1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:25,560 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:25,640 --> 00:00:28,400 Speaker 1: My name is Matt. Our colleague Noal will be returning shortly, 6 00:00:28,640 --> 00:00:31,280 Speaker 1: they called me Ben. We're joined as always with our 7 00:00:31,400 --> 00:00:36,199 Speaker 1: super producer Paul. Mission controlled decands. Most importantly, you are you, 8 00:00:36,200 --> 00:00:39,360 Speaker 1: You are here, and that makes this the stuff they 9 00:00:39,479 --> 00:00:43,880 Speaker 1: don't want you to know. This is a free show. Uh. 10 00:00:43,920 --> 00:00:46,800 Speaker 1: This some of the topics we cover not appropriate for 11 00:00:46,840 --> 00:00:50,960 Speaker 1: all ages. But importantly we don't ask for I D. 12 00:00:51,640 --> 00:00:55,279 Speaker 1: You don't need to present any paperwork to us uh 13 00:00:55,400 --> 00:01:00,000 Speaker 1: to hang out with us on the show. But you know, Matt, 14 00:01:00,400 --> 00:01:03,080 Speaker 1: I were talking about today's topic a little bit off 15 00:01:03,120 --> 00:01:07,520 Speaker 1: air earlier, and I forgot to ask you, Matt, did 16 00:01:07,560 --> 00:01:11,440 Speaker 1: you what's the weirdest form of I D you've ever had? 17 00:01:11,520 --> 00:01:14,479 Speaker 1: Or what's the weirdest thing, if not you, that you've 18 00:01:14,520 --> 00:01:16,800 Speaker 1: seen someone else try to use his I D. Oh 19 00:01:16,920 --> 00:01:20,840 Speaker 1: that's a good question. I just I'm rewatching Utopia, the 20 00:01:21,080 --> 00:01:25,240 Speaker 1: remake of the British version for US television on Amazon 21 00:01:25,800 --> 00:01:28,200 Speaker 1: and the weirdest form of i D in there is 22 00:01:28,480 --> 00:01:33,200 Speaker 1: like a a little name tag uh for like some 23 00:01:33,280 --> 00:01:35,880 Speaker 1: kind of get together at a con like a festival, 24 00:01:36,200 --> 00:01:39,520 Speaker 1: And it's just a kid who scrawled his name on it, 25 00:01:40,160 --> 00:01:42,360 Speaker 1: uh and it was accepted. He got the room key 26 00:01:42,880 --> 00:01:47,080 Speaker 1: and let him down the path. Um. So for me, 27 00:01:47,120 --> 00:01:49,360 Speaker 1: it's always just been a driver's license. Really, that's the 28 00:01:49,400 --> 00:01:52,920 Speaker 1: only thing I've ever had outside of like a campus 29 00:01:52,960 --> 00:01:56,440 Speaker 1: I D for a college campus. I D. Yeah, people 30 00:01:56,480 --> 00:02:00,560 Speaker 1: still use that for discounts at movie theaters and so on. 31 00:02:00,600 --> 00:02:03,920 Speaker 1: In the US, a lot of people use passports. I've 32 00:02:04,040 --> 00:02:08,239 Speaker 1: used the passport for I D multiple times. Um, I've 33 00:02:08,280 --> 00:02:12,440 Speaker 1: seen some things that didn't work. I remember seeing a 34 00:02:12,560 --> 00:02:17,680 Speaker 1: very inebriated man many years ago who was visibly upset 35 00:02:17,919 --> 00:02:23,720 Speaker 1: that neither his fishing license nor true story his Blockbuster 36 00:02:23,800 --> 00:02:27,480 Speaker 1: card would be accepted as the I D at the 37 00:02:27,520 --> 00:02:30,639 Speaker 1: door of the bar. Um. And if you're hearing this, man, 38 00:02:30,840 --> 00:02:34,240 Speaker 1: I hope you found your license. But that was that 39 00:02:34,360 --> 00:02:36,960 Speaker 1: was like more than a decade ago, so it was 40 00:02:37,120 --> 00:02:41,799 Speaker 1: very very strange situation. But we know people need I D. Right, 41 00:02:42,080 --> 00:02:44,720 Speaker 1: how else can you know someone is who they say 42 00:02:44,800 --> 00:02:49,640 Speaker 1: they are. I think most people on the planet agree that, Like, 43 00:02:49,800 --> 00:02:52,280 Speaker 1: even if you are very very far right, you're very 44 00:02:52,360 --> 00:02:54,840 Speaker 1: very far left. One thing you can agree on is 45 00:02:54,880 --> 00:02:58,920 Speaker 1: that certain activities should at least be age restricted. And 46 00:02:58,960 --> 00:03:02,520 Speaker 1: that's a big role, uh that our I D system 47 00:03:02,520 --> 00:03:06,040 Speaker 1: in the US plays. You wouldn't, for example, one a 48 00:03:06,120 --> 00:03:09,200 Speaker 1: six year old raging at a KEG party. You also 49 00:03:09,200 --> 00:03:12,480 Speaker 1: probably wouldn't want that same six year old hot rotting 50 00:03:12,520 --> 00:03:15,400 Speaker 1: down the interstate on a Porsche or flying a plane. 51 00:03:15,440 --> 00:03:19,160 Speaker 1: That's why we have driver's licenses, pilot licenses, things like that. 52 00:03:19,720 --> 00:03:24,240 Speaker 1: Although they are just meant to say that you are 53 00:03:24,360 --> 00:03:28,160 Speaker 1: legally allowed to operate a vehicle of one sort or another, 54 00:03:28,480 --> 00:03:31,600 Speaker 1: because America has such a huge car culture, they function 55 00:03:31,800 --> 00:03:34,280 Speaker 1: as I D s. That's I mean, Matt, that's a 56 00:03:34,360 --> 00:03:38,840 Speaker 1: question I had when um it comes up cyclically every 57 00:03:38,880 --> 00:03:42,400 Speaker 1: time there's an election, someone will start saying what we 58 00:03:42,480 --> 00:03:46,640 Speaker 1: need is a voter I D card or something like that, Right, 59 00:03:46,760 --> 00:03:49,600 Speaker 1: and yeah, And there's a solid argument to be made 60 00:03:49,640 --> 00:03:52,200 Speaker 1: that those claims are not made in good faith. I 61 00:03:52,240 --> 00:03:55,440 Speaker 1: think the way they are instituted often runs the risk 62 00:03:55,520 --> 00:04:01,000 Speaker 1: of preventing people from voting instead of weeding out fraudulent votes. 63 00:04:01,120 --> 00:04:03,720 Speaker 1: But so we gotta we got a bunch of stuff, 64 00:04:03,880 --> 00:04:08,240 Speaker 1: you know, but not any national idea. Really. Yeah, as 65 00:04:08,280 --> 00:04:10,520 Speaker 1: of right now, we don't have a national idea here 66 00:04:10,520 --> 00:04:12,760 Speaker 1: in the States. And you know, we we sat at 67 00:04:12,800 --> 00:04:15,600 Speaker 1: the top of the primary reason to have that I 68 00:04:15,720 --> 00:04:17,479 Speaker 1: d or to have it function in the way that 69 00:04:17,520 --> 00:04:19,840 Speaker 1: it does here in the US, the driver's license, I mean, 70 00:04:20,440 --> 00:04:24,280 Speaker 1: is because it contains on it a certain amount of 71 00:04:24,400 --> 00:04:29,039 Speaker 1: private information, your private information, and it is controlled by 72 00:04:29,279 --> 00:04:33,400 Speaker 1: some government entity, right or in this case, like Department 73 00:04:33,400 --> 00:04:35,680 Speaker 1: of Motor Vehicles within your state. It's controlled by that 74 00:04:36,160 --> 00:04:39,839 Speaker 1: which is then in turn, uh ties to the federal government. 75 00:04:40,000 --> 00:04:42,560 Speaker 1: So it makes sense why you would want something like that. 76 00:04:43,360 --> 00:04:46,479 Speaker 1: This whole episode, we're gonna be talking about the dangers 77 00:04:46,520 --> 00:04:50,080 Speaker 1: of having a physical thing like a card that has 78 00:04:50,200 --> 00:04:52,960 Speaker 1: lots of personal information on it and how that changes 79 00:04:53,000 --> 00:04:56,560 Speaker 1: when it becomes digitized. Right. Yeah, So a lot of 80 00:04:56,600 --> 00:05:01,279 Speaker 1: people in the US in particular, might have a driver's 81 00:05:01,360 --> 00:05:05,039 Speaker 1: license but might not even drive, you know, especially if 82 00:05:05,080 --> 00:05:07,000 Speaker 1: they live in a very crowded city, they might be 83 00:05:07,080 --> 00:05:10,200 Speaker 1: way more likely to pull that little card out when 84 00:05:10,240 --> 00:05:14,360 Speaker 1: they're trying to buy alcohol or tobacco, or certain medicines 85 00:05:14,480 --> 00:05:17,960 Speaker 1: or other age restricted products. That's why a lot of 86 00:05:18,000 --> 00:05:20,760 Speaker 1: people get a license or state idea in the first place. 87 00:05:21,200 --> 00:05:26,520 Speaker 1: But you brought up yeah, just to prove age. You 88 00:05:26,600 --> 00:05:31,000 Speaker 1: brought up an important point when you mentioned the move 89 00:05:31,320 --> 00:05:36,000 Speaker 1: to a digital sphere. The idea of a physical license 90 00:05:36,120 --> 00:05:39,560 Speaker 1: or i D might not be long for the world 91 00:05:39,760 --> 00:05:44,359 Speaker 1: in a very real way. Here are the facts first, okay, 92 00:05:44,400 --> 00:05:47,800 Speaker 1: concept of an idea identification document. Will just give you 93 00:05:47,839 --> 00:05:52,280 Speaker 1: some quick history. It's pretty old. One precursor to this 94 00:05:52,520 --> 00:05:59,440 Speaker 1: came up in nineteen century France. So Napoleon, remember that guy, 95 00:05:59,600 --> 00:06:03,000 Speaker 1: he was in Bill and ted Uh Napoleon. Napoleon wanted 96 00:06:03,040 --> 00:06:09,800 Speaker 1: to kind of streamline the French government after the revolution 97 00:06:09,960 --> 00:06:15,599 Speaker 1: between sev sev so he brought some clarity to property rights. 98 00:06:15,680 --> 00:06:18,320 Speaker 1: He made these new kind of organs of the state 99 00:06:18,400 --> 00:06:22,760 Speaker 1: bureaucratic offices, and they also introduced a system of i 100 00:06:22,960 --> 00:06:26,479 Speaker 1: D documents for workers. He did this in the early 101 00:06:26,560 --> 00:06:29,960 Speaker 1: eight hundred, eighteen o three, and eighteen o four. At first, 102 00:06:30,000 --> 00:06:33,799 Speaker 1: these things, these pass cards were just intended for people 103 00:06:33,839 --> 00:06:40,040 Speaker 1: in the working class. But these reforms inspired other countries 104 00:06:40,080 --> 00:06:43,640 Speaker 1: to follow suit. The streets, as they say, were watching 105 00:06:44,160 --> 00:06:49,240 Speaker 1: or Matt as you just pointed out, the streets around 106 00:06:49,279 --> 00:06:52,960 Speaker 1: my neighborhood are growling more often than not when we record. Uh, 107 00:06:53,040 --> 00:06:57,800 Speaker 1: let's talk a little bit about Sultan Mahmud the second. 108 00:06:58,440 --> 00:07:02,800 Speaker 1: He was pretty impressed with what Napoleon was doing, and 109 00:07:02,920 --> 00:07:05,960 Speaker 1: by eighteen thirty nine he thought, you know, these are 110 00:07:06,040 --> 00:07:09,640 Speaker 1: this is a great opportunity to build out state capabilities 111 00:07:09,640 --> 00:07:14,560 Speaker 1: through systems like this identification systems, And in eighteen forty 112 00:07:14,600 --> 00:07:19,240 Speaker 1: four he rolled out national ID cards in the Ottoman Empire. 113 00:07:19,640 --> 00:07:22,280 Speaker 1: So they're older than a lot of people might expect. 114 00:07:22,400 --> 00:07:29,520 Speaker 1: They were meant to consolidate state institutions, but also too, uh, 115 00:07:29,760 --> 00:07:33,760 Speaker 1: standardize the kind of information that was collected about people 116 00:07:34,160 --> 00:07:38,680 Speaker 1: and then use that information as a way to place 117 00:07:38,800 --> 00:07:44,240 Speaker 1: them in society, placed them in a social hierarchy. Originally 118 00:07:45,240 --> 00:07:48,720 Speaker 1: nineteen century like one of the predecessors of the modern 119 00:07:48,760 --> 00:07:51,200 Speaker 1: I D card also comes about in the eighteen hundreds. 