Speaker 1: On this episode of its World. Last week, Ukraine attacked
Speaker 1: Russia with drones, launching them from semi trucks and destroyed
Speaker 1: or damage at least a dozen Russian aircraft, including many
Speaker 1: of Moscow's nuclear capable strategic bombers. On Friday, Russia responded
Speaker 1: by launching four hundred and seven drones in decoys, nearly
Speaker 1: forty crews missiles, and six ballistic missiles from land, air,
Speaker 1: and sea at towns and cities across the breadth of
Speaker 1: the nation. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, it appeared
Speaker 1: to be the second largest drone assault of the war,
Speaker 1: after Russia launched nearly five hundred drones last weekend. As
Speaker 1: the war in Ukraine escalates, how will the United States respond?
Speaker 1: I'm really pleased to welcome my guests, Anatole Levin. He
Speaker 1: is the director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy
Speaker 1: Institute for Responsible State CREP. Anatole, welcome and thank you
Speaker 1: for joining me.
Speaker 2: On news World. Nice to be here. How long have
Speaker 2: you been.
Speaker 1: Looking at Ukraine and Ukraine Russian relations?
Speaker 2: Since nineteen ninety when I was a British journalist for
Speaker 2: London Times. It was sent out to the then Soviet
Speaker 2: Union and spent seven years there. I visited Ukraine a lot,
Speaker 2: I can't remember how many times in those years. And
Speaker 2: then I wrote a book about the Ukrainian Russian relationship
Speaker 2: called A Fraternal Rivalry, which came out in nineteen ninety nine.
Speaker 1: And so you were actually there during the whole transition
Speaker 1: from the Soviet Union to Russia and from a Russia
Speaker 1: trying to grapple with openness to the rise of Putin.
Speaker 1: I was, yes, were you surprised by the rise of Putin?
Speaker 2: No? I mean, in fact, given what happened to Russia
Speaker 2: in the nineteen nineties, I was afraid at the time
Speaker 2: that it could be even worse, that you could have,
Speaker 2: I mean out right fascism and persecution of national minorities
Speaker 2: and civil war. Of course, what we've got has been bad,
Speaker 2: but in Russia things can always be worse, because you
Speaker 2: had a combination of things that very few countries have
Speaker 2: faced before, which was a combination of the loss of empire,
Speaker 2: because that's really what the Soviet Union was. Now. Of
Speaker 2: course other countries went through that, Britain went through it,
Speaker 2: France went through it, but that was combined with catastrophic
Speaker 2: economic collapse whereas one of the things that made the
Speaker 2: loss of Empire easier for the British and French in
Speaker 2: the fifties and sixties was that these were years of
Speaker 2: great economic prosperity and expansion. And then on top of
Speaker 2: that you had the end of communist ideology, which left
Speaker 2: people morally and intellectually and ideologically completely at sea. And
Speaker 2: so I was expecting backlash against the backlash is what
Speaker 2: we got. I mean also, I have to say, and
Speaker 2: this alerted me in advance to some of the things
Speaker 2: that we've seen, well we're already seeing. We've seen much
Speaker 2: more since then. It was the absolute contempt and indifference
Speaker 2: of the Moscow and Petersburg liberal intelligentsia to the mass
Speaker 2: of the Russian population. They absolutely despise them. Well, there
Speaker 2: were reasons they despise them as ignorant Soviet educated backward,
Speaker 2: but in the meantime, the liberals fell absolutely headlong for
Speaker 2: every Western latest intellectual and moral fashion, while being totally
Speaker 2: indifferent to the suffering of ordinary Russians in these years,
Speaker 2: and especially older Russians, and Putin's most important base but
Speaker 2: also the one he's most afraid of, are in fact,
Speaker 2: the pensioners it's rather funny Putin crushes other opponents with
Speaker 2: police force and battles and tear gas. You can't do
Speaker 2: that to grandmothers. And whenever the grandmothers start to protest,
Speaker 2: Putin backs down because for them he paid their pensions
Speaker 2: on time. I mean, that was as important as anything else.
Speaker 1: Do you see him, despite everything, as relatively stable in power.
