Speaker 1: Hey, guys, ready or not, twenty twenty four is here
Speaker 1: and we here at breaking points, are already thinking of
Speaker 1: ways we can up our game for this critical election.
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Speaker 2: But enough with that, let's get to the show. We're
Speaker 2: very excited now to be joined by Professor John Meersheimer,
Speaker 2: personal hero of mine. He is the R. Wendell Harrison
Speaker 2: Distinguished Service Professor in the Political Science Department at the
Speaker 2: University of Chicago since nineteen eighty two. Thank you very
Speaker 2: much for joining us, sir.
Speaker 3: We appreciate it, my pleasure.
Speaker 2: So, Professor, you're well known in many circles for being
Speaker 2: a well known scholar on realism. But recently, I would
Speaker 2: say you've really come into especial relevance with the collapse
Speaker 2: of the liberal international system and of how we are
Speaker 2: to deal with it, especially with the flare ups of
Speaker 2: Israel and Ukraine. We wanted to start actually on the
Speaker 2: issue of Israel. I read your book The Israel lobby
Speaker 2: many many years ago, really opened my eyes as to
Speaker 2: the influence here in Washington. But what I would I
Speaker 2: really like to know from you is how the US
Speaker 2: policy visa the Israel since October seventh has only further
Speaker 2: isolated the United States, both in terms of Israeli action
Speaker 2: and in terms of Israeli policy.
Speaker 4: Well, I think there's no question that the United States,
Speaker 4: in large part because of the Israel Lobby, has been
Speaker 4: joined at the hip with Israel. And after October seventh,
Speaker 4: when the Israelis decided to go on a rampage in Gaza,
Speaker 4: the United States fully supported the Israelis. Many Israeli generals
Speaker 4: have made it clear that they could not conduct this
Speaker 4: offensive against the Palestinians in Gaza without the materials support.
Speaker 4: And here we're talking mainly about weaponry that the United
Speaker 4: States is providing them, and furthermore, we're providing them with
Speaker 4: diplomatic cover. The United States is COMPLICITUS with what Israel
Speaker 4: is doing in Gaza. And this is hardly surprising given
Speaker 4: the power of the lobby in the United States.
Speaker 1: I wanted to get your reaction to recent events. So
Speaker 1: we've had many quite significant factors emerged recently. We have
Speaker 1: the ICC signaling they're likely to issue arrest warrants for
Speaker 1: net Yahoo. And in addition, Defense Minister you of Galant,
Speaker 1: you have the ICJ just recently issuing yet another injunction
Speaker 1: basically saying you cannot go into Rafa. You had Biden
Speaker 1: sort of weekly signaling this redline and pretending at least
Speaker 1: like he was going to halt weapons shipments if there
Speaker 1: was what he described as a quote unquote major invasion
Speaker 1: of Rafa.
Speaker 3: You have three more.
Speaker 1: European countries coming out and recognizing a Palestinian state, and
Speaker 1: yet in spite of all of that, or perhaps because
Speaker 1: of some of that, you still have the IDF. Going forward.
Speaker 1: We saw this horrific massacre of Palestinians who were displaced
Speaker 1: in a safe zone inside of their tents, at least
Speaker 1: forty five killed. What do you make of the Israeli
Speaker 1: calculation at this point and the moment that we're in
Speaker 1: right now.
Speaker 4: Well, just to talk about the Israeli calculation, I think
Speaker 4: it's important emphasize that Netya, who has no real interest
Speaker 4: in ending the war, the longer the war goes on,
Speaker 4: the better for him politically, because once the war ends,
Speaker 4: he'll have to face the music for what happened on
Speaker 4: October seventh, and he could be pushed overboard. So he
Speaker 4: has a vested interest in keeping the war going for
Speaker 4: that reason. Secondly, he's committed to defeating Hamas completely. He's
Speaker 4: committed to winning the decisive victory. I don't believe for
Speaker 4: one second that he can do that, but if he's
Speaker 4: going to attempt.
Speaker 3: To do it, he has to go into Rafa.
Speaker 4: So to defeat Hamas, in his mind, it's necessary to
Speaker 4: go into Rafa. Now, with regard to why he did it,
Speaker 4: given all the intern national condemnation of Israel's behavior towards
Speaker 4: the Palestinians in Gaza in general, and especially with regard
Speaker 4: to what's happening in Rafa, she just doesn't care. It
Speaker 4: doesn't matter to him what world opinion says one way
Speaker 4: or the other, as long as the United States backs them,
Speaker 4: as long as the United States has his back and
Speaker 4: Joe Biden has his back, and he knows full well
Speaker 4: that if Trump gets elected in November, the Trump will
Speaker 4: have his back as well. So he's free to do
Speaker 4: whatever he wants. And given that he has a vested
Speaker 4: interest and continuing this war and trying to defeat jumas
Speaker 4: we go on and.
