WEBVTT - Loads of Vultures: Funds, Agents, Bets

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio News. I have another piece

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<v Speaker 1>of information that can't be used on the podcast.

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<v Speaker 2>We'll say it in front of the microphone.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a dead possible in my backyard, and I'm trying

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<v Speaker 1>to pretend that I haven't noticed that that I.

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<v Speaker 2>Have to Matt. That gets worse by the hour.

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<v Speaker 1>I know.

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<v Speaker 2>The thing is, wait, we can't put this in the

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<v Speaker 2>pod well.

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<v Speaker 1>Because then my wife would hear it?

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<v Speaker 2>Now, did she listen? Sometimes that's cute.

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<v Speaker 1>So one day I noticed the dead scroll in my yard,

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<v Speaker 1>and I and then like, I forgot about and I

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<v Speaker 1>came back the next day and I was gone, there's

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<v Speaker 1>like a fairy number of birds of prey in my yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>And I was like, ah, good job birds of prey.

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<v Speaker 2>So he's just hoping one of them gets the job done.

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<v Speaker 1>But this problem is now past this expission day.

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<v Speaker 2>Birds of prey, you most only mean vultures, because I

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<v Speaker 2>don't think like a hawk would eat.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, there's loads of vultures in my neighborhood, right, but no,

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<v Speaker 1>we see bald eagles a fair amount, and the bald

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<v Speaker 1>eagle famously a scavenger.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, I feel like I did know that actually,

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<v Speaker 2>but I have.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like Ben Franklin's whole thing, like he wanted the

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<v Speaker 1>national bird of America to be the turkey because the

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<v Speaker 1>turkey is a noble bird in the bald eagle as

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<v Speaker 1>a scavenger.

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<v Speaker 2>It kind of reminds me of when my cat vomits

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<v Speaker 2>in my apartment and I pretend not to notice it

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<v Speaker 2>until my husband does and then he cleans it up.

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to the Money Stuff Podcast. You're a

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<v Speaker 1>weekly podcast where we talk about stuff relate it to money.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Matt Levine and I write the Money Stuff column

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<v Speaker 1>for Bloomberg Opinion.

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<v Speaker 2>And I'm Katie Greifeld, a reporter for Bloomberg News and

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<v Speaker 2>an anchor for Bloomberg Television.

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<v Speaker 1>Speaking of dead thing, ah, the.

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<v Speaker 2>Death of a multi strat.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so yeah, there's a big story this week about

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<v Speaker 1>Edward Eisler's multi strategy hedge fund, which is called something like.

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<v Speaker 2>Strategy edge fund some only along those lines.

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<v Speaker 1>Is winding down because it's hard out there for a

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<v Speaker 1>multi strategy hedge fund that is not one of the

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<v Speaker 1>big four multi strategy edge funds.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, this is a great scoop from Bloomberg. I did

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<v Speaker 2>enjoy also the post mortem written by Sarah Butcher over

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<v Speaker 2>at E Financial Careers, which spoke to a bunch of

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<v Speaker 2>people who had worked there or were familiar with it,

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<v Speaker 2>And I don't know, you add the two articles together,

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<v Speaker 2>it seems like a lot of this just comes down

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<v Speaker 2>to costs. Also, returns weren't great.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, the hedgehod market has gotten so much more efficient

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<v Speaker 1>in like my time, it used to be that if

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<v Speaker 1>you wanted to start a hedgehund, you start a hedge fund,

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<v Speaker 1>and you got capital based on your track record, but

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<v Speaker 1>also your ability to appeal to LP's and what was

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<v Speaker 1>in style and what institutional investors are looking for. And

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<v Speaker 1>now increasingly the hedge fund business is dominated by these

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<v Speaker 1>big multi strategy funds like Millennium and set It All

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<v Speaker 1>and zero point seventy two. And if you are a

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<v Speaker 1>person who wants to run money, you probably end up

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<v Speaker 1>guiding to work for those guys rather than going off

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<v Speaker 1>on your own. And to run money for those guys,

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<v Speaker 1>you don't have to be good or telps, you don't

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<v Speaker 1>have to be necessarily in style. You're just doing a

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<v Speaker 1>job at a big firm. And so as the market

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<v Speaker 1>gets more efficient, like the people who are good at

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<v Speaker 1>those firms get handed huge piles of capital the trade,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's just harder and harder to work outside of

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<v Speaker 1>those institutions. In particular, it seems really hard to run

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<v Speaker 1>a multi strategy fund.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I feel like just the story of Eisler in

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<v Speaker 2>general is a sign of the times in two different ways,

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<v Speaker 2>because it didn't start as a multi strategy. It started

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<v Speaker 2>as just a single manager fund. Then it pivoted to

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<v Speaker 2>become a multi strat in like twenty twenty one, and

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<v Speaker 2>now it's winding down because it's not Millennium or Citadel

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<v Speaker 2>to simplify it.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, when are my reader is about to be like,

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<v Speaker 1>his mistake was pivoting to being a multi strategy fund.

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<v Speaker 1>Like when you're a single manager fund, you have his

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<v Speaker 1>own skill, which is what allowed him to launch a

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<v Speaker 1>hedge fund, and you have much more ability to evaluate

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<v Speaker 1>the people you're hiring because you're kind of hiring them

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<v Speaker 1>to assist you in making calls that you have a

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<v Speaker 1>good understanding of, rather than hiring them to stand up

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<v Speaker 1>an entirely new business under your umbrella. My headline about

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<v Speaker 1>this was something like hedge funds have to be big,

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<v Speaker 1>and that's not really true right, there's still a market

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<v Speaker 1>niche for like people running single manager specialized hedge funds.

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<v Speaker 1>But it's probably true that multi strategy hedge funds have

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<v Speaker 1>to be big, right, So if you're going to pivot

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<v Speaker 1>from being a single manager fund to being a platform

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<v Speaker 1>for a lot of portfolio managers, you have to be

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<v Speaker 1>a big platform because otherwise they'll go to somewhere that

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<v Speaker 1>can give them more capital and more money. I don't

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<v Speaker 1>know why he pivoted, right, And clearly like there is

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<v Speaker 1>some pressure to pivot. Even if you run a single

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<v Speaker 1>manager or fund that has like a good track record

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<v Speaker 1>and is really good at its specialty, you're still going

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<v Speaker 1>to feel kind of like squeezed by the big multi

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<v Speaker 1>strategy funds that have more resources and are like an

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<v Speaker 1>easier check for big allocators to write. It's harder to

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<v Speaker 1>compete with them, and so you might think, well, the

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<v Speaker 1>best way to compete with them is to be a

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<v Speaker 1>multi manager fund myself. But that's a big bet. You

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<v Speaker 1>have to become a giant multi strategy fund, yeah, to

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<v Speaker 1>really compete.

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<v Speaker 2>Instead of getting even better at your thing, Yeah, you

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<v Speaker 2>spread out across all the things.

