1 00:00:04,880 --> 00:00:13,000 Speaker 1: Alright, we'll find some clever way to introduce us. Huh, 2 00:00:13,800 --> 00:00:17,360 Speaker 1: you know what, I might just go with that. I 3 00:00:17,400 --> 00:00:19,759 Speaker 1: will find some clever way to introduce us. And that 4 00:00:19,920 --> 00:00:24,000 Speaker 1: is that is the introduction. Now because because I said it, Hello, 5 00:00:24,320 --> 00:00:27,720 Speaker 1: welcome to it could happen here. Today we are going 6 00:00:27,760 --> 00:00:32,000 Speaker 1: to be talking about um Internet privacy and some new 7 00:00:32,080 --> 00:00:37,559 Speaker 1: bills that will possibly undermine it. UM. Today I have 8 00:00:37,800 --> 00:00:43,960 Speaker 1: with me Christopher, Hello, Christopher, Hello, I am here. I am. 9 00:00:44,000 --> 00:00:45,960 Speaker 1: I don't know if excited is the right word, but no, 10 00:00:48,320 --> 00:00:51,919 Speaker 1: people are really excited to come on the show. This 11 00:00:52,000 --> 00:00:56,760 Speaker 1: is a this is a mild dread of the Internet. 12 00:00:57,080 --> 00:01:01,120 Speaker 1: I try because we definitely, we definitely can. Things don't 13 00:01:01,160 --> 00:01:04,040 Speaker 1: need to be always horrible and grim, even when you're 14 00:01:04,040 --> 00:01:07,160 Speaker 1: talking about things that aren't great. But yeah, today today 15 00:01:07,200 --> 00:01:09,600 Speaker 1: we'll be talking about some some interesting things. As per 16 00:01:09,640 --> 00:01:12,280 Speaker 1: the title of this episode will probably be related to 17 00:01:12,400 --> 00:01:16,479 Speaker 1: we are talking about the proposed earn It Act and 18 00:01:16,520 --> 00:01:19,080 Speaker 1: we'll just I'll explain what it is in the different 19 00:01:19,160 --> 00:01:23,080 Speaker 1: kind of implications that could have on how like everyone 20 00:01:23,240 --> 00:01:26,680 Speaker 1: uses the internet, UM, but also affects a few specific 21 00:01:26,720 --> 00:01:29,759 Speaker 1: types of people in particular. So but kind of part 22 00:01:29,760 --> 00:01:32,399 Speaker 1: of this whole thing. We're gonna start off by talking 23 00:01:32,400 --> 00:01:33,960 Speaker 1: about something a little bit different and then to kind 24 00:01:34,000 --> 00:01:37,160 Speaker 1: of segue to the inn an act UM. So last 25 00:01:37,240 --> 00:01:40,880 Speaker 1: year Apple, the company announced like a controversial plan to 26 00:01:40,959 --> 00:01:45,080 Speaker 1: install photo scanning software into every kind of every every 27 00:01:45,080 --> 00:01:48,160 Speaker 1: device UM. Apple's kind of long been seen as a 28 00:01:48,160 --> 00:01:51,320 Speaker 1: pro privacy company. UM. In the past, they have like 29 00:01:51,400 --> 00:01:55,720 Speaker 1: refused FBI demands to help investigators by pass locked phones. 30 00:01:56,320 --> 00:01:58,600 Speaker 1: So this this idea on this plan to create a 31 00:01:58,600 --> 00:02:02,080 Speaker 1: backdoor into the iPhone store system to scan for photos. 32 00:02:01,920 --> 00:02:03,600 Speaker 1: It was kind of a big deal coming for Apple 33 00:02:03,600 --> 00:02:06,000 Speaker 1: because they were definitely, at least in the past, known 34 00:02:06,000 --> 00:02:08,400 Speaker 1: as a generally like out of all of the companies, 35 00:02:08,440 --> 00:02:11,280 Speaker 1: the ones that if you're dealing with sensitive matters, Apples 36 00:02:11,720 --> 00:02:14,799 Speaker 1: generally generally the better one. Now that that has become 37 00:02:14,840 --> 00:02:16,440 Speaker 1: less of a case in the past few years, but 38 00:02:16,520 --> 00:02:19,440 Speaker 1: that was that that definitely was the case. So when 39 00:02:19,480 --> 00:02:22,240 Speaker 1: when this kind of idea was announced, there was a 40 00:02:22,280 --> 00:02:26,720 Speaker 1: decently sized global coalition also formed to push back on 41 00:02:26,760 --> 00:02:30,040 Speaker 1: this thing UM and the company did pause the plan. Now, 42 00:02:30,480 --> 00:02:32,280 Speaker 1: this came at a time that a lot of different 43 00:02:32,320 --> 00:02:35,880 Speaker 1: kind of companies were also pushing back against not safe 44 00:02:35,880 --> 00:02:40,880 Speaker 1: for work materials UM specifically for like like like relating 45 00:02:40,880 --> 00:02:43,560 Speaker 1: to the transactional money and banks. This was, you know, 46 00:02:43,600 --> 00:02:46,600 Speaker 1: around the time that only fans was flip flopping on 47 00:02:46,639 --> 00:02:49,200 Speaker 1: whether they would actually have not safe for work kind 48 00:02:49,200 --> 00:02:52,240 Speaker 1: of materials as a part of this kind of growing 49 00:02:53,080 --> 00:02:57,720 Speaker 1: trend of like worrying about um, the term now is 50 00:02:57,760 --> 00:03:01,440 Speaker 1: like child sexual abuse materials. More traditionally was it's called 51 00:03:01,560 --> 00:03:04,640 Speaker 1: child pornography or you know. So it's part of this 52 00:03:04,720 --> 00:03:07,760 Speaker 1: kind of overall kind of extra focus that tech companies 53 00:03:07,800 --> 00:03:11,520 Speaker 1: have about being worried that if they if someone is 54 00:03:11,560 --> 00:03:14,600 Speaker 1: doing that who is underage, or if someone's being exploited 55 00:03:14,600 --> 00:03:18,600 Speaker 1: who's underage, um, you know, they could unfinancially hurt the company. 56 00:03:18,680 --> 00:03:20,560 Speaker 1: So they're trying to a lot lots of companies have 57 00:03:20,600 --> 00:03:23,760 Speaker 1: been trying to do this thing to prevent that legal 58 00:03:23,840 --> 00:03:26,120 Speaker 1: and financial issue for happening. Now. Of course, all this 59 00:03:26,240 --> 00:03:29,080 Speaker 1: really actually ends up doing is just negatively affecting sex 60 00:03:29,080 --> 00:03:31,600 Speaker 1: workers UM. But that's that's kind of a topic for 61 00:03:31,600 --> 00:03:33,840 Speaker 1: a different episode because we're talking about the inn act 62 00:03:33,880 --> 00:03:37,520 Speaker 1: more specifically and not not specifically talking about only fans. 63 00:03:37,560 --> 00:03:40,000 Speaker 1: But this was Apple's plan to kind of scan all 64 00:03:40,040 --> 00:03:43,320 Speaker 1: these photos to make sure that that they were not 65 00:03:43,680 --> 00:03:47,400 Speaker 1: you know, naked photos of and of children. Um. Now 66 00:03:47,400 --> 00:03:50,040 Speaker 1: there's whole much of other privacy issues around that because 67 00:03:50,360 --> 00:03:53,800 Speaker 1: I mean, obviously teens do take news and send them 68 00:03:53,800 --> 00:03:57,000 Speaker 1: to each other and there is really no stopping that. Um. 69 00:03:57,120 --> 00:03:59,640 Speaker 1: So the idea that all these pots are getting scanned 70 00:04:00,000 --> 00:04:02,240 Speaker 1: and then seen and then like it would be the 71 00:04:02,480 --> 00:04:05,760 Speaker 1: idea was that parents would be like alerted if something 72 00:04:05,840 --> 00:04:09,320 Speaker 1: was found on the photo automatically, which means that for me, 73 00:04:09,400 --> 00:04:10,840 Speaker 1: I have a whole bunch of other issues with that. 74 00:04:10,920 --> 00:04:15,400 Speaker 1: Like that is a whole other kind of level, especially 75 00:04:15,440 --> 00:04:17,800 Speaker 1: for queer kids, like that is like that is a 76 00:04:17,800 --> 00:04:20,320 Speaker 1: whole again. But that that is mostly a whole whole 77 00:04:20,360 --> 00:04:22,479 Speaker 1: other discussion that I'm not going to talk about right 78 00:04:22,480 --> 00:04:23,800 Speaker 1: now because we are I do want to focus is 79 00:04:23,960 --> 00:04:25,800 Speaker 1: focus this more on the more on the earn at 80 00:04:25,880 --> 00:04:31,000 Speaker 1: act um. But so this this plan was paused. Um. 81 00:04:31,040 --> 00:04:34,839 Speaker 1: But now that may not necessarily matter actually, um, because 82 00:04:34,880 --> 00:04:38,000 Speaker 1: Congress kind of wants to force Apple's hand along with 83 00:04:38,360 --> 00:04:41,839 Speaker 1: along with essentially every other company that allows users to 84 00:04:42,000 --> 00:04:46,320 Speaker 1: store or share messages or kind of really any content. Um. 85 00:04:46,400 --> 00:04:50,720 Speaker 1: And Congress is some senators and there's a bill that 86 00:04:50,760 --> 00:04:54,640 Speaker 1: will try to essentially mandate photo scanning and specific photo 87 00:04:54,640 --> 00:04:59,760 Speaker 1: scanning technology approved by the government. So yeah. So, while 88 00:05:00,000 --> 00:05:02,800 Speaker 1: P's plan would have put privacy and it's the security 89 00:05:02,920 --> 00:05:05,640 Speaker 1: at risk for all of its users, the Earned Act 90 00:05:06,120 --> 00:05:09,280 Speaker 1: of compromises the security and free speech for basically everyone 91 00:05:09,320 --> 00:05:12,520 Speaker 1: who uses the Internet. UM. The bill would create serious 92 00:05:12,600 --> 00:05:16,359 Speaker 1: legal risks for businesses that host content such as messages 93 00:05:16,480 --> 00:05:20,240 Speaker 1: or photos of stored in the cloud, online backups, and 94 00:05:20,279 --> 00:05:23,760 Speaker 1: potentially even any kind of cloud hosting sites such as 95 00:05:23,800 --> 00:05:27,760 Speaker 1: Amazon Web Services, which means basically