Speaker 2: On, Professor, how do you see in the short term.
Speaker 2: Obviously they're going to have the back of the US,
Speaker 2: the US is the dominant power in the world. But
Speaker 2: the increasing isolation of both the United States and Israel,
Speaker 2: what does that look like for Israel in the long
Speaker 2: in the medium to long term future, are they going
Speaker 2: to be an international pariah state? How do you see
Speaker 2: the evolution of the international system with respect to Israel
Speaker 2: over time?
Speaker 4: Well, I think it's very important to emphasize that independent
Speaker 4: of what's going on in Gaza, Israel is an apartheid state.
Speaker 4: And here we're talking about Greater Israel, which includes the
Speaker 4: West Bank and Gaza.
Speaker 3: Which are part of Greater Israel. For sure.
Speaker 4: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and but Selim, which is
Speaker 4: the leading human rights organization inside of Israel, have all
Speaker 4: issued lengthy and sophisticated reports that make a compelling case
Speaker 4: that Israel is an apartheid state. The Israelis are well
Speaker 4: aware of what happened to South Africa. South Africa with
Speaker 4: ones in apartheid state, and it's no longer in apartheid
Speaker 4: state because it's very hard to sustain an apartheid state
Speaker 4: in the modern world. So Israel has real problems moving
Speaker 4: forward because it's an apartheid state and it has no
Speaker 4: way at the moment of getting out of that situation.
Speaker 4: When you marry that to the fact that Israel is
Speaker 4: committing genocide in Gaza. And by the way, if you
Speaker 4: don't think Israel is committing genocide in Gaza, you at
Speaker 4: least have to admit that they're engaged in mass murder
Speaker 4: and that they're attempting to starve the Palestinians in Gaza.
Speaker 4: What they're doing in Gaza is absolutely horrible. I would
Speaker 4: call it a genocide. So what you have here is
Speaker 4: an apartheid state that's engaged in genocide. And the question
Speaker 4: you have to ask yourself is what is the long
Speaker 4: term viability of a state that fits that description? And
Speaker 4: I would argue over the long term this presents enormous
Speaker 4: problems for Israel, and one can argue that the survival
Speaker 4: of Israel will be at stake if it doesn't change
Speaker 4: its ways.
Speaker 1: Could you talk a little bit about how you came
Speaker 1: to the conclusion that this isn't just a mass laughter,
Speaker 1: that it does in fact meet the definition of genocide
Speaker 1: and whether you see that determination as being significant.
Speaker 3: Well, at first I didn't think it was a genocide.
Speaker 4: I thought there was no question that the Israelis were
Speaker 4: inflicting significant punishment on the civilian population.
Speaker 3: Of Gaza.
Speaker 4: And it was clear in the beginning that what they
Speaker 4: were trying to do was they were trying to ethnically
Speaker 4: cleanse Gaza. You want to understand that if the Israelis
Speaker 4: were able to cleanse Gaza, they would solve the apartheid problem.
Speaker 4: And that's true, of course with regard to the West
Speaker 4: Bank as well. If Israel could cleanse Gaza and the
Speaker 4: West Bank of Palestinians, they would solve the apartheid problem.
Speaker 4: So I think from the beginning what the Israelis were
Speaker 4: doing in Gaza was they were trying to cleanse Gaza.
Speaker 4: They were trying to drive all the Palestinians out, and
Speaker 4: the way they tried to do that was by making
Speaker 4: the place unlivable. So they were killing huge numbers of Palestinians.
Speaker 4: They were destroying their homes, they were destroying schools, they
Speaker 4: were destroying cemeteries, they were destroying government buildings, they were
Speaker 4: destroying moss. And at a certain point it became clear
Speaker 4: that this was genocide, that they were trying to kill
Speaker 4: an enormous number of people in Gaza for the purposes
Speaker 4: of cleansing Gaza. And then you marry on top of
Speaker 4: that the fact that they were starving the population. They
Speaker 4: were greatly greatly the amount of food and water and
Speaker 4: fuel and medicine that could come into Gaza, and all
Speaker 4: of this was for the purpose of making the place
Speaker 4: unlivable and killing large numbers of Palestinians. And this is
Speaker 4: what led the International Court of Justice in January to
Speaker 4: say that there was enough evidence to make a plausible
Speaker 4: case that Israel is committing genocide. And I think, having
Speaker 4: looked very carefully at the case, that the evidence is
Speaker 4: quite clear that this is a genocide.
