WEBVTT - Interview With John Roque: Masters in Business (Audio)

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<v Speaker 1>Brought to you by Bank of America Merrill Lynch, committed

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<v Speaker 1>to bringing higher finance to lower carbon named the most

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<v Speaker 1>That's the power of Global Connections. Bank of America North

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<v Speaker 1>America member f D i C. This is Masters in

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<v Speaker 1>Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio this week on

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<v Speaker 1>the podcast, I have someone I've actually followed his work

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<v Speaker 1>for many many years. His name is John Roke, and

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<v Speaker 1>he is a technician extraordinaire. Uh. He is one of

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<v Speaker 1>those technical folks that other technicians talk about in hushed

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<v Speaker 1>and reverent tones. You will find him to be uh straightforward, humble,

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<v Speaker 1>uh blunt and how he describes what he what he does.

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<v Speaker 1>If you're looking for somebody who has worked for George

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<v Speaker 1>Soros and worked for other storage shops to be arrogant

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<v Speaker 1>and uh suffer from a big head, this is not

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<v Speaker 1>the guy uh uh that exhibits any of that. He

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<v Speaker 1>is uh someone who um not only has worked at

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<v Speaker 1>places like uh Lehman Brothers and and Sorrows Funds Management,

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<v Speaker 1>but has constantly improved his craft and constantly raised his

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<v Speaker 1>own skill level and reputation within the industry UM and

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<v Speaker 1>is really insightful and really knowledgeable about just about everything

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<v Speaker 1>related to technical analysis. So if you were all interested

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<v Speaker 1>in charts, in in investing, in trading, if you want

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<v Speaker 1>to know how some of the sausage is made on

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<v Speaker 1>the technical side, UH, you can't do much better than

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<v Speaker 1>John Rokee. So, with no further ado, my conversation with

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<v Speaker 1>John Roke. This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholtz

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<v Speaker 1>on Boomberg Video. My special guest today is John Roke.

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<v Speaker 1>He is a technician extraordinaire and spent the first twenty

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<v Speaker 1>one years of his career as a south side analyst

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<v Speaker 1>before being recruited to the buy side by UH George

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<v Speaker 1>Soros UH and his hedge funds UH. He spent five

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<v Speaker 1>years at Lehman Brothers, about a decade at the Texas

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<v Speaker 1>BLI Schroeder, a few years at w JB Capital before

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<v Speaker 1>he ended up with Soros. He is now let's call it,

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<v Speaker 1>managing director and chief market strategist at a sorrow seated

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<v Speaker 1>hedge fund called Key Square Capital Management. John Roke, Welcome

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<v Speaker 1>to Bloomberg. Thanks Barry. Pleasure to be here. So you

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<v Speaker 1>and I know each other for for some time. I

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<v Speaker 1>was always a fan of getting your research. UM, let's

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<v Speaker 1>talk a little bit about what you do and how

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<v Speaker 1>you do it. H you were on the South Side

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<v Speaker 1>for over twenty years. Most of what I know about

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<v Speaker 1>your work is that you were U technician, a chart reader.

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<v Speaker 1>Was that always your career? Did you start out as

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<v Speaker 1>a technician or or how did you eventually evolved to that.

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<v Speaker 1>I finished my NBA fort them University and now called

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<v Speaker 1>the Gabelly School. Uh, And like anybody else who probably

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<v Speaker 1>graduated either with an undergraduate degree in the mid eighties

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<v Speaker 1>or an NBA in the early nineties, you probably wanted

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<v Speaker 1>to work on Wall Street. I found it difficult going.

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<v Speaker 1>I you know, walked around my resume back then, and

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<v Speaker 1>there was very little security in the buildings, so you

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<v Speaker 1>were able to go in and deliver just resume want

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<v Speaker 1>it was. It was a great time. I got to

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<v Speaker 1>meet the Sanford Bernstein just by doing that. Just happenstance.

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<v Speaker 1>And there was an ad in the paper. Like guys

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<v Speaker 1>of our age used to do. We used to look

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<v Speaker 1>at what's in the classified correct and UH, there was

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<v Speaker 1>a job for a an analyst position at Sappian Investment

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<v Speaker 1>Research and place, New York. That's way back when. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>It certainly is Ken Sappian Uh and his former partner,

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<v Speaker 1>Ken Smiling where top analysts on the street in the seventies,

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<v Speaker 1>and uh he ran a boutique investment shop. I applied

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<v Speaker 1>to him. I sent the resume, a cover letter and

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<v Speaker 1>a copy of my thesis paper, and Ken was kind

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<v Speaker 1>enough to hire me. So you you come out of

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<v Speaker 1>school with an m b A, you start working for

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<v Speaker 1>a boutique research firm. How does that morph into a CMT?

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<v Speaker 1>How does that morph into technicals? Well, to be honest,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm not a CMT, but I'll tell you how it

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<v Speaker 1>morphed into technicals. So Ken saffian Um did a ton

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<v Speaker 1>of economic work, but he also did a ton of

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<v Speaker 1>technical work. In fact, he had a process in the

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<v Speaker 1>late sixties seventies called the dual market principle, where he

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<v Speaker 1>saw the market as being delineated between growth stocks and

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<v Speaker 1>cyclical stocks at different points in an economic cycle. So

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<v Speaker 1>he did a lot of cutting edge technical work, and

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<v Speaker 1>um he allowed me to join in to maintain and

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<v Speaker 1>and create and keep economic UH indicators as well as

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<v Speaker 1>technical indicators. And I think it was sort of Um,

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<v Speaker 1>you know he opened the kimono for lack of a

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<v Speaker 1>better phrase, and I got to see a lot of things.

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<v Speaker 1>I became very interested. So so how did that lead

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<v Speaker 1>to chart? Well, every single day, I know this will

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<v Speaker 1>sound really old school or or dinosaur like, at the

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<v Speaker 1>end of the day, I would print out nine D

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<v Speaker 1>prices from my bloomberg. There was one Bloomberg in the

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<v Speaker 1>whole shop, and I would graph using pencil and a

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<v Speaker 1>ruler and graph paper. Uh, the high low enclosing prices

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<v Speaker 1>for nineties stocks for every day for four years. You

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<v Speaker 1>are you are not the only technician who said that.

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<v Speaker 1>We We've had from Jeff to graft to to Luisia Matta,

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<v Speaker 1>to Paul Desmond to Ralph Akimpora. It seems that this

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<v Speaker 1>generation and the previous generation of people all graft by

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<v Speaker 1>hand in the early days. Well that was the only

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<v Speaker 1>way to do it when it really came down to it.

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<v Speaker 1>The Mansfield chart used to be delivered on a Saturday

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<v Speaker 1>morning to your house, but they were through Thursday prices.

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<v Speaker 1>Explain what that is? That's people so younguns aren't going

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<v Speaker 1>to know. Mansfield was was out of New Jersey. I

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<v Speaker 1>think it was Jersey City, and it was a subscription

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<v Speaker 1>pricing and you sent in your check and you would

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<v Speaker 1>get New York Stock Exchange or nasdac amex charts like

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<v Speaker 1>Giant book would show it was Actually it was almost

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<v Speaker 1>like loose leap paper that you could you could update stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>You would flip through it and they would deliver it on.

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<v Speaker 1>You could put it in a binder, but um, I

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<v Speaker 1>would end up flipping through it, throwing out the ones

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<v Speaker 1>I didn't want, keeping the ones I did, And it

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<v Speaker 1>came and sell a fane paper and some guy would

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<v Speaker 1>drop it off like your newspaper on a Saturday morning

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<v Speaker 1>on your front stoop. If I recall they were located

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<v Speaker 1>in Jersey City, so they could get to the New

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<v Speaker 1>York City people quickly as opposed to where, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>being on the other side of the country. They had

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<v Speaker 1>printed and then drop it off in. It was an

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<v Speaker 1>excellent service. The charts were easy to read. And uh,

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<v Speaker 1>nobody had this sort of stuff at your home, right

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<v Speaker 1>bloom By coming into your house was thin. But you

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<v Speaker 1>didn't have the Internet, you didn't have the computing patter,

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<v Speaker 1>you didn't have anything, right, So and then UH Investors

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<v Speaker 1>Business Daily. You could buy chart books from them. They

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<v Speaker 1>would also be delivered on a weekly basis. That sort

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<v Speaker 1>of took Mansfield and and upgraded a little bit. Uh huh.

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<v Speaker 1>But those were the only ways to do it, really,

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<v Speaker 1>that was it. So at what point did you say, gee,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm a pure technician. I'm not really looking at a

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<v Speaker 1>whole lot else besides technicals. Well, when at Saffian Investment Research,

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<v Speaker 1>I thought that doing it from a technical point of

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<v Speaker 1>view allowed me to see a lot of things pretty

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<v Speaker 1>dawn quickly, rather than focusing on one thing and being

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<v Speaker 1>in depth. And I like the overview aspect of it.

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<v Speaker 1>And at that point, although my thesis paper was on

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<v Speaker 1>kind of peripherals and it was using you know, financial

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<v Speaker 1>statement analysis, I was sort of wholly technical. And I've

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<v Speaker 1>been wholly technical since ever since. So so let's talk

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<v Speaker 1>about technicals a little bit. Um. What is it that

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<v Speaker 1>charts actually measure and why does that work? I think

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<v Speaker 1>charts measure the dynamic between buyers and sellers, supply and demand.

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<v Speaker 1>Now you know you're you're you're a long time market participant,

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<v Speaker 1>and you might say to me, well, John, for every

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<v Speaker 1>buyer there has to be a seller, and I'd say,

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<v Speaker 1>I agree, But technical analysis tells us who's more aggressive,

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<v Speaker 1>the buyer or the seller. And I think that's a

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<v Speaker 1>very important concept. So we might say, yeah, for every buyer,

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<v Speaker 1>there's a seller. Yeah. But if I'm the buyer and

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<v Speaker 1>I want to pay more for it because I really

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<v Speaker 1>think it's going up, that is information that is readily available.

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<v Speaker 1>There may not be a buyer seller at every price.

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<v Speaker 1>That's correct. So that's what determined. That's correct. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>if you think about it this way, um, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>you might say to me that I'm buying this stock

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<v Speaker 1>because it's cheap, and and I'll say that's true, But

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<v Speaker 1>it doesn't win because it stays cheap, right, It wins

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<v Speaker 1>because by definition, it gets momentum and gets less cheap.

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<v Speaker 1>And and just just because something is cheap doesn't mean

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<v Speaker 1>it's not going to get cheaper. That's correct. I'm Barry Ridults.

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<v Speaker 1>You're listening to Master's in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My

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<v Speaker 1>special guest today is John Roke. He is the master

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<v Speaker 1>technician who previously was working with George Soros. Now he

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<v Speaker 1>works at a sorrow specked hedge fund called Key Square Capital.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's talk a little bit about technicals, and I'm assuming

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<v Speaker 1>the audience is fairly lay person. Explain exactly what technical

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<v Speaker 1>analysis is for the lay person. I think technical analysis

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<v Speaker 1>is about trend It is not about trading. There are

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<v Speaker 1>some people who are really good at trading, but I'm not.

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<v Speaker 1>And I think in the advent of machines at hyper

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<v Speaker 1>speed um, the less we talk about trading, the the

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<v Speaker 1>likely we're going to be more successful at our trend

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<v Speaker 1>following discipline. So I think technicals are about trend. Trend

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<v Speaker 1>is the most is the trend is the least in

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<v Speaker 1>my opinion, understood investment concept, however, because it's very hard

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<v Speaker 1>to identify. So let's let's let's go into trends a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit. I was always taught a trend is you

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<v Speaker 1>you can as if you can draw a straight line

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<v Speaker 1>across three points, you have a trend. Is Is that oversimplifying? No,

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<v Speaker 1>I don't think it's oversimplifying it at all. And how

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<v Speaker 1>many people do you know in a business are willing

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<v Speaker 1>to stick with that trend until it's finished, as long

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<v Speaker 1>as it's going in the same right direction. Richard Russell

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<v Speaker 1>said the most difficult thing in the business is to

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<v Speaker 1>stick with the bull market the entire way through, and

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<v Speaker 1>the second most difficult thing in the business is to

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<v Speaker 1>stay out of a bear market the entire way through.

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<v Speaker 1>So I'd say trend following is pretty darned difficult. Richard

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<v Speaker 1>Russell was pretty ahead of the game with that one.

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<v Speaker 1>So what do you think are some of the bigger

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<v Speaker 1>misconceptions about charts and technical analysis. I think the misconceptions

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<v Speaker 1>are that technical analysis sees all. It may be that

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<v Speaker 1>it does, but no technical analysts sees all that's intriguing.

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<v Speaker 1>So explain the difference between everything being there in price

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<v Speaker 1>and not being able to recognize that from from the charts. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>just to give you an example, when I was at

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<v Speaker 1>Sorrows Fund Management, I surveyed, uh, let's call it twelve

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<v Speaker 1>technical types every week and I asked them buy, sell,

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<v Speaker 1>or neutral on a roster item list, and you'd be

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<v Speaker 1>surprised how many people came back with items that were

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<v Speaker 1>different from the person who had just responded. So you

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<v Speaker 1>could have twelve people responding every week and there would

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<v Speaker 1>be no quorum as to what, let's say, item A

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<v Speaker 1>is doing. And so my former partner, Steve Schaubin at

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<v Speaker 1>Lehmann was fond of saying, it's the singer and not

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<v Speaker 1>the song. Hey, so uh. The naturally leads the next question,

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<v Speaker 1>how much of this is science and how much of

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<v Speaker 1>this is art and and somewhat subjective. I get the

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<v Speaker 1>sense you're implying it's a little of both. I think

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<v Speaker 1>it's a lot of both. So I'm I'm fond of

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<v Speaker 1>this book that was that I read earlier in my career.

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<v Speaker 1>It's it's not a it's not an investment book. It's

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<v Speaker 1>a poker book. It's called Shut Up and Deal. And

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<v Speaker 1>it's written by a guy named Jesse May. Okay, and

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<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna paraphrase it, and I'm going to cuff the comment.

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<v Speaker 1>But in the book he said, when you play poker,

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<v Speaker 1>everybody wants to master the rules, right, when you raise,

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<v Speaker 1>when you fold, right, that's important, he said. But but

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<v Speaker 1>winning it poker is about mastering the luck. And I

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<v Speaker 1>think that's appropriate for our business as well. So so

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<v Speaker 1>I would apply that to your question and say, it's

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<v Speaker 1>a little bit of science, it's a little bit of uh,

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<v Speaker 1>it's a little bit of um poetry, it's it's all

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<v Speaker 1>those things put together. So, so how do we master luck?

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<v Speaker 1>I always assume luck is to some degree random, although

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<v Speaker 1>we've all heard the expression luck is with preparation meets

0:12:26.320 --> 0:12:29.760
<v Speaker 1>opportunity or branch Rickey said, luck is the residue of design, right.

0:12:29.760 --> 0:12:32.080
<v Speaker 1>I mean, the harder I work, the luckier I get.

0:12:32.280 --> 0:12:36.760
<v Speaker 1>All those things are appropriate. I think it is listening

0:12:36.800 --> 0:12:42.000
<v Speaker 1>to the message in the charts and not putting your

0:12:42.040 --> 0:12:45.480
<v Speaker 1>biases into what you think it's telling you. How hard

0:12:45.559 --> 0:12:47.560
<v Speaker 1>is it to keep your biases? I think it's very hard,

0:12:47.559 --> 0:12:50.000
<v Speaker 1>which is why sometimes when I was on the cell side,

0:12:50.040 --> 0:12:52.760
<v Speaker 1>I would send out charts that I would reports entitled

0:12:52.800 --> 0:12:55.800
<v Speaker 1>mystery charts, and I would say, the first person who

0:12:55.800 --> 0:12:58.080
<v Speaker 1>gets this question right, I'll buy him lunch next time

0:12:58.120 --> 0:13:00.679
<v Speaker 1>I'm in there town. And you'd be prize. How many

0:13:00.679 --> 0:13:03.280
<v Speaker 1>people would be quick to respond, and I would put

0:13:03.320 --> 0:13:06.439
<v Speaker 1>the chart, I would put the technical characteristics of it,

0:13:06.480 --> 0:13:08.480
<v Speaker 1>but I would take the title off of it. Huh.

0:13:08.559 --> 0:13:11.079
<v Speaker 1>And I think when people saw it without the title,

0:13:11.440 --> 0:13:14.080
<v Speaker 1>they made a more objective decision than when they saw

0:13:14.080 --> 0:13:17.000
<v Speaker 1>it with the title. And I think that's a good

0:13:17.000 --> 0:13:19.560
<v Speaker 1>way to think about it. So I have a variation

0:13:19.640 --> 0:13:23.280
<v Speaker 1>of that, which I call the indicator. That when you

0:13:23.320 --> 0:13:26.800
<v Speaker 1>would talk about a name with somebody who is on

0:13:26.840 --> 0:13:29.160
<v Speaker 1>the bi side, when you're on the cell side. If

0:13:29.200 --> 0:13:31.160
<v Speaker 1>you would bring up the name and three out of

0:13:31.160 --> 0:13:33.679
<v Speaker 1>four people go, uh, I can't touch that. That's a

0:13:33.679 --> 0:13:36.840
<v Speaker 1>piece of junk. Hey, well guess what if everybody thinks

0:13:36.880 --> 0:13:39.679
<v Speaker 1>that it's probably already in the price and it was

0:13:39.720 --> 0:13:42.240
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of momentum and you have plenty upside there.