most of the Internet 96 00:05:28,480 --> 00:05:32,040 Speaker 1: UM and based so have the all these companies, all 97 00:05:32,040 --> 00:05:34,920 Speaker 1: of these services and companies would be in serious legal 98 00:05:35,040 --> 00:05:38,640 Speaker 1: risk unless they use this government approved scanning tools. A 99 00:05:38,720 --> 00:05:41,039 Speaker 1: version of this bill was first introduced two years ago, 100 00:05:41,360 --> 00:05:45,440 Speaker 1: sponsored by Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican from South Carolina and 101 00:05:45,480 --> 00:05:49,719 Speaker 1: Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat from Connecticut. And now, like 102 00:05:49,760 --> 00:05:51,920 Speaker 1: a lot of these other things, it is allegedly aimed 103 00:05:52,160 --> 00:05:56,559 Speaker 1: at tackling so called child sexual abuse material online UM. 104 00:05:56,600 --> 00:05:58,360 Speaker 1: Which is which is a problem there is the kids 105 00:05:58,400 --> 00:06:02,880 Speaker 1: definitely do get exploited. UM, kids do get groomed, exploited stuff, 106 00:06:02,920 --> 00:06:06,000 Speaker 1: photos of children do get shared online. Uh that like 107 00:06:06,080 --> 00:06:09,960 Speaker 1: that that that actually is a real issue. UM. Now, 108 00:06:10,160 --> 00:06:12,120 Speaker 1: a lot of the ways that these tools get implemented 109 00:06:12,360 --> 00:06:14,480 Speaker 1: don't actually address that issue. And of course it doesn't 110 00:06:14,480 --> 00:06:17,599 Speaker 1: actually deal with the people that do this, like you know, 111 00:06:17,640 --> 00:06:19,600 Speaker 1: like the bad the bad people that do exploit kids. 112 00:06:19,640 --> 00:06:22,440 Speaker 1: It doesn't necessarily deal with them either. That is that 113 00:06:22,520 --> 00:06:25,679 Speaker 1: is what they wrapped this idea as the original bills 114 00:06:25,680 --> 00:06:28,599 Speaker 1: that was introduced two years ago threatened encryption and privacy 115 00:06:28,640 --> 00:06:31,960 Speaker 1: features that would have actually you know, put Americans privacy, 116 00:06:32,000 --> 00:06:35,440 Speaker 1: particularly particularly the privacy of children, UM at risk. It 117 00:06:35,480 --> 00:06:38,120 Speaker 1: also got in section to thirty in ways that caused 118 00:06:38,160 --> 00:06:40,960 Speaker 1: over fifty civil rights groups to penel letter describing the 119 00:06:40,960 --> 00:06:45,839 Speaker 1: potential consequences UM of such things like censorship, um, you know, 120 00:06:47,120 --> 00:06:51,320 Speaker 1: cramming down on free speech, and the basically destruction of encryption. 121 00:06:51,839 --> 00:06:54,360 Speaker 1: So when the legislation failed to advance two years ago, 122 00:06:54,560 --> 00:06:58,120 Speaker 1: digital UM, liberty advocates, you know, sex workers, civil rights 123 00:06:58,240 --> 00:07:02,600 Speaker 1: organizations all breathed a sigh of relief. But this past month, 124 00:07:02,680 --> 00:07:05,960 Speaker 1: as I record this UM in twenty in February, a 125 00:07:05,960 --> 00:07:09,760 Speaker 1: group of lawmakers, again led by Senator Richard Blumenthal and 126 00:07:09,920 --> 00:07:13,880 Speaker 1: Senator Lindsay Graham, reintroduced the Earnet ACTUM, a slightly modified 127 00:07:13,920 --> 00:07:17,160 Speaker 1: version of it UM, and on the on the tenth 128 00:07:17,160 --> 00:07:20,400 Speaker 1: of February, the Senate to Judiciary Committee voted to advance 129 00:07:20,440 --> 00:07:25,200 Speaker 1: the dangerous earn It Act bill. So yeah, it is, 130 00:07:25,240 --> 00:07:27,320 Speaker 1: it is. It is chugging along a bit further than 131 00:07:27,320 --> 00:07:30,080 Speaker 1: what it did than what it did last time. The 132 00:07:30,120 --> 00:07:33,960 Speaker 1: Earnet Act aims to tackle the horrific criminal activity related 133 00:07:33,960 --> 00:07:38,000 Speaker 1: to child sexual abuse material by making Section to thirty 134 00:07:38,000 --> 00:07:42,600 Speaker 1: protections contingent on the prevention and response to such material online. 135 00:07:42,920 --> 00:07:46,080 Speaker 1: So Section to thirty shields online services like you know 136 00:07:46,160 --> 00:07:50,679 Speaker 1: commonly used social media from liability from most user generated content. 137 00:07:51,320 --> 00:07:53,640 Speaker 1: Under earn it A Section to thirty would be amended 138 00:07:53,760 --> 00:07:57,360 Speaker 1: to enable civil claims and state criminal prosecution related to 139 00:07:57,480 --> 00:08:02,160 Speaker 1: child abuse materials online a platforms. Now already this can 140 00:08:02,240 --> 00:08:05,200 Speaker 1: kind of happen federally a little bit, um, but it 141 00:08:05,240 --> 00:08:08,000 Speaker 1: depends on how the company responds to it. So, but 142 00:08:08,400 --> 00:08:11,480 Speaker 1: this would introduce a whole new wave for civil claims 143 00:08:11,480 --> 00:08:14,320 Speaker 1: and state claims to be filed against companies like this. 144 00:08:15,000 --> 00:08:17,400 Speaker 1: Um if if if if, if material like this is 145 00:08:17,440 --> 00:08:20,200 Speaker 1: to be found hosted on their site. You know, including 146 00:08:21,280 --> 00:08:24,160 Speaker 1: you know that that would even include if like someone 147 00:08:24,160 --> 00:08:26,640 Speaker 1: who's underage operates and not safe for work Twitter account 148 00:08:26,680 --> 00:08:29,680 Speaker 1: that they probably should not be operating. Um but this this, 149 00:08:29,760 --> 00:08:31,960 Speaker 1: you know, this this could also this could basically make 150 00:08:31,960 --> 00:08:34,600 Speaker 1: the company in trouble. They can fall under state claims 151 00:08:35,080 --> 00:08:39,440 Speaker 1: or civil claims, so as as a result, online services 152 00:08:39,440 --> 00:08:42,520 Speaker 1: could be subject to endless litigation under fifty different you 153 00:08:42,559 --> 00:08:45,160 Speaker 1: know legal law systems per you know for all the 154 00:08:45,160 --> 00:08:48,800 Speaker 1: states regarding you know, finding child sexual beast material online. 155 00:08:49,360 --> 00:08:52,120 Speaker 1: So the bill's proponents claim that this isn't necessarily a 156 00:08:52,120 --> 00:08:54,439 Speaker 1: problem for any service as long as it is getting 157 00:08:54,480 --> 00:08:57,920 Speaker 1: the files then reporting child sexual beast material to law enforcement. 158 00:08:58,160 --> 00:09:01,600 Speaker 1: Internet companies are already required to report suspected material if 159 00:09:01,600 --> 00:09:04,400 Speaker 1: they come across it, and they do report material on 160 00:09:04,440 --> 00:09:07,080 Speaker 1: a massive scale that often comes comes with a lot 161 00:09:07,120 --> 00:09:10,319 Speaker 1: of mistakes. Facebook is often held as a positive example 162 00:09:10,360 --> 00:09:13,240 Speaker 1: by lawmakers and law enforcement for how much they do 163 00:09:13,440 --> 00:09:18,440 Speaker 1: report such such material. But while their new scanning techniques 164 00:09:18,480 --> 00:09:22,280 Speaker 1: have produced many millions of reports, most of them are inaccurate, 165 00:09:22,320 --> 00:09:24,600 Speaker 1: Like most of them actually aren't of miners. It's it's 166 00:09:24,640 --> 00:09:27,520 Speaker 1: it's not, it's not. Actually none of the scanning material 167 00:09:27,640 --> 00:09:30,800 Speaker 1: is good because a lot of cases, many people up 168 00:09:30,800 --> 00:09:34,160 Speaker 1: into their thirties can get often flagged, and often like 169 00:09:34,720 --> 00:09:38,600 Speaker 1: even non humans can get flagged, like pictures of fruit 170 00:09:38,800 --> 00:09:41,640 Speaker 1: because like like it's not like it's not like none 171 00:09:41,679 --> 00:09:44,240 Speaker 1: of these scanning tools are actually very good. Yeah, and 172 00:09:44,280 --> 00:09:45,800 Speaker 1: like this is I think, I think a thing that like, 173 00:09:46,240 --> 00:09:49,120 Speaker 1: if you've never like had to work with a machine 174 00:09:49,160 --> 00:09:52,959 Speaker 1: learning algorithm before, I think it's difficult to understand how 175 00:09:53,360 --> 00:09:59,680 Speaker 1: unbelievably bad these things are. Like it's just ease, oh god, 176 00:09:59,720 --> 00:10:03,600 Speaker 1: like the incomprehensible horror of trying to get a machine 177 00:10:03,640 --> 00:10:05,680 Speaker 1: learning algorithm to do the thing that you wanted to 178 00:10:05,720 --> 00:10:07,760 Speaker 1: do and not do the other things that you're not 179 00:10:07,800 --> 00:10:09,520 Speaker 1: that you don't wanted to do, to like, you know, 180 00:10:09,600 --> 00:10:12,439 Speaker 1: be able to tell a difference between like a particularly 181 00:10:12,559 --> 00:10:17,640 Speaker 1: smooth and round peach and like child's exhibuse material. You know, 182 00:10:17,800 --> 00:10:21,840 Speaker 1: you human being can do this, right, The machine cannot, 183 00:10:21,920 --> 00:10:25,600 Speaker 1: and it is they it is horrifically inaccurate. You have 184 00:10:25,720 --> 00:10:29,000 Speaker 1: to do all kinds of like hacking stuff together in 185 00:10:29,120 --> 00:10:31,120 Speaker 1: order to get this stuff to work. And yeah, it's 186 00:10:31,160 --> 