1 00:00:03,200 --> 00:00:08,000 Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Brusso from Bloomberg Radio. 2 00:00:09,160 --> 00:00:12,280 Speaker 2: Is imposing the fourteenth Amendment a perfect solution? No it 3 00:00:12,400 --> 00:00:15,720 Speaker 2: is not, but using the fourteenth Amendment would allow the 4 00:00:15,800 --> 00:00:18,480 Speaker 2: United States to continue to pay its bills on time 5 00:00:18,760 --> 00:00:22,000 Speaker 2: and without delay, prevent an economic catastrophe. 6 00:00:22,360 --> 00:00:25,000 Speaker 1: With no sign of a debt limit deal in sight, 7 00:00:25,400 --> 00:00:29,960 Speaker 1: some progressive Democrats, like Senator Bernie Sanders are urging President 8 00:00:30,000 --> 00:00:33,920 Speaker 1: Biden to invoke the fourteenth Amendment to go around Congress 9 00:00:33,960 --> 00:00:37,400 Speaker 1: to pay off the nation's debts. Biden believes he has 10 00:00:37,440 --> 00:00:40,760 Speaker 1: the legal right to do that, but doesn't necessarily know 11 00:00:40,920 --> 00:00:44,600 Speaker 1: if he has the time because of the expected legal challenges. 12 00:00:45,200 --> 00:00:48,479 Speaker 2: I'm looking at the fourteenth Amendment whether or not we 13 00:00:48,560 --> 00:00:51,720 Speaker 2: have the authority. I think we have the authority. The 14 00:00:51,800 --> 00:00:54,960 Speaker 2: question is could it be done and invoked in time? 15 00:00:55,440 --> 00:00:58,240 Speaker 1: Joining me is Michael Dorf, a professor at Cornell Law 16 00:00:58,280 --> 00:01:02,320 Speaker 1: School who's been studying and writing about this issue for 17 00:01:02,400 --> 00:01:06,360 Speaker 1: some twelve years. So the White House has appeared to 18 00:01:06,440 --> 00:01:10,640 Speaker 1: rule out invoking the fourteenth Amendment, even though President Biden 19 00:01:10,680 --> 00:01:12,959 Speaker 1: said this week that he believes he has the legal 20 00:01:13,080 --> 00:01:15,840 Speaker 1: right to invoke it. So tell us what the argument 21 00:01:15,880 --> 00:01:17,319 Speaker 1: is there? For the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 00:01:17,720 --> 00:01:21,640 Speaker 3: So Section four of the Fourteenth Amendment says that the 23 00:01:21,720 --> 00:01:24,160 Speaker 3: validity of the public debt of the United States shall 24 00:01:24,200 --> 00:01:29,480 Speaker 3: not be questioned. And it was adopted in eighteen sixty 25 00:01:29,520 --> 00:01:34,400 Speaker 3: eight in response to the fear that representatives of the 26 00:01:34,440 --> 00:01:38,920 Speaker 3: states of the former Confederacy in Congress might not pay 27 00:01:39,280 --> 00:01:44,520 Speaker 3: for the Union side debts from the Civil War. But 28 00:01:44,600 --> 00:01:49,160 Speaker 3: the language is much clearly broader than simply Civil War debts, 29 00:01:49,440 --> 00:01:53,480 Speaker 3: and so it is taken by everybody to be a 30 00:01:53,600 --> 00:01:57,279 Speaker 3: general statement of the proposition that the federal government should 31 00:01:57,280 --> 00:02:01,600 Speaker 3: pay its debts. There is debate over or what counts 32 00:02:01,680 --> 00:02:05,120 Speaker 3: as part of the public debt. Does that mean, as 33 00:02:05,280 --> 00:02:09,920 Speaker 3: some people say, only principle and interest payments on bonds, 34 00:02:10,280 --> 00:02:13,239 Speaker 3: or does it mean, as simplical say, in the other direction, 35 00:02:13,880 --> 00:02:17,840 Speaker 3: everything that the government has agreed to pay. So that includes, 36 00:02:17,880 --> 00:02:21,919 Speaker 3: of course bond principle and interest, but also paying creditors 37 00:02:21,960 --> 00:02:26,000 Speaker 3: for services rendered, such as hospitals and doctors who perform 38 00:02:26,200 --> 00:02:30,480 Speaker 3: medical services pursued to medicare social security recipients who are 39 00:02:30,520 --> 00:02:34,560 Speaker 3: owed the money by virtue of entitlement legislation, and so forth. 