120 00:07:51,720 --> 00:07:57,920 Speaker 1: It was originally made by police and experts in biometrics. 121 00:07:58,720 --> 00:08:02,560 Speaker 1: They this was a These I D cards were a 122 00:08:02,680 --> 00:08:06,600 Speaker 1: response really to a changing world. There was we're talking 123 00:08:06,600 --> 00:08:10,640 Speaker 1: about the Industrial age. People are moving around the world 124 00:08:10,680 --> 00:08:15,960 Speaker 1: at an unparalleled pace. Cities are becoming increasingly important, and 125 00:08:17,280 --> 00:08:20,400 Speaker 1: as the city's grow, so does their rate of crime. 126 00:08:21,120 --> 00:08:24,480 Speaker 1: It's so weird, but it makes sense. Their solution makes 127 00:08:24,480 --> 00:08:28,440 Speaker 1: sense at this point. It might surprise you. It definitely 128 00:08:28,440 --> 00:08:31,280 Speaker 1: surprised me, but it might surprise you. Fell a conspiracy 129 00:08:31,320 --> 00:08:35,360 Speaker 1: realists to learn that not many countries actually did adopt 130 00:08:35,800 --> 00:08:40,360 Speaker 1: some kind of national I D system until World War Two. 131 00:08:41,040 --> 00:08:44,640 Speaker 1: So the history is older, but like the new stuff 132 00:08:44,720 --> 00:08:47,240 Speaker 1: is is still pretty new. You know, well, it makes 133 00:08:47,280 --> 00:08:50,680 Speaker 1: an awful lot of sense that and there are more 134 00:08:50,720 --> 00:08:53,120 Speaker 1: than this. But two of the primary reasons that an 135 00:08:53,160 --> 00:08:56,719 Speaker 1: idea would be beneficial for a group would be if 136 00:08:56,760 --> 00:08:59,680 Speaker 1: it's a government and if there's some kind of state 137 00:09:00,000 --> 00:09:02,480 Speaker 1: an institution that needs to identify you to get you 138 00:09:02,520 --> 00:09:06,480 Speaker 1: either benefits or to impose taxes on you, right right, 139 00:09:06,559 --> 00:09:09,400 Speaker 1: That makes sense. The second and the second one is 140 00:09:09,440 --> 00:09:13,560 Speaker 1: if there is crime, and you know, you can't just 141 00:09:13,600 --> 00:09:15,720 Speaker 1: go around asking everybody, have you seen this person? They 142 00:09:15,760 --> 00:09:18,720 Speaker 1: look kind of like this, They were wearing this. Do 143 00:09:18,760 --> 00:09:21,960 Speaker 1: you have any idea who that person is? No? Okay, great, well, 144 00:09:22,880 --> 00:09:26,480 Speaker 1: I guess we're done here. Uh, crime not solved, Everybody 145 00:09:26,480 --> 00:09:28,920 Speaker 1: go home. You need to be able to prove someone 146 00:09:29,200 --> 00:09:33,400 Speaker 1: is who they are, especially if they're traveling across a country. 147 00:09:33,559 --> 00:09:36,880 Speaker 1: Or between countries. Makes total sense, but I just never 148 00:09:36,960 --> 00:09:40,800 Speaker 1: thought about it in those terms. Men. Yeah, agreed. And 149 00:09:40,960 --> 00:09:44,079 Speaker 1: you know, we're not saying that these things are not important. 150 00:09:44,480 --> 00:09:47,280 Speaker 1: We're we're not even saying that they're unnecessary. But we 151 00:09:47,320 --> 00:09:51,280 Speaker 1: have to set this up to understand the great controversy 152 00:09:51,440 --> 00:09:55,240 Speaker 1: and the great opportunity for conspiracy and corruption just on 153 00:09:55,280 --> 00:09:59,280 Speaker 1: the horizon, way closer than you might. You might think 154 00:09:59,360 --> 00:10:01,959 Speaker 1: that any of us would like to think. Like we said, 155 00:10:02,080 --> 00:10:05,400 Speaker 1: the US right now doesn't have a national I. D. Card. 156 00:10:06,040 --> 00:10:07,959 Speaker 1: We have a bunch of stuff that does what a 157 00:10:08,080 --> 00:10:12,160 Speaker 1: national ID card would do. Your driver's license comes from 158 00:10:12,160 --> 00:10:15,079 Speaker 1: your home state, right it doesn't come straight from d C. 159 00:10:15,679 --> 00:10:19,960 Speaker 1: Your Social Security card. This might surprise people. Your Social 160 00:10:20,000 --> 00:10:24,040 Speaker 1: Security card technically doesn't verify your identity. It was made 161 00:10:24,040 --> 00:10:28,360 Speaker 1: to help comply with payroll tax laws. That's why it's 162 00:10:28,520 --> 00:10:31,160 Speaker 1: uh so private companies when they ask you for the 163 00:10:31,200 --> 00:10:34,320 Speaker 1: last four digits of your Social Security number, that's just 164 00:10:34,360 --> 00:10:36,400 Speaker 1: the thing that they do, you know what I mean, 165 00:10:36,559 --> 00:10:39,840 Speaker 1: That's like that, that's just the way that they can, 166 00:10:41,240 --> 00:10:44,000 Speaker 1: They can, for their purposes, confirm you are who you 167 00:10:44,040 --> 00:10:47,040 Speaker 1: say you are, but still not the same as a 168 00:10:47,120 --> 00:10:51,520 Speaker 1: national I D there's no federal agency with nationwide jurisdiction. 169 00:10:52,000 --> 00:10:57,320 Speaker 1: There's like, there's no federal agency that is directly sending 170 00:10:57,600 --> 00:11:01,880 Speaker 1: I D documents to us it is ins and mandating 171 00:11:01,960 --> 00:11:04,200 Speaker 1: that they be used. You know, you can live your 172 00:11:04,240 --> 00:11:08,240 Speaker 1: whole life and never get a driver's license for instance. Yeah, 173 00:11:08,280 --> 00:11:12,520 Speaker 1: there's no federal Bureau of Identification yet. Really quickly taken 174 00:11:12,520 --> 00:11:14,600 Speaker 1: back to World War Two and the concept that many 175 00:11:14,640 --> 00:11:17,559 Speaker 1: countries didn't have some kind of national I D until 176 00:11:17,679 --> 00:11:20,720 Speaker 1: that time, untill after World War Two, that again makes 177 00:11:20,720 --> 00:11:22,880 Speaker 1: sense to me, but again I hadn't thought about it. 178 00:11:23,360 --> 00:11:27,679 Speaker 1: When you think about conscription and necessary conscription during a 179 00:11:27,720 --> 00:11:30,200 Speaker 1: world conflict like that, or a large enough conflict where 180 00:11:30,240 --> 00:11:33,040 Speaker 1: you have to get people of fighting age and you 181 00:11:33,080 --> 00:11:35,080 Speaker 1: have to identify who they are and get them into 182 00:11:35,120 --> 00:11:38,320 Speaker 1: the system as quickly as possible. Uh, it makes sense 183 00:11:38,320 --> 00:11:40,080 Speaker 1: that you if it were to happen again, you would 184 00:11:40,080 --> 00:11:43,000 Speaker 1: want to keep track of everybody who's around who could 185 00:11:43,000 --> 00:11:47,280 Speaker 1: potentially fight. Yeah. That is a huge piece of the 186 00:11:47,320 --> 00:11:50,760 Speaker 1: puzzle to write, because we have to remember conscript armies 187 00:11:51,520 --> 00:11:56,000 Speaker 1: were more prevalent than they are today. Uh, this is 188 00:11:56,000 --> 00:11:59,760 Speaker 1: strange the conversation about national I D today in the us. 189 00:12:00,520 --> 00:12:03,520 Speaker 1: It continues, It continues on a cyclical basis. You'll see 190 00:12:03,520 --> 00:12:07,600 Speaker 1: it come up in conversations almost any time there's an election, 191 00:12:08,040 --> 00:12:10,360 Speaker 1: and every so often you'll see a push for a 192 00:12:10,559 --> 00:12:16,280 Speaker 1: standardized national I D. Someone says, Okay, we can do this. 193 00:12:16,880 --> 00:12:20,839 Speaker 1: We're working smarter, we're making things simpler, and we're ultimately 194 00:12:20,920 --> 00:12:25,440 Speaker 1: going to be helping everybody. But every time so far 195 00:12:25,960 --> 00:12:30,000 Speaker 1: that legislation is proposed or floated, it fails. It has 196 00:12:30,040 --> 00:12:33,680 Speaker 1: not happened yet, and it's not one political party who's 197 00:12:33,679 --> 00:12:37,040 Speaker 1: against it. There are people on both sides of America's 198 00:12:37,080 --> 00:12:41,720 Speaker 1: great political divide that are concerned national ID cards are 199 00:12:41,880 --> 00:12:46,120 Speaker 1: a symptom of totalitarian societies and that they might pave 200 00:12:46,240 --> 00:12:51,880 Speaker 1: the way for a very undemocratic future. But this might 201 00:12:51,880 --> 00:12:55,120 Speaker 1: not be the case for much longer. I mean, imagine, okay, 202 00:12:55,200 --> 00:12:59,280 Speaker 1: let's say Matt and Mission Control and I go out 203 00:12:59,320 --> 00:13:01,720 Speaker 1: for a night on the town. What town are we 204 00:13:01,760 --> 00:13:05,920 Speaker 1: in that? What? What are we doing? We are in Boise, Idaho, Yeah, 205 00:13:05,960 --> 00:13:09,959 Speaker 1: we are. We're in Boise, Idaho, and we're partying. We're 206 00:13:10,000 --> 00:13:13,680 Speaker 1: gonna paint paint the Potato town red. And so we're 207 00:13:13,760 --> 00:13:18,880 Speaker 1: leaving our hotel and we let's say we grab at uber. Right, 208 00:13:18,880 --> 00:13:21,640 Speaker 1: we're going downtown to check out you know, the restaurant, 209 00:13:21,640 --> 00:13:26,640 Speaker 1: bar club scene. Uh. The uber operates on an I 210 00:13:26,720 --> 00:13:30,520 Speaker 1: D right, so we know that Paul, based on his 211 00:13:30,720 --> 00:13:35,240 Speaker 1: national idea, can get this uber, and that national idea 212 00:13:35,280 --> 00:13:37,880 Speaker 1: will also be used to pull his banking information to 213 00:13:37,920 --> 00:13:40,800 Speaker 1: pay for the uber. Then we go to the bar, 214 00:13:41,320 --> 00:13:47,480 Speaker 1: we don't present our driver's licenses. Instead, a complex surveillance 215 00:13:47,520 --> 00:13:51,120 Speaker 1: system clocks us and confirms that we are the people 216 00:13:51,120 --> 00:13:53,040 Speaker 1: who said we are we are, and that we are 217 00:13:53,080 --> 00:13:56,040 Speaker 1: old enough to go into this bar. And then we 218 00:13:56,160 --> 00:13:59,079 Speaker 1: buy a round of drinks right, or we get a 219 00:13:59,160 --> 00:14:04,720 Speaker 1: karaoke or something. And at each step that idea is 220 00:14:04,840 --> 00:14:08,840 Speaker 1: used as kind of a skeleton key to our financial lives, 221 00:14:08,880 --> 00:14:13,440 Speaker 1: to our physical lives, um, to even our movements along 222 00:14:13,520 --> 00:14:17,559 Speaker 1: Earth surface. And it's just the same thing. It's kind 223 00:14:17,600 --> 00:14:20,840 Speaker 1: of like, um, it's in that respect, it's similar to 224 00:14:21,560 --> 00:14:24,440 Speaker 1: a thing that happens on MacBooks where you have a 225 00:14:24,480 --> 00:14:28,040 Speaker 1: password key chain, right, and you've got like one thing 226 00:14:28,120 --> 00:14:31,280 Speaker 1: to rule them all, which full disclosure, I don't use, 227 00:14:31,440 --> 00:14:33,160 Speaker 1: even though it's a pain in the asked to remember 228 00:14:33,160 --> 00:14:36,440 Speaker 1: a bunch of passwords. That this is the idea. It 229 00:14:36,520 --> 00:14:41,120 Speaker 1: sounds really convenient, honestly, but a lot of critics, and 230 00:14:41,160 --> 00:14:45,160 Speaker 1: we're not just talking about super fringe people on the internet, 231 00:14:45,200 --> 00:14:48,720 Speaker 1: a lot of critics believe this could be immensely dangerous. 