened to do so. This is

1016
01:07:46,240 --> 01:07:48,280
Speaker 3: not a good guys, bad guys thing at this point.

1017
01:07:48,600 --> 01:07:52,040
Speaker 3: It means that a nuclear launch is dangerous, not just

1018
01:07:52,080 --> 01:07:57,000
Speaker 3: because of the immediate physical consequences, but also because it

1019
01:07:57,120 --> 01:08:00,760
Speaker 3: makes it that much easier for everybody else in the

1020
01:08:00,800 --> 01:08:03,760
Speaker 3: standoff to say, oh, I can launch my toys too,

1021
01:08:04,320 --> 01:08:06,000
Speaker 3: you know what I mean. As a matter of fact,

1022
01:08:06,240 --> 01:08:10,000
Speaker 3: I better because this moves quickly. In actual nuclear war,

1023
01:08:10,920 --> 01:08:14,400
Speaker 3: the period of deployment and detonation, or the period of

1024
01:08:14,400 --> 01:08:18,519
Speaker 3: detonation for sure, would be fairly short in duration, kind

1025
01:08:18,560 --> 01:08:22,599
Speaker 3: of like how real gunfights almost never last as long

1026
01:08:22,640 --> 01:08:26,280
Speaker 3: as they do in the films. Right, It's the consequences

1027
01:08:26,640 --> 01:08:28,720
Speaker 3: that get you, you know what I mean. If you

1028
01:08:28,760 --> 01:08:33,160
Speaker 3: are hearing this, the elephants make war. You are the grass,

1029
01:08:33,400 --> 01:08:35,840
Speaker 3: no matter what you believe, no matter what you agree with.

1030
01:08:36,320 --> 01:08:38,360
Speaker 3: You don't get to take a survey as the bomb

1031
01:08:38,400 --> 01:08:41,679
Speaker 3: is landing, and the bomb doesn't get to decide whether

1032
01:08:41,760 --> 01:08:45,360
Speaker 3: or not you get to survive some areas of the world,

1033
01:08:45,560 --> 01:08:49,439
Speaker 3: some small enclaves of people with the ability to prepare,

1034
01:08:49,640 --> 01:08:53,680
Speaker 3: they can solderraw On. It's a cold comfort, but it's comfort, nonetheless,

1035
01:08:53,800 --> 01:08:58,160
Speaker 3: and it's not a certainty yet, but it is certainly

1036
01:08:58,479 --> 01:09:01,720
Speaker 3: on the horizon. So what do you think, man, I

1037
01:09:01,760 --> 01:09:06,840
Speaker 3: feel like our next episode in this series should be.

1038
01:09:07,280 --> 01:09:09,639
Speaker 3: So we've talked about the facts and the crazy things

1039
01:09:09,920 --> 01:09:11,479
Speaker 3: that could happen. I think a lot of us in

1040
01:09:11,520 --> 01:09:15,360
Speaker 3: the audience right now are wondering after learning this, well,

1041
01:09:15,400 --> 01:09:19,160
Speaker 3: holy shit, what should I do? How can me and

1042
01:09:19,200 --> 01:09:22,800
Speaker 3: my loved ones survive a nuclear war? And all these implications?

1043
01:09:23,040 --> 01:09:25,599
Speaker 3: Do I feel like it's worth a follow up episode?

1044
01:09:26,240 --> 01:09:28,280
Speaker 4: Oh yeah, for sure, for sure.

1045
01:09:28,960 --> 01:09:30,280
Speaker 2: You know, one of the things we talked about with

1046
01:09:30,320 --> 01:09:32,519
Speaker 2: Garrett Graft when we had him on a while ago,

1047
01:09:32,800 --> 01:09:36,000
Speaker 2: talked about, you know, like underground bases, bunkers, nuclear war,

1048
01:09:36,040 --> 01:09:38,360
Speaker 2: all that stuff we talked about in the Nuclear Football.

