1 00:00:01,720 --> 00:00:04,960 Speaker 1: All Media. 2 00:00:05,240 --> 00:00:08,840 Speaker 2: Welcome back to It Could Happen Here and our special 3 00:00:08,960 --> 00:00:13,920 Speaker 2: two part series Irregular Naval Warfare and You, where James 4 00:00:13,960 --> 00:00:17,200 Speaker 2: and I teach you how you too can challenge the 5 00:00:17,360 --> 00:00:20,640 Speaker 2: US Navy's dominance of the seas, or at least the 6 00:00:20,680 --> 00:00:25,279 Speaker 2: coasts for fun and profit. Actually today, last episode we 7 00:00:25,320 --> 00:00:28,760 Speaker 2: talked about people challenging the US Navy's coastal dominance. Today 8 00:00:28,760 --> 00:00:32,120 Speaker 2: we're talking about doing the same thing for the Russian Navy. 9 00:00:32,400 --> 00:00:34,519 Speaker 2: So that's going to be fun. And of course the 10 00:00:34,600 --> 00:00:37,040 Speaker 2: Navy of Myanmar, which is a bit of a different 11 00:00:37,040 --> 00:00:40,279 Speaker 2: class from the US and Russian Navy, but no less interesting. 12 00:00:41,280 --> 00:00:43,560 Speaker 1: Yeah, still fun. I'd love to see about lose. 13 00:00:43,760 --> 00:00:45,839 Speaker 2: Yeah. Well I just like boats going down, you know, 14 00:00:45,880 --> 00:00:46,640 Speaker 2: I just hate a boat. 15 00:00:46,680 --> 00:00:50,560 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, USS many many such cases. 16 00:00:50,920 --> 00:00:53,400 Speaker 2: Yeah, I'm going to start with Ukraine, and then we're 17 00:00:53,400 --> 00:00:55,240 Speaker 2: going to throw to James to talk about our friends 18 00:00:55,240 --> 00:00:59,400 Speaker 2: in Myanmar and how they have repurposed civilian technology and 19 00:00:59,520 --> 00:01:04,040 Speaker 2: stolen weapons to counter a navy without really having one 20 00:01:04,080 --> 00:01:08,240 Speaker 2: of their own. But first Ukraine. In twenty fourteen, when 21 00:01:08,240 --> 00:01:11,520 Speaker 2: the Russian Army invaded eastern Ukraine and took Crimea, Ukraine 22 00:01:11,560 --> 00:01:15,240 Speaker 2: lost a significant portion of it's already not that impressive navy. 23 00:01:15,720 --> 00:01:18,520 Speaker 2: Most of their boats were just taken by Russia, along 24 00:01:18,520 --> 00:01:21,000 Speaker 2: with a number of sailors who defected. A lot of 25 00:01:21,000 --> 00:01:23,680 Speaker 2: other sailors fled the region, leaving behind their homes and 26 00:01:23,760 --> 00:01:26,640 Speaker 2: cities like Sebastopol to continue serving their country in a 27 00:01:26,640 --> 00:01:30,360 Speaker 2: war that a decade later is still ongoing. One of 28 00:01:30,400 --> 00:01:32,880 Speaker 2: these sailors, who is a Sebastopol native and had to 29 00:01:32,920 --> 00:01:36,480 Speaker 2: flee his home, possibly forever, in order to continue serving 30 00:01:36,480 --> 00:01:40,920 Speaker 2: his country, is the current commander of Ukraine's navy, Admiral Nazpapa. 31 00:01:41,280 --> 00:01:44,360 Speaker 2: He leads a navy that is almost without manned ships, 32 00:01:44,400 --> 00:01:47,880 Speaker 2: and on paper, it is utterly incapable of challenging Russia's 33 00:01:47,960 --> 00:01:51,000 Speaker 2: legendary Black Sea Fleet. Since the age of the Tsars, 34 00:01:51,040 --> 00:01:53,440 Speaker 2: the Black Sea Fleet has been infamous as a pillar 35 00:01:53,520 --> 00:01:57,680 Speaker 2: of Russian military power. However, also since the age of 36 00:01:57,720 --> 00:02:00,400 Speaker 2: the Tsars, it's had a nasty tendency to get utterly 37 00:02:00,440 --> 00:02:02,840 Speaker 2: housed by enemies that should have been able to beat it. 38 00:02:03,000 --> 00:02:03,200 Speaker 3: Right. 39 00:02:03,840 --> 00:02:07,720 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, yeah, not the first time it's taken unexpected loot. 40 00:02:08,000 --> 00:02:08,200 Speaker 3: Yeah. 41 00:02:08,440 --> 00:02:11,440 Speaker 2: It has a legendary history that doesn't mean good. There's bad. 42 00:02:11,520 --> 00:02:13,200 Speaker 2: Legendsy out there. 43 00:02:13,240 --> 00:02:15,960 Speaker 1: You know, Yeah, it's well known. 44 00:02:16,280 --> 00:02:20,040 Speaker 2: Yeah today that enemy is Ukraine. Since the expanded Russian 45 00:02:20,040 --> 00:02:23,679 Speaker 2: invasion in twenty twenty two, just two years, Ukraine has 46 00:02:23,720 --> 00:02:26,800 Speaker 2: destroyed or badly damaged more than a third of the 47 00:02:26,840 --> 00:02:30,359 Speaker 2: Black Sea fleet. Despite having no battleships or destroyers in 48 00:02:30,400 --> 00:02:33,119 Speaker 2: the sea to counter Russian naval power. They have done 49 00:02:33,200 --> 00:02:36,760 Speaker 2: enough damage to reopen Odessa and at least one other 50 00:02:36,840 --> 00:02:39,600 Speaker 2: port on the Black Sea to international commerce, which has 51 00:02:39,600 --> 00:02:43,000 Speaker 2: provided Ukraine with a crucial economic and strategic lifeline. And 52 00:02:43,040 --> 00:02:45,640 Speaker 2: that's a remarkable achievement. Sinking a third of the Black 53 00:02:45,680 --> 00:02:48,920 Speaker 2: Sea fleet, and basically when you reopen a port, that 54 00:02:48,960 --> 00:02:51,680 Speaker 2: means that you have taken away naval dominance from a 55 00:02:51,720 --> 00:02:56,120 Speaker 2: country that has a navy and you don't. That's pretty good, 56 00:02:56,200 --> 00:03:01,000 Speaker 2: pretty good stuff. Over the last two years, had damaged, 57 00:03:01,000 --> 00:03:04,520 Speaker 2: irreparably or sunk seven active landing ships and one to 58 00:03:05,040 --> 00:03:08,280 Speaker 2: seven active landing ships and one landing vessel. I don't 59 00:03:08,320 --> 00:03:10,720 Speaker 2: know the difference. They've They've fucked up a lot of boats. 60 00:03:10,760 --> 00:03:14,519 Speaker 2: They have destroyed a submarine with seed to ground capability 61 00:03:14,520 --> 00:03:17,080 Speaker 2: that was docked for repairs. They have sunk a cruiser, 62 00:03:17,160 --> 00:03:19,880 Speaker 2: the capital ship of the entire Black Sea fleet, the Moskva. 63 00:03:20,320 --> 00:03:22,720 Speaker 2: They've also sunk a supply vessel and a handful of 64 00:03:22,720 --> 00:03:25,240 Speaker 2: patrol boats and missile boats, and a number of other 65 00:03:25,240 --> 00:03:28,480 Speaker 2: boats have been damaged. That's a significant rate of casualties, 66 00:03:28,800 --> 00:03:31,880 Speaker 2: especially when you consider that every actually destroyed vessel we're 67 00:03:31,880 --> 00:03:35,600 Speaker 2: looking at a year's multiple years lead time to replace. 68 00:03:36,000 --> 00:03:40,640 Speaker 2: You cannot make naval vessels very quickly anymore. Back during 69 00:03:40,840 --> 00:03:44,840 Speaker 2: the big Dub Dub dose, the US did, but nobody 70 00:03:44,840 --> 00:03:48,320 Speaker 2: really does that anymore, not with the big ones. 71 00:03:48,320 --> 00:03:53,040 Speaker 4: At least you through that. We were just yeating aircraft 72 00:03:53,120 --> 00:03:57,520 Speaker 4: carriers into the sea, just flotting them out. Yeah, it 73 00:03:57,520 --> 00:03:58,440 Speaker 4: don't take them out a week. 74 00:03:58,840 --> 00:04:02,520 Speaker 1: Yeah, it's because it's because Raisi de Rivetay was really 75 00:04:02,560 --> 00:04:03,640 Speaker 1: riveting at a high speed. 76 00:04:04,680 --> 00:04:08,040 Speaker 2: She was quite a riveter. So at the start of hostilities, Turkey, 77 00:04:08,080 --> 00:04:11,920 Speaker 2: which controls access to the Black Sea forbade any additional 78 00:04:12,000 --> 00:04:15,040 Speaker 2: military vessels or at least military vessels of significant size, 79 00:04:15,080 --> 00:04:17,520 Speaker 2: from entering the area. What this means this has a 80 00:04:17,560 --> 00:04:21,480 Speaker 2: significant impact on how well Ukraine strikes work, because even 81 00:04:21,640 --> 00:04:24,719 Speaker 2: if Russia can replace the losses physically, they can't actually 82 00:04:24,800 --> 00:04:27,600 Speaker 2: get replacements into the Black Sea easily. They can't sail 83 00:04:27,720 --> 00:04:30,400 Speaker 2: new shit past the Turks. The Turks are not allowing 84 00:04:30,400 --> 00:04:33,479 Speaker 2: that right now. So again, this is a situation that 85 00:04:33,560 --> 00:04:36,120 Speaker 2: has kind of favored the way in which Ukraine has 86 00:04:36,279 --> 00:04:40,279 Speaker 2: adapted to countering Russian naval dominance. It is possible that 87 00:04:40,320 --> 00:04:42,679 Speaker 2: at the present rate of attrition, the Black Sea Fleet 88 00:04:42,720 --> 00:04:46,000 Speaker 2: could be rendered inoperable in less than two years. Like 89 00:04:46,040 --> 00:04:47,800 Speaker 2: if they keep going at this rates, like eighteen months 90 00:04:47,920 --> 00:04:49,880 Speaker 2: or something before, there's not really much of a fleet 91 00:04:49,920 --> 00:04:53,279 Speaker 2: anymore now. If Ukraine had accomplished this task with a 92 00:04:53,360 --> 00:04:57,040 Speaker 2: traditional navy using standard naval tactics, this would have been 93 00:04:57,080 --> 00:05:00,160 Speaker 2: an impressive victory given the disparity in resources between the 94 00:05:00,200 --> 00:05:02,040 Speaker 2: two nations. But they have done all this with a 95 00:05:02,080 --> 00:05:04,960 Speaker 2: mix of cruise missiles, many of which are produced in country, 96 00:05:05,200 --> 00:05:09,839 Speaker 2: aerial drones, and new bespoke locally produced suicide drone boats. 