232 00:14:48,760 --> 00:14:52,320 Speaker 1: Today's question why will pause for a word from our sponsor, 233 00:14:52,640 --> 00:15:04,120 Speaker 1: and uh, we'll tell you it's spooky spoiler. Here's where 234 00:15:04,120 --> 00:15:07,680 Speaker 1: it gets crazy. Then, before we jump in in that 235 00:15:08,160 --> 00:15:11,040 Speaker 1: setup that we had in Boise with Paul, are we 236 00:15:11,120 --> 00:15:14,680 Speaker 1: carrying something? Is Paul carrying something with him that is 237 00:15:15,000 --> 00:15:18,160 Speaker 1: getting clocked? Is it biometrics? Is it just his phone 238 00:15:18,360 --> 00:15:23,120 Speaker 1: that's getting verified? What do you what do you think? Well, 239 00:15:23,480 --> 00:15:27,240 Speaker 1: ideally it would be a system with multiple possible inputs, 240 00:15:27,240 --> 00:15:29,080 Speaker 1: so there could be something on his phone that uses 241 00:15:29,120 --> 00:15:32,239 Speaker 1: facial recognition. But then when we get to the Applebee's, 242 00:15:32,600 --> 00:15:35,560 Speaker 1: which is obviously like the big ticket party for us, 243 00:15:36,120 --> 00:15:41,200 Speaker 1: then there could be something like CCTV or some kind 244 00:15:41,240 --> 00:15:46,640 Speaker 1: of camera that's cloud connected that can also verify that 245 00:15:46,680 --> 00:15:51,000 Speaker 1: biometric information and then cross check it against the geolocation 246 00:15:51,440 --> 00:15:55,000 Speaker 1: capabilities of that phone and then say, yep, these are 247 00:15:55,000 --> 00:15:57,960 Speaker 1: the right guys, They're in the right place. Let him in. 248 00:15:58,360 --> 00:16:03,440 Speaker 1: They got some apps the use your app to order 249 00:16:03,480 --> 00:16:06,560 Speaker 1: some apps. I love it. Do it. Let's make an 250 00:16:06,560 --> 00:16:09,640 Speaker 1: app just called app. Someone is beating us through that already. 251 00:16:10,440 --> 00:16:14,880 Speaker 1: If not, how disappointing. You're right though, like that's that's 252 00:16:14,880 --> 00:16:18,000 Speaker 1: a good question, because then if you're a person who 253 00:16:18,080 --> 00:16:20,680 Speaker 1: wants to avoid being sucked up in a system like this, 254 00:16:21,120 --> 00:16:24,640 Speaker 1: then logically you could just say I'm gonna use an 255 00:16:24,640 --> 00:16:27,880 Speaker 1: old flip phone, a phone that's just a phone, right, 256 00:16:28,280 --> 00:16:32,000 Speaker 1: Uh and even that still has some location information about you. Uh. 257 00:16:32,120 --> 00:16:34,400 Speaker 1: Then you might just say I'm not going to use 258 00:16:34,400 --> 00:16:36,880 Speaker 1: the phone at all. I'll just see you when I 259 00:16:36,920 --> 00:16:40,800 Speaker 1: see you, you know what I mean, write me a letter. Yeah, 260 00:16:40,800 --> 00:16:44,000 Speaker 1: but your face is still there at the Applebee's. Your 261 00:16:44,000 --> 00:16:46,560 Speaker 1: face is still there. I bet you could just wear 262 00:16:46,640 --> 00:16:52,240 Speaker 1: a giant mask or something like a giant something helps 263 00:16:52,280 --> 00:16:57,560 Speaker 1: you blend in right. Uh So this is uh that 264 00:16:57,680 --> 00:17:03,280 Speaker 1: joke will make sense in fall. Huh So. So the 265 00:17:03,280 --> 00:17:06,159 Speaker 1: the fascinating thing about that is what what you're saying 266 00:17:06,400 --> 00:17:08,879 Speaker 1: hits on something that I believe is really important and 267 00:17:09,160 --> 00:17:12,479 Speaker 1: more people need to be aware of. In the US 268 00:17:13,200 --> 00:17:17,320 Speaker 1: and in many other countries, the law generally states that 269 00:17:17,359 --> 00:17:21,960 Speaker 1: one has no expectation of privacy in a public space. Right, 270 00:17:22,640 --> 00:17:27,400 Speaker 1: And if you are in a private space. Technically, any 271 00:17:27,440 --> 00:17:29,800 Speaker 1: restaurant you go to is going to be a private space. 272 00:17:29,960 --> 00:17:33,280 Speaker 1: It has owners and they're not the government. Uh, they 273 00:17:33,560 --> 00:17:37,040 Speaker 1: can capture your image if they wish. It's kind of 274 00:17:37,119 --> 00:17:40,040 Speaker 1: up to them what they want to do. And you 275 00:17:41,119 --> 00:17:44,719 Speaker 1: it is understood that you can't. You can ask, you know, 276 00:17:44,760 --> 00:17:46,520 Speaker 1: like if your celebrity and you want to go to 277 00:17:46,560 --> 00:17:48,840 Speaker 1: a fancy restaurant, I'm sure you could have one of 278 00:17:48,880 --> 00:17:52,920 Speaker 1: your people call ahead and say, hey, I'm Luther Van 279 00:17:53,000 --> 00:17:58,439 Speaker 1: Dross's agent, or i work for Beyonce Knowles or um 280 00:17:58,720 --> 00:18:02,560 Speaker 1: Steven Seagal or what ever, and and I want, uh, 281 00:18:02,800 --> 00:18:07,199 Speaker 1: we need that restaurant closed down. We're just gonna have 282 00:18:08,240 --> 00:18:10,840 Speaker 1: our our v I P there so we can keep 283 00:18:10,880 --> 00:18:13,520 Speaker 1: things private, keep the paparazzi await. You can do that, 284 00:18:13,600 --> 00:18:16,399 Speaker 1: and restaurants will do that because you're paying them. But 285 00:18:16,520 --> 00:18:20,840 Speaker 1: if you're just a normal person, a non famous, nonwealthy 286 00:18:20,880 --> 00:18:23,800 Speaker 1: person and you show up, then there's not really much 287 00:18:23,840 --> 00:18:26,159 Speaker 1: you can do. You can't say don't take pictures of 288 00:18:26,160 --> 00:18:30,040 Speaker 1: me at Applebee's and they'll be like, well, don't come back. 289 00:18:32,800 --> 00:18:35,040 Speaker 1: When you go to Applebee's, you have to take selfies. 290 00:18:35,160 --> 00:18:39,120 Speaker 1: What is wrong with you? Part of the ape's right. 291 00:18:39,240 --> 00:18:42,280 Speaker 1: People need to know, people need to know that we 292 00:18:42,600 --> 00:18:45,520 Speaker 1: are living high on the hog. Uh. This is not 293 00:18:45,640 --> 00:18:48,760 Speaker 1: science fiction. This digital idea we're describing it is not. 294 00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:53,960 Speaker 1: It is already happenings. It just hasn't hit the US 295 00:18:54,040 --> 00:18:56,520 Speaker 1: and quite the same way yet. But countries across the 296 00:18:56,560 --> 00:19:00,000 Speaker 1: planet are already doing this. India is doing it, Australia 297 00:19:00,080 --> 00:19:03,760 Speaker 1: is working on it. Of course, China will, I imagine, 298 00:19:03,840 --> 00:19:10,000 Speaker 1: do some extreme things with this kind of system. Canada 299 00:19:10,160 --> 00:19:14,560 Speaker 1: as well. Yeah. Canada, uh, which means five eyes is 300 00:19:14,600 --> 00:19:19,320 Speaker 1: gonna lend their tremendous data to something like this. Governments 301 00:19:19,400 --> 00:19:22,800 Speaker 1: want to digitize what they're really doing. They're digitizing you 302 00:19:23,040 --> 00:19:25,800 Speaker 1: as an individual. They want to digitize you as a 303 00:19:25,840 --> 00:19:29,640 Speaker 1: citizen because if you believe, like if we just look 304 00:19:29,640 --> 00:19:32,080 Speaker 1: at the good stuff, if we look at the silver 305 00:19:32,200 --> 00:19:35,880 Speaker 1: lining of the storm cloud on the horizon, we see 306 00:19:35,920 --> 00:19:38,960 Speaker 1: you on the selling points. Yeah, the selling point. Oh 307 00:19:39,000 --> 00:19:41,439 Speaker 1: there we go, yeah, the selling points, the silver lining 308 00:19:41,480 --> 00:19:45,240 Speaker 1: selling points. What we'll see is the government's want you 309 00:19:45,359 --> 00:19:52,040 Speaker 1: digitized because they believe this can improve access to government services. 310 00:19:52,720 --> 00:19:57,880 Speaker 1: And the private industries love the idea of making it 311 00:19:58,160 --> 00:20:01,480 Speaker 1: essentially easier for you to say yes. This stuff. A 312 00:20:01,600 --> 00:20:05,360 Speaker 1: lot of private industry, like marketing advertising, it's figuring out 313 00:20:05,400 --> 00:20:08,879 Speaker 1: how to get you, specifically you to say yes to 314 00:20:08,960 --> 00:20:13,000 Speaker 1: a thing, to spend that time, to spend that money, uh, 315 00:20:13,040 --> 00:20:17,560 Speaker 1: and to become converted as a consumer. And also there's 316 00:20:17,560 --> 00:20:20,760 Speaker 1: a really interesting episode we did a ridiculous history years 317 00:20:20,760 --> 00:20:25,159 Speaker 1: and years back about how people stop being referred to 318 00:20:25,200 --> 00:20:27,840 Speaker 1: as citizens in the US and started being referred to 319 00:20:27,960 --> 00:20:31,400 Speaker 1: as consumers. Careful, small change, but it's a big deal, 320 00:20:31,520 --> 00:20:35,000 Speaker 1: So do check that out. I don't know it makes sense, 321 00:20:35,160 --> 00:20:40,040 Speaker 1: right because you're kind of like companies sandbox people so 322 00:20:40,119 --> 00:20:42,000 Speaker 1: effectively and they make a lot of money off that. 323 00:20:42,200 --> 00:20:46,240 Speaker 1: Oh yeah, definitely. And you know, really, the governments in 324 00:20:46,240 --> 00:20:48,760 Speaker 1: these countries are going to stamps dot com route where 325 00:20:48,920 --> 00:20:50,880 Speaker 1: a lot of the rhetoric I've heard when it comes 326 00:20:50,920 --> 00:20:53,560 Speaker 1: to promoting this kind of thing it is you'll never 327 00:20:53,600 --> 00:20:56,240 Speaker 1: have to stand in line again at the d m 328 00:20:56,320 --> 00:21:01,360 Speaker 1: V or at the whatever X places to update your 329 00:21:01,400 --> 00:21:04,680 Speaker 1: idea every you know, certain time frame where you'll never 330 00:21:04,760 --> 00:21:07,959 Speaker 1: have to wait to get something back from the government 331 00:21:07,960 --> 00:21:11,600 Speaker 1: when you submit forms over some system. It's all just 332 00:21:11,640 --> 00:21:15,040 Speaker 1: gonna be digitized. It will be lightning fast, and it'll 333 00:21:15,080 --> 00:21:18,480 Speaker 1: all be accurate. It makes sense that government and private 334 00:21:18,760 --> 00:21:23,280 Speaker 1: institutions would be very interested in this, and as you said, 335 00:21:23,320 --> 00:21:26,760 Speaker 1: been particularly in getting you to click oh yeah, and 336 00:21:26,800 --> 00:21:30,120 Speaker 1: then also being able to share data with each other 337 00:21:31,119 --> 00:21:34,639 Speaker 1: in in a way that, uh, in a way that 338 00:21:34,720 --> 00:21:38,120 Speaker 1: is exponentially more powerful and sophisticated than what's going on now, 339 00:21:38,359 --> 00:21:42,199 Speaker 1: even with outfits like Cambridge Analytica. They would be able 340 00:21:42,280 --> 00:21:47,359 Speaker 1: to look at every move you make, every step, They'll 341 00:21:47,359 --> 00:21:51,119 Speaker 1: be watching you. Uh. That's that's the idea. It is 342 00:21:51,119 --> 00:21:56,600 Speaker 1: not necessarily sinister, it's seamless, it's convenient. The concept is 343 00:21:56,680 --> 00:22:00,320 Speaker 1: gives you less to worry about, fewer chores. And if 344 00:22:00,320 --> 00:22:04,360 Speaker 1: you look past that normal everyday convenience, you can imagine 345 00:22:04,480 --> 00:22:10,520 Speaker 1: some extreme scenarios wherein global digital i D that's the 346 00:22:10,600 --> 00:22:13,479 Speaker 1: ultimate endgame. By the way, a global digital idea of 347 00:22:13,520 --> 00:22:16,200 Speaker 1: some sort you can imagine ways in which it would 348 00:22:16,240 --> 00:22:20,080 Speaker 1: be incredibly beneficial. Like let's say some kind of disaster 349 00:22:20,720 --> 00:22:25,160 Speaker 1: has stricken your town or your country a matter of fact, 350 00:22:25,200 --> 00:22:27,480 Speaker 1: you know what, Let's keep with the same example. After 351 00:22:27,560 --> 00:22:33,919 Speaker 1: matt emission control and me leave Boise, Idaho, something terrible 352 00:22:34,000 --> 00:22:39,880 Speaker 1: happens in Boise. There is an absolute natural disaster. No 353 00:22:39,920 --> 00:22:44,080 Speaker 1: one predicted it. Hundreds of thousands of people are fleeing. 