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<v Speaker 1>Almost like by the way, all the people who run

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<v Speaker 1>the big multi strategy funds like did kind of start

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<v Speaker 1>as you know, hedgehund managers and then they became managers

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<v Speaker 1>of hedgehome managers. Right, So there's a path, right, It's

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<v Speaker 1>just it's likely how many people can follow it anymore.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I don't know if I would pivot my hedge

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<v Speaker 2>funds that I run to become a multi manager fund

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<v Speaker 2>in this day and age. I do want to talk

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<v Speaker 2>about fees because that's a recurring theme here, is that

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<v Speaker 2>the pass through expenses at Isler were really high and

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<v Speaker 2>they were trying to bring them down and are passed

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<v Speaker 2>through fees unique to the multi strategy dynamic.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, the modern multi strategy funds are somewhere between a

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<v Speaker 1>hedge fund and a fund of funds. They're kind of

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<v Speaker 1>like their business is to hire portfolio managers, allocate capital

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<v Speaker 1>to them, and sort of pay them like hedge fund managers,

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<v Speaker 1>and then collect fees from the ultimate investors. And so yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>the past three fees are traditionally a hallmark of modern

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<v Speaker 1>pod shops because they go to pass through fee is

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, it's like paying for rent and Bloomberg terminals

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<v Speaker 1>and stuff, But really what it is is paying performance

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<v Speaker 1>fees to the individual portfolio managers regardless of the performance

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<v Speaker 1>of the overall fund. Right, So like when you're hiring

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<v Speaker 1>portfolio managers, you can pay them incentive compensation on their

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<v Speaker 1>own performance. And I think in the current market you

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<v Speaker 1>pay them like accelerated performance compensation on their own performance.

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<v Speaker 1>So you pay them like a bigger chunk if the

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<v Speaker 1>going rate is they get twenty percent of their profits,

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<v Speaker 1>like you might pay them thirty percent for their first year,

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<v Speaker 1>so that they like have an incentive to join you,

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<v Speaker 1>because it's like a really hot market for hedge fund talent.

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<v Speaker 1>And if you're doing that and you run a big fund,

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<v Speaker 1>you have some economies of scale and you have some offsetting,

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<v Speaker 1>Like you have the ability to like aggregate a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of good portfolio managers into something with like high and

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<v Speaker 1>uncorrelated returns. But you have a big expense base, and

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<v Speaker 1>if you are a smaller fund, it is harder to

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<v Speaker 1>spread that expense base over a lot of winning bets.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, you think about some of the figures that Nishan

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<v Speaker 2>Kumar wrote about. So the firm charge clients two hundred

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<v Speaker 2>and forty four million dollars in pass through fees in

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<v Speaker 2>twenty twenty three, it was about two hundred million in

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<v Speaker 2>twenty twenty two. They had a restructuring earlier this year,

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<v Speaker 2>and we're trying to bring their pass through fees down

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<v Speaker 2>to twenty twenty two levels. But then you pair that

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<v Speaker 2>with the Sara Butcher article and there are some snarky

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<v Speaker 2>quotes from people who used to work there about how

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of their real risk takers had left, like

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<v Speaker 2>their hotshot, and they just had this is a direct quote.

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<v Speaker 2>They had far too many junior people who didn't know

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<v Speaker 2>how to take risks. So it seems like their costs

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<v Speaker 2>were really high for at least what's being described in

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<v Speaker 2>this article is subper talent.

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<v Speaker 1>Well, this is just the efficiency of the market. Like

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<v Speaker 1>this is what Kapi Palaoligo said to us on the

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<v Speaker 1>podcast that the funds that he works at are sieves

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<v Speaker 1>for talent, right like you have. The big funds are

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<v Speaker 1>pretty good at identifying talent, pretty good at firing people

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<v Speaker 1>they don't think are talented, and so they end up

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<v Speaker 1>with a lot of the good portfolio managers. And if

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<v Speaker 1>you're a good portfolio manager at a multi strategy fund,

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<v Speaker 1>your name's not on the door. You're kind of doing it.

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<v Speaker 1>For the money, right, Like, if someone is like, we'll

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<v Speaker 1>allocate you more money and give you more of your

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<v Speaker 1>performance as a fee, then you know you end up

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<v Speaker 1>at the bigger places they can allocate you more money.

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<v Speaker 1>And if the bigger places are really good at identifying talent,

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<v Speaker 1>that's how the talent stive works, and that makes it

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<v Speaker 1>really hard for someone who runs a smaller place to

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<v Speaker 1>keep the best talent.

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<v Speaker 2>There was something in the article about how a lot

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<v Speaker 2>of the meeting rooms after this letter went out were

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<v Speaker 2>filled with people calling headhunters, et cetera. Apparently some insiders

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<v Speaker 2>know that Issler's more mediocre portfolio managers will now simply

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<v Speaker 2>fan out across the industry and dilute returns elsewhere. It's just.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know why that would be true. I mean, well,

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know. I wish the best to all mediocre

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<v Speaker 1>portfolio managers. But it's the talent sive, right. No one's like, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>let's scoop up the mediocre portfolio was right, They're trying

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<v Speaker 1>to find the people who have good returns.

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<v Speaker 2>A lot of these Eisler employees were calling headhunters at

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<v Speaker 2>the start of the week. They could have been calling

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<v Speaker 2>actually their new agent.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so there's this most of your journal story about

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<v Speaker 1>this guy, Ryan wallshoe Is, I think, has styled themselves

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<v Speaker 1>as the first talent agent for hedgphund managers or portfolio managers.

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<v Speaker 2>I've certainly never heard of one before.

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<v Speaker 1>Haven't you, though, Because you've heard of recruiters.

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<v Speaker 2>I've heard of recruiters. I've heard.

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<v Speaker 1>Are they different?

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<v Speaker 2>They're a little bit different in terms of who's paying.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, okay, I said it, Yeah, all right.

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<v Speaker 2>Do you think they're not different?

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<v Speaker 1>Do you think they're different?

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<v Speaker 2>I think they're a little bit different.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, they're a little bit different. You could call a

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<v Speaker 1>headhunter the headitor will one try to find your job

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<v Speaker 1>at a hedge fund, and two try to get you

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<v Speaker 1>the best possible compensation package because probably they get a

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<v Speaker 1>cut of it, you know.

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<v Speaker 2>True, now, but that cut isn't coming from your past, all.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, It's coming from the hedge fund, which is so

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<v Speaker 1>so right. Traditional headhunter is probably more aligned with the employer,

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<v Speaker 1>whereas an agent is more aligned with the employee.

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<v Speaker 2>They should be, there should be, But of.

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<v Speaker 1>Them are mostly interested in burgering.

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<v Speaker 2>A deal rather than like we're all trying to eat

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<v Speaker 2>you know.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, So I don't know. My friend is that like

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<v Speaker 1>a hedge found agent is not so different from a

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<v Speaker 1>hedge fund recruiter. It's a little different.