40 00:02:34,680 --> 00:02:38,440 Speaker 3: So that's the question, and the theory is that if 41 00:02:38,520 --> 00:02:41,720 Speaker 3: the government is unable to pay all of its bills, 42 00:02:41,960 --> 00:02:44,840 Speaker 3: then that is either a default, or even if not 43 00:02:44,880 --> 00:02:49,280 Speaker 3: a default, it calls into question the validity of the 44 00:02:49,280 --> 00:02:52,040 Speaker 3: public debt. So some people argue, and I think this 45 00:02:52,080 --> 00:02:57,000 Speaker 3: is a pretty plausible argument, that if the government fails 46 00:02:57,080 --> 00:02:59,359 Speaker 3: to raise the debt feeling and can't come up with 47 00:02:59,400 --> 00:03:01,600 Speaker 3: the money to pay all of its bills some other 48 00:03:01,639 --> 00:03:04,760 Speaker 3: way by taxes or selling property or what have you, 49 00:03:05,680 --> 00:03:10,080 Speaker 3: then that would violate the fourteenth Amendment. And under those circumstances, 50 00:03:10,280 --> 00:03:15,120 Speaker 3: the debt sealing statute would be unconstitutional. And so the president, 51 00:03:15,320 --> 00:03:18,440 Speaker 3: by so called invoking that would be saying, well, if 52 00:03:18,440 --> 00:03:21,920 Speaker 3: the debt stealing statute is unconstitutional, we do what we 53 00:03:22,040 --> 00:03:25,000 Speaker 3: do with any unconstituted statute. We put it aside. And 54 00:03:25,040 --> 00:03:28,080 Speaker 3: then there are other statutory provisions that authorize the government 55 00:03:28,120 --> 00:03:31,360 Speaker 3: to borrow so much money as is necessary to pay 56 00:03:31,360 --> 00:03:35,680 Speaker 3: the government's bills. So that's the theory behind invoking the 57 00:03:35,720 --> 00:03:38,520 Speaker 3: fourteenth Amendment. And as I say, it's pretty good. What 58 00:03:38,640 --> 00:03:43,160 Speaker 3: President Biden expressed a worry about is that, as he said, 59 00:03:43,200 --> 00:03:45,240 Speaker 3: it would have to be litigated. Now I don't think 60 00:03:45,360 --> 00:03:48,640 Speaker 3: that's literally accurate. It wouldn't have to be litigated, but 61 00:03:48,680 --> 00:03:52,200 Speaker 3: it almost certainly would be litigated. So, as a practical matter, 62 00:03:52,280 --> 00:03:58,160 Speaker 3: his concern is legitimate people would sue. Possibly House Republicans 63 00:03:58,200 --> 00:04:03,320 Speaker 3: would sue. You could imagine investors in pension funds and 64 00:04:03,360 --> 00:04:08,520 Speaker 3: the like suing to stop the funds from purchasing bonds 65 00:04:08,560 --> 00:04:12,360 Speaker 3: of questionable legality, and so there would be litigation, and 66 00:04:12,400 --> 00:04:15,880 Speaker 3: that would mean that there would be uncertainty about the 67 00:04:16,279 --> 00:04:19,040 Speaker 3: new debt that had been issued. At the very least, 68 00:04:19,279 --> 00:04:22,360 Speaker 3: there would be an interest premium that the government would 69 00:04:22,360 --> 00:04:26,880 Speaker 3: have to offer investors to accept bonds that might not 70 00:04:27,160 --> 00:04:29,000 Speaker 3: later be declared valid. 