97 00:05:10,200 --> 00:05:13,000 Speaker 2: This irregular naval warfare has been successful enough that one 98 00:05:13,120 --> 00:05:16,440 Speaker 2: Rand Corporation engineer and analyst, Scott Savatz, described the Black 99 00:05:16,480 --> 00:05:20,160 Speaker 2: Sea Fleet as a fleet in being quote, it represents 100 00:05:20,160 --> 00:05:22,880 Speaker 2: a potential threat that needs to be vigilantly guarded against, 101 00:05:22,920 --> 00:05:25,640 Speaker 2: but one that remains in check for now. And I'm 102 00:05:25,640 --> 00:05:27,719 Speaker 2: going to quote from a New York Times article on 103 00:05:27,800 --> 00:05:31,000 Speaker 2: the topic, it brought a little more context. Ukraine has 104 00:05:31,000 --> 00:05:33,880 Speaker 2: effectively turned around ten thousand square miles in the western 105 00:05:33,880 --> 00:05:36,240 Speaker 2: Black Sea off its southern coast into what the military 106 00:05:36,279 --> 00:05:39,239 Speaker 2: calls a gray zone, where neither side can sail without 107 00:05:39,240 --> 00:05:42,599 Speaker 2: the threat of attack. James Heapy, Britain's Armed Forces minister, 108 00:05:42,760 --> 00:05:45,599 Speaker 2: told a recent security conference in Warsaw that Russia's Black 109 00:05:45,600 --> 00:05:48,640 Speaker 2: Sea fleet had suffered a functional defeat, and contended that 110 00:05:48,680 --> 00:05:51,120 Speaker 2: the liberation of Ukraine's coastal waters in the Black Sea 111 00:05:51,240 --> 00:05:54,200 Speaker 2: was every bit as important as the successful counter offensives 112 00:05:54,240 --> 00:05:57,480 Speaker 2: on land and Corsona and Kharkiv last year. The classical 113 00:05:57,520 --> 00:06:00,320 Speaker 2: approach that we studied at military maritime academies is not 114 00:06:00,400 --> 00:06:03,280 Speaker 2: work now, Admiral Nese Papas said. Therefore, we have to 115 00:06:03,320 --> 00:06:05,839 Speaker 2: be as flexible as possible and change approaches to planning 116 00:06:05,880 --> 00:06:08,760 Speaker 2: and implementing work as much as possible. That at articles 117 00:06:08,800 --> 00:06:11,919 Speaker 2: about a year old or so so. The Neptune anti 118 00:06:11,920 --> 00:06:14,640 Speaker 2: ship missile is one of the prides of Ukraine's nason 119 00:06:14,760 --> 00:06:18,440 Speaker 2: arms industry. Neptune missiles are credited with destroying the Moskva 120 00:06:18,560 --> 00:06:21,560 Speaker 2: in April of twenty twenty two. Ukraine also has access 121 00:06:21,600 --> 00:06:24,840 Speaker 2: to several Western anti ship missiles, including these storm Shadow 122 00:06:24,880 --> 00:06:27,200 Speaker 2: and Scalp missiles. I believe the storm Shadow comes from 123 00:06:27,200 --> 00:06:31,720 Speaker 2: your folks, right James, Yeah, prevention, Yeah yeah. And these 124 00:06:31,760 --> 00:06:34,640 Speaker 2: seem to be pretty effective missiles. These obviously much more advanced. 125 00:06:34,640 --> 00:06:37,800 Speaker 2: And these are modern naval weapons, right. These are much 126 00:06:37,839 --> 00:06:40,080 Speaker 2: more advanced than, for example, the weapons to who these have. 127 00:06:40,279 --> 00:06:42,159 Speaker 2: These are the kind of things that can counter to 128 00:06:42,279 --> 00:06:46,640 Speaker 2: some extent modern anti missile technology. For an example of 129 00:06:46,720 --> 00:06:48,200 Speaker 2: kind of how that tends to work, they used a 130 00:06:48,240 --> 00:06:51,279 Speaker 2: barrage of I believe it was mostly storm shadows to 131 00:06:51,400 --> 00:06:55,240 Speaker 2: rain death on the crime import of Sebastopol. Recently, seven 132 00:06:55,320 --> 00:06:57,560 Speaker 2: out of eighteen of the missiles fired made it through 133 00:06:57,640 --> 00:07:00,760 Speaker 2: Russian air defenses. And these damaged or just destroyed four 134 00:07:00,880 --> 00:07:03,320 Speaker 2: landing ships and a single strike. And these are sizable 135 00:07:03,400 --> 00:07:06,440 Speaker 2: naval vessels. This is the most recent attack, although as 136 00:07:06,520 --> 00:07:08,760 Speaker 2: after I wrote this, there was another attack on the 137 00:07:08,839 --> 00:07:11,680 Speaker 2: Kirch Bridge. I'm not really sure how that took place 138 00:07:11,880 --> 00:07:14,080 Speaker 2: yet that seems to have shut it down again. But 139 00:07:14,160 --> 00:07:15,880 Speaker 2: that gives you an idea of like what you actually 140 00:07:15,880 --> 00:07:17,400 Speaker 2: have to do. How much of these missiles you have 141 00:07:17,440 --> 00:07:18,920 Speaker 2: to put in the air to get some through. And 142 00:07:18,960 --> 00:07:21,560 Speaker 2: that's not too bad, right eighteen missiles seven get through, 143 00:07:21,600 --> 00:07:25,440 Speaker 2: four ships down. That's a really good rate of return. 144 00:07:25,640 --> 00:07:28,120 Speaker 1: Especially when you consider that, like you know, we were 145 00:07:28,160 --> 00:07:30,200 Speaker 1: talking in our first episode about how the US is 146 00:07:30,240 --> 00:07:35,080 Speaker 1: spending significant resources on maintaining its defending its carriers, right 147 00:07:35,840 --> 00:07:38,640 Speaker 1: Russia does not have the same ability to keep good 148 00:07:38,720 --> 00:07:43,320 Speaker 1: lord munitions. No, and so like that's a finite resource, 149 00:07:43,400 --> 00:07:46,080 Speaker 1: right there, their means of defining that. Defending their ships 150 00:07:46,240 --> 00:07:49,880 Speaker 1: and defending really anything against missiles are a finite resource. 151 00:07:49,920 --> 00:07:53,400 Speaker 1: So any time you can, even if the ship doesn't 152 00:07:53,920 --> 00:07:56,040 Speaker 1: get sunk, if the ship has to deploy one of 153 00:07:56,080 --> 00:07:58,960 Speaker 1: these missiles, which it doesn't, which the whole country doesn't 154 00:07:59,000 --> 00:08:00,480 Speaker 1: have very many of, that's win. 155 00:08:00,920 --> 00:08:04,040 Speaker 2: Now, this is we are talking about irregular naval warfare. 156 00:08:04,080 --> 00:08:06,200 Speaker 2: And then this is not this is not what most 157 00:08:06,240 --> 00:08:09,840 Speaker 2: people would have considered a traditional naval conflict prior to 158 00:08:10,120 --> 00:08:13,600 Speaker 2: the expansion of hostilities in Ukraine. However, we are talking 159 00:08:13,600 --> 00:08:15,120 Speaker 2: this is very different than the case of the Huthis. 