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<v Speaker 2>There's nuance, there's nuance.

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<v Speaker 1>And this guy is apparently the first edge fund agent

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<v Speaker 1>but possibly the first one to have a work of

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<v Speaker 1>art featuring Ari Gold, the agent from Entourage, on his walls.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, you know you.

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<v Speaker 1>Like watch Like you know, some number of people are

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<v Speaker 1>like watching Entourage, like, oh, I could be an agent

0:11:45.320 --> 0:11:49.040
<v Speaker 1>for hedge funds. I don't understand, but so this is

0:11:49.040 --> 0:11:51.200
<v Speaker 1>what I think about hedgephund agents, Like you think about

0:11:51.240 --> 0:11:58.440
<v Speaker 1>like agents classically. It's like sports actors, television anchors think

0:11:58.520 --> 0:12:03.080
<v Speaker 1>of this nature. It's it's like traditionally people whose day

0:12:03.160 --> 0:12:11.120
<v Speaker 1>job is not financial negotiation and like possibly somewhat unworldly, right,

0:12:11.160 --> 0:12:13.840
<v Speaker 1>Like you think about like a quarterback is not like

0:12:13.880 --> 0:12:16.240
<v Speaker 1>a business person. They're like, you know, they're throwing a football.

0:12:16.280 --> 0:12:19.640
<v Speaker 1>They're not like thinking about business all day. It's funny

0:12:19.720 --> 0:12:21.800
<v Speaker 1>to have an agent for like a hedge fund manager, who,

0:12:21.840 --> 0:12:25.160
<v Speaker 1>like I would think that if you're a portfolio manager

0:12:25.200 --> 0:12:27.559
<v Speaker 1>at a hedge fund, you actually do have a pretty

0:12:27.600 --> 0:12:30.800
<v Speaker 1>good sense of the market. For portfolio managers at hedge

0:12:30.800 --> 0:12:31.720
<v Speaker 1>ones in a way.

0:12:31.760 --> 0:12:32.720
<v Speaker 2>That's true.

0:12:32.720 --> 0:12:35.040
<v Speaker 1>You know, a novelist might not.

0:12:35.679 --> 0:12:36.520
<v Speaker 2>That's true.

0:12:36.920 --> 0:12:38.760
<v Speaker 1>It just sort of like as a matter of temperament

0:12:38.800 --> 0:12:41.520
<v Speaker 1>and personality, you'd pay attention to those things, and you'd

0:12:41.559 --> 0:12:44.240
<v Speaker 1>like be able to discuss the value of getting a

0:12:44.280 --> 0:12:46.600
<v Speaker 1>higher percentage of your profit sources and upfront. You know,

0:12:46.679 --> 0:12:50.680
<v Speaker 1>like you'd think about related topics all day and you'd

0:12:50.679 --> 0:12:52.600
<v Speaker 1>be keenly interested in this, So you would probably have

0:12:52.679 --> 0:12:54.520
<v Speaker 1>less new information. But as the guy points out, like

0:12:54.559 --> 0:12:56.080
<v Speaker 1>you do have a demanding day job, and so you

0:12:56.080 --> 0:12:59.720
<v Speaker 1>probably aren't closely tracking the market for portfolio managers, and

0:12:59.800 --> 0:13:03.040
<v Speaker 1>like the market is not super transparent, so like you're

0:13:03.040 --> 0:13:07.360
<v Speaker 1>relying on rumor and aneko to know what people are

0:13:07.400 --> 0:13:09.520
<v Speaker 1>getting paid elsewhere. And so if there's an agent who

0:13:10.080 --> 0:13:13.000
<v Speaker 1>collates all of that information is going to provide value

0:13:13.040 --> 0:13:13.240
<v Speaker 1>to you.

0:13:13.480 --> 0:13:18.920
<v Speaker 2>Also, the idea of someone negotiating on your behalf and like, so.

0:13:18.679 --> 0:13:23.040
<v Speaker 1>Again, yes, I agree, I would want someone to negotiate

0:13:23.040 --> 0:13:26.520
<v Speaker 1>it on my behalf. It's possible that a lot of

0:13:26.840 --> 0:13:29.599
<v Speaker 1>run portfolio managers are happy to negotiate. I don't know,

0:13:29.640 --> 0:13:33.200
<v Speaker 1>you're really good a stressed guy. You're like, yeah, I'll

0:13:33.480 --> 0:13:34.400
<v Speaker 1>curse at my boss.

0:13:34.640 --> 0:13:36.560
<v Speaker 2>Maybe you just want to sit in front of your

0:13:36.600 --> 0:13:39.439
<v Speaker 2>Bloomberg terminal or whatever and think your big thoughts.

0:13:39.480 --> 0:13:41.120
<v Speaker 1>No, I agree. I think there's a range of people,

0:13:41.320 --> 0:13:43.839
<v Speaker 1>and there certainly a lot of people who have killer

0:13:43.880 --> 0:13:47.160
<v Speaker 1>instinct as like electronic traders, but don't want to negotiate

0:13:47.160 --> 0:13:49.120
<v Speaker 1>with their boss for more money. Yeah, and so they

0:13:49.120 --> 0:13:51.960
<v Speaker 1>can hire an agent. Reading this article else I thought about, like,

0:13:52.120 --> 0:13:53.920
<v Speaker 1>you know who really should have agents?

0:13:54.120 --> 0:13:54.480
<v Speaker 2>Tell me.

0:13:55.720 --> 0:13:59.480
<v Speaker 1>AI researchers. They check all the boxes. First of all,

0:13:59.520 --> 0:14:01.760
<v Speaker 1>they get like an order of magnitude more than hedge

0:14:01.760 --> 0:14:05.480
<v Speaker 1>fund portfolio managers, which is crazy. Second, they are like

0:14:05.559 --> 0:14:08.600
<v Speaker 1>stereotypically kind of unworldly, and like they've been like articles

0:14:08.640 --> 0:14:10.920
<v Speaker 1>about like oh, like these twenty three year old AI

0:14:10.960 --> 0:14:14.960
<v Speaker 1>researchers are consulting with their friends really see what to

0:14:14.960 --> 0:14:16.520
<v Speaker 1>see whether they should take a two hundred and fifty

0:14:16.520 --> 0:14:19.800
<v Speaker 1>million dollars offer from Marketucker work. They should have an agent. Yeah,

0:14:19.840 --> 0:14:21.920
<v Speaker 1>I should be it. I mean I shouldn't be, because

0:14:22.000 --> 0:14:23.920
<v Speaker 1>I mean all aspects of that.

0:14:24.000 --> 0:14:27.520
<v Speaker 2>Job, you'd probably be slightly better than that twenty three

0:14:27.600 --> 0:14:27.960
<v Speaker 2>year old.