71 00:04:30,000 --> 00:04:33,480 Speaker 1: Has this been tested in the courts at all? Barack 72 00:04:33,480 --> 00:04:38,120 Speaker 1: Obama also rejected this option during the twenty eleven debt 73 00:04:38,160 --> 00:04:41,080 Speaker 1: sealing crisis. Why are presidents so reluctant to. 74 00:04:41,160 --> 00:04:44,359 Speaker 3: Use this well, precisely because it hasn't been tested in 75 00:04:44,400 --> 00:04:47,719 Speaker 3: the courts. The way that our legal system works is 76 00:04:47,800 --> 00:04:51,039 Speaker 3: you can't get into federal court just to ask a question. 77 00:04:51,240 --> 00:04:53,520 Speaker 3: You can do that in some state court systems. There 78 00:04:53,520 --> 00:04:55,560 Speaker 3: are many other countries in which you can do that. 79 00:04:55,560 --> 00:04:58,479 Speaker 3: You can get a so called advisory opinion from a 80 00:04:58,520 --> 00:05:02,719 Speaker 3: constitutional court. Until relatively recently that was the only kind 81 00:05:02,760 --> 00:05:05,479 Speaker 3: of ruling you could get in France, for example. But 82 00:05:05,720 --> 00:05:08,680 Speaker 3: our courts do not issue advisory opinions, and so the 83 00:05:08,720 --> 00:05:11,400 Speaker 3: only way to find out the answer to a legal 84 00:05:11,480 --> 00:05:14,880 Speaker 3: question is to do it in real time, as it were. 85 00:05:15,360 --> 00:05:18,280 Speaker 3: And so I think the reason that both President Obama 86 00:05:18,360 --> 00:05:22,040 Speaker 3: and now President Biden were reluctant to go that route 87 00:05:22,600 --> 00:05:26,560 Speaker 3: was because if you do, and then subsequently the courts say, actually, 88 00:05:26,560 --> 00:05:29,120 Speaker 3: you can't do that because the fourteenth Senment has a 89 00:05:29,240 --> 00:05:31,920 Speaker 3: narrower scope, or because even if the dead ceiling is 90 00:05:32,000 --> 00:05:34,560 Speaker 3: unconstitutionally you still don't have the power to borrow money. 91 00:05:34,600 --> 00:05:36,400 Speaker 3: Then you only find out after the fact, and in 92 00:05:36,440 --> 00:05:39,880 Speaker 3: the meantime a whole lot of people might have purchased bonds, 93 00:05:39,920 --> 00:05:44,400 Speaker 3: and that could add to the chaos, uncertainty, and economic damage. 94 00:05:44,680 --> 00:05:48,279 Speaker 1: There is a lawsuit filed by a federal workers' union 95 00:05:49,000 --> 00:05:52,279 Speaker 1: in Massachusetts. Is it on the theory that you have 96 00:05:52,880 --> 00:05:56,040 Speaker 1: said is a possible alternative to the fourteenth Amendment? 97 00:05:56,279 --> 00:05:59,920 Speaker 3: Yes, So that lawsuit, which I think is very well crafted, 98 00:06:00,120 --> 00:06:04,760 Speaker 3: is on behalf of unionized federal workers, thousands of them 99 00:06:04,960 --> 00:06:09,160 Speaker 3: who would risk not getting paid on time and being 100 00:06:09,279 --> 00:06:12,880 Speaker 3: unable to pay the bills. For their families, if the 101 00:06:12,920 --> 00:06:16,279 Speaker 3: government does not raise the dead feeling, and if the 102 00:06:16,600 --> 00:06:20,080 Speaker 3: administration then goes through with what is sometimes thought to 103 00:06:20,120 --> 00:06:25,000 Speaker 3: be the conventional wisdom of then prioritizing paying people who 104 00:06:25,040 --> 00:06:30,440 Speaker 3: have bonds and deprioritizing other government bills, so not paying 105 00:06:30,480 --> 00:06:33,480 Speaker 3: federal workers. Their theory is not that this would violate 106 00:06:33,520 --> 00:06:38,120 Speaker 3: the fourteenth Amendment, but following a line of reasoning that 107 00:06:38,400 --> 00:06:41,880 Speaker 