00:10:34,040 Speaker 1: it's it's a fiasco. A good example of this that 187 00:10:34,040 --> 00:10:36,320 Speaker 1: I've that I've heard before that I'm probably probably gonna 188 00:10:36,320 --> 00:10:39,439 Speaker 1: butcher this explanation, but you know that you can take, 189 00:10:39,720 --> 00:10:42,240 Speaker 1: you know, a photo of a wolf, um, maybe even 190 00:10:42,280 --> 00:10:44,600 Speaker 1: three photos of a wolf, and say here, this is these, 191 00:10:44,640 --> 00:10:47,160 Speaker 1: these are photos of wolves. Um, here's the here's other, 192 00:10:47,360 --> 00:10:50,160 Speaker 1: here's here's these these other photos. Find which ones are wolves, 193 00:10:50,200 --> 00:10:52,720 Speaker 1: and it'll, you know, it'll it'll sort throw the ones. 194 00:10:52,800 --> 00:10:55,079 Speaker 1: So some of them have wolves, some of them don't. Um, 195 00:10:55,120 --> 00:10:56,880 Speaker 1: and it only finds one picture that says this one 196 00:10:57,000 --> 00:10:59,079 Speaker 1: based on the three photos, even given me this photos 197 00:10:59,440 --> 00:11:02,560 Speaker 1: is a wolf and instead the photo is not. The 198 00:11:02,559 --> 00:11:04,880 Speaker 1: photo is of a tree. And you're like, why did 199 00:11:04,920 --> 00:11:07,160 Speaker 1: it tell me this is a wolf? And the computer 200 00:11:07,160 --> 00:11:09,280 Speaker 1: will answer, well, look at all the all of the 201 00:11:09,280 --> 00:11:12,800 Speaker 1: backgrounds are the same because it's trying, it's trying to match, 202 00:11:12,840 --> 00:11:16,040 Speaker 1: like he doesn't have the same thing that humans do. 203 00:11:16,200 --> 00:11:18,280 Speaker 1: When when all these computer algorithms that are trying to 204 00:11:18,360 --> 00:11:21,480 Speaker 1: learn to replicate and trying to find these patterns, it 205 00:11:21,559 --> 00:11:24,280 Speaker 1: is never perfect. So the big thing that is people 206 00:11:24,320 --> 00:11:27,240 Speaker 1: often overlook is that, yeah, specifically with this, like with 207 00:11:27,240 --> 00:11:30,560 Speaker 1: with Facebook scanning tool and the millions of reports that 208 00:11:30,559 --> 00:11:33,560 Speaker 1: that it does make. You know, federal law enforcement will 209 00:11:33,600 --> 00:11:37,120 Speaker 1: frequently use the massive number of reports to suggest there 210 00:11:37,200 --> 00:11:41,040 Speaker 1: is this giant recent uptick in child sexual abuse materials. 211 00:11:41,040 --> 00:11:43,719 Speaker 1: But that's not because there actually is. That's because this 212 00:11:44,240 --> 00:11:46,959 Speaker 1: the scanning that some companies are doing is just so bad, 213 00:11:47,120 --> 00:11:49,480 Speaker 1: Like it's just it's just an accurate that it flags 214 00:11:49,559 --> 00:11:52,960 Speaker 1: so many things. So like in action, the new earn 215 00:11:52,960 --> 00:11:56,640 Speaker 1: It Act would just pave a massive new surveillance system 216 00:11:56,880 --> 00:11:59,240 Speaker 1: run by private companies that would roll back some of 217 00:11:59,240 --> 00:12:02,120 Speaker 1: the most important, oviously in security features and technology used 218 00:12:02,120 --> 00:12:04,920 Speaker 1: by people around the globe. Right, the idea is to 219 00:12:05,000 --> 00:12:08,120 Speaker 1: compel private companies to scan every message that sent online 220 00:12:08,320 --> 00:12:11,000 Speaker 1: and report violations to law enforcement. And it may not 221 00:12:11,040 --> 00:12:13,360 Speaker 1: stop there. The inn An Act could ensure anything hosted 222 00:12:13,360 --> 00:12:16,560 Speaker 1: online and concular like backups, websites, cloud photos, and more, 223 00:12:16,920 --> 00:12:18,840 Speaker 1: is all scanned. Now, of course you can say, I 224 00:12:18,840 --> 00:12:21,760 Speaker 1: mean there is no actual true privacy online. Right. The 225 00:12:21,880 --> 00:12:24,520 Speaker 1: n s A does see everything, which is basically true, 226 00:12:24,720 --> 00:12:28,600 Speaker 1: but stuff like local police departments in the FBI do 227 00:12:28,679 --> 00:12:30,880 Speaker 1: not have constant access to what the n s A has. 228 00:12:31,080 --> 00:12:33,679 Speaker 1: It does actually like legally, it does actually take some 229 00:12:33,720 --> 00:12:36,640 Speaker 1: time for that to happen, the fact that all these 230 00:12:36,679 --> 00:12:39,160 Speaker 1: private companies would be doing it for them. Um, and 231 00:12:39,200 --> 00:12:42,600 Speaker 1: the fact that this would actually break encryption makes people 232 00:12:42,600 --> 00:12:45,360 Speaker 1: like the FBI, makes the local law enforcement have a 233 00:12:45,440 --> 00:12:47,800 Speaker 1: much easier time accessing what we do on the internet, 234 00:12:47,840 --> 00:12:49,800 Speaker 1: because yes, the n S a kind of does always 235 00:12:49,880 --> 00:12:53,560 Speaker 1: see everything, but that that this actually, this actually is 236 00:12:53,600 --> 00:12:56,760 Speaker 1: this actually is quite different in terms of the accessibility 237 00:12:56,840 --> 00:13:00,640 Speaker 1: of that information. And I think I think it's also 238 00:13:01,400 --> 00:13:03,360 Speaker 1: you know, to to to go back into one of 239 00:13:03,400 --> 00:13:06,240 Speaker 1: the sort of like encryption arguments to Right, So, okay, 240 00:13:06,280 --> 00:13:08,720 Speaker 1: what once you put a backdoor into encryption? Right once, once, 241 00:13:08,800 --> 00:13:10,800 Speaker 1: once you have you know, you have your system, you 242 00:13:10,800 --> 00:13:12,559 Speaker 1: have your encryption system, but you know, now there's now 243 00:13:12,600 --> 00:13:14,679 Speaker 1: there's a way to access it, right, because oh, well 244 00:13:14,679 --> 00:13:16,240 Speaker 1: we need to access these you know, we need to 245 00:13:16,240 --> 00:13:18,760 Speaker 1: be able to decrypt this in order to see if 246 00:13:18,760 --> 00:13:21,640 Speaker 1: there's like child pornography materials on it. Right. Once that 247 00:13:21,679 --> 00:13:25,640 Speaker 1: backdoor exists, any anyone who finds it can use it 248 00:13:25,679 --> 00:13:28,280 Speaker 1: for anything they want. And it's it's it's it's not 249 00:13:28,320 --> 00:13:29,880 Speaker 1: even just that like, well, we'll get into some other 250 00:13:29,880 --> 00:13:32,640 Speaker 1: things around encryption, but but yeah, I can continue. Yeah, 251 00:13:32,679 --> 00:13:34,000 Speaker 1: and you know, and I think I think this is 252 00:13:34,000 --> 00:13:38,240 Speaker 1: something that I think people don't like. The people who 253 00:13:38,280 --> 00:13:40,600 Speaker 1: are just thinking about this in terms of child pornography, 254 00:13:40,840 --> 00:13:43,400 Speaker 1: don't think about which is that like I don't know 255 00:13:44,000 --> 00:13:47,840 Speaker 1: a lot like there these these kinds of backdoors, right 256 00:13:48,480 --> 00:13:52,160 Speaker 1: like other people can find them, yes, and you know, Okay, 257 00:13:52,240 --> 00:13:53,560 Speaker 1: now now you've just put it back to it all 258 00:13:53,600 --> 00:13:56,400 Speaker 1: of the encryption, like oh, hey, here's you know, like 259 00:13:56,640 --> 00:13:59,240 Speaker 1: here you're you you are you are going to get 260 00:13:59,280 --> 00:14:01,480 Speaker 1: people killed, and you're gonna get people killed because you're 261 00:14:01,480 --> 00:14:04,439 Speaker 1: going to have people who are doing things under governments 262 00:14:04,480 --> 00:14:07,400 Speaker 1: that you know will will like you know, you're gonna 263 00:14:07,440 --> 00:14:09,320 Speaker 1: have people in mil Mart, You're gonna have people in 264 00:14:10,240 --> 00:14:12,400 Speaker 1: You're gonna have people in Egypt. You're gonna have people 265 00:14:12,400 --> 00:14:16,120 Speaker 1: in Syria who like these these regimes and like these 266 00:14:16,160 --> 00:14:19,200 Speaker 1: you know, private private companies right are are going are 267 00:14:19,200 --> 00:14:21,920 Speaker 1: going to sell the backdoors to these regimes and they're 268 00:14:21,920 --> 00:14:23,880 Speaker 1: going to use it to hunt down, torture and kill people. 