0:14:30.400 --> 0:14:32.640
<v Speaker 1>That's truly, that's right, because like, ultimately the job is

0:14:32.680 --> 0:14:35.680
<v Speaker 1>to like appeal to Mark zucker work that maybe he

0:14:35.760 --> 0:14:38.360
<v Speaker 1>likes the twenty three year old. That's right, like an agent.

0:14:38.640 --> 0:14:41.560
<v Speaker 2>It's not even like cold calling. Your only call is

0:14:41.600 --> 0:14:44.000
<v Speaker 2>to Mark Zuckerberg and trying to write.

0:14:43.760 --> 0:14:47.240
<v Speaker 1>It's it's just a degenerate market. It's not like it's

0:14:47.280 --> 0:14:49.120
<v Speaker 1>not like, oh, this is what all the rates are.

0:14:49.160 --> 0:14:50.240
<v Speaker 1>It's like that this is Mark.

0:14:50.760 --> 0:14:54.680
<v Speaker 2>It is funny that the Wall Street Journal article mentioned

0:14:54.680 --> 0:14:58.760
<v Speaker 2>that their business is dependent on the scale and proliferation

0:14:58.880 --> 0:15:01.720
<v Speaker 2>of multi manager head funds and could dry up if

0:15:01.800 --> 0:15:04.680
<v Speaker 2>funds suffer a run of poor performance or redemptions. And

0:15:04.680 --> 0:15:08.240
<v Speaker 2>of course we're talking about the death spiral of Isler,

0:15:08.600 --> 0:15:12.360
<v Speaker 2>and it's almost similar to the AI researcher. You know,

0:15:12.400 --> 0:15:16.240
<v Speaker 2>you're calling up Mark Zuckerberg, or you're calling up is

0:15:16.280 --> 0:15:20.600
<v Speaker 2>the Englander or Ken Griffin. It's a slightly bigger pool.

0:15:20.720 --> 0:15:24.200
<v Speaker 1>Obviously, it's an interesting question. Like this world that we

0:15:24.240 --> 0:15:26.680
<v Speaker 1>live in of these like mult these strategy pod shops

0:15:26.720 --> 0:15:28.360
<v Speaker 1>paying a lot of money and sort of dominating the

0:15:28.360 --> 0:15:32.320
<v Speaker 1>hedgeh on space is relatively new world, and right, it's

0:15:32.360 --> 0:15:35.000
<v Speaker 1>possible that it's a blip and all this will dry

0:15:35.080 --> 0:15:37.120
<v Speaker 1>up and something new will replace it. But it does

0:15:37.200 --> 0:15:41.080
<v Speaker 1>kind of feel like, this is the correct organizing model

0:15:41.160 --> 0:15:43.560
<v Speaker 1>for the hedgehund world, where you have like these big

0:15:43.600 --> 0:15:49.000
<v Speaker 1>institutions that can allocate a lot of capital to investors

0:15:49.160 --> 0:15:54.280
<v Speaker 1>and measure their skill really carefully and maximize the fees

0:15:54.360 --> 0:15:56.960
<v Speaker 1>they can charge their limited partners. It feels like it's

0:15:57.000 --> 0:16:00.720
<v Speaker 1>a sort of correct and efficient organization of the industry.

0:16:00.920 --> 0:16:04.160
<v Speaker 1>And in that correct and efficient world, like agents will thrive.

0:16:04.400 --> 0:16:07.320
<v Speaker 1>Right if like all these multimager funds blew up and

0:16:07.360 --> 0:16:10.120
<v Speaker 1>we went back to a world of like single manager

0:16:10.160 --> 0:16:12.240
<v Speaker 1>funds with the manager's name on the door, then you

0:16:12.280 --> 0:16:14.160
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't need an agent, right, Yeah, it could be a

0:16:14.160 --> 0:16:17.680
<v Speaker 1>different thing, Like you'd be these headshend managers would need

0:16:18.320 --> 0:16:20.840
<v Speaker 1>capital introduction, right, they'd need like to meet with LP's,

0:16:20.880 --> 0:16:23.440
<v Speaker 1>but they wouldn't need to get hired by big firms.

0:16:23.960 --> 0:16:27.680
<v Speaker 1>But I think the world we live in now where

0:16:28.000 --> 0:16:31.320
<v Speaker 1>the big firms hire the portfolio manager feels kind of robust.

0:16:31.480 --> 0:16:33.880
<v Speaker 1>It's not like just an accident that it's organized that way.

0:16:34.080 --> 0:16:37.640
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. No, it feels like it's a ripe space for

0:16:39.040 --> 0:16:41.800
<v Speaker 2>agents to be in. And I'm kind of surprised that

0:16:42.960 --> 0:16:47.880
<v Speaker 2>this is the first recruiters. Yeah, that's true. Well, it's

0:16:47.880 --> 0:16:49.600
<v Speaker 2>cool that you know, he struck out on his own

0:16:49.640 --> 0:16:52.960
<v Speaker 2>and stalled himself as an agent versus just another headhunter.

0:16:53.440 --> 0:16:55.840
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I mean you see the appeal of a headhunter,

0:16:55.880 --> 0:16:57.760
<v Speaker 1>which is the headhunter cold calls you at your current

0:16:57.840 --> 0:16:59.240
<v Speaker 1>job and it's like, I'd like to get you a

0:16:59.280 --> 0:17:01.080
<v Speaker 1>new job where you get more money and I will

0:17:01.080 --> 0:17:03.240
<v Speaker 1>take zero percent of it. And this guy calls you,

0:17:03.280 --> 0:17:05.080
<v Speaker 1>he's like, I'll take a single digit percent of it.

0:17:05.720 --> 0:17:08.280
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. Well, apparently he's doing well. Yeah.

0:17:08.320 --> 0:17:11.000
<v Speaker 1>Well, the pitch if I will take a single digit

0:17:11.080 --> 0:17:15.159
<v Speaker 1>percent when the number is very large, is actually pretty appealing, right, Like,

0:17:15.160 --> 0:17:17.040
<v Speaker 1>I'll negotiat on your behalf. I'll work for you, not

0:17:17.080 --> 0:17:18.560
<v Speaker 1>for the hedge fund. Like, I don't know, that's an

0:17:18.560 --> 0:17:20.720
<v Speaker 1>appealing pitch if the numbers are large enough.

0:17:20.880 --> 0:17:23.960
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. Also single digit not bad.

0:17:24.200 --> 0:17:24.680
<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

0:17:24.720 --> 0:17:28.000
<v Speaker 2>So he founded this shop. According to LinkedIn and this

0:17:28.160 --> 0:17:32.800
<v Speaker 2>article a year ago October twenty twenty four, he's helped

0:17:32.880 --> 0:17:36.639
<v Speaker 2>twelve clients land jobs in deals worth a combined one

0:17:36.720 --> 0:17:40.320
<v Speaker 2>hundred and eighty million dollars since launching. So it's so

0:17:40.440 --> 0:17:40.760
<v Speaker 2>not the.