Speaker 2: Professor, what standing has the US's real relationship had, or sorry,
Speaker 2: what effect has the US's relationship had, especially post October seventh,
Speaker 2: on the US is standing in the international community and
Speaker 2: in the world. Has it how negatively do you think
Speaker 2: it's affected the US And what are the long term
Speaker 2: impacts in terms of our own policy and standing.
Speaker 4: Well, I think it's done significant damage to our repation.
Speaker 4: I mean, I think that outside of the West, most
Speaker 4: people believe that this is a genocide. And again, if
Speaker 4: you don't believe it's a genocide, it's at least mass murder.
Speaker 4: This is certainly a crime against humanity what the Israelis
Speaker 4: are doing in Gaza. But I think most people outside
Speaker 4: of the West believe it is a genocide, and I
Speaker 4: think most people believe correctly that the United States is
Speaker 4: complicit in this genocide.
Speaker 3: And the end.
Speaker 4: Result is that's going to do enormous damage not only
Speaker 4: to Israel's reputation, but to our reputation.
Speaker 3: Then it taken a step further.
Speaker 4: As you both know well, the United States privileges the
Speaker 4: liberal international order, or.
Speaker 3: The rules based order.
Speaker 4: We believe that international law, international rules really matter. When
Speaker 4: you look at how the Israelis are behaving in Gaza
Speaker 4: and how they react to the ICC and the ICJ,
Speaker 4: and how we support them in their reaction, it's quite
Speaker 4: clear that we are massive hypocrites when it comes to
Speaker 4: international law. And this too damages the United States. The
Speaker 4: United States basically created the international liberal order. It has
Speaker 4: a vested interest in making it work. And what we're
Speaker 4: doing in our support of israel Is, we're undermining the
Speaker 4: international liberal order. People around the world are actually quite
Speaker 4: shocked at the extent to which the United States is
Speaker 4: willing to excuse Israeli behavior when it's in direct violation
Speaker 4: of international law.
Speaker 1: I'm almost afraid to ask the next question, but how
Speaker 1: do you think this ends? I mean, do they effectively
Speaker 1: succeed in completing the genocide? Because, as you point out, Nanna,
Speaker 1: who has no interest in ending this war, Joe Biden
Speaker 1: clearly has no interest in moving away from the unconditional
Speaker 1: support posture. Donald Trump would be the same, probably without
Speaker 1: the little bit of liberal hand ringing that we get
Speaker 1: from Joe Biden. So how do you see this playing out?
Speaker 3: It's very hard to say.
Speaker 4: I mean, I'm hoping that the shooting stops at some
Speaker 4: point they're not too distant future. I'm hoping that after
Speaker 4: the assault on Rafa, the Israelis stop the large scale
Speaker 4: offensive military operations in Gaza and instead they restrict their
Speaker 4: military operations to small scale attacks against Tamas. I mean,
Speaker 4: I'd like to see all the shooting stop, but I
Speaker 4: think that's highly unlikely. But I'd like to see it
Speaker 4: become more limited. And I think that what will end
Speaker 4: up happening here is that the Israelis will end up
Speaker 4: occupying Gaza for the foreseeable future, and Israel will remain
Speaker 4: in apartheid state, and the Palestinians, of course, at some
Speaker 4: time in the future will revolt again. I mean, you
Speaker 4: want to understand that what happened on October seventh is
Speaker 4: not the first instance of the Palestinians rebelling against the Israelis.
Speaker 4: You had the first into Fada in nineteen eighty seven,
Speaker 4: you had the second into Fada in two thousand and
Speaker 4: then you had October seventh, and there were all sorts
Speaker 4: of mini revolts in between those three important events. And
Speaker 4: this is what happens when you have an apartheid state.
Speaker 4: The people who are being dominated, and that course is
Speaker 4: the Palestinian population, they are going to revolt. And therefore
Speaker 4: I think that we can expect to see trouble for
Speaker 4: as far as the eye can.
Speaker 2: See, Professor, how do you see the risks of a
Speaker 2: regional conflict? If that is going to increase, and then
Speaker 2: the odds of the US would be dragged along. We
Speaker 2: talked previously in some mar shows, has been cross border
Speaker 2: fire between the Egyptians and the Israelis. Is there going
Speaker 2: to be a power vacuum similar to the nineteen sixteen seventies,
Speaker 2: or the Palestinian cause brings a lot of popularity and
Speaker 2: could invite broader regional conflict. Where do you see that going.