269 00:14:24,720 --> 00:14:27,800 Speaker 1: So yeah, there is there is a lot of problems 270 00:14:27,840 --> 00:14:31,200 Speaker 1: with it, especially especially how it how it kind of 271 00:14:31,240 --> 00:14:35,120 Speaker 1: addresses encryption, because the bill does try to actually have 272 00:14:35,160 --> 00:14:37,840 Speaker 1: some encryption protections, but the way they go about it, 273 00:14:38,200 --> 00:14:42,120 Speaker 1: of course is not is not adequate, and it even 274 00:14:42,240 --> 00:14:45,320 Speaker 1: kind of fosters. It's its own negation in some ways 275 00:14:45,360 --> 00:14:47,840 Speaker 1: if you read the entire bill. So, but I'll get 276 00:14:47,880 --> 00:14:50,200 Speaker 1: more into encryption in a sec because there are other 277 00:14:50,320 --> 00:14:52,800 Speaker 1: like technical issues with the way this bill is designed 278 00:14:52,800 --> 00:15:05,240 Speaker 1: and how it would be enacted. There is this sort 279 00:15:05,280 --> 00:15:08,520 Speaker 1: of benefit to having a legal material that is that 280 00:15:08,680 --> 00:15:12,320 Speaker 1: is actually exploding miners being primarily hosted on big tech 281 00:15:12,400 --> 00:15:16,640 Speaker 1: platforms because these platforms are used so much and are 282 00:15:16,680 --> 00:15:19,720 Speaker 1: mostly non restricted, so it makes catching this stuff and 283 00:15:19,760 --> 00:15:22,320 Speaker 1: reporting it actually much easier, like it is if they're 284 00:15:22,360 --> 00:15:24,440 Speaker 1: hosted on these mainstream things. It does make seeing it 285 00:15:24,440 --> 00:15:28,080 Speaker 1: and reporting less difficult. So not only will this bill 286 00:15:28,240 --> 00:15:30,560 Speaker 1: make tech companies be more likely just to ban all 287 00:15:30,600 --> 00:15:33,480 Speaker 1: not safe work material in general, right, because if companies 288 00:15:33,520 --> 00:15:36,360 Speaker 1: are forced to scan and they're going to be filing 289 00:15:36,360 --> 00:15:38,640 Speaker 1: swimming reports that this will this will result in a 290 00:15:38,720 --> 00:15:41,520 Speaker 1: lot a lot more companies just saying no new photos 291 00:15:41,560 --> 00:15:44,000 Speaker 1: at all, like just completely gone. Not only will this 292 00:15:44,120 --> 00:15:47,120 Speaker 1: bill just make tech companies more likely to ban all 293 00:15:47,160 --> 00:15:49,240 Speaker 1: not safe for work content in general, which would be 294 00:15:49,280 --> 00:15:52,400 Speaker 1: horrible for sex workers and just a bad precedent. But yeah, 295 00:15:52,880 --> 00:15:55,120 Speaker 1: they would be more likely just to do that because 296 00:15:55,160 --> 00:15:57,280 Speaker 1: of how much overscanning, there would be and just a 297 00:15:57,280 --> 00:15:59,000 Speaker 1: whole bunch of things, so we create it would create 298 00:15:59,040 --> 00:16:02,120 Speaker 1: too many fears of lead repercussions. Thus, you know, that 299 00:16:02,160 --> 00:16:05,560 Speaker 1: would force people who distribute child porn onto more sketchy 300 00:16:05,600 --> 00:16:08,720 Speaker 1: sites and sites that might just refuse to scan content 301 00:16:08,760 --> 00:16:11,800 Speaker 1: in general because they're temporary hosting. But the bill could 302 00:16:11,800 --> 00:16:13,920 Speaker 1: also just to scare these bad people off of mainstream 303 00:16:13,920 --> 00:16:17,600 Speaker 1: platforms and make them voluntarily migrate to more niche and 304 00:16:17,600 --> 00:16:19,840 Speaker 1: hard to finde the corners of the Internet, making illegal 305 00:16:19,880 --> 00:16:22,640 Speaker 1: content harder to catch and take down because there will 306 00:16:22,720 --> 00:16:26,000 Speaker 1: always be weird temporary sites to host this type of thing. 307 00:16:26,120 --> 00:16:30,120 Speaker 1: Like they're always They're like, these bad people will find 308 00:16:30,160 --> 00:16:33,080 Speaker 1: a way. It's always like that is it is gonna 309 00:16:33,120 --> 00:16:36,880 Speaker 1: always be a problem. Um. And so in a way, 310 00:16:37,040 --> 00:16:40,080 Speaker 1: it's it is better to have these things on mainstream 311 00:16:40,120 --> 00:16:42,400 Speaker 1: platforms because reporting them and taking them down can be 312 00:16:42,480 --> 00:16:44,960 Speaker 1: much easier. Um. It's it's like it's like when people 313 00:16:44,960 --> 00:16:49,400 Speaker 1: really advocate platforms like Telegram shut down all fascist channels, right. 314 00:16:50,280 --> 00:16:52,800 Speaker 1: The thing is is that there's a lot of benefits 315 00:16:52,800 --> 00:16:55,400 Speaker 1: to having these chat rooms on Telegram because that makes 316 00:16:55,400 --> 00:16:59,280 Speaker 1: them really easy to monitor and really easy to infiltrate. UM. 317 00:16:59,400 --> 00:17:03,960 Speaker 1: So there's a lot worse places for fascists to organize. Um. 318 00:17:04,000 --> 00:17:06,200 Speaker 1: If you're doing it on telegram, it's actually really easy 319 00:17:06,240 --> 00:17:09,920 Speaker 1: to watch. So it's this weird given take in terms 320 00:17:09,920 --> 00:17:13,440 Speaker 1: of in terms of where where these things happen, because 321 00:17:13,480 --> 00:17:17,240 Speaker 1: they are going to happen somewhere. So I now want 322 00:17:17,240 --> 00:17:20,520 Speaker 1: to talk about how specifically this bill threatens, UH threatens 323 00:17:20,520 --> 00:17:23,880 Speaker 1: online encryption services. All right, Um, The bill would strip 324 00:17:23,920 --> 00:17:27,200 Speaker 1: critical legal protection for websites, apps, and specifically section to thirty. 325 00:17:27,600 --> 00:17:29,760 Speaker 1: If passed, it would empower many different levels of government 326 00:17:29,840 --> 00:17:33,400 Speaker 1: to make sweeping new Internet regulations right in individual states 327 00:17:33,440 --> 00:17:36,520 Speaker 1: will be able to pass laws um to hold private 328 00:17:36,520 --> 00:17:41,320 Speaker 1: companies like libel um as long as they somehow relate 329 00:17:41,359 --> 00:17:45,239 Speaker 1: their new rules to child abuse materials like they they 330 00:17:45,280 --> 00:17:47,199 Speaker 1: wible to have a whole bunch of new rules on 331 00:17:47,280 --> 00:17:50,639 Speaker 1: Internet regulations if they can sift it through this lens. 332 00:17:51,359 --> 00:17:53,800 Speaker 1: The goal is to get states to pass these laws 333 00:17:53,800 --> 00:17:56,479 Speaker 1: that will punish that will punish companies when they deploy 334 00:17:56,600 --> 00:18:00,280 Speaker 1: end and encryption or offer other encryption services. This includes 335 00:18:00,320 --> 00:18:03,560 Speaker 1: messaging systems like What's Apps, Signal my Message, and as 336 00:18:03,600 --> 00:18:07,040 Speaker 1: well as web hosting like Amazon Web services um EARN. 337 00:18:07,080 --> 00:18:09,560 Speaker 1: It aims to spread the use of tools to scan 338 00:18:09,720 --> 00:18:14,600 Speaker 1: all online content against law enforcement databases like directly. UM. 339 00:18:14,640 --> 00:18:18,080 Speaker 1: In a myths and Facts document distributed by the bill's proponents, 340 00:18:18,480 --> 00:18:21,960 Speaker 1: it even names a government approved software program that they 341 00:18:22,040 --> 00:18:25,200 Speaker 1: could mandate called a photo DNA, which is a program 342 00:18:25,200 --> 00:18:28,880 Speaker 1: that Microsoft made that reports directly to law enforcement databases. 343 00:18:29,320 --> 00:18:34,360 Speaker 1: So earn it doesn't specifically attack encryption per se UM, 344 00:18:34,359 --> 00:18:37,480 Speaker 1: but that's because it doesn't need to, Like it doesn't 345 00:18:37,520 --> 00:18:39,240 Speaker 1: have to because of the way the bill is designed 346 00:18:39,560 --> 00:18:43,160 Speaker 1: how it approaches encryption is actually a little more insidious. UM. 347 00:18:43,200 --> 00:18:46,120 Speaker 1: It allows the fact that encryption exists on the platform 348 00:18:46,119 --> 00:18:49,359 Speaker 1: itself to be used as evidence against a company in 349 00:18:49,480 --> 00:18:53,360 Speaker 1: order to find it liabele for hosting child sexual abuse materials. 350 00:18:53,560 --> 00:18:57,760 Speaker 1: So they can use the fact that encryption exists as evidence, 351 00:18:58,080 --> 00:19:02,680 Speaker 1: which is why old like this is this is the thing. 352 00:19:02,680 --> 00:19:04,960 Speaker 1: This is the thing the CCP does a lot like 353 00:19:05,200 --> 00:19:06,920 Speaker 1: with you know, like they'll they'll use they used the 354 00:19:06,960 --> 00:19:10,480 Speaker 1: fact that like somebody is using a VPN for example, 355 00:19:10,720 --> 00:19:13,720 Speaker 1: as evidence that they're taking This happens constantly and and 356 00:19:13,720 --> 00:19:16,359 Speaker 1: it's it makes a lot of a lot of encryption 357 00:19:16,359 --> 00:19:19,040 Speaker 1: stuff incredibly unsafe because like you know, you show up 358 00:19:19,040 --> 00:19:20,639 Speaker 1: with your phone, you have signal on it, and the 359 00:19:20,680 --> 00:19:22,359 Speaker 1: CCP is like, well, you're this is this is this 360 00:19:22,400 --> 00:19:23,800 Speaker 1: is proof. We're just gonna we're gonna lock it up 361 00:19:23,840 --> 00:19:27,040 Speaker 1: and throw away the key. Yeah, and yeah. It's extremely bad. 362 00:19:27,640 --> 00:19:30,840 Speaker 1: So the result is that laws will make companies liable 363 00:19:31,440 --> 00:19:35,160 Speaker 1: um if they don't scan and report user content for child, 364 00:19:35,200 --> 00:19:37,679 Speaker 1: sexual beast materials, which they can't do unless they make 365 00:19:37,720 --> 00:19:41,760 Speaker 1: break encryption. You know, big companies like Apple, um are 366 00:19:41,800 --> 00:19:45,640 Speaker 1: going to full to to protect themselves. UM so earn 367 00:19:45,640 --> 00:19:48,280 Speaker 1: it would is like it coerces these sites and platforms 368 00:19:48,280 --> 00:19:50,719 Speaker 1: and services to do this sort of scanning, and not 369 00:19:50,760 --> 00:19:54,520 Speaker 1: just some messages but all online content encrypted or not. UM. 370 00:19:54,560 --> 00:19:57,040 Speaker 1: Companies that handle online content would have to weigh the 371 00:19:57,080 --> 00:20:00,520 Speaker 1: benefit of their users securely encrypting their data content against 372 00:20:00,520 --> 00:20:03,480 Speaker 1: the legal risk of doing so. Um and encryption becomes 373 00:20:03,520 --> 00:20:06,679 Speaker 1: much harder when it, you know, puts the company's bottom 374 00:20:06,680 --> 00:20:09,359 Speaker 1: line at risk. And and and and like and and 375 00:20:09,359 --> 00:20:11,919 Speaker 1: and Encryption isn't just her messages, right, It's it's not 376 00:20:12,000 --> 00:20:15,359 Speaker 1: just on signal. It secures most of the Internet, or 377 00:20:15,520 --> 00:20:17,520 Speaker 1: at least at least a lot of it. Keeping what 378 00:20:17,600 --> 00:20:21,800 Speaker 1: you do allegedly you know, private, unsafe online. You can't 379 00:20:22,080 --> 00:20:25,800 Speaker 1: have a secure internet where all the content is also 380 00:20:25,920 --> 00:20:32,080 Speaker 1: screened because you can't haven't encryption alongside mass scanning requirements. 