0:13:42.559 --> 0:13:44.720
<v Speaker 1>That's that's funny that you you did it by just

0:13:44.760 --> 0:13:47.960
<v Speaker 1>pulling the names off. So when you reveal the names,

0:13:48.559 --> 0:13:50.800
<v Speaker 1>what was generally the response to people who said, this

0:13:50.880 --> 0:13:53.800
<v Speaker 1>chart looks great, I'm excited about this. I think some

0:13:54.120 --> 0:13:58.200
<v Speaker 1>people who had the objectivity would say, oh, well, okay,

0:13:58.200 --> 0:13:59.640
<v Speaker 1>I don't care what the name is. The dawn chart

0:13:59.679 --> 0:14:01.720
<v Speaker 1>looks it must be that the story is pretty good,

0:14:02.400 --> 0:14:04.840
<v Speaker 1>and other people might have been a little bit dismissive

0:14:04.880 --> 0:14:07.839
<v Speaker 1>of it. Oh yeah, okay, but I'm not interested. But

0:14:07.960 --> 0:14:12.360
<v Speaker 1>I think the yeah, and I think the exercise sort

0:14:12.360 --> 0:14:15.120
<v Speaker 1>of was a good exercise to allow them to say, hey,

0:14:15.160 --> 0:14:17.920
<v Speaker 1>there's something there and if we remove our biases, we

0:14:17.960 --> 0:14:21.240
<v Speaker 1>can actually pick up some important information. So tell me

0:14:21.240 --> 0:14:23.320
<v Speaker 1>a little bit about your process. When you're on the

0:14:23.360 --> 0:14:27.800
<v Speaker 1>cell side. What did your daily research consist of and

0:14:27.840 --> 0:14:30.560
<v Speaker 1>how did that change once you moved to the buy side.

0:14:31.680 --> 0:14:35.360
<v Speaker 1>So My process includes trying, and I'm going to emphasize

0:14:35.360 --> 0:14:38.960
<v Speaker 1>the word of trying to monitor or pay attention to

0:14:39.600 --> 0:14:44.960
<v Speaker 1>all sorts of traded prices, bonds, they're corresponding, yields, commodities,

0:14:45.000 --> 0:14:49.880
<v Speaker 1>currency sectors, indexes, stocks across all sorts of time zones.

0:14:51.040 --> 0:14:54.520
<v Speaker 1>And I built some screening tools, some scoring mechanisms that

0:14:54.560 --> 0:14:57.720
<v Speaker 1>helped me do that. And like any other technical person

0:14:57.840 --> 0:15:00.200
<v Speaker 1>or any other chart person, I look at it ton

0:15:00.240 --> 0:15:02.920
<v Speaker 1>of charts, and I've taken that discipline from the cell

0:15:03.040 --> 0:15:05.440
<v Speaker 1>side and I've tried to apply it on the by side.

0:15:05.520 --> 0:15:07.800
<v Speaker 1>So now that you're on the by side, is your

0:15:07.800 --> 0:15:11.200
<v Speaker 1>process very much different? Other than having to travel for

0:15:11.280 --> 0:15:14.280
<v Speaker 1>work and and sell a product? Short of that, is

0:15:14.320 --> 0:15:16.920
<v Speaker 1>the research process still the same? I'd say it's pretty

0:15:16.960 --> 0:15:20.640
<v Speaker 1>much the same. That's that's really, um quite interesting. One

0:15:20.640 --> 0:15:23.600
<v Speaker 1>of the things I loved about when you were on

0:15:23.640 --> 0:15:27.720
<v Speaker 1>the seal side, you're written product, you would you would,

0:15:28.360 --> 0:15:31.600
<v Speaker 1>similar to Ed Hyman, who's an economist, take a chart

0:15:31.760 --> 0:15:35.360
<v Speaker 1>and mark it up by hands. Um. First, where did

0:15:35.400 --> 0:15:38.360
<v Speaker 1>that idea come from? Well, well, I mean you you

0:15:38.360 --> 0:15:40.440
<v Speaker 1>you prefaced it. I mean Ed Hyman taught us all

0:15:40.520 --> 0:15:45.080
<v Speaker 1>that annotating charts simply and clearly really goes a long

0:15:45.120 --> 0:15:47.840
<v Speaker 1>way to making your research more palatable to the people

0:15:47.880 --> 0:15:49.720
<v Speaker 1>who are paying for it. So he's the he's the

0:15:49.760 --> 0:15:52.080
<v Speaker 1>godfather of it. To tell him truth. And you answered

0:15:52.120 --> 0:15:55.000
<v Speaker 1>the second question, which is what's the purpose of right,

0:15:55.080 --> 0:15:57.680
<v Speaker 1>I think it's just so people become familiar with you

0:15:58.400 --> 0:16:00.760
<v Speaker 1>and your research. And I think when people become familiar

0:16:00.800 --> 0:16:04.880
<v Speaker 1>with you, there's a trust aspect that grows. And uh,

0:16:04.920 --> 0:16:07.320
<v Speaker 1>you know when for somebody who was formally selling research.

0:16:07.360 --> 0:16:10.560
<v Speaker 1>I think that's a really important concept to building a business.

0:16:10.600 --> 0:16:12.320
<v Speaker 1>You have to develop a trust aspect with the people

0:16:12.320 --> 0:16:14.960
<v Speaker 1>who are going to pay you commission dollars for your research.

0:16:15.400 --> 0:16:19.000
<v Speaker 1>I'm Barry Rihults. You're listening to Masters in Business on

0:16:19.080 --> 0:16:23.000
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Radio. My special guest today is John Roke. And

0:16:23.200 --> 0:16:27.040
<v Speaker 1>you have been working UM for the past couple of

0:16:27.120 --> 0:16:32.440
<v Speaker 1>years for Soros Fund Management, which is George Soros's hedge

0:16:32.440 --> 0:16:36.800
<v Speaker 1>funds UM. What is it like working at such a

0:16:36.920 --> 0:16:40.720
<v Speaker 1>storied firm like that. I'm going to try to create

0:16:40.760 --> 0:16:43.240
<v Speaker 1>a metaphor. I think it was to me it was

0:16:43.240 --> 0:16:45.520
<v Speaker 1>sort of like being able to play basketball for University

0:16:45.520 --> 0:16:47.520
<v Speaker 1>of North Carolina Tar Hills. When Dean Smith was a

0:16:47.560 --> 0:16:50.280
<v Speaker 1>coach or playing basketball for the u c l A

0:16:50.360 --> 0:16:52.800
<v Speaker 1>Bruins when John Wooden was a coach. It was sort

0:16:52.840 --> 0:16:58.800
<v Speaker 1>of PhD macro um across the board. Just a true

0:16:58.800 --> 0:17:01.640
<v Speaker 1>honor for me to have been there. So I we

0:17:01.720 --> 0:17:04.359
<v Speaker 1>all recall the story I think was told by a

0:17:04.440 --> 0:17:08.800
<v Speaker 1>Soros's son that when his back started aching started bothering him,

0:17:08.840 --> 0:17:11.560
<v Speaker 1>he basically had to sell something to make the pain

0:17:11.600 --> 0:17:14.119
<v Speaker 1>go away. Any truth to that, Well, I read the

0:17:14.160 --> 0:17:17.160
<v Speaker 1>same story, but I would probably say that was akin

0:17:17.240 --> 0:17:21.520
<v Speaker 1>to a very strong intuition. And um, I think after

0:17:21.600 --> 0:17:23.120
<v Speaker 1>being in the business for a long period of time,

0:17:23.160 --> 0:17:27.159
<v Speaker 1>we all developed intuitions that we uh listened to, you know,

0:17:27.320 --> 0:17:29.720
<v Speaker 1>with with with a very uh, you know, attentive ear.

0:17:30.119 --> 0:17:33.840
<v Speaker 1>So he's known as a big macro trader, famously bet

0:17:33.840 --> 0:17:37.159
<v Speaker 1>against the pound and a number of other really large

0:17:37.240 --> 0:17:41.080
<v Speaker 1>macro bets. How does a technician fit into a shop

0:17:41.160 --> 0:17:45.160
<v Speaker 1>like that that, at least publicly seems to be so

0:17:45.960 --> 0:17:50.119
<v Speaker 1>macro event driven. I actually think it's a natural that

0:17:50.240 --> 0:17:55.000
<v Speaker 1>macro and technical analysis are complimentary, uh. In my opinion.

0:17:55.480 --> 0:17:57.359
<v Speaker 1>One of my favorite books in the business is a

0:17:57.359 --> 0:18:00.400
<v Speaker 1>book entitled More Money Than God, which is written by

0:18:00.400 --> 0:18:05.280
<v Speaker 1>Sebastian Mallaby, and in it you read about all of

0:18:05.280 --> 0:18:08.119
<v Speaker 1>the storied hedge funds and about guys in our business

0:18:08.160 --> 0:18:10.960
<v Speaker 1>whose faces are on the mount rushmore of investing, and

0:18:11.000 --> 0:18:15.399
<v Speaker 1>you realize just how important technical analysis is, was, or

0:18:15.520 --> 0:18:18.159
<v Speaker 1>is to their process. I think it's just a natural

0:18:18.400 --> 0:18:21.520
<v Speaker 1>and uh, it wasn't a shock to me, not a

0:18:21.560 --> 0:18:25.040
<v Speaker 1>shock at all. It wasn't a pretty consistent Um. It's

0:18:25.040 --> 0:18:28.480
<v Speaker 1>funny Malaby just put out the book on Greenspan, which

0:18:28.520 --> 0:18:31.240
<v Speaker 1>I haven't gotten to, but I have more money than

0:18:31.280 --> 0:18:33.200
<v Speaker 1>God at home, and it was it's one of those

0:18:33.240 --> 0:18:35.600
<v Speaker 1>things that's on my short list that I'm that I'm

0:18:35.600 --> 0:18:39.119
<v Speaker 1>going to get to. UM. So you move from the

0:18:39.119 --> 0:18:41.840
<v Speaker 1>cell side to the by side. When you were on

0:18:41.880 --> 0:18:44.720
<v Speaker 1>the cell side, you were very much a public figure,

0:18:44.840 --> 0:18:47.560
<v Speaker 1>used to do conferences, in television everything. You go to

0:18:47.600 --> 0:18:50.639
<v Speaker 1>the buy side and its radio silence. What was that

0:18:50.720 --> 0:18:54.280
<v Speaker 1>transition like? Was it was it relaxing to kind of

0:18:54.280 --> 0:18:56.480
<v Speaker 1>get out of the public eye or did you miss

0:18:56.480 --> 0:18:59.720
<v Speaker 1>a little of the back and forth give and take. UM. Well,

0:18:59.800 --> 0:19:02.040
<v Speaker 1>I I gotta tell you, for twenty years of of

0:19:02.240 --> 0:19:05.040
<v Speaker 1>doing shows like this with people like you, there are

0:19:05.119 --> 0:19:08.800
<v Speaker 1>no shows. It's very nice or or traveling to market

0:19:08.840 --> 0:19:10.840
<v Speaker 1>my product was a was a great thrill being on

0:19:10.880 --> 0:19:14.119
<v Speaker 1>Wall Street Week with Lewis Ruth Keiser was Uh, you know,

0:19:14.280 --> 0:19:16.040
<v Speaker 1>one of a bucket list kind of thing to do.

0:19:16.119 --> 0:19:18.920
<v Speaker 1>But I'm equally happy being on the buy side, and

0:19:19.240 --> 0:19:22.560
<v Speaker 1>I put all my energy and emphasis into putting out

0:19:22.600 --> 0:19:24.240
<v Speaker 1>product that I think is going to help Key Square

0:19:24.280 --> 0:19:27.520
<v Speaker 1>Capital Management. So when you say put out products, I'm

0:19:27.560 --> 0:19:31.359
<v Speaker 1>assuming there's an investment committee you're participating in that, or

0:19:31.640 --> 0:19:36.560
<v Speaker 1>there's some dialogue back and forth. How is advising on

0:19:36.680 --> 0:19:42.600
<v Speaker 1>deploying capital different then selling a commission transaction or or

0:19:42.720 --> 0:19:45.440
<v Speaker 1>is it not different? I think an idea is an

0:19:45.440 --> 0:19:48.359
<v Speaker 1>idea irrespective of which side of the business you're on.

0:19:48.960 --> 0:19:52.080
<v Speaker 1>And I think the person that you're speaking to uh,

0:19:52.119 --> 0:19:54.200
<v Speaker 1>and I happen to be speaking to a person who

0:19:54.280 --> 0:19:57.719
<v Speaker 1>is uh intellectually open. His name is Scott Bessant and

0:19:58.040 --> 0:20:01.520
<v Speaker 1>always willing to listen to an idea. And and because

0:20:01.560 --> 0:20:03.600
<v Speaker 1>he's like that, it gives me confidence to continue to

0:20:03.640 --> 0:20:06.560
<v Speaker 1>present those ideas. It's sort of like, uh, when you're

0:20:06.560 --> 0:20:08.040
<v Speaker 1>on the cell side and you have a client that

0:20:08.080 --> 0:20:11.359
<v Speaker 1>you get along with really well, you'll call that person

0:20:12.040 --> 0:20:14.720
<v Speaker 1>all the time and you'll show that person all of

0:20:14.760 --> 0:20:18.800
<v Speaker 1>your ideas because they're they're willing recipients of those ideas.

0:20:18.880 --> 0:20:21.440
<v Speaker 1>And some of your clients when you're on when on

0:20:21.600 --> 0:20:25.520
<v Speaker 1>being on the cell side, were probably less um receptive.

0:20:25.600 --> 0:20:27.960
<v Speaker 1>Receptive is a good word, and so I'm just I've

0:20:28.000 --> 0:20:30.440
<v Speaker 1>been lucky that the the gentleman I'm working with now

0:20:30.440 --> 0:20:33.639
<v Speaker 1>and have worked with over five years is receptive to

0:20:33.760 --> 0:20:36.920
<v Speaker 1>ideas and intellectually open and uh and willing to listen

0:20:36.920 --> 0:20:39.720
<v Speaker 1>to my my, my imagination. So, Scott Besson, if the

0:20:39.920 --> 0:20:43.199
<v Speaker 1>I recall the name correctly formally c I O of

0:20:43.240 --> 0:20:47.639
<v Speaker 1>Soros Fund Management, is that right? And I also recall

0:20:47.720 --> 0:20:50.840
<v Speaker 1>you saying he's the person who recruited you to work

0:20:50.840 --> 0:20:53.480
<v Speaker 1>it with Sorows. That's exactly right. So I have to

0:20:53.520 --> 0:20:58.080
<v Speaker 1>assume that he is a heavy hitter running Soros is money.

0:20:58.119 --> 0:21:02.600
<v Speaker 1>That's a fairly substantial. And is it the same sort

0:21:02.640 --> 0:21:05.640
<v Speaker 1>of investment process at Key Square that it was at

0:21:05.920 --> 0:21:08.680
<v Speaker 1>Sorrows or is it a little different? You know, soroces

0:21:08.760 --> 0:21:12.440
<v Speaker 1>now mostly running his own money, if I'm correct, mostly

0:21:13.040 --> 0:21:17.240
<v Speaker 1>um the family office family office, as opposed to Key Square,

0:21:17.240 --> 0:21:20.280
<v Speaker 1>whereas it's a lot of outside I think it is

0:21:20.280 --> 0:21:22.640
<v Speaker 1>a macro focus fund, and from that point of view,

0:21:23.000 --> 0:21:26.280
<v Speaker 1>UH it has a similar focus. My special guest today

0:21:26.480 --> 0:21:30.880
<v Speaker 1>is John Roke. He is a technician UH currently working

0:21:31.000 --> 0:21:34.360
<v Speaker 1>for key Square Capital, which is a hedge fund seated

0:21:34.400 --> 0:21:37.399
<v Speaker 1>by George Soros. He worked on the sealth side and

0:21:37.480 --> 0:21:41.159
<v Speaker 1>a number of storied shops, including Lehman Brothers UH for

0:21:41.240 --> 0:21:45.359
<v Speaker 1>many years before going to work at Soros Fund Management.

0:21:45.760 --> 0:21:49.600
<v Speaker 1>Let's let's talk a little bit about your approach. You

0:21:49.720 --> 0:21:52.399
<v Speaker 1>do some things that I find to be really interesting

0:21:52.800 --> 0:21:54.800
<v Speaker 1>that I don't see a lot of other people doing.