Speaker 2: Wells Jogi Berra said about never making predictions, especially about
Speaker 2: the future. So I say this with hesitation, but yes,
Speaker 2: I think so. Now. There was of course a very
Speaker 2: serious wobble because he and his cronies well launched the
Speaker 2: Ukraine War and then hideously mismanaged it, in part because
Speaker 2: of the corruption that they had tolerated or even encouraged
Speaker 2: within the Russian military. And there was the co attempt
Speaker 2: by one of his cronies, Pregosion of Wagner. But he
Speaker 2: overcame that, in part, of course, because Pregosian was hoping
Speaker 2: that enough of the army would mutiny junior officers and
Speaker 2: soldiers on his side because of anger at the way
Speaker 2: that the war had been mismanaged. But of course they
Speaker 2: all knew that if they did that, that was the
Speaker 2: shortest road to defeat. In Ukraine, and first they didn't
Speaker 2: want to be defeated. But also, of course they don't
Speaker 2: need to learn the history of the Weimar Republic to
Speaker 2: know that if you're trying to come to power as
Speaker 2: a new regime, you don't want to inherit defeat. So yes,
Speaker 2: I think he's relatively stable unless the economy completely collapses.
Speaker 2: But it's in trouble, but it showed no sign of
Speaker 2: collapse yet.
Speaker 1: Given the Russian capacity for endurance, what we would think
Speaker 1: of is the terrible recession. They would think of as normal.
Speaker 2: Yeah, and they went through much worse the older ones
Speaker 2: in the nineties. And what the nineties, on top of
Speaker 2: the terrible experiences of Russia in the twentieth century left
Speaker 2: ordinary Russians is this deep fear of chaos, of anarchy,
Speaker 2: of civil strife and violence, and that does make them
Speaker 2: naturally conservative. The old British poem always keep tight hold
Speaker 2: of nurse for fear of finding something worse. The Russians
Speaker 2: have a kind of absolute gut feeling of that.
Speaker 1: If I understand you from their perspective, an authoritarian regime
Speaker 1: that blocks the criminals and that blocks the chaos is
Speaker 1: preferable to a soft regime that allows the society to decay.
Speaker 2: Well, that's right. And if you talk to small businessmen
Speaker 2: or business women in Russia, they dislike the corruption of
Speaker 2: the top elites in Moscow. But the ones who are
Speaker 2: around in the nineteen nineties or whose parents were still
Speaker 2: say that now is much better because you know, in
Speaker 2: the nineties the mafia was everywhere. There were competing mafias
Speaker 2: all extorting from small businesses and ruining them. And now
Speaker 2: you know, it's got much more regular. It's you know,
Speaker 2: if you like it's you make your payments to the police,
Speaker 2: Widows and Orphans Fund, and they do protect you against
Speaker 2: the mafia. And so it's sort of become a regular, predictable,
Speaker 2: limited form of corruption that businessmen can live with.
Speaker 1: You know, those I think parents that we just don't
Speaker 1: appreciate in the West, that fit the historic experience. And
Speaker 1: I think also if you remember that two weeks before
Speaker 1: the Russian attack on Ukraine, the chairman of the Joint
Speaker 1: Chiefs of Staff, General Milly, testified in front of a
Speaker 1: Senate committee he thought the Russians would be in Ukraine
Speaker 1: in three days. So it's not abnormal that the Russians
Speaker 1: thought they'd be in Kievan three days and then it
Speaker 1: just all fell apart.
Speaker 2: That's right, But you know, all the same, I actually
Speaker 2: expect them to try and go for the whole country,
Speaker 2: because I didn't think that they had the troops to
Speaker 2: do that. I thought they were going to seize the
Speaker 2: Russian speaking areas of the east and south, which they
Speaker 2: could have done if they ignored Kiev and gone for that.
Speaker 2: Then they were going to try to negotiate on that
Speaker 2: basis and do a deal, which of course they did
Speaker 2: in March of twenty twenty two. But by then they
Speaker 2: had already suffered so many defeats that their bargaining position
Speaker 2: had gone way down, and the Ukrainians were able, i mean,
Speaker 2: possibly foolishly, but still to refuse to do that deal.
Speaker 2: And of course the Russians were also still asking some
Speaker 2: absolutely unacceptable things, as they are today.
Speaker 1: Seems to me that it's pretty clear that Putin's interest
Speaker 1: is a totally neutralized Ukraine, incapable of defending itself.
Speaker 2: Yep, that's what the Russians are asking for or demanding,
Speaker 2: But of course the Ukrainians will never agree to that.