381 00:20:32,080 --> 00:20:34,400 Speaker 1: It's just so this isn't just an attack on encryption. 382 00:20:34,720 --> 00:20:37,760 Speaker 1: It's attack on any fund of fundamental security that the 383 00:20:37,800 --> 00:20:43,680 Speaker 1: Internet you know has. Yeah, and you know there's lots 384 00:20:43,720 --> 00:20:51,080 Speaker 1: of like god, there are lots of extremely technical reasons 385 00:20:51,119 --> 00:20:55,880 Speaker 1: why this isn't extremely bad face, Like it's like okay, yeah, 386 00:20:55,960 --> 00:20:58,520 Speaker 1: like you you you think you think malware is bad, 387 00:20:58,560 --> 00:21:03,240 Speaker 1: now like like look at like the things the things 388 00:21:03,280 --> 00:21:06,640 Speaker 1: that will happen, Like you you think people are stealing apes? Now, 389 00:21:07,119 --> 00:21:09,239 Speaker 1: like the things that will happen if you have to 390 00:21:09,280 --> 00:21:11,440 Speaker 1: if you have to deal with an Internet that's unencrypted 391 00:21:11,920 --> 00:21:15,920 Speaker 1: or you know, like yeah, it's an absolute horror show 392 00:21:16,440 --> 00:21:21,520 Speaker 1: like if yeah, like I yeah, it's this. This is 393 00:21:21,560 --> 00:21:23,679 Speaker 1: a thing bad enough that like I do not have 394 00:21:23,760 --> 00:21:26,720 Speaker 1: the words to express how catastrophic this would be because 395 00:21:26,760 --> 00:21:29,000 Speaker 1: it's just a fundamental structure of the Internet. It really 396 00:21:29,040 --> 00:21:32,360 Speaker 1: is not just for messages like the earned uh miss 397 00:21:32,400 --> 00:21:36,040 Speaker 1: and fast document also like specifically attacks Amazon for not 398 00:21:36,160 --> 00:21:39,399 Speaker 1: scanning enough of its content um And since Amazon is 399 00:21:39,520 --> 00:21:42,800 Speaker 1: the home of Amazon Web Services, which hosts a huge 400 00:21:42,880 --> 00:21:45,760 Speaker 1: number of websites, that implies that, like the bill's aim 401 00:21:46,080 --> 00:21:49,480 Speaker 1: is to ensure that anything hosted online also gets scanned. 402 00:21:49,560 --> 00:21:53,280 Speaker 1: Like like like everything the online service providers, even the 403 00:21:53,320 --> 00:21:56,720 Speaker 1: smallest ones, will be compelled to scan user content with 404 00:21:56,760 --> 00:22:00,560 Speaker 1: government approved software like photo doo ana um And if 405 00:22:00,640 --> 00:22:04,119 Speaker 1: earnest supporters succeed in getting large platforms like cloud fair 406 00:22:04,160 --> 00:22:06,600 Speaker 1: and that some web services to scan, they may not 407 00:22:06,680 --> 00:22:09,480 Speaker 1: even need to compel smaller websites because the government will 408 00:22:09,520 --> 00:22:13,560 Speaker 1: already have access to the data through the cloud platforms. 409 00:22:13,960 --> 00:22:16,160 Speaker 1: So like, as long as they get you know, these 410 00:22:16,200 --> 00:22:18,960 Speaker 1: big hosting platforms, they don't even like they won't even 411 00:22:18,960 --> 00:22:20,959 Speaker 1: need need to bother with a lot of with a 412 00:22:20,960 --> 00:22:24,080 Speaker 1: lot of smaller sites. I think there's another thing I 413 00:22:24,080 --> 00:22:28,720 Speaker 1: think that's probably worth mentioning here, which is, so we 414 00:22:29,040 --> 00:22:31,600 Speaker 1: don't really have like the time to fully go into 415 00:22:31,640 --> 00:22:33,760 Speaker 1: this in this episode, but like there's a lot of 416 00:22:33,800 --> 00:22:37,520 Speaker 1: this sort of stuff is being pushed by these incredibly 417 00:22:37,600 --> 00:22:41,320 Speaker 1: right wing, evangelical anti porn groups, and their goal is 418 00:22:41,359 --> 00:22:46,119 Speaker 1: just to eliminate anything that is not like part of 419 00:22:46,160 --> 00:22:50,639 Speaker 1: their sort of fundamentalist Christianity from the internet and those people. 420 00:22:50,880 --> 00:22:53,320 Speaker 1: And this is this is particularly relevant to this because 421 00:22:53,720 --> 00:22:57,800 Speaker 1: those people are going to find a way to to 422 00:22:57,800 --> 00:23:02,160 Speaker 1: to like to bring laws suits against these companies specifically 423 00:23:02,200 --> 00:23:03,760 Speaker 1: so that they specifically so that they can do this 424 00:23:03,760 --> 00:23:05,600 Speaker 1: because this is you know, what what you've done is 425 00:23:05,640 --> 00:23:07,760 Speaker 1: say you've just handed them a gun. Poor insence will 426 00:23:07,760 --> 00:23:09,639 Speaker 1: all be taken down because they'll be because they'll be 427 00:23:09,640 --> 00:23:13,480 Speaker 1: facing so many endless lawsuits. Um like only like only 428 00:23:13,520 --> 00:23:16,600 Speaker 1: fans will no longer host ethical poor like like none 429 00:23:16,640 --> 00:23:18,040 Speaker 1: of this will have like all of it will be 430 00:23:18,080 --> 00:23:21,440 Speaker 1: taken down. No one like this will. This will attack 431 00:23:21,960 --> 00:23:25,520 Speaker 1: sex workers to such an absurd degree. Um, it'll make base. 432 00:23:25,600 --> 00:23:28,040 Speaker 1: It will make a lot of, if not most, online 433 00:23:28,080 --> 00:23:30,600 Speaker 1: sex work just impossible because there will be so many 434 00:23:30,640 --> 00:23:33,600 Speaker 1: lawsuits always happening that companies will just always ban it 435 00:23:33,720 --> 00:23:35,919 Speaker 1: just because they can't. They can't risk dealing with all 436 00:23:35,960 --> 00:23:40,440 Speaker 1: those legal fees. Um it's it's yeah. And and and 437 00:23:40,480 --> 00:23:42,960 Speaker 1: in the fact that state prosecutors and private attorneys will 438 00:23:42,960 --> 00:23:45,120 Speaker 1: be able to drink an online service provider into court 439 00:23:45,520 --> 00:23:49,080 Speaker 1: over accusation that their users committed crimes and then use 440 00:23:49,119 --> 00:23:52,359 Speaker 1: the fact that the service chose to encrypt like like 441 00:23:52,480 --> 00:23:55,840 Speaker 1: chose to use encryption UM at all as evidence against them. 442 00:23:56,280 --> 00:23:59,240 Speaker 1: Is the fact that the strategy specifically allowed under earn 443 00:23:59,280 --> 00:24:02,280 Speaker 1: it will makes the possibilities of this type of thing 444 00:24:02,480 --> 00:24:06,000 Speaker 1: just endless, like like imagine, imagine like they'll be able 445 00:24:06,040 --> 00:24:10,080 Speaker 1: to take down signal so easily because like it's it's 446 00:24:10,160 --> 00:24:12,199 Speaker 1: it's it's wild all if they can, if they can 447 00:24:12,240 --> 00:24:15,800 Speaker 1: find one instance of you know, as like as like 448 00:24:15,880 --> 00:24:19,879 Speaker 1: a of of an abuser using signal or has you signal, 449 00:24:20,040 --> 00:24:22,920 Speaker 1: then basically all of signal description will be severely threatened 450 00:24:23,400 --> 00:24:25,800 Speaker 1: UM because of the way that legal finds will be 451 00:24:25,840 --> 00:24:29,879 Speaker 1: forced onto this company. It's is like specifically for stuff 452 00:24:29,880 --> 00:24:32,399 Speaker 1: based like for any kind of in any any service 453 00:24:32,480 --> 00:24:36,040 Speaker 1: allowed in the States. And yeah, it's really frustrating because 454 00:24:36,080 --> 00:24:39,920 Speaker 1: you know, people including senators UM who are pro earn 455 00:24:39,960 --> 00:24:42,200 Speaker 1: It say that the new tools are necessary to tackle 456 00:24:42,240 --> 00:24:44,840 Speaker 1: the issue of online child abuse and the and the 457 00:24:44,920 --> 00:24:49,600 Speaker 1: distribution of illegal materials online. But you know, obviously, like possessing, 458 00:24:49,760 --> 00:24:54,080 Speaker 1: viewing or distributing child poorn or child sexual abust materials 459 00:24:54,720 --> 00:24:57,400 Speaker 1: is already written into laws is a serious like it's 460 00:24:57,400 --> 00:25:00,800 Speaker 1: an extremely serious crimes legal you can do, yes, and 461 00:25:00,840 --> 00:25:04,560 Speaker 1: it has a broad framework of existing laws seeking to 462 00:25:04,600 --> 00:25:07,359 Speaker 1: eradicated right people could like companies can already get in 463 00:25:07,400 --> 00:25:10,960 Speaker 1: federal trouble if they're find if they're found to continue 464 00:25:11,520 --> 00:25:12,959 Speaker 1: if like you know, if stuff was found and