0:21:55.359 --> 0:22:00.200
<v Speaker 1>For example, I I've noticed how you calculate market up

0:22:00.240 --> 0:22:04.640
<v Speaker 1>of sector and then put it against the SMP. Tell

0:22:04.720 --> 0:22:08.920
<v Speaker 1>us what that actually accomplishes and how you began doing

0:22:08.960 --> 0:22:12.480
<v Speaker 1>that sort of analysis. Okay, so all credit goes to

0:22:12.520 --> 0:22:14.480
<v Speaker 1>a former client of mine by the name of Bob Rosette,

0:22:14.480 --> 0:22:16.920
<v Speaker 1>who was at Morgan Stanley as a management at the

0:22:16.960 --> 0:22:20.439
<v Speaker 1>time Organ Stanley Capital Management and UH. He was a

0:22:20.560 --> 0:22:25.000
<v Speaker 1>very technically focused guy, although a fundamental guy, but very

0:22:25.040 --> 0:22:27.399
<v Speaker 1>technically focused. And one day he said to me, you know,

0:22:27.440 --> 0:22:29.199
<v Speaker 1>I have some data that might be of interest to you,

0:22:29.480 --> 0:22:31.240
<v Speaker 1>and he shared the data with me, which was sort

0:22:31.280 --> 0:22:34.000
<v Speaker 1>of like giving me the keys to the Kingdom. How

0:22:34.040 --> 0:22:37.400
<v Speaker 1>long ago this? Gosh, this was in the nineties. Really, yeah,

0:22:37.440 --> 0:22:39.200
<v Speaker 1>this was in the mid nineties. So he says, here's

0:22:39.240 --> 0:22:41.760
<v Speaker 1>the data showing take take the cap of each sector

0:22:42.280 --> 0:22:45.240
<v Speaker 1>versus the total capitalization, and do it on a relative

0:22:45.240 --> 0:22:47.399
<v Speaker 1>market cap basis. That's right, as I present to the SMP,

0:22:48.080 --> 0:22:50.640
<v Speaker 1>and I thought that was I mean, he really opened

0:22:50.680 --> 0:22:53.280
<v Speaker 1>my eyes to a section of the market that I

0:22:53.320 --> 0:22:56.040
<v Speaker 1>was formerly not aware of or how to use it

0:22:56.080 --> 0:22:59.000
<v Speaker 1>in an in an analytical sense, and so I used

0:22:59.000 --> 0:23:03.200
<v Speaker 1>it to great success s i'll say polite, to some success. Um.

0:23:03.240 --> 0:23:06.919
<v Speaker 1>In two particular instances after that. One of them was

0:23:07.200 --> 0:23:11.920
<v Speaker 1>as Tech was making its apotheosis in late and early

0:23:11.960 --> 0:23:15.439
<v Speaker 1>two thousand and Tech had grown to be about a

0:23:15.560 --> 0:23:18.440
<v Speaker 1>third of the weight of the SMP five hundred. Really,

0:23:18.480 --> 0:23:21.840
<v Speaker 1>that's a market relative market cap basis. And when it

0:23:21.920 --> 0:23:24.400
<v Speaker 1>first cracked, I knew that Icarus had flown too close

0:23:24.440 --> 0:23:26.600
<v Speaker 1>to the sun, and I knew that we were going

0:23:26.640 --> 0:23:29.040
<v Speaker 1>to have a very painful bear market and it was

0:23:29.040 --> 0:23:31.040
<v Speaker 1>going to be more than a flesh wound, to paraphrase

0:23:31.080 --> 0:23:34.560
<v Speaker 1>the black knife from Monty python Um. And so I

0:23:34.600 --> 0:23:37.720
<v Speaker 1>thought Tech was going to get destroyed and what's down

0:23:38.440 --> 0:23:41.720
<v Speaker 1>amongst friends? And then in uh in two thousand and six,

0:23:42.320 --> 0:23:45.040
<v Speaker 1>the relative market cap of financials grew to be more

0:23:45.080 --> 0:23:48.359
<v Speaker 1>than of the spire cracked at twenty two and a

0:23:48.400 --> 0:23:51.040
<v Speaker 1>third at twenty two and a percent, and I thought

0:23:51.080 --> 0:23:52.800
<v Speaker 1>that that was going to be really bad because the

0:23:52.800 --> 0:23:56.240
<v Speaker 1>financials not only did they have a big market cap,

0:23:56.280 --> 0:23:58.119
<v Speaker 1>but even a technical guy would probably tell you how

0:23:58.119 --> 0:24:00.440
<v Speaker 1>important they are to the economy to say the least.

0:24:00.680 --> 0:24:04.639
<v Speaker 1>And uh so I used that analysis to tom some

0:24:04.760 --> 0:24:07.520
<v Speaker 1>success at both of those important So when you're looking

0:24:07.520 --> 0:24:11.280
<v Speaker 1>at the cap relative to to the broader index, what

0:24:11.480 --> 0:24:14.920
<v Speaker 1>is that actually informing you other than those instances where

0:24:14.920 --> 0:24:17.879
<v Speaker 1>you're at wild extremes or is that what you're looking for.

0:24:18.280 --> 0:24:20.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm looking for wild extremes, but I'm also looking for

0:24:20.760 --> 0:24:24.800
<v Speaker 1>trends within those relative market caps. Right, Relative market cap

0:24:24.800 --> 0:24:27.439
<v Speaker 1>is sort of a way of saying relative price. And

0:24:27.480 --> 0:24:30.320
<v Speaker 1>if relative market cap continues to steadily move higher, then

0:24:30.320 --> 0:24:33.320
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to figure that the trend for that sector

0:24:33.920 --> 0:24:37.560
<v Speaker 1>is intact, firm, strong, and advancing, and I should be

0:24:37.600 --> 0:24:40.640
<v Speaker 1>looking for stocks in that sector that I should be

0:24:41.000 --> 0:24:43.520
<v Speaker 1>biased towards the upside with. All Right, so let's say

0:24:43.560 --> 0:24:46.360
<v Speaker 1>you find a particular sector you like, how do you

0:24:46.440 --> 0:24:50.040
<v Speaker 1>keep drilling down from there? Do you look at subsectors?

0:24:50.080 --> 0:24:52.879
<v Speaker 1>Do you go right to companies? When you pick a

0:24:53.000 --> 0:24:57.440
<v Speaker 1>random sector that the trend is long, strong, firm, where

0:24:57.440 --> 0:24:59.119
<v Speaker 1>do you go from there? I want to find the

0:24:59.119 --> 0:25:01.640
<v Speaker 1>biggest cap comp and he's in that particular sector. Really,

0:25:01.680 --> 0:25:05.440
<v Speaker 1>why is that? Because for a fund of some size,

0:25:06.359 --> 0:25:09.639
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't make much sense to focus on stocks of

0:25:10.080 --> 0:25:13.320
<v Speaker 1>smaller market capitalizations because it's very difficult to move the needle.

0:25:13.960 --> 0:25:16.520
<v Speaker 1>So I want to focus on the largest market cap

0:25:16.560 --> 0:25:19.400
<v Speaker 1>stocks in a sector that is trending, because I think

0:25:19.440 --> 0:25:23.960
<v Speaker 1>I can get the better longer dated performance from those stocks. Right,

0:25:24.000 --> 0:25:26.159
<v Speaker 1>you can't get enough of a small cap for a

0:25:26.160 --> 0:25:28.879
<v Speaker 1>substantial fund to make any sort of difference, That's right.

0:25:29.040 --> 0:25:31.560
<v Speaker 1>And and the big stocks are always very liquid, and

0:25:31.600 --> 0:25:33.320
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure you could buy as much of that as

0:25:33.359 --> 0:25:36.240
<v Speaker 1>you want. And if you need it to take yourself

0:25:36.240 --> 0:25:38.280
<v Speaker 1>out of a position, you could do it with with

0:25:38.280 --> 0:25:42.280
<v Speaker 1>with little dislocation. That's very interesting. So of late you've

0:25:42.320 --> 0:25:46.719
<v Speaker 1>been somewhat barished on the financials um How important our

0:25:46.800 --> 0:25:50.520
<v Speaker 1>financials to the SMP into the economy. Can we really

0:25:50.560 --> 0:25:54.120
<v Speaker 1>have a bull market without the financials participating well. So

0:25:54.320 --> 0:25:57.720
<v Speaker 1>I'm always going through my process and and always going

0:25:57.720 --> 0:26:01.280
<v Speaker 1>through the Now eleven SMP econom ex sectors, financials are

0:26:01.320 --> 0:26:03.800
<v Speaker 1>one of the eleven. There were formerly ten SMP broke

0:26:03.840 --> 0:26:06.639
<v Speaker 1>out reads from the financials. Now they're eleven. And I

0:26:06.720 --> 0:26:09.040
<v Speaker 1>noticed that during a twenty two month period from December

0:26:09.920 --> 0:26:16.160
<v Speaker 1>through October, the financials had gone through four important setbacks fourteen,

0:26:16.240 --> 0:26:18.359
<v Speaker 1>twenty two, and ten and a half, and they had

0:26:18.480 --> 0:26:21.239
<v Speaker 1>underperformed the SMP during that twenty two month period. So

0:26:22.080 --> 0:26:24.960
<v Speaker 1>to have them as an underweight or to be cautious

0:26:25.000 --> 0:26:27.800
<v Speaker 1>on them probably wasn't such a bad idea. In addition,

0:26:27.840 --> 0:26:30.720
<v Speaker 1>at the same time, European banks and Japanese banks were

0:26:31.359 --> 0:26:34.399
<v Speaker 1>very poor, right, and the only bank group that was

0:26:34.480 --> 0:26:38.199
<v Speaker 1>doing pretty well of G seven markets was Canada. So

0:26:38.320 --> 0:26:41.600
<v Speaker 1>to have avoided financials for that period it wasn't such

0:26:41.640 --> 0:26:43.359
<v Speaker 1>a bad idea. It was only in the last week

0:26:43.359 --> 0:26:47.479
<v Speaker 1>where you really had a tremendous performance post election. That's correct,

0:26:47.600 --> 0:26:50.720
<v Speaker 1>But you know, when you have a geopolitical surprise like that,

0:26:50.720 --> 0:26:56.000
<v Speaker 1>that isn't necessarily going to be reflected in in analysis beforehand,

0:26:56.200 --> 0:26:58.719
<v Speaker 1>everybody's playing because it was just so darn sudden right

0:26:59.280 --> 0:27:01.320
<v Speaker 1>and then and so now how do you look at

0:27:01.400 --> 0:27:06.520
<v Speaker 1>financials today? Has has the recent move change your mind

0:27:06.600 --> 0:27:10.399
<v Speaker 1>or does it look like a temporary spasm. So quite

0:27:10.400 --> 0:27:16.320
<v Speaker 1>recently the uh SMP Diversified Bank Index was above it's

0:27:17.640 --> 0:27:20.160
<v Speaker 1>above it's two D day moving average. I'd say that's

0:27:20.160 --> 0:27:23.679
<v Speaker 1>like an athlete who sprinted a long way very quickly

0:27:23.760 --> 0:27:25.440
<v Speaker 1>in a short period of time. So it's a little

0:27:25.440 --> 0:27:27.520
<v Speaker 1>ahead of itself. This may need to rest, it couldn't

0:27:27.520 --> 0:27:29.400
<v Speaker 1>need to pause, but I would say that the pattern

0:27:29.480 --> 0:27:32.919
<v Speaker 1>that's in there is is a very good technical set up.

0:27:33.560 --> 0:27:36.159
<v Speaker 1>I'd also say, with respect of the financials during the

0:27:36.200 --> 0:27:40.119
<v Speaker 1>period when they were underperforming, UH, I would ask myself

0:27:40.240 --> 0:27:42.840
<v Speaker 1>and my counterparties on the cell side, are we in

0:27:42.880 --> 0:27:46.239
<v Speaker 1>a bull market? And more often than not you'd hear

0:27:46.280 --> 0:27:48.560
<v Speaker 1>people say yes. But during that entire time, the SMP

0:27:48.720 --> 0:27:53.000
<v Speaker 1>was up maybe two or three percent pretty much range. Uh,

0:27:53.040 --> 0:27:54.600
<v Speaker 1>if you were in the fang stocks, it was a

0:27:54.600 --> 0:27:57.080
<v Speaker 1>bull market. But I think if you were in the index,

0:27:57.359 --> 0:27:59.600
<v Speaker 1>you would probably say it wasn't a bull market, but

0:27:59.640 --> 0:28:03.560
<v Speaker 1>it wasn't a bear market either, So just arranged bound market. Look,

0:28:03.600 --> 0:28:07.720
<v Speaker 1>we can't from the lows and O nine to let's

0:28:07.720 --> 0:28:12.199
<v Speaker 1>call it thirteen um market was up two hundred plus percent.

0:28:12.680 --> 0:28:14.760
<v Speaker 1>That's a lot of motion in a real short period

0:28:14.800 --> 0:28:17.159
<v Speaker 1>of time. You have to eventually catch your breath and

0:28:17.200 --> 0:28:20.639
<v Speaker 1>market has to digest those games, I would think so um. So,

0:28:20.640 --> 0:28:23.159
<v Speaker 1>so let me ask you a broader question, which you

0:28:23.280 --> 0:28:26.440
<v Speaker 1>just made me think of. A lot of people say

0:28:26.480 --> 0:28:28.840
<v Speaker 1>this market is long in the tooth because you have

0:28:28.920 --> 0:28:33.280
<v Speaker 1>a nice run from O nine to sixteen. That's seven years.

0:28:33.359 --> 0:28:36.880
<v Speaker 1>But I always learned secular bull markets don't begin until

0:28:36.920 --> 0:28:40.720
<v Speaker 1>you make new highs above the previous highs, and we

0:28:40.800 --> 0:28:45.960
<v Speaker 1>didn't see that happen until So first, do you look

0:28:45.960 --> 0:28:49.160
<v Speaker 1>at the current situation as if we're in a secular

0:28:49.200 --> 0:28:52.000
<v Speaker 1>bull market? And if we are, where would you date

0:28:52.040 --> 0:28:55.880
<v Speaker 1>that too? So I think we've been. There was a

0:28:55.960 --> 0:29:00.080
<v Speaker 1>six sixty six low in two thousand and nine, and

0:29:00.320 --> 0:29:03.760
<v Speaker 1>uh up from oh nine to now. The cumulative return

0:29:03.800 --> 0:29:06.800
<v Speaker 1>would say time and price, you have been in a

0:29:06.880 --> 0:29:10.240
<v Speaker 1>bowl market. But you've got most of that through Let's

0:29:10.240 --> 0:29:13.800
<v Speaker 1>call it the midpoint of two thousand fourteen or the

0:29:13.840 --> 0:29:15.920
<v Speaker 1>autumn of two thousand fourteen, And from the autumn of

0:29:15.960 --> 0:29:19.240
<v Speaker 1>two thousand fourteen to now, you've really marked time by

0:29:19.240 --> 0:29:22.960
<v Speaker 1>going sideways, although it's been difficult and adjective filled. But

0:29:23.040 --> 0:29:27.400
<v Speaker 1>I tend not to think of things secularly or cyclically.

0:29:27.520 --> 0:29:29.760
<v Speaker 1>I tend to think of things, Can I make money

0:29:29.800 --> 0:29:31.480
<v Speaker 1>on the long side? Or can I make money on

0:29:31.480 --> 0:29:33.720
<v Speaker 1>the short side. That's the way I tend to approach things,

0:29:33.800 --> 0:29:36.280
<v Speaker 1>because I don't want to be locked into a viewpoint

0:29:36.760 --> 0:29:39.720
<v Speaker 1>that's really interesting. Over the past two years, has it

0:29:39.880 --> 0:29:41.880
<v Speaker 1>been easier to make money on the long side or

0:29:41.920 --> 0:29:45.600
<v Speaker 1>the short side or none of the above? I think

0:29:45.600 --> 0:29:48.440
<v Speaker 1>it's been. I think it's been equally difficult. I think

0:29:48.480 --> 0:29:52.040
<v Speaker 1>it's been a very difficult period. The market, in my mind,

0:29:53.160 --> 0:29:57.920
<v Speaker 1>has been Uh. The market is driven h E t

0:29:58.120 --> 0:30:01.440
<v Speaker 1>F drive stocks, stocks don't drive t F. And I

0:30:01.480 --> 0:30:04.200
<v Speaker 1>think the market on any given day can do just

0:30:04.280 --> 0:30:07.160
<v Speaker 1>about anything because your algal is an aggressive buyer, and

0:30:07.200 --> 0:30:09.520
<v Speaker 1>then my algal follows your algo, and my algal is

0:30:09.520 --> 0:30:12.920
<v Speaker 1>an aggressive buyer. Um. But it has been exceedingly difficult,

0:30:13.400 --> 0:30:16.800
<v Speaker 1>and UM, I think we're not for the FED pinning

0:30:17.080 --> 0:30:21.000
<v Speaker 1>the FED funds rate where it is. Uh, perhaps the

0:30:21.080 --> 0:30:23.160
<v Speaker 1>environment might be a little bit different. Can can you

0:30:23.360 --> 0:30:26.600
<v Speaker 1>find another period in time and history that's comparable to

0:30:26.840 --> 0:30:30.520
<v Speaker 1>the zero or is this drue unique. I think it's

0:30:30.520 --> 0:30:33.400
<v Speaker 1>truly unique because of the central bank backdrop. That's my

0:30:33.760 --> 0:30:37.560
<v Speaker 1>that's my opinion that that changes, that changes everything. Um,

0:30:37.640 --> 0:30:40.480
<v Speaker 1>we mentioned financials earlier. One of the things I know

0:30:40.520 --> 0:30:44.960
<v Speaker 1>about your prior work. You use JP Morgan as a

0:30:45.000 --> 0:30:49.640
<v Speaker 1>proxy for financials. I suspect that's because it goes back

0:30:49.680 --> 0:30:53.000
<v Speaker 1>in history so long. But why one stock as opposed

0:30:53.040 --> 0:30:55.880
<v Speaker 1>to a group of stocks. Uh So, My former partner

0:30:55.920 --> 0:30:58.640
<v Speaker 1>at Lehman Brother, Steve Showben, taught me about the importance

0:30:58.680 --> 0:31:02.240
<v Speaker 1>of bell Weathers So of time I've tried to find

0:31:02.320 --> 0:31:05.800
<v Speaker 1>and define sector or market bell weathers Now for a

0:31:05.800 --> 0:31:08.840
<v Speaker 1>long time. You'll recall this. Uh, people use General motors.