Speaker 2: I think it's possible that you might get a deal,
Speaker 2: which is the terms of the Austrian State Treaty in
Speaker 2: nineteen fifty four that the Ukrainians give up certain categories
Speaker 2: of weapons like long range missiles that are capable of
Speaker 2: striking deep in Russia. But that's as far as they
Speaker 2: can go in my view. And look, maybe if the
Speaker 2: Russians go on and on, the Ukrainian army will collapse.
Speaker 2: But as everyone says over the past year, I mean,
Speaker 2: the Russians have been making progress, but very very slowly
Speaker 2: and with heavy casualties. So you know, in the end,
Speaker 2: I'm afraid this will be decided on the battlefield, and
Speaker 2: we just don't know, We cannot be sure what's going
Speaker 2: to happen on the battlefield.
Speaker 1: Were you surprised by the Ukrainian ability to drive trucks
Speaker 1: thirty four hundred miles from Kiev and then have them
Speaker 1: launch automated drones that were reasonably effective in taking out
Speaker 1: very expensive aircraft.
Speaker 2: Well I was, yes, I mean it was clearly a
Speaker 2: brilliantly planned operation, I mean, a masterpiece of its kind.
Speaker 2: But then of course, you know, look at what is
Speaker 2: the miss terrorists have been able to do inside Russia
Speaker 2: over the years, these ghastly massacres, I mean, of course
Speaker 2: this has happened in Europe as well, but then you know,
Speaker 2: putin state is a kind of police state. You expect
Speaker 2: police states to be able to stop this kind of thing. Clearly,
Speaker 2: the Russian system is also very incompetent and leaky.
Speaker 1: I mean, the whole idea that you could drive these
Speaker 1: trucks and not a single one of them got picked
Speaker 1: up struck me as amazing.
Speaker 2: Yeah, well, you know, could have been bribes to the
Speaker 2: police along the way if you claimed that these trucks
Speaker 2: were actually full of some kind of smuggled goods and
Speaker 2: then paid the police a few thousand dollars to let
Speaker 2: them throw and not to check. And of course the
Speaker 2: thing is, just as there are so many Russians in Ukraine,
Speaker 2: there are millions and millions and millions of Ukrainians in Russia,
Speaker 2: and so it's not that you could spot Ukrainian agents automatically,
Speaker 2: and they clearly have a network within Russia. From that
Speaker 2: point of view, it's almost a little bit like the
Speaker 2: IRA in Britain in the past.
Speaker 1: Does that just make it interesting or does it make
Speaker 1: it a serious sign that the Ukrainians may be able
Speaker 1: to balance off Russian mass by being more agile and
Speaker 1: more inventive.
Speaker 2: Well, I think the real thing that's holding the Russians
Speaker 2: back on the battlefield is the change of military technology.
Speaker 2: Many people have made the analogy with the First World War,
Speaker 2: and I think that's right in many ways, because I
Speaker 2: was in Ukraine and talked to Ukrainian veterans and what
Speaker 2: they said was, you know, we hear all these reports
Speaker 2: of supposed Russian human waive attacks and meat attacks. They said,
Speaker 2: that's absolute nonsense. They said, you cannot do that because
Speaker 2: the battlefields are absolutely choked with mines, and of course
Speaker 2: you can clear minefields, but it takes a long time,
Speaker 2: and somebody trying to clear a minefield in the open
Speaker 2: with a drone hovering overhead as a dead man. The
Speaker 2: Russians can't bring tanks up to the front line. So
Speaker 2: this whole old Russian approach, or what we thought of
Speaker 2: in the Cold War of a huge tank army sweeping
Speaker 2: forwards and you know, advancing over hundreds of miles just
Speaker 2: not possible. And they're bringing up their reinforcements to the
Speaker 2: front line, apparently in groups the smallest three, because anything
Speaker 2: bigger will be spotted by drones and destroyed.
Speaker 1: Given how inexpensive some of the drones are. Now, how
Speaker 1: much should we be re thinking the American defense system
Speaker 1: in the light of these capabilities.
Speaker 2: Well, I think we should be rethinking it very seriously,
Speaker 2: as should the Europeans, because I think it does mean,
Speaker 2: for example, that the Europeans could stop a Russian attack
Speaker 2: on Europe but relatively low cost, which would give them
Speaker 2: time to build up their own defenses. As far as
Speaker 2: America is concerned, well, one thing, you know, well, several
Speaker 2: European countries have already withdrawn from the Anti land Mine Treaty.