0:17:40.680 --> 0:17:42.919
<v Speaker 1>Top of the top end where like individual deals are

0:17:42.960 --> 0:17:45.200
<v Speaker 1>fifty or one hundred million dollars, but like pretty good.

0:17:45.200 --> 0:17:47.240
<v Speaker 1>Pretty good. It's like fifteen million average time, and.

0:17:47.240 --> 0:17:50.080
<v Speaker 2>Maybe those people will you know, their next jobs will

0:17:50.200 --> 0:18:12.800
<v Speaker 2>be bigger. Yeah, good, onya Ryan Walsh, I love football,

0:18:13.359 --> 0:18:17.880
<v Speaker 2>and so do folks on the prediction market that is Calcie.

0:18:18.600 --> 0:18:22.960
<v Speaker 1>I do love that CALSHI, which is simultaneously a sports

0:18:22.960 --> 0:18:25.880
<v Speaker 1>book and not a sports book. The advertising you need

0:18:25.880 --> 0:18:31.000
<v Speaker 1>to there simultaneously a sports book and not a sports book. Yeah,

0:18:31.080 --> 0:18:34.120
<v Speaker 1>they like advertise on Instagram like, you know, the only

0:18:34.240 --> 0:18:37.919
<v Speaker 1>legal sports gambling in all fifty states, and then they're like,

0:18:37.960 --> 0:18:41.240
<v Speaker 1>we don't do gambling. This has nothing to do with gambling.

0:18:41.480 --> 0:18:41.720
<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

0:18:41.840 --> 0:18:43.960
<v Speaker 1>The other thing that makes them unlike a sports book

0:18:44.400 --> 0:18:48.639
<v Speaker 1>is that they don't license like the NFL's trademarks. So like,

0:18:48.720 --> 0:18:50.800
<v Speaker 1>you can bet on the Super Bowl, but it's called

0:18:50.840 --> 0:18:52.200
<v Speaker 1>the Pro Football.

0:18:51.880 --> 0:18:55.679
<v Speaker 2>Championship Big Game. They can call the Big Game the.

0:18:55.680 --> 0:18:57.399
<v Speaker 1>Big Game is controversial. I think it's some point the

0:18:57.480 --> 0:19:01.639
<v Speaker 1>NFL tried to trademark. It's great. In any case, CALSHI

0:19:01.680 --> 0:19:04.120
<v Speaker 1>will allow you to bet on the pro football competitions.

0:19:04.400 --> 0:19:06.480
<v Speaker 1>And the latest news in CALSHI is that they are

0:19:06.520 --> 0:19:10.320
<v Speaker 1>now offering same game parlays. We talked about this on

0:19:10.359 --> 0:19:12.480
<v Speaker 1>the mailbag off so prediction markets come out of this

0:19:12.560 --> 0:19:15.120
<v Speaker 1>like high minded idea of like, we're going to have

0:19:16.160 --> 0:19:21.880
<v Speaker 1>these prediction markets that produce information about geopolitically important events. Right,

0:19:22.000 --> 0:19:24.439
<v Speaker 1>We're going to allow people to predict events. That's going

0:19:24.520 --> 0:19:26.879
<v Speaker 1>to provide more information for the market, and it's going

0:19:26.920 --> 0:19:28.199
<v Speaker 1>to be great, and it's going to allow people to

0:19:28.240 --> 0:19:30.040
<v Speaker 1>hedge the results of elections, right.

0:19:30.200 --> 0:19:30.720
<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

0:19:30.760 --> 0:19:32.919
<v Speaker 1>And it turns out that the demand for that is

0:19:33.440 --> 0:19:35.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, like every four years you want to bet

0:19:35.200 --> 0:19:38.080
<v Speaker 1>on a presidential election, but otherwise it's just not that hot.

0:19:38.359 --> 0:19:41.400
<v Speaker 2>The Olympics. Yeah, you care about track and field once

0:19:41.440 --> 0:19:43.440
<v Speaker 2>every four years and then you move on unless.

0:19:43.160 --> 0:19:47.280
<v Speaker 1>You're kidding Greyfeld, but all dresslage and track and field that.

0:19:47.240 --> 0:19:49.200
<v Speaker 2>You're at esoteric sports.

0:19:49.520 --> 0:19:53.679
<v Speaker 1>But it turns out that when you have a prediction market,

0:19:53.720 --> 0:19:56.240
<v Speaker 1>one thing people like to predict is sporting events, and

0:19:56.280 --> 0:19:59.600
<v Speaker 1>those happen all the time, and people are really addicted

0:19:59.680 --> 0:20:02.000
<v Speaker 1>gambler who put a lot of money into predicting sporting events.

0:20:02.320 --> 0:20:04.040
<v Speaker 1>And so if you can have your prediction market predict

0:20:04.080 --> 0:20:08.320
<v Speaker 1>suporting events, then that's a big business. And everybody thought

0:20:08.840 --> 0:20:13.680
<v Speaker 1>all of the time until this January that that would

0:20:13.680 --> 0:20:17.960
<v Speaker 1>be crazy. And then obviously you couldn't have sports gambling

0:20:17.960 --> 0:20:21.240
<v Speaker 1>in your prediction market, but now you can. So now

0:20:21.359 --> 0:20:25.960
<v Speaker 1>CALSI does. And we've talked about like the regulatory drama

0:20:26.000 --> 0:20:28.400
<v Speaker 1>where like the States all try to stop them from

0:20:28.400 --> 0:20:31.320
<v Speaker 1>doing this, but cal she has so far succeeded in

0:20:31.480 --> 0:20:33.639
<v Speaker 1>telling the States to buzz off. But anyway, so now

0:20:33.640 --> 0:20:35.960
<v Speaker 1>they're offering same game parlay as everyone who talks about

0:20:35.960 --> 0:20:38.800
<v Speaker 1>this sounds insane, right, So like Robinhood is like we're

0:20:38.800 --> 0:20:44.679
<v Speaker 1>democratizing access to emerging asset classes like sports predictions. But

0:20:44.760 --> 0:20:48.680
<v Speaker 1>it's like the emerging asset class here is same game parlays,

0:20:48.840 --> 0:20:54.600
<v Speaker 1>which is just like a product for gamblers, like no

0:20:55.160 --> 0:20:58.679
<v Speaker 1>socially beneficial information is created by people betting on like

0:20:58.720 --> 0:21:01.399
<v Speaker 1>the joint odds of like a football team winning and

0:21:01.480 --> 0:21:03.800
<v Speaker 1>hitting the over and like someone scoring a touchdown. To

0:21:03.880 --> 0:21:08.080
<v Speaker 1>self certify these contracts to like allow CALCI to do this,

0:21:08.320 --> 0:21:10.280
<v Speaker 1>they don't have to get approval from the CFTC, but

0:21:10.359 --> 0:21:12.360
<v Speaker 1>they have to like file a form with the CFTC

0:21:12.520 --> 0:21:15.400
<v Speaker 1>being like we're doing this, and with the forum they

0:21:15.400 --> 0:21:17.800
<v Speaker 1>have to say what the purpose of it is, like

0:21:17.800 --> 0:21:20.439
<v Speaker 1>with the hedging or like price discovery, purpose of it

0:21:20.520 --> 0:21:23.480
<v Speaker 1>is They don't have to publish that, so they've confidentially

0:21:23.520 --> 0:21:27.439
<v Speaker 1>told the CFTC like, yeah, someone somewhere is hedging some

0:21:27.560 --> 0:21:30.840
<v Speaker 1>economic risk by betting same game parlay as in a

0:21:30.840 --> 0:21:33.520
<v Speaker 1>football game, but seems like a pretty marginal use.