0:31:08.880 --> 0:31:11.480
<v Speaker 1>As General Motors went, so, so went the market. People

0:31:11.560 --> 0:31:14.320
<v Speaker 1>used IBM for a long time. We Steve Schouben and

0:31:14.360 --> 0:31:17.400
<v Speaker 1>I used General Electric. And then as you went into

0:31:17.440 --> 0:31:19.719
<v Speaker 1>the mid two thousand, City Group was the most important

0:31:19.720 --> 0:31:21.840
<v Speaker 1>stock in the entire world, not just the most pill

0:31:21.880 --> 0:31:24.040
<v Speaker 1>stock in the SMP five hundred. Well, that didn't work

0:31:24.080 --> 0:31:26.000
<v Speaker 1>out too well. Well, it did work out very well

0:31:26.040 --> 0:31:29.360
<v Speaker 1>because when it peaked then you knew that was correct.

0:31:29.480 --> 0:31:31.800
<v Speaker 1>So it didn't work out well for City Group shareholders.

0:31:31.800 --> 0:31:33.840
<v Speaker 1>But if you were paying attention to what City was doing.

0:31:33.960 --> 0:31:35.440
<v Speaker 1>Told you a lot about city, It told you a

0:31:35.480 --> 0:31:36.760
<v Speaker 1>lot about the banks, and it told you a lot

0:31:36.760 --> 0:31:38.720
<v Speaker 1>about the market. So it was an excellent bell weather.

0:31:38.880 --> 0:31:41.200
<v Speaker 1>When did city pink and the peak? And well, it

0:31:41.320 --> 0:31:43.920
<v Speaker 1>was peaking in two thousands six seven, right around the

0:31:43.960 --> 0:31:45.960
<v Speaker 1>time when the financials as a percent of the SMP

0:31:46.040 --> 0:31:49.520
<v Speaker 1>five hundred got to about on a realtive market cap basis.

0:31:49.520 --> 0:31:51.880
<v Speaker 1>So when City rolled over, that was short of all

0:31:51.920 --> 0:31:54.920
<v Speaker 1>she won't And so I use I think JP Morgan

0:31:55.000 --> 0:31:58.080
<v Speaker 1>is a good bell weather, not only for financials but

0:31:58.320 --> 0:32:01.360
<v Speaker 1>for the market as a whole. We've been speaking with

0:32:01.480 --> 0:32:05.680
<v Speaker 1>John Roque. He is the technical strategist at key Square

0:32:05.720 --> 0:32:09.560
<v Speaker 1>Capital Management, backed by George soros Uh. If you enjoy

0:32:09.680 --> 0:32:12.560
<v Speaker 1>this conversation, be sure and check out all our podcast

0:32:12.600 --> 0:32:15.720
<v Speaker 1>extras where we keep the tape rolling and continue chatting

0:32:15.760 --> 0:32:19.400
<v Speaker 1>about all things technical. Be sure and check out my

0:32:19.600 --> 0:32:23.200
<v Speaker 1>daily column at Bloomberg View dot com or follow me

0:32:23.480 --> 0:32:27.800
<v Speaker 1>on Twitter at rid Halts. We love your feedback and comments.

0:32:27.960 --> 0:32:31.800
<v Speaker 1>Be sure to write to us at m IB podcast

0:32:32.320 --> 0:32:36.160
<v Speaker 1>at Bloomberg dot net. I'm Barry rit Halts. You've been

0:32:36.200 --> 0:32:40.400
<v Speaker 1>listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio, brought to

0:32:40.440 --> 0:32:43.560
<v Speaker 1>you by Bank of America. Merrill Lynch Seeing what others

0:32:43.600 --> 0:32:47.360
<v Speaker 1>have seen, but uncovering what others may not. Global Research

0:32:47.440 --> 0:32:50.840
<v Speaker 1>that helps You Harness disruption voted top global research firm

0:32:50.880 --> 0:32:54.800
<v Speaker 1>five years running. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Spinner and Smith Incorporated.

0:32:55.560 --> 0:32:58.000
<v Speaker 1>Welcome to the podcast, John, Thank you so much for

0:32:58.080 --> 0:33:00.440
<v Speaker 1>doing this. I'm right, you know. I been a fan

0:33:00.480 --> 0:33:02.400
<v Speaker 1>of you as for forever. I've been reading your stuff

0:33:02.400 --> 0:33:05.440
<v Speaker 1>for a long time, which is not easy to get.

0:33:05.680 --> 0:33:09.720
<v Speaker 1>Your stuff was always hard to track down. Well, thanks,

0:33:09.760 --> 0:33:13.680
<v Speaker 1>I was always horse trading with other people. Hey, you

0:33:13.720 --> 0:33:17.160
<v Speaker 1>get Rokee, get me that. What do you got, I'll

0:33:17.160 --> 0:33:18.800
<v Speaker 1>give you this, You give me that that. You know

0:33:18.840 --> 0:33:21.480
<v Speaker 1>what happens on the so that that went on all

0:33:21.480 --> 0:33:24.320
<v Speaker 1>the time, and it was we were never a client.

0:33:24.360 --> 0:33:27.080
<v Speaker 1>We were never big enough to play in the pond

0:33:27.160 --> 0:33:30.120
<v Speaker 1>where you played. Um, there were a couple of questions

0:33:30.160 --> 0:33:32.920
<v Speaker 1>I didn't get to that I really want to get

0:33:32.960 --> 0:33:37.440
<v Speaker 1>to before we start our usual podcast stuff. Um, why

0:33:37.440 --> 0:33:40.080
<v Speaker 1>don't we jump right into the sports analogy since we

0:33:40.080 --> 0:33:43.280
<v Speaker 1>were just talking about you. You we were off fair.

0:33:43.360 --> 0:33:48.640
<v Speaker 1>We were talking about um, uh, we're talking about listening

0:33:48.680 --> 0:33:52.640
<v Speaker 1>to baseball and joining the metaphor between baseball on the

0:33:52.720 --> 0:33:56.840
<v Speaker 1>radio versus financial television. You use a lot of sports

0:33:56.840 --> 0:34:01.120
<v Speaker 1>analogies in your research. Now, is that because you're sports junkie?

0:34:01.240 --> 0:34:05.880
<v Speaker 1>Or is that because there's a metaphorical parallel between sports

0:34:05.880 --> 0:34:10.040
<v Speaker 1>and investing? Why why all the baseball? In fact, just

0:34:10.080 --> 0:34:14.440
<v Speaker 1>earlier we were talking about um, you know, sorrows fund

0:34:14.520 --> 0:34:19.600
<v Speaker 1>like like the Ruins. So I am a sports junkie,

0:34:19.600 --> 0:34:24.480
<v Speaker 1>but I think that there are metaphorical examples that transfer seamlessly.

0:34:24.520 --> 0:34:27.960
<v Speaker 1>And I'll give you one. So baseball people will tell

0:34:27.960 --> 0:34:30.919
<v Speaker 1>you that Ted Williams is the greatest hitter of all time,

0:34:31.680 --> 0:34:34.760
<v Speaker 1>and uh. He wrote a book entitled The Science of Hitting,

0:34:35.680 --> 0:34:38.160
<v Speaker 1>and one of the chapters in the book is called

0:34:38.560 --> 0:34:43.320
<v Speaker 1>hit according to Your Style, And he relates a story

0:34:43.360 --> 0:34:45.360
<v Speaker 1>that was told to him or or an anecdote that

0:34:45.400 --> 0:34:48.719
<v Speaker 1>was told to him by Rogers Hornsby Rogers Roger with

0:34:48.760 --> 0:34:51.400
<v Speaker 1>an s right Rogers Hornsby, who was the greatest right

0:34:51.440 --> 0:34:53.439
<v Speaker 1>handed hitter of all time. He's the last right handed

0:34:53.520 --> 0:34:56.560
<v Speaker 1>hitter to hit four hundred, and he actually averaged four

0:34:56.680 --> 0:35:00.200
<v Speaker 1>hundred over five seasons. Really the only guy, a guy

0:35:00.280 --> 0:35:04.320
<v Speaker 1>major do that. He said that Williams that the single

0:35:04.360 --> 0:35:06.680
<v Speaker 1>most important thing for a hitter was to get a

0:35:06.760 --> 0:35:10.200
<v Speaker 1>good ball to hit, in other words, to swing it strikes.

0:35:10.920 --> 0:35:13.320
<v Speaker 1>And I think the same thing can be applied to stocks,

0:35:13.320 --> 0:35:16.440
<v Speaker 1>for a example, you have to hit according to your

0:35:16.480 --> 0:35:19.759
<v Speaker 1>style and not swing its stocks that are out of

0:35:19.800 --> 0:35:22.640
<v Speaker 1>your strike zone. And I think that increases your chance

0:35:22.640 --> 0:35:26.920
<v Speaker 1>of winning. Makes makes perfect sense. You've seen the Buffett

0:35:27.200 --> 0:35:31.400
<v Speaker 1>um book that he recommended. So Warren Buffett recommended the

0:35:31.440 --> 0:35:35.680
<v Speaker 1>Ted Williams book. And there's a graphic in the Ted

0:35:35.719 --> 0:35:40.360
<v Speaker 1>Williams famous of the strike zone, and he somehow figured

0:35:40.400 --> 0:35:43.440
<v Speaker 1>out so I think it was like seven balls across

0:35:43.840 --> 0:35:45.920
<v Speaker 1>the top of the strikes because the plate is seventeen

0:35:45.920 --> 0:35:49.840
<v Speaker 1>inches right, so it's seven withs and sixteen or he

0:35:49.880 --> 0:35:51.960
<v Speaker 1>was about six three right. So he figured out the

0:35:51.960 --> 0:35:57.480
<v Speaker 1>exact strike zone and then somehow calculated his hitting percentage

0:35:57.640 --> 0:36:02.160
<v Speaker 1>of each and every which he was a quant before

0:36:02.239 --> 0:36:06.319
<v Speaker 1>any money years before money ball was ever conceived. He

0:36:06.840 --> 0:36:13.440
<v Speaker 1>applied probabilities to hitting. Really, people don't understand how brilliant

0:36:13.520 --> 0:36:17.920
<v Speaker 1>he was as a mathematical hitter, not just as a

0:36:17.920 --> 0:36:23.040
<v Speaker 1>big He was cerebral and that's fascinating to me. Yeah,

0:36:23.200 --> 0:36:25.760
<v Speaker 1>I I read the book when I was a player.

0:36:25.880 --> 0:36:28.160
<v Speaker 1>I bought the book and tried to help my sons

0:36:28.239 --> 0:36:31.040
<v Speaker 1>with it when they were players, And um, I tried

0:36:31.080 --> 0:36:33.800
<v Speaker 1>to use some of his methods when I was coaching.

0:36:34.560 --> 0:36:37.919
<v Speaker 1>UM and I would just tell my kids, if it's good,

0:36:37.960 --> 0:36:41.040
<v Speaker 1>you've got to be swinging, and if you're in certain counts,

0:36:41.080 --> 0:36:44.080
<v Speaker 1>you need to be a hitter. You can't be taken pitches.

0:36:44.640 --> 0:36:48.320
<v Speaker 1>And I know it's inappropriate or not, it's not the

0:36:48.400 --> 0:36:51.600
<v Speaker 1>right way to say it, but uh to little league players.

0:36:51.600 --> 0:36:53.480
<v Speaker 1>But nobody ever went to the Hall of Fame being

0:36:53.480 --> 0:36:55.879
<v Speaker 1>a good walker. You got there by being a good hitter.

0:36:56.480 --> 0:36:58.520
<v Speaker 1>So you play where did you play ball? I played

0:36:58.520 --> 0:36:59.920
<v Speaker 1>in high school, I played a little while in colle

0:37:00.040 --> 0:37:02.200
<v Speaker 1>leg and I played some semi pro baseballs. Oh really,

0:37:02.480 --> 0:37:05.120
<v Speaker 1>I was a picturer and I now have the torn

0:37:05.280 --> 0:37:11.160
<v Speaker 1>rotator cuff. Um, no, not anymore. But um, I was accurate.

0:37:11.200 --> 0:37:13.279
<v Speaker 1>I was fast. I had no breaking pitch and that's

0:37:13.280 --> 0:37:16.200
<v Speaker 1>why nothing after high school. Wait, you're supposed to make

0:37:16.239 --> 0:37:18.360
<v Speaker 1>the bull dry. I don't throw that way. I just

0:37:18.400 --> 0:37:21.040
<v Speaker 1>throw it as hard as I can. So, um, that's

0:37:21.080 --> 0:37:24.759
<v Speaker 1>really and I was deadly accurate. That was the yeah,

0:37:24.880 --> 0:37:27.799
<v Speaker 1>well corner, A little little chin music. Whatever you had

0:37:27.840 --> 0:37:31.160
<v Speaker 1>to do. Um, So you played a semipro, That's that's great.

0:37:31.239 --> 0:37:35.560
<v Speaker 1>How How what's amazing at that level? And we'll talk

0:37:35.600 --> 0:37:38.520
<v Speaker 1>about a little math. Is you get one more hit

0:37:38.760 --> 0:37:42.600
<v Speaker 1>a week and statistically you're just so far ahead of

0:37:42.680 --> 0:37:47.000
<v Speaker 1>everybody else. That's correct. The level of competition is really amazing.

0:37:47.120 --> 0:37:49.400
<v Speaker 1>That's correct. If you strike out one less time a week,

0:37:49.440 --> 0:37:52.440
<v Speaker 1>it's a big deal, huge, just a huge. Um. Have

0:37:52.600 --> 0:37:59.120
<v Speaker 1>you read much of Michael Mobison's work on luck and skill? Um? So,

0:37:59.200 --> 0:38:02.279
<v Speaker 1>I have been. I have been able to sit in

0:38:02.360 --> 0:38:04.719
<v Speaker 1>on some of his presentations. So the answer to that

0:38:04.800 --> 0:38:06.399
<v Speaker 1>question is yes. I think he does some really good

0:38:06.400 --> 0:38:11.279
<v Speaker 1>work about that. The book um The Success Equations, Separating

0:38:11.360 --> 0:38:15.000
<v Speaker 1>Luck from Skill and Sports Investing in Business. The irony

0:38:15.160 --> 0:38:18.080
<v Speaker 1>is that the skill level is so high in professional

0:38:18.120 --> 0:38:21.520
<v Speaker 1>sports that it turns out that luck matters a whole

0:38:21.520 --> 0:38:25.320
<v Speaker 1>lot more than it does amongst amateurs. Yeah, without a doubt.

0:38:25.760 --> 0:38:27.719
<v Speaker 1>And and and they're playing a game in their head

0:38:27.800 --> 0:38:30.239
<v Speaker 1>all the time, right, which is why. And I've said

0:38:30.239 --> 0:38:32.359
<v Speaker 1>to my son, I said to my son's when during

0:38:32.360 --> 0:38:34.480
<v Speaker 1>the playoffs in the World Series, if you really watched

0:38:34.560 --> 0:38:39.120
<v Speaker 1>baseball closely, you'll watch that major League Baseball players swing

0:38:39.120 --> 0:38:42.600
<v Speaker 1>at pitches, not necessarily at strikes. And by that I

0:38:42.640 --> 0:38:44.960
<v Speaker 1>mean you'll you'll be watching a game and you'll see

0:38:44.960 --> 0:38:46.440
<v Speaker 1>a guy take a pitch right down the middle, and

0:38:46.480 --> 0:38:48.399
<v Speaker 1>you might say to yourself, how could he not swing

0:38:48.400 --> 0:38:50.400
<v Speaker 1>at that? And the reason he wasn't swinging at is

0:38:50.400 --> 0:38:53.480
<v Speaker 1>because he wasn't guessing that on that pitch. You know,

0:38:53.520 --> 0:38:55.040
<v Speaker 1>he got a fastball. He may have been looking for

0:38:55.040 --> 0:38:56.680
<v Speaker 1>a curveball. He got a curveball. He may have been

0:38:56.680 --> 0:38:59.640
<v Speaker 1>looking for a fastball. So they're they're guessing right, and

0:38:59.640 --> 0:39:02.799
<v Speaker 1>they're in a mental game, a calculation game, or a

0:39:02.840 --> 0:39:06.240
<v Speaker 1>game of probability versus the picture. And that's the reason

0:39:06.320 --> 0:39:09.439
<v Speaker 1>that you know at that level that sometimes you would say,

0:39:09.480 --> 0:39:11.360
<v Speaker 1>you're a younger guy, you'd say you have to be

0:39:11.400 --> 0:39:14.520
<v Speaker 1>swinging in that situation. And sometimes they're not swinging because

0:39:14.520 --> 0:39:17.880
<v Speaker 1>they're not guessing at that pitch. You know, Um the

0:39:17.920 --> 0:39:21.920
<v Speaker 1>coach of the Giants, Um who departed a couple of

0:39:21.960 --> 0:39:25.879
<v Speaker 1>years of right, Tom Coughlin. I'm not a sports book fan,

0:39:26.560 --> 0:39:29.239
<v Speaker 1>but he wrote a book called Earned the Right to Win,

0:39:30.120 --> 0:39:35.000
<v Speaker 1>and he talks about in the book the research they

0:39:35.000 --> 0:39:37.920
<v Speaker 1>were doing. All right, what is this opposition team. What

0:39:37.960 --> 0:39:41.160
<v Speaker 1>do they do on on you know, second and long?