they 465 00:25:13,000 --> 00:25:15,240 Speaker 1: continue to host it, or if they're going if like 466 00:25:15,320 --> 00:25:18,399 Speaker 1: their stated purposes to host it, like like some of 467 00:25:18,600 --> 00:25:21,480 Speaker 1: the most trouble you can get into UM at least 468 00:25:21,640 --> 00:25:24,760 Speaker 1: at least like on the books, UM, because you know 469 00:25:24,880 --> 00:25:26,560 Speaker 1: you can you can look at you know, how many 470 00:25:27,400 --> 00:25:29,119 Speaker 1: cops are involved with this type of thing as like 471 00:25:29,160 --> 00:25:31,640 Speaker 1: other than to being like like like as evidence said, 472 00:25:31,640 --> 00:25:33,640 Speaker 1: like it doesn't like it may not get enacted upon. 473 00:25:33,640 --> 00:25:36,359 Speaker 1: Always there was there was a horrible story recently of 474 00:25:36,680 --> 00:25:39,080 Speaker 1: a teacher who sorry, this is this is this is 475 00:25:39,119 --> 00:25:41,560 Speaker 1: this is going to be quite graphic, UM, but of 476 00:25:41,880 --> 00:25:43,720 Speaker 1: a like skip ahead like a minute or two if 477 00:25:43,760 --> 00:25:46,280 Speaker 1: you don't want to UM of a teacher who fed 478 00:25:46,400 --> 00:25:51,959 Speaker 1: students UM food containing her husband's seamen UM her husband 479 00:25:52,040 --> 00:25:55,400 Speaker 1: was a cop and her and her husband again who 480 00:25:55,480 --> 00:25:58,359 Speaker 1: was a cop and the also the leader of a 481 00:25:58,400 --> 00:26:02,919 Speaker 1: swatch team UM had raped multiple children UM as like 482 00:26:02,960 --> 00:26:06,280 Speaker 1: it had and had had pictures of children UM and 483 00:26:06,359 --> 00:26:09,960 Speaker 1: like like both of them were doing this together, so like, yeah, 484 00:26:10,000 --> 00:26:12,639 Speaker 1: that's like the lead of spot teams like police. Like 485 00:26:12,840 --> 00:26:14,480 Speaker 1: the fact that like if you if you look at 486 00:26:14,480 --> 00:26:16,840 Speaker 1: the people often doing this type of stuff, it's cops 487 00:26:16,880 --> 00:26:19,760 Speaker 1: a lot of the time, Like the cops raped so 488 00:26:19,800 --> 00:26:24,159 Speaker 1: many um kids that that they that they arrest and detain. 489 00:26:24,440 --> 00:26:26,800 Speaker 1: It is shocked. Like you you can google this every 490 00:26:26,800 --> 00:26:30,800 Speaker 1: week and you'll find you'll find like new reports of it. 491 00:26:30,800 --> 00:26:34,520 Speaker 1: It is, it is. It is horrific. Um. And you know, 492 00:26:34,640 --> 00:26:37,400 Speaker 1: online service providers that have actual knowledge of an apparent 493 00:26:37,560 --> 00:26:41,560 Speaker 1: or imminent violation of current laws around child sexual materials 494 00:26:41,600 --> 00:26:45,760 Speaker 1: are required to report it or they will face legal trouble. Um. Yeah, 495 00:26:45,840 --> 00:26:48,520 Speaker 1: like you you could you can kill people and get 496 00:26:48,520 --> 00:26:51,000 Speaker 1: in less trouble with the law. Then then you will 497 00:26:51,040 --> 00:26:54,080 Speaker 1: get if if if you intentionally do this stuff, like 498 00:26:54,520 --> 00:26:56,520 Speaker 1: there are scenarios where you can kill people where you 499 00:26:56,520 --> 00:26:58,600 Speaker 1: won't get in trouble with law. There is no scenario 500 00:26:58,840 --> 00:27:02,760 Speaker 1: where you do you you like you you intentionally do 501 00:27:02,920 --> 00:27:05,159 Speaker 1: like you intentionally do this stuff where you will like 502 00:27:05,520 --> 00:27:08,000 Speaker 1: unless you're a cop with like with with the legal 503 00:27:08,000 --> 00:27:12,560 Speaker 1: protection of your other cops won't rat you out, like yeah, 504 00:27:12,840 --> 00:27:16,000 Speaker 1: or you're like very very rich. Yeah, like you know, 505 00:27:16,600 --> 00:27:20,520 Speaker 1: unless unless you have extra legal protection. Yeah, like you 506 00:27:20,560 --> 00:27:25,359 Speaker 1: are fucking going to vanish. So yeah, like we already 507 00:27:25,359 --> 00:27:26,760 Speaker 1: have a lot of stuff to deal with this. And 508 00:27:26,880 --> 00:27:29,879 Speaker 1: the methods proposed by Earnest would not only chip at 509 00:27:29,880 --> 00:27:33,000 Speaker 1: the last semblance of of of privacy online, but it 510 00:27:33,040 --> 00:27:36,400 Speaker 1: would all but it would arguably make actually combating real 511 00:27:36,440 --> 00:27:39,720 Speaker 1: instances of online check of online child abuse a lot 512 00:27:39,760 --> 00:27:43,800 Speaker 1: more difficult. It would pressure distributors and abusers um into 513 00:27:43,920 --> 00:27:46,280 Speaker 1: harder to find corners of the Internet that don't fall 514 00:27:46,359 --> 00:27:49,679 Speaker 1: under big tech companies UM. Plus, the massive increase in 515 00:27:49,720 --> 00:27:52,920 Speaker 1: content scanning would produce so many false flags it would 516 00:27:52,960 --> 00:27:56,399 Speaker 1: clog up any effort to find action materials because so 517 00:27:56,480 --> 00:27:58,399 Speaker 1: much stuff is gonna get flagged, Right, it's gonna you're 518 00:27:58,400 --> 00:28:00,520 Speaker 1: gonna get a wave of so many ima just that 519 00:28:00,560 --> 00:28:02,960 Speaker 1: you have that you have sort sort through and figure 520 00:28:03,000 --> 00:28:05,240 Speaker 1: out if the people in it actually are under age 521 00:28:05,480 --> 00:28:08,600 Speaker 1: because a lot of people who look thirty and sorry, 522 00:28:09,240 --> 00:28:11,200 Speaker 1: a lot of people that are thirty can also look 523 00:28:11,280 --> 00:28:13,800 Speaker 1: under age sometimes, like like with lighting with e fact 524 00:28:13,840 --> 00:28:16,760 Speaker 1: like it's it is, it will be. It's gonna it's 525 00:28:16,760 --> 00:28:20,760 Speaker 1: gonna be such a task UM and we can atly 526 00:28:20,800 --> 00:28:23,800 Speaker 1: see this in effect with new scanning techniques used by Facebook, 527 00:28:23,960 --> 00:28:26,720 Speaker 1: they that have produced millions of reports to law enforcement, 528 00:28:27,040 --> 00:28:30,239 Speaker 1: most of them in accurate. Um of course, federal law 529 00:28:30,320 --> 00:28:33,560 Speaker 1: enforcement use uses this massive number of reports produced by 530 00:28:33,560 --> 00:28:36,440 Speaker 1: low quality scanning software to you know, suggest there's a 531 00:28:36,520 --> 00:28:39,200 Speaker 1: huge uptick in these images. Thus, you know, armed with 532 00:28:39,240 --> 00:28:43,040 Speaker 1: misleading statistics, the same law enforcement groups make new demands 533 00:28:43,040 --> 00:28:46,120 Speaker 1: to break encryption um or with earn it hold companies 534 00:28:46,160 --> 00:28:59,239 Speaker 1: liable if they don't scan user content those scanning algorithms, right, 535 00:28:59,320 --> 00:29:02,600 Speaker 1: like you know, okay, this this is an oversimplification, but 536 00:29:02,680 --> 00:29:06,640 Speaker 1: like to to to conceptualize why this is a bad idea, 537 00:29:06,720 --> 00:29:10,200 Speaker 1: like these these are these like this is the this 538 00:29:10,240 --> 00:29:12,000 Speaker 1: is the same stuff that like you know how you 539 00:29:12,040 --> 00:29:14,360 Speaker 1: know how there's there's there's those like trending topics on 540 00:29:14,400 --> 00:29:17,760 Speaker 1: Twitter and they'll they'll they'll show you a tweet and 541 00:29:17,800 --> 00:29:20,360 Speaker 1: the tweet will be like I don't know, they'll they'll 542 00:29:20,360 --> 00:29:22,440 Speaker 1: they'll be someone talking about a subway sandwich and it'll 543 00:29:22,440 --> 00:29:26,840 Speaker 1: get like it'll show up under trains because it's the subway. 544 00:29:26,880 --> 00:29:30,440 Speaker 1: Like this, those are the algorithms that they want to 545 00:29:30,560 --> 00:29:33,560 Speaker 1: fucking run the entire Internet through. I have seen I 546 00:29:33,600 --> 00:29:37,000 Speaker 1: have seen some very I've seen some very erotic bell peppers. 