3: I and Neil Buchanan, who's a macroeconomist at the University 108 00:06:41,880 --> 00:06:44,800 Speaker 3: of Florida, have articulated over the last dozen or so years, 109 00:06:45,040 --> 00:06:46,920 Speaker 3: the theory would be that this would be a violation 110 00:06:47,080 --> 00:06:50,200 Speaker 3: of separation of powers. And let me explain why that 111 00:06:50,240 --> 00:06:53,280 Speaker 3: would be so. Article one, section eight of the Constitution 112 00:06:53,520 --> 00:06:57,480 Speaker 3: gives to Congress all of the relevant powers of the purse, 113 00:06:57,600 --> 00:07:00,240 Speaker 3: the power to tax, the power to spend, and the 114 00:07:00,279 --> 00:07:04,440 Speaker 3: power to borrow. If the government passes sets of laws 115 00:07:04,920 --> 00:07:10,120 Speaker 3: that say, collectively, spend more money than the combination of 116 00:07:10,200 --> 00:07:14,640 Speaker 3: what you take in through taxation and borrowing, Professor Buchanan 117 00:07:14,680 --> 00:07:17,720 Speaker 3: and I say, well, that means that the government can't 118 00:07:17,720 --> 00:07:21,560 Speaker 3: comply with all three of those things simultaneously. Something has 119 00:07:21,600 --> 00:07:24,960 Speaker 3: got to give. Our analysis has always been that what 120 00:07:25,120 --> 00:07:29,920 Speaker 3: has to give then should be the debt sealing that 121 00:07:30,040 --> 00:07:33,280 Speaker 3: the debt sealing provision would be the one that you 122 00:07:33,360 --> 00:07:37,160 Speaker 3: don't comply with. And the reason is that you can't 123 00:07:37,280 --> 00:07:40,520 Speaker 3: do either of the other two things. Certainly, the president 124 00:07:40,880 --> 00:07:44,240 Speaker 3: isn't going to raise taxes on his own. That's not 125 00:07:44,520 --> 00:07:47,480 Speaker 3: power the president has. But the president also doesn't have 126 00:07:47,560 --> 00:07:51,000 Speaker 3: the power to prioritize, that is to say, to cut spending. 127 00:07:51,360 --> 00:07:55,200 Speaker 3: That's the power of Congress. The Constitution says Congress gets 128 00:07:55,240 --> 00:07:58,000 Speaker 3: decide how much we spend money on. And it's not 129 00:07:58,080 --> 00:08:01,400 Speaker 3: just that the president can't spend money without authorization. The 130 00:08:01,440 --> 00:08:05,040 Speaker 3: president also can't not spend money that he's been authorized 131 00:08:05,080 --> 00:08:08,560 Speaker 3: to spend. I can give you two relatively recent examples 132 00:08:08,640 --> 00:08:12,160 Speaker 3: of this. So President Nixon tried to do this. He impounded, 133 00:08:12,240 --> 00:08:14,440 Speaker 3: that is to say, didn't spend a whole bunch of 134 00:08:14,480 --> 00:08:18,360 Speaker 3: money that Congress had appropriated, and that was eventually slapped 135 00:08:18,360 --> 00:08:22,440 Speaker 3: down by the court. When President Trump did this with 136 00:08:22,480 --> 00:08:24,800 Speaker 3: respect to the money that was supposed to go to Ukraine, 137 00:08:24,880 --> 00:08:28,960 Speaker 3: that ended up being the first basis for the articles 138 00:08:29,040 --> 00:08:32,320 Speaker 3: of impeachment against him in twenty nineteen. Right, the idea 139 00:08:32,360 --> 00:08:35,760 Speaker 3: that you can't fail to spend money that Congress has 140 00:08:35,800 --> 00:08:38,600 Speaker 3: said you should spend. And the reason for that is simple. 