354 00:22:44,520 --> 00:22:48,359 Speaker 1: Our server from the Applebee's earlier that weekend. Has lived 355 00:22:48,359 --> 00:22:52,040 Speaker 1: in Boise for a long long time, and now she 356 00:22:52,200 --> 00:22:54,640 Speaker 1: all of a sudden, without time to prepare, without time 357 00:22:54,640 --> 00:22:57,560 Speaker 1: to pack, she has to move. Let's say it's a 358 00:22:57,640 --> 00:23:01,720 Speaker 1: huge disaster, and she can't just go to another state. 359 00:23:01,880 --> 00:23:03,840 Speaker 1: She has to go to Canada. And she has to 360 00:23:03,880 --> 00:23:07,679 Speaker 1: go to Canada as a refugee with no paperwork, no 361 00:23:07,840 --> 00:23:10,800 Speaker 1: proof of her i D. This is pretty common with 362 00:23:10,840 --> 00:23:14,320 Speaker 1: a lot of refugee populations because of the circumstances surrounding 363 00:23:14,320 --> 00:23:19,720 Speaker 1: their evacuation. So our unfortunate server in this case would 364 00:23:19,840 --> 00:23:23,360 Speaker 1: have to try to prove that she is who she 365 00:23:23,440 --> 00:23:27,720 Speaker 1: says she is. If this person had a digital i D, 366 00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:31,639 Speaker 1: it would function as a sort of global proof, and 367 00:23:31,720 --> 00:23:36,919 Speaker 1: this would improve their odds of resettlement, improve their odds 368 00:23:36,920 --> 00:23:43,520 Speaker 1: of accessing services, and maybe even getting ahold of their finances, 369 00:23:43,560 --> 00:23:46,639 Speaker 1: you know, the different electronic accounts they had to leave behind, 370 00:23:47,080 --> 00:23:50,840 Speaker 1: and could help them with job prospects. That's cool, that's 371 00:23:50,880 --> 00:23:53,400 Speaker 1: pretty amazing, you know what I mean? Because if you're 372 00:23:53,400 --> 00:23:56,320 Speaker 1: in a refugee situation, you are having one of the 373 00:23:56,359 --> 00:24:00,320 Speaker 1: most harrowing experiences of your life. You know. Uh so 374 00:24:00,440 --> 00:24:04,200 Speaker 1: I can see that as inarguably a positive, a potential positive. 375 00:24:04,600 --> 00:24:10,359 Speaker 1: It can also simplify so much stuff already complained about passwords, 376 00:24:10,400 --> 00:24:13,320 Speaker 1: but I'm too paranoid to use the key chain thing, 377 00:24:13,440 --> 00:24:16,399 Speaker 1: and I know it's it's probably harmless. But with a 378 00:24:16,440 --> 00:24:20,320 Speaker 1: digital I D, you wouldn't need all those different passwords necessarily. 379 00:24:20,440 --> 00:24:24,240 Speaker 1: You wouldn't need to do all the different paperwork shenanigans, 380 00:24:24,280 --> 00:24:27,320 Speaker 1: All the forms go through the red tape. You just 381 00:24:27,480 --> 00:24:31,400 Speaker 1: present your thing, yep. I think about a minor traffic 382 00:24:31,520 --> 00:24:34,520 Speaker 1: accident or something like that in how a digital I 383 00:24:34,640 --> 00:24:39,000 Speaker 1: D would really change that interaction with everybody. You know, 384 00:24:39,040 --> 00:24:41,480 Speaker 1: if you've got two parties, two vehicles, there was a 385 00:24:41,480 --> 00:24:45,080 Speaker 1: small accident, rather than having to exchange any kind of information, 386 00:24:45,119 --> 00:24:48,800 Speaker 1: you literally would just send over your digital ID file 387 00:24:48,960 --> 00:24:52,880 Speaker 1: that has the necessary things for a car accident, including 388 00:24:52,920 --> 00:24:56,000 Speaker 1: all your insurance information. Your insurance company gets all that 389 00:24:56,080 --> 00:24:58,680 Speaker 1: information as well, verifies it's you, and it all goes 390 00:24:58,680 --> 00:25:02,880 Speaker 1: down super smoothly, and everybody's cars get fixed, and then 391 00:25:03,080 --> 00:25:05,280 Speaker 1: you never even had to go in the glove compartment. 392 00:25:05,600 --> 00:25:08,840 Speaker 1: You never even had to check the glove box. That's crazy. 393 00:25:08,960 --> 00:25:11,480 Speaker 1: Also quick question, this is Matt, this is for you. 394 00:25:11,600 --> 00:25:14,880 Speaker 1: I think I know the answer. Have you ever kept 395 00:25:14,880 --> 00:25:18,320 Speaker 1: gloves in a glove compartment like actual gloves? Yes? I 396 00:25:18,359 --> 00:25:22,119 Speaker 1: have black leather driving gloves at all times, black Weather, 397 00:25:22,560 --> 00:25:26,760 Speaker 1: you have serial killer gloves in your car? Uh, it's 398 00:25:26,960 --> 00:25:32,440 Speaker 1: it's it's from the movie Drive And uh, it's just something. 399 00:25:35,200 --> 00:25:37,720 Speaker 1: Did I tell you that time where I realized in 400 00:25:37,920 --> 00:25:42,840 Speaker 1: my go bag that I had I had what looked 401 00:25:42,840 --> 00:25:47,280 Speaker 1: like a kill kit quite accidentally, like the uh you know, 402 00:25:47,400 --> 00:25:50,120 Speaker 1: because and the pieces all came to like I didn't 403 00:25:50,119 --> 00:25:52,800 Speaker 1: get them all at once, it's just agreing them as 404 00:25:52,960 --> 00:25:54,720 Speaker 1: it occurred to me what I would need. So I 405 00:25:54,760 --> 00:25:57,400 Speaker 1: had like work gloves for working on working on the car. 406 00:25:57,480 --> 00:25:59,840 Speaker 1: Do we mind your repairs at duct tape which is 407 00:26:00,000 --> 00:26:02,920 Speaker 1: of the most invaluable tools in the world of auto mechanics. 408 00:26:03,080 --> 00:26:07,840 Speaker 1: And uh. Then I also had um like a tarp 409 00:26:08,640 --> 00:26:11,520 Speaker 1: in instead of a tent. Uh. And and then I 410 00:26:11,560 --> 00:26:15,160 Speaker 1: had some rope and and some like steaks and hammers 411 00:26:15,160 --> 00:26:19,280 Speaker 1: and stuff too, like get the get the tarp situated. Uh. 412 00:26:19,359 --> 00:26:23,400 Speaker 1: And it wasn't until it wasn't until a friend pointed 413 00:26:23,440 --> 00:26:26,240 Speaker 1: out that that's kind of sketchy. Have. If you want 414 00:26:26,240 --> 00:26:28,119 Speaker 1: to hear more more about that, check out our go 415 00:26:28,240 --> 00:26:30,800 Speaker 1: Bag episode. Yeah, I was gonna say, thanks to the 416 00:26:30,880 --> 00:26:33,960 Speaker 1: Golden Age of true crime, all Eagle Scouts are now 417 00:26:34,040 --> 00:26:36,560 Speaker 1: serial killers just because of the contents of their trunk. 418 00:26:39,280 --> 00:26:42,320 Speaker 1: Oh man, well, it's a gig economy, you know what 419 00:26:42,359 --> 00:26:47,320 Speaker 1: I mean. Uh So, without explaining that comment, let's go 420 00:26:47,480 --> 00:26:52,639 Speaker 1: back to digital ideas. Uh So, Yeah, in a good case, 421 00:26:53,640 --> 00:26:56,639 Speaker 1: this is convenient and in some cases it could really 422 00:26:56,680 --> 00:26:59,240 Speaker 1: help out people when they need help the most. So 423 00:26:59,320 --> 00:27:03,560 Speaker 1: that's pretty dope, right, maybe not? Maybe not? Spoiler. Uh 424 00:27:03,680 --> 00:27:07,640 Speaker 1: there's there's a guy named Brett Solomon. I quite enjoy 425 00:27:07,680 --> 00:27:09,760 Speaker 1: his writing. He wrote an article for why or a 426 00:27:09,760 --> 00:27:14,160 Speaker 1: while back, and he laid out some clear, salient, and 427 00:27:14,680 --> 00:27:19,199 Speaker 1: frankly disturbing concerns about the possibilities of what could go 428 00:27:19,280 --> 00:27:23,000 Speaker 1: wrong with the digital I D system. This, okay, I 429 00:27:23,040 --> 00:27:24,879 Speaker 1: want to see what you think. This This struck me 430 00:27:25,280 --> 00:27:27,439 Speaker 1: and I know it self. For you to uh this 431 00:27:27,520 --> 00:27:31,760 Speaker 1: struck me at first is maybe hyperbolic, but after our research, 432 00:27:31,800 --> 00:27:36,400 Speaker 1: I'm not I'm not so sure. Solomon called a digital 433 00:27:36,440 --> 00:27:39,359 Speaker 1: I D system quote one of the gravest risk to 434 00:27:39,600 --> 00:27:43,880 Speaker 1: human rights of any technology that we have encountered. It's 435 00:27:43,880 --> 00:27:50,240 Speaker 1: a lot well, because I think to Solomon's point there, 436 00:27:51,080 --> 00:27:54,600 Speaker 1: digital I D is not just one thing, It's not 437 00:27:54,760 --> 00:27:58,000 Speaker 1: one technology. It's a culmination of a whole bunch of 438 00:27:58,040 --> 00:28:03,359 Speaker 1: different technologies, right and I entification systems mixed with you know, 439 00:28:03,920 --> 00:28:09,000 Speaker 1: a singular file that has all this stuff. I I 440 00:28:09,000 --> 00:28:11,800 Speaker 1: think I understand that, but I don't know. But it 441 00:28:11,840 --> 00:28:15,760 Speaker 1: seems like we're facing a lot of grave risks right now. 442 00:28:15,800 --> 00:28:19,080 Speaker 1: But I guess risks to human rights. I don't know. 443 00:28:19,359 --> 00:28:21,600 Speaker 1: Let's let's keep talking and let's see how we feel 444 00:28:21,600 --> 00:28:24,359 Speaker 1: about that statement. Okay, yeah, Well we'll hit you with 445 00:28:24,400 --> 00:28:28,680 Speaker 1: another quote from Mr Solomon where he says we are 446 00:28:28,800 --> 00:28:33,399 Speaker 1: rushing headlong into a future where new technologies will converge 447 00:28:33,440 --> 00:28:36,399 Speaker 1: to make this risk much more severe, like you were saying, 448 00:28:36,440 --> 00:28:39,120 Speaker 1: like you already called it. Uh. And the main thing, 449 00:28:39,200 --> 00:28:40,959 Speaker 1: the main danger of that is that people are not 450 00:28:41,080 --> 00:28:44,840 Speaker 1: aware of the extent of this issue, of the long 451 00:28:44,920 --> 00:28:48,880 Speaker 1: tail possible effects. Like there's a thing I was thinking 452 00:28:48,920 --> 00:28:52,600 Speaker 1: about a lot for another show, actually, Nolan, I did 453 00:28:52,600 --> 00:28:57,800 Speaker 1: an episode on this