1049
01:09:38,680 --> 01:09:42,799
Speaker 2: We also talked about the fact that the US president,

1050
01:09:42,800 --> 01:09:46,439
Speaker 2: whoever is acting US president, whether that's the president or

1051
01:09:46,640 --> 01:09:49,200
Speaker 2: the president, dies, then you know, it goes down that

1052
01:09:49,479 --> 01:09:54,000
Speaker 2: chain of command. That single human being is the only

1053
01:09:54,120 --> 01:09:56,760
Speaker 2: person on the planet who can decide if the US

1054
01:09:56,840 --> 01:10:03,160
Speaker 2: launches nukes, and no advisor, vice president, no senator, no congressman,

1055
01:10:03,240 --> 01:10:08,559
Speaker 2: no anybody can have any say. No general can have

1056
01:10:08,640 --> 01:10:10,559
Speaker 2: any say on whether or not the nukes get.

1057
01:10:10,439 --> 01:10:14,679
Speaker 3: Launched unless that general, due to massive disaster, is now

1058
01:10:14,760 --> 01:10:18,160
Speaker 3: the top dog because the chain of command technically goes

1059
01:10:18,320 --> 01:10:19,519
Speaker 3: all the way down.

1060
01:10:19,760 --> 01:10:20,400
Speaker 4: Oh for sure.

1061
01:10:20,600 --> 01:10:22,400
Speaker 2: But that's what I mean. But that guy, that one

1062
01:10:22,520 --> 01:10:24,760
Speaker 2: general then is the person.

1063
01:10:25,000 --> 01:10:27,679
Speaker 3: And that, you know, that's it reminds me. I think

1064
01:10:27,760 --> 01:10:29,680
Speaker 3: I shared this story with you guys. Canmer was on

1065
01:10:29,720 --> 01:10:32,960
Speaker 3: era off air, it's probably off air, but I remember

1066
01:10:33,160 --> 01:10:37,960
Speaker 3: being so impressed with a local politician when I was

1067
01:10:38,320 --> 01:10:43,240
Speaker 3: as a very younger iteration, and the guy told me

1068
01:10:44,600 --> 01:10:49,160
Speaker 3: exactly how many people had to die for him to

1069
01:10:49,240 --> 01:10:52,720
Speaker 3: automatically become president of the United States, and it was

1070
01:10:52,760 --> 01:10:57,040
Speaker 3: a lot, but he knew the exact number, and I was,

1071
01:10:58,560 --> 01:11:02,800
Speaker 3: you know, in retrospect, I'm still so fascinated by that dude,

1072
01:11:02,800 --> 01:11:06,000
Speaker 3: who has long since passed, but I'm a little scared

1073
01:11:06,080 --> 01:11:07,519
Speaker 3: that he knew the exact number.

1074
01:11:08,200 --> 01:11:09,320
Speaker 4: Yeah, that is scary.

1075
01:11:09,880 --> 01:11:13,400
Speaker 3: It makes you think about people and their pursuit of

1076
01:11:13,640 --> 01:11:16,599
Speaker 3: power and the dehumanizing effects of that.

1077
01:11:17,040 --> 01:11:19,719
Speaker 2: But well, it's weird that the continuity of government plans

1078
01:11:19,760 --> 01:11:23,400
Speaker 2: are available. Anybody can read them, like the chain of

1079
01:11:23,479 --> 01:11:26,759
Speaker 2: custody and all that other stuff, and anybody can read

1080
01:11:26,920 --> 01:11:29,960
Speaker 2: the nuclear deterrence plans that the US has in place.

1081
01:11:30,000 --> 01:11:33,599
Speaker 2: It's just as Amy Jacobson found, it's something we don't

1082
01:11:33,640 --> 01:11:37,639
Speaker 2: talk about, like, we just don't talk about it anymore.