Speaker 4: Well, you want to remember that the United States is
Speaker 4: already fighting the Huthis in the Red Sea as a
Speaker 4: result of what going on in Gaza. But the really
Speaker 4: interesting question has to do with Iran. Now, it's clear
Speaker 4: from what happened in April. You remember, on April first,
Speaker 4: the Israeli struck the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria, and
Speaker 4: on April fourteenth, the Iranians attacked Israel in response, and
Speaker 4: then on April nineteenth, Israel launched a very limited strike
Speaker 4: against Iran. So between April first and April nineteenth, we
Speaker 4: had this conflict not simply involving Israel and Iran. The
Speaker 4: United States was involved as well. We were in in
Speaker 4: the combat that took place on April fourteenth when Iran
Speaker 4: attacked Israel. We shot down about half of the drones
Speaker 4: and cruise missiles and ballistic missiles that were aimed at Israel.
Speaker 4: So we were deeply involved. Now what does this tell you?
Speaker 4: If you look carefully, you see that the United States
Speaker 4: and Iran had no interest in having this conflict take place.
Speaker 4: It's the Israelis who wanted to drag the Americans into
Speaker 4: a war with Iran. It's the Israelis who started these
Speaker 4: events on April first when they attacked the Iranian embassy
Speaker 4: in Damascus. Then after April first, the United States and
Speaker 4: the Iranians went to great lengths to make sure that
Speaker 4: the conflict did not escalate to the point where you
Speaker 4: had a war between the United States and Iran. We
Speaker 4: don't want a wider conflict in the region. We're not
Speaker 4: happy about the fact that we're fighting the Whothies. We
Speaker 4: certainly don't want a war with Iran, and we don't
Speaker 4: want a war with Hesbelah either, And in that case,
Speaker 4: we've been putting significant pressure on the Israelis not to
Speaker 4: get into a major league fight with Hesblah on their
Speaker 4: northern border, because again, we're afraid that we'll be pulled in.
Speaker 4: So I think it's very important to understand that there
Speaker 4: is potential for escalation in the region beyond what's happening
Speaker 4: in the Israel Palestine conflict, but that the United States
Speaker 4: has no interest in seeing itself get dragged into another
Speaker 4: forever war and Therefore, I think it is unlikely that
Speaker 4: we will end up fighting against Iran in the foreseeable future.
Speaker 1: Do you see any Israeli domestic political considerations that could
Speaker 1: and pressures that could lead to some sort of a
Speaker 1: ceasefire agreement in the short term? You had both Benny Ganson,
Speaker 1: you have Glant coming out against specifically issuing these series
Speaker 1: of ultimatums. Looks like he's preparing to exit the war
Speaker 1: cabinet on June eighth. You have massive protests. You know,
Speaker 1: there isn't a lot of disagreement about the prosecution of
Speaker 1: the war, the treatment palace and civilians per se, but
Speaker 1: there is massive friction over the pursuit of a hostage deal.
Speaker 1: Do you think that any of those things could bring
Speaker 1: this conflict to a close the at least the micro
Speaker 1: conflict that's being engaged in right now.
Speaker 4: Well, as you point out, there are you know, very
Speaker 4: powerful centrifugal forces inside of Israel, the threatened that government,
Speaker 4: and at first glance appear to push.
Speaker 3: In the direction of some sort of cease fire.
Speaker 4: But I would just say that if you watch Benjamin Nettna,
Speaker 4: who in action, he is something of a magician when
Speaker 4: it comes to maintaining his position in power. There's no
Speaker 4: question that you know, his work cabinet is deeply unhappy
Speaker 4: with the fact that he has no plan for how
Speaker 4: to run Gaza once the shooting stops. It's very clear
Speaker 4: that the hostage problem is causing him enormous trouble. But again,
Speaker 4: he is something of a magician, and I would not
Speaker 4: bet a lot of money that he's toppled anytime soon.
Speaker 4: I would also know that if he is toppled, it
Speaker 4: won't matter that much. The fact that you know, net
Speaker 4: Yahoo is not an outlier here. Many liberal American Jews
Speaker 4: like to make the argument that the real problem here
Speaker 4: is Benjamin nan Yaho, and if only we can get
Speaker 4: rid of Benjamin nan Yahoo will live happily ever after.