ridiculous history just quite recently called 454 00:28:57,840 --> 00:29:02,560 Speaker 1: the cobra effect. Long story short, During the British raj 455 00:29:03,160 --> 00:29:07,200 Speaker 1: Uh colonial powers that be saw that Delhi had a 456 00:29:07,240 --> 00:29:11,200 Speaker 1: cobra problem. Snakes were overrunning the city. So their solution 457 00:29:11,320 --> 00:29:13,880 Speaker 1: was to say, all right, we're gonna crowdsource this. We're 458 00:29:13,920 --> 00:29:17,520 Speaker 1: gonna make We're gonna roll out a universal solution. If 459 00:29:17,520 --> 00:29:20,880 Speaker 1: you live in Delhi and one a little extra cash, 460 00:29:21,280 --> 00:29:23,920 Speaker 1: chills and cobras brings us, the Skins will pay you. 461 00:29:24,600 --> 00:29:29,600 Speaker 1: But this led to unintended consequences because they instituted such 462 00:29:29,600 --> 00:29:34,000 Speaker 1: a big system so quickly. People who are you know, 463 00:29:34,120 --> 00:29:37,840 Speaker 1: people are super intelligent. They said, hey, why why am 464 00:29:37,880 --> 00:29:40,840 Speaker 1: I walking around like a schmuck in the main streets 465 00:29:40,840 --> 00:29:43,320 Speaker 1: of Delhi looking for cobras. Why don't I just get 466 00:29:43,320 --> 00:29:46,800 Speaker 1: a couple of cobras and start growing cobras when I 467 00:29:46,840 --> 00:29:49,000 Speaker 1: start a little cobra farm, and then I'll just kill 468 00:29:49,080 --> 00:29:50,959 Speaker 1: them when they get big enough, and then I'll just 469 00:29:51,000 --> 00:29:55,120 Speaker 1: be making money. And this led to a bunch of 470 00:29:55,160 --> 00:29:59,600 Speaker 1: people becoming like cobra bootleggers or cobra farmers. Eventually, the 471 00:29:59,640 --> 00:30:02,320 Speaker 1: government it figured it out and they said, okay, well, 472 00:30:02,320 --> 00:30:04,880 Speaker 1: we're not gonna pay anybody anymore for these cobras. We 473 00:30:04,960 --> 00:30:07,600 Speaker 1: realize there's a problem with this system. We're gonna dial 474 00:30:07,680 --> 00:30:11,560 Speaker 1: it back a little. And then the cobra farmers said, oh, 475 00:30:11,680 --> 00:30:15,240 Speaker 1: all these cobras are worthless at some point of killing them, 476 00:30:15,240 --> 00:30:19,280 Speaker 1: I'm just gonna let them out. And as a result, 477 00:30:19,880 --> 00:30:23,440 Speaker 1: as a result, delhi uh directly because if it's planned 478 00:30:23,440 --> 00:30:26,239 Speaker 1: to eradicate cobras, ended up with more cobras than they 479 00:30:26,240 --> 00:30:30,840 Speaker 1: had in the beginning. So this this kind of applies 480 00:30:30,880 --> 00:30:35,000 Speaker 1: here because people aren't sure what the long term consequences 481 00:30:35,040 --> 00:30:38,280 Speaker 1: of a system like this could be, because honestly, we 482 00:30:38,360 --> 00:30:43,480 Speaker 1: don't understand the full consequences yet of some of the 483 00:30:43,520 --> 00:30:46,600 Speaker 1: technology that will be used as building blocks for digital 484 00:30:46,640 --> 00:30:52,760 Speaker 1: I D. Right, like facial recognition added to real time geolocation. 485 00:30:53,160 --> 00:30:55,160 Speaker 1: I know what you look like, I know where you 486 00:30:55,160 --> 00:30:59,760 Speaker 1: are now you know Santa Claus rhyme right, we're making 487 00:30:59,800 --> 00:31:04,560 Speaker 1: a us checking it twice. Yeah. I also know everything 488 00:31:04,600 --> 00:31:08,920 Speaker 1: that you've purchased since you've owned a credit card. There's 489 00:31:09,040 --> 00:31:11,320 Speaker 1: the list. It's tied directly back to the credit card 490 00:31:11,400 --> 00:31:18,160 Speaker 1: you've got when George W. Bush was president. So I 491 00:31:18,160 --> 00:31:22,400 Speaker 1: mean that's scary alone. I know your property, what you own, 492 00:31:22,880 --> 00:31:24,640 Speaker 1: I know how much you pay for rent, I know 493 00:31:24,680 --> 00:31:30,959 Speaker 1: your credit score, Yeah, I know who you I know 494 00:31:31,120 --> 00:31:35,720 Speaker 1: you hang with, right, I know you're let's see, I 495 00:31:36,040 --> 00:31:39,719 Speaker 1: know your friends at a Kevin Bacon level, and I 496 00:31:39,760 --> 00:31:42,479 Speaker 1: know who they know, and I know who they know. 497 00:31:42,960 --> 00:31:48,400 Speaker 1: So this like this dramatically erodes, if not completely, erases, 498 00:31:48,520 --> 00:31:52,719 Speaker 1: the concept of privacy, right. And there's and there's been 499 00:31:52,760 --> 00:31:56,600 Speaker 1: a concerted effort, I would say, in the zeitgeist to 500 00:31:57,960 --> 00:32:01,280 Speaker 1: make privacy concerns seem like it's important than they are, 501 00:32:02,200 --> 00:32:06,040 Speaker 1: because it's beneficial for companies if you don't worry about 502 00:32:06,040 --> 00:32:09,880 Speaker 1: it too much. So what we're saying here now, like 503 00:32:09,920 --> 00:32:12,880 Speaker 1: this digital idea system, this global ide system. And granted 504 00:32:12,920 --> 00:32:15,240 Speaker 1: at this point that is a thought experiment that hasn't 505 00:32:15,240 --> 00:32:20,000 Speaker 1: happened yet. You don't have a global Idea card or 506 00:32:20,080 --> 00:32:25,320 Speaker 1: number code yet, but emphasis on yet. What would happen 507 00:32:25,360 --> 00:32:27,520 Speaker 1: then is that there would be a constant stream of 508 00:32:27,520 --> 00:32:32,640 Speaker 1: communication about you living live at all times on the 509 00:32:32,760 --> 00:32:36,080 Speaker 1: quote unquote Internet of Things. It would go from you 510 00:32:36,280 --> 00:32:40,800 Speaker 1: to other notes, to other identities, to other businesses, government agencies, 511 00:32:41,160 --> 00:32:45,960 Speaker 1: all of it, Kevin all of it. Hashtag Devil's Advocate, 512 00:32:46,080 --> 00:32:52,680 Speaker 1: great chopporco uh, automatically without your informed consent. So you're 513 00:32:52,800 --> 00:32:58,000 Speaker 1: in um. So we've left, we've left Boise. We're out 514 00:32:58,080 --> 00:33:00,800 Speaker 1: on the road. Uh, we're you know, okay, we're flying. 515 00:33:01,200 --> 00:33:03,880 Speaker 1: We have a layover on the way back to New 516 00:33:03,960 --> 00:33:08,600 Speaker 1: York or Atlanta. And while we're there, we buy a 517 00:33:08,640 --> 00:33:12,600 Speaker 1: couple of like souvenirs at the airport. Then in this 518 00:33:12,680 --> 00:33:16,920 Speaker 1: kind of reality, the information about those purchases and the 519 00:33:17,040 --> 00:33:21,000 Speaker 1: time that we made those purchases and the company we 520 00:33:21,080 --> 00:33:25,680 Speaker 1: kept during those purchases can all communicate out to other 521 00:33:25,800 --> 00:33:28,600 Speaker 1: nodes of the network, unless there are laws against it 522 00:33:30,080 --> 00:33:34,360 Speaker 1: without informed consent, you know what I mean. On the 523 00:33:34,440 --> 00:33:37,200 Speaker 1: off chance, for some reason, if you didn't want your 524 00:33:37,600 --> 00:33:39,600 Speaker 1: credit union to know that you were leaning on a 525 00:33:39,720 --> 00:33:42,480 Speaker 1: different credit card pretty heavily to buy like a miniature 526 00:33:42,520 --> 00:33:46,960 Speaker 1: replication of that weird nightmare horse at the at the 527 00:33:47,000 --> 00:33:51,320 Speaker 1: Temver airport, you couldn't stop them. It doesn't matter why 528 00:33:51,440 --> 00:33:53,400 Speaker 1: you wouldn't want them to know that. It just means 529 00:33:53,640 --> 00:33:57,120 Speaker 1: you could not stop them. Uh. And this can go 530 00:33:57,320 --> 00:34:01,640 Speaker 1: through all sorts of angles. It's it's airy how plausible 531 00:34:01,680 --> 00:34:06,760 Speaker 1: that is. The Next thing, these systems, in many ways 532 00:34:06,760 --> 00:34:13,600 Speaker 1: are automated machine learning, artificial intelligence. They're being used already 533 00:34:13,680 --> 00:34:17,120 Speaker 1: without a world of digital idea to make decisions based 534 00:34:17,200 --> 00:34:22,080 Speaker 1: on the electronic footprints, the data footprint they have of 535 00:34:22,160 --> 00:34:25,480 Speaker 1: you in your past actions and your current actions, and 536 00:34:25,520 --> 00:34:28,920 Speaker 1: it's all about predicting your future actions. Like Matt said, 537 00:34:29,000 --> 00:34:33,320 Speaker 1: it's all about getting those clicks. Uh. And these systems 538 00:34:33,360 --> 00:34:38,879 Speaker 1: are built unfortunately by humans, and humans all function under 539 00:34:38,960 --> 00:34:42,759 Speaker 1: some degree of bias and discrimination, and we very much 540 00:34:42,800 --> 00:34:45,919 Speaker 1: see a sins of the Father's situation with a lot 541 00:34:45,960 --> 00:34:49,040 Speaker 1: of this stuff, Like it's it's hard to figure out 542 00:34:49,080 --> 00:34:54,200 Speaker 1: the best way to implement these things in a nondiscriminatory, 543 00:34:54,480 --> 00:34:58,520 Speaker 1: fair method. Uh. There's often not a lot of human review, 544 00:34:59,320 --> 00:35:02,520 Speaker 1: and they're they're probably won't They'll probably be less and 545 00:35:02,600 --> 00:35:06,600 Speaker 1: less human review, honestly as the systems get smarter and 546 00:35:06,680 --> 00:35:10,440 Speaker 1: cleaner and more seamless, And there's definitely not going to 547 00:35:10,520 --> 00:35:14,160 Speaker 1: be a lot of transparency, right unless there's a specific 548 00:35:14,239 --> 00:35:19,200 Speaker 1: law that says when something crazy happens to you unexpected, 549 00:35:20,360 --> 00:35:24,440 Speaker 1: every time you get a weirdly specific AD, you have 550 00:35:24,560 --> 00:35:29,920 Speaker 1: to be told exactly what information lead that vendor to 551 00:35:30,200 --> 00:35:33,080 Speaker 1: send or that platform to send that ad to you. 552 00:35:34,000 --> 00:35:35,960 Speaker 1: That would be amazing. I'd love to learn that. I 553 00:35:35,960 --> 00:35:39,000 Speaker 1: think most people would. Oh man, Ben, I just watched 554 00:35:39,040 --> 00:35:42,040 Speaker 1: this documentary on Netflix about Cambridge Analytica, and it feels 555 00:35:42,160 --> 00:35:47,520 Speaker 1: very similar to what you're what you're describing here. Um, 556 00:35:47,680 --> 00:35:49,800 Speaker 1: there's a single person that wanted to get all of 557 00:35:49,840 --> 00:35:53,360 Speaker 1: the information that Cambridge Analytica had on him, just one person. 