547 00:29:37,520 --> 00:29:41,040 Speaker 1: Um and like it's it's gonna act like that these 548 00:29:41,080 --> 00:29:44,520 Speaker 1: things aren't aren't going to be good. Um And like 549 00:29:44,880 --> 00:29:48,840 Speaker 1: independent child protection experts are not asking for systems to 550 00:29:48,960 --> 00:29:53,040 Speaker 1: read everyone's private messages. Rather, they recognize that children, particularly 551 00:29:53,120 --> 00:29:56,920 Speaker 1: children that might be abused or exploited, actually need encrypted 552 00:29:56,920 --> 00:29:59,560 Speaker 1: and private messaging just as much, if not more than 553 00:29:59,600 --> 00:30:02,320 Speaker 1: the rest of us. Like no one, including the most 554 00:30:02,400 --> 00:30:06,360 Speaker 1: vulnerable among us, can have privacy or security online without 555 00:30:06,440 --> 00:30:10,720 Speaker 1: strong encryption. UM. And the Earner Act doesn't really just 556 00:30:10,800 --> 00:30:14,000 Speaker 1: target big tech. What it does is it targets every 557 00:30:14,080 --> 00:30:17,520 Speaker 1: individual Internet user, treating all of us as potential criminals 558 00:30:17,640 --> 00:30:20,800 Speaker 1: who deserve to have every single message, photographer, document scanned 559 00:30:21,040 --> 00:30:25,320 Speaker 1: and you know, compared against a government database like directly 560 00:30:25,400 --> 00:30:29,560 Speaker 1: directly to law enforcement. UM. And since direct government surveillance 561 00:30:29,600 --> 00:30:32,640 Speaker 1: would be you know, blatantly unconstitutional and provote public outrage, 562 00:30:33,000 --> 00:30:35,320 Speaker 1: U earn it to use as tech companies, you know, 563 00:30:35,640 --> 00:30:38,200 Speaker 1: from the largest smalls the smallest ones, as its tools 564 00:30:38,280 --> 00:30:44,200 Speaker 1: to kind of bypass that constitutional like barrier. Um. Because yeah, 565 00:30:44,240 --> 00:30:45,920 Speaker 1: if you, if you, if you, if you, if you 566 00:30:45,960 --> 00:30:48,280 Speaker 1: hit the touch companies where it hurts, they will not 567 00:30:48,360 --> 00:30:50,360 Speaker 1: allow this type of stuff at all. Like and this 568 00:30:50,440 --> 00:30:52,280 Speaker 1: is also the thing, you can you know, you cannot 569 00:30:52,280 --> 00:30:54,320 Speaker 1: deny that this is also just part of a larger 570 00:30:54,560 --> 00:30:57,960 Speaker 1: effect to ban porn um and just to ban any 571 00:30:58,040 --> 00:31:00,080 Speaker 1: kind of sex work online as well. Like you you 572 00:31:00,080 --> 00:31:02,760 Speaker 1: cannot deny that this is this is this is definitely 573 00:31:02,800 --> 00:31:05,040 Speaker 1: an ingrained part of this, particularly with a lot a 574 00:31:05,080 --> 00:31:07,440 Speaker 1: lot of its supporters and of course, you know Senator 575 00:31:07,600 --> 00:31:11,120 Speaker 1: little Lindsay Graham appealing to that side of the Republicans. 576 00:31:11,560 --> 00:31:14,080 Speaker 1: This is this is a big part of just trying 577 00:31:14,120 --> 00:31:17,680 Speaker 1: to you know, remove porn and remove um, you know, 578 00:31:18,000 --> 00:31:21,360 Speaker 1: any not safe work material from being hosted online. So 579 00:31:21,960 --> 00:31:24,560 Speaker 1: the strategy is to get private companies to do the 580 00:31:24,600 --> 00:31:27,120 Speaker 1: dirty work of mass surveillance. Um. You know, it's the 581 00:31:27,200 --> 00:31:29,760 Speaker 1: same it's the same tactic that government's try to use 582 00:31:29,800 --> 00:31:32,040 Speaker 1: this year trying to you know, convince Apple to subvert 583 00:31:32,040 --> 00:31:35,240 Speaker 1: its own encryption and scan all of its users photos. Um. 584 00:31:35,280 --> 00:31:37,520 Speaker 1: It's the same strategy that the that the UK law 585 00:31:37,560 --> 00:31:40,400 Speaker 1: enforcement is using to convince the British public to give 586 00:31:40,440 --> 00:31:44,400 Speaker 1: up their privacy, having spent public money on a laughable 587 00:31:44,440 --> 00:31:48,720 Speaker 1: public publicity campaign that demon as his companies that use encryption. UM, 588 00:31:48,880 --> 00:31:52,000 Speaker 1: so that that's really how it's operating. UM. I do 589 00:31:52,040 --> 00:31:55,680 Speaker 1: want to shout out, um uh the e f F 590 00:31:56,000 --> 00:31:58,760 Speaker 1: for providing a lot of the kind of research that 591 00:31:58,840 --> 00:32:02,680 Speaker 1: I used for compilot stuff on on this episode. UM, 592 00:32:02,680 --> 00:32:05,160 Speaker 1: thank you, thank you, thank you e f F. UM 593 00:32:05,320 --> 00:32:10,200 Speaker 1: you often often do good work. That's the Electronic Frontier Foundation. 594 00:32:10,320 --> 00:32:14,680 Speaker 1: They focus a lot on like Internet privacy issues. UM. 595 00:32:14,720 --> 00:32:17,720 Speaker 1: And I do want to point people to a a 596 00:32:17,760 --> 00:32:22,560 Speaker 1: link tree. It is a you know l I n 597 00:32:22,760 --> 00:32:28,000 Speaker 1: K t R dot E slash stop earn it UM. 598 00:32:28,040 --> 00:32:30,600 Speaker 1: So yeah, you can find different ways to UM. You know, 599 00:32:30,680 --> 00:32:34,000 Speaker 1: if you're the type of person that enjoys calling representatives 600 00:32:34,120 --> 00:32:36,160 Speaker 1: or something, it has. It has links for that kind 601 00:32:36,160 --> 00:32:39,280 Speaker 1: of thing. It has links to send you know, automated 602 00:32:39,280 --> 00:32:42,680 Speaker 1: messages onto your representative to vote no on the Internet Act. 603 00:32:42,960 --> 00:32:44,400 Speaker 1: That has stuff. You know, if if you're a type 604 00:32:44,400 --> 00:32:47,520 Speaker 1: of person that enjoys the signing petitions, UM it has. 605 00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:49,240 Speaker 1: It has more info on what earn it is and 606 00:32:49,320 --> 00:32:52,840 Speaker 1: what it does. UM, and a whole bunch of other 607 00:32:52,880 --> 00:32:55,520 Speaker 1: stuff around, you know, organizing to help stop this bill. 608 00:32:55,640 --> 00:32:58,840 Speaker 1: There's like discord channels that have people organizing to to 609 00:32:58,920 --> 00:33:02,320 Speaker 1: stop this bill um links links forward on that has 610 00:33:02,360 --> 00:33:05,840 Speaker 1: info on like actions you can take UM. So yeah, 611 00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:08,320 Speaker 1: I would uh if if you're interested in like looking 612 00:33:08,320 --> 00:33:11,440 Speaker 1: for the different ways that can maybe you know contribute. 613 00:33:11,560 --> 00:33:13,840 Speaker 1: You know, not no single person that can make an impact, 614 00:33:14,080 --> 00:33:17,440 Speaker 1: but you know enough people, enough people can UM. So 615 00:33:17,560 --> 00:33:21,360 Speaker 1: yeah that's link tree slash stop earn it um And 616 00:33:21,400 --> 00:33:26,200 Speaker 1: then also again another shout out to the e f F. Yeah, 617 00:33:26,320 --> 00:33:28,960 Speaker 1: I wanted to make doing say two closing things before 618 00:33:29,000 --> 00:33:32,680 Speaker 1: we close this out. One if if you think that, 619 00:33:33,600 --> 00:33:35,840 Speaker 1: if you think that once you're handing the entire context 620 00:33:35,880 --> 00:33:37,560 Speaker 1: of the Internet over to the government who go through 621 00:33:37,560 --> 00:33:39,320 Speaker 1: scanning all groups, that the only thing they're ever going 622 00:33:39,360 --> 00:33:41,920 Speaker 1: to scan for is child pornography. I have no n 623 00:33:41,960 --> 00:33:43,400 Speaker 1: f D to sell you. It is a picture of 624 00:33:43,440 --> 00:33:45,720 Speaker 1: a bridge. Once once you buy this n f T 625 00:33:45,800 --> 00:33:48,120 Speaker 1: of the bridge, you will own the Brooklyn Bridge. Contact 626 00:33:48,120 --> 00:33:53,440 Speaker 1: contact me for more details. The second thing is that, um, 627 00:33:53,480 --> 00:33:57,080 Speaker 1: you know, when when we talk about like when we 628 00:33:57,080 --> 00:34:00,280 Speaker 1: talk about anti porn stuff, when we talk about how 629 00:34:01,480 --> 00:34:04,240 Speaker 1: you know the way you get around this is by 630 00:34:04,240 --> 00:34:07,920 Speaker 1: banning all different work content. Right. The other thing that 631 00:34:08,000 --> 00:34:12,480 Speaker 1: almost immediately gets banned, it's inevitably when when when when 632 00:34:12,480 --> 00:34:15,400 Speaker 1: when companies for for whatever reason, and this is true 633 00:34:16,360 --> 00:34:18,560 Speaker 1: just of of of companies that are trying to comply 634 00:34:18,760 --> 00:34:22,239 Speaker 1: with you know, like the app store or stuff like that, 635 00:34:22,239 --> 00:34:24,120 Speaker 1: like when when when whenever you get target things that 636 00:34:24,200 --> 00:34:28,200 Speaker 1: target not for work content, they inevitably, inevitably without failed, 637 00:34:28,200 --> 00:34:33,080 Speaker 1: target queer content content literally nothing at all through sexuality, 638 00:34:33,320 --> 00:34:35,080 Speaker 1: because that's you know, this is this is this is 639 00:34:35,120 --> 00:34:38,160 Speaker 1: this has always been like an accusing queer people of 640 00:34:38,239 --> 00:34:41,359 Speaker 1: being child predators has been the attack line on queer people. 