141 00:08:38,760 --> 00:08:41,319 Speaker 3: Congress has the power of the purse. Budget deals are 142 00:08:41,679 --> 00:08:45,839 Speaker 3: carefully negotiated. There's all sorts of bargaining going on. If 143 00:08:45,880 --> 00:08:48,439 Speaker 3: the president could just decide, you know what, I didn't 144 00:08:48,480 --> 00:08:51,319 Speaker 3: want to spend the money on this combat fighter plane 145 00:08:51,720 --> 00:08:54,400 Speaker 3: or for this environmental project, so I'm just not going 146 00:08:54,480 --> 00:08:58,080 Speaker 3: to spend it, you would be taking over legislative power. 147 00:08:58,200 --> 00:09:02,040 Speaker 3: And so what this lawsuit argues is if the president, 148 00:09:02,280 --> 00:09:05,440 Speaker 3: in a debt sealing crisis were to say, I'm going 149 00:09:05,520 --> 00:09:10,120 Speaker 3: to pay the bondholders, I'm going to pay federal military contractors, 150 00:09:10,400 --> 00:09:12,960 Speaker 3: but I'm not going to pay all of these federal workers. 151 00:09:13,240 --> 00:09:18,240 Speaker 3: That would be a usurpation of legislative power, far worse 152 00:09:18,440 --> 00:09:21,199 Speaker 3: than for the president simply to instruct the Secretary of 153 00:09:21,240 --> 00:09:24,520 Speaker 3: the Treasury continue borrowing money the way you always do, 154 00:09:24,840 --> 00:09:30,200 Speaker 3: but only in the amount necessary to cover the revenue gap. Crucially, 155 00:09:30,200 --> 00:09:33,440 Speaker 3: what the lawsuit says is that Congress could, if it 156 00:09:33,640 --> 00:09:37,440 Speaker 3: wanted to give to the president discretion not to spend 157 00:09:37,520 --> 00:09:40,360 Speaker 3: certain funds. But it hasn't done that here, and it 158 00:09:40,440 --> 00:09:44,160 Speaker 3: certainly hasn't provided any kind of what is sometimes called 159 00:09:44,200 --> 00:09:47,560 Speaker 3: an intelligible principle, by which the president is supposed to 160 00:09:47,800 --> 00:09:50,600 Speaker 3: make the decision of whom to pay, when to pay, 161 00:09:50,720 --> 00:09:53,400 Speaker 3: whom to stiff by how much, and so forth, so 162 00:09:53,440 --> 00:09:59,920 Speaker 3: that in the absence of congressional legislation specifying a prioritization scheme, 163 00:10:00,320 --> 00:10:03,960 Speaker 3: it is a usurpation of legislative power because of the 164 00:10:04,080 --> 00:10:07,240 Speaker 3: vast scope of presidential discretion. As I say, that is 165 00:10:07,559 --> 00:10:10,079 Speaker 3: the theory of this lawsuit. It is also more or 166 00:10:10,200 --> 00:10:12,360 Speaker 3: less the view that Professor Buchanan and I have been 167 00:10:12,440 --> 00:10:15,000 Speaker 3: arguing for now for about a dozen years. 168 00:10:15,280 --> 00:10:18,760 Speaker 1: The judge in Boston has ordered a hearing for next 169 00:10:18,760 --> 00:10:22,560 Speaker 1: week on May thirty first, on this key argument, But 170 00:10:22,640 --> 00:10:26,640 Speaker 1: the Justice Department lawyer didn't take a position on that 171 00:10:26,760 --> 00:10:28,120 Speaker 1: question at issue. 172 00:10:28,120 --> 00:10:31,880 Speaker 3: So far right, So this goes back to a point 173 00:10:31,880 --> 00:10:35,840 Speaker 3: you made earlier, which is that although President Biden has 174 00:10:36,040 --> 00:10:39,760 Speaker 3: seemed to rule out the so called fourteenth Amendment option, 175 00:10:40,320 --> 00:10:44,360 Speaker 3: neither he nor Secretary Yellen has taken off the table 176 00:10:44,679 --> 00:10:48,600 Speaker 3: all of the other possible workarounds in the event that 177 00:10:48,960 --> 00:10:52,760 Speaker 3: a deal doesn't get through Congress. I suspect that what 178 00:10:52,840 --> 00:10:56,400 