Speaker 4: I think this is not the case. I think that
Speaker 4: nan Yahoo has views that are, you know, similar to
Speaker 4: Benny Gantz's views, similar to Yoav Galand's views. I mean,
Speaker 4: he's not an outlier. And in fact, if you look
Speaker 4: at his entire cabinet, he has a number of people
Speaker 4: who are far to the right of him. He looks
Speaker 4: like a statrist in the context of.
Speaker 3: His own cabinet.
Speaker 4: The fact is that Israel is a remarkably hawkish state.
Speaker 4: The Israel that I knew when I was a young
Speaker 4: boy and a young man has gone away. It's moved
Speaker 4: steadily to the right over time, and I believe with
Speaker 4: the passage of time it will move even further and
Speaker 4: further to the right. This is a hawkish country that
Speaker 4: that has extremest views towards the Palestinians.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's one of the only countries where younger people
Speaker 1: are actually more hardline, more hawkish, more right wing than
Speaker 1: older populations. I wanted to ask you about Joe Biden
Speaker 1: to the best that you can assess if there are
Speaker 1: for people here who want to put pressure on him
Speaker 1: to change policy in some way? You know, do you
Speaker 1: see any pressure points? Is it your assessment that he's
Speaker 1: driven primarily by his own ideology, clearly has this great
Speaker 1: sentimental attachment to that Israel of long gone Israel of
Speaker 1: your Is it about the power of the Israel lobby.
Speaker 1: We saw, you know, an email from a top Biden
Speaker 1: donor that was outraged that he wouldn't consider cutting off
Speaker 1: weapons ever, or is it, you know, is it a
Speaker 1: political calculation where he thinks there's more to be gained
Speaker 1: from being very pro Israel than to be gained by,
Speaker 1: you know, having a more sympathetic view towards the Palestinians
Speaker 1: and reflecting what the overwhelming majority of the Democratic base
Speaker 1: wants to see. How do you assess those things? What
Speaker 1: would your assessment be of potential pressure points on Joe
Speaker 1: Biden himself.
Speaker 4: I think there's no question that Biden is profoundly committed
Speaker 4: to Israel. He is an art Zionist, and he self
Speaker 4: describes as an art Zionist, so no question about that.
Speaker 4: At the same time, I think he believes that the
Speaker 4: Israelis have gone too far in Gaza and it's not
Speaker 4: good for Israel to continue on the path that it's
Speaker 4: now on. And I think he believes you could be
Speaker 4: an art Zionist. You can be deeply committed to Israel
Speaker 4: and you can still think that Israel should change its
Speaker 4: behavior in Gaza.
Speaker 3: So I think there is.
Speaker 4: A difference of opinion between Benjamin nan Yahu and Joe
Speaker 4: Biden at this point in time on moving forward in Gaza.
Speaker 3: However, the problem he faces is the lobby.
Speaker 4: If he does anything that puts pressure on Israel to
Speaker 4: change its behavior in Gaza, the lobby is going to
Speaker 4: land on him like a ton of bricks, and this
Speaker 4: would be disastrous for him in terms of getting re elected.
Speaker 4: In November, he has an election coming up, and the
Speaker 4: last thing he wants to do is antagonize the Israel
Speaker 4: lobby because he's fully aware how powerful it is. At
Speaker 4: the same time, because he's a Democrat, and because the
Speaker 4: Democratic Party has a large constituency of progressives in it
Speaker 4: who are outraged by what Biden is doing via the Gaza,
Speaker 4: he has to go to great lengths to try to
Speaker 4: appease those people so that they don't vote against him
Speaker 4: or stay home in November. So what you see is
Speaker 4: that Biden is caught between a rock and a hard place.
Speaker 4: If he tilts towards Arab American in sentiments, the lobby
Speaker 4: will punish him. And if he continues to support Israel
Speaker 4: hook line and sinker, the Arab Americans and the progressives
Speaker 4: more generally will punish him in the full election. So
Speaker 4: he isn't a damned if you do, damned if you
Speaker 4: don't situation, and he could very well lose the election
Speaker 4: because of this.
Speaker 3: Certainly possible.
Speaker 2: So I want to switch gears a little bit to
Speaker 2: Ukraine and to check in on where we are now.
Speaker 2: You were possibly one of the most maligned people in
Speaker 2: the foreign policy world at the outbreak of the conflict,
Speaker 2: even though you'd long been and writing about the fact
Speaker 2: that it was in fact NATO expansion in US policy
Speaker 2: visa v. Russia, that it was a contributing factor to
Speaker 2: the Russian invasion of Ukraine several years now into US
Speaker 2: policy and many of the Ukrainians stalled so called counter
Speaker 2: offensive and ongoing Russian gains. How do you assess the
Speaker 2: situation in Ukraine today?