1083
01:11:38,600 --> 01:11:40,679
Speaker 2: It just kind of gone away because we're so far

1084
01:11:40,720 --> 01:11:45,160
Speaker 2: removed from World War Two now, the thought of nuclear war,

1085
01:11:46,280 --> 01:11:48,840
Speaker 2: no matter how hot any of these other conflicts get,

1086
01:11:48,880 --> 01:11:51,479
Speaker 2: it's just kind of we we put it away. It's

1087
01:11:51,800 --> 01:11:54,479
Speaker 2: that's not really going to happen, because if it does happen,

1088
01:11:54,960 --> 01:11:55,439
Speaker 2: it's over.

1089
01:11:56,640 --> 01:12:00,720
Speaker 3: Well. With that in mind, I'm trying to and on

1090
01:12:01,200 --> 01:12:03,080
Speaker 3: some kind of comfort or some kind of good note,

1091
01:12:03,120 --> 01:12:05,799
Speaker 3: I want to shout out the work of Brian Martin,

1092
01:12:06,200 --> 01:12:10,280
Speaker 3: his critique of nuclear extinction published in the Journal of

1093
01:12:10,360 --> 01:12:14,040
Speaker 3: Peace Research. It may be worth your time to read

1094
01:12:14,560 --> 01:12:17,160
Speaker 3: if you want to see some of the folks who

1095
01:12:17,280 --> 01:12:22,600
Speaker 3: are challenging the dystopian assumptions or several of those dystopian

1096
01:12:22,600 --> 01:12:26,000
Speaker 3: assumptions at play. We'd also love to hear your personal

1097
01:12:26,120 --> 01:12:31,000
Speaker 3: take on the idea of full scale nuclear war. We'd

1098
01:12:31,000 --> 01:12:34,679
Speaker 3: love to hear any firsthand experience you have in related fields,

1099
01:12:34,880 --> 01:12:37,519
Speaker 3: and we'd love to hear from you anyway you wish

1100
01:12:37,560 --> 01:12:41,520
Speaker 3: to find us. You can find us online on YouTube, Instagram,

1101
01:12:42,280 --> 01:12:46,400
Speaker 3: all the social medis people sip where conspiracy stuff show

1102
01:12:46,640 --> 01:12:49,960
Speaker 3: or some derivation of conspiracy stuff. You can also give

1103
01:12:50,040 --> 01:12:53,320
Speaker 3: us a call on a telephonic device, or as long

1104
01:12:53,360 --> 01:12:56,160
Speaker 3: as there an emp doesn't hit, you can also email

1105
01:12:56,240 --> 01:12:58,280
Speaker 3: us at our good old fashioned email address.

1106
01:12:58,640 --> 01:12:58,800
Speaker 5: Oh.

1107
01:12:58,880 --> 01:13:02,120
Speaker 2: Our number is one eight three three STDWYTK. It's a

1108
01:13:02,160 --> 01:13:04,640
Speaker 2: voicemail system. Call in, give yourself a nickname and let

1109
01:13:04,760 --> 01:13:06,360
Speaker 2: us know within the message if we can use your

1110
01:13:06,400 --> 01:13:08,040
Speaker 2: name and message on the air. If you want to

1111
01:13:08,080 --> 01:13:10,080
Speaker 2: send us an email, we are the.

1112
01:13:10,080 --> 01:13:12,800
Speaker 3: Entities that read every piece of correspondence we receive. Be

1113
01:13:12,880 --> 01:13:16,720
Speaker 3: well aware, yet unafraid. Sometimes the void writes back. Would

1114
01:13:16,840 --> 01:13:19,040
Speaker 3: especially love to have a bit of a book club.

1115
01:13:19,520 --> 01:13:23,880
Speaker 3: Recommend your favorite nuclear disaster works of film or fiction.

1116
01:13:24,080 --> 01:13:28,320
Speaker 3: Thinking things like Canton Go for Leebowitz the day after tomorrow. Hey,

1117
01:13:28,479 --> 01:13:51,400
Speaker 3: you hit us to your favorites conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

1118
01:13:51,560 --> 01:13:53,639
Speaker 2: Stuff they Don't Want You to Know is a production

1119
01:13:53,760 --> 01:13:58,280
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio, app,

1120
01:13:58,360 --> 01:14:01,200
Speaker 2: Apple podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.