Speaker 2: America was never part of it because of South Korea.
Speaker 2: But mines, in my view, are well they're not good,
Speaker 2: of course, they're hideous things, but they are critical to
Speaker 2: the battlefield now.
Speaker 1: Which means that we're moving towards the defense having a
Speaker 1: great advantages over the offense.
Speaker 2: Well, that's right. And for Taiwan this has two very
Speaker 2: interesting things. I think One is if the Taiwanese are
Speaker 2: actually prepared to spend a lot of money and build
Speaker 2: up their defenses, they can really deter and badly damage
Speaker 2: Chinese attempt at invasion. I think the Chinese would suffer
Speaker 2: very heavily. But on the other hand, of course, this
Speaker 2: is very worrying for the US Navy if the Chinese
Speaker 2: instead impose a naval blockade on Taiwan, because look at
Speaker 2: what happened to the Black Sea Fleet. I mean something
Speaker 2: that I got completely wrong, but I have to say
Speaker 2: so did every other analyst I know. Is that we
Speaker 2: thought that the Black Sea Fleet would simply dominate the
Speaker 2: Russian Black Sea Fleet would dominate the Black Sea. The
Speaker 2: Ukrainians had no navy at all. Instead, they have defeated
Speaker 2: and very badly damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet, forced
Speaker 2: it out of its base in Crimea, simply with land
Speaker 2: based missiles, drones, seaborn drones as well as airborn drones.
Speaker 1: You have an eleven billion dollar aircraft carrier, and you
Speaker 1: have seventeen hundred Chinese merchant ships that visited the US
Speaker 1: last year. Now, it would be pretty easy to put
Speaker 1: ten or twenty or thirty drones on every merchant ship.
Speaker 1: We wouldn't have another ammunition to stop all.
Speaker 2: Look what the Ukrainians did, you know, containers full of
Speaker 2: drones operated from a distance. But on the other hand,
Speaker 2: you know, if you look at the First and Second
Speaker 2: World Wars, it hasn't perhaps been sufficiently noticed because it
Speaker 2: wasn't very dramatic, unlike the Great Naval battles. But of course,
Speaker 2: if China can blockade Taiwan, the US Navy can still
Speaker 2: blockade the whole of China's maritime trade. China still doesn't
Speaker 2: have a blue water navy that could unblock the Straits
Speaker 2: of Malacca or challenge America in the Indian Ocean. Now,
Speaker 2: of course that's a key reason why the Chinese are
Speaker 2: building Belton Road and their overland energy supplies. But I
Speaker 2: think that is a good deterrent against the Chinese. Look,
Speaker 2: you may think you can force Taiwan into surrender, but
Speaker 2: we can blockade you the way that the British did
Speaker 2: to the Germans, which, of course, in the First War
Speaker 2: War at least crippled the German economy and eventually won
Speaker 2: the war.
Speaker 1: There's a bill which I have frankly have encouraged in
Speaker 1: the Senate that has eighty co sponsors on basically draconian
Speaker 1: sanctions against Russia, which Trump doesn't seem to be very
Speaker 1: happy with. But at the same time, I have a
Speaker 1: hunch that as things above, the Senators may pass it anyway,
Speaker 1: and at eighty you really have a pretty big statement.
Speaker 1: How do you see this dance continuing over the next
Speaker 1: six months?
Speaker 2: What would you expect? Well, I mean, on this bill.
Speaker 2: The real problem is countries like India, and above all India,
Speaker 2: which are of course very important US partners, but are
Speaker 2: very heavily dependent on imports of Russian oil and LNG.
Speaker 2: And the Indians they have this tremendous sense of themselves
Speaker 2: as a great independent power and as a partner of
Speaker 2: the US, but not a satellite or dependency. Is America
Speaker 2: really going to slap five hundred percent tariffs on Indian
Speaker 2: imports and other countries South Korea that are important US allies.