0:21:33.720 --> 0:21:35.560
<v Speaker 2>There's like certain people in the world that I want

0:21:35.600 --> 0:21:38.199
<v Speaker 2>to sit down with and like give them truths hereum

0:21:38.680 --> 0:21:42.679
<v Speaker 2>and ask them specific questions. And one of those people

0:21:43.359 --> 0:21:47.320
<v Speaker 2>is probably Vlad ten Of, and I want him, under

0:21:47.560 --> 0:21:50.720
<v Speaker 2>truths herem to tell me, like, what do you truly

0:21:50.840 --> 0:21:55.080
<v Speaker 2>see in this prediction market that's different from just sports

0:21:55.119 --> 0:21:58.159
<v Speaker 2>gambling or the founders of CALCI. Those are questions that

0:21:58.320 --> 0:22:01.160
<v Speaker 2>I would like to I know, but we can't give

0:22:01.160 --> 0:22:02.040
<v Speaker 2>them truths here.

0:22:03.240 --> 0:22:04.399
<v Speaker 1>They'd be pretty honest about it.

0:22:04.480 --> 0:22:07.000
<v Speaker 2>But I want to know if they truly truly believe

0:22:07.920 --> 0:22:12.440
<v Speaker 2>that there is a real substantial difference between a prediction

0:22:12.560 --> 0:22:17.399
<v Speaker 2>market where you can offer single game parlays versus just

0:22:17.440 --> 0:22:23.600
<v Speaker 2>sports betting. Okay one, no, yeah, two, But I know

0:22:23.680 --> 0:22:24.880
<v Speaker 2>that you think that too.

0:22:25.280 --> 0:22:28.000
<v Speaker 1>I think then what people have historically said about this

0:22:29.600 --> 0:22:34.560
<v Speaker 1>is that there's a big difference between sports books and

0:22:34.640 --> 0:22:37.800
<v Speaker 1>prediction markets, and that difference is that a sports book

0:22:37.880 --> 0:22:39.920
<v Speaker 1>is on the other side of the bet from you, right,

0:22:39.960 --> 0:22:43.320
<v Speaker 1>and a prediction market is just a platform where people

0:22:43.359 --> 0:22:44.320
<v Speaker 1>can bet against each.

0:22:44.160 --> 0:22:45.600
<v Speaker 2>Other, faceless, emotionless.

0:22:45.720 --> 0:22:48.040
<v Speaker 1>No, it's not faceless, motionless. It's a peer to peer platform.

0:22:48.080 --> 0:22:50.720
<v Speaker 1>It's a place where I want to predict that the

0:22:50.760 --> 0:22:53.160
<v Speaker 1>Bills will win. You want to predict the Patriots will win.

0:22:53.400 --> 0:22:57.080
<v Speaker 1>We bet against each other. Kelshi brings us together. They

0:22:57.080 --> 0:22:59.199
<v Speaker 1>provide a platform for us to bet, but they're not

0:22:59.240 --> 0:23:02.040
<v Speaker 1>the bookmaker, not setting the odds. They're not taking the

0:23:02.040 --> 0:23:04.800
<v Speaker 1>other side of it. They don't want you to lose.

0:23:05.280 --> 0:23:09.040
<v Speaker 1>They don't care. They're just like intermediate between people on

0:23:09.040 --> 0:23:10.640
<v Speaker 1>one side people on the other side. They don't want

0:23:10.640 --> 0:23:13.200
<v Speaker 1>anyone to lose. They're not trying to trick anyone. They're

0:23:13.200 --> 0:23:16.960
<v Speaker 1>not trying to limit winning betters. They're just bringing people together.

0:23:17.000 --> 0:23:19.879
<v Speaker 1>Whereas a sports book is betting against you, so they

0:23:19.920 --> 0:23:21.879
<v Speaker 1>want you to lose. They want you to bet a

0:23:21.920 --> 0:23:24.880
<v Speaker 1>lot of money and lose, and if you bet and win,

0:23:25.240 --> 0:23:27.320
<v Speaker 1>they will limit you so that you can't win too

0:23:27.400 --> 0:23:29.200
<v Speaker 1>much money from them because they're taking the other side

0:23:29.200 --> 0:23:34.520
<v Speaker 1>of every bet. I've always found this distinction overstated because

0:23:34.560 --> 0:23:39.080
<v Speaker 1>like the way, for instance, robinhood works when you're traade

0:23:39.080 --> 0:23:43.120
<v Speaker 1>stocks is nominally like you can buy yourselves stocks, Robinhood

0:23:43.160 --> 0:23:44.600
<v Speaker 1>is not on the other side of you. But like

0:23:44.640 --> 0:23:47.240
<v Speaker 1>practically your orders are going to a market maker, right,

0:23:47.240 --> 0:23:50.199
<v Speaker 1>Like modern markets have market makers who are taking the

0:23:50.200 --> 0:23:53.800
<v Speaker 1>other side of you and they want, loosely speaking, to win.

0:23:55.240 --> 0:23:59.800
<v Speaker 1>And in prediction markets, it's a mixed bag. Like it

0:23:59.840 --> 0:24:04.240
<v Speaker 1>is clearly the case that like small dollar prediction markets

0:24:04.720 --> 0:24:08.240
<v Speaker 1>on like local elections, like Jane Street is not taking

0:24:08.280 --> 0:24:10.000
<v Speaker 1>the other side of your bet on that right, like

0:24:10.320 --> 0:24:12.320
<v Speaker 1>they're clearly they really are a peer to peer, right,

0:24:12.480 --> 0:24:14.520
<v Speaker 1>like some people are more professional than others, some people

0:24:14.600 --> 0:24:17.600
<v Speaker 1>have more capital than others, but like, ultimately their prediction

0:24:17.720 --> 0:24:20.040
<v Speaker 1>market is a is just a platform for people to

0:24:20.040 --> 0:24:23.800
<v Speaker 1>bet against each other with sports, It's not clear that's true, right,

0:24:23.840 --> 0:24:26.320
<v Speaker 1>Like you have like some of the big market makers,

0:24:26.320 --> 0:24:29.360
<v Speaker 1>Susqueahanna has a big sports betting business. Now the big

0:24:29.400 --> 0:24:32.320
<v Speaker 1>market makers will like support sportsbooks or trade on sportsbooks,

0:24:32.880 --> 0:24:36.400
<v Speaker 1>and like, it seems clear that some big market makers,

0:24:36.720 --> 0:24:39.159
<v Speaker 1>you know, if there's a big enough demand to trade

0:24:39.200 --> 0:24:42.399
<v Speaker 1>sports bets on prediction markets, they'll be on the other

0:24:42.440 --> 0:24:43.399
<v Speaker 1>side of the sports bets.