0:39:41.239 --> 0:39:43.040
<v Speaker 1>What do they do on third and short? What are

0:39:43.040 --> 0:39:45.879
<v Speaker 1>they And then every player would have to learn that,

0:39:46.239 --> 0:39:49.560
<v Speaker 1>and some of the players really um pushed back on it.

0:39:49.560 --> 0:39:52.399
<v Speaker 1>And I'm trying to remember which was its straight hand

0:39:52.400 --> 0:39:56.200
<v Speaker 1>it was it was one of their um defensive backs

0:39:56.600 --> 0:39:59.319
<v Speaker 1>used to complain about it all the time. And then

0:39:59.480 --> 0:40:02.239
<v Speaker 1>years la he's playing for another team and it's a

0:40:02.360 --> 0:40:06.040
<v Speaker 1>bowl game situation and it's third and short and he says,

0:40:06.400 --> 0:40:08.480
<v Speaker 1>all right, what do these guys do on third and short?

0:40:08.800 --> 0:40:11.319
<v Speaker 1>And he realizes I don't have this information? Oh my god.

0:40:11.440 --> 0:40:14.640
<v Speaker 1>Cochlin was right. You need to have that prep as

0:40:14.640 --> 0:40:15.920
<v Speaker 1>big as a pain in the neck. It was as

0:40:15.960 --> 0:40:20.000
<v Speaker 1>it was. It was a decided advantage. And what you're

0:40:20.000 --> 0:40:23.839
<v Speaker 1>describing with the batters very similar there. If they know

0:40:23.920 --> 0:40:26.560
<v Speaker 1>the picture, if they've studied him, they know their tendency,

0:40:27.080 --> 0:40:30.360
<v Speaker 1>they're making a reasonable guess. All right, with three and

0:40:30.480 --> 0:40:32.640
<v Speaker 1>third and one. He tends to throw a breaking bowl

0:40:32.680 --> 0:40:36.120
<v Speaker 1>outside I'm looking for I like to hit those. It's

0:40:36.160 --> 0:40:38.279
<v Speaker 1>really fascinating the whole And I think the same thing

0:40:38.360 --> 0:40:40.279
<v Speaker 1>applies to stocks, right, You want to you want to

0:40:40.320 --> 0:40:42.880
<v Speaker 1>find a stock that fits your style. What's the tendency

0:40:43.520 --> 0:40:47.160
<v Speaker 1>of a stock to do something after it looks like

0:40:47.480 --> 0:40:51.480
<v Speaker 1>it looks now? And so over time you you recognize

0:40:52.000 --> 0:40:55.239
<v Speaker 1>that a pattern looks like it does now and that

0:40:55.400 --> 0:40:59.880
<v Speaker 1>usually is followed by some reaction. And that's because you

0:41:00.080 --> 0:41:02.120
<v Speaker 1>tend to understand and you tend to have seen so

0:41:02.160 --> 0:41:04.920
<v Speaker 1>many of them over time, you you tend to I

0:41:04.920 --> 0:41:07.320
<v Speaker 1>don't want to say foretell, but expect a certain result.

0:41:07.400 --> 0:41:09.520
<v Speaker 1>But that's why you look at hundreds of charts tonight.

0:41:09.600 --> 0:41:12.000
<v Speaker 1>You do that for twenty years, and eventually you really

0:41:12.040 --> 0:41:14.919
<v Speaker 1>get a feel for Right, I've seen this pattern before,

0:41:14.960 --> 0:41:18.279
<v Speaker 1>and I know what tends to happen here exactly. What

0:41:18.280 --> 0:41:21.719
<v Speaker 1>what other sports metaphors apply to markets and invest there.

0:41:22.120 --> 0:41:24.640
<v Speaker 1>I really think baseball is is about as good as

0:41:24.640 --> 0:41:27.480
<v Speaker 1>there is. Um we could you know, we could go

0:41:27.520 --> 0:41:30.000
<v Speaker 1>into uh into basketball too, and I think there are

0:41:30.000 --> 0:41:32.120
<v Speaker 1>a lot of a lot of basketball metaphors to where

0:41:32.440 --> 0:41:34.759
<v Speaker 1>and you could see now the teams really want to

0:41:34.760 --> 0:41:38.279
<v Speaker 1>shoot three pointers. They know that you're getting more per

0:41:38.280 --> 0:41:40.799
<v Speaker 1>basket made than you would be when you're shooting a

0:41:40.840 --> 0:41:42.840
<v Speaker 1>two pointer. Right, they want despite the fact that some

0:41:42.880 --> 0:41:45.280
<v Speaker 1>of them might be low percentage shots. But the reward

0:41:46.280 --> 0:41:48.719
<v Speaker 1>is so much greater. And but from the corner, it's

0:41:48.719 --> 0:41:51.640
<v Speaker 1>a really high percentage shots, not that much because it's

0:41:52.040 --> 0:41:54.960
<v Speaker 1>it's it's a it's a higher percentage shot because it's closer,

0:41:55.520 --> 0:41:58.120
<v Speaker 1>but conceivably you're seeing less of the basket. It might

0:41:58.120 --> 0:42:00.239
<v Speaker 1>be thought to be harder when my fall, there was

0:42:00.280 --> 0:42:02.680
<v Speaker 1>a player, you know, when they still had laces on

0:42:02.719 --> 0:42:05.160
<v Speaker 1>basketballs that I would have told you that's a poor

0:42:05.280 --> 0:42:08.600
<v Speaker 1>percentage shot because you're not seeing the entire basketball. You're

0:42:08.600 --> 0:42:11.200
<v Speaker 1>not getting the same deaths exactly just see the rim

0:42:11.239 --> 0:42:14.239
<v Speaker 1>floating exactly right. But if you have a touch and

0:42:14.280 --> 0:42:18.319
<v Speaker 1>if you know where that is, that's your closest three

0:42:18.320 --> 0:42:21.160
<v Speaker 1>point shot you're gonna make. And you see guys like Curry,

0:42:21.320 --> 0:42:23.239
<v Speaker 1>they live in those courts without a doubt. And I

0:42:23.280 --> 0:42:25.680
<v Speaker 1>think as did Michael Jordan when he was shooting and

0:42:25.680 --> 0:42:27.600
<v Speaker 1>and and I think, uh, you know, sort of an

0:42:27.600 --> 0:42:32.960
<v Speaker 1>appropriate football metaphor is that, uh Brady and the Patriots

0:42:33.000 --> 0:42:36.040
<v Speaker 1>is are so successful not because he throws over the

0:42:36.040 --> 0:42:38.600
<v Speaker 1>top to Gronkowski thirty yards down the field every time,

0:42:38.600 --> 0:42:41.640
<v Speaker 1>but because he hits Edelman or amend Ola or when

0:42:41.640 --> 0:42:43.360
<v Speaker 1>they had west Walker, he would hit them in the

0:42:43.360 --> 0:42:45.920
<v Speaker 1>flat for five or six yards, moved down the field,

0:42:45.920 --> 0:42:47.719
<v Speaker 1>moved down the field, and then go over the top

0:42:47.760 --> 0:42:50.200
<v Speaker 1>to Gronkowski, right. But but to set it up so

0:42:50.200 --> 0:42:52.480
<v Speaker 1>that you're you know, you're taking short gains, short gains

0:42:52.520 --> 0:42:56.799
<v Speaker 1>that then you have a lead, you know, the the

0:42:56.840 --> 0:42:58.640
<v Speaker 1>yard is in your favor, and then you could go

0:42:58.719 --> 0:43:00.239
<v Speaker 1>over the top to try to hit you know, a

0:43:00.320 --> 0:43:03.200
<v Speaker 1>mixed matter of home run. Right. Well, you know that

0:43:03.200 --> 0:43:07.600
<v Speaker 1>that's the the interesting thing about football is you're always

0:43:08.440 --> 0:43:12.719
<v Speaker 1>trying to not just use each play to move the

0:43:12.719 --> 0:43:16.359
<v Speaker 1>ball downfield, but each play subsequently sets up a lot

0:43:16.440 --> 0:43:18.880
<v Speaker 1>of play. Are you are Are you throwing long and

0:43:18.920 --> 0:43:22.640
<v Speaker 1>everybody's sitting back, then they're giving you the shorter over

0:43:22.680 --> 0:43:25.799
<v Speaker 1>the chess not check it's checkers, not apart me. It's chess,

0:43:25.800 --> 0:43:29.000
<v Speaker 1>not checkers. As Denzel Washington said to Ethan Hawk in

0:43:29.239 --> 0:43:33.840
<v Speaker 1>training day, it's multiple steps down the road checkers. You know,

0:43:33.880 --> 0:43:37.680
<v Speaker 1>there are some players that have the mental game, have

0:43:37.800 --> 0:43:40.399
<v Speaker 1>the pizzical game, and then have all the tools out

0:43:40.440 --> 0:43:42.400
<v Speaker 1>there to hit. When you look at New England, I

0:43:42.400 --> 0:43:46.080
<v Speaker 1>mean that's really just an embarrassment of riches for a

0:43:46.200 --> 0:43:49.399
<v Speaker 1>quarterback who's smart, who has good field vision and could

0:43:49.520 --> 0:43:54.799
<v Speaker 1>really right. So it's it's it's not a coincidence that

0:43:54.880 --> 0:43:57.799
<v Speaker 1>those guys have, um have been winning as much as

0:43:57.800 --> 0:44:01.440
<v Speaker 1>they have been over the past couple of years. Um,

0:44:01.480 --> 0:44:04.680
<v Speaker 1>So give me a basketball metaphor. So it's the three

0:44:04.760 --> 0:44:07.239
<v Speaker 1>pointer and and what else? What else is a good

0:44:07.239 --> 0:44:10.560
<v Speaker 1>basketball metaphor for investing? You know, I keep coming back.

0:44:10.760 --> 0:44:12.160
<v Speaker 1>I think a good one is. I think a good

0:44:12.160 --> 0:44:15.799
<v Speaker 1>one is is that? Uh So, I watch a lot

0:44:15.800 --> 0:44:17.600
<v Speaker 1>of basketball. I watch a lot of high school basketball.

0:44:17.680 --> 0:44:19.759
<v Speaker 1>My former c y OH coach is a is a

0:44:19.840 --> 0:44:22.040
<v Speaker 1>very school basketball. Watch a lot of high school basketball

0:44:22.040 --> 0:44:23.719
<v Speaker 1>because my former c y O coach is a friend

0:44:23.760 --> 0:44:27.600
<v Speaker 1>of mine is perhaps too. You know, he's a He's

0:44:27.640 --> 0:44:30.480
<v Speaker 1>a Westchester County Hall of Fame basketball coach, and he

0:44:30.520 --> 0:44:33.920
<v Speaker 1>wins about eight percent of his games. And I watched

0:44:33.920 --> 0:44:37.839
<v Speaker 1>the games a lot, and I sometimes I see how

0:44:37.880 --> 0:44:40.640
<v Speaker 1>they're playing or how they're winning, and I wonder, you know,

0:44:41.480 --> 0:44:43.920
<v Speaker 1>whereas sort of hit according to your style style in

0:44:43.920 --> 0:44:46.000
<v Speaker 1>baseball or swing at strikes would be a kin in

0:44:46.040 --> 0:44:49.440
<v Speaker 1>basketball to making your free throws right. Often in a

0:44:49.480 --> 0:44:52.040
<v Speaker 1>high school game, the team that loses is the team

0:44:52.040 --> 0:44:54.799
<v Speaker 1>that shot more poorly from the free throw line than

0:44:54.840 --> 0:44:58.640
<v Speaker 1>their opponents. Real, that's interesting. So we can practice, however

0:44:58.680 --> 0:45:03.359
<v Speaker 1>many offensive se it's our plays that are in my playbook. Um,

0:45:03.400 --> 0:45:06.960
<v Speaker 1>but if our team doesn't hit our free throws, regardless

0:45:07.000 --> 0:45:09.719
<v Speaker 1>of how many offensive plays we have, we're probably not

0:45:09.719 --> 0:45:11.840
<v Speaker 1>going to play that. Well, what do you think about

0:45:11.880 --> 0:45:14.000
<v Speaker 1>the I don't remember it was the high school the

0:45:14.040 --> 0:45:18.279
<v Speaker 1>college coach who every fourth down he doesn't care, he goes,

0:45:18.400 --> 0:45:21.399
<v Speaker 1>he goes. I love the statistics. Yeah, the statistics were great.

0:45:21.440 --> 0:45:23.279
<v Speaker 1>I remember that. Was that the wall a Wall Street

0:45:23.360 --> 0:45:25.680
<v Speaker 1>Journal article or a Times article. I can't remember where

0:45:25.680 --> 0:45:27.480
<v Speaker 1>it was where it was printed, but I did read it,

0:45:27.560 --> 0:45:31.279
<v Speaker 1>and he said, you know, my odds of success, I

0:45:31.280 --> 0:45:34.040
<v Speaker 1>got a third more plays than everybody else. Stop and

0:45:34.080 --> 0:45:37.160
<v Speaker 1>thinking a third more offensive plays if I'm going for

0:45:37.239 --> 0:45:39.719
<v Speaker 1>an on fourth it's right. I remember that. So the

0:45:40.239 --> 0:45:44.040
<v Speaker 1>math behind that, the statistics are really quite fascinating. All right,

0:45:44.080 --> 0:45:50.279
<v Speaker 1>So let's bring this back to UH to technico analysis. UM.

0:45:50.320 --> 0:45:55.759
<v Speaker 1>I took the course, the the course UM with the

0:45:55.800 --> 0:45:59.239
<v Speaker 1>Great Ralph at Kumpora, and one of the things I

0:45:59.320 --> 0:46:04.520
<v Speaker 1>remember from that course was Ralph saying, fundamentals tell you

0:46:04.560 --> 0:46:08.920
<v Speaker 1>what to buy, Technicals tell you when to buy true false,

0:46:08.960 --> 0:46:10.239
<v Speaker 1>What do you think of that. I think it's a

0:46:10.239 --> 0:46:13.600
<v Speaker 1>pretty good tenant. Um. But I'm also very fond of um.

0:46:14.320 --> 0:46:17.080
<v Speaker 1>A tenant that is that was said by I believe

0:46:17.120 --> 0:46:20.800
<v Speaker 1>Paul Tutor Jones. Uh. He said something to the effect

0:46:20.800 --> 0:46:26.920
<v Speaker 1>of price moves first, fundamentals follow, meaning that price moves,

0:46:26.960 --> 0:46:30.600
<v Speaker 1>and then a narrative develops around the price move. So

0:46:30.680 --> 0:46:33.040
<v Speaker 1>I'm not dismissing what Ralph said. I think it's right,

0:46:33.080 --> 0:46:35.520
<v Speaker 1>but I think Paul Tutor Jones is is a little

0:46:35.520 --> 0:46:39.399
<v Speaker 1>bit has a little bit more um. It's a wry observation, uh,

0:46:39.440 --> 0:46:43.719
<v Speaker 1>and probably a little bit more cynical. Um. It's sort

0:46:43.719 --> 0:46:46.680
<v Speaker 1>of you know, stocks moved sharply, especially financials in the

0:46:46.760 --> 0:46:51.879
<v Speaker 1>last week on the Trump election, and now people are

0:46:51.920 --> 0:46:56.880
<v Speaker 1>trying to ascribe what will happen going forward. I'll leave

0:46:56.920 --> 0:46:59.359
<v Speaker 1>those frank, but but it's always an after that. I'll

0:46:59.400 --> 0:47:03.080
<v Speaker 1>leave those sentence to the fundamental guys. But price moved,

0:47:03.120 --> 0:47:06.680
<v Speaker 1>and then here's the reason price moved? Right? Well, what

0:47:06.680 --> 0:47:09.400
<v Speaker 1>good are you doing telling me? Right well? Why weren't

0:47:09.400 --> 0:47:12.120
<v Speaker 1>you giving me this analysis before? I think Palter to

0:47:12.200 --> 0:47:14.640
<v Speaker 1>Jones is uh, you know, line is is pretty appropriate.

0:47:14.920 --> 0:47:17.719
<v Speaker 1>I don't think it's cynical. I think it's human nature.

0:47:17.560 --> 0:47:22.320
<v Speaker 1>We were just discussing this the other day that before this,

0:47:22.560 --> 0:47:26.600
<v Speaker 1>so we can talk about the Clinton Trump election. Before

0:47:26.760 --> 0:47:31.120
<v Speaker 1>Trump won, the story was she has more money, she

0:47:31.280 --> 0:47:34.399
<v Speaker 1>is a better get out the vote ground game, they

0:47:34.400 --> 0:47:36.920
<v Speaker 1>have better analytics. The Trump team is kind of just

0:47:37.040 --> 0:47:40.560
<v Speaker 1>flinging darts and hail Mary's and what have you. And

0:47:40.600 --> 0:47:45.800
<v Speaker 1>then afterwards the narrative completely changed. Hey, their their narrative,

0:47:45.960 --> 0:47:50.480
<v Speaker 1>their analytics. Their analytics turned out to be much better. Um,

0:47:50.600 --> 0:47:53.759
<v Speaker 1>they understood what was going on on the ground in Wisconsin.