Speaker 4: Oh, I think the Russians are clearly in the driver's seat.
Speaker 4: The balance of power, I think through most of twenty
Speaker 4: twenty two favored the Ukrainians and the West on one
Speaker 4: side over the Russians. In late twenty twenty two, the
Speaker 4: Russians began to mobilize in a serious way, and then
Speaker 4: in twenty twenty three, over the course of twenty twenty three,
Speaker 4: the balance shifted in significant ways towards the Russians, and
Speaker 4: now in twenty twenty four, were five months into twenty
Speaker 4: twenty four, the balance continues to shift more and more
Speaker 4: in Russia's favor, and if you look at what's happening
Speaker 4: on the battlefield the Russians are really pounding the Ukrainians.
Speaker 4: The Ukrainians are in deep trouble. This is a war
Speaker 4: of attrition. This is basically, you know, Muhammad Ali and
Speaker 4: Joe Fraser stand in toe to toe and beating the
Speaker 4: living daylights out of each other. Two big armies just
Speaker 4: pounding each other. And the question is which army is
Speaker 4: going to bleed the other army white first. And it
Speaker 4: is to me manifestly clear that the Russians are bleeding
Speaker 4: the Ukrainian army white, and the Ukrainians are not able
Speaker 4: to much to the Russians anymore. And the reason for
Speaker 4: this is that the balance of man power and the
Speaker 4: balance of firepower, these are two indicators that really matter
Speaker 4: in a war of attrition, decisively favor the Russians. The
Speaker 4: Russians have an enormous advantage in artillery, They have an
Speaker 4: enormous advantage in air power. Those two things they add
Speaker 4: up to say they have an enormous advantage in firepower.
Speaker 4: Firepower being airpower plus artillery put together. And then if
Speaker 4: you look at the manpower balance, the Russians have a
Speaker 4: significant advantage there. You know, the average age of a
Speaker 4: Ukrainian soldier on the front lines is forty three years old.
Speaker 4: Forty three years old. Combat is designed for young men
Speaker 4: and now young women, right, you want people in their twenties.
Speaker 4: You don't even want people in their thirties. The idea
Speaker 4: that the average aide of a soldier on the Ukrainian
Speaker 4: side is forty three years old, it's hard to believe. Furthermore,
Speaker 4: you have a significant problem with draft dodging inside of Ukraine.
Speaker 4: All sorts of young Ukrainian men fully understand that Ukraine
Speaker 4: is doomed and they don't want to die in a
Speaker 4: lost cause. Therefore, it's very hard for the Ukrainian military
Speaker 4: to mobilize people. Moreover, you have a huge number of
Speaker 4: Ukrainian men who are of draft age, who are in
Speaker 4: the European Union and don't want to come back to
Speaker 4: Ukraine and fight. So the Ukrainians are at a significant
Speaker 4: disadvantage in terms of the balance of soldiers on the
Speaker 4: front line, and as I said before, there are a
Speaker 4: significant disadvantage in terms of the balance of firepower.
Speaker 3: And this is a war of attrition. So they are.
Speaker 4: Being clobbered on the battlefield day by day, and eventually
Speaker 4: that military is going to suffer significant defeat. They're going
Speaker 4: to in a position where they can no longer carry
Speaker 4: on the war.
Speaker 1: What do you think the political calculation is in Washington
Speaker 1: at this point, Because from an outsider vantage point, I
Speaker 1: think in the early days, back when there was potential
Speaker 1: peace negotiations on the table, there was a lot of arrogance.
Speaker 1: There was a thought, no, we can push for a
Speaker 1: total victory. Then we had the counter offensive and all
Speaker 1: the hopes surrounding that that's when Ukraine is going to
Speaker 1: be able to take back significant amount of terrain that
Speaker 1: obviously didn't happen. Now there doesn't even seem to be
Speaker 1: a narrative about how this is going to play out,
Speaker 1: how it's going to result in anything other than disaster.
Speaker 1: So what do you see as Washington's political calculation being
Speaker 1: at this point.
Speaker 4: Well, in terms of a purely political calculation, I think
Speaker 4: given that the elections coming up in early November, the
Speaker 4: administration wants to make sure that Ukraine does not suffer
Speaker 4: an obvious defeat before early November, before the election, they
Speaker 4: what a great lengths to prevent that from happening. I
Speaker 4: think the story that people tell themselves, which they probably
Speaker 4: don't believe very much anymore, is that if Ukraine can
Speaker 4: hold out in twenty twenty four, by twenty twenty five.
Speaker 3: All of this weaponry that we have in the West.