160 00:08:15,240 --> 00:08:18,000 Speaker 2: Ukraine is a state. It doesn't have a massive arms industry, 161 00:08:18,040 --> 00:08:20,320 Speaker 2: but it has one, and it has the supportive nations 162 00:08:20,360 --> 00:08:23,080 Speaker 2: with sizable arms industries, right, So we are not talking 163 00:08:23,120 --> 00:08:25,640 Speaker 2: about this part. We are going to talk about the 164 00:08:25,680 --> 00:08:28,960 Speaker 2: aspects of Ukrainian irregular naval warfare that are some guys 165 00:08:29,080 --> 00:08:31,840 Speaker 2: that are hobbyists building shit. Yeah, this is not that 166 00:08:31,960 --> 00:08:34,959 Speaker 2: part yet. But I think this information is kind of 167 00:08:35,000 --> 00:08:37,360 Speaker 2: significant and that it shows the tactical use of anti 168 00:08:37,400 --> 00:08:40,480 Speaker 2: ship cruise missiles and their ability to significantly shape an 169 00:08:40,559 --> 00:08:44,160 Speaker 2: operational environment even when the country using them has minimal 170 00:08:44,200 --> 00:08:47,200 Speaker 2: conventional naval assets of their own. It is largely through 171 00:08:47,200 --> 00:08:49,160 Speaker 2: the use of these missiles that Ukraine has been able 172 00:08:49,160 --> 00:08:52,439 Speaker 2: to reopen their black sea ports. That matters to people 173 00:08:52,480 --> 00:08:55,120 Speaker 2: seeking to understand both this conflict and the future of 174 00:08:55,240 --> 00:08:57,600 Speaker 2: unconventional naval warfare. I mean, I guess you could say 175 00:08:57,600 --> 00:09:00,160 Speaker 2: this is the future of conventional naval warfare, but think 176 00:09:00,200 --> 00:09:03,200 Speaker 2: we're still leaning on the unconventional side at the moment, 177 00:09:03,200 --> 00:09:05,840 Speaker 2: at least in terms of how doctrine is changing as 178 00:09:05,880 --> 00:09:08,520 Speaker 2: a result of this. So maybe I should update how 179 00:09:08,559 --> 00:09:11,800 Speaker 2: we're defining this. But for our purposes as people unlikely 180 00:09:11,840 --> 00:09:14,600 Speaker 2: to have access to cruise missiles but significantly likely to 181 00:09:14,600 --> 00:09:17,800 Speaker 2: find ourselves waging an unconventional war than having cruise missiles 182 00:09:18,000 --> 00:09:20,400 Speaker 2: it's more relevant to look at the new weapons systems 183 00:09:20,520 --> 00:09:22,720 Speaker 2: Ukraine has developed that have helped them lock down the 184 00:09:22,720 --> 00:09:26,280 Speaker 2: Black Sea Fleet using civilian hobbyists. And this is where 185 00:09:26,280 --> 00:09:30,880 Speaker 2: we get to drones. Ukraine's conventional aerial drones are a 186 00:09:30,920 --> 00:09:33,800 Speaker 2: mix of actual military hardware. I'm talking about stuff like 187 00:09:33,840 --> 00:09:37,600 Speaker 2: the Bairaktar, the Turkish drone, which is like kind of 188 00:09:37,640 --> 00:09:40,800 Speaker 2: like the Predator, all right, it's like an actual military product. 189 00:09:41,080 --> 00:09:43,560 Speaker 2: But the majority in terms of numbers of drones that 190 00:09:43,679 --> 00:09:46,680 Speaker 2: Ukraine is fielding are civilian drones, or at least drones 191 00:09:46,960 --> 00:09:49,640 Speaker 2: that started out a civilian technology. A lot of these 192 00:09:49,679 --> 00:09:52,720 Speaker 2: are now built to be military, but they're still based 193 00:09:52,760 --> 00:09:55,079 Speaker 2: on these designs that started with people hacking and cobbling 194 00:09:55,120 --> 00:09:58,920 Speaker 2: together civilian drones and outside of naval stuff. Prior to 195 00:09:58,960 --> 00:10:01,320 Speaker 2: the war, there had been a lot of veterans and 196 00:10:01,480 --> 00:10:04,440 Speaker 2: hobbyists who were veterans trying to convince the Ukrainian military 197 00:10:04,440 --> 00:10:07,520 Speaker 2: that it needed to adopt drone warfare on a large scale, 198 00:10:07,559 --> 00:10:09,520 Speaker 2: the kind of drone warfare that you can do with 199 00:10:09,640 --> 00:10:12,800 Speaker 2: these these less expensive drones, and they received a lot 200 00:10:12,840 --> 00:10:15,280 Speaker 2: of pushback until the war started and these guys just 201 00:10:15,320 --> 00:10:18,400 Speaker 2: took to the field as started fucking murking Russian armed 202 00:10:18,480 --> 00:10:22,319 Speaker 2: units and infantry and killing generals and shit. And now 203 00:10:22,440 --> 00:10:25,040 Speaker 2: Ukraine has integrated in a way that everyone is going 204 00:10:25,040 --> 00:10:28,559 Speaker 2: to follow. Like Ukrainian like battalions have like companies now 205 00:10:28,559 --> 00:10:31,760 Speaker 2: that are drone assault companies, and like line battalions, and. 206 00:10:31,840 --> 00:10:36,240 Speaker 1: Within infantry you have people used artillery eating transport of zebibusters. 207 00:10:36,320 --> 00:10:38,760 Speaker 2: Yes, all over. They have set a goal for this 208 00:10:38,840 --> 00:10:41,160 Speaker 2: year producing at least a million and ideally more like 209 00:10:41,160 --> 00:10:43,600 Speaker 2: two million drones and at least from what I read, 210 00:10:43,600 --> 00:10:45,680 Speaker 2: that looks like very plausible, and most of these are 211 00:10:45,760 --> 00:10:48,600 Speaker 2: quite small, right, but that doesn't mean obviously ineffective. 212 00:10:48,840 --> 00:10:50,240 Speaker 1: I know they buy a lot of their drones in 213 00:10:50,280 --> 00:10:53,680 Speaker 1: the UK because the UK has consistently kicked itself in 214 00:10:53,679 --> 00:10:56,520 Speaker 1: the nuts when it comes to the breaksit and so 215 00:10:56,840 --> 00:10:59,280 Speaker 1: the pound is significantly weaker, and so they're able to 216 00:10:59,280 --> 00:11:01,440 Speaker 1: get the drones cheaper price and then drive them all 217 00:11:01,480 --> 00:11:02,200 Speaker 1: the way across. 218 00:11:02,800 --> 00:11:03,000 Speaker 3: Yeah. 219 00:11:03,000 --> 00:11:05,200 Speaker 1: I know people who've done that. I was going to 220 00:11:05,200 --> 00:11:06,560 Speaker 1: go join them, but never worked it out. 221 00:11:06,880 --> 00:11:10,680 Speaker 2: Yeah, And you know there are a number of different 222 00:11:10,720 --> 00:11:15,080 Speaker 2: like these drones earlier in the war had an easier 223 00:11:15,160 --> 00:11:17,960 Speaker 2: time being effective and causing casualties in the Russians then 224 00:11:18,000 --> 00:11:20,760 Speaker 2: later this is something that you know, kind of the 225 00:11:21,080 --> 00:11:24,360 Speaker 2: hooplaw and support which I think is necessary that Ukraine gets. 226 00:11:24,400 --> 00:11:27,600 Speaker 2: Lead some people to discount the degree to which Russian 227 00:11:27,600 --> 00:11:30,480 Speaker 2: forces have adapted and gotten smarter. And one of the 228 00:11:30,520 --> 00:11:32,800 Speaker 2: ways in which they've adapted and gotten smarter is in 229 00:11:32,920 --> 00:11:35,320 Speaker 2: blocking drones and using drones of their own. You know, 230 00:11:35,320 --> 00:11:37,040 Speaker 2: one of the stories the last couple of weeks is 231 00:11:37,080 --> 00:11:41,120 Speaker 2: that Russia has succeeded in carrying out strikes on advanced 232 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:45,720 Speaker 2: weapons systems like samsites deep in Ukrainian territory. They've extended 233 00:11:45,760 --> 00:11:48,320 Speaker 2: their kill chain beyond what they used to be capable of, 234 00:11:48,320 --> 00:11:51,839 Speaker 2: and that's because they've adapted. They're also adapted with less 235 00:11:51,840 --> 00:11:55,600 Speaker 2: efficacy at blocking drones and attacks on naval vessels. Some 236 00:11:55,640 --> 00:11:57,160 Speaker 2: of this has been kind of funny. I want to 237 00:11:57,160 --> 00:12:00,360 Speaker 2: read a quote from a Business Insider article here. Russia 238 00:12:00,400 --> 00:12:02,959 Speaker 2: is painting silhouettes on naval vessels on land to try 239 00:12:03,000 --> 00:12:06,200 Speaker 2: and trick Ukraine, which keeps destroying its warships. In an 240 00:12:06,240 --> 00:12:09,000 Speaker 2: intelligence update on Wednesday, the UK Ministry of Defense said 241 00:12:09,000 --> 00:12:11,360 Speaker 2: that silhouettes of vessels have also been painted on the 242 00:12:11,400 --> 00:12:15,280 Speaker 2: side of k's probably to confuse the uncrude aerial vehicle operators. 243 00:12:15,679 --> 00:12:18,400 Speaker 2: They showed there's some images of this. They don't seem 244 00:12:18,520 --> 00:12:21,760 Speaker 2: convincing to me. I don't know if I think this 245 00:12:21,960 --> 00:12:22,520 Speaker 2: is working. 246 00:12:23,160 --> 00:12:27,320 Speaker 1: This is great. I love this. Have a cardboard navy next. 247 00:12:27,440 --> 00:12:31,000 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's very bugs bunny. Yes, they're not working as 248 00:12:31,040 --> 00:12:31,959 Speaker 2: well as bugs would. 249 00:12:32,320 --> 00:12:33,959 Speaker 1: More like a hole in the side of the cliff 250 00:12:34,000 --> 00:12:38,960 Speaker 1: face and crushing into keeps throwing at it. 251 00:12:38,960 --> 00:12:41,120 Speaker 2: It's very funny. I mean obviously they just Ukraine just 252 00:12:41,120 --> 00:12:44,280 Speaker 2: sank like or damn it badly damaged four boats. So 253 00:12:44,360 --> 00:12:46,480 Speaker 2: I don't think this is I haven't seen evidence this 254 00:12:46,600 --> 00:12:49,560 Speaker 2: is working well. Their actual like jamming efforts have been 255 00:12:49,600 --> 00:12:50,839 Speaker 2: much more successful. Right. 