0:47:54.120 --> 0:47:58.120
<v Speaker 1>And all these after the fact rationalizations which to be blunts.

0:47:58.200 --> 0:48:00.799
<v Speaker 1>This election could have gone either way. They pretty easy.

0:48:01.120 --> 0:48:06.000
<v Speaker 1>If if the Access Hollywood tape doesn't come out, he

0:48:06.320 --> 0:48:10.160
<v Speaker 1>steam rolls her. If the Comy letter doesn't take place

0:48:10.200 --> 0:48:13.360
<v Speaker 1>in October, she probably beats it. Really, this could have

0:48:13.520 --> 0:48:17.160
<v Speaker 1>easily broken either way, and yet everybody wants to make

0:48:17.200 --> 0:48:23.319
<v Speaker 1>these broad pronouncements after the fact. It's that same exact process. Oh,

0:48:23.360 --> 0:48:25.840
<v Speaker 1>now that we know what happens, let's craft a narrative.

0:48:26.280 --> 0:48:28.880
<v Speaker 1>Let's craft a narrative around that. I find that to

0:48:28.960 --> 0:48:34.399
<v Speaker 1>be um, absolutely fascinating. Um. So, a couple of other

0:48:34.480 --> 0:48:40.120
<v Speaker 1>questions I didn't get to during the regular broadcast portion. Uh.

0:48:40.160 --> 0:48:42.960
<v Speaker 1>We we just touched on on this very lightly when

0:48:43.000 --> 0:48:45.680
<v Speaker 1>when I asked, you know, what attracted you to the

0:48:45.680 --> 0:48:50.239
<v Speaker 1>technical side. Was it the rigor of the discipline, was

0:48:50.320 --> 0:48:55.319
<v Speaker 1>it the did it make sense logically? Um? Was it

0:48:55.640 --> 0:48:59.279
<v Speaker 1>some evidence or data that supported it? What made you say, Oh,

0:48:59.360 --> 0:49:01.600
<v Speaker 1>this is really seems to be the way to go,

0:49:01.719 --> 0:49:04.279
<v Speaker 1>and what I learned as an NBA student may not

0:49:04.360 --> 0:49:07.640
<v Speaker 1>be the best way to buy and sell stocks. I'm

0:49:07.640 --> 0:49:09.239
<v Speaker 1>going to try to answer it like this. Let's say

0:49:09.239 --> 0:49:10.799
<v Speaker 1>that I'm a real estate broker and I call you

0:49:10.920 --> 0:49:13.319
<v Speaker 1>up and I said, hey, Barry, I got a place

0:49:13.360 --> 0:49:15.840
<v Speaker 1>i'd like you to see. What's the first thing you

0:49:15.880 --> 0:49:18.480
<v Speaker 1>say to me? You likely say to me, what does

0:49:18.520 --> 0:49:23.720
<v Speaker 1>it look like? Where is it? That's probably akin to saying,

0:49:23.800 --> 0:49:26.960
<v Speaker 1>what is the Can I look at the chart? If? Um?

0:49:27.040 --> 0:49:29.560
<v Speaker 1>Let's say I had a younger brother and you had

0:49:29.600 --> 0:49:32.759
<v Speaker 1>a younger sister, and we would like them to sort of,

0:49:32.800 --> 0:49:34.759
<v Speaker 1>you know, meet, perhaps they can go out at a date,

0:49:35.080 --> 0:49:38.000
<v Speaker 1>and we introduced the idea to each of them separately.

0:49:38.080 --> 0:49:39.759
<v Speaker 1>What's the first thing that they would say to us?

0:49:40.000 --> 0:49:43.080
<v Speaker 1>What does that person look like? I think it's appropriate

0:49:43.120 --> 0:49:44.960
<v Speaker 1>to think of it the same way with respect to charts.

0:49:45.000 --> 0:49:48.440
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you have to look at something to be

0:49:48.520 --> 0:49:51.160
<v Speaker 1>able to have an idea as to what you're talking about.

0:49:52.080 --> 0:49:56.560
<v Speaker 1>I mean, Billy Bean popularized moneyball, but guys in the

0:49:56.600 --> 0:49:58.920
<v Speaker 1>business will tell you that you still have to watch

0:49:59.000 --> 0:50:03.480
<v Speaker 1>baseball players play. That's the reason teams pay scouts to

0:50:03.520 --> 0:50:06.520
<v Speaker 1>go watch high school and college players. They have to

0:50:06.560 --> 0:50:09.520
<v Speaker 1>see if they can play. Uh, It's sort of like

0:50:09.520 --> 0:50:11.640
<v Speaker 1>getting a high school kid or a kid who played

0:50:12.320 --> 0:50:14.920
<v Speaker 1>in a league that wasn't a strong league and he

0:50:15.000 --> 0:50:17.600
<v Speaker 1>hits six hundred, Well, is that a legit six hundred

0:50:17.680 --> 0:50:19.279
<v Speaker 1>versus a kid who may have played in a league

0:50:19.320 --> 0:50:21.960
<v Speaker 1>that was really tough who hit four and a quarter.

0:50:22.719 --> 0:50:24.439
<v Speaker 1>I don't know. Maybe you need to see them play

0:50:24.520 --> 0:50:26.520
<v Speaker 1>to be able to determine who was really the better player.

0:50:26.600 --> 0:50:28.919
<v Speaker 1>So I think you have to look at what you're

0:50:28.920 --> 0:50:32.320
<v Speaker 1>thinking about with respect to stocks, index's yields, currencies, commodities

0:50:32.360 --> 0:50:35.160
<v Speaker 1>across the board. I've asked a number of people if

0:50:35.200 --> 0:50:38.120
<v Speaker 1>you were only able to look at one thing, would

0:50:38.160 --> 0:50:40.720
<v Speaker 1>you take a research report? Would you take the chart?

0:50:41.040 --> 0:50:44.600
<v Speaker 1>And invariably everybody says, even non technicians, I have to

0:50:44.640 --> 0:50:47.239
<v Speaker 1>see the chart well, I'm glad you said that, because

0:50:47.280 --> 0:50:50.239
<v Speaker 1>I think charts are the language of Wall Street. No

0:50:50.280 --> 0:50:53.360
<v Speaker 1>matter who comes in to make a presentation. Uh, it

0:50:53.440 --> 0:50:57.840
<v Speaker 1>could be uh, an overview analyst from Hong Kong, it

0:50:57.840 --> 0:51:01.120
<v Speaker 1>could be an overview analyst from Australia, wherever. It could

0:51:01.120 --> 0:51:03.120
<v Speaker 1>be somebody here in town. One of the I I

0:51:03.239 --> 0:51:07.000
<v Speaker 1>ranked overview people when they come in their presentation packages

0:51:07.080 --> 0:51:11.000
<v Speaker 1>are chalk full of charts, and so it may not

0:51:11.080 --> 0:51:14.240
<v Speaker 1>be that they're technically oriented, but they are chart oriented.

0:51:14.280 --> 0:51:16.440
<v Speaker 1>And I'm I really believe charts of the language of

0:51:16.440 --> 0:51:19.839
<v Speaker 1>Wall Street. So, given how much computing power is at

0:51:19.880 --> 0:51:23.400
<v Speaker 1>everybody's desk or even in your pocket on your phone,

0:51:24.000 --> 0:51:28.200
<v Speaker 1>how does that change the world of technical analysis when

0:51:28.280 --> 0:51:31.960
<v Speaker 1>everybody can access a chart anytime, anywhere, What what does

0:51:32.000 --> 0:51:35.279
<v Speaker 1>that do to the field? I think it's actually made

0:51:35.280 --> 0:51:37.680
<v Speaker 1>it stronger, right, I think it has made it more

0:51:37.800 --> 0:51:43.200
<v Speaker 1>rigorous because people can check really quickly by looking at

0:51:43.239 --> 0:51:45.760
<v Speaker 1>what you're looking at. Again, I'll go back to Steve

0:51:45.760 --> 0:51:48.480
<v Speaker 1>Schobin's line, it's the singer, not the song, right, It's

0:51:48.480 --> 0:51:51.400
<v Speaker 1>the interpretation that means more. But I think there's a

0:51:51.480 --> 0:51:54.279
<v Speaker 1>certain there's a greater degree of rigor with respect to

0:51:54.360 --> 0:51:56.440
<v Speaker 1>technicals that wasn't there in the past, when it was

0:51:56.520 --> 0:51:58.719
<v Speaker 1>only I don't want to say control, but but but

0:51:58.840 --> 0:52:02.799
<v Speaker 1>let's say dominated by a few, because it was so

0:52:02.880 --> 0:52:05.359
<v Speaker 1>hard to do these disciplines, right, everything was pretty much

0:52:05.360 --> 0:52:09.919
<v Speaker 1>done by hand. But now it's so widely dispersed that

0:52:10.120 --> 0:52:12.120
<v Speaker 1>I think everybody has a flavor for it, and I

0:52:12.120 --> 0:52:14.840
<v Speaker 1>think that's a very good thing for technical analysis. That

0:52:14.840 --> 0:52:18.319
<v Speaker 1>that's interesting. So you you reference the the impact of

0:52:18.320 --> 0:52:22.000
<v Speaker 1>the fed earlier um and the impact of al goes.

0:52:22.080 --> 0:52:25.799
<v Speaker 1>What what is high frequency trading done to the way

0:52:25.920 --> 0:52:29.080
<v Speaker 1>charts look and feel? Um? I actually think high when

0:52:29.120 --> 0:52:33.919
<v Speaker 1>when Michael Lewis wrote the book with about bread Fukayama, Um, yeah,

0:52:34.080 --> 0:52:36.319
<v Speaker 1>I thought that that was the smoke screen. Not that

0:52:36.400 --> 0:52:39.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm not dismissing the book. I'm not dismissing high frequency trading.

0:52:39.800 --> 0:52:41.880
<v Speaker 1>But I think high frequency trading was getting the blame

0:52:41.960 --> 0:52:44.000
<v Speaker 1>for something that it shouldn't be getting the blame from it.

0:52:44.160 --> 0:52:46.440
<v Speaker 1>I think the real risk to our business is in

0:52:46.480 --> 0:52:50.360
<v Speaker 1>the e t f uh side of the business. Really explain,

0:52:50.880 --> 0:52:54.000
<v Speaker 1>So I have a pet theory about bonds, but explain

0:52:54.080 --> 0:53:00.000
<v Speaker 1>why you think e t fs are are so problematic? Uh?

0:53:00.040 --> 0:53:02.160
<v Speaker 1>I don't. Well, they're not problematic when we go up,

0:53:02.600 --> 0:53:05.440
<v Speaker 1>then they may be problematic when we go down. I

0:53:05.440 --> 0:53:08.879
<v Speaker 1>think because people don't understand them. For example, if you

0:53:08.960 --> 0:53:11.640
<v Speaker 1>call your broker and say I'm gonna buy an order

0:53:11.719 --> 0:53:16.080
<v Speaker 1>of spiders, the s P Y you buy spiders, but

0:53:16.120 --> 0:53:18.600
<v Speaker 1>you've created an unnatural bid for every stock in the

0:53:18.719 --> 0:53:21.399
<v Speaker 1>SMP five d absolutely, and I think most people who

0:53:21.560 --> 0:53:24.960
<v Speaker 1>use those E t F don't understand that. And I

0:53:25.040 --> 0:53:27.920
<v Speaker 1>also think that if you have a portfolio of individual

0:53:28.000 --> 0:53:31.319
<v Speaker 1>stocks and you add in an e t F let's

0:53:31.320 --> 0:53:34.920
<v Speaker 1>say the spider, your risk profile has changed because some

0:53:35.000 --> 0:53:37.440
<v Speaker 1>of the stocks you already own are in the spider.

0:53:38.280 --> 0:53:40.840
<v Speaker 1>So your risk parameter is not what you thought it was.

0:53:40.920 --> 0:53:44.239
<v Speaker 1>You've actually created sort of a derivative product and a

0:53:44.320 --> 0:53:47.120
<v Speaker 1>leverage product by using a simple et S. So so

0:53:47.280 --> 0:53:51.240
<v Speaker 1>years ago we had the SMP, we had the down industrials,

0:53:51.560 --> 0:53:54.160
<v Speaker 1>but you couldn't very easily trade them. You could go

0:53:54.160 --> 0:53:57.239
<v Speaker 1>out and buy each of the components in them, but

0:53:57.320 --> 0:53:59.799
<v Speaker 1>you couldn't just push a button and say I want

0:54:00.040 --> 0:54:03.319
<v Speaker 1>us and it was done. So when you say E

0:54:03.480 --> 0:54:07.520
<v Speaker 1>t f s have have impacted this, it's not the

0:54:07.560 --> 0:54:11.640
<v Speaker 1>index itself, it's that there's a trading vehicle that's that's

0:54:11.680 --> 0:54:14.840
<v Speaker 1>really easily accessible. And I don't think a lot of

0:54:14.840 --> 0:54:18.680
<v Speaker 1>people understand how E t F s are made and unmade.

0:54:18.719 --> 0:54:22.160
<v Speaker 1>I'm not certain I understand. Well, what little I know

0:54:22.200 --> 0:54:25.920
<v Speaker 1>about it is normally something like, uh, maybe the SMP

0:54:26.160 --> 0:54:29.280
<v Speaker 1>the spiders aren't a good example. But you take another

0:54:29.440 --> 0:54:33.240
<v Speaker 1>E T F UM or g l D for that matter,

0:54:33.840 --> 0:54:36.440
<v Speaker 1>UM and it has some components, and most of the

0:54:36.480 --> 0:54:39.360
<v Speaker 1>time when you're buying and selling it, you're just buying

0:54:39.360 --> 0:54:43.440
<v Speaker 1>and selling that component. There are there are ARBs who

0:54:43.440 --> 0:54:47.759
<v Speaker 1>will basically identify when it gets out of whack with

0:54:47.840 --> 0:54:50.880
<v Speaker 1>the underlying holdings and buy this and sell that in

0:54:50.960 --> 0:54:56.160
<v Speaker 1>order to bring it into into um appropriate balance. But

0:54:56.360 --> 0:54:59.920
<v Speaker 1>sometimes the underwriter is making more units when the demand

0:55:00.200 --> 0:55:03.120
<v Speaker 1>is overwhelming. We saw that with g l D on

0:55:03.160 --> 0:55:06.239
<v Speaker 1>the way up. It wasn't a finite matter of g

0:55:06.440 --> 0:55:09.480
<v Speaker 1>l D shares. They were actually making more as the

0:55:09.560 --> 0:55:12.640
<v Speaker 1>demand had blown up from let's call it oh five

0:55:12.760 --> 0:55:17.360
<v Speaker 1>to and then as that unwinds on the way down,

0:55:17.800 --> 0:55:21.720
<v Speaker 1>they start taking those units apart and selling the actual

0:55:21.840 --> 0:55:27.160
<v Speaker 1>gold futures or whatever. Yeah, it's not just this is

0:55:27.200 --> 0:55:30.479
<v Speaker 1>a closed and fund that's trading based on supplians men.

0:55:30.920 --> 0:55:33.359
<v Speaker 1>There are components that go into it. Yeah, no doubt,

0:55:33.360 --> 0:55:35.280
<v Speaker 1>which is why I think it's very hard to understand

0:55:35.280 --> 0:55:37.880
<v Speaker 1>those things. So it's okay on the upside, it's a problem.

0:55:37.880 --> 0:55:40.680
<v Speaker 1>On the downside, I think it's that then the the

0:55:40.840 --> 0:55:43.680
<v Speaker 1>is that the balance of risk. I don't think we

0:55:43.880 --> 0:55:46.880
<v Speaker 1>I don't think anybody is understands and I'm at the

0:55:46.920 --> 0:55:49.640
<v Speaker 1>forefront with not understanding what it could mean. On the downside.

0:55:49.680 --> 0:55:52.640
<v Speaker 1>We haven't seen it, but I do recall, Uh, so

0:55:52.680 --> 0:55:55.360
<v Speaker 1>it wasn't August fifteen. It would probably have been August

0:55:55.760 --> 0:55:59.399
<v Speaker 1>where we were down really sharply over a few days. Uh,

0:55:59.400 --> 0:56:01.520
<v Speaker 1>and there was some dislocation with respect to e t

0:56:01.680 --> 0:56:03.520
<v Speaker 1>F s and e t F that were sort of

0:56:04.040 --> 0:56:08.160
<v Speaker 1>supposed to be um more stable were marked down tremendously.