Speaker 4: That we're building for Ukraine will be available and we
Speaker 4: can shift it or we can send it to Ukraine
Speaker 4: twenty twenty five, and that will shift the balance back
Speaker 4: in favor of Ukraine. It will look like the situation
Speaker 4: that you described Crystal in twenty twenty two. That's I
Speaker 4: think that's the most optimistic story that people tell themselves.
Speaker 4: But my sense is that deep down, at this point
Speaker 4: in time, most people fully understand that Ukraine is doomed.
Speaker 4: That the only interesting question at this point in time
Speaker 4: is how much territory are the Russians going to cap
Speaker 4: sure before this turns into a frozen conflict. But there's
Speaker 4: really no way to rescue the situation here. The Ukrainians
Speaker 4: are simply doomed. They can't fix the manpower problem, and
Speaker 4: with regard to the weaponry problem, we don't have the
Speaker 4: weaponry to give them, and we're not going to be
Speaker 4: able to spin up the industrial base to provide them
Speaker 4: even in twenty twenty five, with enough weaponry to rescue
Speaker 4: the situation.
Speaker 3: But again, even if we give them the weaponry.
Speaker 4: They have a huge manpower problem, and the Russians just
Speaker 4: get stronger and stronger. Putin is on a roll. The
Speaker 4: Russians are on a roll. So I think that what
Speaker 4: you're going to see here is what I call an
Speaker 4: ugly Russian victory.
Speaker 2: Professor, here in Washington, the justification for the Ukrainian cause
Speaker 2: is if we don't stop putin Ukraine, then Estonia, latf
Speaker 2: and the other NATO countries are at risk. You have
Speaker 2: long argued, and I've long agreed with you, that what
Speaker 2: happens in you is not all of that much interest.
Speaker 2: But what would you say to those who say, that's why,
Speaker 2: Professor Marshamer, we must give even more to Ukrainians to
Speaker 2: make sure that that doesn't happen. Why does this not
Speaker 2: actually matter that much? And what's wrong with that logic
Speaker 2: about if we don't stop him here that he'll continue onwards.
Speaker 4: Well, first of all, I don't even think that Putin
Speaker 4: is interested in conquering all of Ukraine. He's never said
Speaker 4: that he's interested in conquering all of Ukraine, and in fact,
Speaker 4: he's told the Ukrainians in recent months that the great
Speaker 4: danger to them is that Romania and Poland in countries
Speaker 4: on Ukraine's western border, may someday take territory in Western
Speaker 4: Ukraine that once belonged to them. It's very important to
Speaker 4: understand that a huge chunk of Western Ukraine once belonged
Speaker 4: to Poland, and there are a number of Poles who
Speaker 4: would like to get that territory back. I'm not arguing
Speaker 4: that Poland is operating on the basis that it can
Speaker 4: get that territory back. But nevertheless, Putin has said that
Speaker 4: there is a danger that this will happen. That indicates
Speaker 4: to you that he is not planning to take western Ukraine.
Speaker 3: And indeed, he would be.
Speaker 4: Crazy to take western Ukraine because it's filled with ethnic
Speaker 4: Ukrainians who hate Russians, and he would have a major
Speaker 4: insurgency on his hand hands if he tried to conquer
Speaker 4: all of Ukraine. So he's not even going to take
Speaker 4: all of Ukraine. He's never been interested in taking all
Speaker 4: of Ukraine. Now, the idea that he's going to then,
Speaker 4: you know, go conquer countries in Eastern Europe, he's never
Speaker 4: indicated any interest in that. And by the way, during
Speaker 4: the Cold War, the Soviet Union occupied all of Eastern Europe.
Speaker 3: It was a nightmare. The Soviets have been there, done that,
Speaker 3: and it did not work out very well.
Speaker 4: The last thing they want to do is start occupying
Speaker 4: countries in Eastern Europe so they can do hung fifty
Speaker 4: six again, Czechoslovakia sixty eight again, East Germany fifty three again.
Speaker 4: The problems that they had were with the Poles were legion.
Speaker 4: The problems they had with the Romanians and the Albanians
Speaker 4: were even worse. I mean, the idea that they want
Speaker 4: to conquered territory and recreate the Russian Empire in Eastern
Speaker 4: Europe is just not a serious argument. It's standard threat
Speaker 4: inflation that we engage in here in the West, all
Speaker 4: for the purposes of getting the public to support continued
Speaker 4: support of Ukraine. And again this is just not.
Speaker 3: A serious threat, Professor.