558 00:35:53,400 --> 00:35:55,480 Speaker 1: He said, Okay, so you collected all this data on 559 00:35:55,560 --> 00:35:57,879 Speaker 1: all of these people, you said you had it on 560 00:35:57,960 --> 00:36:01,520 Speaker 1: every voting American. To show me what you have on 561 00:36:01,640 --> 00:36:05,719 Speaker 1: me and had on me during during the election. Just 562 00:36:05,719 --> 00:36:08,040 Speaker 1: just show it to me. And went to court. And 563 00:36:08,040 --> 00:36:11,319 Speaker 1: they ended up pleading guilty to this other thing so 564 00:36:11,360 --> 00:36:14,560 Speaker 1: that they didn't have to give this person the information, 565 00:36:15,000 --> 00:36:19,520 Speaker 1: like reveal their hands. They triaged. Huh that's right, yeah, 566 00:36:19,600 --> 00:36:23,840 Speaker 1: they said, they said, it's I guess essentially they're treating 567 00:36:23,880 --> 00:36:28,440 Speaker 1: it like paying an additional business expense to keep the 568 00:36:28,480 --> 00:36:32,680 Speaker 1: secret sauce. So it makes you wonder because you can 569 00:36:32,719 --> 00:36:35,840 Speaker 1: see you can see the value that they placed in 570 00:36:35,880 --> 00:36:41,319 Speaker 1: that idea. Wow. Yeah, Like I'll plead guilty so I 571 00:36:41,320 --> 00:36:45,919 Speaker 1: can keep my keep my magic tricks. Yeah. And effectively, 572 00:36:46,600 --> 00:36:50,160 Speaker 1: it was his psychological profile that was built by Cambridge 573 00:36:50,200 --> 00:36:53,600 Speaker 1: Analytica and the Facebook data that they had along with 574 00:36:53,680 --> 00:36:57,759 Speaker 1: several other major data points that they had on him. Uh. 575 00:36:57,920 --> 00:36:59,359 Speaker 1: We you know, we can kind of guess on what 576 00:36:59,400 --> 00:37:04,840 Speaker 1: it was that hiding. But still it's, uh, it's creepy 577 00:37:04,920 --> 00:37:09,080 Speaker 1: to think the extents that private corporation that is benefiting 578 00:37:10,040 --> 00:37:13,600 Speaker 1: huge amounts of money on just the data that we generate, 579 00:37:13,840 --> 00:37:15,520 Speaker 1: and then thinking that we're going to connect all of 580 00:37:15,560 --> 00:37:17,759 Speaker 1: that data in one place and then carry it around 581 00:37:17,800 --> 00:37:22,520 Speaker 1: with us essentially. Yeah, yeah, centralization, that's another issue, and 582 00:37:22,520 --> 00:37:26,840 Speaker 1: and Solomon writes about that too. Uh he says, the 583 00:37:26,840 --> 00:37:30,400 Speaker 1: the problem with this is that there are things like 584 00:37:30,480 --> 00:37:33,680 Speaker 1: social credit systems, and I love that he points that out, 585 00:37:33,719 --> 00:37:37,200 Speaker 1: like China assessment credit social credit system which was opted 586 00:37:37,360 --> 00:37:41,120 Speaker 1: and then became mandatory, and we called it. The issue 587 00:37:41,160 --> 00:37:45,360 Speaker 1: with this centralized digital I D is that it means 588 00:37:47,120 --> 00:37:52,640 Speaker 1: there is a possibility that your participation in society could 589 00:37:52,640 --> 00:37:58,080 Speaker 1: be quickly and easily cut off. Right. Imagine you're going somewhere, 590 00:37:58,160 --> 00:38:00,320 Speaker 1: like we talked about in the Sanctions episode, all of 591 00:38:00,360 --> 00:38:03,440 Speaker 1: a sudden, a t m S work for other people, 592 00:38:03,800 --> 00:38:06,680 Speaker 1: just not for you, you know what I mean? The 593 00:38:06,719 --> 00:38:12,719 Speaker 1: one another like paranoid more extreme spectrum of this. Um, 594 00:38:12,880 --> 00:38:15,680 Speaker 1: you have a vehicle, your vehicle totally works, it's in 595 00:38:15,760 --> 00:38:19,120 Speaker 1: good condition, you get into start it, but something about 596 00:38:19,120 --> 00:38:21,000 Speaker 1: your I D won't let it start, you know what 597 00:38:21,040 --> 00:38:24,080 Speaker 1: I mean? Like that, and and again not to spook 598 00:38:24,120 --> 00:38:26,279 Speaker 1: people too much, but we need to understand that those 599 00:38:26,280 --> 00:38:30,200 Speaker 1: are possible things in the future. I mean, go right now, 600 00:38:30,239 --> 00:38:33,080 Speaker 1: try getting on an international flight without a passport. Just 601 00:38:33,160 --> 00:38:37,440 Speaker 1: see what happens. Uh see, I mean, it's not gonna happen. 602 00:38:37,600 --> 00:38:40,719 Speaker 1: And imagine that, as Ben said, if your vehicle depended 603 00:38:40,840 --> 00:38:44,200 Speaker 1: on you being the person that's trying to pilot that 604 00:38:44,360 --> 00:38:46,560 Speaker 1: vehicle or just drive it, you can call it driving 605 00:38:46,560 --> 00:38:55,120 Speaker 1: whatever I feel like. When full digital ideas happened, I mean, 606 00:38:55,160 --> 00:38:58,000 Speaker 1: we're gonna be piloting vehicles rather than driving them. But 607 00:38:58,080 --> 00:39:02,040 Speaker 1: that's fine because I can't imagine this is happening anytime soon, 608 00:39:02,239 --> 00:39:08,000 Speaker 1: but it is, but it is. Yes, Yeah, So there's 609 00:39:08,040 --> 00:39:11,200 Speaker 1: another question that we have to ask, like, digital I 610 00:39:11,280 --> 00:39:17,440 Speaker 1: das may well become necessary for you to function in 611 00:39:17,680 --> 00:39:23,880 Speaker 1: future society as society becomes increasingly digitized. Not having something 612 00:39:23,960 --> 00:39:27,440 Speaker 1: like this may mean that you start to live in 613 00:39:27,440 --> 00:39:30,720 Speaker 1: a very different world if you don't have a digital 614 00:39:30,840 --> 00:39:35,520 Speaker 1: I d in a digitally connected society? Do you exist? 615 00:39:36,040 --> 00:39:39,200 Speaker 1: We're gonna pause for word from our sponsors, and we'll 616 00:39:39,239 --> 00:39:42,880 Speaker 1: return with some some of the not so nice things 617 00:39:42,960 --> 00:39:45,759 Speaker 1: about this. Oh wait, we're just now getting into the 618 00:39:45,840 --> 00:39:57,239 Speaker 1: not so nice things. Oh boy, we've returned. So the 619 00:39:57,360 --> 00:40:02,320 Speaker 1: stuff that we outlined as both possible benefits and both 620 00:40:02,440 --> 00:40:08,680 Speaker 1: possible dangers. Governments already know they know about this stuff. 621 00:40:09,040 --> 00:40:11,960 Speaker 1: Private entities know about this stuff, especially in the world 622 00:40:12,040 --> 00:40:18,080 Speaker 1: of finance and data collection. Authoritarian governments also know about this. 623 00:40:18,239 --> 00:40:21,600 Speaker 1: There's a common mistake that people make, especially if you 624 00:40:21,760 --> 00:40:24,600 Speaker 1: grow up in a democracy where you are raised on 625 00:40:24,640 --> 00:40:29,680 Speaker 1: a steady diet of anti dictator propaganda. And just to 626 00:40:29,680 --> 00:40:32,560 Speaker 1: be clear, I'm anti dictator. I think all of us 627 00:40:32,560 --> 00:40:35,040 Speaker 1: on the show are pretty pretty pretty much on the 628 00:40:35,080 --> 00:40:41,120 Speaker 1: same page there. But for an authoritarian government, this is 629 00:40:41,160 --> 00:40:43,879 Speaker 1: a tremendous opportunity that you and are talking off air 630 00:40:43,920 --> 00:40:46,960 Speaker 1: about it, and I I said it in slightly more 631 00:40:47,080 --> 00:40:50,960 Speaker 1: blue terms. But if you were a dictator and you 632 00:40:51,040 --> 00:40:54,960 Speaker 1: sat down and said how can I build a better 633 00:40:55,080 --> 00:41:00,000 Speaker 1: surveillance system for oppressing dissent? You couldn't. You would build 634 00:41:00,080 --> 00:41:04,759 Speaker 1: something like this. This is the This is like a 635 00:41:04,960 --> 00:41:08,719 Speaker 1: birthday gift. For those kind of those sorts of governments, 636 00:41:09,320 --> 00:41:15,400 Speaker 1: they can be easily leveraged for exploitation, for abuse. You 637 00:41:15,440 --> 00:41:19,239 Speaker 1: can imagine any demographic you wish, like, there's a world 638 00:41:19,280 --> 00:41:22,960 Speaker 1: in which you could say, for instance, uh, let's say 639 00:41:23,120 --> 00:41:29,120 Speaker 1: Estonia has decided for some reason to track and in 640 00:41:29,280 --> 00:41:34,920 Speaker 1: prison blue eyed people and they had this digital I 641 00:41:35,040 --> 00:41:38,040 Speaker 1: D kind of thing. And that's a weird example because 642 00:41:38,160 --> 00:41:41,080 Speaker 1: Estonia I think has as a pretty high percentage of 643 00:41:41,120 --> 00:41:43,759 Speaker 1: the population or blue eyed that you could do it 644 00:41:43,800 --> 00:41:45,759 Speaker 1: with this thing. You could say, well, I don't even 645 00:41:45,800 --> 00:41:48,480 Speaker 1: want to track him. I just I don't like I 646 00:41:48,520 --> 00:41:52,960 Speaker 1: don't like the sky eyed people walking around getting driver's 647 00:41:53,040 --> 00:41:55,920 Speaker 1: licenses and going to a T M S and stuff. 648 00:41:56,280 --> 00:41:59,080 Speaker 1: So just cut them off and then you could enter 649 00:41:59,160 --> 00:42:03,000 Speaker 1: that that that little piece of biometric info into the 650 00:42:03,080 --> 00:42:06,560 Speaker 1: system and then pop the thing and boom. There are 651 00:42:06,640 --> 00:42:10,080 Speaker 1: restrictions on what their digital idea allows them to do. 652 00:42:10,480 --> 00:42:14,520 Speaker 1: That's the concern. And we're just picking blue eye the 653 00:42:14,520 --> 00:42:17,400 Speaker 1: blue eyes as as a biometric quality because it seems 654 00:42:17,440 --> 00:42:22,280 Speaker 1: relatively innocuous. Blue eyed conspiracy realists out there, we're friends, 655 00:42:22,320 --> 00:42:25,040 Speaker 1: we have your back. We're not we're not telling Estonia 656 00:42:25,160 --> 00:42:27,480 Speaker 1: to do anything. But then that reminds me of the 657 00:42:27,520 --> 00:42:31,960 Speaker 1: elementary school teacher that used to give the lesson on 658 00:42:32,200 --> 00:42:35,120 Speaker 1: blue eyed people versus brown eyed people, and and she 659 00:42:35,280 --> 00:42:38,000 Speaker 1: taught a very specific lesson about that, and I can't 660 00:42:38,040 --> 00:42:40,400 Speaker 1: remember her name. It's incredible. You can look it up online. 