0:56:08.960 --> 0:56:12.080
<v Speaker 1>Maybe that was you know, sort of uh a preview

0:56:12.080 --> 0:56:16.919
<v Speaker 1>of what could happen. But again I'm not I don't

0:56:16.920 --> 0:56:19.200
<v Speaker 1>think I can take a guess as to what it

0:56:19.200 --> 0:56:21.439
<v Speaker 1>could look like. It might look it might be fine,

0:56:21.440 --> 0:56:23.040
<v Speaker 1>it might be well contained, it might not be I

0:56:23.040 --> 0:56:25.200
<v Speaker 1>don't know. I mean, there's still plenty of ETFs, not

0:56:25.320 --> 0:56:28.000
<v Speaker 1>there was as nearly as much money in them, but oh,

0:56:28.040 --> 0:56:31.120
<v Speaker 1>eight oh nine, they were, there were the spiders, the cues,

0:56:31.239 --> 0:56:34.480
<v Speaker 1>the diamonds. Yeah, but but I I think the these

0:56:34.560 --> 0:56:37.759
<v Speaker 1>trillions more to the active versus passive now is has

0:56:37.840 --> 0:56:41.160
<v Speaker 1>really you know, the ratio has shifted and and the

0:56:41.239 --> 0:56:44.720
<v Speaker 1>rate of change for assets going into passive versus assets

0:56:44.719 --> 0:56:48.520
<v Speaker 1>going into active has really benefits the the the the

0:56:48.560 --> 0:56:50.840
<v Speaker 1>passive side of the business, of which the e t

0:56:50.960 --> 0:56:55.120
<v Speaker 1>f s are. Bill mcnap of Vanguard says, we look

0:56:55.160 --> 0:56:58.600
<v Speaker 1>at this wrong, that it's not active versus passive. It's

0:56:58.640 --> 0:57:02.839
<v Speaker 1>expensive versus It's fine. That's fine too, Yes, but that's

0:57:02.920 --> 0:57:05.120
<v Speaker 1>we could characterize it like that too. Yeah, that he's

0:57:05.239 --> 0:57:08.000
<v Speaker 1>he believes that's what's been driving. Well, sometimes you know,

0:57:08.480 --> 0:57:13.160
<v Speaker 1>expensive versus cheap, and then cheap becomes expensive. Right that

0:57:13.160 --> 0:57:17.360
<v Speaker 1>that certainly is a is a possibility assuming there's no

0:57:17.440 --> 0:57:20.880
<v Speaker 1>risk management in a in a downside and downside move

0:57:20.960 --> 0:57:24.120
<v Speaker 1>and et f s get she'll act. So there were

0:57:24.120 --> 0:57:28.320
<v Speaker 1>one or two other questions I wanted to to go over,

0:57:29.120 --> 0:57:32.440
<v Speaker 1>um and you you implied this, but I want to

0:57:32.480 --> 0:57:37.600
<v Speaker 1>explore a little more, Um, the advancement of technology. What

0:57:37.640 --> 0:57:40.840
<v Speaker 1>has this done for technicals? What does this mean? Uh

0:57:40.880 --> 0:57:44.280
<v Speaker 1>to trading in the market. I think the effect on

0:57:44.320 --> 0:57:50.560
<v Speaker 1>technical analysis is incalculable. Really, it's I mean, the Bloomberg terminals,

0:57:50.640 --> 0:57:52.760
<v Speaker 1>what you can do on the Bloomberg terms insane, It's

0:57:52.760 --> 0:57:55.960
<v Speaker 1>totally insane. We we are office laughs. It's like I

0:57:55.960 --> 0:57:57.920
<v Speaker 1>feel like we barely scratched. I mean, just to give

0:57:57.960 --> 0:57:59.680
<v Speaker 1>an idea. So the other day I I did a

0:57:59.720 --> 0:58:03.160
<v Speaker 1>relic to ratio of the of a group of Macau

0:58:03.320 --> 0:58:08.280
<v Speaker 1>gaming stocks to Patty Power, which is the Island base

0:58:09.760 --> 0:58:14.720
<v Speaker 1>London traded online betting. I mean ten years ago. I

0:58:14.720 --> 0:58:18.240
<v Speaker 1>couldn't have done that twenty years ago. It was inconceivable.

0:58:18.280 --> 0:58:19.680
<v Speaker 1>And if you did it, you had to you do

0:58:19.760 --> 0:58:22.920
<v Speaker 1>a calculator if you had one, or a spreadsheet if

0:58:22.960 --> 0:58:26.360
<v Speaker 1>you had a lotus one to three. Uh, you know too.

0:58:26.480 --> 0:58:28.000
<v Speaker 1>And then I can do it with with with a

0:58:28.040 --> 0:58:33.160
<v Speaker 1>handful of keystrokes on Bloomberg. That's it's crazy. Yeah, that's amazing, amazing.

0:58:33.280 --> 0:58:37.400
<v Speaker 1>So what does this do to the process of learning

0:58:37.440 --> 0:58:39.320
<v Speaker 1>how to chart and what does it due to the

0:58:39.360 --> 0:58:44.040
<v Speaker 1>market having all this technical horsepower. Well, it's another reason

0:58:44.080 --> 0:58:46.400
<v Speaker 1>that I think it's more appropriate for me to try

0:58:46.400 --> 0:58:49.240
<v Speaker 1>to stick with longer term trends rather than trying to

0:58:49.280 --> 0:58:51.640
<v Speaker 1>be a trader because I can't figure that I'm going

0:58:51.680 --> 0:58:55.800
<v Speaker 1>to be any better than any machine. And John Henry, Yeah,

0:58:56.080 --> 0:58:58.200
<v Speaker 1>I can't figure that I'm going to be any better

0:58:58.600 --> 0:59:01.880
<v Speaker 1>than somebody who is a trader. I'm not a trader.

0:59:01.920 --> 0:59:04.280
<v Speaker 1>I'm an analyst, and so I think my strength is

0:59:04.320 --> 0:59:07.240
<v Speaker 1>trying to stick with trend rather than trying to, uh,

0:59:07.280 --> 0:59:09.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, be able to trade better than somebody who's

0:59:09.760 --> 0:59:12.280
<v Speaker 1>doing it every single minute they're in their chair. So

0:59:12.360 --> 0:59:16.040
<v Speaker 1>you reference trends earlier. Let's let's talk about trend as

0:59:16.040 --> 0:59:21.200
<v Speaker 1>opposed to patterns and mean reversion. What makes trend so

0:59:21.320 --> 0:59:24.240
<v Speaker 1>significant because I think when you have the trend right,

0:59:24.240 --> 0:59:27.360
<v Speaker 1>you're bailed out of your mistakes. When you have the

0:59:27.400 --> 0:59:29.920
<v Speaker 1>trend right, Well, what are the mistakes when you have

0:59:29.960 --> 0:59:33.760
<v Speaker 1>the trend right? Sometimes you overthink your positions. I'll use

0:59:33.800 --> 0:59:36.240
<v Speaker 1>you as my example. Let's say you bought something today.

0:59:37.200 --> 0:59:40.360
<v Speaker 1>Invariably you come in on Monday morning, you're questioning yourself

0:59:40.360 --> 0:59:42.400
<v Speaker 1>whether or not you should have bought that. Tuesday, you're

0:59:42.400 --> 0:59:44.440
<v Speaker 1>doing the same thing, and you do that every single

0:59:44.520 --> 0:59:47.120
<v Speaker 1>day that you own that item until you get rid

0:59:47.160 --> 0:59:52.160
<v Speaker 1>of it. But sometimes our best decisions are made stepping

0:59:52.200 --> 0:59:55.360
<v Speaker 1>away from the screen or the terminal, whatever you want

0:59:55.360 --> 0:59:57.560
<v Speaker 1>to say, and trying to conceive of that item within

0:59:57.600 --> 1:00:01.400
<v Speaker 1>its trend. And you might say, Okay, I get it.

1:00:01.680 --> 1:00:04.560
<v Speaker 1>That stock might have some difficulties because I might have

1:00:04.560 --> 1:00:08.360
<v Speaker 1>not had the best entry point, but overall, it is

1:00:08.400 --> 1:00:10.640
<v Speaker 1>in an uptrend, and because it's in an up trend,

1:00:10.720 --> 1:00:12.800
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to give that stock the benefit of the

1:00:12.840 --> 1:00:16.920
<v Speaker 1>doubt on any pullback. Now, you might have to set

1:00:17.040 --> 1:00:20.080
<v Speaker 1>up a risk parameter for yourself that says, Okay, I

1:00:20.120 --> 1:00:23.680
<v Speaker 1>know it's an uptrend, but if it breaks some percentage

1:00:24.160 --> 1:00:27.040
<v Speaker 1>retracement level, I don't care what that trend says, I

1:00:27.120 --> 1:00:30.080
<v Speaker 1>have to reduce my position because it impacts the rest

1:00:30.080 --> 1:00:34.000
<v Speaker 1>of my portfolio. But I think when an item is

1:00:34.040 --> 1:00:36.160
<v Speaker 1>in an up trend and you are along that item,

1:00:36.280 --> 1:00:39.320
<v Speaker 1>it deserves the benefit of the doubt, meaning that you

1:00:39.360 --> 1:00:41.160
<v Speaker 1>know it can get knocked around a little bit, but

1:00:41.200 --> 1:00:44.680
<v Speaker 1>the trend is not broken. And before I get to

1:00:44.760 --> 1:00:47.400
<v Speaker 1>my favorite questions, I would be remiss if I did

1:00:47.440 --> 1:00:50.360
<v Speaker 1>not ask you. You were Lehman Brothers in the middle

1:00:50.360 --> 1:00:53.960
<v Speaker 1>of the nineties, that had to be a hopping place

1:00:54.000 --> 1:00:56.120
<v Speaker 1>at that time. What what was that like? It was

1:00:56.160 --> 1:00:58.400
<v Speaker 1>a great place. I worked with a guy named Steve Schoubin.

1:00:58.440 --> 1:01:01.880
<v Speaker 1>I've mentioned his name a few times today. He's um.

1:01:01.880 --> 1:01:06.160
<v Speaker 1>He was exceedingly patient and kind with me. He answered uh,

1:01:06.400 --> 1:01:09.840
<v Speaker 1>millions of my questions. Uh, he's uh he was. He

1:01:09.920 --> 1:01:13.240
<v Speaker 1>still is one of the quippiest guys in the business. Quippiest, tuippiest.

1:01:13.320 --> 1:01:16.800
<v Speaker 1>I mean, he's never at a loss for a quippy comeback. Uh.

1:01:16.840 --> 1:01:19.240
<v Speaker 1>And you just laughed because he was just so darn

1:01:19.320 --> 1:01:21.800
<v Speaker 1>fast with him. Lehman was a great place. He was

1:01:21.880 --> 1:01:24.360
<v Speaker 1>a great place. I just had a chance to be

1:01:24.840 --> 1:01:27.600
<v Speaker 1>detectical guy at Arnholden splite shorter, and I thought it

1:01:27.640 --> 1:01:29.720
<v Speaker 1>was a chance to you know, sort of be Uh

1:01:29.800 --> 1:01:32.240
<v Speaker 1>that's why you jumped from one of men. It wasn't.

1:01:32.280 --> 1:01:35.840
<v Speaker 1>It wasn't because of any you know, I was um displeased.

1:01:35.880 --> 1:01:37.400
<v Speaker 1>On the other side. I just said, you know, here's

1:01:37.400 --> 1:01:41.560
<v Speaker 1>an opportunity for myself. Um, I asked us Jeff DeGraf

1:01:41.680 --> 1:01:45.320
<v Speaker 1>um reference, who was Lehman's chief techne. He replaced me

1:01:45.400 --> 1:01:49.480
<v Speaker 1>at Lehman. Really, Oh, that's hilarious, he said, he goes,

1:01:50.040 --> 1:01:53.600
<v Speaker 1>he goes. I assure you, it's dumb luck. But he

1:01:53.760 --> 1:01:57.960
<v Speaker 1>handed his resignation in the day of the old time high.

1:01:58.400 --> 1:02:03.240
<v Speaker 1>Pretty good timing. Yeah, so uh to set up ren macro. Um,

1:02:03.440 --> 1:02:06.160
<v Speaker 1>so I go that. That's how you know, guys, a

1:02:06.200 --> 1:02:09.360
<v Speaker 1>good technician is he quits a publicly traded company and

1:02:09.680 --> 1:02:11.720
<v Speaker 1>that marks the high of the day. All right, So

1:02:11.800 --> 1:02:16.000
<v Speaker 1>let's jump to my favorite questions. I asked all my guests. Um,

1:02:16.200 --> 1:02:18.240
<v Speaker 1>you you told us about your background. You said you

1:02:18.320 --> 1:02:21.280
<v Speaker 1>got an m b a from what is now Gibelly

1:02:21.400 --> 1:02:24.680
<v Speaker 1>School of Management, but uh it's at Fordham. Did you

1:02:24.720 --> 1:02:27.440
<v Speaker 1>do anything between school and Wall Street? Or you went

1:02:27.880 --> 1:02:31.120
<v Speaker 1>right from right from college, right from grad school to

1:02:31.120 --> 1:02:34.040
<v Speaker 1>to finance that's right, yeah, right right in Yeah, nothing

1:02:34.040 --> 1:02:38.400
<v Speaker 1>in between. And um, obviously I'm gonna ask you who

1:02:38.440 --> 1:02:40.680
<v Speaker 1>your early mentors are. Steve Schobin is going to be

1:02:40.680 --> 1:02:42.960
<v Speaker 1>one of them. My very first boss was a guy

1:02:43.040 --> 1:02:45.080
<v Speaker 1>named Tom McKee. He was a great boss. He taught

1:02:45.080 --> 1:02:47.680
<v Speaker 1>me how to do my job responsibly. Uh. And then

1:02:47.720 --> 1:02:50.280
<v Speaker 1>I worked for Ken Saffie and Saffie Investment Research, and

1:02:50.280 --> 1:02:52.880
<v Speaker 1>he gave me a lot of freedom to do a

1:02:52.880 --> 1:02:54.480
<v Speaker 1>lot of things for him and it was a great

1:02:54.560 --> 1:02:58.320
<v Speaker 1>learning experience. Steve Schobin, I can't say enough about I

1:02:58.360 --> 1:03:01.280
<v Speaker 1>worked for a guy named Jeff earlier and John arnhold

1:03:01.960 --> 1:03:05.320
<v Speaker 1>Arnholden s Bleischroder and both both were gentlemen to me.

1:03:05.520 --> 1:03:09.240
<v Speaker 1>And while Sorrows Fund Management, I worked for Robert Soros,

1:03:09.240 --> 1:03:11.520
<v Speaker 1>who was a gentleman to me as well, a very

1:03:12.280 --> 1:03:14.920
<v Speaker 1>a guy who was always open to technicals and um

1:03:15.400 --> 1:03:18.400
<v Speaker 1>and looking at markets and charts. And I've been fortunate

1:03:18.440 --> 1:03:19.880
<v Speaker 1>for the last five years to work for a guy

1:03:19.920 --> 1:03:24.560
<v Speaker 1>named Scott Besson who encourages imaginative, imaginative thinking. He's always

1:03:24.600 --> 1:03:28.480
<v Speaker 1>interested in listening to an idea. He's really pragmatic and

1:03:28.560 --> 1:03:32.440
<v Speaker 1>he um. He's instilled confidence because he's allowed me the

1:03:32.520 --> 1:03:34.640
<v Speaker 1>freedom to make a mistake. And I don't want to.

1:03:35.280 --> 1:03:37.880
<v Speaker 1>I don't want to dismiss that point. You know, we

1:03:37.960 --> 1:03:41.240
<v Speaker 1>don't want to make mistakes, but you make them. It's

1:03:41.240 --> 1:03:43.240
<v Speaker 1>the nature of the business. If you're a four hundred

1:03:43.320 --> 1:03:45.400
<v Speaker 1>hit or you're a rock star, right and you're still

1:03:45.800 --> 1:03:48.600
<v Speaker 1>making out six out of ten times. Um so he

1:03:48.920 --> 1:03:52.600
<v Speaker 1>uh he um. He understands the mistake part of the business,

1:03:52.600 --> 1:03:54.720
<v Speaker 1>thankfully for me, and I'm lucky to be a part

1:03:54.720 --> 1:03:58.680
<v Speaker 1>of Key Square and with him. So what other investors

1:03:58.960 --> 1:04:03.880
<v Speaker 1>influenced how you approach uh markets and investing? So I've

1:04:03.920 --> 1:04:07.720
<v Speaker 1>tried to listen to anything UH or read anything that

1:04:07.760 --> 1:04:09.480
<v Speaker 1>these people have said. And some of them I worked

1:04:09.520 --> 1:04:12.920
<v Speaker 1>with and for, so Steve Chabin, Scott Besson, Howard Marks,

1:04:12.920 --> 1:04:16.080
<v Speaker 1>who was a value guy, and anything he's ever written.

1:04:16.120 --> 1:04:18.680
<v Speaker 1>I've tried to read, you know, his memos when they

1:04:18.720 --> 1:04:22.040
<v Speaker 1>are you know, every right, UH, Stan druck and Miller's,

1:04:22.080 --> 1:04:24.840
<v Speaker 1>George Sorrows, Paul Jones, and I really, um, I really

1:04:24.880 --> 1:04:27.160
<v Speaker 1>appreciate anything that seemed to Leb has to say. I

1:04:27.440 --> 1:04:31.960
<v Speaker 1>really like his common sense, sort of contrary approach to UH,

1:04:31.960 --> 1:04:34.200
<v Speaker 1>to the business and to the thinking in the business.