Speaker 1: At the beginning of this conflict, we really through the
Speaker 1: kitchen sink at Russia in terms of sanctions, made it
Speaker 1: maybe the most ancient country on the entire planet. I'm
Speaker 1: not going to say that those sanctions didn't bite at all,
Speaker 1: but the Russian economy seems to be doing fairly well
Speaker 1: in spite of those master massive coordinated Western sanctions. The
Speaker 1: significance of the failure of that sanctions regime.
Speaker 3: Here it's very significant.
Speaker 4: I mean, if you go back to twenty twenty two
Speaker 4: when the war first started, and as we were talking
Speaker 4: about before, it looked like the Ukrainian military was doing
Speaker 4: very well against the Russian military in twenty twenty two.
Speaker 4: It was that factor plus the fact that we thought
Speaker 4: that the sanctions would work, and we thought the sanctions
Speaker 4: would bring the Russians to their knees. So it was
Speaker 4: the combination of a belief that the sanctions would work,
Speaker 4: combined with the success of the Ukrainian military on the
Speaker 4: battlefield in twenty twenty two that led us to think
Speaker 4: that we could win the war against Russia. You want
Speaker 4: to remember that there were peace negotiations that started immediately
Speaker 4: after the war began in February. These were the famous
Speaker 4: peace negotiations between Zelensky's side and Putin's side in Istanbul,
Speaker 4: and it looked like the two sides were going to
Speaker 4: work out in agreement. This was in March early April
Speaker 4: of twenty twenty two, and the war started on February
Speaker 4: twenty fourth, twenty twenty two, so it looked like the
Speaker 4: war was going to be brought to an end. It's
Speaker 4: now quite clear that the West, and here we're talking
Speaker 4: mainly about the United States and the British told the
Speaker 4: Ukrainians to walk away from the negotiations.
Speaker 3: And why did they do that.
Speaker 4: They did it because the West thought that Ukraine could
Speaker 4: defeat the Russians on the battlefield number one and number two,
Speaker 4: that the sanctions would do grave damage to the Russian economy.
Speaker 4: Then in the fall, you remember, after the Ukrainians had
Speaker 4: been successful on the battlefield in two big areas of
Speaker 4: eastern Ukraine, General Milly, who was then Gairman of the
Speaker 4: Joint Chiefs of Staff, said it's time for peace negotiations.
Speaker 4: This is the high water mark for the Ukrainian military.
Speaker 4: This is what General Milly said in the fall of
Speaker 4: twenty twenty two. He understood the Ukrainians had done quite
Speaker 4: well on the battlefield, but now was the time to
Speaker 4: reach some sort of agreement or settlement with the Russians,
Speaker 4: because again, this was the high water mark for the
Speaker 4: Ukrainian military. That's what he thought, correctly, of course, But
Speaker 4: the White House said absolutely not and told General Milly
Speaker 4: to stop making these arguments in public. Why did we
Speaker 4: tell or why did the White House tell General Milly
Speaker 4: to cease and desist from making those kinds of arguments.
Speaker 4: It's because we thought the sanctions would work. We thought
Speaker 4: we would bring the Russians to their knees, and we
Speaker 4: thought the Ukrainians would continue to win on the battlefield.
Speaker 4: This was a giant miscalculate with regard to what was
Speaker 4: happening on the battlefield, and it was a giant miscalculation
Speaker 4: regarding the sanctions.
Speaker 3: General Milly was right.
Speaker 4: We should have tried to cut a deal in the
Speaker 4: fall of twenty twenty two. Indeed, going back to the
Speaker 4: negotiations in Istanbul in March early April of twenty twenty two,
Speaker 4: we should have let them play themselves out those negotiations
Speaker 4: and hopefully brought an end to the conflict. But we
Speaker 4: did not do that because in good part we thought
Speaker 4: the sanctions would work. They haven't worked. The Ukrainians have
Speaker 4: done have been less successful on the battlefield, and the
Speaker 4: end result is that the Russians are going to win
Speaker 4: an ugly victory.
Speaker 2: Yeah, well, very well, said Sir. I can't say enough
Speaker 2: how much we admire your work. How I personally was
Speaker 2: inspired funny story I had the Israel Lobby on my
Speaker 2: shelf in college and a guy said you should take
Speaker 2: that down. That guy's an anti semi Yeah, I said,
Speaker 2: have you read it, and of course that the answer
Speaker 2: was no. So the rightest man in international relations. We
Speaker 2: appreciate you very much, sir, Thank you, professor, thank you,
Speaker 2: thank you.
Speaker 3: For having me on the show. I appreciate it.