256 00:12:51,520 --> 00:12:53,920 Speaker 1: Yeah, they always will be on civilian One of the 257 00:12:53,960 --> 00:12:56,560 Speaker 1: thing that's really interesting compared to me and is that 258 00:12:57,000 --> 00:12:59,679 Speaker 1: Ukraine tends to rely on modified off the shelf civilian 259 00:12:59,760 --> 00:13:02,839 Speaker 1: drone Right your dji is that kind of thing in 260 00:13:03,120 --> 00:13:07,160 Speaker 1: Mianma because of where a lot of the PDFs are, 261 00:13:07,240 --> 00:13:09,960 Speaker 1: because well, they increasingly do control the borders, but they 262 00:13:10,000 --> 00:13:13,880 Speaker 1: haven't always. They have been making their own drones. The 263 00:13:13,880 --> 00:13:16,160 Speaker 1: group called Federal Wings you can find them on telegram, 264 00:13:16,360 --> 00:13:19,360 Speaker 1: who make their own drones, and I think those seem 265 00:13:19,480 --> 00:13:24,560 Speaker 1: to be less the Jammas that the sac that the 266 00:13:24,640 --> 00:13:29,120 Speaker 1: Tamadoor has are Chinese made like Jamma rifles. You see 267 00:13:29,160 --> 00:13:31,160 Speaker 1: them all the time in captured weapon cases, but they 268 00:13:31,160 --> 00:13:34,560 Speaker 1: don't seem to be having as much impact on these 269 00:13:34,600 --> 00:13:36,280 Speaker 1: homemade drones, which is really interesting. 270 00:13:37,080 --> 00:13:40,120 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, and it's you know, I've mentioned a couple 271 00:13:40,120 --> 00:13:42,680 Speaker 2: of times we're doing this in part because the odds 272 00:13:42,720 --> 00:13:45,760 Speaker 2: that people listening might be involved in an a regular 273 00:13:45,840 --> 00:13:47,160 Speaker 2: conflict are not zero. 274 00:13:47,679 --> 00:13:47,880 Speaker 3: You know. 275 00:13:47,920 --> 00:13:50,680 Speaker 2: What I think about when I say that is not 276 00:13:50,800 --> 00:13:53,600 Speaker 2: that there's high odds for any individual person fighting themselves 277 00:13:53,640 --> 00:13:56,160 Speaker 2: in that situation, but there is, Given the number of 278 00:13:56,160 --> 00:13:58,760 Speaker 2: people who listen to this podcast, probably someone who is 279 00:13:58,800 --> 00:14:01,960 Speaker 2: not currently involved in conflict that will find themselves that 280 00:14:02,000 --> 00:14:04,120 Speaker 2: way in the future. And I based that in part 281 00:14:04,120 --> 00:14:05,840 Speaker 2: on the fact that all of our friends in Myanmar 282 00:14:05,880 --> 00:14:08,200 Speaker 2: who are currently fighting a war were a couple of 283 00:14:08,240 --> 00:14:11,880 Speaker 2: years ago delivery drivers and you know, playing pubg online 284 00:14:11,960 --> 00:14:14,320 Speaker 2: and not really thinking they would wind up as insurgents. 285 00:14:14,559 --> 00:14:16,360 Speaker 1: Yeah. I've spoken to a number of people who are 286 00:14:16,360 --> 00:14:19,880 Speaker 1: currently fighting on in Mianma who have listened to our 287 00:14:19,920 --> 00:14:23,760 Speaker 1: Meanma podcast and realized the capacity of three D printing. Yeah, 288 00:14:23,840 --> 00:14:26,920 Speaker 1: to be very useful and so like, even in that sense, 289 00:14:27,080 --> 00:14:29,400 Speaker 1: it's already happening. But yeah, don't know one in Memma, 290 00:14:30,680 --> 00:14:33,440 Speaker 1: Like many of them said, their entire combat experiences playing 291 00:14:33,440 --> 00:14:36,560 Speaker 1: pubg Yeah, now they're murking ships. 292 00:14:36,640 --> 00:14:39,320 Speaker 2: Yeah. So anyway, it bears thinking about this stuff. And 293 00:14:39,320 --> 00:14:42,560 Speaker 2: this brings me back to Ukraine's irregular drone warfare units, 294 00:14:42,560 --> 00:14:44,520 Speaker 2: which again a lot of these guys started out as 295 00:14:44,520 --> 00:14:48,240 Speaker 2: civilian enthusiasts who expanded responded to the outbreak or at 296 00:14:48,280 --> 00:14:52,280 Speaker 2: least expansion of hostilities by expanding their hobby into a 297 00:14:52,320 --> 00:14:55,000 Speaker 2: real world military effort that had a real world effect. 298 00:14:55,040 --> 00:14:58,160 Speaker 2: Civilian drones were crucial in the Battle of Kiev, allowing 299 00:14:58,240 --> 00:15:00,800 Speaker 2: Ukraine to do severe damage to that mass Russian armored 300 00:15:00,800 --> 00:15:03,480 Speaker 2: column heading towards the city and providing intel that led 301 00:15:03,480 --> 00:15:06,640 Speaker 2: to the assassination of multiple general level officers. So it 302 00:15:06,680 --> 00:15:09,560 Speaker 2: is perhaps not surprising that Ukraine looked to the same 303 00:15:09,600 --> 00:15:12,120 Speaker 2: group of volunteer hobbyists when it came time to expand 304 00:15:12,120 --> 00:15:14,880 Speaker 2: their naval arsenal. And there's a really good article I 305 00:15:14,960 --> 00:15:19,800 Speaker 2: found in CNN by Sebastian Shukla, Alex Marcott, and Daria Tarasova, 306 00:15:19,800 --> 00:15:21,800 Speaker 2: and I actually want to give you the title of 307 00:15:21,840 --> 00:15:23,480 Speaker 2: this article. Yeah, I'll try to thriller in the show 308 00:15:23,520 --> 00:15:27,080 Speaker 2: notes is exclusive rare access to Ukraine's sea drones, part 309 00:15:27,120 --> 00:15:29,680 Speaker 2: of Ukraine's fight back in the Black Sea. Haven't really 310 00:15:29,720 --> 00:15:31,560 Speaker 2: seen the word fight back use that way, but there 311 00:15:31,600 --> 00:15:33,040 Speaker 2: you go. So I'm going to read a quote from 312 00:15:33,040 --> 00:15:37,520 Speaker 2: that article. A government link Ukrainian fundraising organization called United 313 00:15:37,560 --> 00:15:40,120 Speaker 2: twenty four has sourced money from companies and individuals all 314 00:15:40,160 --> 00:15:42,240 Speaker 2: around the world, pooling funds to disperse it to a 315 00:15:42,320 --> 00:15:45,360 Speaker 2: variety of developers and initiatives, from defense to soccer matches. 316 00:15:45,720 --> 00:15:48,560 Speaker 2: The entire outfit is very security conscious, insisting on strict 317 00:15:48,560 --> 00:15:51,440 Speaker 2: guidelines on filming and revealing identities. Those who see in 318 00:15:51,520 --> 00:15:53,280 Speaker 2: and met with declined to give their full names or 319 00:15:53,280 --> 00:15:56,080 Speaker 2: even their ranks within Ukraine's armed forces. On a creaky 320 00:15:56,080 --> 00:15:58,840 Speaker 2: wooden jetty, a camouflaged sea drone pilot says he wants 321 00:15:58,880 --> 00:16:01,280 Speaker 2: to go by shark. In front of him is a long, 322 00:16:01,320 --> 00:16:05,440 Speaker 2: black hardshell briefcase. He unveils a bespoke multi screened mission control, 323 00:16:05,720 --> 00:16:09,040 Speaker 2: essentially an elaborate gaming center combined complete with levers, joysticks, 324 00:16:09,040 --> 00:16:11,360 Speaker 2: a monitor, and buttons that have covers over switches that 325 00:16:11,440 --> 00:16:15,520 Speaker 2: shouldn't accidentally be knocked with labels like blast. The developer 326 00:16:15,520 --> 00:16:17,480 Speaker 2: of the drone, who asked to remain anonymous, said their 327 00:16:17,480 --> 00:16:19,720 Speaker 2: work on sea drones only began once the war started. 328 00:16:19,960 --> 00:16:22,000 Speaker 2: It was very important because we did not have many 329 00:16:22,000 --> 00:16:24,760 Speaker 2: forces to resist the maritime state Russia, and we needed 330 00:16:24,760 --> 00:16:26,840 Speaker 2: to develop something of our own because we didn't have 331 00:16:26,920 --> 00:16:31,880 Speaker 2: the existing capabilities. So again, these are hobbyist design I mean, 332 00:16:31,920 --> 00:16:34,160 Speaker 2: this guy's not really a hobbyist in anymore, but that's 333 00:16:34,200 --> 00:16:36,760 Speaker 2: how he started. He's only not a hobbyist because the 334 00:16:36,760 --> 00:16:39,360 Speaker 2: military recognized the value of what he was doing. And 335 00:16:39,480 --> 00:16:42,320 Speaker 2: the current iterations of this sea drone weigh a little 336 00:16:42,320 --> 00:16:45,720 Speaker 2: over two thousand pounds with an explosive six hundred and 337 00:16:45,800 --> 00:16:48,880 Speaker 2: sixty one pound payload, a five hundred mile range and 338 00:16:48,920 --> 00:16:51,160 Speaker 2: a max speed of fifty miles per hour. That is 339 00:16:51,680 --> 00:16:53,240 Speaker 2: a significant weapons system. 