1:04:34.320 --> 1:04:37.240
<v Speaker 1>Very interesting. Let's let you mentioned reading. Let's talk about

1:04:37.280 --> 1:04:40.000
<v Speaker 1>some books. What are some of your favorite books, be

1:04:40.160 --> 1:04:45.000
<v Speaker 1>they fiction, non fiction, investing, or otherwise. Okay, so I

1:04:45.040 --> 1:04:48.840
<v Speaker 1>really liked UH a book about the commanches called the

1:04:48.840 --> 1:04:52.560
<v Speaker 1>The Empire of the Summer Moon, which was really really

1:04:52.560 --> 1:04:56.640
<v Speaker 1>a fantastic book. Really yeah, just great. I really liked

1:04:56.640 --> 1:04:58.680
<v Speaker 1>that a lot. I really liked it a lot. With

1:04:58.720 --> 1:05:01.680
<v Speaker 1>respect to to markets stuff Market Wizards by Jack Swagger,

1:05:01.720 --> 1:05:05.840
<v Speaker 1>I think is is a required reading. More money than God. Um.

1:05:05.880 --> 1:05:08.560
<v Speaker 1>I really liked The Creature from Jekyl Island, which by

1:05:08.680 --> 1:05:12.200
<v Speaker 1>Edward Griffin that was about the start of the Federal Reserve. Uh.

1:05:12.240 --> 1:05:14.200
<v Speaker 1>One of my favorites of all time is The Lords

1:05:14.240 --> 1:05:19.120
<v Speaker 1>of Finance by Ahmed Ahammed, and the subtitle of the

1:05:19.120 --> 1:05:21.680
<v Speaker 1>book is The Bankers Who Broke the World, which I

1:05:21.680 --> 1:05:25.040
<v Speaker 1>think is as good as it gets. Manias, Panics and

1:05:25.080 --> 1:05:28.280
<v Speaker 1>Crashes by Charles Kindleberger Shut Up a Deal by Jesse

1:05:28.440 --> 1:05:31.840
<v Speaker 1>may Um. I'm a big sports sports book guy as well.

1:05:31.880 --> 1:05:34.919
<v Speaker 1>I really I recently read a biography about Thai Cobb

1:05:34.960 --> 1:05:40.200
<v Speaker 1>which sort of changed away people. Um originally thought about Cobb. Um,

1:05:40.400 --> 1:05:42.919
<v Speaker 1>he was supposed to be really hard, charging spikes out,

1:05:43.040 --> 1:05:46.320
<v Speaker 1>no fooling around that he was. He played really hard,

1:05:46.720 --> 1:05:49.360
<v Speaker 1>and uh, I'd say back then it was sort of

1:05:49.640 --> 1:05:51.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, killer be killed in baseball. I know I'm

1:05:51.920 --> 1:05:54.880
<v Speaker 1>making too much of it, but um, there was no fraternizing.

1:05:55.440 --> 1:05:58.360
<v Speaker 1>But he was thought to have been a bad guy.

1:05:59.760 --> 1:06:01.800
<v Speaker 1>I'd necessarily think that he was a bad guy. In

1:06:01.840 --> 1:06:05.280
<v Speaker 1>this new biography, would would would would say that he

1:06:05.360 --> 1:06:10.080
<v Speaker 1>wasn't a newer and gentler ty coon or something like that. Um.

1:06:10.120 --> 1:06:14.400
<v Speaker 1>So since you've joined finance all those years ago, what

1:06:14.720 --> 1:06:18.000
<v Speaker 1>has changed? What do you think is the most significant

1:06:18.120 --> 1:06:21.560
<v Speaker 1>changes in the industry over the past. When we got

1:06:21.560 --> 1:06:25.360
<v Speaker 1>into the business, there was a tremendous broker client component

1:06:25.440 --> 1:06:28.320
<v Speaker 1>of the business, which to a great degree doesn't exist.

1:06:28.360 --> 1:06:31.520
<v Speaker 1>Now there's more of an asset gathering component, whereby then

1:06:31.560 --> 1:06:35.120
<v Speaker 1>it was more transactional. Uh. And I can remember a

1:06:35.120 --> 1:06:36.840
<v Speaker 1>lot of guys that I knew in the business they

1:06:36.840 --> 1:06:39.360
<v Speaker 1>started their career making cold calls. I don't know, is

1:06:39.400 --> 1:06:42.320
<v Speaker 1>it is it better or worse? This? This change is this?

1:06:42.440 --> 1:06:45.960
<v Speaker 1>Is this now? Is that a better structure or do

1:06:46.040 --> 1:06:50.840
<v Speaker 1>you lose something? I think what's changed is that it

1:06:50.960 --> 1:06:54.520
<v Speaker 1>was easier than to come up with some sort of

1:06:54.720 --> 1:06:58.560
<v Speaker 1>sentiment read for the market. I think it's harder now. Uh.

1:06:58.600 --> 1:07:01.200
<v Speaker 1>And with the individual investor or in an asset gather,

1:07:01.320 --> 1:07:05.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, having been asset gathered rather than via the

1:07:05.200 --> 1:07:07.400
<v Speaker 1>old broker method, I think it's harder to figure things

1:07:07.440 --> 1:07:10.400
<v Speaker 1>out in that regard. But it's a natural evolution. I

1:07:10.400 --> 1:07:12.600
<v Speaker 1>think the advent and ubiquity of E t f s,

1:07:13.160 --> 1:07:16.400
<v Speaker 1>the continued involvement of central bankers, the evolution of central

1:07:16.440 --> 1:07:19.240
<v Speaker 1>bankers from behind the scenes, practitioners of the hippocratic oath,

1:07:19.640 --> 1:07:23.200
<v Speaker 1>the virtual financial celebrities, those are all tremendous changes over

1:07:23.240 --> 1:07:26.120
<v Speaker 1>the last twenty financial celebrities. Yeah, that's the way I

1:07:26.120 --> 1:07:27.960
<v Speaker 1>tend to think of them. Is that a bad thing

1:07:28.040 --> 1:07:30.960
<v Speaker 1>or a good thing? Um? Or does it depend on

1:07:31.000 --> 1:07:37.520
<v Speaker 1>the celebrity? I I think UM. I think that there's

1:07:37.520 --> 1:07:40.480
<v Speaker 1>a major shift occurring where investors are moving away from

1:07:40.480 --> 1:07:44.160
<v Speaker 1>the belief of the omniscience of central bankers. In fact,

1:07:44.160 --> 1:07:46.600
<v Speaker 1>in my mind, that has been a bubble in its

1:07:46.640 --> 1:07:49.560
<v Speaker 1>own right, and I think that we are realizing that

1:07:49.640 --> 1:07:55.160
<v Speaker 1>central bankers are far from omniscient. Well, everybody remembers Greenspan

1:07:55.240 --> 1:08:00.680
<v Speaker 1>as the maestro, and he left as chairman, and then

1:08:00.760 --> 1:08:03.640
<v Speaker 1>it didn't take all that long for that reputation to

1:08:03.880 --> 1:08:08.680
<v Speaker 1>really unwind. The financial crisis certainly didn't didn't help his reputation.

1:08:09.080 --> 1:08:11.480
<v Speaker 1>The guy who looked like he was never wrong suddenly,

1:08:11.920 --> 1:08:14.080
<v Speaker 1>Oh maybe this guy was never right. He just got

1:08:14.120 --> 1:08:18.000
<v Speaker 1>a little lucky. And I'm amazed that people put so

1:08:18.080 --> 1:08:22.280
<v Speaker 1>much faith in central bankers after the guy was little.

1:08:22.320 --> 1:08:26.479
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I remember the CNBC briefcase cam like, how

1:08:26.520 --> 1:08:29.040
<v Speaker 1>thick or thin is his briefcase and that's whether he'll

1:08:29.520 --> 1:08:33.559
<v Speaker 1>raise or tighten. That's that's how tightly people track that.

1:08:34.560 --> 1:08:40.120
<v Speaker 1>I don't think anybody holds bankers at least with the

1:08:40.200 --> 1:08:43.839
<v Speaker 1>same you know, belief that they know all the answers.

1:08:43.880 --> 1:08:47.920
<v Speaker 1>They're certainly important, But did did Greenspan break the spell

1:08:48.000 --> 1:08:54.360
<v Speaker 1>for that? I think we're in an environment where people

1:08:54.439 --> 1:08:59.120
<v Speaker 1>are looking at um, for lack of a better phrase,

1:08:59.760 --> 1:09:02.760
<v Speaker 1>the political financial elite in a different light than they

1:09:02.800 --> 1:09:06.280
<v Speaker 1>had in prior cycles. I think so much. So many

1:09:06.320 --> 1:09:12.679
<v Speaker 1>of their missteps are well categorized, uh or delineated, and

1:09:12.760 --> 1:09:16.559
<v Speaker 1>that information is well dispersed, whereby perhaps it may have

1:09:16.600 --> 1:09:18.920
<v Speaker 1>only been in prior cycles. People in our business who

1:09:18.960 --> 1:09:21.840
<v Speaker 1>are aware of who the head of the central bank was,

1:09:22.320 --> 1:09:25.280
<v Speaker 1>the public knows that. Not only does the public know

1:09:25.360 --> 1:09:28.040
<v Speaker 1>who the the head of the central bank is, they

1:09:28.120 --> 1:09:29.960
<v Speaker 1>know there's a central bank. You go back to twenty

1:09:30.000 --> 1:09:32.519
<v Speaker 1>years they had no clue. I mean, every every day

1:09:32.560 --> 1:09:38.120
<v Speaker 1>you turn around, there's another central banker speaking somewhere. Yeah.

1:09:38.160 --> 1:09:41.240
<v Speaker 1>I think that they're ubiquitous, both of their presence and

1:09:41.240 --> 1:09:45.559
<v Speaker 1>their comments. And uh, I think that they're going They'll

1:09:45.600 --> 1:09:48.040
<v Speaker 1>run through their cycle, just like every other item runs

1:09:48.040 --> 1:09:51.240
<v Speaker 1>through a cycle. You mentioned Malaby's more money than God.

1:09:51.400 --> 1:09:54.599
<v Speaker 1>Have you gotten around to his new tone on green Space?

1:09:54.600 --> 1:09:56.519
<v Speaker 1>I have not. I have the book. I haven't even

1:09:56.520 --> 1:10:00.200
<v Speaker 1>cracked it open yet. I'm really curious because, um, my

1:10:00.240 --> 1:10:03.960
<v Speaker 1>head of research, Mike Battnick, like you loved More Money

1:10:04.040 --> 1:10:07.160
<v Speaker 1>than God, And that's another book I haven't gotten. I

1:10:07.240 --> 1:10:11.120
<v Speaker 1>actually started reading it right after I finished reading something else,

1:10:11.520 --> 1:10:14.120
<v Speaker 1>and they were so similar in who they looked at.

1:10:14.200 --> 1:10:15.920
<v Speaker 1>And I said, you're I'm gonna put this aside a

1:10:15.960 --> 1:10:17.600
<v Speaker 1>little bit and come back to it. But I know

1:10:17.640 --> 1:10:20.040
<v Speaker 1>a number of people who just love that book, think

1:10:20.040 --> 1:10:23.120
<v Speaker 1>it's great, really, So I'm gonna move that up in

1:10:23.200 --> 1:10:27.200
<v Speaker 1>my uh up in my queue. So you mentioned you

1:10:27.240 --> 1:10:30.000
<v Speaker 1>played ball in school. What do you do to relax

1:10:30.040 --> 1:10:32.480
<v Speaker 1>outside of the office. What do you do to stay

1:10:33.240 --> 1:10:37.080
<v Speaker 1>mentally and physically fit so you can do your job? Listen,

1:10:37.120 --> 1:10:38.200
<v Speaker 1>Like a lot of guys, I like to go to

1:10:38.200 --> 1:10:39.680
<v Speaker 1>the gym. I like to be active. I like to

1:10:39.720 --> 1:10:42.240
<v Speaker 1>spend a little time walking down at the Bronx Riviera,

1:10:42.760 --> 1:10:46.520
<v Speaker 1>which is otherwise known as Orchard Beach, Um the Bronx Riviera.

1:10:46.600 --> 1:10:49.479
<v Speaker 1>So things like that, How do you are you in

1:10:49.720 --> 1:10:53.639
<v Speaker 1>um Bronxville with you? I'm a Westchester guy, but listen,

1:10:53.840 --> 1:10:56.559
<v Speaker 1>driving down to Orchard Beach from Lower Westchester is an

1:10:56.560 --> 1:10:59.439
<v Speaker 1>easy thing to do, very easy. Thing to do that.

1:10:59.439 --> 1:11:03.000
<v Speaker 1>That's pretty uh, that's pretty interesting. Um, so you've been

1:11:03.000 --> 1:11:06.120
<v Speaker 1>mentored along in your career. What sort of advice would

1:11:06.160 --> 1:11:10.599
<v Speaker 1>you give a recent college grad or a millennial who

1:11:10.680 --> 1:11:13.240
<v Speaker 1>was just starting their career and said, Hey, John, I'm

1:11:13.280 --> 1:11:16.360
<v Speaker 1>thinking about going into technicals. What what would you say

1:11:16.360 --> 1:11:20.280
<v Speaker 1>to them? I'd offer no advice, but I'd offer some suggestions. Okay,

1:11:20.400 --> 1:11:26.080
<v Speaker 1>I'd say, listen intensely, h ask a ton of questions,

1:11:26.680 --> 1:11:31.920
<v Speaker 1>and read everything you can, everything and anything. Listen intensely,

1:11:32.080 --> 1:11:36.439
<v Speaker 1>ask lots of questions, and read just about anything you can,

1:11:36.600 --> 1:11:39.760
<v Speaker 1>not only finance, because I think sometimes your best thinking

1:11:39.760 --> 1:11:43.200
<v Speaker 1>about finance is when you're not thinking about finance. It

1:11:43.200 --> 1:11:46.439
<v Speaker 1>could because you're reading a biography about Billy Martin. It

1:11:46.479 --> 1:11:49.280
<v Speaker 1>could be because you're reading about the Comanches, an empire,

1:11:49.360 --> 1:11:52.080
<v Speaker 1>the Summer Moon. It could be because you're reading Lonesome

1:11:52.160 --> 1:11:54.439
<v Speaker 1>Dub by Larry McMurtry. I don't know, but I think

1:11:54.439 --> 1:11:56.720
<v Speaker 1>you should read as much as you can. That that

1:11:56.920 --> 1:11:59.559
<v Speaker 1>is not an uncommon theme. A number of people who

1:11:59.640 --> 1:12:05.840
<v Speaker 1>have paid through these doors, billionaires, fund managers, Nobel Prize winners,

1:12:05.840 --> 1:12:08.759
<v Speaker 1>have all said the same thing that the two themes

1:12:08.800 --> 1:12:11.800
<v Speaker 1>that come up over and over again reading and you

1:12:11.920 --> 1:12:13.960
<v Speaker 1>gotta you gotta be in a position to get lucky,

1:12:13.960 --> 1:12:16.720
<v Speaker 1>because a little luck goes a long way. And our

1:12:16.800 --> 1:12:20.200
<v Speaker 1>last question, what is it that you know about investing

1:12:20.200 --> 1:12:25.240
<v Speaker 1>in technicals today that you wish you knew years ago? Everything?

1:12:25.280 --> 1:12:28.360
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I wish I knew everything then that I

1:12:28.400 --> 1:12:30.760
<v Speaker 1>know now, and I haven't learned anything I think in

1:12:30.760 --> 1:12:33.600
<v Speaker 1>the last ten years. Why say that again, because I

1:12:33.600 --> 1:12:37.400
<v Speaker 1>think I wish I knew then what I know now.

1:12:37.439 --> 1:12:39.519
<v Speaker 1>But I feel like, even though I've picked up a

1:12:39.560 --> 1:12:41.519
<v Speaker 1>lot in the last ten years, there's still so much

1:12:41.560 --> 1:12:44.360
<v Speaker 1>to learn. And I think every single day you go

1:12:44.439 --> 1:12:47.400
<v Speaker 1>to work, you know, juiced, not only because you want

1:12:47.439 --> 1:12:50.200
<v Speaker 1>to win, but because it's a learning environment. It's an

1:12:50.200 --> 1:12:53.639
<v Speaker 1>active learning environment, and I think that's a lucky environment

1:12:53.680 --> 1:12:57.160
<v Speaker 1>to be in. That that's a really interest answer, John,

1:12:57.160 --> 1:12:59.760
<v Speaker 1>Thank you so much for being so generous with your

1:13:00.000 --> 1:13:03.280
<v Speaker 1>I'm we have been speaking with John Roque. He is

1:13:03.360 --> 1:13:08.400
<v Speaker 1>managing director and technical analyst at Key Square Capital Partners

1:13:08.439 --> 1:13:12.080
<v Speaker 1>is Apple Management key Square Capital Management. If you enjoy

1:13:12.160 --> 1:13:14.519
<v Speaker 1>this conversation, be sure and look up an inch or

1:13:14.600 --> 1:13:17.320
<v Speaker 1>down an inch on Apple iTunes and you could see

1:13:17.320 --> 1:13:20.920
<v Speaker 1>any of the other hundred and let's call it twelve

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<v Speaker 1>previous podcasts we've done. We enjoy your comments and feedback.

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<v Speaker 1>Be sure to write to us at m IB podcast

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<v Speaker 1>did not think Charlie Vollmer, my engineer, H Taylor Riggs,

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<v Speaker 1>our booker, and Michael Batnick, who is the head of

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<v Speaker 1>research for US. I'm Barry Ridults. You've been listening to

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<v Speaker 1>D I C