0:24:43.800 --> 0:24:43.960
<v Speaker 2>Right.

0:24:44.040 --> 0:24:45.640
<v Speaker 1>So again, there's a market you can take either side,

0:24:45.640 --> 0:24:47.880
<v Speaker 1>but like a market maker will sit in between and

0:24:48.359 --> 0:24:49.920
<v Speaker 1>try to take the winning side of the bet right.

0:24:49.960 --> 0:24:52.280
<v Speaker 1>And this is especially true with parlays because like the

0:24:52.280 --> 0:24:55.240
<v Speaker 1>way a parlay works is like there's no natural person

0:24:55.280 --> 0:24:57.679
<v Speaker 1>on the other side. Like if I pick, like, here

0:24:57.680 --> 0:24:59.320
<v Speaker 1>are the six things that I think will happen in

0:24:59.359 --> 0:25:02.679
<v Speaker 1>this football game, and if I hit all of them correct,

0:25:02.720 --> 0:25:04.560
<v Speaker 1>I win a lot of money, and if I miss

0:25:04.600 --> 0:25:07.560
<v Speaker 1>even one, I get nothing. Like no one, no person

0:25:07.920 --> 0:25:10.439
<v Speaker 1>is taking the other side of that, no individual retail

0:25:10.440 --> 0:25:13.040
<v Speaker 1>gambler is like I want to predict that one of

0:25:13.040 --> 0:25:14.879
<v Speaker 1>these six things will not come true, and if they

0:25:14.920 --> 0:25:16.679
<v Speaker 1>all come true, I'll pay a lot of money, and

0:25:16.720 --> 0:25:18.440
<v Speaker 1>if none come true, then I'll make a little money.

0:25:18.480 --> 0:25:21.080
<v Speaker 1>Like it's not a retail gambling bet. The person on

0:25:21.080 --> 0:25:23.119
<v Speaker 1>the other side of the parlay has to be a

0:25:23.160 --> 0:25:25.840
<v Speaker 1>market maker. And it's like not entirely clear exactly what

0:25:25.880 --> 0:25:28.280
<v Speaker 1>the mechanics are, but like it seems like the mechanics

0:25:28.320 --> 0:25:30.719
<v Speaker 1>are Like there's a market maker with a pricing model,

0:25:31.000 --> 0:25:34.680
<v Speaker 1>and like, if you pick up parlay, you can get

0:25:34.680 --> 0:25:36.439
<v Speaker 1>it sent to the market maker, who will fill it

0:25:36.480 --> 0:25:39.399
<v Speaker 1>for you at like a price that the market maker

0:25:39.440 --> 0:25:44.480
<v Speaker 1>sets and So that's different from everything else on Calshi. Right,

0:25:44.520 --> 0:25:47.439
<v Speaker 1>It's different from the story of like we're just a

0:25:47.480 --> 0:25:49.840
<v Speaker 1>neutral platform where people could try it. This is clearly

0:25:49.840 --> 0:25:52.160
<v Speaker 1>a story of like you are trading with a market maker.

0:25:52.200 --> 0:25:55.119
<v Speaker 1>It's not Calhi. Calshy isn't directly bidding against you, but

0:25:55.200 --> 0:25:58.000
<v Speaker 1>someone is directly betting against you. Who has partnered with

0:25:58.040 --> 0:26:01.280
<v Speaker 1>Calshi to provide this service? Yeah, or maybe it's more

0:26:01.280 --> 0:26:03.399
<v Speaker 1>than one somebody. Right, there were a bunch of market

0:26:03.400 --> 0:26:06.200
<v Speaker 1>makers who are providing the prices. But that's like pretty

0:26:06.240 --> 0:26:10.159
<v Speaker 1>different and like much much much, much much closer, not

0:26:10.200 --> 0:26:12.560
<v Speaker 1>only in the product, but in like the structure to

0:26:13.400 --> 0:26:14.400
<v Speaker 1>traditional sports betting.

0:26:14.520 --> 0:26:18.160
<v Speaker 2>So I see how obviously from the perspective of Calshi,

0:26:18.760 --> 0:26:21.800
<v Speaker 2>that is a really substantial and meaningful difference.

0:26:22.200 --> 0:26:24.280
<v Speaker 1>But I'm saying they're getting rid of that difference by

0:26:24.400 --> 0:26:25.240
<v Speaker 1>doing the parlays.

0:26:25.440 --> 0:26:27.439
<v Speaker 2>Well, I was going to say, like, if I'm an

0:26:27.480 --> 0:26:31.400
<v Speaker 2>investor or a better a trader on Calshi versus a

0:26:31.480 --> 0:26:35.919
<v Speaker 2>gambler on fan duel, like, is my experience any different?

0:26:37.080 --> 0:26:38.639
<v Speaker 1>Uh?

0:26:39.160 --> 0:26:39.679
<v Speaker 2>Probably not?

0:26:40.080 --> 0:26:42.640
<v Speaker 1>Well, it's different in various ways. The news this week

0:26:42.680 --> 0:26:45.080
<v Speaker 1>of Calshi offering parlay is like caused the big drop

0:26:45.119 --> 0:26:47.159
<v Speaker 1>in the stocks of the traditional sports books. Yeah, they

0:26:47.200 --> 0:26:49.919
<v Speaker 1>both went down like ten percent, like Vando and Flutter,

0:26:50.240 --> 0:26:53.119
<v Speaker 1>But Calshi is still like a teeny tiny fraction of

0:26:53.160 --> 0:26:55.680
<v Speaker 1>the size of them, because like they offer more bets

0:26:55.680 --> 0:26:58.119
<v Speaker 1>and a better user experience and everything. But like that's

0:26:58.680 --> 0:27:02.080
<v Speaker 1>that's converging. But is your experience different? Yeah, Like I mean,

0:27:02.080 --> 0:27:04.320
<v Speaker 1>like the buttons you push and like the sort of

0:27:04.840 --> 0:27:07.920
<v Speaker 1>layout of the thing is different. But like I don't

0:27:07.960 --> 0:27:10.040
<v Speaker 1>know how big a difference it is that they're a