340 00:16:53,400 --> 00:16:53,600 Speaker 1: Yeah. 341 00:16:54,360 --> 00:16:56,880 Speaker 2: Multiple sea drones have been used to strike Russian assets 342 00:16:56,880 --> 00:16:58,920 Speaker 2: in the Black Sea, and drones were involved in a 343 00:16:58,960 --> 00:17:02,600 Speaker 2: successful attack that severely damaged the Kirch Bridge last July, 344 00:17:02,760 --> 00:17:06,239 Speaker 2: rendering it impassable since until September. So these have had 345 00:17:06,280 --> 00:17:08,879 Speaker 2: a real battlefield effect. And they probably will continue to 346 00:17:08,920 --> 00:17:11,919 Speaker 2: do so. The developer of these drones told CNN these 347 00:17:12,000 --> 00:17:14,920 Speaker 2: drones are a completely Ukrainian production. They are designed, drawn 348 00:17:14,960 --> 00:17:17,560 Speaker 2: and tested here. It's our own production of holes, electronics 349 00:17:17,600 --> 00:17:19,800 Speaker 2: and software. More than fifty percent of the production of 350 00:17:19,840 --> 00:17:23,439 Speaker 2: equipment is here in Ukraine. And that's really significant because 351 00:17:24,160 --> 00:17:26,400 Speaker 2: you know, I think we're all aware of the difficulty 352 00:17:26,480 --> 00:17:29,679 Speaker 2: Ukraine has had getting weaponry lately from the West as 353 00:17:29,720 --> 00:17:33,159 Speaker 2: a result of fucking around in Congress, and so it 354 00:17:33,240 --> 00:17:35,560 Speaker 2: is a necessity for them to be able to develop 355 00:17:35,600 --> 00:17:38,840 Speaker 2: weapon systems like this that can interdict and counteract more 356 00:17:38,840 --> 00:17:42,359 Speaker 2: advanced and expensive weapon systems and can be produced indigenously. 357 00:17:42,720 --> 00:17:45,120 Speaker 2: You know, I don't think we have seen a mass 358 00:17:46,240 --> 00:17:49,360 Speaker 2: suicide boat attack. I'm interested in what happens when we do, 359 00:17:49,560 --> 00:17:53,480 Speaker 2: like with more significant numbers than we've seen deployed. I 360 00:17:53,600 --> 00:17:56,199 Speaker 2: kind of wonder the degree to which the Russians have 361 00:17:56,200 --> 00:17:58,240 Speaker 2: gotten good at spotting this stuff. I've come across at 362 00:17:58,320 --> 00:18:00,560 Speaker 2: least a couple of stories of these boats like destroyed 363 00:18:00,560 --> 00:18:03,080 Speaker 2: on approach. So they certainly don't always work or even 364 00:18:03,080 --> 00:18:05,240 Speaker 2: a majority of the time. But given the cost of 365 00:18:05,240 --> 00:18:07,200 Speaker 2: these things, they don't have to get through the majority 366 00:18:07,200 --> 00:18:11,600 Speaker 2: of the time very much worth it right now. In 367 00:18:11,640 --> 00:18:14,919 Speaker 2: that interview with The New York Times, Admiral Najpapa caution 368 00:18:15,080 --> 00:18:18,160 Speaker 2: that Ukraine is still outgunned in the Black Sea. Even 369 00:18:18,240 --> 00:18:21,399 Speaker 2: though the Russians no longer have supremacy, they still have 370 00:18:21,520 --> 00:18:24,679 Speaker 2: air superiority. They are still able to launch from the 371 00:18:24,720 --> 00:18:29,040 Speaker 2: sea long range missiles at Ukrainian targets, including civilian targets. 372 00:18:30,080 --> 00:18:32,400 Speaker 2: So this is not again a situation that should be 373 00:18:32,520 --> 00:18:35,600 Speaker 2: portrayed as them having their own way. Their ability to 374 00:18:35,680 --> 00:18:38,199 Speaker 2: kind of interdict the sea has been the primary effects 375 00:18:38,200 --> 00:18:40,800 Speaker 2: of it have been number one, the reopening of trade 376 00:18:40,840 --> 00:18:43,480 Speaker 2: in the Black Sea, and earlier in the war, by 377 00:18:43,560 --> 00:18:46,040 Speaker 2: locking down the ability of these landing ships to put 378 00:18:46,040 --> 00:18:48,080 Speaker 2: more troops on ground and by doing damage to the 379 00:18:48,119 --> 00:18:51,600 Speaker 2: Kurch Bridge, they were able to slow Russian reinforcements and 380 00:18:51,680 --> 00:18:55,119 Speaker 2: Russian materiel from entering the war zone in order to 381 00:18:55,240 --> 00:18:58,080 Speaker 2: and this aided in some of the advances, particularly in 382 00:18:58,160 --> 00:19:01,399 Speaker 2: like areas like Carson. At this moment, the situation has 383 00:19:01,480 --> 00:19:04,439 Speaker 2: changed because again the Russians aren't just kind of like 384 00:19:04,520 --> 00:19:06,800 Speaker 2: sitting around doing the same thing over and over again, 385 00:19:06,880 --> 00:19:09,480 Speaker 2: or at least not always. And we don't tend to 386 00:19:09,480 --> 00:19:11,960 Speaker 2: talk as much about successes on the Russian side of things, 387 00:19:11,960 --> 00:19:14,119 Speaker 2: but that is an important part of the story. And 388 00:19:14,160 --> 00:19:15,960 Speaker 2: one of the things the Russians have done is kind 389 00:19:15,960 --> 00:19:18,679 Speaker 2: of acknowledge that the Black Sea Fleet may not be 390 00:19:18,880 --> 00:19:22,919 Speaker 2: a fleet in being forever and certainly cannot be relied 391 00:19:23,000 --> 00:19:25,919 Speaker 2: upon to handle everything they initially thought it would handle. 392 00:19:26,280 --> 00:19:28,920 Speaker 2: And so Russian engineers spent a significant period of time 393 00:19:28,960 --> 00:19:32,480 Speaker 2: building a sizeable new railroad that connects Rostov and southern 394 00:19:32,560 --> 00:19:36,400 Speaker 2: Russia to Mariopol and occupied southern Ukraine. This has allowed 395 00:19:36,440 --> 00:19:39,560 Speaker 2: them to get high volume shipments into the area and 396 00:19:39,680 --> 00:19:44,760 Speaker 2: supply troops to the area along Ukraine's southern front without 397 00:19:44,800 --> 00:19:47,800 Speaker 2: relying on that bridge or relying on naval landings. 398 00:19:47,920 --> 00:19:48,040 Speaker 1: Right. 399 00:19:48,920 --> 00:19:50,960 Speaker 2: So the fact that Ukraine has been able to take 400 00:19:51,000 --> 00:19:53,720 Speaker 2: out for landing ships recently is good. That's a win 401 00:19:53,840 --> 00:19:56,960 Speaker 2: for Ukraine. It reduces Russian capability, but it is not 402 00:19:57,080 --> 00:19:58,879 Speaker 2: half the same effect that it would have had, for example, 403 00:19:58,880 --> 00:20:03,199 Speaker 2: two years earlier. Yeah, because Russia has also evolved, and 404 00:20:03,359 --> 00:20:06,040 Speaker 2: among other things, railroads are a lot easier, are a 405 00:20:06,040 --> 00:20:08,920 Speaker 2: lot harder to destroy to like take out, right, it's 406 00:20:08,920 --> 00:20:11,040 Speaker 2: easy to damage a railroad, but they're easy to fix. 407 00:20:11,080 --> 00:20:12,960 Speaker 2: It's not. It doesn't take a lot to get some 408 00:20:13,000 --> 00:20:15,840 Speaker 2: guys over to fix a damage sunk of railroad. Fixing 409 00:20:15,840 --> 00:20:18,160 Speaker 2: a bridge that's been blown up or a sunk boat 410 00:20:18,280 --> 00:20:19,040 Speaker 2: is a lot harder. 411 00:20:19,400 --> 00:20:22,320 Speaker 1: Yeah. Absolutely, I mean, and there are people within Russia 412 00:20:22,320 --> 00:20:25,560 Speaker 1: even who are sabotaging railroads, but as you say, it's 413 00:20:25,600 --> 00:20:28,160 Speaker 1: like it's very high stakes for them, and it's relatively 414 00:20:28,200 --> 00:20:31,159 Speaker 1: low cost for the Russian state to fix that stuff, 415 00:20:31,359 --> 00:20:33,640 Speaker 1: so like it's not as effective. 416 00:20:34,160 --> 00:20:36,040 Speaker 2: Yeah, But I think this gives you an idea of 417 00:20:36,080 --> 00:20:38,440 Speaker 2: kind of like what we're looking at when we look 418 00:20:38,440 --> 00:20:42,520 Speaker 2: at this kind of ongoing irregular conflict is the side 419 00:20:42,600 --> 00:20:45,520 Speaker 2: that does not have access to a functional navy, not 420 00:20:45,600 --> 00:20:48,840 Speaker 2: able to interdict or destroy fleets, but able to stop 421 00:20:48,880 --> 00:20:51,120 Speaker 2: them from dominating the coast. And when you can stop 422 00:20:51,160 --> 00:20:53,920 Speaker 2: them from dominating the coast, you have effectively denied them 423 00:20:54,400 --> 00:20:58,000 Speaker 2: terrain that they can act in without being countered, and 424 00:20:58,160 --> 00:21:00,960 Speaker 2: you have also denied them from stopping you from acting 425 00:21:01,000 --> 00:21:03,200 Speaker 2: in that same terrain, even if you don't have total 426 00:21:03,200 --> 00:21:08,320 Speaker 2: safety in that area. That opens up the operational possibilities substantially. 