Speaker 3: the Justice Department is doing here is sort of holding 179 00:10:56,400 --> 00:10:59,880 Speaker 3: their cards as close to the vest as possible, because 180 00:11:00,080 --> 00:11:04,719 Speaker 3: they undoubtedly have a Plan B, but they want to 181 00:11:04,840 --> 00:11:09,920 Speaker 3: keep the pressure on the Congress to make a deal 182 00:11:10,080 --> 00:11:13,240 Speaker 3: by not saying what that Plan B is. I should 183 00:11:13,240 --> 00:11:16,840 Speaker 3: say this is not necessarily the best bargaining strategy. Sometimes 184 00:11:16,880 --> 00:11:19,440 Speaker 3: you want to make clearer to your bargaining partner what 185 00:11:19,480 --> 00:11:23,199 Speaker 3: you'll do in the event that the negotiations break down, 186 00:11:23,320 --> 00:11:26,480 Speaker 3: because arguably by ruling out or seeming to rule out, 187 00:11:26,760 --> 00:11:30,240 Speaker 3: these other workarounds, what the administration is doing is telling 188 00:11:30,400 --> 00:11:33,320 Speaker 3: Speaker McCarthy, hey, we've got no Plan B, and so 189 00:11:33,440 --> 00:11:35,840 Speaker 3: we need this more than you do. What you really 190 00:11:35,880 --> 00:11:38,800 Speaker 3: want is to put the pressure on the other side 191 00:11:38,960 --> 00:11:41,280 Speaker 3: to think that they need it more than you do, 192 00:11:41,720 --> 00:11:44,559 Speaker 3: and so ruling out Plan B doesn't seem to do that. 193 00:11:44,760 --> 00:11:47,400 Speaker 3: But as I say, I don't think that President Biden 194 00:11:47,520 --> 00:11:51,280 Speaker 3: has fully ruled out other options, whether it's the fourteenth 195 00:11:51,320 --> 00:11:55,800 Speaker 3: Amendment or even better, this separation of powers argument, or 196 00:11:55,800 --> 00:11:57,840 Speaker 3: some of the other ideas that have been floated. 197 00:11:58,440 --> 00:12:00,880 Speaker 1: So as the Union was pushed for the case to 198 00:12:00,880 --> 00:12:03,800 Speaker 1: be put on an even faster track, the federal judge 199 00:12:03,880 --> 00:12:07,200 Speaker 1: Richard Stern said, if the emergency is as dire as 200 00:12:07,240 --> 00:12:09,160 Speaker 1: you think it is. I would think that it's within 201 00:12:09,200 --> 00:12:12,240 Speaker 1: the power of the president to address it using executive 202 00:12:12,280 --> 00:12:15,120 Speaker 1: branch authority. What do you think he was saying there? 203 00:12:15,480 --> 00:12:18,000 Speaker 1: It's not my value Wick, So I'm. 204 00:12:17,840 --> 00:12:23,360 Speaker 3: Not really sure. Until we hit the so called X date, right, 205 00:12:23,400 --> 00:12:25,480 Speaker 3: the date in which the government runs out of money, 206 00:12:25,920 --> 00:12:30,360 Speaker 3: the president isn't going to address it by borrowing additional funds, 207 00:12:30,559 --> 00:12:34,000 Speaker 3: and for the moment, the Treasury is paying all of 208 00:12:34,040 --> 00:12:37,160 Speaker 3: the bills in full and on time. Now, maybe he's 209 00:12:37,200 --> 00:12:42,560 Speaker 3: suggesting that the administration could issue an executive order stating 210 00:12:43,120 --> 00:12:45,760 Speaker 3: what it's going to do in the event that the 211 00:12:45,840 --> 00:12:49,280 Speaker 3: clock strikes midnight with no legislation. But of course the 212 00:12:49,800 --> 00:12:53,559 Speaker 3: Union is suing the administration right, Saying that the administration 213 00:12:53,679 --> 00:12:57,360 Speaker 3: could do something seems like it's confusing who the plaintiff 214 00:12:57,400 --> 00:13:00,079 Speaker 3: and the defendant