Speaker 2: I mean, so I think somewhat the Europeans are doing
Speaker 2: it may be more effective, but I think we've already
Speaker 2: learned there isn't an economic knockout blow against Russia. There's pressure,
Speaker 2: there isn't a ko as to what will happen in
Speaker 2: the next six months, you know, as President Trump has said,
Speaker 2: he's going to walk away from the peace process. The
Speaker 2: big question though, is does the US continue military and
Speaker 2: above all intelligence aid to Ukraine. I think intelligence is
Speaker 2: more important than weapons, even because without US satellite intelligence
Speaker 2: and the Ukrainians don't know when the Russians are building up
Speaker 2: their forces. Without terrain mapping, they can't actually fire the
Speaker 2: European cruise missiles they've been given because they can't hit
Speaker 2: their targets, and without starlink they can't talk to each other.
Speaker 2: So if that is cut, the Ukrainians will be in
Speaker 2: very serious trouble. I mean, if it's not, then we will,
Speaker 2: I think, see a continuation on the battlefield of this
Speaker 2: war of attrition. Plus the Russians, as they've been doing
Speaker 2: in the past couple of days, trying to wear down
Speaker 2: the Ukrainian economy by attacking above all Ukrainian's energy infrastructure,
Speaker 2: we will have to see by the First World War analogy.
Speaker 2: On the one hand, you can have a stalemate lasting
Speaker 2: for years. On the other hand, as you well know,
Speaker 2: eventually one side or the other did crack. And it
Speaker 2: doesn't seem to me that if either side cracks, it's
Speaker 2: going to be the Russians. And so there is this
Speaker 2: risk that eventually the Ukrainians well above all, will run
Speaker 2: out of men because we can provide well. Our stocks
Speaker 2: are now very low, but still we can corn providing
Speaker 2: weapons to the Ukrainians and intelligence unless we send our
Speaker 2: own armies, which every administration has vowed not to do.
Speaker 2: We can't provide men for the Ukrainians, and that's their
Speaker 2: gracious weakness. I think.
Speaker 1: In the middle of all this, as you know, President
Speaker 1: Trump spoke with Putin and then posted on truth Social
Speaker 1: sort of his version of what they talked about. And
Speaker 1: it was a little chilling in that he said. The
Speaker 1: call lasted approximately an hour and fifteen minutes. We discussed
Speaker 1: the attack on Russia's dock airplanes by Ukraine, and also
Speaker 1: various other attacks have been taking place by both sides.
Speaker 1: It was a good conversation, but not a conversation that
Speaker 1: will lead to immediate peace. President Putin did say and
Speaker 1: very strongly, that he will have to respond to the
Speaker 1: recent attack on the airfields. He promptly turns it and says,
Speaker 1: we also discussed Iran. It's as though I like to
Speaker 1: have Russia as an ally, but he knows he really
Speaker 1: ought to try to get peace in Ukraine and he's
Speaker 1: sort of torn between the two strategic goals.
Speaker 2: Well, I think that's right. I think the problem as
Speaker 2: well is that, for reasons I don't fully understand that
Speaker 2: Trump administration has not put together a professional team with
Speaker 2: the detailed knowledge to be able to negotiate with Russia,
Speaker 2: because as far as I can see, the only hope
Speaker 2: is that you get Russia to withdraw or reduce its
Speaker 2: demands on Ukraine the things that the Ukrainians cannot accept,
Speaker 2: withdrawal from more territory disarmament in return giving the Russians
Speaker 2: some of what they want. That's also in accordance with
Speaker 2: Trump administration policy when it comes to US Russian relations
Speaker 2: because clearly, I mean Putin is very anxious not to
Speaker 2: completely ruin his relationship with Trump. And there you're talking
Speaker 2: about new arms control agreements, talking about maybe limiting US
Speaker 2: forces in Europe, which is what Trump wants to do anyway,
Speaker 2: You're talking about some kind of institutionalized you recognition of
Speaker 2: a Russian, say, in European security, and of course if
Speaker 2: you're looking at an end to further NATO expansion, which
Speaker 2: I think Trump is totally uninterested in any way. So
Speaker 2: there are things we can offer the Russians that could
Speaker 2: potentially lead them to reduce their demands on Ukraine. But
Speaker 2: of course, under the surface, but not entirely under the surface,
Speaker 2: there's a big debate going on within the Russian establishment.
Speaker 2: Over this, there are the hardliners who really do want
Speaker 2: to press on for complete victory in Ukraine, and the
Speaker 2: others who are saying, look, this isn't militarily possible, it's
Speaker 2: not worth it anyway. You know, all we get is
Speaker 2: a keep of ruins populated by people who hate us.