427 00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:11,840 Speaker 2: And this is something that I kind of don't think 428 00:21:11,920 --> 00:21:13,760 Speaker 2: is going to get put back in the bag. Even 429 00:21:13,800 --> 00:21:16,800 Speaker 2: if some of these Star Wars ass weapons systems do 430 00:21:16,880 --> 00:21:19,520 Speaker 2: come out in the near future, you know, maybe that'll 431 00:21:20,000 --> 00:21:22,639 Speaker 2: have an impact in the immediate term on people like 432 00:21:22,680 --> 00:21:25,160 Speaker 2: the Houthis, but I don't think that it really will 433 00:21:25,720 --> 00:21:28,680 Speaker 2: on you know, for example, what what Ukraine's doing right? 434 00:21:28,880 --> 00:21:32,879 Speaker 1: Yes, yeah, Russia can't keep up with getting decent small arms, 435 00:21:33,000 --> 00:21:36,160 Speaker 1: body armor, grenades and ship It's there's no way it's 436 00:21:36,200 --> 00:21:39,320 Speaker 1: going to implement some kind of massive Star Wars system 437 00:21:39,320 --> 00:21:41,240 Speaker 1: over its navy. Not right now in the middle of 438 00:21:41,240 --> 00:21:43,360 Speaker 1: a conflict. That's it's struggling to supply. 439 00:21:44,240 --> 00:21:46,480 Speaker 2: Yep, you know what, here's an ad break. 440 00:21:57,280 --> 00:22:00,399 Speaker 1: All right, we're back and we are traveling around the 441 00:22:00,400 --> 00:22:03,200 Speaker 1: world's been your little globe in your head, and look 442 00:22:03,280 --> 00:22:07,640 Speaker 1: for Meanma, which is of course in Asia. Now I'm 443 00:22:07,680 --> 00:22:12,080 Speaker 1: talking about two different I guess anti ship sabotage or 444 00:22:12,119 --> 00:22:14,879 Speaker 1: attack or two different ways the ships have been sunk 445 00:22:14,920 --> 00:22:16,880 Speaker 1: in the EMMA. I'll start with the first one, which 446 00:22:16,920 --> 00:22:21,960 Speaker 1: is undoubtedly the flashiest, just because it's fun. So a 447 00:22:22,160 --> 00:22:25,680 Speaker 1: ship in the port of Yangon about about a month ago, 448 00:22:25,760 --> 00:22:27,400 Speaker 1: so we're recording on a twenty. It's about the first 449 00:22:27,400 --> 00:22:30,840 Speaker 1: of March. It was in the river, in the river 450 00:22:30,920 --> 00:22:34,720 Speaker 1: in yangon right, and it was carrying allegedly carrying jet fuel. Now, 451 00:22:34,920 --> 00:22:39,760 Speaker 1: if you follow Burmese activists, people in the Burmese Freedom Movement, 452 00:22:40,080 --> 00:22:42,280 Speaker 1: they will one of their demands for a long time 453 00:22:42,359 --> 00:22:45,560 Speaker 1: has been to stop supplying the Hunter with jet fuel, 454 00:22:45,600 --> 00:22:51,280 Speaker 1: which would in turn stop it being able to bomb villages, schools, civilians, 455 00:22:51,600 --> 00:22:55,200 Speaker 1: PDF formations, just about anyone in the country. It's bombed 456 00:22:55,240 --> 00:22:57,879 Speaker 1: at some point in the last couple of years. And 457 00:22:58,240 --> 00:23:00,000 Speaker 1: they haven't been to exactly right, they haven't been able 458 00:23:00,200 --> 00:23:03,359 Speaker 1: to stop the supply of jet fuel coming to the Hunter. 459 00:23:03,800 --> 00:23:05,639 Speaker 1: So they've taken it into their own hands. And what 460 00:23:05,640 --> 00:23:08,440 Speaker 1: they did on the first of March was that they 461 00:23:09,080 --> 00:23:13,160 Speaker 1: snuck onto a boat. So two this is the story 462 00:23:13,240 --> 00:23:17,120 Speaker 1: from the Burmese National Unity Government's Ministry of Defense. Anyway, 463 00:23:17,960 --> 00:23:22,719 Speaker 1: combat divers snuck onto this boat planted a kilogram of 464 00:23:22,720 --> 00:23:25,159 Speaker 1: TNT or a charge equivalent to a kilogram of TNT. 465 00:23:25,560 --> 00:23:28,040 Speaker 1: Robert and I've both spoken to people who make explosives 466 00:23:28,040 --> 00:23:30,240 Speaker 1: in memis we do. We definitely know the PDF has 467 00:23:30,320 --> 00:23:33,199 Speaker 1: access to a range of explosives. They set it on 468 00:23:33,240 --> 00:23:35,639 Speaker 1: a five hour fuse and it blew up in the 469 00:23:35,640 --> 00:23:38,520 Speaker 1: middle of the night, and there's definitely footage of a 470 00:23:38,560 --> 00:23:42,280 Speaker 1: ship on fire having blown up. Now, this is pretty 471 00:23:42,280 --> 00:23:46,959 Speaker 1: remarkable forever. This is why the United States has units 472 00:23:47,000 --> 00:23:50,080 Speaker 1: like the Navy Seals, right, like the higher speed guys, 473 00:23:50,960 --> 00:23:56,080 Speaker 1: because it is not easy to scuba dive across a harbor, 474 00:23:56,520 --> 00:24:00,000 Speaker 1: climb onto a ship, set an explosive charge without being detected, 475 00:24:00,440 --> 00:24:02,399 Speaker 1: and then leave that ship and have the charge go 476 00:24:02,440 --> 00:24:05,400 Speaker 1: off and sink the ship without you being compromised, without 477 00:24:05,440 --> 00:24:09,920 Speaker 1: the charge itself being like compromised, and the ship being saved. Right, 478 00:24:09,960 --> 00:24:13,919 Speaker 1: this is some like. This is some classic like. This 479 00:24:14,000 --> 00:24:17,240 Speaker 1: is why they are special units within the US military. Now, 480 00:24:17,800 --> 00:24:20,959 Speaker 1: the PDF very obviously did not have combat divers. Two 481 00:24:21,040 --> 00:24:24,680 Speaker 1: years ago, I was looking into hobby scuba diving in Yangon. 482 00:24:25,280 --> 00:24:28,840 Speaker 1: The rivers in that area are extremely muddy and visibility 483 00:24:28,920 --> 00:24:32,840 Speaker 1: is very low. So the people who you find diving 484 00:24:32,880 --> 00:24:35,159 Speaker 1: in that area are not so much like hobby scuba 485 00:24:35,200 --> 00:24:39,800 Speaker 1: divers or free divers. But there's salvage divers and there's 486 00:24:39,840 --> 00:24:43,200 Speaker 1: a whole little industry of people. And these people are 487 00:24:43,240 --> 00:24:48,240 Speaker 1: diving in equipment that I would not consider safe or reliable. 488 00:24:48,680 --> 00:24:52,040 Speaker 1: It's clamping an air hose in between your teeth and 489 00:24:52,119 --> 00:24:54,919 Speaker 1: diving down and trying to find there's a large deposit 490 00:24:55,040 --> 00:24:57,400 Speaker 1: of coal in one of the rivers in Yangon because 491 00:24:57,440 --> 00:24:59,840 Speaker 1: of a ship that's sunk. There was, of course copper, 492 00:25:00,119 --> 00:25:02,880 Speaker 1: which everyone all around the world, including the big Coong 493 00:25:02,960 --> 00:25:06,560 Speaker 1: in Santia, are stealing copper. There's iron, right, so these 494 00:25:06,600 --> 00:25:09,919 Speaker 1: people are diving down and trying to collect scrap and 495 00:25:10,040 --> 00:25:13,159 Speaker 1: sell that for whatever minimal amount they can. Right. It's 496 00:25:13,760 --> 00:25:19,679 Speaker 1: an extremely dangerous and extremely low income. It's one of 497 00:25:19,720 --> 00:25:22,399 Speaker 1: the sort of really high risk, low reward jobs that 498 00:25:22,480 --> 00:25:24,840 Speaker 1: you get in economies where people are really struggling to 499 00:25:24,880 --> 00:25:28,880 Speaker 1: make ends meet. Right, So those are the only divers 500 00:25:28,920 --> 00:25:31,400 Speaker 1: I can find evidence of in Yangon. I don't think 501 00:25:31,440 --> 00:25:33,520 Speaker 1: it was them who did this, because you have to 502 00:25:33,560 --> 00:25:35,280 Speaker 1: have a boat above you with a pump if you're 503 00:25:35,320 --> 00:25:37,600 Speaker 1: diving with a rubber hose in your teeth, right, So 504 00:25:38,240 --> 00:25:43,560 Speaker 1: it seems like somebody within the They said it was 505 00:25:43,560 --> 00:25:45,919 Speaker 1: a Yangon PDF, that's what they attribute it to, So 506 00:25:46,560 --> 00:25:49,320 Speaker 1: that would be one of these. It would likely be 507 00:25:49,359 --> 00:25:52,440 Speaker 1: an underground group within the PDF, right, some people living 508 00:25:52,480 --> 00:25:55,040 Speaker 1: in the city who were able to sneak onto this 509 00:25:55,080 --> 00:25:56,919 Speaker 1: boat set a charge and blow it up, and they 510 00:25:56,960 --> 00:25:59,840 Speaker 1: would also had to have intelligence at the boat where 511 00:25:59,840 --> 00:26:02,760 Speaker 1: it was, what it was carrying, et cetera. It's a 512 00:26:02,800 --> 00:26:06,920 Speaker 1: pretty pretty daring mission that this is the first one 513 00:26:06,960 --> 00:26:09,000 Speaker 1: like this we've seen, and we haven't seen anything since. 