are, right, the plaintiffs of the and 215 00:13:00,080 --> 00:13:02,160 Speaker 3: who are saying, yeah, they should do something, so give 216 00:13:02,200 --> 00:13:03,080 Speaker 3: them an order to do it. 217 00:13:03,440 --> 00:13:06,040 Speaker 1: How likely is it that the judge would give them 218 00:13:06,120 --> 00:13:07,120 Speaker 1: an order to do it? 219 00:13:07,440 --> 00:13:11,439 Speaker 3: I think it's quite unlikely. Before you know, June one 220 00:13:11,520 --> 00:13:13,960 Speaker 3: or June two, that is, I think the judge here 221 00:13:14,160 --> 00:13:17,920 Speaker 3: quite understandably is hoping to be let off the hook 222 00:13:18,120 --> 00:13:21,840 Speaker 3: and waiting to see whether Congress enacts something in the 223 00:13:21,880 --> 00:13:22,960 Speaker 3: next few days. 224 00:13:23,320 --> 00:13:26,920 Speaker 1: In the area of I told you so, the president 225 00:13:27,400 --> 00:13:30,520 Speaker 1: could have announced from the start that the debt ceiling 226 00:13:30,640 --> 00:13:33,680 Speaker 1: was unconstitutional and it won't stop him from paying the 227 00:13:33,679 --> 00:13:35,719 Speaker 1: country's bills, and that's it. 228 00:13:36,160 --> 00:13:38,560 Speaker 3: So let me be clear. I have never said, and 229 00:13:38,640 --> 00:13:43,559 Speaker 3: I don't think that there is any good way around 230 00:13:43,720 --> 00:13:48,280 Speaker 3: the debt ceiling if Congress doesn't raise it. All we're 231 00:13:48,320 --> 00:13:51,920 Speaker 3: talking about are what are the less bad ways around it. 232 00:13:52,120 --> 00:13:54,880 Speaker 3: And it's not necessarily even my view that the debt 233 00:13:54,880 --> 00:13:58,000 Speaker 3: feeling is unconstitutional the way Professor Buchanan and I talk 234 00:13:58,040 --> 00:14:01,200 Speaker 3: about it, As we say, violating the debt ceiling is 235 00:14:01,600 --> 00:14:07,880 Speaker 3: less unconstitutional than the other plausible options, in particular, less 236 00:14:07,960 --> 00:14:12,720 Speaker 3: unconstitutional than usurping legislative power to make the president have 237 00:14:12,800 --> 00:14:16,840 Speaker 3: the decision over the entire budget. But what I have said, 238 00:14:17,200 --> 00:14:19,920 Speaker 3: and this is more as a matter of sort of 239 00:14:20,240 --> 00:14:25,520 Speaker 3: strategy and tactics and constitutional law, is that the president's 240 00:14:25,600 --> 00:14:30,480 Speaker 3: hand would be strengthened in any bargaining were he to 241 00:14:30,600 --> 00:14:34,960 Speaker 3: announce that, if push comes to shove, I'm going to 242 00:14:35,000 --> 00:14:38,480 Speaker 3: continue to issue debt. I should say I'm not a 243 00:14:38,480 --> 00:14:43,000 Speaker 3: professional strategist, tactician, or politician. And so when I say 244 00:14:43,000 --> 00:14:45,080 Speaker 3: that they should have announced that, I don't say that 245 00:14:45,160 --> 00:14:49,800 Speaker 3: with enormous confidence. I have greater confidence in my legal 246 00:14:49,800 --> 00:14:53,800 Speaker 3: analysis than I do in my ability to project how 247 00:14:53,840 --> 00:14:55,240 Speaker 3: all the politics plays out. 248 00:14:55,560 --> 00:15:00,240 Speaker 1: But no one has that ability, as we've seen. What 249 00:15:00,320 --> 00:15:02,680 Speaker 1: are some of the other suggestions out there? 