641 00:34:41,480 --> 00:34:43,560 Speaker 1: Queer people are always on the front line of all 642 00:34:43,600 --> 00:34:45,960 Speaker 1: of this stuff. Yeah, they will always be the first 643 00:34:45,960 --> 00:34:50,359 Speaker 1: people impacted. They will be the first people demonized, even 644 00:34:50,400 --> 00:34:51,960 Speaker 1: if even if even if it's not even not say 645 00:34:52,200 --> 00:34:53,840 Speaker 1: material if if it has if it has nothing to 646 00:34:53,840 --> 00:34:56,440 Speaker 1: do with it, it will still always always be impacted 647 00:34:56,440 --> 00:34:59,560 Speaker 1: more than basically any anyone else. Yeah, I mean, we've 648 00:34:59,640 --> 00:35:03,000 Speaker 1: we've been this on YouTube, but constantly, lots of lots 649 00:35:03,000 --> 00:35:06,080 Speaker 1: of people who just you know, make trans content channels 650 00:35:06,080 --> 00:35:09,680 Speaker 1: are always being banned or demonetized, yep marked as a 651 00:35:09,719 --> 00:35:13,040 Speaker 1: bell content like yeah, it's it's horrifying. And if if 652 00:35:13,080 --> 00:35:15,120 Speaker 1: if you want an internet not even just if you 653 00:35:15,120 --> 00:35:17,799 Speaker 1: want to Internet that has like sex on it, if 654 00:35:17,800 --> 00:35:20,799 Speaker 1: you want to Internet that has queer people on it, right, 655 00:35:21,080 --> 00:35:25,200 Speaker 1: expressing themselves in in in in any way that's not 656 00:35:25,360 --> 00:35:29,280 Speaker 1: like literally just it's straight person but you say queer, 657 00:35:29,680 --> 00:35:31,759 Speaker 1: right if if that's a thing that you think is 658 00:35:31,840 --> 00:35:35,239 Speaker 1: valuable and if and if you think that, you know 659 00:35:35,320 --> 00:35:37,120 Speaker 1: it is important for core people to be able to 660 00:35:37,120 --> 00:35:40,600 Speaker 1: express themselves for their own health and safety. Like you 661 00:35:40,719 --> 00:35:45,279 Speaker 1: have to op post this, yes you absolutely, Um, I 662 00:35:45,280 --> 00:35:47,560 Speaker 1: guess what one final thing I'll add because they know 663 00:35:47,760 --> 00:35:51,080 Speaker 1: someone will probably message me about it. Um. There is 664 00:35:51,120 --> 00:35:54,759 Speaker 1: a slight opinion piece by somebody saying that this bill 665 00:35:54,800 --> 00:35:58,239 Speaker 1: would actually let child abusers walk free because they could 666 00:35:58,320 --> 00:36:01,239 Speaker 1: use the fact that this bill essentially, um you know, 667 00:36:01,719 --> 00:36:05,359 Speaker 1: compels companies to do scanning software via via government like 668 00:36:05,480 --> 00:36:08,880 Speaker 1: mandate because of this bill. They would that because because 669 00:36:09,440 --> 00:36:12,800 Speaker 1: in their mind this could possibly violate the Fourth Amendment 670 00:36:12,800 --> 00:36:16,120 Speaker 1: to this would allow abusers, um, the evidence that they 671 00:36:16,200 --> 00:36:19,400 Speaker 1: was collected to prosecute abusers to become invalid in court. 672 00:36:19,640 --> 00:36:21,480 Speaker 1: So this would actually also make the this would just 673 00:36:21,520 --> 00:36:24,600 Speaker 1: make this would make the bill, um uh you know, 674 00:36:24,640 --> 00:36:26,719 Speaker 1: actually make people walk free. I do do not agree 675 00:36:26,760 --> 00:36:28,239 Speaker 1: with this take. I don't think that's how it would 676 00:36:28,239 --> 00:36:30,360 Speaker 1: work out at all, because especially for you know, you 677 00:36:30,360 --> 00:36:32,640 Speaker 1: can use this for like political organizing. You can use 678 00:36:32,680 --> 00:36:33,880 Speaker 1: this for a lot of like you can use this 679 00:36:33,920 --> 00:36:36,000 Speaker 1: same argument for a lot of cases, and it never 680 00:36:36,000 --> 00:36:38,439 Speaker 1: works out that way because the government does not care 681 00:36:38,600 --> 00:36:41,600 Speaker 1: about that sort of thing. Um, it's it's it's not 682 00:36:41,719 --> 00:36:44,600 Speaker 1: that's not how it works. Um. I mean, like even 683 00:36:44,640 --> 00:36:47,279 Speaker 1: these things that get violated like in theory that does 684 00:36:47,320 --> 00:36:51,640 Speaker 1: not know that's the way, like they illegally seized you know, 685 00:36:52,640 --> 00:36:56,839 Speaker 1: ten Kazinski's you know, uh, you know, like evidence and yeah, 686 00:36:56,840 --> 00:36:59,640 Speaker 1: you know, it doesn't it doesn't matter, Like that's that's 687 00:36:59,680 --> 00:37:02,279 Speaker 1: that's that's not gonna matter, because then this bill would 688 00:37:02,280 --> 00:37:04,040 Speaker 1: be seen as a good thing because it would prevent 689 00:37:04,080 --> 00:37:06,920 Speaker 1: people from you know, then the encryption wouldn't be necessary 690 00:37:06,920 --> 00:37:09,960 Speaker 1: because then none of the evidence that people would you know, 691 00:37:10,680 --> 00:37:13,759 Speaker 1: would have gathered would ever be admissible in court. And 692 00:37:14,120 --> 00:37:16,040 Speaker 1: that is that they would never design the bill like 693 00:37:16,080 --> 00:37:19,160 Speaker 1: that that. That's not that's not the case. I disagree 694 00:37:19,160 --> 00:37:21,320 Speaker 1: with this take. So do not send me this article 695 00:37:21,719 --> 00:37:24,120 Speaker 1: saying actually it's going to have this happen, because I 696 00:37:24,760 --> 00:37:27,280 Speaker 1: do not believe it, because This assumes that the government 697 00:37:27,840 --> 00:37:32,239 Speaker 1: operates like like coherently and operates like you know, like no, 698 00:37:32,440 --> 00:37:35,560 Speaker 1: the government does does does not care no like again, 699 00:37:35,640 --> 00:37:40,000 Speaker 1: like the First Amendment is superseded by traffic law. Like 700 00:37:40,600 --> 00:37:43,239 Speaker 1: you know that you're not going to be able to 701 00:37:43,360 --> 00:37:47,400 Speaker 1: use this. This isn't like this will secretly let abusers 702 00:37:47,400 --> 00:37:50,399 Speaker 1: go free. This is not secretly a good thing because 703 00:37:50,440 --> 00:37:56,720 Speaker 1: it will make all evidence inadmissible in court. Bullshit. Anyway, Anyway, 704 00:37:58,360 --> 00:38:00,919 Speaker 1: I'll give a final shout out to the link tree 705 00:38:01,840 --> 00:38:05,360 Speaker 1: link tree slash stop earn it um. That's l I 706 00:38:05,719 --> 00:38:09,239 Speaker 1: n k T dot e er slash stop earn it 707 00:38:09,719 --> 00:38:11,960 Speaker 1: um if you're the type of person that likes doing 708 00:38:11,960 --> 00:38:13,759 Speaker 1: those types of things. And also it has like links 709 00:38:13,800 --> 00:38:16,640 Speaker 1: like discord channels for other types of organizing beyond you know, 710 00:38:16,719 --> 00:38:19,399 Speaker 1: petitions and calling and senators and setting messages and blah 711 00:38:19,400 --> 00:38:24,080 Speaker 1: blah blah blah blah. Anyway, that's the episode. Um, thank 712 00:38:24,080 --> 00:38:27,839 Speaker 1: you for listening. I just thought, I just thought, this 713 00:38:27,880 --> 00:38:29,680 Speaker 1: is this is this is an important thing enough that 714 00:38:29,719 --> 00:38:31,479 Speaker 1: I haven't seen enough. I have not seen enough people 715 00:38:31,480 --> 00:38:33,440 Speaker 1: talking about the earn it Act and the way it 716 00:38:33,520 --> 00:38:38,360 Speaker 1: does seriously threatened digital privacy and because it was approved 717 00:38:38,400 --> 00:38:41,560 Speaker 1: by the Senate Judiciary Committee to be pushed forward. Um, 718 00:38:41,600 --> 00:38:44,520 Speaker 1: it is actually chugging along on the slow legal process, 719 00:38:44,880 --> 00:38:47,880 Speaker 1: so it's gotten further than what it got in. So 720 00:38:47,920 --> 00:38:50,839 Speaker 1: I thought it was actually worth talking about, um, you know, 721 00:38:50,920 --> 00:38:53,759 Speaker 1: for privacy issues, how it affects queer people, how it 722 00:38:53,760 --> 00:38:56,920 Speaker 1: affects sex workers, um, and all all that general thing. 723 00:38:57,080 --> 00:38:59,640 Speaker 1: So yeah, and also I wanted the you know, the 724 00:39:00,360 --> 00:39:02,360 Speaker 1: it's very easy to feel hopefuls with this kind of stuff, 725 00:39:02,400 --> 00:39:06,440 Speaker 1: but like, we've beaten legislation. Like one of my one 726 00:39:06,440 --> 00:39:08,960 Speaker 1: of my formative childhood experiences was when when we beat 727 00:39:09,120 --> 00:39:12,080 Speaker 1: when we beat SOPA, and people like we can beat them. 728 00:39:12,160 --> 00:39:14,880 Speaker 1: It takes it takes a lot, takes a lot of mobilization. 729 00:39:15,080 --> 00:39:18,719 Speaker 1: But yeah, like we we we we we I know 730 00:39:18,800 --> 00:39:20,759 Speaker 1: we can. I know we can beat this because we've 731 00:39:20,800 --> 00:39:24,359 Speaker 1: beaten things like it before. Agreed, all right, that nothing 732 00:39:24,400 --> 00:39:26,120 Speaker 1: for us today. If you want to find us on 733 00:39:26,160 --> 00:39:29,760 Speaker 1: a currently more secure than what it could be internet, 734 00:39:29,920 --> 00:39:33,840 Speaker 1: you can follow us on Twitter at cool Zone Media 735 00:39:34,400 --> 00:39:37,560 Speaker 1: um and happened here pod. I think apparently Instagram too, 736 00:39:37,760 --> 00:39:40,799 Speaker 1: So that's cool. If you're an Instagram person, good for you, 737 00:39:40,920 --> 00:39:43,319 Speaker 1: because Twitter Twitter is bad. Um, You can find me 738 00:39:43,360 --> 00:39:47,719 Speaker 1: on Twitter at hungry about tie um. Yeah, find me 739 00:39:47,840 --> 00:39:51,320 Speaker 1: at at h R three you can't. You can indeed 740 00:39:52,360 --> 00:40:00,320 Speaker 1: that that do? Is it for us UM encryption? Yeah? 741 00:40:02,719 --> 00:40:05,120 Speaker 1: It could happen here as a production of cool Zone Media. 742 00:40:05,320 --> 00:40:08,000 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website 743 00:40:08,040 --> 00:40:10,160 Speaker 1: cool zone media dot com, or check us out on 744 00:40:10,200 --> 00:40:12,719 Speaker 1: the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you 745 00:40:12,800 --> 00:40:15,560 Speaker 1: listen to podcasts. You can find sources for It could 746 00:40:15,560 --> 00:40:18,560 Speaker 1: Happen here, updated monthly at cool zone media dot com 747 00:40:18,640 --> 00:40:20,480 Speaker 1: slash sources. Thanks for listening.