514 00:26:09,119 --> 00:26:12,320 Speaker 1: But it's of course possible that this is a story 515 00:26:12,320 --> 00:26:14,880 Speaker 1: that we're being told. In fact, they had like someone 516 00:26:14,960 --> 00:26:17,879 Speaker 1: undercover on the ship, right, or like they had some 517 00:26:17,960 --> 00:26:20,639 Speaker 1: other means of getting this charge onto the ship. But 518 00:26:21,520 --> 00:26:23,320 Speaker 1: one way or another they managed to blow up this 519 00:26:23,359 --> 00:26:28,240 Speaker 1: ship carrying fuel, which is a significant detrima. Right, that's 520 00:26:28,240 --> 00:26:30,160 Speaker 1: how they get most of their ship. It's not over land, 521 00:26:30,240 --> 00:26:32,560 Speaker 1: especially with more. 522 00:26:32,359 --> 00:26:36,000 Speaker 2: The terrain there is just absolutely, like even with modern 523 00:26:36,040 --> 00:26:38,680 Speaker 2: technology difficult to get significant amounts of shit through. 524 00:26:39,080 --> 00:26:42,760 Speaker 1: They're resupplying some of their outposts that are ten miles 525 00:26:42,800 --> 00:26:45,600 Speaker 1: from a town with helicopters right now, like a the 526 00:26:45,680 --> 00:26:52,440 Speaker 1: terrain is burly, and B they don't have They PDF 527 00:26:52,480 --> 00:26:55,159 Speaker 1: has denied them access that any time they send out 528 00:26:55,160 --> 00:26:58,679 Speaker 1: a convoy, it gets attacked, so sending out plus you 529 00:26:58,680 --> 00:27:01,880 Speaker 1: know that their land board crossings are increasingly falling into 530 00:27:01,920 --> 00:27:05,639 Speaker 1: the hands of the PDFs and the eros, So getting 531 00:27:05,640 --> 00:27:07,199 Speaker 1: stuff through the ocean is one of the ways that 532 00:27:07,200 --> 00:27:09,800 Speaker 1: they can still get stuff. And if this keeps happening, 533 00:27:09,840 --> 00:27:12,280 Speaker 1: then they will make that more expensive for them. And 534 00:27:12,400 --> 00:27:15,840 Speaker 1: they're not exactly a wealthy hunter, even though I guess 535 00:27:16,040 --> 00:27:19,040 Speaker 1: Minna Lang just made himself an air Force one recently. 536 00:27:19,160 --> 00:27:21,000 Speaker 1: I was just looking at it today. He's God, he's 537 00:27:21,000 --> 00:27:24,520 Speaker 1: got himself too luxury. Yeah, they called it dictator class, 538 00:27:24,960 --> 00:27:27,040 Speaker 1: like he's upgraded from president class. 539 00:27:27,119 --> 00:27:28,000 Speaker 2: Nice class. 540 00:27:28,119 --> 00:27:32,960 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, yes, he has in many ways. So yeah, 541 00:27:32,960 --> 00:27:35,119 Speaker 1: that's one way that the PDF has been blowing up 542 00:27:35,119 --> 00:27:37,360 Speaker 1: ships in the yang On. Robert, do you know who 543 00:27:37,400 --> 00:27:40,880 Speaker 1: else has been blowing up ships in the in Yangon? 544 00:27:41,600 --> 00:27:46,760 Speaker 2: Well, we are sponsored entirely by the British Navy circa 545 00:27:46,840 --> 00:27:51,440 Speaker 2: the mid eighteen hundreds, so I would guess them, that's right, Yeah, yeah, yeah, 546 00:27:51,520 --> 00:27:55,199 Speaker 2: yeah yeah. Lots of repressed, repressed feelings and glowing up 547 00:27:55,600 --> 00:28:00,360 Speaker 2: a lot of cabin boys with deep trauma. Anyway, it. 548 00:28:11,960 --> 00:28:14,800 Speaker 1: Eric Rebeca, We hope you enjoyed that. That pivot one 549 00:28:14,800 --> 00:28:17,800 Speaker 1: of our best ones yet. And we're talking about the 550 00:28:17,840 --> 00:28:21,840 Speaker 1: Arakan Army now, So the Arakan Army are not to 551 00:28:21,880 --> 00:28:24,760 Speaker 1: be confused with the Arakan Rahine of Salvation. Army different group. 552 00:28:24,960 --> 00:28:27,600 Speaker 1: Arakan is the name of what is now a kind 553 00:28:27,680 --> 00:28:30,600 Speaker 1: state before it was colonized by the Burmese. That was 554 00:28:30,680 --> 00:28:32,800 Speaker 1: I think Arakan was a king before it was colonized 555 00:28:32,800 --> 00:28:34,919 Speaker 1: by the Burmese, so that that's where that refers to. 556 00:28:34,960 --> 00:28:39,840 Speaker 1: It's a geographical appellation rather than like necessarily an ethnic one. 557 00:28:40,120 --> 00:28:43,440 Speaker 1: The Rakin would be the ethnic group. So what the 558 00:28:43,440 --> 00:28:46,560 Speaker 1: AA have done is sunk. I think at least four 559 00:28:47,560 --> 00:28:50,120 Speaker 1: Hunter ships now, and most of these ships are kind 560 00:28:50,120 --> 00:28:53,680 Speaker 1: of they're like the They look like big Higgins boats. 561 00:28:53,680 --> 00:28:56,880 Speaker 1: They're like landing craft or like car ferries, like flat 562 00:28:57,000 --> 00:29:00,360 Speaker 1: bottom with a bow that goes down. Right. I ride 563 00:29:00,400 --> 00:29:02,680 Speaker 1: around a lot in the Marshall Islands in little landing 564 00:29:02,680 --> 00:29:04,200 Speaker 1: craft like that because they can get them in. They 565 00:29:04,240 --> 00:29:06,360 Speaker 1: don't have like docks, so they can just ride that 566 00:29:06,440 --> 00:29:07,960 Speaker 1: right up to the beach and then drop the front 567 00:29:08,080 --> 00:29:10,640 Speaker 1: and off you go. And they use them a lot. 568 00:29:10,880 --> 00:29:13,719 Speaker 1: The Hunter doesn't have like per se marines that they 569 00:29:13,720 --> 00:29:17,440 Speaker 1: don't have maritime infantry, but they use them to transport 570 00:29:17,480 --> 00:29:20,360 Speaker 1: their regular army around, right, and they use them to 571 00:29:20,360 --> 00:29:23,080 Speaker 1: transport them up river. They also use them a lot 572 00:29:23,120 --> 00:29:28,560 Speaker 1: in Rakhine State to shell AA positions and any townships 573 00:29:28,600 --> 00:29:30,320 Speaker 1: that they've decided they want to wipe off the map 574 00:29:30,480 --> 00:29:32,840 Speaker 1: and kill all the people in right, So, these these 575 00:29:32,840 --> 00:29:35,840 Speaker 1: boats have been a real thorn in the side of 576 00:29:35,880 --> 00:29:39,760 Speaker 1: the Arakan Army. After Operation ten twenty seven when they 577 00:29:39,920 --> 00:29:43,360 Speaker 1: joined with two other groups to form the Three Brotherhood Alliance, 578 00:29:43,400 --> 00:29:46,800 Speaker 1: a launch attacks on the Hunter all over VMA. And 579 00:29:46,880 --> 00:29:50,880 Speaker 1: so what they've been doing, it appears, is using underwater 580 00:29:51,120 --> 00:29:55,040 Speaker 1: mines to think these ships, which is interesting, right. I 581 00:29:55,040 --> 00:30:00,880 Speaker 1: guess the mines are like a very old technology, right, 582 00:30:00,920 --> 00:30:04,600 Speaker 1: Like it's probably one hundred years plus underwater mines have existed. 583 00:30:05,120 --> 00:30:08,440 Speaker 1: It seems the way that like the reason they're able 584 00:30:08,520 --> 00:30:11,120 Speaker 1: to get away with using what is their relatively dated 585 00:30:11,160 --> 00:30:15,240 Speaker 1: technology is because the Hunter just doesn't expect to encounter anything, right, 586 00:30:15,280 --> 00:30:18,200 Speaker 1: and so has not equipped its ships as such. Like 587 00:30:18,400 --> 00:30:20,680 Speaker 1: they do have stuff like submarines, but that's not what's 588 00:30:20,680 --> 00:30:22,520 Speaker 1: getting sunk. What's getting sun to these big kind of 589 00:30:22,640 --> 00:30:26,040 Speaker 1: landing craft riverboats, And it seems that they're using mines 590 00:30:26,200 --> 00:30:28,960 Speaker 1: and then once they disable the ship, they're then attacking 591 00:30:28,960 --> 00:30:32,760 Speaker 1: it with small boats, small arms like indirect fire mortars 592 00:30:32,760 --> 00:30:36,160 Speaker 1: and stuff. I saw one post that suggested they'd use 593 00:30:36,200 --> 00:30:39,040 Speaker 1: which is pretty cool if they did. The Burmese military 594 00:30:39,080 --> 00:30:44,000 Speaker 1: has these like tank destroyers. It's a tank, it's what 595 00:30:44,040 --> 00:30:46,560 Speaker 1: it is. And they've captured the AA has captured a 596 00:30:46,600 --> 00:30:49,000 Speaker 1: number of these, right, and I've seen suggestions that they're 597 00:30:49,080 --> 00:30:51,760 Speaker 1: using some of these on like they just set up 598 00:30:51,760 --> 00:30:53,640 Speaker 1: an ambush along the banks of the river, right and 599 00:30:53,760 --> 00:30:55,840 Speaker 1: as a ship comes in they can they can maybe 600 00:30:55,880 --> 00:30:57,720 Speaker 1: disable it with a mine and then attack it with those. 