250 00:15:03,160 --> 00:15:08,239 Speaker 3: There are other suggestions floating about. One that was popular 251 00:15:08,800 --> 00:15:12,120 Speaker 3: back in twenty eleven and has been refloated this time 252 00:15:12,160 --> 00:15:18,080 Speaker 3: around is a seemingly crazy idea to have the US 253 00:15:18,280 --> 00:15:22,800 Speaker 3: Mint create a coin with a face value of approximately 254 00:15:22,920 --> 00:15:27,040 Speaker 3: three trillion dollars and deposit this with the Federal Reserve, 255 00:15:27,200 --> 00:15:32,560 Speaker 3: which would then credit the Treasury's account by three trillion dollars, 256 00:15:32,680 --> 00:15:35,640 Speaker 3: and they would use that money to pay the government's bills. 257 00:15:35,880 --> 00:15:39,200 Speaker 3: The idea is so facially outlandish that I believe the 258 00:15:39,240 --> 00:15:43,280 Speaker 3: administration has ruled it out. In addition, I don't actually 259 00:15:43,320 --> 00:15:46,840 Speaker 3: believe it has the legal advantages that as proponents say. 260 00:15:46,840 --> 00:15:50,400 Speaker 3: That is to say, I don't think the statute authorizing 261 00:15:51,040 --> 00:15:54,040 Speaker 3: the creation of these coins is for anything other than 262 00:15:54,560 --> 00:15:59,200 Speaker 3: collector's items and commemorative coins. But that's one idea that's 263 00:15:59,200 --> 00:16:04,000 Speaker 3: floating around a somewhat less ridiculous idea is to have 264 00:16:04,120 --> 00:16:07,880 Speaker 3: the government borrow money but to issue bonds that either 265 00:16:08,160 --> 00:16:13,200 Speaker 3: have no expiration date or that pay a super premium 266 00:16:13,280 --> 00:16:16,440 Speaker 3: rate of interest. And the reason to do that is that, 267 00:16:16,600 --> 00:16:19,680 Speaker 3: given that the way that the Debt Feeling Statute is written, 268 00:16:19,880 --> 00:16:24,600 Speaker 3: the face value of those bonds would be much lower 269 00:16:24,600 --> 00:16:27,240 Speaker 3: than what the government could sell them for, and so 270 00:16:27,320 --> 00:16:29,720 Speaker 3: the government would be able to actually issue a lot 271 00:16:29,760 --> 00:16:32,720 Speaker 3: of debt, not all of which would count against the 272 00:16:32,800 --> 00:16:35,080 Speaker 3: debt fealing, and so that would buy a whole lot 273 00:16:35,120 --> 00:16:38,520 Speaker 3: of time potentially. I think this argument is somewhat more 274 00:16:38,520 --> 00:16:41,400 Speaker 3: plausible as a matter of the statutory text, but it 275 00:16:41,400 --> 00:16:44,560 Speaker 3: would also be subject to the same problem that the 276 00:16:44,560 --> 00:16:48,200 Speaker 3: President had with invoking the fourteenth Amendment, namely, there would 277 00:16:48,240 --> 00:16:51,880 Speaker 3: undoubtedly be litigation over the validity of those bonds. 278 00:16:51,920 --> 00:16:54,960 Speaker 1: Well, thanks so much for covering the entire landscape for us. 279 00:16:55,160 --> 00:16:58,760 Speaker 1: That's Professor Michael Dorf of Cornell Law School, and that's 280 00:16:58,800 --> 00:17:01,520 Speaker 1: it for this edition of the Bloomberg Glaw Show. Remember you 281 00:17:01,520 --> 00:17:04,000 Speaker 1: can always get the latest legal news on our Bloomberg 282 00:17:04,080 --> 00:17:07,720 Speaker 1: Law podcasts. You can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, 283 00:17:07,880 --> 00:17:12,960 Speaker 1: and at www dot Bloomberg dot com, slash podcast Slash Law, 284 00:17:13,359 --> 00:17:15,919 Speaker 1: and remember to tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every 285 00:17:15,960 --> 00:17:19,880 Speaker 1: weeknight at ten pm Wall Street Time. I'm June Grosso 286 00:17:20,000 --> 00:17:21,600 Speaker 1: and you're listening to Bloomberg