661 00:42:40,800 --> 00:42:43,600 Speaker 1: You can watch the whole video of this incredible teacher 662 00:42:43,680 --> 00:42:47,080 Speaker 1: just giving this example to teach children what what it 663 00:42:47,120 --> 00:42:52,959 Speaker 1: feels like to be mothered early on, you know, in education. Um, 664 00:42:53,000 --> 00:42:56,239 Speaker 1: but you know, what if those ideas have you know, 665 00:42:56,320 --> 00:43:01,000 Speaker 1: ethnic background information, what if they have related just background 666 00:43:01,080 --> 00:43:05,600 Speaker 1: information attached to them? Like what does that? Do you 667 00:43:05,719 --> 00:43:07,760 Speaker 1: think about that? At least over the course of history, 668 00:43:07,800 --> 00:43:11,720 Speaker 1: what we've seen right right, the human track record, which 669 00:43:11,760 --> 00:43:17,839 Speaker 1: could be best described as not great, not great, don't 670 00:43:17,880 --> 00:43:21,719 Speaker 1: love it anyhow. So we we've talked about and we're 671 00:43:21,719 --> 00:43:23,319 Speaker 1: going to get to that because as I think, that's 672 00:43:23,320 --> 00:43:26,440 Speaker 1: one of the most important points of today's episode, and 673 00:43:26,480 --> 00:43:30,480 Speaker 1: it's one that is also unfortunately the most plausible. So 674 00:43:31,239 --> 00:43:34,239 Speaker 1: we talked about discrimination, we talked about surveillance, talked about 675 00:43:34,239 --> 00:43:39,400 Speaker 1: privacy concerns. We should also talk about security because these 676 00:43:39,440 --> 00:43:42,920 Speaker 1: things could be easily hacked. Is a matter of fact, 677 00:43:42,960 --> 00:43:47,080 Speaker 1: Matt and I were earlier talking about big data breaches 678 00:43:47,480 --> 00:43:50,319 Speaker 1: that just popped up in the news and disappeared, And 679 00:43:50,360 --> 00:43:54,240 Speaker 1: there may be a future episode on that, uh coming 680 00:43:54,280 --> 00:43:56,680 Speaker 1: your way, And one of the questions we'll try to 681 00:43:56,680 --> 00:44:00,640 Speaker 1: answer is why those disappeared from the news exactly, or 682 00:44:00,680 --> 00:44:03,560 Speaker 1: why the mainstream news treated those things the way they did. 683 00:44:04,200 --> 00:44:07,759 Speaker 1: But maybe for our purposes now, it's best for us 684 00:44:07,800 --> 00:44:10,640 Speaker 1: to look at an example of a digital I D 685 00:44:10,880 --> 00:44:15,480 Speaker 1: system in action. The best way to do that India's 686 00:44:15,680 --> 00:44:20,360 Speaker 1: National Digital I D Framework. One system to rule them all. 687 00:44:20,800 --> 00:44:24,480 Speaker 1: It's the world's largest of its kind, and it was 688 00:44:24,560 --> 00:44:28,319 Speaker 1: recently shown to have been compromised. The case went all 689 00:44:28,320 --> 00:44:30,719 Speaker 1: the way to the highest court of the land, and 690 00:44:32,040 --> 00:44:35,800 Speaker 1: I guess we could describe it like this. So it's 691 00:44:36,320 --> 00:44:40,480 Speaker 1: street name is odd Hare, it's technical name is the 692 00:44:40,640 --> 00:44:45,080 Speaker 1: U I D program and odd Hare, by the way, 693 00:44:45,160 --> 00:44:48,719 Speaker 1: is a is a Hindi term that kind of translates 694 00:44:48,760 --> 00:44:53,160 Speaker 1: to foundation. So foundation was made in two thousand eight, 695 00:44:53,719 --> 00:44:57,200 Speaker 1: kind of a while ago. Now it is a unique 696 00:44:57,480 --> 00:45:02,000 Speaker 1: twelve digit number that is a kind every resident of India. 697 00:45:02,160 --> 00:45:07,760 Speaker 1: It's linked to their demographic data, their biometric information, and 698 00:45:08,800 --> 00:45:12,000 Speaker 1: it is right now the largest thing of its kind 699 00:45:12,400 --> 00:45:14,880 Speaker 1: in the world, which means also it's the largest thing 700 00:45:14,920 --> 00:45:19,200 Speaker 1: of its kind ever in human history. So it also 701 00:45:19,280 --> 00:45:23,640 Speaker 1: got tied to all these other services like how how 702 00:45:23,680 --> 00:45:27,399 Speaker 1: to get rations? If rations are being distributed, it ties 703 00:45:27,440 --> 00:45:30,919 Speaker 1: into your banking, It ties into your internet services, ties 704 00:45:30,960 --> 00:45:35,120 Speaker 1: into your international travel, even ties into your marriage registration 705 00:45:35,239 --> 00:45:37,799 Speaker 1: because you have to prove that you are who you 706 00:45:37,840 --> 00:45:43,200 Speaker 1: say you are. Uh. Private tech firms they're used. They're 707 00:45:43,239 --> 00:45:47,359 Speaker 1: using Foundation, Radar and Facebook. You would love this, man. 708 00:45:47,400 --> 00:45:51,200 Speaker 1: Facebook is even testing new logins on its platform that 709 00:45:51,239 --> 00:45:56,759 Speaker 1: would require Indian users to use that national idea to 710 00:45:56,960 --> 00:46:00,719 Speaker 1: log in, so you couldn't just be like, you know, 711 00:46:01,480 --> 00:46:07,440 Speaker 1: caso boy at Yahoo dot com or whatever. Todd the 712 00:46:07,520 --> 00:46:13,920 Speaker 1: concept of directly tying social media personas to your digital idea. 713 00:46:14,320 --> 00:46:18,880 Speaker 1: That's probably terrifying to a lot of us. Wow, that 714 00:46:19,000 --> 00:46:23,319 Speaker 1: doesn't scare me though, because you know me not on 715 00:46:23,480 --> 00:46:27,160 Speaker 1: not on the social medias. Yeah, which is a decision 716 00:46:27,200 --> 00:46:30,640 Speaker 1: I respect and it is true. Uh. This led to 717 00:46:30,719 --> 00:46:34,600 Speaker 1: the court attempting to sort out a few different things. Also, 718 00:46:34,719 --> 00:46:36,719 Speaker 1: wait before we move onto this, I gotta say, man, 719 00:46:37,360 --> 00:46:39,560 Speaker 1: I can't be the only person here. I I know 720 00:46:39,680 --> 00:46:42,040 Speaker 1: you and I are in the same page. If you 721 00:46:42,080 --> 00:46:45,320 Speaker 1: ever go to a website that wants you to log 722 00:46:45,360 --> 00:46:48,960 Speaker 1: in and it's like continue with Facebook or continue with Google, 723 00:46:49,520 --> 00:46:52,040 Speaker 1: I just find a way around it, or I just 724 00:46:52,280 --> 00:46:58,480 Speaker 1: don't go to that site because that really skeeves me out. Absolute, 725 00:46:58,840 --> 00:47:02,320 Speaker 1: don't do that. Don't log in with Facebook or Google 726 00:47:02,400 --> 00:47:07,359 Speaker 1: or whatever. Just log in with whatever account they want 727 00:47:07,360 --> 00:47:10,560 Speaker 1: you to make with your email. Just make a a 728 00:47:10,560 --> 00:47:14,120 Speaker 1: fun new email that you only get alerts for whatever 729 00:47:14,160 --> 00:47:18,200 Speaker 1: that thing is, or use one of the email throwaway systems, 730 00:47:18,480 --> 00:47:20,920 Speaker 1: which we should we should probably talk about in the future, 731 00:47:21,239 --> 00:47:24,560 Speaker 1: but anyhow, and those are legal. By the way, here's 732 00:47:24,600 --> 00:47:28,880 Speaker 1: what the Court of India found after they were attempting 733 00:47:28,880 --> 00:47:32,400 Speaker 1: to sort out these concerns. They said, one, private companies 734 00:47:32,440 --> 00:47:38,680 Speaker 1: cannot demand that you use add her. Two There they 735 00:47:38,719 --> 00:47:45,160 Speaker 1: cited a need for robust data protection frameworks. Essentially, they 736 00:47:45,200 --> 00:47:47,719 Speaker 1: recognized the problem. They said, yeah, we get it, we 737 00:47:47,800 --> 00:47:50,319 Speaker 1: get it. That's that's not a good look. Uh. And 738 00:47:50,400 --> 00:47:55,680 Speaker 1: then third surveillance. For the first time in the laws 739 00:47:55,719 --> 00:47:59,799 Speaker 1: of India, now the High Court justices will have to 740 00:47:59,800 --> 00:48:05,239 Speaker 1: be consulted in any data disclosure request for national security 741 00:48:05,360 --> 00:48:10,240 Speaker 1: related demands of of like like we think this person 742 00:48:10,719 --> 00:48:15,120 Speaker 1: may be involved in terrorist activities. That's the easiest example. Uh, 743 00:48:15,600 --> 00:48:19,719 Speaker 1: we would have just pulled their card, you know what 744 00:48:19,760 --> 00:48:23,160 Speaker 1: I mean and figure out what's what. But now we 745 00:48:23,200 --> 00:48:27,759 Speaker 1: have to at least check with the judicial system. Kind 746 00:48:27,760 --> 00:48:32,760 Speaker 1: of weird that didn't occur before. But lest lest any 747 00:48:33,400 --> 00:48:38,439 Speaker 1: US citizens in the crowd, I think that's ridiculous. Ask 748 00:48:38,480 --> 00:48:42,800 Speaker 1: yourself how many times FISA has said no dissimilar request, 749 00:48:43,200 --> 00:48:46,000 Speaker 1: you know what I mean. I don't know the exact number, 750 00:48:46,000 --> 00:48:47,759 Speaker 1: but I know it's as close as zero as you 751 00:48:47,800 --> 00:48:52,160 Speaker 1: can get. Yeah. Yeah, FIA is like if a court 752 00:48:52,239 --> 00:48:58,040 Speaker 1: system took an improv class. They're resting their resting like 753 00:48:58,440 --> 00:49:04,120 Speaker 1: mentality is yes, And I walked around the quarter of that. 754 00:49:04,280 --> 00:49:07,799 Speaker 1: I'm sorry. But the other thing is citizens now in 755 00:49:07,800 --> 00:49:13,240 Speaker 1: India can file complaints about data breaches they couldn't before. 756 00:49:13,840 --> 00:49:16,880 Speaker 1: Uh you could say, if you want to be corporate 757 00:49:16,920 --> 00:49:19,400 Speaker 1: America about it, you could say, hey, we're you know, 758 00:49:19,480 --> 00:49:22,719 Speaker 1: we're building the car while we drive it. But at 759 00:49:22,800 --> 00:49:26,319 Speaker 1: some point, knowing what could happen here that we've outlined here, 760 00:49:26,480 --> 00:49:29,240 Speaker 1: you have to ask yourself, is that really the sort 761 00:49:29,280 --> 00:49:32,400 Speaker 1: of road trip you want to take? Because now we 762 00:49:32,440 --> 00:49:36,320 Speaker 1: have to return to the thing that you would establish earlier, Matt, 763 00:49:36,800 --> 00:49:39,319 Speaker 1: which is a tremendous concern. I think it's one of 764 00:49:39,320 --> 00:49:42,120 Speaker 1: the biggest media concerns. Once a system like this is 765 00:49:42,200 --> 00:49:45,680 Speaker 1: up and running, but it has demographic information that includes 766 00:49:45,719 --> 00:49:50,240 Speaker 1: stuff like ethnicity, that includes stuff like maybe spiritual beliefs 767 00:49:50,320 --> 00:49:55,839 Speaker 1: or identifications, is it possible to weaponize that information, to 768 00:49:55,920 --> 00:50:00,399 Speaker 1: weaponize that system against a given demographic of people. Uh, 769 00:50:00,440 --> 00:50:04,440 Speaker 1: there's a there's a cool article on historians dot org 770 00:50:04,760 --> 00:50:09,160 Speaker 1: by an author named Jose Ragas, and he brought up 771 00:50:09,200 --> 00:50:13,480 Speaker 1: something that I hadn't thought about in years, which was 772 00:50:13,600 --> 00:50:19,640 Speaker 1: the scuttle but around or so the idea that in 773 00:50:19,719 --> 00:50:24,200 Speaker 1: the United States people of the Muslim faith might be 774 00:50:24,280 --> 00:50:29,560 Speaker 1: required to carry specialized cards. And that concept is poisonous. 775 00:50:29,960 --> 00:50:33,239 Speaker 1: You know, every every student of history knows exactly where 776 00:50:33,239 --> 00:50:36,799 Speaker 1: that kind of thing leads. The Muslim community in the 777 00:50:36,920 --> 00:50:42,280 Speaker 1: US responded in a tremendously creative way. They're uploading photos 778 00:50:42,280 --> 00:50:46,759 Speaker 1: of ideas to Instagram, Twitter, etcetera, and putting the hashtag 779 00:50:46,880 --> 00:50:49,560 Speaker 1: Muslim I D And I'm over the moon that something 780 00:50:49,600 --> 00:50:52,640 Speaker 1: like that did not get instituted. But thinking like, think 781 00:50:52,719 --> 00:50:56,320 Speaker 1: about all the areas of the world that have intergenerational, 782 00:50:56,760 --> 00:51:02,759 Speaker 1: long standing conflicts based based on religion, based on ethnicity 783 00:51:02,880 --> 00:51:08,320 Speaker 1: or perceived tribal affiliation. This could become a powerful battle 784 00:51:08,920 --> 00:51:11,800 Speaker 1: between conflicting There are a powerful tool in a battle 785 00:51:11,840 --> 00:51:15,680 Speaker 1: between conflicting groups. It's it's way deeper than just having 786 00:51:16,400 --> 00:51:19,040 Speaker 1: a driver's license. That could also be your passport when 787 00:51:19,080 --> 00:51:22,920 Speaker 1: you need it. Yeah, precisely. Well, and let's just take 788 00:51:22,920 --> 00:51:25,640 Speaker 1: it back one more time to the mechanism. Where does 789 00:51:25,680 --> 00:51:28,240 Speaker 1: this digital I D actually live? Where do you carry 790 00:51:28,280 --> 00:51:30,840 Speaker 1: it on you? Because if you think about it right now, 791 00:51:31,440 --> 00:51:34,560 Speaker 1: if I'm not traveling with my I D and my wallet, 792 00:51:34,960 --> 00:51:37,920 Speaker 1: I can you know, claim to be somebody else and 793 00:51:38,000 --> 00:51:43,520 Speaker 1: maybe like save myself if I'm in a really troubling position. Uh, 794 00:51:43,200 --> 00:51:48,279 Speaker 1: if I am traveling with my phone, that's another situation. 