Speaker 2: So let's try and do a deal. I think both
Speaker 2: of those elements are present in Putin's mind from what
Speaker 2: I gather, so we need to find a way to
Speaker 2: strengthen the one and diminish the other.
Speaker 1: How seriously do you take the worry that if he
Speaker 1: does win in Ukraine, that it puts Estonia, Lautfia, Lithuania
Speaker 1: and Finland under an increased threat.
Speaker 2: I don't, to be honest, partly because look, I mean,
Speaker 2: if you see the problems that Russia has faced in
Speaker 2: Ukraine and its failures to launch a direct attack on
Speaker 2: NATO would be hideously risky, and the question then is
Speaker 2: what do you actually get out of this? But also
Speaker 2: there's a contradiction here because many people have said, and
Speaker 2: in part quite rightly, they're not just Putin, but Russians
Speaker 2: have this particular obsession with Ukraine for a whole set
Speaker 2: of historical ethnic, cultural, whatever reasons. But the Russians don't
Speaker 2: have these feelings about the Baltic States and certainly not
Speaker 2: about Finland. The Russians are a bit bewildered about Finland
Speaker 2: joining later because they said, look, we haven't done anything
Speaker 2: to Finland since nineteen forty four. We've never threatened Finland.
Speaker 2: We always had a good relationship with Finland. We like
Speaker 2: the Finns. What's going on here. The Russians didn't like
Speaker 2: NATO enlargement to Poland and the Baltic States, but you know,
Speaker 2: if you remember, they never did anything about it, and
Speaker 2: they could have done. The Russians could have really stirred
Speaker 2: up the Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia to revolt.
Speaker 2: They could have carried out terrorist attacks and then tried
Speaker 2: to stimulate ethnic conflict. They could have laid claim to
Speaker 2: Russian majority areas on Russia's borders. They didn't do any
Speaker 2: of that because it wasn't worth a catastrophic clash with
Speaker 2: NATO for the sake of the Baltic States. But if
Speaker 2: they didn't do it, then there really isn't a reason
Speaker 2: why they would do it now. Also, I think there
Speaker 2: is this desire, certainly to get on with Trump and
Speaker 2: hopefully his successor Republican success, whoever that is. There's also,
Speaker 2: of course still this desire to reach out to the
Speaker 2: right in Europe, who of course have if you look
Speaker 2: at the pen in France and so forth, they've lined
Speaker 2: up by NATO against the Russian invasion. But still they
Speaker 2: and their supporters are not at all enthusiastic about unlimited
Speaker 2: permanent support for Ukraine. If you ought a direct attack
Speaker 2: on NATO and the European Union, because of course all
Speaker 2: these countries are also you members, well, all that simply
Speaker 2: goes out of the window. Then you have well the
Speaker 2: risk of nuclear catastrophe, but you also have of course
Speaker 2: a permanently foreseeable time rect relationship with the West, and
Speaker 2: of course you put yourself even more deeply in the
Speaker 2: pockets of the Chinese. Now. The Russians are being very
Speaker 2: disciplined in public about not talking about their fears in
Speaker 2: this regard, but believe me, if you talk to them
Speaker 2: in private, a lot of them are very unhappy with
Speaker 2: the way in which Russia is becoming dependent on China.
Speaker 1: Goes right to the heart of going all the way
Speaker 1: back to the Mongol yoke and the fear of being
Speaker 1: absorbed by the East and seeing themselves as a unique
Speaker 1: civilization between the West and the East. It's an amazing time.
Speaker 1: I want to thank you. I think Anatole, this is
Speaker 1: such a complex area and it was very helpful to
Speaker 1: get your insights and your understanding. I want to let
Speaker 1: our listeners know they can follow the work you're doing
Speaker 1: at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft at quincyist dot org.
Speaker 1: We're going to have that on our show page and
Speaker 1: make sure that people can stay in touch and follow
Speaker 1: what you're doing. I really appreciate you taking the time
Speaker 1: to be with us today.
Speaker 2: It was a great pleasure, sir, Thank you.
Speaker 1: Thank you to my guests, Anatole Evan. You can learn
Speaker 1: more about the war in Ukraine on our show page
Speaker 1: at newtsworld dot com. Newsworld is produced by Genglish three
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