601 00:30:58,040 --> 00:31:01,080 Speaker 1: But there are videos online you can find them of 602 00:31:01,480 --> 00:31:04,000 Speaker 1: the AA sinking these ships, and then they've done some 603 00:31:04,080 --> 00:31:07,600 Speaker 1: amazing drone photography of like they obviously they then like 604 00:31:08,080 --> 00:31:11,000 Speaker 1: staged their units on the ships, like all saluting the 605 00:31:11,080 --> 00:31:13,360 Speaker 1: drone and they had the Arakan Army flags and they're 606 00:31:13,360 --> 00:31:17,760 Speaker 1: actually really cool photos of them taking these ships. But again, 607 00:31:17,800 --> 00:31:20,560 Speaker 1: like I think this might be the first sinking of 608 00:31:20,800 --> 00:31:26,959 Speaker 1: a Bermese naval ship since since independence from Britain. Like 609 00:31:27,480 --> 00:31:29,160 Speaker 1: I can't think that they were. They al really haven't 610 00:31:29,160 --> 00:31:31,440 Speaker 1: played much of a role at all in its conflicts 611 00:31:31,880 --> 00:31:35,560 Speaker 1: with the Eros, aside as from like basically kind of 612 00:31:35,880 --> 00:31:38,800 Speaker 1: just shelling places when they want to do that. But 613 00:31:38,840 --> 00:31:41,320 Speaker 1: there's never really been any significant opposition to them, and 614 00:31:41,360 --> 00:31:44,800 Speaker 1: that's changed now they have to obviously, just like everywhere 615 00:31:44,800 --> 00:31:47,120 Speaker 1: else watch out for drones. Drones have been used to 616 00:31:47,160 --> 00:31:52,120 Speaker 1: a massive extent in Myanmar, and like the AA doesn't 617 00:31:52,160 --> 00:31:54,880 Speaker 1: have as many like associated PDFs, I haven't seen them 618 00:31:55,000 --> 00:31:58,320 Speaker 1: doing as much of the drone stuff as the PDFs. 619 00:31:58,480 --> 00:32:02,000 Speaker 1: The pdf tend to be like the more urban folks, right, 620 00:32:02,040 --> 00:32:05,280 Speaker 1: the younger folks and the gen Z folks that we've 621 00:32:05,280 --> 00:32:07,760 Speaker 1: spoken about before, and a lot of them have been 622 00:32:07,920 --> 00:32:10,000 Speaker 1: very savvy with their use of drones. Like I said, 623 00:32:10,000 --> 00:32:12,040 Speaker 1: you can look up Federal Wings and you can see 624 00:32:12,040 --> 00:32:15,160 Speaker 1: them dropping bombs with drones on all kinds of stuff 625 00:32:15,600 --> 00:32:19,640 Speaker 1: with their heavy metal soundtracks, so they like. But what 626 00:32:19,760 --> 00:32:22,040 Speaker 1: it wasn't even drone to It's pretty simple. It was 627 00:32:22,120 --> 00:32:25,000 Speaker 1: just mines. So things they do love mines and mea 628 00:32:25,120 --> 00:32:27,960 Speaker 1: ether of mines all over that country. But in this case, 629 00:32:28,160 --> 00:32:31,440 Speaker 1: these I guess massive what mines in the rivers. Given 630 00:32:31,440 --> 00:32:34,840 Speaker 1: that the Hunter is the only only entity sending big 631 00:32:34,840 --> 00:32:36,880 Speaker 1: boats up and down, you could set them at a 632 00:32:36,880 --> 00:32:38,800 Speaker 1: certain depth where these small boats wouldn't hit them, and 633 00:32:39,280 --> 00:32:41,320 Speaker 1: eventually one of the Hunter boats is going to hit them, 634 00:32:41,360 --> 00:32:45,040 Speaker 1: I guess. And so it's pretty basic technology, but it's 635 00:32:45,080 --> 00:32:47,360 Speaker 1: still a massive step forward in terms of like a 636 00:32:47,400 --> 00:32:51,959 Speaker 1: place where the state had complete impunity, It now doesn't. Right. 637 00:32:52,040 --> 00:32:54,760 Speaker 1: They can't just cruise up and down these rivers shelling people. 638 00:32:55,080 --> 00:32:57,360 Speaker 1: They were actually using some of the ships to evacuate 639 00:32:57,480 --> 00:33:00,480 Speaker 1: soldiers and their families from a position, and the soldiers 640 00:33:00,520 --> 00:33:02,640 Speaker 1: they were trying to, like, rather than surrendering, they were 641 00:33:02,640 --> 00:33:04,640 Speaker 1: trying to evacuate them and move them to somewhere else. 642 00:33:06,080 --> 00:33:07,880 Speaker 1: The AA asked them to surrender, and they didn't. They 643 00:33:07,880 --> 00:33:10,040 Speaker 1: tried to evacuate them, so then they mined the ships 644 00:33:10,200 --> 00:33:14,640 Speaker 1: and took those out. I think the hunters like tried 645 00:33:14,680 --> 00:33:17,800 Speaker 1: to spin this as like the AA is attacking civilians, 646 00:33:17,880 --> 00:33:21,040 Speaker 1: but I think a Burmese navy ship with a Burmese 647 00:33:21,080 --> 00:33:23,440 Speaker 1: Navy flag, when the ships have just been shelling you, 648 00:33:23,480 --> 00:33:25,520 Speaker 1: seems like a legitimate target to me. And I think 649 00:33:25,560 --> 00:33:28,400 Speaker 1: it's very hard. It's you know, it's a hunter, but 650 00:33:28,480 --> 00:33:31,400 Speaker 1: children on one of their naval ships rather than the 651 00:33:31,480 --> 00:33:34,320 Speaker 1: AA who attacked the ship because it had children. You 652 00:33:34,360 --> 00:33:36,400 Speaker 1: can hear in one of the things you can hear 653 00:33:36,480 --> 00:33:38,960 Speaker 1: the AA are like attacking the ship in small boats 654 00:33:38,960 --> 00:33:40,880 Speaker 1: and they're shouting like there are children on board, and 655 00:33:41,200 --> 00:33:43,320 Speaker 1: you can hear them acknowledging it. And there are videos 656 00:33:43,320 --> 00:33:47,800 Speaker 1: of the AA rescuing people who jumped overboard, rescuing them 657 00:33:47,960 --> 00:33:50,200 Speaker 1: from the river, and then like, I guess they just 658 00:33:50,200 --> 00:33:51,520 Speaker 1: held as POWs. 659 00:33:52,960 --> 00:33:53,200 Speaker 2: Cool. 660 00:33:53,880 --> 00:33:57,040 Speaker 1: Yeah, it's cool. It's interesting. Obviously, not many of us 661 00:33:57,040 --> 00:34:02,040 Speaker 1: have access to underwater mines, but you know, maybe in 662 00:34:02,080 --> 00:34:03,320 Speaker 1: a fictional future we might. 663 00:34:04,000 --> 00:34:07,360 Speaker 2: Yeah. Well there you go, folks. Uh, this has been 664 00:34:07,520 --> 00:34:12,920 Speaker 2: a regular naval warfare, and you a podcast about a 665 00:34:13,000 --> 00:34:15,160 Speaker 2: regular naval warfare, and you. 666 00:34:15,880 --> 00:34:18,880 Speaker 1: Yeah, send us to your videos of yourself in irregular 667 00:34:18,920 --> 00:34:19,560 Speaker 1: naval war Yeah. 668 00:34:19,560 --> 00:34:22,320 Speaker 2: Absolutely, go out there. Look how about this, Every listener, 669 00:34:22,800 --> 00:34:26,840 Speaker 2: go out and sink one naval vessel, you know, don't 670 00:34:26,840 --> 00:34:29,600 Speaker 2: matter who's just any boat. Any go sink a boat, 671 00:34:29,640 --> 00:34:34,680 Speaker 2: any boat, take supery, knock it out. You see a dinghy, 672 00:34:34,840 --> 00:34:38,160 Speaker 2: take that fucker out, people kayaking, fuck them up. 673 00:34:38,360 --> 00:34:38,560 Speaker 1: You know. 674 00:34:38,640 --> 00:34:42,719 Speaker 2: Banana boat, absolutely, a banana boat for sure. One of 675 00:34:42,719 --> 00:34:45,200 Speaker 2: those weird duck boat car things that they have in 676 00:34:45,280 --> 00:34:48,200 Speaker 2: some city. Oh yeah, actually, you know what, you don't 677 00:34:48,200 --> 00:34:50,319 Speaker 2: need to do anything with that. That'll kill everybody on 678 00:34:50,400 --> 00:34:54,439 Speaker 2: board on it. Those things are dead traps. Just pray 679 00:34:54,520 --> 00:34:57,759 Speaker 2: for those people. Yeah, any any other boat. Yeah, you 680 00:34:57,800 --> 00:35:00,600 Speaker 2: see a doughnut. You know, behind being behind a speedboat? 681 00:35:00,800 --> 00:35:07,359 Speaker 2: Oh yeah, market Anyway, everybody go away. 682 00:35:10,640 --> 00:35:13,000 Speaker 3: It could Happen here as a production of cool Zone Media. 683 00:35:13,239 --> 00:35:15,920 Speaker 3: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website 684 00:35:15,960 --> 00:35:19,080 Speaker 3: coolzonemedia dot com or check us out on the iHeartRadio app, 685 00:35:19,080 --> 00:35:22,279 Speaker 3: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can 686 00:35:22,280 --> 00:35:25,000 Speaker 3: find sources for It could Happen Here, updated monthly at 687 00:35:25,000 --> 00:35:28,200 Speaker 3: coolzonemedia dot com slash sources. Thanks for listening.