795 00:51:48,520 --> 00:51:51,560 Speaker 1: Imagine if you know, because the phone already has inherent 796 00:51:51,760 --> 00:51:56,839 Speaker 1: issues right with privacy, specifically that just by it being 797 00:51:56,920 --> 00:52:01,560 Speaker 1: pinned by cell towers, somebody could figure out where I am. Uh, 798 00:52:01,600 --> 00:52:03,600 Speaker 1: what if the digital ideas on your phone, which is 799 00:52:03,680 --> 00:52:06,759 Speaker 1: I think the most likely scenario. Apple right now is 800 00:52:06,920 --> 00:52:11,000 Speaker 1: attempting to work these new digital ideas that are popping 801 00:52:11,080 --> 00:52:13,960 Speaker 1: up in several states in the United States trying to 802 00:52:13,960 --> 00:52:16,160 Speaker 1: get them to work with Apple Wallet so that you 803 00:52:16,160 --> 00:52:19,160 Speaker 1: could literally just open up your Apple Wallet and use 804 00:52:19,200 --> 00:52:22,400 Speaker 1: your I D that's in there to verify your identity. 805 00:52:22,520 --> 00:52:26,400 Speaker 1: UM in Sweden a couple of years ago. I I 806 00:52:26,640 --> 00:52:28,399 Speaker 1: you may have seen this. You probably saw this been 807 00:52:28,880 --> 00:52:31,480 Speaker 1: in twenty nineteen. There are stories going around and be 808 00:52:31,600 --> 00:52:36,359 Speaker 1: seeing a couple other places featuring one of these implants 809 00:52:36,520 --> 00:52:41,000 Speaker 1: that you can get in your right here, I'm pointing 810 00:52:41,040 --> 00:52:43,160 Speaker 1: to between my thumb and the rest of my fingers. 811 00:52:43,560 --> 00:52:45,360 Speaker 1: That's about the size of a grain of rice. A 812 00:52:45,400 --> 00:52:48,600 Speaker 1: little larger that sits in there and functions as an 813 00:52:48,680 --> 00:52:51,400 Speaker 1: r F I D chip that would have your digital 814 00:52:51,400 --> 00:52:54,120 Speaker 1: idea on it, your banking information, your credit cards, all 815 00:52:54,160 --> 00:53:00,520 Speaker 1: that stuff. UM imagine if that becomes the norm where 816 00:53:00,680 --> 00:53:03,360 Speaker 1: it really is an implant. You know, it's not a 817 00:53:03,400 --> 00:53:06,920 Speaker 1: brain implant or anything that invasive, but it is something 818 00:53:07,120 --> 00:53:11,080 Speaker 1: physically on your body that just functions as the thing 819 00:53:11,160 --> 00:53:12,960 Speaker 1: you use every time you have to pay for something, 820 00:53:12,960 --> 00:53:14,839 Speaker 1: every time you have to prove who you are, every 821 00:53:14,880 --> 00:53:18,960 Speaker 1: time you want to rent whatever. It just occurs that way. Yeah, 822 00:53:19,080 --> 00:53:22,399 Speaker 1: and we become normalized so quickly. Right now, that kind 823 00:53:22,400 --> 00:53:27,879 Speaker 1: of stuff is largely in the world of wet wear enthusiast, 824 00:53:28,640 --> 00:53:32,080 Speaker 1: which it is. It's becoming. Yeah, we did talk about, 825 00:53:32,080 --> 00:53:37,359 Speaker 1: but it's becoming pretty pretty mainstream in Sweden a couple 826 00:53:37,400 --> 00:53:40,800 Speaker 1: other countries in that region that are just looking forward, 827 00:53:40,840 --> 00:53:50,400 Speaker 1: I think more so than than other places, specifically the US. Yeah. Uh. 828 00:53:50,880 --> 00:53:54,680 Speaker 1: To quote Chuck Palainuk, I am Jack's complete lack of surprise, 829 00:53:54,960 --> 00:53:57,640 Speaker 1: you know what I mean, Like it's there's there's gonna be. 830 00:53:57,719 --> 00:54:02,120 Speaker 1: There's always with these sorts of societal changes, there's always 831 00:54:02,120 --> 00:54:04,680 Speaker 1: a tipping point, you know what I mean. If you 832 00:54:05,360 --> 00:54:10,120 Speaker 1: were alive before the time of cell phones and smartphones, 833 00:54:10,719 --> 00:54:15,879 Speaker 1: then you have seen how quickly widespread adoption can occur, right, 834 00:54:15,960 --> 00:54:18,759 Speaker 1: And there are if you are working at an economy 835 00:54:18,760 --> 00:54:21,399 Speaker 1: of scale, there are some really clever things you can 836 00:54:21,440 --> 00:54:26,880 Speaker 1: do to incentivize adoption. So you can um give people 837 00:54:27,080 --> 00:54:31,000 Speaker 1: discounts on stuff if they have you know that this 838 00:54:31,280 --> 00:54:35,319 Speaker 1: implants here. You can also have it show up in 839 00:54:35,360 --> 00:54:39,960 Speaker 1: a flattering way and works of fiction, right, like sunglasses 840 00:54:40,200 --> 00:54:45,320 Speaker 1: were popularized by celebrities even though First Nations people had 841 00:54:45,560 --> 00:54:49,399 Speaker 1: pretty much made up sunglasses thousands and thousands of years ago. Right, 842 00:54:49,440 --> 00:54:52,840 Speaker 1: No one cared until the tool of fiction was used 843 00:54:53,000 --> 00:54:57,319 Speaker 1: to leverage that. And we're not saying that sunglasses are 844 00:54:57,400 --> 00:54:59,560 Speaker 1: the same as smartphones are the same as you know, 845 00:55:00,080 --> 00:55:02,560 Speaker 1: this concept of a digital ID, but it's important to 846 00:55:02,600 --> 00:55:07,359 Speaker 1: know how these ideas can be spread and propagated to you. 847 00:55:08,200 --> 00:55:13,400 Speaker 1: With that, we have to ask for your take. What 848 00:55:13,480 --> 00:55:17,360 Speaker 1: do you think? What is your personal cost benefit analysis? 849 00:55:18,000 --> 00:55:21,120 Speaker 1: Would you be okay with a digital I D? What 850 00:55:21,160 --> 00:55:24,759 Speaker 1: do you think about the data collection systems that are 851 00:55:24,760 --> 00:55:26,840 Speaker 1: going to function with a digital ide the things that 852 00:55:26,920 --> 00:55:31,360 Speaker 1: actually scan and pull all that data in. If a 853 00:55:31,360 --> 00:55:34,200 Speaker 1: government agency can create something like that, don't you think 854 00:55:34,520 --> 00:55:38,560 Speaker 1: smart people, you know, engineers who maybe have a nefarious 855 00:55:38,600 --> 00:55:41,799 Speaker 1: ideas about how what to do with that data and 856 00:55:41,840 --> 00:55:43,640 Speaker 1: how to get ahold of it. Don't you think they 857 00:55:43,640 --> 00:55:46,600 Speaker 1: could scrape up that that stuff if we're just walking 858 00:55:46,640 --> 00:55:49,880 Speaker 1: around with it on our persons at all times. That 859 00:55:49,920 --> 00:55:53,560 Speaker 1: worries me. What do you think? Yeah? And what would 860 00:55:53,760 --> 00:55:57,480 Speaker 1: it take for you to adopt this? You know, a guy, 861 00:55:57,600 --> 00:56:01,520 Speaker 1: I think of Gataga and the way that uh, certain 862 00:56:01,640 --> 00:56:05,680 Speaker 1: genetic standards were instituted on the population. There was never 863 00:56:05,719 --> 00:56:09,640 Speaker 1: a law saying you can't just be a regular born 864 00:56:09,760 --> 00:56:12,400 Speaker 1: human or just a bunch of laws saying that regular 865 00:56:12,440 --> 00:56:17,960 Speaker 1: born humans can't do certain things. So yeah, it's it's strange. 866 00:56:18,480 --> 00:56:22,239 Speaker 1: It is strange. Uh, it is in no small part disturbing. 867 00:56:22,719 --> 00:56:25,759 Speaker 1: It hasn't happened yet, but it's probably some form of this, 868 00:56:26,000 --> 00:56:29,160 Speaker 1: some aspect of it is on the way. Uh. And 869 00:56:29,640 --> 00:56:31,680 Speaker 1: we want to know if you think that's a good thing, 870 00:56:32,080 --> 00:56:36,880 Speaker 1: a bad thing, they're just a thing. Are these concerns overblown? 871 00:56:37,280 --> 00:56:38,879 Speaker 1: Let us know. We try to be easy to find 872 00:56:38,920 --> 00:56:43,360 Speaker 1: online Facebook, here's where it gets crazy. Instagram. Uh, stay 873 00:56:43,360 --> 00:56:46,759 Speaker 1: tuned for some other announcements that we have. You can 874 00:56:47,000 --> 00:56:51,240 Speaker 1: also uh find you can find me on social media 875 00:56:51,400 --> 00:56:54,920 Speaker 1: app and bullying hs W or appen bulling on Instagram. 876 00:56:55,040 --> 00:56:57,000 Speaker 1: If you want of behind the scenes, look at some 877 00:56:57,040 --> 00:56:59,440 Speaker 1: of the stuff we're working on there. Any weird questions 878 00:56:59,520 --> 00:57:03,520 Speaker 1: and in my way, Also, if you, like Matt, have 879 00:57:04,000 --> 00:57:07,560 Speaker 1: objectively made the correct decision, I'll say it and dropped 880 00:57:07,560 --> 00:57:10,360 Speaker 1: off social media, but you still have a story to 881 00:57:10,400 --> 00:57:13,759 Speaker 1: tell us. We want to make sure that you can 882 00:57:13,800 --> 00:57:17,000 Speaker 1: still reach us. And that's why we have an official 883 00:57:17,040 --> 00:57:19,080 Speaker 1: phone number. Okay, So I still don't know how we 884 00:57:19,120 --> 00:57:21,560 Speaker 1: pulled it off, but I'm very glad we have it. Yes, 885 00:57:21,600 --> 00:57:25,000 Speaker 1: we do that number is one eight three three s 886 00:57:25,080 --> 00:57:28,320 Speaker 1: T d W y t K. When you call in, 887 00:57:28,400 --> 00:57:31,920 Speaker 1: give yourself a cool nickname. You've got three minutes at 888 00:57:31,920 --> 00:57:34,040 Speaker 1: the top. Please do tell us whether or not we 889 00:57:34,080 --> 00:57:37,480 Speaker 1: can use your voice and message on the air. That's 890 00:57:37,560 --> 00:57:40,760 Speaker 1: very helpful to us In that three minutes. Say whatever 891 00:57:40,800 --> 00:57:43,520 Speaker 1: you want, ask a question, to suggest a topic, tell 892 00:57:43,600 --> 00:57:45,920 Speaker 1: us the answer to the questions we just asked. And 893 00:57:45,960 --> 00:57:48,560 Speaker 1: you've got three minutes again to do that. If you've 894 00:57:48,560 --> 00:57:50,760 Speaker 1: got more to say than can fit in that timeframe, 895 00:57:50,840 --> 00:57:53,960 Speaker 1: why not instead send us a good old fashioned email. 896 00:57:54,360 --> 00:58:16,960 Speaker 1: We are conspiracy at ihart radio dot com. Stuff they 897 00:58:16,960 --> 00:58:18,880 Speaker 1: don't want you to know. Is a production of I 898 00:58:19,000 --> 00:58:22,120 Speaker 1: Heart Radio. For more podcasts from my heart Radio, visit 899 00:58:22,120 --> 00:58:24,920 Speaker 1: the i heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you 900 00:58:24,960 --> 00:58:26,120 Speaker 1: listen to your favorite shows.