0:27:10.080 --> 0:27:13.480
<v Speaker 1>platform and other places are sports books, because I do

0:27:13.520 --> 0:27:15.879
<v Speaker 1>think that like in either case you're kind of facing

0:27:16.320 --> 0:27:22.600
<v Speaker 1>ultimately some algorithmic price center, some professional who sets the

0:27:23.000 --> 0:27:27.160
<v Speaker 1>prices and tries to tries to set the market the prices,

0:27:27.160 --> 0:27:28.800
<v Speaker 1>so that like the market is just like any other

0:27:28.840 --> 0:27:32.959
<v Speaker 1>market maker. Like you want to have a relatively balanced book, right,

0:27:33.000 --> 0:27:35.560
<v Speaker 1>you don't want to be facing a huge risk of

0:27:35.760 --> 0:27:37.480
<v Speaker 1>you know, you don't want to betting all on one

0:27:37.520 --> 0:27:39.040
<v Speaker 1>side so that if you lose, you lose a lot

0:27:39.040 --> 0:27:42.000
<v Speaker 1>of money. But like you take some risk. You're not

0:27:42.000 --> 0:27:44.600
<v Speaker 1>looking for a perfectly balanced book, right, You're like looking

0:27:44.640 --> 0:27:47.199
<v Speaker 1>to have some bets where you think the odds are

0:27:47.200 --> 0:27:47.680
<v Speaker 1>in your paper.

0:27:47.960 --> 0:27:50.840
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, the fact that you did have those shares drop

0:27:51.480 --> 0:27:55.560
<v Speaker 2>meant that sell side analysts had to react to the news,

0:27:55.800 --> 0:27:59.000
<v Speaker 2>and there was an article by the Wall Street Journal

0:27:59.320 --> 0:28:02.760
<v Speaker 2>quoting this Benchmark analyst Mike Hickey, who made the same

0:28:02.800 --> 0:28:06.080
<v Speaker 2>point that this is small. Until its scales or becomes

0:28:06.119 --> 0:28:09.159
<v Speaker 2>more robust, it doesn't appear competitive, and it seems like

0:28:09.240 --> 0:28:13.080
<v Speaker 2>DraftKings and fan duels still have an edge. He also

0:28:13.119 --> 0:28:17.040
<v Speaker 2>mentioned that the strategy by Calshie to make themselves look

0:28:17.400 --> 0:28:19.919
<v Speaker 2>just like a sports book certainly comes with some risks,

0:28:20.480 --> 0:28:22.679
<v Speaker 2>which is interesting. I mean, you made the point that

0:28:23.240 --> 0:28:26.280
<v Speaker 2>there's all this legal drama, but then the calendar flipped

0:28:26.280 --> 0:28:28.720
<v Speaker 2>and it was January of this year and now you're

0:28:28.720 --> 0:28:29.879
<v Speaker 2>in Trump's America.

0:28:30.000 --> 0:28:31.480
<v Speaker 1>Yeah. I don't think they think it comes with that

0:28:31.600 --> 0:28:34.560
<v Speaker 1>much Rusk. Yeah, there's risk their court cases are still

0:28:34.600 --> 0:28:37.480
<v Speaker 1>on appeal, Like, there's still some risk that it will

0:28:37.520 --> 0:28:40.160
<v Speaker 1>turn out that they're subject to state gaming regulation and

0:28:40.160 --> 0:28:43.480
<v Speaker 1>then basically this kind of goes away. Yeah, like not entirely,

0:28:43.520 --> 0:28:46.240
<v Speaker 1>but it kind of goes away. But well, I think

0:28:46.280 --> 0:28:50.120
<v Speaker 1>they're very strongly betting on in Trump's CFTC, they can

0:28:50.160 --> 0:28:52.000
<v Speaker 1>do whatever they want and no one will stop them.

0:28:52.160 --> 0:28:56.960
<v Speaker 2>It's funny because DraftKings, the CEO apparently has specifically cited

0:28:57.000 --> 0:28:59.840
<v Speaker 2>Calshi's legal troubles as part of the reason why that

0:28:59.840 --> 0:29:03.080
<v Speaker 2>they they steered clear prediction markets. But I think they

0:29:03.080 --> 0:29:06.080
<v Speaker 2>should fight back. They should launch their own prediction markets

0:29:06.120 --> 0:29:08.520
<v Speaker 2>and go for it, or they should offer stock trading.

0:29:08.680 --> 0:29:12.560
<v Speaker 1>Why not offering stock trading is actually a separate set

0:29:12.600 --> 0:29:16.320
<v Speaker 1>of questions right where their prediction markets are are gambling.

0:29:16.680 --> 0:29:21.280
<v Speaker 1>I think if like Calshi ultimately ends up a really

0:29:21.280 --> 0:29:27.360
<v Speaker 1>big competitor to Fandel and DraftKings and the legal stuff

0:29:27.360 --> 0:29:29.520
<v Speaker 1>has all resolved in favor of like you can offer

0:29:29.560 --> 0:29:32.920
<v Speaker 1>whatever bets you want on a prediction market, then Calshi

0:29:32.960 --> 0:29:35.800
<v Speaker 1>has a huge advantage. They're legal in fifty states and

0:29:36.840 --> 0:29:38.360
<v Speaker 1>it's not free from that, but they seem to get

0:29:38.360 --> 0:29:41.120
<v Speaker 1>a better tax treatment and so there. Yeah, I think

0:29:41.200 --> 0:29:44.560
<v Speaker 1>Fandel and DraftKings flip into funding a prediction market, right.

0:29:44.960 --> 0:29:46.760
<v Speaker 1>I think it's hard, right they have to like register

0:29:46.800 --> 0:29:48.480
<v Speaker 1>at the CFTC, but it's like, yeah, there's a path

0:29:48.480 --> 0:29:48.959
<v Speaker 1>that's doing it.

0:29:49.040 --> 0:29:51.000
<v Speaker 2>Fandil did it and apparently sort.

0:29:50.760 --> 0:29:53.120
<v Speaker 1>Of then they partnered with CME for like, yeah.

0:29:53.120 --> 0:29:57.640
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I've written go on.

0:29:57.840 --> 0:30:01.040
<v Speaker 1>This will be of interest. Yeah. Within the next two years,

0:30:01.080 --> 0:30:06.280
<v Speaker 1>we're going to see a football dot ETF You're right,

0:30:06.320 --> 0:30:13.600
<v Speaker 1>I commended here. Yeah, and that was the Money Stuff Podcast.

0:30:13.880 --> 0:30:15.960
<v Speaker 2>I'm Matt Levine and I'm Katie Greifeld.

0:30:16.200 --> 0:30:18.360
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0:30:20.160 --> 0:30:22.920
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0:30:40.320 --> 0:30:43.360
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0:30:43.480 --> 0:30:46.560
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0:30:46.880 --> 0:30:49.200
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